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The presidential election of 1916

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Thesis

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1916

Submitted by

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In order that the forces in the "Election of 1916" may be fully understood, it might be advisable to survey briefly the progress in legislation during the years, 1912 to 1916. Under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson a constructive program of great proportion and importance was enacted. The Progressive adherents of Roosevelt were radical reformers in 1912, the Taft men were conservative while Wilson and the Democrats held to the middle course. Yet, the legislation of this administration was decidedly of a progressive character.

As usual, when a change of parties occurs, the first subject to receive attention is that of the tariff. According to the principles of the Democratic Party, "tariff for revenue only", the Underwood Tariff was passed, reducing the tariff eleven percent, with an income tax to make up the deficit in the treasury. A national banking system was established by the Federal Reserve banking act, providing for an elastic currency, greatly needed in times of stress. A Federal Trade Commission to investigate corporations, carrying on interstate business, came into existence in 1914 in an effort, similar to that of Roosevelt's, to restrain the selfish trusts. Then followed a Farmers' Credit Law which aided the farmers to a great extent.

in their period of financial embarrassment. Being a reformer
and a politician as well, Woodrow Wilson used his influence to
help pass the Child Labor Law and the Adamson eight hour law.
Both Mr. Hughes and Mr. Roosevelt bitterly assailed the President
in the campaign for his domestic policy, Roosevelt calling
Wilson's actions "a series of broken promises."

President Wilson, in attempting to keep neutrality, had a
very delicate matter to settle. On February 10, 1915, a note was
sent to Germany, stating that the United States would hold Germany
to "strict accountability", if she, by her submarine warfare
caused American lives to be lost or American ships to be sunk.
From March 23, 1915 to March 24, 1916, four vessels; the Falaba,
the Lusitania, the Arabic and the Sussex were sunk with the loss
of over one hundred and twenty-five American citizens. These
incidents resulted in notes between the two countries and finally
on May 4, 1916, the German government promised to conduct her
submarine warfare according to the rules of international law
if in return the United States would force Great Britain to re-
strain her activities in regard to neutral trade. However, the
condition was not recognized by the United States as having any
bearing upon the case. Until February 1, 1917 Germany ceased
her nefarious policy, but on that date, she issued a decree,
avowing her intention of pursuing "unrestricted submarine warfare."

Note 1. "Our War with Germany" by John Spencer Bassett, See p.39-59.
Also, "The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson" by Robinson and West,
F.230, 245 and 256.
A considerable portion of the public objected exceedingly to Wilson’s diplomacy as it seemed that Germany did not come to terms quickly enough nor did she keep her word for more than a short interval after each incident. Joseph P. Tumulty defends President Wilson’s action in these words: 1 "It was not the policy of a weakling or a timid man. It was the policy of a president, leader and statesman, who was feeling his way amid dangers and who, as an historian himself, knew the difficulties of an imprudent or incautious move. I am certain that had President Wilson been free to do so, he would have yielded to the impulse of championing a cause that in his heart of hearts he felt involved the civilization of the world. It was the consciousness that in carrying out that trusteeship, he had no right to permit his own passionate feelings to govern his public acts."

Another severely criticized policy was that in the Mexican affair. 2 Again, it seems necessary to take a step backward to treat this subject adequately. On February 9, 1913 during the last days of Taft’s administration President Kadero and Vice-President Suarez of Mexico were murdered and General Huerta, minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the revolution became president. President Wilson refused to recognize this usurper and based his Mexican policy on these two principles: 3

"The firm conviction that all nations both the weak and

Note 1: "Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him" by Joseph Tumulty. Page 227.
Note 2: "A Short History of the United States" by J.S. Bassett. Chap. 51.
Note 3: "Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him" by Joseph Tumulty. Pages 145-161. "Mexico".
the powerful, have the inviolable right to control their internal affairs." "The belief established from the history of the world that Mexico will never become a peaceful and law abiding neighbor of the United States until she has been permitted to achieve a permanent and basic settlement of her troubles without outside interference."

Huerta treated this announcement contemptuously. Congress, as well as many of our citizens, urged a "blood and iron" toward Mexico. The President said at that time, "I have to pause and remind myself that I am President of the United States and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico."

Wilson's course of action was termed from his own words "that of watchful waiting". Another statement of the President's, which stirred up intense antagonism against him was "I am more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men, women, and children than in any property rights whatever".1

Finally, forced by the moral pressure of the President, Huerta resigned in July of 1914. During the Huerta controversy in April of 1914, a paymaster and his men, while loading supplies on an American ship, the "Dolphin", were arrested by Mexicans. Admiral Mayo, commander of an American squadron off Tampico, demanded the release of the sailors and an apology from the Huerta government in the form of a salute to the American flag. The sailors were released within an hour of their arrest, but

Note 1. "Oppressed men, women, and children" are the Mexicans.
the apology of the Huerta government was not forthcoming.
At this critical moment, the German steamship, "Ypirango" was on the way to Vera Cruz to deliver ammunition and five hundred rapid fire guns. As it was impossible under international law to seize the German ship, Admiral Mayo was ordered to take Vera Cruz. War seemed imminent. However, the President was content to hold Vera Cruz. Upon Huerta's abdication, aided by the assistance of Argentine, Brazil and Chile, Venustiana Carranza became President. Carranza and Villa were the chief leaders against Huerta. Then, Villa quarrelled with Carranza and conducted raiding expeditions in American territory as well as in Mexico. When Villa attacked and murdered some sleeping soldiers at Columbus, the demand for intervention was insistent. As a result, General Pershing was sent to Mexico with 10,000 troops to capture Villa. In June, 1916, one of Pershing's columns, which was advancing toward a Mexican city was fired upon by Carranza's men. Besides loss of life, seventeen men were captured. Again it looked like war, but President Carranza released the seventeen prisoners and proposed that the matter be settled by a joint commission. This commission met in Atlantic City in September 1916. While there, the commission was doing its best to bring these difficult questions to a satisfactory and peaceful conclusion. In the meantime, the presidential campaign of 1916 kept the Mexican situation before the public, very much complicating
and impeding the progress of the conference.

Wilson was ridiculed by his opponents for his attempt to bring the Mexicans to reason by his policy of "watchful waiting" which was called by them, "vacillating and ineffective". The President's personal view of the affair was seen in what he told his secretary, Joseph F. Tumulty, to tell the cabinet in June 1916. "There won't be any war with Mexico if I can prevent it. I do not have to fight and neither do the gentlemen on the Hill who now clamor for it. I will not resort to war against Mexico until I have exhausted every means to keep out of this mess." The President continued with the following words which were not to be published at that time or for long afterwards: "German propagandists are there now fomenting strife and trouble between our countries. Germany is anxious to have us at war with Mexico so that our minds and our energies will be taken off the great war across the sea. It begins to look as if war with Germany is inevitable. If it should come I do not wish American energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. Some day, the people of American will know why I hesitated to intervene in Mexico. I cannot tell them now, for we are at peace with the great power whose poisonous propaganda is responsible for the present terrible condition of affairs in Mexico."

