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Religious implications of personalistic psychology

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RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF PERSONALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Statement of the Problem

The problem of this dissertation is to determine the adequacy of the concepts of some current psychologies for their relevance and implications for understanding religion. Special attention is paid to personalistic psychology. It is concerned mainly with evaluating the relationships of the concepts of some recent psychologies to problems of religious experience. The problem raises at least three main questions. (1) What are the manifestations of religion? (2) In what categories of psychology do the manifestations lie? (3) Are the concepts in these various categories of psychologies sufficiently relevant and adequate for interpreting religious phenomena?

1. Importance of the Problem. In recent years most psychologists have tended to steer clear of any subject that may be related favorably to religion or philosophy. Psychology, whose business it is to study the mind and behavior of man, has tended to become the study of carefully selected areas of the mind; or it has renounced mind and focused its energies solely on behavior. This has been for the purpose
of keeping itself respectable as a "science". This trend has been very definite, it seems, since the arrival of behaviorism with its claim of being the "scientific messiah" of psychology. However, there are some psychologists who view the problems of religion as important from a psychological standpoint.

Several differing "schools" of psychology exist. Each tends to claim that it alone gives an adequate interpretation and understanding of human behavior and experience. One school of psychology, claiming that it covers all the human phenomena worth explaining, ignores the religious phenomena of persons. This is despite the fact that the vast majority of people in the world possess and exhibit a religion of one sort or another. Another school of psychology interprets religious experience, but does so from its own particular frame of reference. Thus, because there are different psychologies, each with concepts designed to explain human behavior, and because these psychologies differ in their conceptual explanation of psychological problems of religion, there is a need for examining the concepts of current psychologies for their adequacy and relevance in understanding religious experience and behavior.

ii. Related Studies. There have been several psychological studies of religion from the point of view of particular schools of psychology, i.e., applying the concepts of a
particular psychology to religious experience and behavior in order to understand them. Of the current schools, perhaps Sigmund Freud's application of the concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis to religion was one of the first. By applying his concepts to religion, it is understood as an illusion and a form of obsessional neurosis. Freud apparently was not aware that by applying these same concepts to the atheist the results were the same. Nevertheless, he made significant contributions for understanding religion.

J. H. Leuba studied religion by applying mainly behavioristic concepts for its understanding. His conclusions were similar to those of Freud's and his main contribution seems to be the disposal of the idea that fear is the basic emotion in religious experience.

Alfred Adler applied the concepts of individual psychology to religion and sees religion rooted in the nature of persons and their psychical structure because of the inevitable comparison of humanity as it is with the ideals of perfection. Inferiority feelings with subsequent striving for perfection

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and completion as presented by religion is the result.

Carl Jung applies the concepts of his analytical psychology to religion and this is treated later in the dissertation.\(^5\) The above mentioned psychologists have specifically applied their concepts to religion. There are others who have written from these points of view on subjects having a bearing on religion. But the above are the main recent psychologists who have applied their concepts to religion in order to understand it. Seward Hiltner has reviewed many of the psychological works that are relevant to a psychological understanding of religion.\(^6\) He points out significantly that many a theologian faces the temptation of accepting a psychology because the psychologist has avowedly Christian assumptions, or does not deny Christian assumptions, "without any apparatus for judging the psychology itself which is professedly based on these assumptions".\(^7\) It is at this point that this dissertation is related to these previous studies by providing a method by which the various psychologies may be evaluated as to their relevance and adequacy for interpreting religion.

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\(^5\) See p.79 f. below.


\(^7\) Ibid., p. 16.
2. General Definition of Personalistic Psychology

Personalistic psychology is the science of selves or persons. A person (or self) is defined as the experiencer, unifier, and regulator of conscious states and processes. Although personalistic psychologists differ in details about the characteristics of the person, they appear to be in agreement on the above definition of the person. Personalistic psychology is based on the fact that every consciousness experiences itself as belonging together and as continuous with past and future experiences in a unique way.

Personalistic psychology is a philosophical psychology in that it relies upon human reason to supplement empirical data. Personalistic psychology has been nurtured by personalistic philosophy and has in turn garnered much of the evidence which personalistic philosophy interprets. It often attempts to tackle the philosophical problems of psychology which other schools avoid.

1. Distinctions From Other Psychologies. Personalistic psychology declares that nothing less than the whole person is the basic datum of psychology. It is concerned with relating the whole of mental life to the person who is its carrier and originator. It is distinguished from typological

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8 See W. Stern's General Psychology, Tr. H. Spoerl (New York: Macmillan Co., 1938) and E. S. Brightman's Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Holt Co., 1925) for two superficially different but basically similar definitions.
psychologies in its emphasis on the whole person rather than a dominant physical, mental, or social characteristic. It has a great deal in common with Gestalt psychology with its emphasis on wholes and patterns of mental life. It differs from Gestalt psychologies mainly in its interest in the problems of lasting structure rather than the momentary patterns of behavior. Functional psychology emphasizes the ends toward which consciousness strives and does not concern itself a great deal about that which is striving for ends, or adjustments. Thus it differs from personalistic psychology in that the latter is interested in both the means and ends and that which is using means and striving for ends. A behavioristic psychology denies or ignores the importance of consciousness, it has very little in common with a psychology which makes consciousness a basal fact. Personalistic psychology agrees with hormic psychology in its stress on goals of personality, but many contemporary personalists do not agree on the causes of goal seeking, especially of the instinctive type. Personalistic psychology realizes the importance of unconscious motivation which the depth psychologies hold as paramount for the understanding of human beings. However, personalistic psychology stresses the conscious selectivity and relative autonomy of the person in contrast to the relative enslavement of the person by his unconscious drives, fears, etc.

A distinction may be made between personalistic psy-
chology and scientific psychology in general. Scientific psychology is interested in the facts of mental life for their own sake. It is sometimes referred to as "psychology without a soul". But since scientific psychology has its principal value in the area of explanation of causal relations, mental acts cannot be easily explained apart from the person who has them. Personalistic psychology grapples with the problem of the basis or substratum of acts and is therefore many times designated as a philosophical psychology.

ii. Personalistic Philosophy and Personalistic Psychology. Personalistic philosophy views reality as teleological as opposed to mechanistic principles. It relies on coherence as the criterion of truth and is epistemologically dualistic. It holds that personality (person or self) is the key to reality and the most adequate philosophical principle. Stated briefly, it is the metaphysical view which holds that all existence is experience and all experience is personal. Everything that exists is a self or an aspect of self, or a society of selves.⁹ As a philosophy, its task is to interpret experience as a whole and will of necessity include psychology, history, sociology, and the other sciences for its data. Personalistic psychology, it finds, provides a more adequate basis for interpreting experience than the other school of

psychology. As personalistic psychology finds speculative support for its findings in the realm of final causality in personalistic philosophy, the two share mutual interpenetration. Personalistic philosophy depends upon personalistic psychology for its psychological data.

3. Nature of the Data

As the first part of this study will be a brief survey of some contemporary schools of psychology in their implications for understanding religion, they have been grouped under four main headings: typological, behavioristic, Gestalt, and depth psychologies. The selection of these four divisions of psychological study is to guide somewhat developmentally the study of religious intimations in concepts of current psychology. In order to do as much justice as possible to each school in such a brief survey, the psychologists who have exerted a great deal of historical influence in their field and who, as well, have treated some of the topics that may be related to a better understanding of religion are those selected for study.

Eduard Spranger, whose Lebensformen (Types of Men) is often cited is generally considered to be a prominent representative of typological psychology. His typology is based upon values rather than physiology. Most current typologies are based on physiological characteristics of per-
son's. Since religion is primarily a value experience, Spranger's typology for the purpose of this dissertation well represents typological psychology.

The late Kurt Lewin more than the other prominent Gestaltists concentrated his studies on the whole person in his relationships with his environment. Köhler and Koffka, the other two prominent Gestaltists, were more or less pioneers in the movement and appeared to be more interested in perception and animal psychology. However, both have contributed to problems of experience and personality. Nevertheless, it should be worthwhile to compare the dynamic theory of personality of Lewin's to those of the personalistic psychologists.

Orthodox behaviorism is represented by J. B. Watson. However, many contemporary behaviorists are far removed from Watson's original tenets. A leading behaviorist, E. C. Tolman, represents the typical modern behaviorism. The basic tenets are the same, but a view more consistent with a widened scope of problems makes his views more representative of contemporary behaviorism. His writings on personality comprise one view of motor psychologies.

Depth psychology since Freud has been divided into several protestant groups against orthodox Freudianism. The implications for understanding religion may be seen from one of these representatives of depth psychology. The original
point of view of Freud, the founder, takes an anti-religious view. Carl Jung, who is widely acclaimed by religionists is studied because he represents a somewhat neutral or impartial point of view. Fritz Kunkel for his open advocacy of religion represents the pro-religious view. Alfred Adler's individual psychology obviously has many implications for religion. However, both are omitted arbitrarily for convenience. The impartial view of Jung seems fairer to depth psychology in representing its concepts related to religion.

Since the main problem of this dissertation is to determine the suggestions for understanding religion and religious persons, the personalistic psychologists are treated in detail. This division of the data requires a more explicit understanding and background.

There are many psychologists who share the personalistic ways of thinking up to a certain point. Some of these may be called personalists in a limited way. For example, Wundt, Titchener, and James defined psychology as the study of experience as dependent upon some personal subject. But, having made the definition, all three proceeded as if unaware of the latter part of their definition. Since the works of such writers do not follow up the personalistic trend of thought, they will not be considered data for this study.

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The data for this study are the writings of those authors who have contributed directly to the main stream of personalistic thinking. Another criterion for the data is that the author's influence has been instrumental in the dissemination and defense of personalistic psychology. In other words, the data consists of the writings of unmistakable personalists. Those writers whose interests were in the person secondarily to other emphases in psychology are not considered as the data of this study. Borden Parker Bowne, Mary Whiton Calkins, William Stern, and Gordon Willard Allport seem to be the main representatives of personalistic psychology.

Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), late professor of philosophy in Boston University, is considered to be the systematizer of personalism. Bowne was born at Leonardville, New Jersey on January 14, 1847. He was graduated from New York University in 1871 and studied from 1873 to 1875 at the Universities of Gottingen, Paris, and Halle. He was especially influenced by the philosophers Lotze and Ulrici. He became professor of philosophy in Boston University in 1876 and held this post until his death despite many more attractive offers from such universities as Yale, Chicago, and Johns Hopkins.12

Bowne's greatest interest was in philosophy as was the

12 Ibid., p. 19.
case with most of such writers at the time. Only one of more than a dozen published works was specifically on psychology. Even among his many articles in various journals only a few dwell specifically on psychology. But in his Introduction to Psychological Theory\textsuperscript{13} are to be found some of the foundations of personalistic psychology that will be discovered again and again by later psychologists in the future. For Bowne, personality was as ultimate a principle psychologically as it was philosophically. He was one of the first to use the term "personalism" in the English language.\textsuperscript{14} His influence is felt now more than when he lived because of the number and quality of students he influenced. It is with the psychological data of Bowne that this study begins.

The writings of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) covered a wide range of psychological and philosophical subjects. They were in the main a development of Josiah Royce's monistic and personalistic idealism. Born in Hartford, Connecticut on March 30, 1863, Miss Calkins attended Smith and Radcliffe Colleges. She studied as a guest of Harvard University and also studied at the University of Leipzig. She began teaching at Wellesley College in 1887 and continued there until her death on February 26, 1930.

The great majority of her almost one hundred published

\textsuperscript{13} Published in 1886 by Harper Brothers in New York.

\textsuperscript{14} Knudson, Philosophy of Personalism, p. 17.
articles and books were for the advocacy and defense of the personalistic trend of thought. She is probably the most widely quoted author on self-psychology. Her writings constitute the second phase of the development of personalistic psychology.

In 1906 a young German psychologist published the first volume of a philosophical work called Person und Sache in which he set forth the foundations of a system that he called "Critical Personalism". This young psychologist was William Stern who was born April 29, 1871 in Berlin. He did his college and graduate work at the University of Berlin. His views were affected by Ebbinghaus, Wundt, and Dilthey in the field of psychology. His philosophy was influenced by the works of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Stern taught for nineteen years at the University of Breslau before going to the newly created University of Hamburg. There he remained until coming to America after being expelled by the Nazis in 1935. He taught at Duke University until his death two years later.

Stern made significant contributions in a half dozen fields of psychology, notably in differential and child psychology. He arrived at his system of personalism using the knowledge and experience he had gained from many years of work in psychology. The undivided totality of the person is the point of departure throughout. He regarded his psycholo-
gy as a branch of a more generalized science of **Personalistics** which is outlined with its bearings on metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology in the three volumes of *Person und Sache*. However, his *Psychologie auf Personalimus Grundpunkt* was not published until 1937. His most widely known student in America is Gordon W. Allport.

Gordon Willard Allport (1897-), although aware of philosophical problems, is the only personalistic psychologist in the study who has not developed a philosophical system. His writings have been mainly on the psychological level. Allport was born in Montezuma, Indiana, on November 11, 1897. He received his college and graduate degrees from Harvard University. He studied also at the Universities of Hamburg, Berlin, and Cambridge. He taught at Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey, and Dartmouth College before coming to Harvard to teach. He has remained at Harvard until the present time.

Although he was influenced a great deal by William Stern, Allport has nevertheless developed his own personalistic psychology. His contributions have been mainly in the field of personality. He has been very influential in helping to remove the study of personality from the borderline of the sciences and putting it on an empirical basis. His emphasis on the expansion of the bounds of psychology to include the person has been well placed. Because he represents
one of the contemporary peaks in the development of personalistic psychology his writings constitute the final data of this study.


The data for this study are gathered from library resources. Such data consist of the principal psychological writings of the four main representatives of personalistic psychology. With this are included such secondary sources as have a direct bearing on the respective representatives and issues of this thesis.

The main writings of the representatives of the other current psychologies selected for study are data for this study for the purpose of comparison and contrast.

The data are treated as developed in historical sequence except that personalistic psychology is treated last. But its representatives are treated as they developed in historical sequence.

The current psychologies other than personalistic psychology are treated with respect to their general position toward religion as well as the philosophical position which helps to determine their attitude, whether such philosophical position is expressed or implied. An attempt is made to discern just what their conception of the origin and motive of religion is. Does religion serve any purpose or have any
value in personality? If so, what is it, and if not, why? The attempt is to determine the emphases of each psychology and its effects for a psychological understanding of religion.

5. Definitions

Religion is defined as cooperation and communication with the Creator and Sustainer of values. The cooperation and communication are expressed in attitudes, feelings, desires, intentions, and behavior by means of an organized unity of sensing, feeling, thinking, wanting, knowing, oughting, and willing. Cooperation and communication with the Creator and Sustainer of values may be initiated within the person by trauma (a highly intensified experience of God), search, or learning. It is affected by intellectual, physical, temperamental, and emotional needs. As cooperation and communication become organized by the person, religion assumes a driving power that coalesces with other needs or becomes more or less differentiated from them. It seems best characterized as a sentiment. However, it is a sentiment that is embracing in scope, relatively enduring, and striving toward goals.

This definition of religion makes a distinction between personal and institutional religion. The latter is

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a stimulator for personal religion, a mediator (so to speak) between the person and God, and a preserver of religious instrumentalities.

Religious experience is defined as the consciousness of communicating and cooperating with God. It involves awareness, search, recognition, and purposeful activity. Religious behavior refers to the acts involved in cooperation and communication with the Creator and Sustainer of values. Religiosity refers to the arousal and expression of the religious sentiment within the person.

By religious implications is meant what the concepts of psychology reveal for a psychological understanding of religion. Religious implications of a psychology are determined by the relevance, significance, and adequacy of its concepts for understanding religion.

6. Procedure

A frame of reference consisting of those areas of psychology most conducive to a psychological understanding of religion by which the adequacy of psychologies may be determined is given in the second chapter. Some representatives of current psychologies are examined from this point of view as to the adequacy of their concepts. This comprises the third chapter. It will serve as a background of contrast for personalistic psychology.
Bowne's psychology contains some germs of the later development of personalistic psychology. Because Bowne seemed to have had introvert tendencies as regards his contemporaries, he did not gain the popularity commensurate with his attainments. His writings have been largely overlooked by historians. He seldom quoted others, and in turn, was seldom quoted by others. His works, however, still furnish a solid foundation for a personalistic psychology. To indicate this, his psychology is presented in Chapter Three.

Calkins represents another tributary flowing into the main stream of personalism. Most of her writings were in psychology. She has often been designated as one of the greatest defenders of personalism. Her contributions represent, in many respects, a development of suggestions outlined by Bowne and Royce. However, she far exceeded the psychological contributions of Bowne. Some implications of her thought furnish the data for Chapter Five.

Stern brings to personalism a varied background in many fields of psychological research unequalled in richness by other personalists. His psychology represents a reconstruction of general psychology around the person. He creates new concepts and extends old dimensions in order to characterize the unique and individual person. His psychology is examined in the sixth chapter.

Following suggestions outlined by Stern, Allport at-
tempts to extend and reconstruct the bounds of psychology to include the individual person and the organization of his tendencies that characterize his unique adjustments. His contributions toward an adequate understanding of religion are noted in the seventh chapter.

The eighth chapter contains the summary and conclusions.
CHAPTER II

RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY

This chapter is intended as a background against which the merits as well as the demerits of personalistic psychology may be seen for understanding religion. An analysis of religious experience and religious behavior is given so that there may be clarity as to what psychological concepts attempt to explain. A frame of reference by which the adequacy of psychological concepts can be evaluated for an understanding of religion is then given.

1. Religion

1. Religious Experience. Religious experience is the awareness of communication or cooperation with the Creator and Sustainer of values. This awareness may arise through the effect of stimuli symbolic of the Creator or of various aspects of communication and cooperation with Him. It may arise as a result of a conscious search for the stimuli, a search for Him, or from attempts to cooperate with Him. There is an interpretation of the stimuli, a judgment or recognition of His presence or communication with Him.¹

Religious experience may also come about through a learning process (suggestion, imitation, insight, etc.) as well as by direct communication. It inevitably involves conscious processes as well as unconscious processes. There is organization of the experience, a selectivity, guidance, and regulating which is oriented toward the future. It affects behavior tendencies. Because it is an experience of communication and cooperation, it is essentially an interpersonal experience.

This definition of religious experience thus reveals that there is an organized unity of thinking, feeling, knowing, wanting, sensing, and willing. Regardless of how the experience is ultimately generated, it is a conscious experience and must be dealt with on that level. The "why" of such experience involves the problem of motivation. The experience is that of interacting persons. These aspects of the religious experience thus constitute a frame of reference by which the adequacy and usefulness of the concepts of a psychology may be judged for understanding the religious experience.

Religious experience does not stand isolated from behavior. The importance of religious experience such as prayer, meditation, etc., is that it affects behavior. However, what may be judged as religious behavior from the standpoint of the observer, may not be so judged by the in-
individual himself and vice versa.

ii. Religious Behavior. Religious behavior may be defined as the acts of the individual in attempting to communicate or cooperate with God. Such behavior may be conscious, deliberate, and intended or it may be unconscious and automatic. As conscious action, it is marked by its direction toward God or toward the fulfillment or promotion of His Will. When such behavior is unconsciouslly performed, its direction is the same, but such behavior has become ordered under some system which the individual develops to facilitate such adjustment. Thus religious behavior is understood by a knowledge of the personal organization of systems of tendencies to action as well as by a knowledge of the significance of experience for such behavior. The frame of reference therefore includes personality.

Under religious behavior are those aspects of personal religion as the loyal testing of religious beliefs, obedience to the divine will, and acting on religious principles rather than convention.\(^2\) Worship and other forms of group participation for communication and cooperation with God are also significant aspects of religious behavior.

2. Frame of Reference

There are at least five religious problems that psychology can investigate: religious experience, its organization, motivation, the development of enduring systems of behavior tendencies, and its interpersonal character. These factors are directly related to religion and are vital for its understanding. The adequacy of the concepts of a psychology for interpreting religious experience and behavior may be evaluated from such a frame of reference. However, there are two other factors that may be considered. They are the postulates and presuppositions of a psychology. These are dealt with first.

1. Postulates of Psychology. Psychology cannot escape the determinants set by its premises. The postulates of a psychology determine its metaphysical basis as well as its attitude and usefulness to religious understanding, although psychology has no effect upon the truth or validity of religious experience.3 Psychologists postulate at least four propositions in attempting to make psychology an independent science.4 Because psychology is interested in the world in so far as it may become an object of knowledge, "the Existence


of the Material World" must be postulated. Given the material world, psychology is interested in the processes by which we come to know this reality. The nature of the material world is left to metaphysics, physics, geology, etc.

The second postulate is "the Existence of Consciousness." This postulate is essential for psychology in that consciousness is the subject matter of psychology. Consciousness is presupposed by the science of psychology, behaviorism to the contrary notwithstanding. The argument of behaviorism, however, is not that consciousness does not exist, but that the subject matter of psychology is human responses to stimuli. The behaviorist simply has no need for consciousness as the subject matter of psychology, because objective behavior meets his needs. He contends that consciousness is not only non-objective, but confusing as well. Nevertheless, no behaviorist can rationally state that his discernment of the meaning of a response is the product of his viscera and glands, etc. "Organismic behavior" is meaningless unless there is a conscious mind to interpret it. The main fallacy in behaviorism is that the behaviorist uses the most important aspect of

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5 Ibid., p. 159.

6 Ibid., p. 16.

himself, his consciousness, for understanding others, but overlooks the consciousness of others.

The "Interrelation of Consciousness and the Material World" is a very complex postulate. It involves two subordinate postulates, namely, (1) "that consciousness can be studied only so far as it is connected with some definite human organism", and (2) "that the interrelation between consciousness and the world beyond the body (italics in the original) is always through the medium of the individual body ---especially the nervous system......." Moore calls the latter a "psycho-physical" and the former a "psycho-physiological" interrelation.

He holds that the interrelation between consciousness and external objects (beyond the body) is of two types. The first type is the perceptual relation and the second, the conative relation. Thus psychology must postulate a true knowledge of the material world by the mind and an effective power of the mind to make changes in the material world. As this interrelation is indirect and evidence points to behavior caused by consciousness there arises the physiological interrelation between consciousness and its organism. This postulate also involves two subordinate ones. The first is that all mental processes have physiological conditions and the

second is that all mental processes tend to express themselves physiologically. This is the principle of psychocerebral parallelism. It is opposed to the principle of psychophysical interactionism. It is postulated by those who desire to do so because of some evidence and because it fits into their scheme of thinking. It is unacceptable because it may be a part of the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth.

The larger truth seems to lie in the fourth postulate. It is that concerning the principle of independent psychical causation or interactionism. Psychological science postulates the "Uniformity of Mental Life". More complex than the postulates of uniformity of other sciences, the psychologist yet has to postulate a degree of uniformity of mental life along with natural science postulating the uniformity of the world of objects of consciousness. This fourth postulate is not widely held by psychologists, especially the resulting principle of independent psychical causation.

This postulate is usually held by personalists. The basic considerations for this view are the purposiveness of human beings, comprehension, memory, and expectation, and the synthesizing power of the mind. This postulate is to the effect that the mind and the body are distinct and they interact with each other. Thus the mind is not a product of

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the body, neither does it merely reflect the body; the mind is capable of initiating thought and actions of which the body is the registering accompaniment. Likewise, bodily conditions may affect the mind.

Parallelism errs in overlooking the fact that there is a difference between bodily and mental activities and the facts that there is no one-to-one correspondence and interdependence between them. Mental processes are non-spatial whereas bodily processes are successive or side by side. Conscious striving, furthermore, is unknown outside of the mind. If one accepts the principle of psychophysical parallelism, then one understands religion as the psychological accompaniment of bodily processes. In that case, the religious quest is doomed before it is started because the awareness, search, and recognition of God is but a psychological manifestation of physiological processes. It leads to a dead end. The principle of psychophysical interaction is more pregnant with possibilities. As such, it is more relevant to a psychological understanding of religion because it gives a more coherent basis for physiological reactions as a result of psychological causes such as religious belief, prayer, etc.