Undoubtedly, as can now be seen President Wilson felt that war against Mexico would not only be aiding Germany; but also that it would not be right to inflict the horror and suffering of war
upon the mass of innocent Mexicans, whose country was being used as a cat's paw by Germany. Naturally, it was with difficulty that many Americans, especially those who had money invested in Mexico, to bear with such inaction and humiliation by Mexico. History alone justifies or condemns a man for his actions. It seems as if President Wilson has been vindicated to some extent, although he was at fault for his exceedingly stiff attitude in his explanations to the public.

Early in the year of 1916, the Progressive National Committee opened a conference in Chicago on January 11, 1916.1 As the vanguard of this committee arrived in Chicago the chief topic was Roosevelt as President but every Progressive was of the opinion that Roosevelt must be the joint candidate of the Progressives and Republicans in order to beat Wilson.

This conference in which every state but one was represented met in the Florentine Room of the Congress Hotel, with George W. Perkins, an influential man in the party, as presiding officer. Informally, Charles Evans Hughes was suggested, but the objections were that the judge was out of politics too long and would probably reject the nomination. Everyone shouted the slogan "Roosevelt for President!" The committee voted officially to have the Progressive National Convention meet in Chicago June 7, at the same time as the older Republican party. Fusion with Republicans under certain conditions met with the approval of the majority. Some of the

radical Progressives were opposed to any fusion of the two parties; but they were gradually brought into line. Finally, there was but one dissenting vote on this point, that of Austin E. Griffith of Washington.

Then the committee drew up the address to be issued to the public. This address began: "We take this action, believing that the surest way to secure for our country the required leadership will be by having, if possible, both the Progressive and Republican parties choose the same standard bearer and the same principles. We are confident that the rank and file of the Republican party and the very large independent vote of the country will support such an effort." It attacked the Wilson Administration "for its failure to deal adequately with the national honor and industrial welfare". The Progressive party itself, stood for "preparedness, military, economic, agricultural and industrial justice." The proposal was made that the Progressive and the Republicans nominate the same Presidential candidate and adopt the same platform. Yet, the Progressives asserted that they would not surrender their principles, would follow only a leader who stood for them and put them through. The address continued that they advocated "federal regulation of business, budget system of government affairs, permanent non-partisan tariff, equal suffrage, short ballot, initiative, referendum, and recall."

This latter part was simply a restatement of the principles
of 1912, composed by Herbert K. Smith of Commission of Corporations in Roosevelt's presidency. It is said that Colonel Roosevelt scrutinized and approved this declaration before it was issued to the public.

Although many of the delegates were for Roosevelt and for Roosevelt only others of the committee were open to suggestions. William Flinn of Pittsburg, a Bull Moose leader of 1912 campaign remarked during the conference, "Roosevelt is not the only man in the country who can run the Government and we can not expect him to be a candidate all the time". Such a remark reveals the conviction of many that no one but Roosevelt could make a suitable president in spite of the fact that there were a few of Flinn's opinion.

Although the Progressives were in favor of nominating the same presidential candidate, their leaders declared to the press that there would be no amalgamation with the Republican party even if both parties should draw the same presidential candidate for, "the Progressive party plans to nominate a national ticket in its convention". Mr. McGrath, secretary to Roosevelt, read Colonel Roosevelt's message of greeting to the committee, on its assembling. In part, the message was: "There is crying need that we shall cast aside all purely partisan considerations and disregard all but the vital issue affecting material life. We must do justice to our people at home, we must insist that they have justice abroad. We must insist in the most thorough going preparedness to protect our rights against all possible attack by any aggressors."
Such preparedness is the best guarantee of any honorable people."
The committee closed its meeting with the decision that Colonel Theodore Roosevelt or Charles Evans Hughes would be an acceptable candidate. Thus, this Progressive National Pre-Convention had given to the public an inkling of their possible nominees, and had practically made it almost impossible for their party to run Colonel Roosevelt on a third ticket as in 1912 if the Republicans refused to accept Roosevelt's leadership.

The problem of the Republicans was to prevent the Progressives from running a separate ticket, to bring back into the fold the majority of the Bull Moose Party. In short, they had to find a way to beat Wilson, who was stronger than his party. It was understood that the progressives of the West were more independent and that a great deal depended on the conciliatory attitude of the Old Guard.

In general, the line of action was to be the attack of the Wilson Administration, especially the foreign policies. The Republicans did not, at that time, have any constructive program, but hoped to combine all the elements of dissatisfaction in an anti-Wilson cause.

Mr. Root was suggested as a possible Republican candidate in the early months of 1916. Elihu Root had been secretary of war, secretary of state, United States Senator from New York, a lawyer, statesman and publicist of international standing. On February 15, 1916 Elihu Root addressed the official Republican Convention
of the State of New York, at Carnegie Hall, New York City.

The core of Root's speech became the essence of the Republican campaign. For this reason, it is worthy of consideration. Mr. Root stressed the fact that the Wilson administration failed to have a firm foreign policy in its relations with Mexico and the European war. Mr. Root called the Wilson policy "weak, vacillating and stultifying." "In Mexico Wilson's duties are to protect the lives of Americans and to refrain from interference in Mexico's internal affairs. Wilson has certainly not protected American lives and he has interfered to aid one faction against another, sending troops as if to secure an apology for an insult to our flag; but really to aid a Mexican faction against Huerta." Root also attacked Wilson "for trying to be neutral between right and wrong, between justice and injustice, between humanity and cruelty in the case of Germany's invasion of Belgium."

So effective was Root's address that seventy men of great influence signed a statement supporting Root for president. However, in the presidential campaign of 1912 Elihu Root had won the seat of temporary Chairman of the Republican Convention away from the Roosevelt faction. He had manipulated the Convention in the interests of President Taft and prevented the Progressives from securing control. Such a candidate would naturally be unacceptable to the Progressives who still remembered his share in the so-called "steamroller" of 1912. Success could not be had without the Progressive support.

Constantly the name of Charles Evans Hughes appeared in the newspapers as a possible Republican nominee. In New York, Governor Whitman led many prominent men in a movement against Root and Roosevelt, for Hughes. C. Blascom Slemp, a member of Congress from Virginia, being spokesman for the movement, wrote to Justice Hughes concerning the fact that his name was being mentioned in political circles. Slemp received a reply from Justice Hughes to this effect. "I am totally opposed to the use of my name in connection with the nomination and selection or instruction of any delegates in my interest either directly or indirectly". Justice Hughes had previously said: "Supreme Court must not be dragged into politics and no man is as essential to the country's well being as is the unstained integrity of the courts. A political party may undertake to capitalize the judicial decisions of its candidate than which nothing could be more deeply violative of the spirit of the judicial institution." Hughes had felt the same in 1912 and so his position was not unexpected. Still, it made no effect on the organized movement in his behalf. Hughes was handicapped by his attitude, but he had not said that he would refuse the nomination, if offered to him.