The acceptance of psychophysical interactionism leads to an understanding of religion in terms of conscious striving, intention, and expectation, which may be affected by
conditions of the body, but not necessarily determined by them.

ii. Presuppositions. There are philosophical presuppositions that mark psychologies and help to determine their value for understanding religion. Psychologies whose world view presupposes that the world is a machine and that mental phenomena are mechanically determined, see no purpose in the world. All is determined by mechanical antecedents.\(^{10}\) There is no room for independent psychical causation. This presupposition stems from the isomorphic, epiphenomenal, and parallelistic postulates. Such a presupposition precludes the essential purpose of religion. The world not being designed by an Intelligence, all is left to mere chance. Many philosophical and all religions testify to the inadequacy of such a view.

The postulate of interactionism leads to a presupposition that the world is a result of intelligence and that there is a plan which man discovers (natural laws). It indicates that religion may have a sound basis. At least, it does not prejudice one in advance either way.

A psychology may be characterized by an anti-rationalistic bias. By this is meant that the psychologist attempts to resort to sensory experimental verification alone for

\(^{10}\) E. S. Brightman, *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 251f.
truth. He abhors rational psychology as nature abhors a vacuum. That much of the data of psychology cannot be subjected to universal experimental verification is a fact because each individual exhibits manifestations that are unique and lawful only to the individual and general conclusions must be based upon reason. Witness experimental verification of an experience of love, for example, if one can. Such a bias stems, in part at least, from rejecting the method of introspection. It so happens that religious experience cannot always be subjected to many experimental tests. As a result of a lack of rational interpretations of introspection in a psychology, there exists very little helpfulness for understanding religion because religious experience is mostly private and has to be studied introspectively.

iii. The Self. As a result of mechanistic and deterministic emphases there is little need for a director and governor of responses in some psychologies and no possibility of the person having any freedom or choice of responses. As an objection to such antipathy to experience, concepts of self, person, ego, and the like, account for the "unity and multiplicity, continuity, and change, identity and difference within human experience". 11

Psychologically, the person-concept seeks to explain religion in terms of the organized whole of multitudinous responses. It seeks to escape microscopic views of explanation in terms of atoms and elements of behavior such as the reflex arc, stimulus-response, and unconscious mechanism.\(^\text{12}\) While these parts of the whole have an important function, they are of necessity to be viewed only as parts. The self concept seeks to give objective perspective to the whole of experience and to its parts. Such a concept seems indispensable for a psychological understanding of religion as well as personality. How else could the unity, identity, and multiplicity of experience be explained than by such a concept?\(^\text{13}\) The self gives a unifier and identifier of the many conscious actions. It unites past and future with the present and gives order to what otherwise would be chaos. Psychologies that overlook such a regulatory principle miss an important aspect of the meaning of religion to the person. They fail to state whether the body is the experiencer, or just what experiences.

iv. Experience. The fragmentary life of consciousness is the life of experience. Johnson has outlined at least


four steps in the process of becoming conscious. These steps are selective attention, a process of search, a judgment of recognition, and purposeful activity. Experience and the process of becoming aware are overlooked by behaviorists. Watson once defined personality as "but the end product of our habit systems".

Because religion is a conscious process it can be dealt with most adequately by a psychology of consciousness. Unconsciousness, mechanisms, habits, and glands may affect the process of consciousness, but religion is nevertheless first and foremost a conscious experience. The unconscious and super-conscious phases are supplements to explaining the conscious religious experience.

v. Motivation. There seems to be a tendency now to view psychology as a study of human dynamics. Such a view is not new. It continues the viewpoint of the older psychologists who considered the aim of psychology as "the workings of the mind". As psychology has become divided

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into more and more fields of specialization there have resulted different ideas concerning its subject matter. Today the depth, hemic, and functional psychologies have reinstated the dynamic trend. Practically all subjects that psychology investigates are being studied from the point of view of causal relations. Religion is no exception.

Religion is being subjected to scrutiny as to the dynamics within the person that motivate the process of becoming religious and the religious experience itself. There can be no adequate understanding of religion without an understanding of the dynamics of the person because a knowledge of what prompts experience and behavior may give a clue to its nature.

There has been a considerable degree of uncertainty as to the nature of human dynamics. The question is still far from being permanently settled. Instincts, drives, urges, and psychoanalytic mechanisms, and a host of other concepts have been advanced as explanations.17 A test of dynamic concepts has been stated by G. W. Allport.13 Allport states that the units of motivational structure should measure up to the requirements of being dynamic, unique, personal, and

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17 For a review of modern concepts of motivation, see M. Sherman, Mental Conflicts and Personality (New York: Longmans Green, 1933), pp. 31. Also P. T. Young, Motivation in Behavior (New York: Wiley Co., 1938).

ultimate.

Measured by such criteria, it is obvious that many concepts will fall by the wayside. In examining the religious implications of the personalistic school of psychology, close scrutiny is attempted in order to evaluate the relative usefulness of the dynamic concepts set forth by the psychologists. Usefulness in explaining the religiosity of men demands dynamic concepts in a psychology for a more adequate understanding of religion because religion is not static. Each experience is different for each person at different times. Its effects vary both within the person and from person to person.

vi. Personality. The central features of human behavior are those structuring activities of the person. By this is meant those enduring systems organized uniquely and which help determine the individuals characteristic adjustment to his environment. Psychologies that take rats, machines, infants, and mentally sick persons for their models appear to be less adequate for dealing with the complex psychophysical systems of the majority of society than the psychologies which make the study of human personality their main aim. Without question, the former aims are legitimate and useful when results are stated in terms of the behavior of rats, machines, etc. Were it not possible to study personality,
the analogy between the behavior of animals and adults would, as a matter of course, be accepted as the best possible information as to the mental life of human beings. However, there are psychologists who are demonstrating their efficacy in the field of personality.19

There is very little in the behavior of mechanisms and rats, that could correspond to religious phenomena. Although mentally sick persons may experience phenomena of religion in their personal lives, all too often the delusions and illusions as well as false (unsupported) analogies are taken to be the experience of all people, healthy and sick. William James' distinction between the "healthy-minded and morbid-minded" religion apparently fails to impress such psychologists.20 Psychology must account for the consistent behavior of persons toward religious ideas and objects in terms of both degree and manner. There must be some account of why such behavior is similar or dissimilar to the person's behavior to other ideas and objects. It is mainly in this sphere that the field of personality is relevant to understanding religion.

vii. Interpersonal Relations. For a better and more

19 The foremost in America are G. Allport and G. Murphy, and P. E. Vernon in England.

20 James, Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Longmans Green, 1902), pp. 78f.
mature understanding of religious phenomena in human behavior and experience the field of personality seems to extend the boundaries of modern psychology. "Religion develops in persons" (italics in the original) and religion cannot be understood apart from the developing persons.21 Indeed, it cannot be understood apart from the development of the persons and the environment (other persons, too) in which he develops. The study of personality aids the understanding of religion, but it is not the whole story. There would hardly be any personality if there were no objective environment. As "man is a creature that responds to other men in as full a sense as he responds to oxygen and gravity", the psychology of interpersonal relations must be included. Because religion is highly socialized, there must be some understanding of its social character. A psychology thus has to present a sound basis for social psychology for understanding his aspect of religion.

Ordinarily social psychology alone tends to emphasize the group without adequately treating developmental processes of interpersonal adjustments. Such an emphasis has led F. H. Allport to reject what he calls the "group fallacy" and to substitute individual psychology as the subject-matter of


social psychology. However, J. K. Folsom synthesizes the contrasting views of the subject-matter of social psychology as being, on the one hand, the group as an organic whole, and on the other, the group as an aggregate of individuals. The group as a whole does not behave, but acts according to a pattern of interaction of its components in individuals. "This interactionology deals with the inter-relations of attitudes and wishes within the group, as distinguished from the material culture activities and bonds of social organization". Thus social psychology means the science of the interaction of persons.

The church as a social institution seeks to propagate and stimulate religious ideas and actions. As a social institution it provides the means for the interaction of persons to promote and guide religious development. Thus religion is better understood in the knowledge of interpersonal relations for the attitudes and wishes expressed and stimulated by other persons affect greatly the religion of the individual.

CHAPTER III

SOME CURRENT PSYCHOLOGIES AND RELIGION

The major contemporary psychological views are divided into four classifications - structural, motor, depth, and personalistic. By considering the scientific models that these different views represent, the understanding of religion may be discerned in the light of the emphases of these four views. Each of the views considerably overlaps and interpenetrates with the others. Nevertheless the concepts and ideas of the psychologists appear to be constant as pertains to the particular approaches. Some psychologists, notably behaviorists and Freidians, almost go to the point of dogmatism when there is a question of the subject-matter and approach of psychology.

In this section we shall present a critique of the concepts of psychological views as they pertain to religion. Under the structural views are considered typological and Gestalt psychology. The motor approach consists of a brief examination of behaviorism. Depth psychologies are represented by the views of Carl Jung. Personalistic views are treated in the following chapters.

Structural psychologies are interested in the pattern or Gestalt of related mental contents. The structure of
personality and the pattern of inter-related mental items is the central focus of attention. Such views contemporarily take two forms: (a) typological and (b) Gestalt psychologies. The former stressing types of persons and the latter patterns of mental structure within the person.

1. Typological Psychology

Psychologies that emphasize different traits or characteristics as differentiating enduring structure of personality are called typological psychologies. They are based upon the assumption "that personality is characterized by a more or less enduring structure." Typological psychology is characterized by a variety of approaches to personality which include the approaches from the points of view of abnormal psychology, cognitive function, constitution, and values. Since religion is primarily concerned with values, a value approach is examined.

There are many criticisms against typologies. MacKinnon says that they are generally too crude, overlap, are difficult to prove and disprove, and most have received very little positive experimental verification. Allport criti-

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2 Ibid., p. 23f.
izes the biosocial reference of types by the observation that "types exist not in people or nature, but rather in the eye of the observer". He further states that a typology is a means used by a psychologist to glorify his special interest at the expense of the total life of the person. Typologies are abstract, artificial categories. They fail to do justice to the richness and variety of personality and are thus a mere half-way approach to individuality. This caustic criticisms serve to modify undue exuberance over this particular approach.

Edward Spranger describes the dominant types of meanings that are exhibited in the total organization of personalities resulting from their interaction with their cultural environment. His method is to abstract a psychic value tendency, idealize it and relate it to the total cultural environment including other persons.

Spranger's a priori list includes the theoretic, economic, esthetic, social, political, and religious types. The religious type is considered in greater detail by Spranger than any of the other types. By devoting a full chapter to

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4 Ibid., pp. 13f.
5 E. Spranger, Types of Men, Tr. P. Pigors (Halle: Nie- meyers Verlag, 1928).
the religious type and numerous references of a factual rather than prejudiced (either for or against) nature, Spranger may be said to be generally favorable to religion as compared to some psychologists.

Spranger's typology is characterized by a marked philosophical emphasis. In distinguishing between scientific and philosophical psychology, he states that "a pure psychology should only investigate differences which can be experienced regardless of whether or not there are phenomena on the physical side which could themselves be further analyzed." The emphasis is on experience as an experienced whole. The soul is an abbreviation for the inclusive concept of an individual's actions, reactions, and experiences. That the soul is more than a teleological aspect is indicated in his method, in his concept of the self, as well as in religion. The Geisteswissenschaft of which his psychology is a part is mainly concerned with the super-individual mental configurations of value which have become detached from the experiencing selves. Far from presupposing a mechanistic and deterministic conception of personality, Spranger's central thought is on the value-striving of the individual. In fact, his whole philosophical basis in the first part of this book consists of

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6 Ibid., p. 8.
7 Ibid., p. 13.
pointing at the necessary philosophical presuppositions for understanding persons. Thus Spranger's presuppositions create a favorable atmosphere for understanding religious persons.

However, such presuppositions are peculiar to Spranger and the *Kulturwissenschaft* school. Most other typologies, notably those approaches from the points of view of cognitive function and constitution appear to presuppose an environmental and physique determinism.

1. The Self. Spranger holds that the relating of a single experience to the total meaning of life ideally gives religious significance to the mental act. "The meaning of religious experience is this value relation which is necessarily a total experience." In considering this relation of a single experience to total meaning, the question arises, "In whom is this taking place?" M. W. Calkins used a similar question to arouse her contemporaries to the need for a stabilizing and guiding concept for psychophysical activities. The answer that was usually given had its analogy in the physiologist not having need of asking whose muscle he was

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9 E. Spranger, *Types of Men*, p. 27.
10 Ibid., p. 42.
The error in such an answer may be seen by the possible answers to the question put to the physiologist that need not enter into the realm of metaphysics. The physiologist has alternatives of asserting that the muscle he is studying exists only in itself and he studies it only in relation to itself and not in relation to the tissues, organs, circulation, and the physical body as a whole. Or he may answer that it is a certain organ's muscle or the physical body's muscle, each of which is a larger inter-related whole. The latter answer is the more probable and scientific. Such an answer corresponds to the answer that the psychologist should give to the question, whose psycho-physical activity? The answer can only be in terms of a concept of a regulator, carrier, and adjustor of the individual activities. It corresponds to the inter-related whole of the physical body in the psychical realm. Spranger gives such an answer.

Spranger's psychology takes into account the fact that "the essence of mental acts is that they issue from a unitary individual consciousness, a self, and are directed to a not-self". He agrees with K. Oesterreich that the self is the independent unitary prius of all acts, contents, functions, and conditions which are found in it.

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12 Spranger, *Types of Men*, p. 84.
In a manner somewhat reminiscent of William James, Spranger sees several levels of selfhood. James' levels are based on the objectification of the self in its relations to its environment with the spiritual self acting as unifier. Spranger's levels of selfhood are based on the positivistically interpreted contents of the mind related to the acts in which an object is grasped. Thus there are as many interpretations or levels of self as there are objective regions of significance into which the individual process of acts and experiences is interwoven. He accordingly sets up six levels of self in accordance with six specific classes of value. The pure ego is thought of as the subject of the instinct of self-preservation and of all physical urges and instincts. (Curiously, a note of ambiguity creeps into this pure ego in that it is also called the biological self and the physical self.) Mental regulators do not set in until later. This conception of the pure ego utilizes only sense and motor organs because of their biological importance. From this, Spranger goes on to designate the theoretic, aesthetic, economic, and the religious self.

Spranger, like James, sees the religious self as the ultimate expansion of the soul. It "abolishes individuation

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14 E. Spranger, *Types of Men*, p. 89.
and leads to the highest blessedness, to salvation." It is not only the focal point of value experience, but also of norm experiences. The religious self is the most inclusive that a human being can achieve.

Thus the self concept is given much attention in Spranger's typology. However, the pure self or ego is obscure and it could be easily said that it amounts to a basic concept of motivation such as the Elan Vital. The religious self which acts as a coordinator of the other attitudes is developed out of the historico-cultural environment.

Such a self appears to resemble closely the spiritual me of James' and performs the functions of similar concepts (without the religious aspect) in several other psychologies. Such a consideration of several selves results in the weakness generally inherent in typologies, namely, lack of continuity in the concrete individual. To have a separate self performing religiously, splits religiosity off from the rest of life into a dissociated personality.

ii. Experience. One distinct advantage of Spranger's typology is the emphasis on the conscious experience of the individual. While his typology is supposedly based on certain attitudes, Spranger recognizes that attitudes are the results of conscious experience as well as unconscious experi-
ience (the absorption of cultural norms and values). Each type is characterized by a philosophy of life in line with his attitude. As a result of the emphasis on conscious experience he naturally arrives at a personality type characterized by the religious attitude. Those typologies based upon physique and abnormalities could hardly do this.

iii. **Views on Religion.** Spranger defines religiosity as the condition in which a single experience is either positively or negatively related to the total value of life. Here is seen more clearly the confusion wrought by considering a "religious self" along with other selves. Spranger seems to confuse the "religious self" with the "pure self" or "pure ego." The latter has the over-all perspective to relate single experiences to the total value of life. Religious objects are the objective contexts in which these deepest value experiences are created. Religion is that inclusive concept of objective-mental forms in which these value relations are expressed as dogmas or cults. He states that by his definition nothing is outside the realm of religion. Such a definition would lead to meaninglessness were it not for his explanation. Religious meaning is the relation to the value totality which culminates in the highest value, and God is that final being who is the meaning of the world, or is created mentally as that which endows it with meaning.16

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16 Ibid., p. 211.
Psychologically, God is the objective principle which is thought of as the object of the highest personal value experience. Thus Spranger indicates that human nature is such that religion is basic to it and that human beings conceive a God because of a realization of higher personal value experiences. Such a view is in line with personalistic thought. But an understanding of human nature by means of any typology, as has been indicated by the critics of typological psychology, is necessarily abstract. Without an adequate understanding of the whole person as he experiences religion only a snapshot of the person (in religiosity) is seen in typologies.

Religion performs a valuable function in the personality of the individual who experiences it according to Spranger. Its roots may be instinctive or rational, but nevertheless its function is to give meaning to the world. The religious attitude serves to direct the whole mental structure to the creation of the highest and absolutely satisfying value experience. Apparently Spranger holds to the axiom that origin does not determine value and holds to the scientific method of description rather than drifting into metaphysics by seeking ultimate causes of religion. It can be discerned that Spranger holds to the view that attitudes have the power to initiate and guide consistent forms of behavior. Attitudes to Spranger thus seem to be more important aspects of personality than specific habits. His whole typology attests
to his conviction. Such a consideration also is in line with personalistic thought as will be seen in the seventh chapter.

Spranger’s broad definition of religion seems to lessen its usefulness for understanding the true nature of religion. He is adamant in his statement that he wants to "emphasize not the specific direction of the mind, but the fact that in every attitude the entire meaning of the world can be grasped",\(^\text{17}\) and that a man thus becomes religious when he attempts to fathom the meaning of the world through his particular attitude. In such a case religion is not a particular world view, but an end of any world view, even an atheistic one because of the one-sided emphasis on seeking the meaning of reality without any action toward conserving and promoting value in cooperation with the "Final Meaning".

Spranger sees the religious life as being of three types: the immanent mystic, the transcendental mystic and the mixed type. The immanent mystic is life-affirming; the transcendental is life-negating. By mystic he means any point of view which "searches for the absolute unity of the highest values".\(^\text{18}\) Because of the abstractness of his definitions it is difficult to see the distinction between

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\(^\text{17}\) E. Spranger, *Types of Men*, pp. 214 and 215.

\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., p. 213.
mysticism and religion. The word "mystic" seems to be a synonym for "religious person". In both types of mysticism nothing is valuable per se, everything is permeated with God and filled with a higher meaning. Everything finite is a mirror of the infinite. The religious person depends not on knowledge, but on the value attitude of faith or trust. This attitude is supported by the whole range of values experienced by the person and by the validity of those values he experiences as highest. Thus religion is based on the experience of values rather than a mere knowledge of values.

iv. Theory of Motivation. The theory of instincts was in good standing at the time that Spranger wrote. Spranger recognizes instincts as well as needs and impulses. He speaks of "instinctive forms of self preservation". "The rational guiding rules (of the mind) are not in consciousness......they are unconsciously present in the mind, as it were, instinctive". A kind of lawfulness is spoken of that is a sort of immanent driving force and is given the name of instinctive rationality. This instinctive rationality is a feeling of our ultimate mental destination or conscience. It appears that Spranger sees instincts as the basic driving forces of personality. He gives no list other than implying

\[\text{Ibid., p. 65.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 79.}\]
the six basic attitudes. The question at hand is whether
the theory of instincts alone, is satisfactory to account for
religious motivation. Are they unique, dynamic, personal,
and ultimate enough to account for the uniqueness and varieties
of religious experience and behavior?

The theory of instincts has not stood up well under ex-
periment and cogent questioning according to current psycholo-
gists. There are other psychologists who will be considered
in this study who base their psychologies on an instinct the-
ory. So it is well to examine briefly the theory of in-
stincts in order to criticize Spranger.

Some of the main criticisms against instincts are that
they are abstractions, they fail to account for the diversity
of human purposes, they are mere names for the problem of mo-
tivation and not an explanation of the problem, they are not
universal, and they cannot be experimentally verified. Each
Another main criticism is that there has been no agreement on
how many instincts there are and what they are. The classic
instinctivist MacDougall holds that the normal individual has
in common with other normal individuals certain purposive

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Footnote: These criticisms are taken from Johnson, Psychology
of Religion, p. 402f., G. Allport, Personality, p. 112, and
p. 409. Also see G. Murphy, Historical Introduction to Psy-
chology (London: Paul, Tranch, Truber Co., 1938), Ch. 20.
tendencies which constitute the underlying sources of behavior. Other things being equal, each tendency renders the individual sensitive to stimuli of a certain class and leads to a characteristic form of response. They do not operate mechanically, but are a more or less loose gearing of the means of response (abilities) to the end to be achieved. They can be trained. They may be physiological or psychological. He accounts for unique behavior by sentiment-formation.

Even with such a broad view of instincts they fail to measure up to being dynamic. Whatever the predisposition is, it is fixed. Modification by training seems to indicate a contradiction or, at least, the possibility that the training rather than the instinct causes human behavior attributed to instincts. With a theory of instincts explaining human motivation, there is no unique human behavior or goal. All behavior is a mere expression of one or a combination of a list of instincts. Instincts are more universal than personal. They operate more or less independently of their possessor by depending on the stimulating object. Thus they are not the potentialities for choice of action, but arise spontaneously in the presence of certain stimuli. Instincts do appear to be ultimate, but Knight Dunlap doubts that they are. He considers doctrines of instincts as mere explana-

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The names of instincts are useful for classifying goals of human beings, but in themselves they are vague in explaining what produces behavior.

It appears that Springer's typology is based upon a theory of motivation in human nature that is not acceptable without some other concepts depicting uniqueness. The weakness in Springer's typology seems to lie mainly in the fact that he considered mainly instincts as a source without an adequate consideration of how higher drives or motives are derived from basic instincts. Whether instincts are acceptable or not is not the question, but rather, are the levels of human motivation accounted for which produce religious behavior. This Springer's typology misses.

v. Personality Structure. Springer's method of selecting and isolating ideal types of persons by considering the values that seem to dominate each life is helpful in understanding types of persons. But it is not easy to discern the structure of the individual personality except by the six attitudes that are postulated as ideals. These attitudes are arrived at by considering the individual mental acts, the elemental mental laws, and subjective spheres of interest and objective levels, all of which have a correspondence to the six types of attitudes. Any one of the six may be dominant.

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23 Knight Dunlap, Personal Adjustment, p. 410.
in a personality. Whichever of the six is most dominant leaves the structure of the personality a subordination of levels of the remaining five attitudes. But the attitudes represent complex levels of integration of other factors. Springer does not consider the intermediary steps in the formation of attitudes which may have an influence on the type of person other than the fact that historical and cultural factors enter into such a formation. Neither is the process by which one attitude may be substituted for another attitude taken up. A conversion experience wherein an economic attitude is forsaken and a religious one becomes dominant is not considered. As in other typologies, Springer's typology allows dominant traits to appear deterministic, that is, no allowance is made for the voluntary choices of the individual. Whatever the structure of his personality is, the individual is more or less a victim of his personality rather than the personality structure being an area of his environment which the self creates and acts through, but is still capable of change.

vi. Interpersonal Relations. It is in the area of interpersonal relationships that most typologies fail to give adequate attention. Considering the individual as an isolated, independent whole does not make for understanding the genesis of the whole. The factors of learning, language, and condi-
tioni ng, as well as many others, stem from interpersonal relationships. Their importance for personal goals, attitudes, and actions of religion are as important as the inner drives, structure, and formation of the person. That Spranger attempts to overcome this deficiency of treatment is indicated by his statement,

...No subject can be separated from its objective counterpart, since subject and object can only be understood in terms of their mutual relations... This science is occupied with transsubjective and collective creations which concern individuals in over-individual effectual relations.²⁴

Thus Spranger attempts to indicate that man is as much an end product of forces that envelop him from without as well as from within. Another indication of Spranger's recognition and insistence upon the importance of interpersonal relationships lies specifically in the area of religion. He contends that in the religious total evaluation, no sphere of life stands higher than the social.²⁵ The social emphasis in most religions is with regard to the bond of love that unites suffering humanity. The increasing social cooperativeness of religion makes such an emphasis necessary for its understanding not only of itself, but for the understanding of the part it plays in the formation of a personality with a cardinal religious trait.

²⁴ Spranger, Types of Men, p. 6.
²⁵ Ibid., p. 231.
vii. Summary. Typological psychology as represented by Eduard Spranger's writings on the subject is not adverse to religion nor to religious persons. The attempt to understand specifically the religious person as well as persons with other dominant interests and attitudes makes it preferable to some other typologies. Nevertheless, the understanding that one gets is an abstract comprehension as in all typologies. Typological psychology seems to gain understanding of a frozen personality and thus misses the dynamic flow of energies in the changes and varieties of the living person in social relations, and especially in religious experience and behavior.

Typological psychology is helpful for understanding a selected characteristic of the person. It indicates that one may have a strong religious sentiment. Even then, however, the selected characteristic is hardly ever applicable to more than a few people in so far as its degree and manner of expression are concerned. Constellations of energies within and without the person prevent a static portrayal of the workings of any specific attitude. What religious understanding psychologically gains from universality, it loses in specificity. No basis is presented for understanding the particular individual and his religious experience. Typological psychology presents starting points for understanding religion, but one gains no account of specific religious
motivation, how it works, and its result in the whole person. From our frame of reference, it is inadequate for understanding religion.

2. GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

The Gestalt school of psychology is a part of a wider protestant movement against elementarism in psychology. Its influence has served also as a check against excessive behaviorism. However, most of the work in this school has been directed to the field of perception. Kurt Lewin has done much of his work in the field of motivation and personality structure. He has thus tended to broaden the scope of problems approached from the Gestaltist point of view.

In the following brief examination of subjects of importance for a psychological understanding of religion, the treatment is by no means adequate to do justice to Gestalt psychology as a whole nor to religion as a whole. Lewin nor any of the other leading Gestaltists give any considerable attention to phenomena of religion.

Kurt Lewin, whose views are examined here, is probably not what one would call an orthodox Gestaltist. Although he still maintains the general traditions of emphasizing wholeness, patterns, and perceptions, he has branched out and developed what is called topological and vector psychology. Topology is a branch of mathematics which deals only with
the most abstract or generalized properties of space, namely, with part-whole relations. Vector psychology is a generalized motivational psychology which studies the more complex aspects of activity.

i. Presuppositions. Kurt Lewin's branch of Gestalt psychology is based on presuppositions similar to those of some of the older sciences. In psychology there has been much argument concerning laws. The tendency has been to base lawfulness on regularity and frequency, considering the individual case as a matter of chance. Lewin agrees with the first two assumptions, but holds that the individual case is likewise lawful. This is in direct opposition to the many psychologists who hold the individual person to be of no significance in so far as he deviates from the great majority. The implications of such a claim are important for scientific results that establish the worth of the individual person.

Lewin's second and very important postulate is that concerning the teleology-mechanism antithesis. The nature of an object does not wholly determine its direction. Antecedent factors are important causal determinants but do not com-


28 Ibid., p. 29f.
prise the whole truth. And neither does the nature of an object wholly regulate its purposive function. The environment or situation in which action takes place assumes as much importance as the object or person. In other words, the whole determines the function of the parts rather than the parts determining the function of the whole. Such a view is not necessarily antagonistic to religion, and tends to be more in harmony with it than postulates of some psychologies because it indicates the the world is a product of intelligence rather than depending upon chance happenings to determine its destiny.

ii. The Ego. In speaking of the dynamic homogeneity of the mind, Lewin is aware that many psychologists consider the mind to be the very prototype of unity. Lewin, however, questions whether that which may be called the self or ego is the psychical totality or mind. The indication is that the self is merely one system or complex of systems, a functional part-region within this psychical totality. Individuality or uniqueness might be present even if the psychical totality (mind) presented no firm unity. It is important that in

29 A more specific and vigorous exposition of this view is found in W. Köhler's Gestalt Psychology (New York: Liveright Co., 1947), p. 121ff.

30 Lewin, Dynamic Theory of Personality, p. 56.

31 Ibid., p. 57.
referring to the self, Lewin cites William James' conception.32 James' consideration of the self was the self as perceived, or the "me", although he uses the spiritual self to unify the others.33 Thus Lewin sees the self as only a functional part-region within the mind and hence the mind not necessarily needing firm unity. However, besides the fact that this view is contrary to common sense, the human mind would be in an awful predicament if there were no unifying agent to regulate and coalesce the different functional part-regions (selves).

It is true that there would still be individuality and uniqueness, but it would be to such an extent that the different part-regions could run rampant and experience and behavior would be meaningless chaos. Recent psychologists give a more refined conception of the self than that presented by James,34 to whom Lewin refers.

Lewin is nevertheless aware of the importance of the self as it is conceived by modern psychologists. It seems to him that

It would be natural from Gestalt theoretical considerations to understand the self in terms of the psychical totality perhaps as its structural individuality. . . . . Some such notion is basic to the concept of character, for the adequate concep-

32 Ibid., see note p. 56.

33 See his Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Chapter X.

tion of which one must start,...from the whole of the person. If...one comes to the problem of the psychical dynamic systems, the attempt will in all probability be made to identify the self with the whole of the psychical totality.\textsuperscript{35}

Lewin holds that the facts drive one in the opposite direction to the view that a special region within the psychical totality must be defined as the self. These two main facts are (1) not every psychically existent system would belong to this central self. "Not all the things, men, and environmental regions which I know and which may be very important to me, belong to my self." (2) "Not every tense psychical system would stand in communication with this self." The tensions which have to do with the self would also have a special functional significance in the total psychical organism.

Apparently the "me's" rather than a "self" performs the functions of knowing, wanting, sensing, and feeling which give the unity and continuity to the person as experienced and observed. If one follows Lewin, such a conception seems, however, to be a contradiction in view of the fact that there may be several "me's", but only one "I" or self. Any conception of "me" may be a psychical system developed by the self to facilitate adjustment, but it can hardly exist independent of some unifying knowing, remembering, and sensing self.

\textsuperscript{35} Lewin, \textit{Dynamic Theory of Personality}, p. 61.
The second piece of evidence concerning the need for a central self seems to be more sound in view of the fact that unconscious psychical systems, for example, may be non-self-conscious. But on closer examination, there is communication between the self and the psychical systems that seem to be out of communication with it. These tense psychical systems were formed in consciousness and repressed. The medium of constant communication seems to be that of the repressive force exerted to keep the particular systems out of consciousness. The repressive agent seems to be the self (or ego). Thus Lewin's conclusion that psychical tensions and energies belong to systems which are in themselves dynamic unities and which show a greater or less degree of abscission seems to be in danger of reverting to another form of elementarism, as William Stern has pointed out, because they would be independent of the whole person. The phenomena of effort and will which are so important for the formation of character and the understanding of religious persons are thus left without an adequate construction which accounts for the unity, guidance, and regulation of these and other psychical energies. Cooperation with the Creator of value has its effects on the social, theoretical, political, and other phases of life by means of some unifying agent. If the religious ego is an independent entity, there is a mystery as to why its activi-

36 Stern, General Psychology, p. 114.
ties interweave with other aspects of life in the interest of cooperating with God. Some account must be given of a unifying self if there is to be an understanding of the fact that the religious ego by some agent's effort is able to exert influence over other areas of life.

### iii. Conscious Experience

Lewin's psychology is almost predominately occupied with the behavior of the individual in "fields of force". The emphasis is on the behavior of the individual and least of all on his experience of forces leading to modes of behavior. The "life space" of the person which includes the psychological environment comes nearest to fulfilling the need for emphasizing the conscious experience of the person. This lack of emphasis on conscious experience, it should be pointed out, is peculiar to Lewin more so than to Gestalt psychologists whose work has been mainly in the field of perception. One might expect that the psychological environment, dealing as it does with momentary fields of force, emphasizes conscious experience. It is distinguished from the person as a part of the life space by the fact that it is "everything in which, toward which, or away from which the person can perform locomotions".\(^{37}\) It can be seen from this that the psychological environment is

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not adequately distinguished from the objective environment. Hence, conscious experience suffers a great deal in comparison with the emphasis placed on field forces or the objective environment. Religious ideals, virtues, and values, it seems, can best be understood by conscious awareness of the individual as well as the environmental forces which lead to their formation. To neglect one at the expense of the other is to give a warped view of the individual and his religion. This seems to be true because ideals and values are also "fields of force" in the sense that they are a part of the reference by which objects of the environment are judged to have valence. Environmental fields of force are important, but likewise is the conscious experience of internal fields of force important for understanding religion.

iv. Theory of Motivation. Lewin's theory of motivation is based neither on tissue needs nor instinctive tensions. The uniqueness of his views on motivation is based on the empirical approach as a means of deciding how needs originate and what needs or tension-systems may exist. In fact it could almost be said that he has no theory of innate motivation. With great emphasis on the empirical approach, he suggests that experimental work on substitute-value and satisfaction seems to point to the solution of the problem of origin and organization of needs or tension-systems within the per-
son. His purpose is to take the problem of analyzing human motives out of the realm of highly personal impressions and to place them in the realm of empirical determination.

The evidence that some needs originate from internal physiological processes is accepted, but the existence of many other needs other than the physiologically produced ones is still held to be tenable. Since the work on the latter has been so slight, Lewin uses the general concept that there are needs of both kinds and that they influence the valences of the life space.

Lewin has given little thought to the problem of what different motives or needs there are. He takes for granted that motives or tension-systems exist and proceeds from there. Since his work in motivation has been mainly limited to studies of the conditions of arousal of motives, his concepts are mainly valid in that sphere. And since he has been attempting to formulate problems of motivation in mathematical terms, he has been rather wary of presenting a theory of motivation that cannot be verified in terms of mathematical concepts.

It is for this reason that Garrett calls Lewin's terms

38 See Leeper, *Lewin's Topological and Vector Psychology*, pp. 56f.

39 Ibid., p. 57.

"pseudo-mathematical" and states that "the scope and unambiguousness of these relationships... reside solely in the mathematical nature of the concepts themselves".

The concepts of valence, need, force, tension, field of force, inner-personal region, and goal-region as motivational terms have a positive significance for interpreting some phenomena of the religious life as in the phenomena of conversion experiences. Their limitations as pointed out by Garrett, Leeper, and Allport,⁴¹ are their confinement to contemporaneous actions rather than more lasting or permanent responses of the individual. The above named concepts are helpful in understanding a part of the person's relation to his momentary environment. Because the effects of religion are more often enduring, and there are many consistent patterns of religious behavior, the concepts of valence, need, force, tension, etc., which may fulfill Lewin's purpose of studying the individual in his momentary setting, do not seem sufficient for understanding the long range character of religious expectation and its consistent forms of religious behavior.

v. Personality Structure. To Lewin, the total personality may be conceived as a Gestalt. A Gestalt is a "system whose parts are dynamically connected in such a way that a change of one part results in a change of all other parts".⁴²

⁴¹ See Allport, Personality, p. 216 and p. 364.
The person is viewed as a differentiated region separated by a permeable boundary from his external environment. Certain perceptual-motor systems engaged in sensing and in acting adaptively are in direct contact with the environment. These perceptual-motor systems interact and respond as a whole. Inward from these lie the external regions of the inner personality which are more enduring and more segregated from one another than are the motor-perceptual regions. They may act independently or as parts of larger systems. Further inward are the central regions representing the deeper motives, interests, and more lasting sentiments. At the heart of the inner-personal region lies the "core." It is this center that is aroused in states of self-consciousness and is involved in aspiration and in phantasy. This core gives, apparently, stability to the whole structure of personality.

Lewin's treatment of personality is unique in its ability to depict the individual case and most of the systems and factors important for understanding the individual. The omission of a temporal region appears to be a handicap which the appearance of the irreality level makes prominent. But, on the whole, except for the lack of a unifying agent, Lewin's conception of the structure of personality in terms of relatively stable and unified systems appears to be a good start, but only a start, for understanding personality. Religious traits and interests can thereby be described in terms of
their nearness or remoteness to the core of the person. The core of the personality that Lewin speaks of appears to correspond to the self in many respects. It gives stability to the actions of the individual. However, Lewin seems to see the formation of personality resulting mainly from environmental forces of a temporary nature. The part that the "inner core" and the "central regions" which represent the deeper motives, interests, and more lasting sentiments of the person, play is minimized by Lewin in considering the formation of motives. Religious experience motivated by only temporary environmental forces is a momentary experience and one fails to understand why there is consistency in such experiences and behavior when the environment differs. Lewin limits the understanding of the religious person by underestimating the importance of the deeper structure of personality in motivation and experience.

vi. Interpersonal Relations. Topological psychology attempts to treat psychological phenomena in relation to their total setting. This is supposed to be in relation to the foreign hull of the life space as well as the inner structure of the personality. The greater emphasis is placed on the foreign hull or the momentary environmental conditions. Such a conception appears to be in line with a biosocial approach to personality, i.e., personality is a joint product of en-
vironmental conditions and inner structure of the person. Lewin attempts to study the individual from the point of view of his life situation.

A distinction may be made between Lewin's emphasis on environmental factors and most other psychological views on the subject. Lewin's concern is not so much with objective environment as with the subjective environment or the environment as conceived. Such a distinction seems to make an enormous difference in determining the force environmental factors play in personality formation because, for example, a group of known thieves may be conceived by the religious person as brothers needing proper help and guidance rather than as objects of threat and fear. Instead of the thieves distorting his personality, they may act as stimulants to greater improvement.

Another emphasis providing utility in interpreting religious experience is that of the social facts exerting influence upon the formation of the individual personality. Lewin states that "social facts, as essential constituents of the psychobiological environment, very early acquire dominant significance". Furthermore, "social facts such as friendship with another child, dependence upon an adult, etc., must also be regarded...as no less real than physical facts".  

43 Lewin, Dynamic Theory of Personality, p. 75.
Many of the facts of religion seem to reside in this sphere of social relations. Friendship within a social group as well as friendship with an unseen companion with a feeling of dependence seem to be characteristic marks of Christianity as well as many other religions. His studies in democratic and dictatorial tendencies in children illustrate what may be called inherent goodness of persons. 44

vii. Summary. The understanding of the religious person that one gains from Lewin's point of view might proceed somewhat like this: The individual finds himself in an environment (the environment would more than likely be a church since Lewin deals with only momentary fields of force) which has valence for the person's religious needs (how he came to have religious needs is not clear). The tension thus developed between personal need and environmental valence causes the person to react to the environment as he conceives it, perhaps by singing, praying, or some other form of religious participation. This is an oversimplified account, but serves to indicate that Gestalt psychology, as represented by Lewin, is relevant to particular situations where religion is concerned. However, there seems to be lack of emphasis on concepts designed to understand the more consistent cooperation

and communication of the individual with his God. Whereas typological psychology studies the ideal type of person, Gestalt studies the living person, but only in particular situations. There seems to be a lack of emphasis on the inner core or self and its central regions or personality, which also have valence for the person. These are the areas which throw light on why the individual who leaves the particular situation may show effects of his religious experience in new situations. Thus Gestalt psychology provides a good foundation for understanding religion, but does not provide concepts adequately holistic for understanding the religious person as he shows permeations of his religiosity in every day affairs.

3. Behaviorism

It might seem that behaviorism with its emphasis on the conduct and action of human beings as the subject-matter of psychology might be the ideal type of psychology for gaining insight into the religious life of man. "By their fruits ye shall know them"45 seems axiomatic for human understanding. But this is to overlook the fact that "as a man thinketh, so is he"46. There may be a great deal of good in behaviorism

45 Matthew 7:16.
for a psychological understanding of religion, but it may not be the whole good. For a psychological understanding of religion there are other factors to be considered besides the behavior of individuals.

The writings of E. C. Tolman furnish the data for a brief review of behaviorism on those topics conducive to religious understanding. As a modern behaviorist, his emphasis on purposive behavior lends a more favorable light from the behavioristic standpoint to the topics discussed.

1. Perspective. Tolman like other behaviorists assumes, it seems, that the human being is patterned after a machine, or at least, a rat. Although he does not hold to Watson's idea that the person is but a battery of trigger-release mechanisms, the principle that the behavior of the individual is determined wholly by physical stimuli is maintained. Such a presupposition leaves little room for an understanding of goodness, truth, and beauty which are predominant in the religious life. This is because goodness, truth, and beauty, for example, are ideals looked forward to and intended and serve themselves as stimuli toward their attainment. Thus because physical stimuli do not possess a long range, future-oriented property, the idea that behavior is determined by only physical stimuli leads to explaining away all the qualitative features of the religious life.
Tolman's behaviorism assumes the validity and supremacy of the method of element analysis. Explanation consists in exhibiting the parts out of which a whole is composed; a whole is nothing but an aggregation of parts. This seems to be the old atomistic mode of description which the majority of modern psychologists have renounced in favor of more dynamic and holistic methods. As Pepper\(^47\) points out, behaviorism of the purposive type has a curious inheritance of mechanism. Religion like other cultural aspects of life can be understood best by more synoptic methods.

A third presupposition of behaviorism that seems questionable is the validity of the rat model for understanding human beings. Assuming a simple behavior-physiological parallelism, "not the old psycho-physical parallelism",\(^48\) Tolman holds that rats exhibit basic laws and principles which underlie and therefore explain man's culturized intelligence, motivation, and instability ----- the three foci of behavior.\(^49\) Although Tolman admits that rats have no culture,\(^50\) it seems that his zeal for means to his scientific quest overshadows


\(^{48}\) Tolman, "Determiners of Behavior at a Choice Point", Psychological Review, 45 (Jan., 1938), p. 1f.

\(^{49}\) Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Men and Animals (New York: Century Co., 1932), Ch. I.

and excludes the end for which he seeks, namely, to explain human behavior. Rodhom expresses amazement at Tolman’s and other rat-psychologists’ prestige attribution of cultures, rats and men. One might well question many of Tolman’s conclusions about persons because the intelligence, motivation, and instability of men is at such a great variance with those same factors in rats.

ii. Consciousness. The keystone to Tolman’s purposive behaviorism lies in the concept of “sign-Gestalt expectancy”. It is this principle along with a doctrine of instincts that marks his psychology as purposive. This seems to be a virtual admission of mental entities. But Tolman regards the problem of the locus of what is called the content of consciousness as a metaphysical question.

In an early article in the Psychological Review Tolman gives a behaviorist’s definition of consciousness. It stems from the concept of behavior-adjustment. Behavior-adjustment is regarded as a functional surrogate for actual behavior which somehow serves to bring into the present the stimulus-results to be expected from the corresponding actual behavior.

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Behavior-adjustments produce or become consciousness. More clearly, he states,

Whenever an organism at a given moment of stimulation shifts then and there from being ready to respond in some relatively less differentiated way to being ready to respond in some relatively more differentiated way, there is consciousness.\footnote{Ibid., p. 435.}

His definition is illustrated by the "lookings back and forth" of rats at a choice point. Later he writes and repudiates this idea. Speaking about the illustration of rats at a choice point, he states that he had unfortunately suggested this as a behavioristic definition of consciousness. But, "this was, no doubt, a silly idea. I would hardly dare propose it now".\footnote{See Tolman, "Determiners of Behavior", \textit{Psychological Review}, 45 (Jan., 1938), p. 27.} Thus the subject of consciousness is dismissed and conscious religious values cannot be treated.

Lest one assume from the concept of expectancy that consciousness is required, Tolman emphatically states, "Let me emphasize again and again that an 'expectation' does not require words nor consciousness --- that it is just a 'set' for a certain environmental object-sequence".\footnote{See Tolman, "Reply to Professor Guthrie", \textit{Psychological Review}, 45 (March, 1938), p. 163.}

As a result of overlooking the importance of the self or some similar concept as consciousness, it seems that behaviorism has its significance in the realm of those peripher-

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 435.}
\footnote{See Tolman, "Determiners of Behavior", \textit{Psychological Review}, 45 (Jan., 1938), p. 27.}
\footnote{See Tolman, "Reply to Professor Guthrie", \textit{Psychological Review}, 45 (March, 1938), p. 163.}
\end{footnotesize}
al, stimulus-oriented, and genetic features of the person. The deeper features of life with which religion is mostly concerned are left untouched because they involve conscious desire, intention, and future oriented thought and action. These features behaviorism explains away.

iii. Theory of Motivation. Although Tolman denies that he has left the Watsonian tradition of disregarding feelings and qualities, he has left the Watsonian tradition in the field of motivation. Whereas Watson saw human motivation in terms of trigger-mechanisms, Tolman sees it through and through as purposive. Conscious intent is not involved in the meaning of the term purposive. Purposive is defined as the readiness to break out in trial and error and to select gradually or suddenly, the more efficient of such trials and errors with respect to getting to an end. Such a definition gains clarity when one remembers that Tolman adheres to a doctrine of instincts.

An act may be discerned from a molecular or from a molar behavioristic point of view. It is contended that only the latter is the psychologist's concern. Molar behavior is not reducible to molecular physiological reaction. A molar act has distinctions all its own that can be identified and described irrespective of whatever muscular, glandular, or neu-

57 See Tolman, "Glossary" in Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men.
ral processes underlie them. The identifying properties of such an act are: 58 (1) initiating causes and (2) behavior determinants. There are two sorts of initiating causes: (a) environmental stimuli and (b) initiating physiological states. There are three kinds of behavior determinants, and this is where instinctivism comes in, (a) purposive and cognitive immanent determinants, (b) purposive and cognitive capacities, and (c) behavior adjustments.

Tolman draws up a list of appetites and aversions from the behavior determinants that closely resembles McDougall's list. 59 As has been pointed out before, instinctivism alone as a theory of motivation fails to measure up to the test of unique, personal, dynamic, and ultimate causation. Instincts are mysterious and static. They fail to account adequately for the unique psychical phenomena characteristic of religion. Religious motivation on such a theory can be explained only by reductionism. Instincts may be adequate for explaining the behavior of rats, but human behavior seems to present a much more complex activity guided by understanding of values as seems prevalent in religion. Besides, if religious behavior were only initiated by physiological states, environ-

58 See Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Man And Animals, Ch. I.

mental stimuli, and instincts, how would religious behavior in different situations be accounted for? And more important, how would the changes or modifications that take place in religious behavior be accounted for? Tolman has an answer for the first question. The concept of conditioning is used to explain the fact that the range of stimuli that may excite a given religious response may be extended. Thus by conditioning, religious behavior in different situations seems to be accounted for. But is it accounted for fully? Desire, intent, and willing make a difference as to whether the range of stimuli is effective. Conditioning is thus a partial explanation.

There is no satisfactory explanation for the modifications in religious behavior in Tolman's psychology. Changes and modifications in religious behavior can best be explained by concepts such as intention and interest. Since both of these imply consciousness, they are not considered by Tolman. Neither is the concept of the unconscious considered in behavioristic psychology.

iv. Interpersonal Relations. Tolman has been greatly influenced by topological and dynamic concepts of Lewin.60 Indeed, his psychology seems to be an attempt to synthesize purposive, Gestalt and behavioristic psychologies. It is

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60 Tolman, "Determiners of Behavior at a Choice Point", Psychological Review, 45 (Jan., 1938), p. 23.
Lewin's influence that has led to his emphasis on the total environment as affecting the behavior of the individual. The Gestalt emphasis on wholeness is taken to mean emphasis on the behavior of the whole organism rather than concentrating on muscles, glands, or the viscera.