Public opinion felt that if he were elected, the Court officers might be filled with political ambitions and their decisions might be influenced by political aspirations.
Yet, for six years, he had not been on either side of the political controversy which was decidedly in his favor. Party leaders though that Hughes might be the very man to reunite the Progressives and Republicans, certainly an impossible feat if Root were the Republican presidential candidate. ¹ The Taft men were the ones who hoped to nominate ex-Senator Root, but it was well understood that the western Progressives would never be induced to vote for the man who was responsible for the "steamroller" in the Republican Convention of 1912. Both Hughes and Root were Easterners. Both men were lawyers of great repute; both were splendid choices from the intellectual and political standpoint, Hughes having been Governor of New York and Root, Senator from New York. Yet, neither were of such a type as to arouse an enthusiastic following of the people as had Roosevelt. Many also felt that Hughes should resign from the Bench and make known his views on foreign policies as the American people had a right to know for what principles he stood before his nomination. In the long run, however, his silence really gave him strength. Hughes had, in addition, made an excellent record as Governor. In fact, there were no objections to Hughes as there were to Root; but there was little popular enthusiasm for either.

On March 9, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt stated from the British West Indies to the correspondent of the New York Evening Mail, in response to the Massachusetts movement to elect Roosevelt.

velt delegates to the Republican Convention; "I will not enter any fighting for the nominations and I will not permit any factional fight to be made in my behalf. Indeed, I will go further and say that it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country had in its mood something of the heroic, unless it feels not only like devoting itself to ideals, but to the purpose measurably to realize those ideals in action." At first glance it would seem that Roosevelt repudiated the idea of running for the presidency; yet, he left an opening in his last sentences. Letters by Roosevelt to his friends revealed that he did not believe the people wished his renomination of which the Progressives spoke so often at this time and in the early part of June.

It was Wilson's foreign policy toward Germany and Mexico which caused Theodore Roosevelt to rise up in arms against the Democratic administration. Upon the sinking of the Lusitania Mr. Roosevelt gave out to the press, on May 9, advance copies of an editorial article entitled "Murder on the High Seas", written for the Metropolitan Magazine. He wrote, "This represents piracy. It seems inconceivable that we can refrain from taking action in this matter; for we owe it not only to humanity, but to our own self-respect. Usually peace is the means to righteousness, but occasionally war offers the only means by which righteousness can be achieved. I shall never accept the view that neutrality between

right and wrong is proper. I shall never accept the view that all wars are to be condemned alike or that all kinds of peace are to glorified."

1In a letter to Baron Rosen, Russian ambassador at Washington, Mr. Roosevelt wrote, "How I wish I were President at this moment! What I would like to do aside from the subordinate incident of aiding civilization and decency in Mexico would be to interfere in the World War on the side of justice and honesty. I would have made this nation actively interfere, if possible, at the head of all neutral nations on the ground of the violation of the Hague Conference as regarded Belgium." Roosevelt's opposition to the president's foreign policy made him the leader of his party, the Progressive. Colonel Roosevelt spread these sentiments throughout the country for the benefit of the public by his articles in the January through May issues of the Metropolitan Magazine in the year of 1916. In these articles Roosevelt expressed clearly his political ideas and the policies he would favor if he were at the head of our government. Thus Roosevelt's ideas, as they were taken up and approved by the Republicans and Progressives, made clear to the public that the campaign would not be a negative one, merely the criticism of Wilsonian administration, but that it would also be a constructive one and would represent a decisive attitude on the questions of the day. As Roosevelt was not content to advertise his opinions simply through the press and magazines, he made these political thoughts more forceful by the addition of his magnetic personality

in speeches in all parts of the country. His subjects were such as these: "Righteous Peace and National Preparedness," "National Duty and International Ideas".

2His address, "National Duty and International Ideas" presented at St. Louis May 31, 1916, is typical of Roosevelt and his ideas on Americanism. He declared for a universal system of military service; for the preparedness of body and soul, not only military but industrial and social. Roosevelt turned then to the hyphenate issue, saying that there was "no room in the United States for German-Americans or any other hyphenated citizens, but room only for those who were Americans and nothing else." More than any other man Roosevelt agitated the issues of preparedness, Americanism, and effectual policy in world politics and protection of American rights at home and abroad without any trepidation of its effect upon the country at large.

As previously in 1912, the primaries did not prove to be of great value. In 1916 the Democratic party was solid for Wilson. For lack of real contest, the primaries had no significance in the Democratic party.

3Because of Hughes' position on the Bench and his utterances in regard to his nomination for presidency, his name could not be submitted to the voters in the primary. Root was unpopular west of New York State. Thus he showed no strength in the primaries of the

Note 1. Articles in Outlook by Frederick M. Davenport. May, June, July, 1916.
states west and south of New York State. Contrary to Roosevelt's attitude of 1912, when he placed great stress upon the popular expression at the primaries and asked all the states possible for their primary vote, Roosevelt would not allow any primary contests to be made for him, probably to avoid any later split between the Progressives and the Republicans, thus the primaries were reduced to a voting "for favorite sons" in the states. Consequently, many men, unknown to the country at large were voted for president and vice-president. Senator Smith of Michigan, although a favorite son of Michigan, failed to carry his state. This was taken away from him by Henry Ford, who won the Michigan primary and a large following in Nebraska. Ford received all these votes because all the farmers were opposed to war. Yet, Henry Ford was not even an avowed candidate and his candidacy was looked upon as a joke.

"In the words of William Howard Taft;" Any political scalawag can get the necessary signatures to run on a ticket. The primary system has broken down, first because of a voter or the necessity of signing so as not to displease a friend and second, because the early appearance of any aspirant in the forum before the voters have any opportunity to survey the political field. The primary was adopted with a simple enthusiasm which must have been laughable to the bosses. It has failed pitifully". Undoubtedly this last statement was true in the election of 1916; for the primaries made no indication of the wishes of the people and pointed

to no conclusion in nominating the presidential candidate.

Then came the month of June in which the nominating conventions of the three prominent parties were scheduled to meet. On June 7, the Republican National Convention assembled in the Coliseum in Chicago. Unlike the nominating convention of 1912 there were no popular votes for the convention to accept or defy. Almost every delegate was "hand picked", a carefully selected man who was a thorough regular in the Republican party. Some of the Progressives of 1912 had returned to the party in 1914 but these were relatively few. Thus, the majority of these delegates were the "standpatters", reactionaries or known as members of the Old Guard whose control and methods in the convention of 1912 had not been free from criticism. However, the dominating purpose of this convention was to win. For this possible victory, they were willing to submerge their personal feeling to the extent of observing the Progressive ideas and desires, in the hope that there might be a reconciliation. The Republican managers realized there must not be a separate Progressive ticket. Their desire was to elect a man who was safe, not venturesome, yet a man easily controlled. These men were coolly alert to the situation like "old war hawks". They did not intend to be stampeded by shouts or hysteria. Why should there be such steel like determination? They were afraid of Roosevelt's power and had no thought of turning the party and leadership over to Mr. Roosevelt. However, these Old Guard delegates were fully aware
of the fact that the rejection of Mr. Roosevelt must be accomplished diplomatically and that at the same time they must be able to offer a nominee who would be acceptable to the Progressives.