This Gestalt influence shows itself again in his emphasis on the environmental factors affecting behavior. In his words, it is "the environment-to-behavior relation which psychologists take as subject matter". The subscription to the "field theory" is shown again in that...

...it appears that the psychologist's independent variables are not in any final sense independent and absolute. They are always immersed in a 'field' constituted by the 'culture pattern' of the whole group. They cannot be manipulated wholly independently of this field.

He concludes that the behavior of human beings as society forming creatures cannot be studied save within larger sociological wholes.

Tolman lists interpersonal factors affecting the behavior of persons as economic, technological, and political along with the geographical, historical, and racial factors. It is Tolman's belief that these factors underlie and condition individuals and their conduct. They are the ultimate

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61 Tolman, "Demands and Conflicts", Psychological Review, 44 (Jan., 1937), p. 158

determiners of the group and its particular conduct. It is not without significance that the behaviorist omits religion as a factor affecting the behavior of individuals. In his article, *Physiology, Psychology and Sociology*, Tolman uses a church wedding scene in which he attempts to analyze the behavior of the participants according to the various sciences mentioned in the title of the article. According to his description, the fact that it was a church wedding was apparently a mere accident. The religious factor was not even mentioned.

The interpersonal character of behaviorism is that of group stimulus to which the behavior of the individual is the response. By overlooking the factor of conscious experience, wherein the stimulus is considered as conceived by the person, behaviorism leaves out a necessary and important step for studying the "whole organism". In the social environment it is the person's awareness or conception of stimuli that affects his behavior rather than the purely objective environment alone. Obviously Tolman did not drink very deeply from the well of Gestalt psychology.

v. Summary. Behaviorism has merit in giving valuable knowledge of reactions of the body to physical stimuli. Its experiments in animal learning have proved beneficial for in-
terpreting some aspects of human learning. Its desire to make psychology an objective science is well taken. However, for a psychological understanding of religion it seems that its presuppositions, concepts, and scope of problems prove too narrow.

4. Depth Psychology

Among the more penetrating methods evolved for understanding psychical phenomena are those discovered by depth psychologists. Because of the practical and clinical nature of their work, the ideas and findings of this group reach probably a wider public than those of any other psychology. Because of the scope and intensity of their methods, it is generally believed that the contributions of depth psychologists have opened up new vistas for understanding the dynamics of the person.

There are several important schools or approaches in depth psychology. The Freudian, Adlerian, and Jungian are the oldest. Yet there are other schools which are proving as significant and useful. To neglect any one of these approaches would be to do an injustice to psychology and religion. But since the whole of depth psychology is not the primary concern of this thesis, for the purpose of illustration, Jung's psychology is briefly examined for the light it may throw on religion. Comments on other depth psychologies
are made as the occasion demands.

Jung's psychology stands in marked contrast to those of other depth psychologists. Whereas religion is overlooked or seen as having negative value by the majority, Jung, along with some other contemporary depth psychologists,\(^64\) has taken the opposite view. Jung has attempted to broaden his psychology in order that such fundamental experiences as those of the religious life can be explained and used for furthering the therapeutic process.

Despite the good (from the religionist's point of view) intentions of Jung to have depth psychology explain and use religious experiences, it seems that on those topics most conducive to an understanding of religion he has shown one-sided interest in a few topics to the detriment of other important topics. Indeed, there appear to be some contradictions in depth psychology on these points.

i. Perspective. In order to comprehend the phenomena of religious persons the principle of teleology must be recognized. It is on such a presupposition that Jung, as well as Adler, departs from orthodox psychoanalysis. He stresses the teleology of psychic phenomena as opposed to a mechanistic interpretation. The latter interpretation could hardly but lead to a misunderstanding of religion as in the case of

\(^{64}\) Mainly Otto Rank and Fritz Kunkel in *Will Therapy* (New York: Knopf, 1945), Ch. 21, and *In Search of Maturity* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1943), p. 85 respectively.
Freud's views.65

Jung assumes along with practically all other depth psychologists the existence of the unconscious mind. The conscious portion of the mind in itself would hardly present many difficulties were it not for the fact that this unconscious portion of the mind leads an independent existence. Moreover, this unconscious portion is an "autonomous power directed against....conscious personality."66 The unconscious possesses a continuity, intelligence, and purposiveness all its own. According to Jung, the unconscious possesses religious tendencies springing from the collective unconscious.

It is this assumption that the unconscious exists independently of conscious personality that leads Jung to render motivation in terms of almost exclusively unconscious processes. What the personal unconscious cannot explain, the collective unconscious is postulated to explain. The difficulty that this seems to present for a psychological understanding of religion is whether religious phenomena are to be explained and understood almost exclusively in terms of unconscious processes or conscious processes. Depth psychology appears to lean too heavily on the unconscious processes. If


the unconscious is wholly autonomous of the conscious mind then there exists an irreconcilable war of motives. There exists under the circumstances no governor or mediator of the two forces.67

Jung, unlike some depth psychologists, seems to have an underlying philosophy closely approaching that of idealism. His concern for understanding the totality of the person and religious experiences of persons makes his basic philosophy harmonize with his aims. He rejects thorough-going naturalism and leans toward interactionism. He postulates the psyche to be as real as any physical object. The real being interpreted in terms of the rational and valuable in experience. Immediate experience is the starting point of any science. The principle of independent psychical causation is subscribed to. Such an idealistic position is more common to depth psychologists of the non-Freudian schools than to the orthodox positions. The idealistic philosophical assumptions of a psychology are more contributive to a psychological understanding of religion than those of other philosophical positions. They lead to an appreciation of religious values for personality.

67 See how Jung holds to the primitive idea of soul as being something independent, capricious, and dangerous in *Modern Man In Search of a Soul*, Tr. W. Dell & C. Baynes (London:Paul, Trench, Truber Co., 1923), p. 211. To him, the soul sought is unity of outlook on life.
ii. The Self. Jung distinguishes the ego from the self. The soul is also distinguished from both the ego and the self. In his writings, however, these distinctions appear to be ambiguous and vague. The ego is defined as a complex of representations which constitute the centrum of consciousness and which appears to possess a very high degree of continuity and identity. The ego is only the subject of consciousness. It is embraced by and included in the self. He gives several definitions of the self. In his definitions of the soul and psyche there appears an apparent lack of clarity to distinguish clearly between the soul, the psyche, and the self. In one place he states,

"The individual Self is a portion, or excerpt, or representation of something universally present in all living creatures, and, therefore, a correspondingly graduated kind of psychological process, which is born anew in every creature." 69

Elsewhere it can be seen that "intellectually the self is nothing but a psychological concept. Since it transcends our powers of comprehension it might as well be called the god in us". 70 Again, the reciprocal functioning of the conscious and the unconscious constitutes a totality, the self.

69 Ibid., p. 475.
"It includes not only the conscious, but also the unconscious psyche, and is therefore a personality".\textsuperscript{71} By speaking of an "individual self" Jung seems to imply that there is also a "collective self" in keeping with the individual and collective unconscious. Since he does not define the self in terms of its functions it seems little wonder that "it transcends our powers of comprehension". His ambiguity adds to the confusion.

Jung stands opposed to the historic development of the soul concept since his idea of the soul does not coincide with the totality of the psychic functions. He defines the soul as "the relation to the unconscious" and again as "a personification of unconscious contents".\textsuperscript{72} In his chapter of definitions in \textit{Psychological Types} it seems that the soul and the anima may be the same. Definition 48 is listed: \textbf{Soul ("Anima")}.\textsuperscript{73} Here he understands a definitely demarcated function-complex that is best characterized as a personality, to be the soul. Such definitions seem to lack precision and may well lead to confusion. To add to the ambiguity the psyche is defined as "the totality of all the psychic processes, both conscious and unconscious".\textsuperscript{74} The self and the

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 138.
\textsuperscript{72} Jung, \textit{Psychological Types}, p. 306.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 538.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 538.
psyche and the anima all lack clear definitions. They seem equivalent. The ego is given the function that personalists give the self in that it is the subject of one's totality. The common element in all of these concepts is awareness.

Jung clearly recognizes the value of a self concept for understanding religious experience. It seems, however, that Jung would rely more on his newly created concepts for such an understanding. His lack of clarity concerning the self, soul, psyche, and ego hardly leads to a better understanding of the function of the self in religious experience. His attitude toward such concepts seems to be more favorable, however, than those of many of the contemporary psychologists.

iii. Conscious Experience. Jung puts his greatest emphasis on the unconscious. What the personal unconscious does not explain, the collective unconscious is posited to explain. Depth psychology is essentially a psychology of the unconscious. It seems to recognize the value of conscious experience for "normal" persons in ordinary everyday affairs. But the orthodox depth psychologists attempt to explain the plain, ordinary person predominately by the unconscious. Jung does not seem to be immune from this bias. The justification of this overemphasis is that the unconscious is regarded as a compensation to the one-sidedness of the general attitude produced by the function of consciousness. The reason-
ing indicates that

The activity of the conscious is **selective**. Selection demands direction. But the direction requires the exclusion of everything irrelevant. Therefore a certain one-sidedness of the conscious orientation is inevitable.75

Generally speaking, the depth psychologists go to the other extreme and conclude that the unconscious is the only portion of the mind worth studying. From it, all that need be known about the person can be gathered by the various analytic methods.

Depth psychology rightly contends that psychological understanding cannot be complete without taking into consideration the unconscious factors and processes. But taken by itself, it gives only one side of the individual because it is concerned more with unconscious valuation or impulses to the neglect of, or dismissal of, conscious values. Consciousness, fragmentary and one-sided as it may be, is the basic datum from which all else must be of necessity inferred. Jung rightly states that the unconscious is a supplement of consciousness. But he (as well as most depth psychologists) implies that consciousness is but a refracting mirror of the unconscious from which all motivation and valuation arise. Thus it seems that the depth picture of experience becomes one-sided. A psychology which takes into consideration both the conscious and unconscious experience of the person, can do

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more justice to understanding religious experience than one
that neglects one phase at the expense of the other. The
recognition of religious values arises when both unconscious
needs and conscious interests become focal in experience.
Depth psychology stresses the unconscious needs and the emo-
tional factors. The processes of search, judgment and pur-
poseful activity are neglected.

iv. Motivation and Personality Structure. The psycho-
analytic movement is noted for its dynamic theories of motiva-
tion. It is in the field of motivation that depth psychology
has made one of its greatest contributions to the field of
psychology. It substituted dynamic concepts of energy in
place of the static concepts that were in use.

A review of the dynamic concepts of depth psychology re-
quires far more space than can be allowed in this thesis.
Hence, only the general and basic concepts of Jung's psycholo-
gy are considered. Jung sees the basic source of energizing
forces in the libido. He uses the term synonymously with
psychic energy. Psychic energy is the intensity of the psy-
chic process --- its psychological determining power.76
Jung holds the Freudian sexual conception of the libido to be
narrow. Jung sees it as an all-embracing name for everything

--- 76 Jung, Psychological Types, p. 571. Also Chapters 1,
2, and 3 of Part II in Psychology of the Unconscious, Tr. B.
Hinkle (New York: Dodd, Mead Co., 1916).
having to do with affects and drives. The libido is not only in the individual, but in human civilization as well. Jung holds that a spiritual force within the individual struggled against the original sexuality of the libido so that there are now a sexual and an anti-sexual tendency in the human psyche. This accounts for innate morality. Morality is considered a gift as is intelligence.\textsuperscript{77}

The transformation of motives is accounted for in that the energy of certain psychic phenomena can be transformed into other dynamisms through suitable means. The suitable means are symbols which make it possible for human beings to assume a counterposition to primitive drives. It is the function of religion to create such symbols.

Another important aspect of Jung's theory of motivation is that concerning instincts. The mind is governed by instincts. Mind is the inevitable form that the power of instincts assumes. This does not mean that mind is a derivative of some instinct. By instinct Jung means "an impulsion toward certain activities". All those psychic processes over whose energies the conscious has no disposal come within the concept of instinct.\textsuperscript{78} According to Jung, not only the individual's manner of acting, but his whole way of life depends upon a definite pattern of inborn tendencies. It is

\textsuperscript{77} Jung, \textit{Psychology and Religion}, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{78} See Jung, \textit{Psychological Types}, p. 475f. and p. 565.
upon this consideration that he develops his theory of mental types for which he is noted. Instinct control is a normative process whose power originates from inherited channels of the ancestral line. Thus are religious symbols developed early in history to assist the control. In other words, sentiments are formed toward certain objects and are therefore expressions of the unique adjustment of general instincts to specific problems. This seems to be the implication of Jung's view. He is therefore somewhat in the hormic tradition, close to MacDougall. Some basic objections to instincts center around the mysterious way in which they operate. Jung sees symbols as the objects of instinctive energy. MacDougall calls this clustering of emotion toward certain ideas and objects sentiments. A part of the mystery is thus cleared. Sentiments and symbols represent the adjustment of general instincts to specific problems. However, hormic psychologists generally limit propensities to objects and there is no account of the fact that religious persons are generally religious in situations where the environmental factors (objects) are different. Jung is correct in saying that religious symbols assist in controlling impulses, but the statement doesn't cover the phenomena of religiosity without objective symbols. This difficulty has recently been overcome by a
hormic-personalistic view of motivation.\footnote{79}

The structure of personality is conceived somewhat differently than in orthodox depth psychology. The structure of personality is viewed as consisting of the self, the ego, consciousness, personal unconscious, emotions, and the collective unconscious. The psychoanalytic terms, id and super-ego, are rarely if ever mentioned in Jung's works. The collective unconscious which contains the spiritual inheritance of human development accounts for morality instead of the ego erecting a protective inner monitor, or super-ego, as an unconscious barrier to repress the forbidden libidinal cravings. The super-ego in the Freudian view represents the coercive ideals of the group which account for morality. Jung seems to hold that the moral imperative is an irreducible function of the psyche.\footnote{80} The moral imperative is not an experience of want, or compulsion. Neither is it a result of fear. It is an expression of the inherited ideals of the race (collective unconscious) and the ideals incorporated into the individual from contemporary culture. Since one's

\footnote{79} See P. A. Bertocci, \textit{Philosophy of Personality} (Unpub. Syll., Boston University, 1948). Bertocci sees instincts as only one level of personality integration. Other levels are accounted for by the formation of sentiments, attitudes, traits, and egos. Such a view is more adequate than those of simple instincts or drives, etc., without any other concepts.

spiritual inheritance may vary from that of other person's, morality is considered a gift.

For Jung, the concepts of instincts and symbols explain the fact that human beings seek common objectives and satisfaction of similar needs. Symbols express the unique adjustment of instinctive tendencies to certain problems of humanity. For example, just as dream symbols represent desires, conflicts, and fears, so religious symbols represent adjustments to common problems faced by humanity. Jung's *Psychology and Religion* attempts to show, among other things, that religious symbols like dream symbols represent attempts of the individual to come to terms with his environment. Attitudes are generally inborn, but can be changed by the transformation of instinctive psychical energy.

v. Views on Religion. Generally Jung has relied a great deal upon religious ideas, beliefs, and symbols to demonstrate his concepts of the collective unconscious, archetypes and the anima. He is distinctive because of his interpretation of these factors in religion. Jung accepts and attempts to understand the values of religious experience. He gives them positive value.

Religion is defined by Jung as the term that designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been altered by the experience of the numinosum. He means the

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*Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 10.*
experience of divine force or potency ascribed to objects or beings regarded with awe in the manner of Rudolph Otto. Jung emphasizes its a priori character as does Otto. It is considered a relationship to the highest or strongest value, be it positive or negative. The relationship may be voluntary or involuntary. It is a spontaneous expression of a certain predominant psychical condition. This condition arises from the experience of the perception of reality by means of awe-inspiring objects or persons. It is somewhat of a mystical state.

Noting the influence of Christianity on the world for the past two thousand years, Jung points out that Christianity is essentially a psychological attitude, a definite form and manner of adaptation to inner and outer experience, which molds a definite form of civilization. He cites one of the great benefits of religion as strengthening the individual against his all too great weakness and insecurity in real life. In a somewhat different attitude and again emphasizing mysticism, he views the benefits of religion as

The benefits of parental hands; its protection and its peace are the results of parental care upon

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83 Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 98.
84 Jung, Psychological Types, p. 230.
85 Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 98f.
the child; its mystic feelings are the unconscious emotions of the first childhood.86

This statement is important because it indicates in brief Jung's view of religion. Jung probably means by benefits of parental hands the benefits derived from the maternal attitude the Church takes in his native Switzerland, which is very Catholic.87 He doesn't amplify or clarify his statement. This would hardly be applicable to Protestantism which stresses individual freedom, initiative, and responsibility. This same interpretation might be applied to the second statement concerning peace and protection being the result of parental care. But, more than likely, both statements mean actual parental care and he thus sees religion being directly affected by the childhood parental care and childhood attitudes. The present religious feelings are understood by finding the repressed emotions felt in childhood. Although the emotions of earlier childhood may be somewhat similar to some felt in the religious experience, there is much room for doubt as to whether they are the same and whether they can be understood as childhood emotions. Since the infant lacks long memory and his capacity for expectation is very short, he is mostly present-oriented. His feelings therefore lack two of the

86 Ibid., p. 99.

most vital points of reference of mature religious emotions. As Johnson states, religious emotions are "dynamic responses to a Sustainer of values believed to have creative answers to human needs, or to any value associated by memory or hope with our destiny". The three vital criteria of conscious belief, memory, and hope are very limited in early childhood and religious feelings are beyond the unconscious emotions of childhood.

A point can also be raised as to whether Jung is correct about the mystical feelings in a narrow sense. Emotions of childhood are engendered by local and visible reality, whereas the mystical emotions are engendered by an unseen reality. They cannot be the same because the person has changed, the feelings are different in so far as they can be compared, and the exciting source is different.

Concerning the origin of religion, Jung states that "the part of the libido which erects religious structures is in the last analysis fixed in the mother". It is inherited as a part of the collective unconscious. Just why it is fixed in the mother and not in both parents is not explained. If it follows the laws of genetics, certainly the psychological "religious gene" of the father would have a contribution.

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89 Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 474.
Jung explains the universality of religion by pointing out that it has been learned that the religious function belongs simply to the constitution of the psyche, and it is constantly and everywhere present, however undifferentiated it may be. He does not seem to mean that there is a religious a priori which is a distinct and irreducible faculty as Otto and Knudson would hold. Jung does hold that the ability to become religious is innate and that the need for religion is transmitted to the individual as a part of his inheritance of the collective unconscious.

When a problem is accepted as religious, Jung holds, it gains a psychological significance of immense importance. A value is involved which relates to the whole of man. In his experience, none of his patients over thirty-five had a problem which was not in the last analysis a problem of regaining religious outlook.

vi. Summary. For a psychological understanding of religion it might be said that Jung's psychology is dynamic, but like many psychologies, his frame of reference is very

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91 Jung, Psychological Types, p. 237.

92 Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 264.
narrow. Muller-Frienfels notes that Jung's great concern with mythological matters has led to a mythical vagueness in his psychology.\textsuperscript{93} Jung has resorted to myths and primitive cultures to bolster his views. It is for this same reason that G. Murphy states, in effect, that he has broadened psychoanalysis past the bounds of natural science into the realm of metaphysics, a transition from the rational to the irrational.\textsuperscript{94} His concept of the collective unconscious with its constructive and creative ability is helpful as an adjunct to the view of the unconscious generally advocated because it indicates psychological continuity with the species as well as a physiological one. Because many of his concepts are culled from the annals of mythology rather than present experience and observation, they are of doubtful value for a psychological understanding of religion. His view on religious experience is that of a pragmatist as the final page of his \textit{Psychology and Religion} clearly shows.\textsuperscript{95}

His overemphasis on the unconscious keeps his psychology in a specialized segment of personality. He largely ig-


\textsuperscript{94} Murphy & Jensen, \textit{Approaches to Personality} (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1932), p. 76.

\textsuperscript{95} Jung holds that as long as religion is helpful it is valuable. J. C. Flugel makes a similar observation concerning Jung in \textit{Man, Morals, and Society} (New York: International U. Press, 1945), p. 266.
nores the interpersonal factors entering into psychology. It seems that A. Adler with his emphasis on the social factors is a supplement to Jung's psychology.

It may be seen, in summarizing, that typological psychology as represented by E. Spranger is conducive to a psychological understanding of religion by its norms of ideal value attitudes in persons. Its limitations are that it is too abstract for an understanding of the concrete individual as he experiences religion. Gestalt psychology attempts to embrace the whole individual. It neglects the guiding and directing aspect of the person, namely, the self. Without an understanding of the self, Gestalt psychology can but deal with the individual in his momentary relationships. It can throw a great deal of light upon religious behavior, however, because of its emphasis on the total environment of the person. Behaviorism of the purposive type seems fitted for description of religious conduct. Because it neglects the conscious and unconscious, it seems too superficial for an explanation or understanding of the religious behavior it might describe. Depth psychology plunges down into the lower strata of human experience and comes up with pearls of insight heretofore unfound. It throws a great deal of light on the undercurrents of human behavior and experiences, but appears to neglect the effects of the conscious strivings which also play a part in religious experience.
In each of these psychologies the individual is a more or less helpless victim of his heredity, his momentary environment, his instincts or his unconscious. It is well that personalistic psychology be examined to see if there is an eclectic perspective which might account for most of these factors and still declare justifiably the relative creativity and autonomy of the whole person. More light may be thrown on religious experiences which may lead to a more profound understanding.
CHAPTER IV

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE'S THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

In this chapter Bowne's conception of personalistic psychology is examined for the light it throws on a psychological understanding of religion. A preliminary consideration of his historical setting shows that his method, although somewhat one-sided in emphasis, is a legitimate one for a grasp of some of the essential problems of psychology and religion which are overlooked by contemporary psychologists. His emphasis on conscious experience and factors essential to human action are then noted. The purpose of this chapter is to point out some of the beginnings of personalistic psychology for a better understanding of the later developments in this area of thought. The emphasis at this point is merely to show the roots of this school of thinking in psychology.

1. Bowne's Historical Setting

Religion as an experience of striving and acting for social relationships and higher values is a phenomena peculiar to human beings. An explanation and understanding of it proceeds from a knowledge of the dynamics of those who experience it. Those refractory patterns of experience that persons
compare and agree are religious experience suggest that there is something there. The concept religion attempts to define these perceptions. Psychology in attempting to explain the causes and functions of these experiences has had difficulty because of the traditional limits of natural science. At one time, psychologists looked only within themselves for explanations. Once all the elements of a process were enumerated the process was considered explained. Reaction set in against the introspective method and to-day very few psychologists rely upon it exclusively for psychological data. The pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme of relying mostly upon observation of stimuli and responses of the individual.

Bowne wrote at a time when the method of introspection was considered the method of psychological investigation. Although he studied in Europe, he, as well as most American psychologists at that time, still had not been too favorably impressed with the influence of Wundt's psychological laboratory. As far as psychological method is concerned, Bowne was a product of his times.