Platforms have lately been looked upon as nets to catch votes, but in the election of 1916 the voters soon lost sight of the parties' formal declarations. Yet, historically, these official records of a party's principles have some significance. The Republican platform was in brief as follows:

1) "For protection of American rights at home and abroad."
2) "A strict and honest neutrality in the European war. This is not maintained by the Democrats."
3) "Settlement of international disputes by a world court."
4) "To restore order and maintain peace in Mexico". The actions of the Democratic administration were described vividly as "shameful",
5) "Maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine."
6) "Closer relations with Latin-America in commercial, financial and social matters."
7) "The proposed abandonment of the Philippines by the Democrats" was denounced. "Our duty to civilization must be maintained."
8) "Rights of asylum in America would be maintained."
9) "Preparedness by an effective Regular Army and a well-equipped navy."

10) Underwood tariff was denounced. "Tariff protection to be adjusted so as to prevent undue exactions by monopolists or trusts."

11) "Strict regulation of transportation and corporations. Republican party would also encourage American business and advance American interests."

12) "To have an effective system of rural credits. Democratic law on this point very inadequate."

13) "Extension of rural free delivery."

14) "To build up American merchant marine by a ship subsidy."

15) "Complete Federal control of interstate and intrastate transportation."

16) "A national budget system and government economy."

17) "For extensive conservation of natural resources."

18) "An honest enforcement of civil service reform." The Democratic administration has been grossly at fault in this respect.

19) "Vocational education and protection of labor; a child labor law; a comprehensive workman's compensation law."

20) "Extension of suffrage to women; but recognizing the right of each state to settle this question for itself."

The Progressive platform was similar to this in substance if not in form. The Progressives were more outspoken on woman suffrage,
industrial and social needs; but the greatest emphasis in accordance with Roosevelt's views was placed on preparedness, "a navy, restored to at least second rank, a Regular Army of 250,000 and universal military training in time of peace." In regard to the treatment of Mexico, tariff, American merchant marine, national budget, child labor and workman's compensation questions, both the Republican and Progressive platforms were identical in substance.

It is well to remember that the Progressive National Convention was assembled in the Auditorium, an adjoining hall to the Coliseum in Chicago on June 7, 1916. The temper of these delegates was far different from that of its brother convention. Uproar and tumult prevailed. The enthusiasm for "Teddy" was unequalled and never wavered. Their leaders knew the hopelessness of their cause. The majority of the delegates wanted the Republican party to choose between the alternative of accepting Roosevelt or facing defeat. The joint Republican-Progressive managers were as one in their endeavor to nominate Justice Hughes with the least possible party discord. Then the threat of the Progressives to force the nomination of Roosevelt was impotent; for Roosevelt had made clear he would not enter the presidential contest as the leader of the third party. Nevertheless Roosevelt made the condition that there should be a fit nominee who would endorse and put before the people the issues of preparedness and Americanism.

Warren G. Harding, chairman of the Republican Convention, and George W. Perkins, chairman of the Progressive Convention, had before them an extremely delicate situation. A conference was proposed by the Progressives and accepted by the Republicans. At first, the Republicans had no candidate to suggest in the conference. Moreover, they did not object to the Progressive choice of Roosevelt. Later, the Republican committee asked the Progressives if Charles Evans Hughes would be acceptable to them. To this the Progressives would not consent. When the Republicans reported that the Progressives offered Theodore Roosevelt as a fusion candidate they made no comment, favorable or unfavorable. Singing, cheering, and shouting the slogan, "We want Teddy" characterized this announcement in the Progressive Convention.

The Republicans balloted twice on Friday, June 9, without any nomination. Early on Saturday, June 10, it was known that the Republicans would not have Roosevelt. At that critical moment a message came from Roosevelt suggesting Senator Lodge of Massachusetts as a compromise candidate. However, it was too late to make any difference although if Lodge were suggested earlier the Republicans might have supported him, but probably not the Progressives. George Perkins wished the Progressive convention to delay until the Republicans had made their choice. However, John W. Parker of Louisiana, an ardent Progressive, did not wish the new party to be inactive. Therefore, through
his efforts, balloting began in the Progressive National Convention on Saturday, June 10. When Roosevelt was suggested, he was proclaimed by an unanimous shout the Progressive nominee. Thirty seconds before the Coliseum, Charles Evans Hughes was nominated by the Republicans. In an effort to reunite the national parties in the South, John M. Parker was nominated for the Vice President on the Progressive Ticket. Before the Progressives adjourned a telegram arrived from Roosevelt which put them in the depths of despair. Roosevelt thanked the Convention for the honor, but stated that he could not accept the nomination at that time. He went on to say that if Hughes' future statements should satisfy the Progressive National Committee, the Progressives could accept his refusal as final. If the Progressives should not approve of Hughes' opinions they could then decide what was best to do. Naturally, such a message took the heart of those enthusiastic devotees of Roosevelt who had dealt them such a blow.

This resentment, that many felt at the failure of the Progressive Convention, was aptly expressed by a spectator, the famous Ida Tarbell: "It was a great and noble-hearted body, and its tremendous fight deserved a better end than the cowardly stab its leader gave it in the message which its chairman mercifully and wisely withheld until almost the movement of adjournment." However, Roosevelt was too great a politician not to know that a third ticket meant undoubtedly the success of Wilson. He realized that his power must be turned to re-
uniting the split of 1912 if the Democrats were to be defeated. In fact, his refusal was the only sensible thing to do.

1In a letter to James Bryce of England, Roosevelt wrote on June 9, 1916, "you have of course seen the result of the presidential nominations. I am having my own troubles with my fellow Progressives. They are wild to have me run on a third ticket. They feel that the Republican Convention was a peculiarly sordid body, a feeling with which I heartily sympathize. They feel that Hughes was nominated largely in consequence of the German-Americans, who were against me, and largely also for the very reason that nobody knew anything of his views on the vital subjects of the day - and, a nomination, made for such a cause is, in my own opinion, evidence of profound political immorality on the part of those making it. But Hughes is an able, upright man whose instincts are right, and I believe in international matters he will learn with comparative quickness, especially as I hope he will put Root into office as Secretary of State. Under the circumstances there is, in my own mind, no alternative but to support him. At his worst, he will be better than Wilson and there is always the chance that he will do very well indeed."

After the Progressive National Convention in Chicago, a meeting of the National Committee was called to be held on June 26 in Chicago to determine their future policy. On June 22 Roosevelt sent a letter, giving his reasons for his refusal of the nomina-

Note 1. "Theodore Roosevelt" by Joseph Bishop, Page 413.
tion. He spoke of the necessity of Progressive support of Hughes and closed with an appeal to them to consider, not their own political fortunes, but the honor and welfare of the people of the United States. He said that Hughes had a satisfactory record and had in his acceptance speech shown himself a dependable candidate. Roosevelt pledged his support of Hughes and urged his fellow Progressives to do the same.

Justice Hughes had resigned from the Supreme Court immediately upon his nomination. He telegraphed to Warren G. Harding of the Republican Convention his acceptance. Mr. Hughes said he could not fail his country's call even though he preferred to remain on the Bench. He not only indicted the Wilson administration, but he placed himself on record for preparedness, the maintenance of American rights under international law, a firm, consistent policy in Mexico, and for a united American, with no division of allegiance.