In other respects it might be said that Bowne represented a stream of thinking that was to be synthesized by William James into a setting down of the basic principles of psychology for many years to come. Bowne's European influences were not as extensive as those of James and neither was his background of education as varied as that of James. As a prede-
cessor of James, the influences upon them and their mode of thinking were similar.¹

Writing in the late eighties of the nineteenth century Bowne's historical setting was that of the period of sensationalism or elementarism. As with James, Bowne was a protestor against the ideas and aims of his contemporaries.

i. His Definition of Psychology. As a philosophical psychologist, Bowne's main interest was in theorizing concerning the origin and causes of mental facts and processes. Bowne holds that a simple description and classifying of mental facts and processes is the duty of scientific psychology. With this as a starting point, philosophical psychology proceeds to theorize concerning the causes and origins of the processes involved. One might infer here that philosophers were not giving up psychology without a fight. Psychology was granted a status as a collector and classifier of facts, but the final interpretation and theorizing must be left to philosophy. The psychologist was not deemed capable of theorizing concerning the ultimate origin and cause of mental processes he studied. One sees a distinction here between early psychology and modern psychology. Modern psychologists declare their competence and right to theorize concerning their

data to the extent that they do not exceed the bounds of science. They grant philosophy its claim to theorize concerning these facts in cosmic perspective. The modern psychologist holds that he is going to theorize, but will stick to empirical evidence concerning origins and causes of his data. To this, modern personalists agree. The great interest in the problems of motivation attests to this fact. Philosophical and scientific psychology to-day have somewhat different methods.  

Bowne is in agreement with modern personalists in his emphasis on mental facts and processes, but omits experimental work on conduct and action as it relates to personality due to the stage of growth that psychology was in at that time. However, where religion is concerned, Bowne stressed action and conduct developing into character. This is with respect to a particular emphasis he placed upon intention and action rather than mysticism in religion.

ii. The Introspective Method. Bowne's conception of the data of psychology led him to a consideration of intro-

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spection as the chief legitimate method of psychological study.
He considers psychology subjective as contrasted to the objec-
tive sciences. The difference to him is that the facts of
the objective sciences are discovered outside of the self.
The facts of psychology are chiefly revealed only in conscious-
ness. He admits that mind can be studied to some extent in
history, institutions and literature. It is because in these
mind manifests its nature and utters its spontaneous convic-
tions. In language, literature, etc., there can be an objec-
tive study of mind. 4 But this does not mean that mind is
presented to the senses; but only that "the nature of mind
can be studied in its products". 5 This means that a psychol-
ogical understanding of religion can, in part, be gained
from a study of history of religions, religious institutions,
and their products. 6

Bowne insists that all knowledge of mind objectively de-

erived must come back to consciousness for either its meaning
or its verification. There must be agreement between the ob-
jectively derived facts and the experience of these facts in

4 See G. W. Allport's statement that personality is so
complex that every legitimate method must be employed in its
study. Personality, p. 369.

5 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 3.

6 Knight Dunlap is a strong supporter of this view in
"Psychology of Religion", Encyclopedia of Psychology. P. Harri-
man, ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 568f. and
Bowne, "The Logic of Religious Belief". Methodist Quarterly
consciousness. Disagreements arise concerning interpretations of facts presented in consciousness. There can be no doubt about the facts presented there. Hence, introspection is the chief psychological method.

Although Bowne seems to have overstressed the importance of introspection as a psychological method, he recognizes the value of other methods of objectively studying the mind. It is in this recognition of the validity of other methods that he points to an eclecticism that is taken up later by other personalists. In his own words, "it is only the mentally one-eyed who insist that all facts shall be treated by the same method, regardless to differences of nature!"  

2. The Self and Conscious Experience

i. The Reality of the Self. Being the foremost pioneer of personalism in America, Bowne furnishes outlines of arguments for self psychology that are echoed later by psychologists and philosophers of the personalistic school. The basal fact in personalistic psychology is the self or person. It is this fact that Bowne uses as a starting point. This fact is also a starting point for understanding religious experience.

Bowne holds that in all mental experience the self appears as the subject and the state is referred to the self as

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Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 5.
its subject. Writing in an era of sensationalistic and faculty psychology, he had to "show cause", as have later personalists, and answer the question: what is this self? To the faculty psychologists the statement is directed that "thought and feelings apart from something that thinks and feels are unreal abstractions, like motion apart from something that moves". The whole structure of thought and language implies a mental subject and, furthermore, the race has constructed names as mind, soul, spirit, etc. to indicate its reality. In answer to objections to the self, Bowne defies anyone to account for the unity and continuity of conscious life without it. Rather than mental data being composed of states of consciousness, it is truer to say that it is a consciousness of states. This is true because a rational life by its very nature demands a unitary consciousness and a unitary subject. Furthermore, in order to think, one and the same conscious subject must grasp in the unity of a single act things compared, distinguished, or united. Moreover, memory presupposes a mental subject having retentive power.

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8 Ibid., p. 10.
9 See Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 28.
There is no clear cut definition of the self. \textsuperscript{10} It is simply experienced. Self-experience is the original and irreducible factor of self-consciousness. The self has its vividness and reality in the life of feeling, desire, emotion, and interest. \textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{ii. Factors in Self-Consciousness.} Consciousness is an essential property of mental processes. It is simply immediate experience. It is the condition of acting, willing, feeling, etc. \textsuperscript{12} It cannot be defined. Only its conditions can be studied. The general form under which it exists is that of antithesis of subject and object, i.e., the object of which we are conscious must be distinguished from self as its subject.

Bowne points out two essential factors of self-consciousness which turn out to be a more detailed exposition of the general form under which consciousness exists, i.e., antithesis of subject and object. These are (1) our conception of ourselves, and (2) our experience of our conceptions as our


\textsuperscript{11} Bowne, \textit{Psychological Theory}, p. 246.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 234.
own. The former is variable and is generally developed so that its history can be traced. It is to this factor that modern psychologists refer when they speak of the ego. It is the knowledge of self. But this is not an original and constant datum. The second factor which has been pointed out by Bowne and to which modern personalists refer to as the self is self-experience. It is the original and irreducible factor of self-consciousness.\(^\text{13}\)

Thus can be seen another foundation of personalistic psychology, empiricism, that is emphasized again by Calkins and Stern.

iii. Rational Consciousness and the Self. In his discussions of the self and consciousness, Bowne lashed many attacks upon the sensationalists and faculty psychologists. He seemed to have clearly discerned the errors of both views. A passage from the conclusion of one of his chapters illustrates this. He states concerning the factors of mental life,

Concerning them a double error is possible. On the one hand, we have an attempt to reduce these factors to some common form; and on the other, we have a tendency to regard them as distinct entities. The former appears in the sensationalist's deductions, and the latter in the traditional doctrine of faculties. Both errors are to be guarded against.\(^\text{14}\)

He concludes that the transformations of sensationalism are

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 245f.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 250.
purely verbal and the faculties are always only abstractions from the many-sided mental life. This life is the reality in which the sensations and faculties have their existence. This precludes any idea of a religious faculty or any attempt to understand religion by reducing it to its lowest common denominator.

With the decks thus cleared, the distinction or relationship between rational consciousness and the self can be made. The experience of self is primal. It is from this self that knowledge is built by the process of distinguishing, relating, or uniting non-self with self. It is this unique inherent ability of the self to build a rational consciousness.

iv. Interaction of Mind and Body. Bowne means by interaction that the mind and the body simply affect one another. The band that ties them together is their mutual influence. Questions as to the seat of the soul exist only on the supposition that space is real, which Bowne in his metaphysics finds reasons for doubting. However, Bowne finds psychological reasons for clearing up such a question. In the first place, the mind is not the brain. Secondly, changes in the brain may be accompanied by changes in the mind. It is not necessary to think of the two as being in contact. He points out that astronomy and physics find no difficulty in the as-

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umption that one atom can immediately affect another across the whole diameter of a system, or that one atom may affect all others in a system at the same time. He concludes that beyond the fact that physical and mental states may mutually determine each other, the question is both idle and empty.

The point that is stressed is that the body is simply receptive and retentive while the mind originates and guides. He holds to the view that the body initiates the mind but that the mind perfects the body because, "Left to itself the soul would never learn to use the body, but the body left to itself would never come to any high development." It might be mentioned that this view seems peculiar to Bowne and not to later personalists. It should be remembered, however, that Bowne seems to rank favorably with James as a creative genius in breaking the thinking chains that bound them to their contemporaries. Later personalists recognize the powers of retention, receptivity, initiative and guidance of both mind and body. On Bowne's view the telic and involuntary movements of the body would either be a contradiction or a result of mental influence. His idea that the body initiates the mind suffices to show the internal inconsistency of the view.

16 Ibid., p. 305.
17 Ibid., p. 304.
18 Cf. p. 18f. with p. 304f. in Introduction to Psychological Theory.
Bowne rejects such a view earlier in his book as he shows the untenability of materialism, but confusingly comes back to it. As Franquiz pointed out about consciousness, Bowne was sometimes inconsistent. However, that still does not take away from his other good points.

3. Motivation

In the last half of the nineteenth century the field of human motivation, in so far as psychology is concerned, was almost untouched. It was during this period that Bowne wrote. The major interests were in the fields of cognition and volition for philosophical and ethical reasons. However, Bowne attempts to come to grips with the problem in his chapters on the feelings and the will. While he did not make any startling discoveries, it is well that the significant points he emphasized be pointed out for the understanding that it may throw on later writers of this point of view.

1. Emotions. Bowne identifies feeling as that state of consciousness which consists in some form of pleasure or pain, like or dislike, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Like James, he holds that feeling is quite indescribable. For

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18 Cf. p. 18f. with p. 304f. in Introduction to Psychological Theory.

19 James, Psychology (Briefer Course), p. 373 and Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 185.
a definition, one can only say that feeling is feeling just as knowing is knowing. He points out that it generally consists in some form of desirable or undesirable consciousness, which either springs directly from our physical experience, or which attends our mental activities, or which arises from the contemplation of our objects and ideas. It cannot be deduced. It is this last statement concerning the irreducibility of feelings that has found an enlarging importance in personalistic psychology.

As if anticipating the James-Lange theory of emotions which sees emotions arising from a physical effect on the nerves, Bowne explains that the attempts to deduce feeling generally confound feeling with its conditions. It is explained that although feeling may result from the state of the organism, this is only one condition. The state of the organism is not the feeling. Furthermore,

as there is nothing in the conception of nervous action which implies that a sensation of light must result, so there is nothing in any physical conception which implies that it must be accompanied with pleasure or pain.20

It is further explained that if pain should result from a physical conception it can be only as there is a subject capable of feeling and in such relation to the organism that the states of the latter furnish the conditions for the develop-

20 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 186.
ment of feeling. It seems for this same reason that Johnson points out that the half truth in the James-Lange theory is the fact that the mind and body interact. 21

One more comparison of Bowne with James. It is significant that James holds that every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion. It is upon this idea that W. McDougall holds that every instinct has as a corollary a concomitant emotion, both of which depend on the appearance of certain objects for their arousal. Bowne's argument holds equally well here. Bowne stresses the person rather than objects. He seems to imply that all activity not of a volitional nature is of a mechanical nature. Its general characteristic is that it follows uniformly from its antecedent. Such motivation is determined by the nervous system and the constitutional needs and impulses of the mind itself. Some are partially subject to volitional control. On the whole, they have a driving or impelling character which probably accounts for modern psychologists simply calling them drives after the German Trieb or Naturtrieb. Bowne's view of personality, however, seems to preclude emphasis on drives of a mechanical nature in favor of the more religious view of freedom. He ascribes motivation to the emotions and the will of the person.

Another ground of feeling toward objects lies in our

conception of their significance for our well-being. He points out that as an abnormal state of nerve in the tooth may give rise to a toothache, so may the perception of such an abnormal state of the nerve. But neither constitutes the toothache. It is neither an abnormal state nor the perception of such; it is its own wretched self. So while feeling attends physical and mental functions, and springs also from the contemplation of objects and relations, there is no way of deducing it from them.

Feelings have two sources: the state of the organism and the relations of our mental states and ideas. Those from the former source are physical feelings and from the latter, emotions. There are many that have both physical and mental roots. Feelings of this class can only be understood from the co-working of the physical with the mental in the person. Physical feelings are roughly distinguished as constitutional and contingent. The former attend those physical appetites and cravings which arise from the nature of the organism itself. The latter depend upon some contingent state, either arising within the organism or resulting from external action upon it. Physical feelings are telic in character. They are almost entirely related to the use and well-being of the person, or to the arousing and directing of our activity. Thus Bowne seems to make allowance for the integrative and disorganizing character of feelings according to the direction
of activity.

Bowne attributes more importance to the feelings which have a mental source, i.e., the conception of an object. He attempts no classification but confines himself to a few general points of view. He points out three general types of feelings or emotions. These are the ego feelings, social feelings and the impersonal feelings. The latter consist of the aesthetic, ethical and the religious feelings. None of these occur in isolation. The ego feelings depend upon self-consciousness. They exist through their relation to our self-esteeem and desire for self-assertion. The ego is at once their subject and object. Bowne means by the term ego, the self as conceived or desired. The value of an experience in the mature person is chiefly determined by this relation to self, i.e., self esteem or self-assertion. Acts of the self are never estimated by the sensations attending them, but by the exaltation of self-feeling which results. The value of an experience to the individual lies in the amount of self-feeling which he has put into it. Thus are the self-feelings constraints and potentialities of the individual. This is another important emphasis of personalistic psychology, ego-involvement.

Human nature is provided with the social feelings as a counter-balance to the ego feelings. Here belong the social impulses and sentiments. "Man is naturally selfish, and
naturally social and sympathetic.\textsuperscript{22} Man seeks man and delights in man far more than man wars upon man. The provision for social and unselfish existence is seen in human love, sympathy, and language as the medium of exchange in thought. It is in the social feelings that the importance of interpersonal relations is pointed out. The field of social relations is the field of benevolent and malevolent impulses and the field of ego feelings. "Indeed human life in general exists (in general) only in society. Of course there can be no society without the individual as its unit; but the individual comes to himself only in society" The ego feelings demand society for their development.\textsuperscript{23}

ii. Ethical Feelings. Ethical and religious feelings belong in that class of feelings that are called impersonal feelings. They are impersonal in the sense that they are independent of the personal reference previously referred to, and seem to depend upon an objective quality of the ideas, objects, or actions themselves. Moral feelings agree with the aesthetic feelings in expressing a satisfaction or dissatis-
faction in the presence of certain conceptions. There is a sense of obligation which is inherent in the moral feelings and there is also a sense of merit or demerit which attends the resultant action. The perception of the good carries obligation, or contains an implicit law for conduct. It is an imperative of the will.

Modern personalists also stress the fact that the universal ethical fact is the recognition of a distinction between right and wrong in conduct, and a resultant sense of obligation. To the objection that feeling is not universal, but is too subjective to be a basis of ethics, Bowne replies that a fact is not made universal by calling it an utterance of the reason or of feeling. Its universality depends upon its content and not upon its psychological classification. Such an objection arises from holding feeling and reason apart in unreal separation. Although ethics gets its law from the ideal, it is forced to limit its actual requirements to the ability of the person. This view is well illustrated in the religious views of that time. Great emphasis was placed on the emotions displayed as a test of religious character. All persons, children as well, were expected to have a sudden or striking exhibition of what Bowne called "hothouse piety".

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24 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 206. This emphasis is seen in the writings of G. W. Allport and P. A. Bertocci. It will be referred to again in a later chapter.
"Ought" was consequently determined by feeling, almost alone. Bowne attempts to give a more adequate place to reason in judging "ought". Ought is thus not a feeling, nor cognition of value, but both interacting. He contends that feeling and reason cannot be artificially separated.

The development of moral sentiments and ideas is a slow and complicated process. The moral characteristic itself is originally given in human nature as a potentiality and not as a completed and systematic insight. Our experience of consequences, our knowledge of tendencies, our underlying world-view all enter into the formation of our codes of conduct. Moral development is impossible without assuming an original ethical germ, or predisposition, in the mind which contains an immanent law of moral development.

The secondary moral feelings are those which result from obedience or disobedience to moral law. From a subjective standpoint, feelings of merit or demerit, worthiness or baseness, remorse, shame, or guilt may result. When the action is another's, our feelings may vary from esteem and approbation to indignation and disgust, according to the circumstances.

iii. Religious Feelings. Bowne dwelt upon this area of the emotions as much as he did other areas. It seems that he was very much disturbed by the emphasis on emotionalism in
religion. We confine ourselves to pointing out those ideas with which contemporary personalists seem to agree. It might be noted that Bowne was tried for heresy because of his view of the religious emotions, but was acquitted.

The religious and the ethical feelings are closely related. The main difference is that religious feelings are mainly concerned with some supernatural being or beings while the latter are not concerned with such reference. When the idea of God is given, the moral law is almost inevitably thought as expressing His will. This does not mean that the moral nature reveals a Holy Person as the author of the moral imperative because differing codes contradict this.²⁵

The origin of religious feelings is found as given in human nature when the idea of God is conceived. The human mind is such that as the outcome of its total experience it forms the conception of the supernatural, not solely as a result of conscious inferential processes, but as an expression of its own needs and nature. This leads to desires and aversions. Desires are conditioned by previous experiences and a knowledge of causes of those experiences and their relation to our interests. Desires have no meaning when separated from those objects or mental functions in which they are realized. We can repress or exalt feeling and we can

direct desire.

Experience first acquires living reality in feeling. Our feelings and interests are the deepest things in us. They furnish the great impulses to action and they also outline its direction. Bowne concludes that for these basal interests, the intellect is instrumental and the will executive. One notes here not only agreement with modern personalists, but also a functional view of the problem of motivation.

iv. Further Views on Religion. Bowne sees the essence of religion in the individual seeking (intending) to do the will of God. All else is secondary and of importance only as it helps achieve this result. As G. W. Allport later emphasizes, Bowne points out that the most characteristic aspect of religious experience is its conscious directedness. Mystical experiences and exhibitions he sees as irrelevant so far as religiosity is concerned. He sees them tending toward the "misdirection of effort and aims". Mysticism leads


27 G. W. Allport, "Intent and Faith", Lecture 6 of The Individual and His Religion (Feb.-March, 1947), and Bowne, "Obedience the Test of Discipleship" in Zion's Herald, 80 (Jan., 1903), p. 10.

28 See Bowne, "The Supernatural in Religion". Zion's Herald, 81 (Jan., 1903), p. 43.
to a divorce of ethical behavior from religion. He concludes that the test of religion is in conduct.

Bowne takes a subjective view of religion in that he feels that it is a personal matter both in experience and life. Having rejected "unutterable experiences", he designates the true religious emotions as based on religious ideas, objects, and activities. Religious emotions must not be mistaken for religious experience. Religious emotions are produced in realizing faith in practice. It is the conscious realizing that constitutes religious experience. He implies that the emotions produced stimulate the realization of faith. Stressing action and conduct, he sees the test of religious emotions in the type of character they cause.

Bowne stresses the cognitive factor in conversion. He considers the main questions about conversion as being whether the individual knows what he is doing and whether he has any sense of the obligations he is assuming in "turning toward God in thought and action", his definition of conversion. 30

As evidence of his assertions about religion, Bowne cites cases concerning childhood religion. The religion of maturity is impossible to childhood. The deeper insight and emotions must come of themselves from cultivation. Person-

29 See Bowne, "Religious Experience", Ibid., p. 74.

30 Bowne, "Are They Converted?", Zion's Herald, 80 (March, 1903), p. 301.
ality must be prepared for mature religion by the cultivation of religious habits of thought and action, an atmosphere of piety, wise religious instruction, and illustrations in living examples. When reflective consciousness does come and the self decides its direction toward God, it has but to ratify its developing personality. Bowne is aware that the individual has to live within the framework of his personality. Religious emotions and experiences that are not incorporated into the personality are useless. It appears from his view that religious traits are developed as a result of conscious intention and introspection of ideals. Without religious traits of action, emotions and mystic experiences are wasted. Bowne also seems to imply that once religious habits of action and thought are developed, they take on a driving power of their own because, as he says, the self then has but to ratify its developed character.

v. The Relationship of Will to Motivation. In feeling and knowing we have the conditions of desire. In desire we have the condition of the will. The essential relationship is that stated above. The will is the executive agency of the person for effecting the desires. The desires have emotions as their bases. Desires have no element of will in them. The intellect is the mediator between the desires and the will. Thus Bowne lays a corner-stone of an anti-materi-
alistic view allowing for the freedom and autonomy of the person.

vi. Will and Action. It seems necessary to report at this point that Bowne's view of the person is of a transcendent nature as contrasted to humanistic and naturalistic views of personality. He views man from above himself and in terms of something higher rather than in terms of properties which he shares with lower animals. His personalistic view flavors his psychology of the will. This view is characteristic of most personalists.

Bowne does not consider all activity volitional. As was pointed out, he makes allowance for mechanical impulses as a form of motivation. The volitional activities are above and beyond these activities. He defines the will as the power which the soul (self) has of controlling itself within certain limits. Later personalists reject this definition because it confuses the effector with its effects. P. A. Bertocci holds to the Jamesian point of view that will is fiat. He holds that the power of the will is an inference from experience as to the ability to accomplish the end willed. Thus Bowne's definition corrected would be the will as the agency

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31 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 222f.

32 Bertocci, Philosophy of Personality, (Unpub. Syll., Boston University, 1947), p. 13. Also see James, Psychology (Briefer course), p. 422.
the self has for controlling itself within certain limits.
Its ability to control would be its power.

Modern personalistic psychologists agree with Bowne's distinctions of volition from its psychological attendants. A volition is not a judgment because the former may contradict the latter and the latter may exist without the former. A volition cannot be identified with desire although it may spring from desire just as it may spring from judgment. This is so because a thing may be strongly desired without being willed and hence a desire may not be attempted or brought to its fruition. Furthermore, the will often appears as the expression of an energy directed toward resistance and control of the desires.

Bowne sees three main characteristics of volition. Volitional action is conditioned by consciousness. Unconscious action is regarded as volitional only by those who war upon the conventions of language. Generally, volition implies foresight and intention. We shall have occasion to come back to this characteristic in Chapter Six in the psychology of G. W. Allport. When foresight and intention are impossible, action is generally regarded as non-volitional. The third characteristic, which has been the subject of much controversy, is that volitional activity is always regarded as free. It involves the thought of a possible alternative and not unbending necessity. Because the conception of the will as
free is often denied, Bowne takes himself to great lengths to show the untenability of arguments on such view.

These arguments against free-will are boiled down to two major objections. The denial of freedom rests first on the impossibility of comprehending free action, and secondly, on the supposed demands of the law of causation. Explanation presupposes the existence of a set of facts and laws which furnish the conditions of explanation. Its very nature is a reference to facts and processes outside itself as its foundation. When we can find in freedom only an irreducible fact, recognition, an admission of this fact is needed more than an explanation. Besides, "there is all the less reason for disturbance, when we see that this freedom is a necessary implication of that rational activity in whose interests explanation itself is undertaken".

The second reason for the denial of freedom concerning the contradiction by the law of causation is doubtful. A free act has as much cause as any other act. Its cause is the free spirit, says Bowne. And if one should ask what caused it to cause, what causes free spirit, then one is shut up to an infinite regression. In other words, the law of causation from a psychological point of view cannot be taken absolutely. Bowne reminds us that the will is not an independent agent

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23 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 278f.
24 Ibid., p. 229.
separated from the person. Thus we see that "if anything is free, it is the soul (self), and not the will; for the will is only an abstraction from the volitional activity of the soul". 35

Bowne points out another fact which is a foundation of personalistic psychology. The freedom of the self is not absolute. It is limited by our mental and physical constitution and by the intensity of the desires and impulses it has to control. A similar consideration has led Brightman to declare that human nature is both limit and potentiality. 36 Within the limits of human nature the person has his realm of freedom.

In summary, Bowne points out that while motives as conceptions are not dynamic, motives as springing from or expressing impulses, do exercise an influence upon volition, and may even defy our attempts to control them.

vii. Summary. This chapter has been an attempt to point out some of the fundamental bases of personalistic psychology as conceived by America's first exponent of this school of thinking. It may be noted that the conception of the self is only partially developed. Conscious experience

35 Ibid., p. 231.

is the starting point from which other data are inferred. The dearth of consideration for personality structure is probably understandable when it is realized that Bowne was principally a protester against sensationalism. The environmental relations are also given scarce attention.

It remains to be seen whether personalistic psychology adequately treats those other areas of personality deemed most important for a psychological understanding of religion. The following chapter undertakes to give the further development of personalistic psychology as it moves forward in undertaking to account for all phases of human activity.
CHAPTER V

MARY WHITON CALKINS' EXPOSITION OF SELF PSYCHOLOGY

In this chapter it will be seen that personalistic psychology has evolved from independent insights rather than as a result of following an exalted master who has charted a course for adherents to follow. This does not mean that it has developed in a vacuum, but rather that it has been the result of new insights following from the synthesis of old facts. Like Bowne, Calkins is a protestant against elementarism and sensationalism in psychology. However, as we shall see, Calkins is also a protester against other one-sided psychological approaches prevalent in her period.

The chapter begins with a brief review of Calkins' historical setting and its resultant influence upon her. The next section deals mainly with her exposition of self psychology and some of its relationships to other problems in psychology. Religion is one of those problems. The following section deals with the problem of motivation. Some influences are noted and comparisons made. The final section contains a summary and some comparisons with Bowne. The purpose of this chapter is to show how personalistic psychology has had its main issues clarified and refined and how its scope has broadened and been justified by other psychological influences. Its growing adequacy for interpreting religion
is also pointed out.

1. Historical Setting

Calkins is not far removed from Bowne in so far as birth dates are concerned, there being hardly more than a dozen years separating them. Bowne did not live to see the great changes that were wrought by the coming of functional, Gestalt, depth, and behavioristic psychologies. Calkins lived through this era. In surviving two decades longer than Bowne, Miss Calkins was much more able to extend the bounds of her thinking by the enrichment of newer points of view. Consequently, she devoted a great deal of her writing to the defense of self psychology against the onslaughts of the newer points of view. Moreover, to the enrichment of the field of psychology, she attempted to reconcile these new psychologies with each other and with personalistic psychology.

As a student of William James, Hugo Munsterberg, and Josiah Royce, she shows characteristics of the influence of all three. As she states, "My debt to these men...both academic and personal, may be acknowledged, but can never be repaid". Miss Calkins was also a participant in experimental psychology in the early days of that field in America under the guidance of Munsterberg. Unlike Bowne, who was an

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immediate predecessor and contemporary of James', Miss Calkins was a direct product of James' influence.

It should be remembered that at the beginning of Calkins' span of psychological productivity (beginning in 1892 and ending in 1930) faculty psychology had been buried and James had given the coup d'état to sensationalistic psychology. Functional and experimental psychology were becoming the fad in America. The analysis of mental structures was giving way to the study of processes or functions. As Moore and Gurnee have pointed out, in a very general sense, previous to the close of the last century, all psychologists were self psychologists. It has been since that time that the position of personalistic psychology has been most clearly formulated and questioned.

1. Miss Calkins' Definition of Psychology. In one of her earliest writings, Miss Calkins makes the statement that "a presupposition of the fact of association is that of the identity of the subject. The same 'I' must exist if there is to be consciousness 'in the same way' or 'of the same object'." Again she writes that "a continuous self seems to

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3 Moore and Gurnee, Foundation of Psychology, p. 79.

the writer to be an inevitable presupposition of psychic phenomena of every kind.\textsuperscript{5} It was from her experiments in association that the realization of the importance of the self for psychology was impressed upon Calkins as indicated in the statements above from her articles on experimental projects. The influence of James and Royce probably had a large part to do with this realization also.

It was upon this basal fact that Calkins conceived the definition of psychology. Psychology defined as the science of consciousness did not seem to go far enough for her because consciousness does not occur impersonally.\textsuperscript{6} Similarly, psychology as the study of mental processes was unsatisfactory to her. Such a psychology studies the percept, for example, rather than the self as perceiving. It fails to answer the inevitable question: whose percept? Furthermore, such a psychology cannot adequately describe the different forms of human experience because "perception and recognition and thought, and, more obviously, emotion, will, and faith, are incompletely described when analyzed into merely structural elements and referred to bodily conditions".\textsuperscript{7} Calkins concludes that the definition of psychology as science of mental functions without referring the functions to the functioning


\textsuperscript{6} Calkins, First Book in Psychology, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 274.
self is an entirely artificial proceeding.

The development of Calkins' definition of psychology will not be considered in detail because such would exceed the scope and boundaries of this thesis. The main fact is that, at first, she considered psychology as the science of the self. She refined this definition later. Thus she defines psychology as "the science of the self in relation to, or conscious of, its environment". Only by such a definition, she believed, could the manifold factors and experiences of human life be studied adequately from a psychological point of view. Thus sensations, behaviorisms, mental functions, Gestalten, and mental disorders are given a bond of unity and ownership. These creations are studied in relation to their creator. Not religious experience, but the self as experiencing religion is a resulting principle.

ii. The Introspective Method. Calkins holds that the methods of psychology are the same as those of other sciences. The first is description (analysis and classification) and the second is that of explanation. Psychology has a method peculiar to itself just as other sciences. The method of introspection is the method peculiar to psychology. This is because the facts of psychology are the inner facts, selves, and ideas.

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8 Ibid., p. 1.
The advantages of introspection she holds to be the absence of need of special conditions of time and place, mechanical adjuncts, search for suitable material. The disadvantages recognized are the need of training in introspection, the changes that it makes in its own subject and the uncertainties of memory. The verification of introspection is secured by the method of experiment. Because psychic facts can never be repeated or exactly measured, experiment must concern itself with the physical stimulus of psychic facts and with the physical reactions to these stimuli. The method of experiment is held to be subsidiary to the method of introspection.

Thus we see personalistic psychology recognizing the value and validity of experimental psychology, but still holding to the primacy of the introspective method. The recognition of experimental psychology is a step forward in the development of personalistic psychology for the productivity of new ideas as well as for the verification of hypotheses. We now proceed to examine the personalistic psychology as espoused by Miss Calkins.

2. Self Psychology and Its Relations

1. The Characteristics of the Self. To Miss Calkins, the self is not merely inferred to exist. It is immediately

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9 Ibid., pp. 7 and 8.
experienced as possessing at least four characteristics. The self is relatively persistent, complex, unique, and related to (or conscious of) personal and impersonal objects. Some of the more fundamental relations of the self to its objects are those of receptivity and activity, sympathy, attention, egoism, and altruism. In her latest writings, Calkins shows the influence of William Stern. In a different manner she states the characteristics of the self as being identical in varying experiences and through succeeding moments, changing, a totality but "nonetheless, a whole of many characters and attitudes, a 'multiplex' self". She did not subscribe to the idea that the self is psychophysically neutral.

Miss Calkins holds that the self cannot be defined. When asked to define it, she replies that "by self is meant that, whatever it is, which the plain man means when he says 'I am ashamed of myself:' 'I am spurring myself on'; etc." This apparent indefinability of the self seems to be one of the main causes of its rejection by many psychologists. Moore and Gurnee state that only the definable can be a fit object of scientific study and what cannot be defined cannot

10 Ibid., p. 3f.


12 Ibid., p. 278.

13 Moore and Gurnee, Foundations of Psychology, p. 91.
be described or explained in any systematic or scientific manner. Roback\textsuperscript{14} holds that the characteristics of the self apply more aptly to consciousness than to the self. As an answer to such criticisms, Calkins points out that many experiences are indescribable without some specific reference to the consciousness of selves. Consciousness apart from that which is conscious is an abstraction. Besides, those who argue against the self imply self in arguing.\textsuperscript{15}

It seems that the substance of the objections to the indefinability of the self remain for William Stern to clarify and answer in a positive manner. As W. E. Hunter points out in a review of Calkins' First Book in Psychology, an analysis of the self and the theories of its analysis would fill a great gap in self psychology.\textsuperscript{16} It seems that Calkins' conception of the self was not very satisfactory to the dominant structuralists and behaviorists. It was severely criticized. But none of her critics had a better or substitute concept to offer. One notes that hardly a single psychologist came to Miss Calkins' defense although many embraced the same point of view.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} A. A. Roback, \textit{Behaviorism and Psychology} (Cambridge: University Bookstore Inc., 1923), p. 264f.
\item \textsuperscript{15} "The Self in Recent Psychology", \textit{Psychological Bulletin}, 24 (Feb., 1927), p. 208.
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Psychological Bulletin}, 12 (April, 1915), p. 328.
\item \textsuperscript{17} James Ward, C. H. Judd and William McDougall are psychologists who have strongly advocated the self concept in psychology.
\end{itemize}
11. The Self and the Soul. Lest one associate the psychological self with the old metaphysical soul, Calkins is first to reject the latter and distinguish it from the former. In the first place, psychology sturdily refuses to study the nature of the soul, its permanence or immortality. "It simply analyzes the forms of self-consciousness, or studies people in their social relations".\(^{18}\)

The main distinction between the metaphysical self or soul and the psychological self is that the metaphysical soul or incorporeal, simple, unchanging being is clearly unjustified by experience. It is "an empty abstraction except for the characters -- persistence and individuality -- which as truly belong to the self".\(^{19}\) The self has none of the characteristics of the soul concept except for the two mentioned above. Furthermore, the self is not an inference, but an experienced reality.\(^{20}\) The metaphysical self is the personalistic psychologist's self supplemented by whatever characteristics which the metaphysician infers as essential.


\(^{19}\) Calkins, "Case of Self Against Soul" in Psychological Review, 24 (May, 1917), p. 299.

to the self. These distinctions between the self of psychology and the self of philosophy seem to be misunderstood even to-day despite Calkins' explanations and protests. At least, this seems to be a main reason for the avoidance of the self in psychology.

Personalistic psychology does not seek an understanding of the metaphysics of the soul for a psychological understanding of religion. Instead, it seeks to understand the dynamics of the empirical, experiencing self in its relations to the Creator and Sustainer of Values.

iii. Forms of Self Psychology. It may be gathered from the characteristics of the self that it does not include the body. It is related to the body but is distinct from it. Calkins is in agreement with Bowne on the fact that the mind and body interact. However, some personalistic psychologists hold that the self or person is not entirely psychical, but is psychophysically neutral. This latter view will be treated in full in the next chapter. The agreements between these types of personalism are pointed out here.

Both types of personalism are strongly opposed to every form of impersonalistic psychology. Both treat psychology as the science of the self or person. The distinction lies in the definition of the self or person. Whereas Calkins holds

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it to be strictly psychical, Stern holds the person to be the whole conscious organism in response to its environment. It is psychophysically neutral. Both stress the totality, unity, multiplicity, uniqueness and continuity of the person. Both are concerned with the objects of the self and credit the self with basic attitudes and dispositions toward the achievement of definite ends. In short, personalistic psychology in general attempts to describe the nature of the reactions of a conscious being which is a unity of many characters, individual, self-identical, and changing. These seem to be the main points of emphasis of personalistic psychology.

iv. The Self and Its Relations. Self psychology, as Miss Calkins conceives it, has three basal conceptions: that of the self, that of the object, and that of the self's relation or attitude toward its object. The latter is primarily a social relation. By the self's relations to objects is meant its awareness or consciousness of objects. Stimuli of which the self is unaware are not considered objects of the self. Objects of the self may be personal, or impersonal, physical or psychological, public or private.

Very important for personalistic psychology are the relations or attitudes of the self toward its objects. It seems in these attitudes of the self toward its objects, that the autonomy and creativity of the person stand in marked con-
trast to the seeming enslavement of the person to his environment, instincts, or unconscious that many psychologists stress. This is putting the matter crudely, but the general idea stands. Calkins divides these attitudes into several groups. In the first group are those attitudes of receptivity, activity, and compulsion. Activity may be in the form of desire or volition. Volition may be in the form of domination or adaptation.

The second group of personal attitudes consists of the egocentric and allocentric, i.e., altruistic, attitudes. The egocentric emphasis is on the self or its body. The allocentric attitude is the relation of the self to things and other selves. An example of the latter may be hatred or reverence. These attitudes are not mutually exclusive because they are experienced in their complexity and go to make up the life of emotion. The third group of relations of the self to its objects are called the individualizing attitudes and the generalizing attitudes. The former is expressed mainly in emotions and the latter in classification and conception. These basal attitudes of the self are descriptions of experience rather than inferences from it. From these descriptions it may be seen that the self is not merely passive or adaptive, but likewise assertive. Thus, environment,

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instincts, needs, etc., are not the only formative influences upon the person because the self not only individualizes these influences, but also may actively assert itself over and beyond them, and in spite of them.

The significance of these relations of the self for a psychological understanding of religion lies in the dynamics of the self they illustrate. The self not only receives stimuli, but acts on them as well. Religious objects may be both stimulators to religious action and raw materials for the self to act upon. The self receives, but selects, to a certain degree, its stimuli. It acts upon them selectively, i.e., selfishly or altruistically. In acting, the self and object of the self may be brought sharply into focus as is the case in experiencing emotions or the self may relate one object to another, or to a general class (generalizing). The person does not merely react to religious stimuli; he reaches out, as it were, and looks for them also.

v. Behaviorism and Self Psychology. It seems that one of Miss Calkins' great contributions to psychology is her attempt to show that personalistic psychology has a place for the facts of behaviorism. In the case of behaviorism, the same can hardly be said because many behaviorists do not consider the fact of consciousness in the domain of psychology. It is interesting to note that Roback classifies Calkins as
such a classification seems to stretch behaviorism far beyond its admitted bounds. Personalistic psychology holds that the experience of the stimulus is a more deciding factor for response than that of simple matter in motion. As Calkins points out, the individual's relation to environment is not exclusively identified with bodily reactions. It consists, in part at least, of consciousness. She points out further that "consciousness is a more fundamental relation with bodily response and not a function strictly coordinate with it".

Self psychology is behavioristic only when it stresses the relations of self to environment. Keeping in mind that the self is psychical rather than physical, behaviorism can hardly embrace personalistic psychology. Nevertheless, there exist other agreements between them. Both reject abstracted states or processes. Both are interested in the conception of the relation of the individual to his environment. And both treat primarily entities or organic wholes. Both are activistic. However, the basal fact of personalistic psychology and its subsequent scope of relations seem to enable Calkins to assume rightly that personalistic psychology is

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23 A. A. Roback, Behaviorism and Psychology (Cambridge: University Bookstore, 1923). See the chart at the back of the book.

the true psychological behaviorism.\textsuperscript{25} Behaviorism lacks many of the concepts necessary for understanding religion, whereas personalism embraces most of the important concepts of behavior and has many others to throw light on the religious experience and religious behavior. It not only deals with physical responses to physical stimuli, but with mental responses to both physical and mental stimuli as well. In fact, a knowledge of the self and its activities gives more understanding of the physical stimulus-response equation than behaviorism gives (reflex actions excluded). Values, morals, and desires affect behavior as much as other stimuli.

vi. \textit{Depth Psychology and Personalistic Psychology}. As a further indication of personalism's adequacy, Calkins points out that self psychology is at the very core of every one of the psychoanalytic systems. Jung's distinction between extraversion and introversion, as positive and negative relations between subject and object, presupposes the existence of self and of object. Adler's contrast between the sense of power and the feeling of inferiority requires the experience of one's self in relation to other selves. The unconscious, superego, and censor in Freud's writings can hardly be impersonally conceived. The doctrines of depth psychology can be made more meaningful only as they are placed in a con-

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 25.
text of self psychology. Personalism avoids the "gremlin"-like character that pervades depth psychology's concepts, by affirming the whole person acting in each experience.

The method of depth psychology seems for practical purposes the same as Calkins'. Both seek knowledge of the individual through introspection. As Furtmuller points out, psychoanalysis is nothing more than artificially guided introspection. Thus Calkins points out the advantages in concreteness and meaningfulness that depth psychology can gain by personalistic interpretations.

vii. Self Psychology and Religion. By describing the attitudes of the self to its objects, self psychology does not have difficulty explaining the religiosity of man. Holding that all personal relationships may be the basis of a psychological study, Miss Calkins sees the relationship between a human self and a conceived divine self as another typical interpersonal relationship important and legitimate for psychological study.

It must be emphasized that personalistic psychology does

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not stress the psychological study of the isolated self nor of its isolated relationships or adjustments. It stresses the self in its adjustments and relations. Thus religion becomes another activity in which the self expresses its basic attitudes toward a self conceived as divine.

Although Miss Calkins realizes the importance of the self and its relations for a psychological understanding of religion, she does not stress the fact that the self organizes its attitudes and tendencies into a somewhat stable organization. The inner structure of the organization of the self's relations is highly important for understanding religion. Since the development of personalistic psychology has not reached the stage of emphasizing the structure of personality, without which an understanding of religion would be incomplete, we confine this section to pointing out characteristics of the religious consciousness given by Miss Calkins, after which a brief examination of the motivation of the person is briefly examined in the following section.

Calkins defines religion as being the conscious relation of a human self to a divine being, i.e., a being regarded as greater than any human self and treated or conceived as personal.29 The adequacy of this definition is shown by the fact that phenomena of nature and fetishes in apparently impersonal religions are worshiped not for what they are, but because they

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29 Ibid., p. 262f.
are looked upon as embodiments of conscious selves. This definition of religion distinguishes the religious experience from the moral experience. Whereas religious experience is fundamentally a consciousness of God or gods, morality is fundamentally a consciousness of one's place and responsibility in the whole system of beings. It may or may not include God, but when it does it becomes a part of religion. There can be religion, however degrading, without morality. But no morality, however sublime, can be religion, without the consciousness of God.30

As the consciousness of God is the first characteristic of religion, a second characteristic is its emotional quality. As Calkins states, "At its lowest emotional terms, it includes at least the feeling of the dependence of the human on the divine".31 The emotional quality may be expressed in fear or reverence. Since the relationship to other selves may be active as well as passive, the active attitude of faith or loyalty to the supreme Self is a characteristic phase of religious experience. It may be exhibited in active submission or adoption of what one conceives as one's subsequent duty. It is here that religion and ethics seem to be so closely related. The final characteristic pointed out by Calkins is that of the conviction of God's reality —— belief. This

30 Ibid., p. 267f.
31 Ibid., p. 266.
phase of religious experience forms the background of the religious consciousness. Without it, there can be no relationship with God because one can hardly relate himself consciously to something he is convinced doesn't exist.\footnote{32} 

The object of faith is a self or selves; the object of belief is impersonal.\footnote{33} Both are altruistic, adaptive attitudes. Both are assertive and include the consciousness of coherence. Both are social attitudes.

3. Motivation

Calkins does not deal very much with the motivational structure of the self. Her concern was so much with reinstating the self in psychology that it seems that the motivational structure of the self, comparatively speaking, was overlooked. The introspective method of description and analysis of one's conscious processes does not seem to give much help in theorizing about the self's motivational structure. With the exception of the topics on emotions, the various aspects of motivation are scattered, rather than being systematically organized, through her book on general psychology. We attempt to bring them together and briefly examine them.

\footnote{32} Philosophically, Calkins sees the individual as a part of the "Absolute Self" (God). See her Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 472.

1. **Instincts.** Calkins sees the reactions of the body consisting of reflex and ideo-motor (after James) movements. The reflex movements are unconditioned by antecedent consciousness. These innate or unlearned reactions are called instincts. The instinctive consciousness is the natural or the temperamental psychic attitudes. These reactions are hereditary and are useful in the perpetuation of the race.

   The instincts are classified as altruistic, adaptive, and egoistic. The greater number of them are primarily social, i.e., reactions to persons and not merely reactions to an impersonal environment. Some are transitory and some permanent. Habit makes the transitory ones relatively permanent. Her views on instincts are archaic, as are the ones she names.

2. **Emotions.** Emotions are first and foremost, intensely individualizing experiences. In an emotional state, one immediately realizes himself as a unique self. One individualizes himself and the object of the emotion. They are receptive experiences, i.e., they include the awareness of being influenced or affected. The elemental experiences peculiar to emotion are pleasantness and unpleasantness. They are characterized also by the organic sensations which they include. Bodily reactions may accompany and condition emotional states. These reactions are instinctive.

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84 Calkins, *First Book in Psychology*, pp. 90 and 92.
Calkins classified emotions according to the varying relations of different selves to each other and on the basis of the contrast between pleasantness and unpleasantness. Thus there are social and non-social emotions. And under each of the above, there are egoistic and altruistic emotions. The pleasant and unpleasant emotions are a matter of valuation.\textsuperscript{35}

The term feeling is used to indicate the emotional states of pleasantness and unpleasantness.\textsuperscript{36}

Calkins does not seem to see the relationship between emotions and instincts advocated by McDougall and adopted by some personalists. Like temperament and instincts, they are simply innate attitudes and reactions of the self to its objects.

The factors in motivation are few as treated by Calkins. This is in direct contrast, as we shall see, to William Stern's treatment of the problem. The main criticism that can be placed on personalistic psychology at this stage, especially in the light of present-day interests, is its inadequate treatment of motivation. Instincts and emotions, important as they may be, seem far too simple to account for the variety of human motives.

\textit{iii. Summary.} As Borne stood on the firing line bat-

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., see Chapter II.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 366.
tling against the forces of impersonalism in psychology in his era, we find Calkins taking her place on that same line. The forces of impersonalism have grown more tremendous and Calkins, although not retreating tries the strategy of reconciliation. She shows that the sects in psychology can all find common ground and advantages to their special interests in a personalistic treatment of their subject.

The self is separated emphatically from the old soul concept and is given a status commensurate with other scientific concepts. In her conception of the self she is in agreement with Bowne. As personalists differ in some respects concerning the self, we shall examine Stern's conception next where many of the deficits of Calkins are made up so that a more complete self psychology appears.

Since our main interest is the personalistic interpretation of religious experience, we have some of Calkins' specific views on the subject. The overview of personalistic psychology as a whole may give more information and furnish more criteria for an evaluation of its adequacy for interpreting religious experience. We proceed now to an examination of Stern's psychology.
CHAPTER VI

STERN'S PERSONALISTIC GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

The claim that a psychologist's underlying philosophy helps to determine his psychological views is cogently illustrated in the personalistic psychology of William Stern. His psychology is treated as a branch of a more general science of which his "critical personalism" is the underlying philosophy. We shall be content with pointing out basic similarities to other personalists on those points having a direct bearing on psychology of religion. The fact that his philosophical speculations, like Calkins', lead him to a pantheistic religious view is not disturbing for the purpose of this thesis because the All-Person or Absolute is regarded as personal. Our main concern is whether the facts about human nature as illustrated in his psychological concepts are relevant and adequate for understanding religion. The underlying philosophy of personalistic psychology is in most respects much the same.

1. Historical Setting

A period of sixty-five years covers the four main representatives of personalistic psychology. In such a short period it seems natural that both the lives and the influences of these representatives would overlap. And to a certain ex-
tent they do. The influences affecting German born and educated William Stern considerably affected the American personalists because of their studies in European, and especially German, universities.

However, the total cultural and psychological situation of the German psychologists was quite different from the same situation in America. There seem to be at least two main factors affecting Stern in Germany which were somewhat different from those affecting American psychologists of the same period, i.e., since the turn of the century. The first factor is the trend of German psychology away from quantitative aspects toward a qualitative psychology.¹ It seems that German psychology at the time was becoming more concerned with kinds of experience and qualitative analysis than trying to grasp the mind with number and measure. This is in contrast to the American scene where the present century has seen a general interest in statistics and quantitative measurements.

The second factor is the close alliance between psychology and philosophy in Germany. As Kluver points out, "the connection between philosophy and psychology has been and still is a very close one in Germany."² The connection seems to be a voluntary one. Practically all of the famous psychologists on the continent have contributed work to some

¹ H. Kluver, "Contemporary German Psychology" in G. Murphy's Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, p. 417.
² Ibid., p. 352f.
field of philosophy. This seemed to have been the case at one time in America, but it is not so to-day to a large extent. At any rate, it should hardly be surprising to find that Stern's psychology is regarded as a branch of his metaphysical personalism, in view of the foregoing facts.