After Mr. Roosevelt's letter of the 22nd, Mr. Hughes thanked the Progressive leader for his endorsement of the Republican nomination. Hughes wrote to Roosevelt: "You have sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call retreat. I want the most effective cooperation with all those who have been fighting for your side. And I want you to feel that I wish to have all the aid that you are able and willing to give. Let us work together for our national security and for the peace of righteousness and justice." In addition,
Mr. Hughes telegraphed to the Progressive National Committee, accepting its support. In this letter, he criticized the Democratic foreign policies and said that he would put forth every effort to promote social justice. Thus, the tremendous difficulty of nominating a fusion candidate had been overcome. Hughes and Roosevelt were on friendly terms and newspapers were optimistic concerning the return of the Progressives to the older party. Roosevelt took the stump for Hughes to bring the Progressives back into the Republican fold that the Democrats and their policies might be displaced. He laid stress upon the issues which he had been advocating for the previous two years, namely; universal military service, preparedness, relentless attack on anti-Americans, and adverse criticism of the Wilson administration, with his usual fiery utterances against Wilson's incompetency and policy toward Mexico and Germany and the European War.

The Democratic National Convention opened at St. Louis on June 14, 1916. This meeting was noted for its apparently harmonious spirit. The delegates were fired with enthusiasm, hope and confidence. The Democrats were united in their desire to renominate President Wilson with the exception of a few of the "political bosses" who have failed to receive the desired recognition in the distribution of the political patronage in their respective states. There was party unity on the surface in the Democratic Convention but as in the nomination of
velt in 1904, there were elements of dissatisfaction among the conservatives and machine leaders. Roger Sullivan of Illinois, Thomas Taggart of Indiana, James Smith of New Jersey, and Charles Murphy of New York were among those most prominent political chiefs against Wilson. In addition, William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury and son-in-law of Wilson, during the years of 1912-1916, endeavored to build up an antagonistic machine to that of Tammany in his home state, New York. However, they did not dare voice their opposition, for Wilson was too popular with the rank and file of the party. Thus, no other course was open to them except to support the renomination of President Wilson. Another difficulty to overcome was the fact that Wilson had been elected on a single presidential term platform in 1912. An amendment to this effect was endorsed in the Democratic platform. Publicly, at the time, President Wilson had not pledged himself to running but one term; but technically, according to his opponents in 1916, he was bound by this clause. To offset this uncertainty, a letter which he wrote to A. Mitchell Palmer, a member of the Democratic National Committee early in 1913, was published in January of 1916. Mr. Wilson stated in this letter that "a fixed constitutional limitation to a single term of office is highly arbitrary and unsatisfactory from every point of view." The President felt that public opinion should decide whether a President should continue in office for a second term. Thus, early in the year,
it was evident that Wilson would run for a second term in
spite of the declaration of the party platform in 1912.

The administration of Wilson was endorsed in the Demo-
cratic platform. The platform stated that the party’s record,
its keeping of pledges, and its constructive legislation could
be favorably compared to "those of any party at any time". The
record of the past three years was reviewed:

1). Federal Reserve Act "making a currency panic impossible".
2). Creation of the Federal Trade Commission; "so that mono-
poly may be prevented and legitimate business encouraged".
3). A tariff which is "fair to the consumer and to the pro-
ducer".
4). An equitable method of taxation by putting "the burden
on swollen incomes".
5). Laws protecting the laborer "against unwarranted writs
of injunction".
6). Greater efficiency in the parcel post system, the rural
postal system, and enlargement of the postal savings system.
7). Maintained the righteousness of their Mexican policy.
Reasserted the Monroe Doctrine.
8). Social reforms for child labor, insanitary conditions,
accident and pension laws and eight hour day.

Thus, just as much emphasis was laid upon the defense of
the administration by the Democrats as was devoted to the attack

Note 1. Platform found in New York Times, June 15 and 16,1916,
also in Democratic Text Book of 1916.
of the administration by the Republicans. The platform continued on the subjects of preparedness, the European War, American rights abroad and hyphenism. The Democrats favored an adequate army and navy, a world peace made effective by some feasible association, stated that the American Government should protect Americans and their rights at home and abroad, and most emphatically condemned the groups or organizations who work in the interests of a foreign power. The temporary chairman, ex-Governor Glynn, of New York, commended Wilson's foreign policy which had more success by negotiations rather than war. This same commendation was reinforced by the permanent chairman, Senator Ollie James of Kentucky, also by Senator Lewis of Illinois, Senator Reed of Missouri and William J. Bryan, who infused into the enthusiastic convention a unified spirit to exalt the Wilson administration, especially for its foreign policy. Such an approval is particularly paramount in Senator James' utterance: "Without orphaning a single American child, without widowing a single American mother, without firing a single gun, or shedding a drop of blood, Wilson wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded over a battlefield a recognition of American rights and a concession to American commands." Yet, this sentiment, even if not expressed as forcibly in the speeches of others, was the dominant note of the convention. Later, in the campaign proper, this feeling was again expressed in the slogan, "He kept us out of war".

Thus, with the exception of just one Tammany delegate,
Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey for President, Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana for Vice President were renominated by acclamation.

In the fall of 1916, the managers of the campaigns, Chairman Wilcox for the Republican nominee, Charles Evans Hughes, and Chairman Vance McCormick for the Democratic nominee, President Wilson, were confronted by a unique situation in the political history of the United States. These managers had the problem of holding their respective party vote; but their greatest concern was what would control the women’s vote, the labor vote, the German-American vote and the Progressive vote, which groups would probably not be held by party ties.

Both Wilson and Hughes endorsed woman suffrage, Wilson stating that it was a question for state action. The Woman’s party persuaded Mr. Hughes to favor the Susan B. Anthony federal amendment. In recognition of his support for their cause, a delegation of women, speaking for Mr. Hughes, was sent by the Woman’s party throughout the west. As the special train was financed by wealthy men and women of the east, it was called "The Golden Special" or "The Wall Street Special", arousing, instead of winning over, the antagonism of the Westerners.

The labor vote loomed up as an important factor because of the passage of the Adamson eight hour law on September 5, 1916. In August of this year, a railroad strike to involve
systems all over the country, was pending. In order that the public would not suffer through this extensive strike, the President intervened on August 13. The labor men refused to arbitrate although the railroad magnates were willing and even offered arbitration. In spite of his efforts in conferences first with the Brotherhood representation and then with the railroad managers, Wilson could arrive at no solution and was forced to call a joint session of Congress, August 29, to avert the strike by immediate legislation. Mr. Adamson, chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission of the House introduced the Adamson eight-hour law. The President signed it on September 5, within a week of its introduction in the House. This law provided for one day of rest and seven days of work, eight hours in length with the same pay as formerly for ten hours of work. Overtime was to be paid at the rate of one and a half hours for one hour of work. A commission of three members, appointed by the President, was to observe the effect of this law on the transportation system of the country for six months, beginning January 1, 1917. Mr. Hughes seized upon this as a prime issue of his campaign, and condemnation of the eight-hour law figured in almost every speech after September 10. Consequently, there was an especial appeal to the labor men in this election.

A great deal was said about the power of the solid German-American vote to be polled in the election of 1916. The German leaders in this country were very boastful as to their influence to elect the next president. It was claimed that the
German vote of 4,000,000 was one and that such a solid note would decide the outcome of the presidential campaign. Innumerable circulars of all kinds were sent out to those Americans of German descent in this country by the German-American leaders. The Fatherland and the Staats-Zeitung took on a great deal of this work. They all hated Wilson because of his neutrality, his submarine policy and failure to bring pressure to bear on Great Britain for enforcing the blockade against Germany and searching the mails of neutral countries. Naturally they turned to Mr. Hughes as their hope of defeating the despised President Wilson.

In 1912, the combined Roosevelt-Taft vote was greater than that of Wilson so it was seen that Wilson won because of the split in the Republican party. If the two wings could be reunited political leaders prophesied a defeat for Wilson. Without doubt the Progressive vote of the country possessed the power to make the president. The man responsible for the breach in 1912 was Theodore Roosevelt and he would be the man if any to heal the wound. Mr. Roosevelt wished to do so; but would he be able to swing his ardent supporters into line for Mr. Hughes or would they turn to President Wilson on account of his decidedly progressive legislation from 1912 to 1916?

The Republican campaign really began when Charles Evans Hughes, former Governor of New York and Justice of the Supreme Court, delivered on July 31 his formal acceptance speech. President Wilson did not accept his renomination until September 2.
Mr. Hughes travelled during the summer, from coast to coast, speaking in seventeen states. In October he again toured the middle west and later the east. During his trip to the coast Mr. Hughes attacked the Democratic administration on the grounds of "waste, extravagance, sectionalism, unfit appointments, violation of civil service principles and its failure to pass any constructive legislation". In the main after the first month the issues narrowed down to the tariff question, the Adamson Law, preparedness, Wilson's policy toward Mexico and Germany, not only the external side of the German problem but also the internal aspects.

Mr. Roosevelt opened his campaign for Mr. Hughes in Lewiston, Maine, the first of September. There he scathingly reviewed the work of the administration; but he subordinated the domestic policy to the paramount issue of American lives and American prestige in foreign affairs; with an onslaught against the hyphenates. Roosevelt made speeches in the middle west and southwest always arousing great enthusiasm in his audiences, pro-Teddy if not pro-Hughes.

No public utterances were heard on the Democratic side until September 2, Wilson's acceptance speech which was in the flowery Wilsonian style and an eulogy on the Democratic record of the preceding four years. On September 3, Wilson spoke at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, his summer home, and from that time on he spoke upon request in different parts of the country.

Note 1. Literary Digest item, Aug. 12, 1916, gives a summary of Hughes statements in his mid-summer campaign.
Note 2. Literary Digest item, Sept 16, 1916, reviews this speech of Wilson's on September 2, 1916.
As befitted the dignity of the office of president, Wilson refused to stump for himself. Instead, the president made his appeals for the most part through speeches at Shadow Lawn or by letters sent all over the country. The Democrats and Wilson offered their four year term as bid for re-election. Wilson defended his party from the Republican attacks and appealed to the independent voters to judge his fitness to be reelected by the progress in character of the administration.

The long debated tariff issue received prominence in this election through the efforts of Mr. Hughes. Wherever he went he spoke of the failure of the Underwood tariff, the need of protection for American industries and American labor. He argued that on the termination of the war this country would be the dumping place of the world's goods. He termed the prosperity of the years 1912-1916 a false condition. The Democrats in power, according to Mr. Hughes, always meant hard times. The exception to the rule had occurred not owing to their legislation but to the unnatural situation produced by the World War. Soon this shaky edifice of prosperity would fall and then the Republicans alone by a protective tariff would render to the country a true and permanent prosperity. To spread this gospel everywhere advertisements covering a whole page property spaced and capitalized to attract attention were inserted in the leading newspapers. A typical announcement was: "Tariff for pro-

Note 1. "Wilson and the Issues" by George Creel presents the Democratic side.
tection to American wages and American industry. Not for revenue only. Profits both for labor and capital. Low paid European labor will compete without an adequate tariff wall with high paid labor of America. The tariff wall will be rebuilt with Hughes to hold back the ruinous competition of cheap foreign labor. Rebuild tariff dyke, only Republicans will do it".

In answer to these arguments the Democrats upheld the Underwood tariff and the creation of an expert bi-partisan board to observe the good and poor points of the law. President Wilson did not give the credit of the prosperity to the tariff, as to the Farmers' Credit Act and the Federal Reserve Banking system. In reality, the war was the cause of the great prosperity although aided immensely by the Federal Reserve Banking system. The tariff itself had not had a chance to operate under normal conditions; so true and exact conclusions could not be drawn at this time. Nevertheless, as is always the case in politics, the parties take credit or discredit the opposing party whenever opportunity offers.

Contrary to the orders of the Republican party, Hughes made the Adamson eight hour day law shortly after its passage one of his leading issues. Mr. Roosevelt joined hands with Mr. Hughes on this point, although a majority of the Republican members in Congress had voted for this measure. It was not the principle of the bill to which both Mr. Hughes and Mr. Roosevelt were in accord that this was not an eight hour day law but a wage
law giving ten hours pay for eight hours work, and extra pay for overtime. "In other words," said these men, "the men will work ten hours just the same, only their wages will be very much increased". They both accused Wilson of framing the law to catch the labor vote, sacrificing his ideals to party expediency. In many other speeches Roosevelt and Hughes were equally vociferous in asserting that Wilson yielded to the pressure of the railroad Brotherhoods. They termed this measure "a force bill", rushed through Congress within a week and passed without arbitration or investigation as to the question of right or wrong. Both referred to Mr. Roosevelt's settlement of the Anthracite Coal Strike in Pennsylvania as the only method in which arbitration was most successfully used.

Wilson gave the following reply to the attacks on the Adamson Law. "I believe in arbitration, if possible. The principle of the law has received the sanction of society and is not arbitrable. The railroad men asked for extra pay in order to make the eight hour day plan work. If this law were a force bill, why did seventy-six Republicans out of one hundred and twenty-five in the House vote for the bill and why did not even one of the Republican Senators put any obstruction in its way?" This last argument seems irrefutable; but that peculiar situation was probably due to the fear of unpopularity with the people. Perhaps such a fear motivated Wilson and the Democrats as the Republicans asserted.
If the later accusation were true, then both parties and leaders were equally guilty. Although the bill was moderate in its demands on the operators and fair from a human standpoint, there was a great deal of objection to the law because the public, as a whole, did not believe in the settlement of such difficulties by Congressional legislation. Many prophesied that the government would lose its strength and impartiality if it became a tool in the hands of Union labor. However, the threatened strike was averted by very quick and clever managing on the part of Mr. Wilson, in an unprecedented manner.