In common with other personalistic psychologies is the fact that Stern was motivated by dissatisfaction with the mechanization and depersonalization of psychology. Unlike the other personalists, he doesn't attempt to subjugate mechanism to teleology, but attempts a radical synthesis between the two and, thus, unity in psychology. It is not unimportant that Stern develops his conception of personalistic psychology after he develops his philosophical system. However, it should be noted that many of the concepts of personalistic philosophy came as a result of studies in various phases of psychology. 3 Stern, admitting the influences in his thinking, gives credit to the following psychologists and philosophers for the following influences: to Ebbinghaus for devotion to the empirical, to Wundt for the emphasis on activity, to Fechner for a hierarchal arrangement, to Hartmann for teleology, and to Dilthey for the emphasis on the concreteness of personality. 4


4 Ibid., p. 352f.
**Purpose and Methods.** Stern's personalistic psychology aims at giving a new foundation to the general psychology of the human individual. It aims at being inclusive, synoptic, and general. It opposes one-sided treatments of psychology and is based in part upon the personalistic philosophy which he expounds.

The subject-matter for psychology is experience, or the essential nature and activity of mind. And Stern defines psychology as the science of the person having experience or capable of having experience. His method is therefore identifying and interpreting experience in terms of the unitary, goal-directed person. His procedure is to interpret experience as the product of the person-world relationship, starting with the dependence of the person on the world and going to those areas of experience where the person is relatively free and acts on the world.

We now proceed to an examination of the concepts Stern uses for interpreting experience, noting similarities with the ideas of other personalists as well as those distinctive of Stern.

2. **Experience**

1. The *Psychophysically Neutral Person.* Stern holds

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that all mental data have a substratum of mind by which they are substantiated and from which they issue. Whereas Calkins and Bowne hold that this substratum is psychical, Stern holds that it must be something that has existence prior to the differentiation into the mental and the physical. Rejecting parallelism and interactionism, Stern sets up the hypothesis that the person must be psychophysically neutral. Stern is attempting to overcome the dichotomy of mind and body or spirit and matter. He is monistic both in his conception of the universe and of individual beings.

It should be pointed out that the word "person" is defined as

Ein solches Existierendes, das trotz der Vielheit der Teile eine reale eigenartige und eigenwertige Einheit bildet und als solche, trotz der Vielheit der teilfunktionen, eine einheitliche zielstrebig Selbsttätigkeit vollbringt.6

The opposite of person is thing. A thing is the contradiction of the characteristics of person. However, "was von oben (als Ganzes) gesehen Person ist, ist von unten (als Summe von Teilen betrachtet) Sache".7 Stern's extension of the word person to cover such a variety of objects such as atoms, molecules and even such universals as races, families, etc. seems to rob the word of all its meaning. This Knudson has

7 Ibid., p. 9.
The human person is defined as "a living whole, individual, unique, striving toward goals, self-contained and yet open to the world around him; he is capable of having experience". He is a psychophysically neutral *unitas multiplex* and may be apprehended through qualities that are psychophysically neutral. It seems that psychophysical neutrality applies to the mind and body as a working whole. The individual, i.e., totality of mind and body, is neither wholly psychical nor physical, but capable of being either according to the sphere of life involved. An indication of this may be seen in a statement concerning the limits of the term "mental". Stern states, "...the act of will as a whole takes its meaning from the purposive unity of mental experience and bodily actions; it is psychophysically neutral, a *personal* act". But Stern in the first place, overlooks the fact that description demands more specificity than the generalizing term "psychophysically neutral" seems to give. In the second place, to describe an act as psychophysically neutral seems to be a contradiction to experience. It seems that an act can only be psychical, physical, or an interaction of both. Taking the act of will as an example, the initiation of the act seems to be psychical; its outcome seems to depend upon the preser-


9 Stern, *General Psychology*, p. 79.
viation of the mental act and the instrumentality of the body. If the person be psychophysically neutral, i.e., neither psychical nor physical, then it seems that the person is an abstraction that can neither be experienced nor observed. It seems that unity is gained at the expense of non-conformity to experience.

Now despite the difference of opinion concerning the person, the similarities are much greater among personalists. Both the person and the self are unique, persistent, many-sided, related to their physical and social environment and are the fundamental basis of all their experiences. Stern, Calkins, and Bowne agree on the characteristics of the person or self. So for all practical purposes the psychological self may be regarded as the person.

ii. The Modalities of Life. One of the fundamental theses of personalistic psychology according to Stern is that experience develops out of and into life. Life for the person appears in three modalities, each of which constitutes a personal world to the person. The first modality is that of the biological which the person shares with other living organisms. This is the behaviorist's interest. The functions of this modality are those of growth, maturation, reproduction, adaptation, and other vital functions for bring-

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10 Stern, General Psychology, p. 72.
ing the person into conformity with his environment. This is called the biosphere. Contrasting with this sphere is the world of values. This is a purely human sphere since it is not shared with the lower animals. The person relates himself to the objective significance of the world and incorporates or introjects these values into his own life. This is a sphere where religion is a great concern.

Introception denotes the activity that gives direction and form to human life. The end result of introception is the formation of personality (character). This is the unitary and meaningful pattern of life. Examples of incorporating objective values into one's own life are loving, understanding, and consecration. They are wholly inconceivable in the absence of consciousness. Introception involves formative tendencies and the enactment of intentions.

The concept of introception is far superior to behavioristic "conditioning" in understanding the meaningful adoption of values. Jung's analytic psychology has no concept to account for such an operation other than by rationalization, a concept denoting the irrational. The typologists are not concerned with how, but mainly with what is the individual's values.

Stern applies the concept of introception to religion in accordance with the introception of spiritual values. Therewith does introception attain a double standpoint. First,
that which is holy to me is more than me, determining (bestimmend), representative for me, and is seen as perfection. Secondly, this more-than-me is felt as somehow related to me.  

He sees different forms of introception of the holy. First is the immediate sanctifying of a person without needing a perceptual or symbolic medium as in Judaism and other religions. The second is the personification of an idea, as when the ideas of freedom, equality, and brotherhood are revered. The third form is the impulse to comprehend the holy in persons, as in heroes or Christ.

He compares religiosity with loving introception. It embraces the reality of persons, but limits itself to the human and anthropomorphic realities. The religious man, as the loving man, determines his relations, in intention and behavior, in recognition of and creation from his position to the introcepted subject.

Stern sees the spiritual position of man to God determined by the four introceptive traits of loving, understanding, consecration, and awe. These traits are exhibited in the following types of religiosity. The religiosity of childhood is colored by love such as that toward the father. The religiosity of the penitent humbles itself in contrition before

12 Ibid., p. 395.
13 Ibid., p. 400.
Godly might. The mystical religiosity, which intends to see the Godly glory immediately, is different from the understanding religiosity which comprehends its own imperfection at the same time in its nearness and its distance to Godly perfection. The characteristic longing of all religions is absolute introception which is complete absorption or incorporation of religious values into one's self, or where the individual is as his ideals. And Stern sees these types of religiosity as applications of the concept to religion.

The third sphere of life is that of experience. Experience occurs wherever the modality of vitality is surpassed, but complete introception is not attained. It is defined as life under cleavage and tension. Cleavage and tension of the person-world relationship being dynamic processes, they are constant but varied. To express this state of affairs, Stern uses two more terms: salience and embeddedness.

The more acute the tension between person and world the more conscious the person becomes. Consciousness is salient, i.e., it stands out from the diffuse background of personal life, in acute tension between the person and world. Embarrassment or acute awareness of some object brings about this salience of consciousness. At other times when there is less sharpness of consciousness or vagueness, consciousness is said

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15 Stern, General Psychology, p. 73.
to be embedded more deeply. Complete embeddedness is unconsciousness (repressed or otherwise).

Personalistic psychology thus far hasn't given much consideration to the unconscious, a concept by which many depth psychologists would attempt to understand all phases of religious experience and behavior. However, it should be noted that the unconscious consists of embedded experience and so is not unaccounted for. What remains to be seen is how this experience works from a personalistic point of view. At this point, this much can be said, the self chooses the experiences it represses or embeds. The self brings these experiences into salience when they are relevant for its adjustment. The unconscious is thus not non-conscious, but is non-self-conscious. Other adjustment mechanisms are discussed in the next chapter. The main point here is that religion is not just a result of unconscious wishes or desires because there is a unifying thinking, wanting, willing self which is in command and selects its method of adjustment to a great degree.

Experience being fragmentary, it is appropriately regulated by selectivity and the personal relevance of objects. The unconscious is thus a necessary supplement to consciousness. The person experiences the world in such a way that the foreground appears large, background small; important items clear, incidental items blurred. He also experiences himself so as to live on the best possible terms with himself.
Conscious experience leads the way to the introception of values.

The facts thus far presented are similar to the personalistic psychologies of Bowne and Calkins. Stern is in agreement with Bowne and Calkins that the significance of functions, adaptations, and adjustments is understood only by reference to a coordinating concept such as the self. All three personalists agree that the self and its relations to its objects (person-world) is the main subject-matter of psychology. Calkins and Stern agree that the unconscious is not a separate entity, but is non-self-conscious experience. Bowne and Calkins are in agreement with Stern concerning the autonomy, creativity, and purposiveness of the person. These personalists agree with Springer that the understanding of persons must be on a higher level of concepts than the last distinguishable elements. But they insist that this understanding be based on empirical evidence, rather than abstraction. These personalists agree with Lewin and the Gestalt psychologists on the importance of understanding the person in his total setting. But Bowne, Calkins, and Stern would say that the person is relatively stable from setting to setting and that the lasting structures of the person are as important as the environmental setting. Personalists are in accord with the behavioristic emphasis on action, but see responses selected and regulated by the person. Stern and Calkins recognize the
relevance of the unconscious, but regard it as a supplement to consciousness and not as an autonomous entity.

iii. **Interpersonal Relations --- Convergence.** In personalistic psychology the person is not viewed as merely passive, but as both receptive and active. Calkins pointed this out when she listed receptivity and activity as two of the fundamental relations of the self to its objects. Stern gives these two relations a somewhat different formulation. Both come under the concept of convergence.

Seeking more than a mere classification of ideas, feelings and actions, Stern holds that the background or the tendency and readiness to act must be sought. To signify the lasting attitude and capacity of the person to act in definite ways, the concepts of dispositions are postulated as fundamental categories. Dispositions are not faculties, but possibilities for action having a range of free play. Teleologically, they act as implements and as directional determinants of functions.\(^\text{16}\) They vary according to time, potency, and tendency. Examples of dispositions are temperament and character traits. It remains for G. W. Allport to distinguish between these latter two more fully.

Heredity does not play the role of determining behavior alone. Factors from the external world also play their part.

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Heredity and environment are convergent mates in the adjustment of the person. External factors converge with the inner dispositions of the person. The environment has effect on the person only because the person is susceptible to its effect by means of dispositions. Thus convergence designates the reciprocal action between the person and world. It means that only in the cooperation of the inner and the outer factors does the personal life arise. This doctrine of convergence indicates that the person is not merely passive to environmental stimuli. It thus differs from behavioristic conceptions of environmental factors in that the individual's values and tendencies are considered as coinciding with external factors to produce behavior. Convergence thus explains why there may be consistent behavior regardless of situations. It depends upon the convergence of the environment with the individual's inner values and tendencies. For example, whether a religious person placed in a criminal dive as an environment will act like a criminal depends to a certain extent on whether there is confluence with his values and environment at the time.

Stern points out that there is another factor involved. It is the personal goal-striving of the person. Only those acts "bei welcher der Anteil der personlichen Zelbstrebigkeit ein Hochstmass erreicht, bezeichnen wir als frei".17 In such acts the person is free from external forces and free from

17 Stern, Die Menschliche Personlichkeit, p. 152.
inner tensions. In free acts, "die Aussenwelt nicht der bestimmende Faktor, sondern das Material ist, an dem sich die Disposition in Wirksamkeit verwandelt".\textsuperscript{18} It is because of the freedom of the person that introception is possible. Otherwise, there could be no meaningful intaking of objective value into selfhood. Thus the person is free within the limits of innate ability and the external factors he has to work with. But since consciousness does not reflect the objective world clearly, external factors have a double standpoint. The person reacts to the stimuli of the world as he conceives it and the objective world acts as a check on his conception and actions. Thus convergence expresses these relations concisely.

This indicates that the person has a capacity for many acts, religiosity included. The double standpoint of external factors appears to preclude any idea of a universal drive in persons toward religiosity as will be seen later. The main point here is that human nature is capable of religiosity by the introception of religious values. Whether such values are objective or not, the person reacts to them as he conceives them. If they are too much out of line with the objective world, it has appropriate checks for him. As the person accumulates experience and evaluates the worth of his desires, he forms a hierarchy of values. If religious values are es-

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 153.
teemed, then they are introcepted. The extent and completeness of such introception helps determine his religiousness.

iv. Thought. Since many aspects of thinking are a part of the religious experience, we briefly sketch the personalistic interpretation of the psychology of thinking. Thought is purposive. It facilitates adjustment. It is an inner experience that goes beyond itself and intends something that is neither object, class, relations, meaning, or solution. Thought is similar to an act of will in that both are internally structured, initiated, proceed toward a goal and come to an end. The distinction is that an act of will aims at an external change while the goal of thought is an intellectual change.

Thought is a salient experience, i.e., it arises as a result of tension. It is fused with images. Formal motives to thought grow out of personal needs and desires. Contents of thought are motivated by lasting interests and ideals. Thus religious thinking may be motivated by desire for changes in the social order or a need to clarify and develop their position in regard to ultimate values.

There are many forms in institutional religion that serve as a framework for thought. Meditation, prayer, and worship are some of them. The religions that glorify mysticism and mystical experiences make a significant place for

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19 Stern, General Psychology, p. 272f.
thought. Stern points out significantly that motives for thought grow out of personal needs and desires and that the content is motivated by interests and ideals of a long-range nature. Religion also provides ideals and interests. Whether these are true or false is not for the psychologist to say. All the psychologist can say is that in intending for such goals, the person achieves a change. The interpretation of the goals must be left for philosophy. 20

3. Motivation

Personalistic psychology is a dynamic psychology. Nevertheless, Stern never mechanized the spiritual life through a process of dissection. He views the person's activity as a purposive function directed toward self-preservation and self-development. 21 Self-development involves the never-ending task of realizing values which the environment suggests by the actualization of the inner goal structure of the person. Unlike many psychologists, Stern does not attempt to represent the inner goal structure of the person by a simple scheme of instincts or drives, or needs. He resorts to all the available concepts of motivation for the purpose of accounting for

20 J. H. Leuba attempts a philosophical interpretation over and above psychological facts about mysticism. See his Psychology of Religious Mysticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925), Chapters 2 and 12.

the higher needs such as the religious, ethical, etc. The doctrine of dispositions underlies the development of the lower and the higher, for the higher drives are always present as possibilities.

1. Reflexes and Drives. Reflexes are not meaningless or aimless. They serve a purpose for the organism or the organ. The intensity and extensiveness of reflex movements depend to a great extent upon the personal significance of the stimulus.\(^{22}\) As they are confined to instantaneous reactions and instincts, their adaptiveness is solely conservational. They differ from instincts in that they lack anticipation and do not originate new connections between means and ends. Reflexes are foremostly "implements that the individual takes over from his forbears in order to adjust himself to conditions...universal to the race".\(^{23}\)

Drives signify directedness toward goals. Unlike reflexes, they do not depend upon external stimuli but upon internal states of the person. Thus they have relative freedom in their adjustment to external conditions. A drive is defined as "an innate directional disposition...toward personal goals, its transformation...being conditioned primarily by the internal dynamics of the person".\(^{24}\) There are drives of

\(^{22}\) Stern, General Psychology, p. 377.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 377.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 380.
self-preservation, self-development, and there are social

drives. There are vital drives. There are also drives to-

ward intellectual, ideal, and cultural objectives. There

are therefore metaphysical, religious, and ethical drives.

Such drives need neither occur at the outset of life nor oc-
cur in bare form. As a disposition, a drive may be assumed
even where its existence is merely in accordance with possi-
bility.\textsuperscript{25} It can be rejected only when its gratification
can be ascribed to external conditions or other drives. Since
drives signify directedness toward personal goals, introcep-
tion indicates that religious drives may be those drives di-
rected toward the goals of one's religion, as cooperating with
God. Since drives are dispositions, they are innate only as

abilities with the goals being suggested by the environment

and selected by the person.

Stern develops the concept of such drives for the pur-

pose of explaining the tendencies such as the religious, which
cannot be explained as secondary products of other drives.
G. W. Allport has pointed out that such a conception of drives
makes motives universal rather than personal, abstract rather
than concrete.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} Stern's theory of motivation is somewhat similar to

that of McDougall's. Dispositions seem to correspond to Mc-

Dougall's "abilities". See McDougall, \textit{Energies of Men}, p. 64f.

\textsuperscript{26} G. W. Allport, \textit{Personality}, note on pp. 556 and 587.
ii. Needs and Instincts. As a further development of the drive concept Stern makes use of the concept of need. The activation of a drive alters the accompanying experience. The "urge away from" becomes an "urge toward" something. A change of direction is desired. Such a feeling from present lack to future fulfillment is called a need. Needs arise when an impulse is not able to be resolved directly through action because of external or internal inhibitions.

Needs are greatly affected by external conditions. The objects of need may be of a general class. But one object of this class may become a specific need because by the theory of convergence, the specific object converges with the inner impulse. A specific object also becomes a need because it has valence, i.e., it acts as a stimulus to which the person reacts, and also because objects possess materiality, i.e., it is the material upon which the person acts.

As the concepts drive and need express direction, Stern uses the concept instinct to indicate the means urging to the goals of the drives.27 Drives are thus directional and instincts instrumental. Instincts like drives are innate, and this does not mean ready to function at the outset. They do not function mechanically. What remains identical is the basic drive and the final goal. In man instinct operates partly as a guide to certain actions and partly as a hidden

27 Stern, General Psychology, p. 387.
source of energy, and again partly as a counterpart of will. Instincts are difficult to identify in adults because they are affected by experience; but they cannot be replaced by experience. They impart to experience the flavor of genuineness or falseness.

It can be seen that Stern forms a hierarchy of generalized motives instead of attempting to trace all human motivation back to a few simple instincts or drives. Such a hierarchy attempts to account for the variety, uniqueness, and universality of human motives. It also attempts to explain the intellectual or "higher" actions of men without resorting to a "nothing but" theory of simple pushes or pulls. Thus there are psychological needs as well as physiological, and there are psychophysical needs as well.

A summary of Stern's theory of motivation proceeds with dispositions acting as potentialities for action. Drives (internal states) are directed toward goals. They are conditioned and transformed by internal dynamics. Needs are activated drives affected by external conditions which have valence and materiality. Goals are attained by instincts which furnish the means toward the goals.

Stern's theory has the advantage of accounting for the possibility of higher drives such as the religious by means of internal transformation of drives. But Stern fails to state precisely whether lower drives are transformed into high-
er or just what is the nature of this "internal transformation". This transformation is brought out more clearly by G. W. Allport. It should be pointed out that practically all psychologists who attempt to account for higher drives do so by pointing out the transformation of other drives, such as curiosity, creativity, etc. Stern holds that the higher drives, such as the religious, are as original as the lower drives. However, by holding that drives are conditioned and transformed by internal dynamics (and the process of transformation is not clear), the higher drives seem in danger of a vagueness that makes them mysterious. Although such higher innate drives account for religious drives, the conditioning and transformation of these drives by internal dynamics indicate that a transformation of certain internal dynamics takes place. These "internal dynamics" and their transformation are not explained on the drive level.

Since human behavior is not exclusively a result of underlying motives, the function of willing is considered.

iii. The Will and Its Relations. Stern, whose aim is reconstructing general psychology around the person, does not overlook one of the most characteristic functions of the person -- willing. Will is neither a sovereign power nor a sublimated instinct. It is both at the same time and thus something new and specifically human. Will occurs when the
striving self is put into opposition to something else. It bridges the gap between the striving self and the opposing object. He therefore defines will as a form of striving, motivated by needs, impelled and ordered by conscious anticipation of end and means, and which is initiated by a particular personal act.28

The variety of acts of will range from a simple act of sustaining an obstructed desire, act of choosing one of several alternatives, to acting on principle rather than wants. Essential to will is a conscious reference to the future. The distance of the future is determined by its personal significance. The goal of will may or may not have its seat within the person. It may be directed to a change within the self. It makes possible relative freedom of self-determination.

The concept of will indicates the co-activity of the unconscious, the conditioning environment, and heredity, but in spite of these factors does the will operate. Although these factors play a part, none of them individually accounts fully for religiosity. The concept of will accounts for the missing link wherein the person may assert himself in spite of the adversity of these factors. This is another indication of the eclectic character of personalistic psychology for an adequate understanding of religion. It considers not only

28 Ibid., p. 398.
both the internal and external factors affecting behavior, but also the means by which the planful and future-oriented consciousness may exert itself in spite of apparent adverse factors.

Stern sees the motivation of will as being conscious and unconscious. Using the terms phenomotive and genomotive, a phenomotive is defined as an anticipatory idea of a goal antecedent to a voluntary action directed toward the goal. A phenomotive always involves emotion. Phenomotives derive their force from genomotives, which are needs. However, genomotives continually arise from phenomotives. This is another instance where Stern makes an observation of the functional autonomy of motives. It remains for Allport to develop this idea further.

As a further prerequisite to willing, Stern points out the importance of belief. Only that striving which is supported by belief in one's ability can develop into willing. Belief is thus psychological competence as distinguished from actual competence to perform an act.

The acme of willing comes at a definite instance in the concentration of the experience of being able to act, into a direct experience of acting. This onset is the core of every act of will. In no other activity, Stern holds, is the ac-

30 Ibid., p. 410.
tive totality of the personality concentrated into such a clear-cut experience of self as in the onset of will.

However, there is another important aspect of willing. That relatively more permanent state of a person which disposes him toward acts of a definite kind is called the setting-of-will. The more positive and definite a will-set, the less important are momentary motives. External influences, internal conditions, and a decisive act of will influences one's will-set. In the latter, convergence is transcended and the cause of acts of will in such a case are caused by self-determination.31

Especially important for religion are the results of will-sets that issue into convictions rather than acts of will. The person consciously sets himself to believe certain propositions of a general class. Differentiated culture compels clarification and justification of predominant tendencies toward certain values. Hence, each person consciously decides his own will-set concerning certain sets of values. Such a conviction is a phenomotive become relatively permanent. There are non-genuine convictions based upon self-deception and there are insincere convictions aimed at the deception of others. Finally, there are exaggerated convictions in which the expressive attitude is viewed as a substitute for the real setting-of-will. From the latter, Stern

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31 Stern, General Psychology, p. 434-435.
draws the axiom that those who are loudest in proclaiming their convictions often have the weakest wills because they dissipate the energy that ought to be devoted to actions corresponding to the conviction.

iv. Feelings. Stern rejects the older theories of feeling as inadequate for explaining or describing the great varieties of feeling. Those based upon physiology alone are inadequate for explaining the higher feelings dealing with the realm of value, as religious fervor. McDougall's theory that every propensity has a connecting emotion holds promise but needs revision.

Stern seeks the position that feelings occupy in the total pattern of the person. He contends that they constitute the domain of embedded experience. It is upon this domain that cognition and acts of will take place. Besides their embeddedness, they have the attribute of formlessness.