During the first part of Wilson's presidency, he was strongly against preparedness; for there was an inbred dislike in America for any form of militarism. However, in 1916, the President began to recommend a decided increase in the army on account of the possibility of war across the waters. As a result the Hay bill or National Defense Act was passed on June 3, 1916. This law authorized a regular army of 180,000 and the federalization of the National Guard with officers' training camps at Colleges and Universities. In addition, the President received a grant of powers over the railroad in the event of war. A Council of National Defense was also established. Roosevelt and Hughes criticized Wilson's policy in this respect. They held up to scorn the delays and inefficiency on the Mexican border where the National Guard had to be sent because the Regular Army was insufficient. Neither saw any solution of this problem in the
Hay Bill as they wished nothing less than universal military training. The federalization of the National Guard was also denounced. Mr. Hughes and Mr. Roosevelt felt that it was wrong to take the power of control away from the state militia instead of providing for a Continental Army of 400,000 according to the idea of Mr. Garrison, Secretary of War. On the other hand, President Wilson defended his inconsistency on the ground that America might be drawn into the world conflict while, at the first, the war seemed but another of those long series of European disputes. Although the National Defense Act was a compromise, it did not render adequate protection. In Wilson's opinion, a more radical plan was not in keeping with the peaceful ideals of America. Yet, this measure proved to be very ineffective in the practical test.

Articles on the Mexican policy of the Democratic administration appeared almost daily during the months of September and October of 1916. The Conference in Atlantic City was in session; but it was meeting with many setbacks. In a speech, delivered in Arizona, Roosevelt presented the usual arguments of the Republicans. The substance of his speech was in the following quotation: "Wilson has conducted a vacillating policy of tame submission to Mexican insult. This has resulted in the murder of men, women, and children by Mexican bandits. Wilson has spoken a great deal of allowing the Mexican people work out "a new freedom without external interference", which means the right of a foreign power to murder American citizens."
He has stood for peace at any price. The procedure to have followed would have been to have captured Villa as Wilson started to do and not to have been stopped by the order of Carranza, no better than the usurper Huerta. When the Mexicans continued to raid and kill Americans an army should have been sent in there to establish order and do for Mexico what the United States had done for Cuba. How can President Wilson justify his action which has failed to protect American property and American citizens? This is not peace, but war. Wilson has intervened in Mexico in every way diplomatically and in war; but timidly and futilely." Undoubtedly, there was an immense amount of truth in Roosevelt's statements that American lives and property should be protected effectively. Hughes spoke in the same view, but he advocated a reversal of the former foreign policy to one of "firmness and consistency" instead of war.

On September 30, President Wilson, in his second public address at Shadow Lawn, spent the greater part of it in defense of his foreign policy. "If the Republicans are going to change our foreign policy, in what direction are they going to change it? There is only one choice as against peace and that is war. The only class who wish intervention in Mexico are those vested interests who see great gains for their pocket books if we go to war." Colonel Henry Watterson of the Louisville Courier Journal turned his pointed brilliant pen to this election especially in regard to Wilson's foreign policy. Although
an ardent Democrat, Henry Watterson lost his admiration for the President and became equally desirous of defeating Wilson in 1916 as he had been in electing him in 1912. "The United States should go to war with Mexico," said Henry Watterson, "because helpless to help herself, Mexico has become a menace to us." Undoubtedly, those who were influenced by Colonel Watterson, plus the enthusiastic followers of Roosevelt were for war; but Wilson was right when he said that the majority of the American people did not want war with Mexico.

Closely connected with the Mexican question was the policy of the administration toward Germany. Each candidate was forced to consider the internal as well as the external phase of the matter. Again, Mr. Roosevelt took the lead on the Republican side. He denounced Wilson's external policy. He upbraided those German-Americans and hyphenates who were endeavoring to influence public opinion and the government's policy for the benefit of Germany. This rapid fire and bombardment of anti-American spirit gave an impetus to the Republican campaign. Henry Watterson added his power of pithy remarks to this cause. He felt that Wilson's notes to Germany were a disgrace in that he neither went to war nor achieved a diplomatic victory. "In all that he does, we can decry the schoolmaster who arrived at the front in this, late in life. One needs only go over the record and work how often he has reversed himself to detect a certain temperamental instability, denoting a lack of intellectual purpose or resolution. This
is characteristic of an excessive education, of the
half-baked mind overtrained."

Hughes endorsed Mr. Roosevelt's remarks by tele-
graph after his Lawrence, Illinois, speech early in the cam-
paign. But, because of fear that he would lose the German-
American vote which had been so favorable to him, Mr. Hughes
neglected to speak upon this subject until a week before the
election when forced to do so by public opinion. Then, Hughes
claimed that Wilson's peace was no peace at all as American
lives were constantly in danger. He advocated a firm policy;
"not war, not cowardly peace, but honorable peace". Upon
the subject of Americanism, Hughes spoke again in rather a
vague and unconvincing manner. He said, in this respect, that
he would neither tolerate improper interference with American
mails, nor with legitimate commercial intercourse, nor, with
the evasion of Germany's U-boat pledge. "He stood for Ameri-
can rights upon land and sea." The German-Americans were very
anxious that Great Britain be prevented from the execution of
the blockade against Germany and from tampering with the mails.
Thus, such statements as the above were very pleasing to the
German-Americans. They were not disconcerted by his inclusion
of the submarine policy even though he characterized the sink-
ing of the Lusitania as an "inhuman and abominable act".

The defense of Wilson's attitude toward Germany was
taken up by his party and in his speeches. The party slogan
was: "He kept us out of war". This watchword became Mr. Bryan's
The war cry in his campaign of twenty states for Wilson. The Republicans answered this catch phrase by saying that President Wilson did not keep us out of war, for, "what was war if it was not the unsafety and murder of American citizens"? Wilson's own motto was more like this, "To maintain our national honor by peace if we can; but by war if we must".

Owing to the President's firm stand, the Gore and McLemore resolutions, warning American citizens that it was unsafe to travel on passenger ships belonging to citizens of subject or belligerent nations, failed to pass Congress. Moreover, one hundred and two Republicans supported them. Wilson pleaded his case on the ground that war meant sufferings and terrible destruction of life. "Was it not better to move slowly and give Germany a chance to peaceably settle the question?" In his estimation, diplomacy had triumphed; for Germany had relinquished her point without war.

In repudiating the German-American voters and all disloyal Americans, Wilson was no second to Roosevelt. The President said on this point, "It is a part of the business of this year of reckoning and settlement to speak plainly and act with unmistakable purpose in the rebuke of Anti-Americanism in order that it may be forever hereafter impossible. I am the candidate of a party; but I am above all things else an American citizen. I neither seek nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element among us which puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States." Besides this emphatic statement, Mr. Wilson made another even more famous. Jeremiah O'Leary, an
anti-British agitator, had throughout the campaign tried to take the alien votes away from Wilson. He wrote an offensive letter to the President prophesying his defeat at the polls in November. The President replied with a sharp and decisive rebuke: "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you to vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them." Such an attitude won the approval of the patriotic Americans.

Until November 7, these issues were kept before the public in a last effort to win over that unusually large group of undecided voters. As the Republicans did to the Democrats; so did Wilson and the Democrats bitterly assail the Republicans. However, Wilson paid many tributes to the Progressives and made a bid for their support as did Mr. Hughes. So complex were the elements in the critical situation of 1916, that many persons did not know until the very day of the election, November 7, for whom they would cast their vote. Late on November 7, the returns began to come in and at this early date, it was prophesied that the election would be sharply contested.

On November 8, the New York Times printed that Hughes was leading with 264 electoral votes to Wilson's 251. The total number of electoral votes was 531; the candidate to be elected must receive 266 votes. That night, the German-Americans in New York City were jubilant, celebrating as they
had not done since the alleged destruction of the British fleet off Jutland. They proclaimed that Wilson had been defeated because of his attitude on the international question which cost him the German-American vote. But on November 9, there was a contradictory report, Wilson now having 251 votes, and Hughes, 247. The final result was reached the next day, definitely awarding the election to President Wilson who had 276 votes against Hughes' 255 votes. The election was a victory for Wilson through the final success of the Wilson electors in California. In this state, there was a plurality of about 3,800 out of a total vote of over 900,000. Wilson's total plurality was comparatively small of only some 400,000 votes. Nevertheless, he showed a gain of 1,200,000 in the popular vote over that of 1912. Mr. Wilson received 2,842,625 more votes than in 1912, and 1,518,885 more than the combined Roosevelt-Taft vote of that year. Wilson lacked a popular majority of 2,459,000 in 1912 as against 275,815 in 1916. He was not a minority president in 1916 as in 1912. The President also carried a large majority of the 48 states.

<table>
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<tr>
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Note: See also "President Wilson" by R. Wilson Harris, Pages 276-285.
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**For Wilson**

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The Republican plurality in Minnesota was less than
500 out of a poll of nearly 360,000 votes. Although Maine and Indiana were Republican on the state ticket by about 14,000 they were for Hughes by less than 16,000. As for California, it has been stated before that there was but 3,200 plurality for Wilson while New Hampshire went Democratic by 56 votes out of a poll of 87,000. In general, the west and the south went for Wilson, electing him in face of the east. Incidentally, the President achieved the unexampled feat of winning against the adverse verdict of New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois which contributed between them 112 votes. A Democratic Congress was also returned with a majority of twelve in the House and one in the Senate. Then, the election experts began to examine the ballots that they might account for the influences which gave Wilson a victory although a slender one. In other words, how did these numerous disaffected groups vote?

The women's organizations were ordered to vote for Hughes as he had endorsed the Susan B. Anthony amendment. However, the majority of the western women did not vote for their own salvation but upon the issues of the day for the Democratic ticket. As a whole, two reasons induced their decision, namely the slogan "He kept us out of war", and the progressive legislation of the Wilson administration. As the state of Washington was radically progressive, the women voted for Wilson because of his progressive ideals.
In Idaho, the prevailing attitude was for peace as in most of the western states and the women voters, together with the farmers were actuated by that well-known Democratic slogan.

Although Wilson was labor's friend, he did not secure the solid labor vote. To be sure, many voted the Democratic ticket on account of the Adamson Law, especially in New England; but this group did not determine any of the electoral votes one way or the other. As a rule, the laborers could not forget the time-worn argument: "Protective tariff means a full dinner pail."

The other prophecy of the importance of the solid German-American vote failed to materialize. The hyphenate vote was sadly divided and the threat that they had the power to make the president became an illusion. Before the election pamphlets were sent to persons of German descent, commanding them to be true Americans and vote for Hughes, not for Wilson. The Hearst papers, pro-German perhaps because of the peculiar idiosyncrasies of William Hearst, the German American Alliance, the American Independence Conference, successor of the American Embargo Conference, the Staats-Zeitung press, oracle of the Imperial Government, Mr. Viereck of "the Fatherland" and all German propagandists upheld Hughes with emphatic praise of "this true American". Yet, nowhere did the hyphenate vote throw a single electoral vote to Hughes. Mr. Viereck of "the Fatherland" gave as the reason for this division in the German-
American vote that Roosevelt's rabid attack on the German submarine warfare and disloyal hyphenates inspired the German-Americans with a desire to hurt Roosevelt. Thus, a vote for Wilson meant a vote against Roosevelt. In some places, the German-Americans voted for their respective parties, as in other years. In other places, the German-Americans followed their own leader so ostentatiously as to arouse the wrath of other Americans in much larger numbers who voted for Wilson. Then, as Mr. Viereck said, many, especially in the west voted for Wilson because of their intense dislike of Roosevelt, and his campaign for Hughes. The Democrats gained on the German-American vote in St. Louis, as the farmers of that descent voted for Wilson because of their prosperity. The German-American vote in Oregon, Minnesota and Boise, Idaho went solidly for Hughes; so disliked was Wilson. This even division of the German-American vote all over the country nullified any possible German influence.

When Hughes was in California during August of 1916, he was asked by Chester Rosell, Progressive member of the Republican National Campaign Committee, to endorse Governor Hiram Johnson, who was running for United States Senator on the Progressive ticket. At that time, Mr. Rowell remarked that the fate of the Republican ticket in California lay in the control of the Progressive vote. The Republican "stand-

Note 1. San Francisco Chronicle, June through November.
patters", known as the Old Guard, said to Hughes, "Keep your hands off." Consequently, Hughes stated in San Francisco that he had no concern with local differences. Governor Johnson should not have been ignored, as he was the biggest man in the progressive party not only in California, but in the nation with the exception of Theodore Roosevelt. Johnson had a powerful grip on the labor interests, too, and in California there were 300,000 Progressives who were not registered with either of the older parties. In a certain way, Mr. Hughes was not to blame. For fear he would lose the vote of the "regulars" Hughes was dominated by the Old Guard who were responsible for his campaign in California. Hughes did not call on Johnson and he did not adequately recognize the progressive ideals of a large majority in the state. These Progressives had been fighting the corrupt and the reactionary in state politics for a decade. After Johnson received a telegram of congratulations from Hughes for his success in the primaries, he canvassed the state for Hughes. However, his followers could not forget Hughes' oversight of their leader and the failure of Hughes to fight the campaign on progressive issues. A Republican victory in California would have given the election to Hughes. Wilson's plurality in the city of San Francisco was 15,000 slightly more than that for Hughes in Los Angeles, while his plurality for the whole state was but 3,800 votes. The northern and southern Progressives

of the state failed Hughes in spite of the monstrous plurality of 500,000 given to Governor Johnson.

Thus the Republican Campaign Committee of California, through hatred for the Progressives and Johnson and the failure of the Republicans to rise to the demand of constructive issues brought the Republican party to defeat in 1916. Another important item, in the success of Woodrow Wilson was the power of that oft repeated phrase: "He kept us out of war". Perhaps the third and most forceful factor of all was that the period was a critical one, needing diplomatic direction of a person fully comprehending the international situation and in entire possession of the history and complicated details since 1910. President Wilson was the only man who could possibly be well versed in these affairs in their actual meaning. To change generals at a critical moment is a poor policy, especially when the general in command has come out of the battle with but a few scars. In addition, Mr. Hughes, because of his predicament in trying to satisfy the Old Guard and the Progressives and the German vote, had been vague on some of the most important issues. He failed to impress the public with any decisive quality or ability to act quickly and surely. In fact, his personality could not persuade the voters that he was worth the gamble. Mr. Hughes could not overcome President Wilson's best argument: his former record of a four year term as President. To change would have been to substitute uncertainty for certainty.
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