Feelings have significance for the person and by way of the person. For the person they contribute ends as controls, signals, preparations, and incentives. By way of the person their significance lies in the fact that they partake of the person's nature and mirror it. In physical behavior it carries over into actions. As it represents the person, it is reflected in expression. Feelings are bipolar: telic and

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[32] Ibid., p. 532.
The telic concerns success or failure in goal-striving. The dynamic concerns the accumulation or expenditure of energy.

Stern recognizes a host of feeling dimensions besides the pleasant-unpleasant, excitement-calm, and strain-relaxation dimensions. As examples of some of the dimensions Stern uses, we point out a few significant for understanding religion. There are genuine and non-genuine feelings. The non-genuine feelings are mostly brought about by unconscious self-deception. They are mostly socially conditioned because social groups demand harmony of feeling above all else. It was Bowne's contention that emotionalism in religion was of the non-genuine type many times. There are higher and lower feelings. Higher feelings occur in the levels of the objective and introceptive spheres of the person. Highest are those that accompany the introception of values: the religious, ethical and aesthetic feelings. There are feelings of expectancy and retrospect, feelings of harmony with the world and its opposite, positive and negative feelings toward the future, and feelings of expansion and negligibility of the self. These feelings have been found most significant in conversion experiences.

33 Ibid., p. 533.
34 See p. 110 above.
35 See Johnson's account of various investigations in Psychology of Religion, p. 97f.
The realm of feeling is one of the most productive for personalistic psychology. Because feelings help regulate action and tone experience, they are of utmost importance in the study of motivation. They represent another level of the motivational factors that must be reckoned with in interpreting religious experience.

v. Summary. The person is a unique, purposive unity in multiplicity whose functions are directed toward self-development and self-preservation. It is the generator and carrier of psychophysical events. Intelligence, temperament, reflexes, drives, needs, instincts, and will are given in the person. They vary according to external conditions and the amount of self-activity involved. They occur in the form of dispositions. They are dynamic and by means of convergence and introception they change.

Motives are arranged in a hierarchy of functions to account for the variety and change of motives. Thus lower motives are not immediately transformed into higher but go through intermediary stages. The higher motives are always present in the form of dispositions.

The feelings connect the self with experience and express the self by toning experience. The rearrangement of concepts generally used by psychologists around the person indicates that personalistic psychology achieves a more empiri-
cal character than most psychologies because the various factors involved are considered in their true context, rather than being artificially isolated and thus abstract. Stern introduces new concepts for understanding personal activities involved in religiosity. These dynamic concepts give person-alistic psychology an eclectic character because they include and supplement concepts of other psychologies.

The patterning of the tendencies of the person around self-regarding and other goals seems to need understanding as a supplement to an understanding of the person. This understanding is developed in the psychology of G. W. Allport, to which we now proceed.
GORDON WILLARD ALLPORT'S PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY

Gordon W. Allport's psychology of personality is the final representative of personalistic psychology considered in this thesis. Having traced the personalistic psychology of Bowne, expositions of personalistic psychology from two independent personalists, Calkins and Stern, were presented showing distinct similarities between them. From them the significance of the concepts for interpreting religious experience were shown. However, the adequacy of personalistic psychology lies not only in its concepts concerning the nature of persons, but also in the organization of those dispositions of the person into an organic unity. Our knowledge of religious behavior of individuals is enhanced in proportion as we have knowledge of the relative reliability and consistency of the organization of psychophysical tendencies of persons. It is only by such knowledge that we can understand the behavior of religious persons.

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the concepts developed by G. W. Allport for understanding personality and to seek the significance of these concepts for a further understanding of religion. Noting the historical setting of Allport's psychology, his aims and methods are stated. The
data proper are then considered, the concepts of his psychology and their implications for understanding religion. A summary concludes the chapter.

1. Historical Setting of Allport's Psychology

The historical setting of Allport's psychology is the contemporary scene in psychology. This includes approximately the period starting after World War I on to the present day. This period is especially marked by the influence of behaviorism, depth psychology, hormic, and Gestalt psychologies. Allport's psychology has developed in the midst of these psychological influences.

Gestalt psychology has generally similar aims as that of personalistic psychology in its emphasis on wholeness. It arose partially, like Allport's psychology, as a protest against reductionism and mechanism in psychology.

In this period, the desire of psychologists to become more scientific and less rationalistic has been one of their main motivations. Following more closely the lead of the natural sciences, psychologists, on the one hand, have been more concerned with universals and uniformities in the generalized human mind than in the particular human mind with its unique as well as common characteristics. They are concerned with studying the structure of a postulated unconscious, for example, and attempting to account for all behavior in terms
of its characteristics. On the other hand, some psychologists have seen no need for studying mind at all. They have seen in the physical stimulus and the physical response the all in all of human motivation and action.

The hormic psychologists classified the goals of human beings in general and found that postulating propensities toward these goals, along with abilities and sentiment formation toward objects of the goals, accounted for the laws of the mind. Sentiments account for uniqueness. Difficulty arose, however, in accounting for the kind and quantity of goals in specific individuals. The focalization of hormic energy from an adequate object of satisfaction to an inadequate one for the propensity, although the stimulus-object remains present, poses the problem of explaining exceptions where a certain propensity fails to make an appearance, as well as explaining the propensities that are felt when no object is present and where the urge has never been felt before.

1. Allport's Aims. It is against such a psychological setting that Allport has reacted. He is concerned with explaining individuality and holds that individuality can be explained without resorting to generality. Believing that the true person has been lost in the nooks and crevices of general psychology's concepts, he proposes to develop concepts which will adequately picture the uniqueness of the single in-
individual. He believes that the past development is important, but that the present organization and dynamics of the person is more important. Following the lead of Stern, he attempts to expand the boundaries of psychology to give a more adequate account of the total person with all his uniqueness, continuity, unity, and multiplicity.

ii. Method of Approach. In attempting to depict personality adequately, Allport expands, refashions, and rearranges other theories. He develops new theories to fill the gaps left by the concepts of other psychologies. His method is essentially synthetic in that he attempts to assimilate the appropriations from other psychologies with his own theories into a coherent theoretical account of personality.

2. Experience

i. Psychophysical Parallelism. Unlike most personalists, Allport accepts the postulate of psychophysical parallelism as his framework for theorizing.\(^1\) Whereas Stern held to psychophysical neutrality, Allport holds that while parallelism has not been proven, "probably no modern investigator doubts that through scientific discovery patterns of personality will be found to parallel patterns of somatic response".\(^2\) Thus both

Allport and Stern differ concerning the relationship between mind and body from the other personalists studied. However, Allport realizes that it does not specifically advance our knowledge to hold that an individual's psychic attributes are rooted some way in the physiological function of his body. But he gives no reasons for his apparent preference other than citing some concepts designed to aid in establishing this correlation.

ii. The Self and Ego. Allport recognizes that consciousness provides us with the one sure criterion of our personal existence and identity. It is consciousness that assures us that we somehow possess consistent personalities. He believes that unless we postulate permanence of personality there can be no account of the many identical threads running through our conscious states. 3

Allport equates self-consciousness with the ego. He criticizes Koffka for treating the ego both as the phenomenal object and the phenomenal subject. 4 Allport holds that Koffka's division of the ego into layers of which the core is the self is unnecessary. To Allport, the ego represents the interiorization of cultural values. 5 He sees the ego or self-con-

3 Ibid., p. 159.
sciousness as dependent upon memory, graded and differentiated emotional responses, language, recognition of recurring experiences, and symbolic anchorage points (such as one's name).

Allport seems to be confused as to the distinction between consciousness and the ego. He overplays the importance of self-consciousness (the ego) at the expense of consciousness (the self). Whereas self-consciousness occurs when one stops and reflects on one's consciousness, consciousness (or the self) is the agent which makes the reflection. Most of the above outlined conditions of the ego are properties of consciousness. It is true that "the ego is a portion of the personality", but the developer of this portion of the personality is rather vague to Allport.

Bertocci clarifies the confusion by pointing out that what develops, involves, participates in and explains the continuity of the ego is the psychological self. He defines the self operationally. The self is thus "the complex, unitary activity of sensing, remembering, imagining, perceiving, wanting, feeling". Bertocci avoids Allport's mistake of thinking that the ego only develops; it is also developed by the self. Self reflection develops nothing; the reflection on the self

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6 Ibid., p. 473f.


8 Ibid., p. 92.
enables the self to evaluate particular behavioral systems or patterns of cultural values. These systems and patterns constitute the egos. The self interacts and communicates with the ego system. The ego and the ego systems are developed by the self. The ego system represents a high level of integration or introception of values into the total personality.

Allport recognizes an ego-ideal within the personality. He sees the ego-ideal setting the goals that lead to a creative pattern of life. It is the plan that the developed personality is able to evolve by transcending unsocialized urges and thereby leading to a new level of personal freedom and maturity.\(^9\) Here it can be seen that undervaluing the role of the conscious self leads to confusion in understanding the ego and the ego-ideal. The ego-ideal now becomes an autonomous entity in that, although it is developed by the personality, it sets the goals for personality. This confusion can only be overcome by the acceptance of a psychological self. This self is the presupposition of egos and ego-ideals. As Bertocci has pointed out, "an ego presupposes some form of knowing and wanting in its development, alteration, and preservation".\(^{10}\)

The ego-ideal is ordered under the concept of directionality, a fundamental concept in Stern's psychology. It rep-

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\(^9\) Allport, Personality, p. 218.

\(^{10}\) Bertocci, "Psychological Self, Ego, and Personality", Psychological Review, 52 (March, 1945), p. 93.
resents the goal-striving, the life-plan, and the intentions of the self for its particular behavioral systems or its patterns of cultural values, its egos. The importance of this concept for understanding religious experience is vital because Allport has found that personal participation is embraced in proportion as the ego is involved in an activity. The degree of religious activity can be discerned by the degree in which a particular behavioral system of the self is involved. This does not necessarily mean that there must be social recognition although this factor seems to play a large part in some person's religiosity. It means more that the individual becomes religious to the degree that the values of religion converge with his inner ideals for himself. The self recognizes the values in religion for its particular behavioral systems (egos) and the self's ideal goal for each is seen as coinciding with religious ideals. Otherwise, one develops a religious ego which may not effectively predominate or carry over into behavior where other ideals are held.

iii. Constraints of the Self. The self is not absolutely free and autonomous in Allport's psychology. There are certain factors that restrain, drive, and influence the self and the subsequent personality that it develops. The first of the constraints of the self is that of suggestion. By

[11 Allport, Personality, p. 219.]
suggestion, Allport means the adoption of a course of conduct or belief by a person who does not engage in those processes of thought and judgments that would be pertinent to the acceptance of such a course of conduct or belief. Suggestion occurs in the absence of complete self-determination. It operates when resistance is weak.

The formation of religious beliefs and attitudes are in a large measure traceable to suggestion in many people. The belief and conduct of others is raw material which the self introcept, or rejects, and refines for its particular needs and adjustments. They constitute a part of the environment upon which the self acts and is acted upon.

Allport lists another constraint as being self-esteem. The self-esteem is not an entity, but is basically co-extensive with life itself. This means that there is at the core of personality a strong element of self-seeking which may be traced in many traits and sentiments. The ultimate character of this principle is psychologically unknown. What is psychologically important is the innumerable and variable contexts in which self-esteem occurs. It is in the interest of self-esteem that techniques of self-deception are formed.

12 Allport, Personality, pp. 166 and 167.


14 Allport, Personality, p. 171.
Rationalization and projection are the main types. It is also in this same context that reason is so important for man.

Self-esteem is enhanced by participation in activities. One's participation in an activity is almost directly proportional to the degree that one's ego is involved in it. The self has various areas in which it acts and seeks esteem. It develops egos in accordance therewith. Self-esteem appears different from ego-involvement because the former is determined a great deal by social factors, whereas the latter is internally conditioned. Thus religiosity, because of self-esteem, may be twisted and turned with change in social environments, whereas that of ego-involvement would tend to be more stable. This principle helps to account for the various degrees of religiosity of persons. Those persons who view themselves as being vital in cooperating with God or with other persons in carrying out His will, will be more active in such an important undertaking. Their ego is involved in what they consider the most important of activities. It does not matter whether they are correct because rationalization may satisfy them that they are correct. They are deeply religious just the same. Their self-esteem will, however, depend a great deal upon their evaluation of their involvement in this activity.

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Feelings of inferiority and compensation are constraints of the self. An inferiority complex is defined as the strong and persistent tension arising from a somewhat morbid emotional attitude towards the failure to adjust satisfactorily to environment owing to some felt-deficiency in personal equipment.\(^{16}\) Feelings of inferiority need not correspond to actual inferiority. The self overcomes feelings of inferiority by attacking the source of inferiority, substituting satisfaction in a different direction, defense mechanisms, rationalization, phantasy, and neuroticism. This is another instance where personalistic psychology makes use of concepts from depth psychology. As Adler points out, inferiority feelings may be a stimulus to religiosity.\(^{17}\) But it is not the only, neither necessarily the main, source of religion.

Allport places the emphasis on inferiority feelings in a more eclectic context than the originator of the concepts. Adler makes them the basis of a systematic psychology and sees motivation almost solely on this basis. Besides the psychoanalytic mechanisms cited above, Allport also sees value in others provided they are seen in perspective. The pleasure principle, reality principle, the unconscious, ambivalence, identification, and psychosexuality are some of the psycho-

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analytic mechanisms for understanding the constraints of the self. Allport stresses the fact that there can be no single factor in the development of personality because biological motives never operate singly. Freud over-emphasizes sexuality. Sexuality is never devoid of mental ramifications and it therefore becomes diffused into major systems of interests and traits which are themselves the fundamental functional systems of personality. What applies to sex applies, states Allport, to every other so-called instinct. Thus religiosity is understood by functional systems and not by single factors of personality.

3. Personality

Allport defines personality as the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustment to his environment. Bertocci has criticized this definition as being somewhat vague, in that these systems seem to organize themselves by mere accident. The function of the individual is vague. He would correct such vagueness by inserting the self as the active organizer of those systems that then determine its unique adjustment to its environment. The personality, like the ego,

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18 Allport, Personality, p. 48.
19 Bertocci, Philosophy of Personality (Unpub. Syllabus, Boston University, 1947), p. 5.
is a development of the self. Both represent the means the self has taken in developing itself among the possibilities suggested by the environment. It must be noted that the organization does not refer to just unique characteristics peculiar to just one individual as E. B. Skaggs seems to think. It rather refers to the unique organization of whatever characteristic the person may possess, whether peculiar to the individual or common to all.

Personality must not be confused with what is commonly called "character". Character is personality evaluated by some moral code; personality is character devaluated. Character is strictly an ethical concept, Allport states, unnecessary for psychological understanding.

1. The Data of Personality. Allport sees the raw material of personality as physique, intelligence, and temperament, the agencies of heredity. The origins of personality may be either a vitalistic urge or protoplasmic irritability. He leans toward the latter. This is reflected in a stream of activity differentiated at birth into gross patterns of movement and specific reflexes. The stream of activity is set into motion and sustained through simple sensitivity, segmental drives, and possibly through goal-seeking processes. Instincts are rejected by Allport, however, because he feels

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that this concept does not obey the law of parsimony, it is difficult to explain exceptions where instincts do not occur, and the similarities that do exist can be explained by the presence of common environment and common abilities. Bertocci, a hormic-personalist, holds that the fact people crave certain basic types of satisfaction irrespective of environment or ability justifies rejection of Allport's objections and sustains the McDougallian view.

The stream of activity employs intelligence, temperament, and physique, as well as adaptive mechanisms.

ii. Personality Motivation. Having rejected instincts, Allport improves upon R. S. Woodworth's theory of drives as an alternative theory of motivation. He sees organic segmental tensions driving the infant into his environment. After the stage of infancy is past, intellectual and volitional factors affect the course of motives. The original tendencies are then transformed so radically that the newly emerging motivational systems may be said to have supplanted the old. The tie of the new with the old is historical, rather than functional. The new motivation systems are autonomous from the old. They possess their own driving power, rather than depending upon the driving power of the segmental tensions.

This theory of functional autonomy of motives dethrones the stimulus for the purpose of generating emotional activity and drive. It makes personal intentions and desires the basis for uniqueness rather than sentiment formation from generalized drives exclusively. It explains personal values from the standpoint of the individual rather than from the standpoint of his drives or environment. Instincts themselves seem but personal categories of values of the psychologists who see them as the basis of motivation. In short, functional autonomy makes motivation a more specific responsibility of the person and indicates that his range of freedom of choice is wider than supposed. It indicates that the person is both morally and psychologically free.

Religiosity might be explained by an instinctivist by pointing out that the person gives vent to his submissive urge in the presence of a religious object representing a better person than himself (God). He also gives vent to his urge to mastery by attempting to cooperate with Him. Difficulties encountered in the attempt give rise to pugnacity and creativity. He might also be a little curious. He forms sentiments about religious objects and ideas. With the development of sentiments, attitudes, and traits of religiosity, one can then explain religiosity by tracing the various formations to their origins in propensities and the vitalistic urge.

The point that Allport makes is that regardless of whether
one holds instincts or segmental tensions to be the origin of motivation, activity is best explained by its contemporary motive rather than its original one. After all, propensities may set up tensions within the person and urge him toward a goal. When the tension is satisfied and the person continues the activity for intellectual or volitional reasons, Allport contends that the motive has now become independent of the instinct or segmental tension.

The difficulty of motivation by organic needs or segmental tensions for religion is that it is difficult to see how an organic need can be so overlaid by intellectual and volitional factors as to produce religiosity unless there are intellectual needs or psychical tensions. Tracing psychical tensions to organic tensions takes us right back to the Watsonian view of depending upon visceral contractions, etc. If they are developed by organic tensions, it is unclear about the source of energy of the intellectual factors that can now affect their source, organic tensions. Instinctivists can rely upon the idea of mental as well as physical tensions and the vitalistic urge. They can also account for the emotions, which Allport's theory cannot do. However, Allport, if pushed, would accept the hormic principle but holds that it is a better metaphysical principle than psychological.23

Nevertheless, the theory of functional autonomy is val-

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23 Allport, Personality, p. 205.
uable for understanding religion. Religiosity can be better understood by present motives than by origins. The theory of functional autonomy is in harmony with the axiom that origin does not determine value. Allport regards intentions, interests, attitudes, and traits as the ultimate and true dispositions of the mature personality. Functional autonomy accounts for the various degrees and varieties of religious experience in terms of present needs rather than by original urges. It avoids explanation by geneticism.

Allport points out that there is need for a concept to characterize the activity of the religious person implying a high degree of conscious participation. He presents the concept of intention to account for the contemporary character of motives that have a thrust toward the future with planful and conscious directedness and to account for this characteristic of religiosity. Prayer, dogma, and ritual have been developed as means of focusing the religious intention at specific times. He sees belief as necessary to set in motion an intent. Belief is the person's confidence or faith in the object or act sought.²⁴ By intention he means simply what the person is trying to do. It is synonymous with will.

Allport also sees personal religion refracted by bodily needs, temperament, intelligence, psychogenic interests and

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²⁴ Allport, "Intent and Faith", Lecture 6 of his Lowell Lectures given at King's Chapel, Boston (Feb. - March, 1947).
values, pursuit of meaning, and the effect of the surrounding culture. Despite its derivative nature, its power through functional autonomy, is independent of its origins. It is as if

the self hands over to it (the religious sentiment) the task of interpreting...and of providing motive power to live...with an adequate frame of value and meaning, and to enlarge and energize this frame by seeking cosmic support.²⁵

iii. Aspects of Growth. Allport sees the basic aspects of growth as differentiation, integration, maturation, and learning. The constraints of the self²⁶ are also aspects of growth. One of the most important is that of integration. Integration produces a hierarchy of levels in personality. Integrated systems of conditioned reflexes form habits. The integration of habits helps to form, in part at least, traits. The integration of traits forms egos.²⁷ Finally, the integration of ego systems forms personality, an ideal stage of unity never reached. These levels occur chronologically in response to the variety of events requiring adjustment.

Another important aspect of growth is learning. Three important applications of learning to personality growth are

²⁵ Allport, "Religion of Maturity", Lecture 3 of series noted above.

²⁶ See p. 172f. above.

²⁷ Allport, Personality, p. 139f. He refers to trait-systems as "selves" after James. Ego seems better as pointed out above (p. 170).
conditioning, insight, and imitation. These are especially important for understanding religious growth because conditioning refers to the extension of the range of stimuli that will arouse a given response. This accounts for the widening, in part, of religious interests and desires as well as actions to religious objects. Insight accounts for the religious growth that occurs when the person is able to survey the field, organize, and intelligently comprehend the potential relationship between various religious objects, symbols, and ideas, and himself to his God. Of the three, insight is most fundamental to religious growth. It presupposes conscious awareness, search, value-judgment, and choice. Growth by insight is more rational, personal, and permanent than that of the other two. However, Allport points out that imitation may be a result of insight. Imitation is defined as consciously or unconsciously taking over a mode of adjustment from someone who serves the imitator as a model for conduct. Imitation is more significant in the religious growth of children who imitate their parents' religious attitudes and behavior.

iv. The Theory of Traits. In order to account for the uniqueness and stability of personality, Allport develops the theory of traits, which also accounts for continuity and variety in personality. The theory of traits is a supplement to

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28 C. Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), Ch. 7.
the theory of functional autonomy. He defines a trait as "a generalized and focalized neuro-psychic system (peculiar to the individual) with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive behavior".29

Traits are a necessary inference to give account of the unity and consistency of separate actions. They function as driving motives and/or as stylistic manners because they are integrated systems of habits. Although traits focus and mobilize lesser habits and attitudes, they overlap, cluster, and interpenetrate with other traits. A sufficiently integrated personality may possess a cardinal trait or central traits which characterize the personality. There are traits common to many persons and there are traits that are the exclusive characteristics of their possessor.

Traits are similar to attitudes in that they are readinesses for response, individualized, and distinctive of their possessor. Both may initiate and guide behavior. There are, however, three distinctions between traits and attitudes. An attitude has a specific object of reference whereas traits have no definite reference. In other words, an attitude represents a point of view whereas a trait refers to one's manner of behaving. Attitudes may be specific and general whereas traits are only general. The third distinction is that

29 Allport, Personality, p. 295.
attitudes have a clear-cut direction; traits are merely inferred and are stylistic.

The significance of the doctrine of traits for understanding religious persons may be seen more clearly by comparing it with the oft-quoted conclusions of Hartshorne and Shuttleworth. After extensive inquiries into character education and conduct, they reach the conclusion that characteristics such as honesty and self-control are specific habits learned in relation to specific situations which have made the one or the other mode of response successful. They are not actions guided by general ideals and are, therefore, not traits. Furthermore, Hartshorne and Shuttleworth hold that specific habits are the units of personality. Thus what an individual does in a given situation depends upon how his past experience has linked his movements to the stimulating situation. A person is therefore not, for example, honest as a man, but honest in particular situations in an insulated way. His honesty in a given situation depends upon the similarity to past situations in which the habit of honesty was formed. On this view one would find it difficult to understand how a thief who experienced a sudden conversion could suddenly become meticulously honest in situations where he had previously been dishonest. This is an extreme example, but

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the point is that interpersonal relations would be in a ter-
rible state of affairs if human actions were bound by situa-
tional habits. For religious training, such a view almost
amounts to conditioning, wherein a child would have to learn
to respond to an ever increasing range of stimuli. He may
not ever become dependably honest because a new situation may
arise and his accumulation of experience will mean nothing.
His habits of telling the truth, respecting the property of
others, etc., which may be ordered under a trait of honesty,
would break down. Such a view seems to presuppose that chil-
dren are incapable of insight.

Allport points out the fallacies of such argument as
being grounded in Hartshorne and Shuttleworth's failure to
see that the children investigated were not inconsistent with
themselves, the investigators failed to consider the fact
that children have traits other than honesty that may have
been invoked, the method used proceeded from the point of
view of child psychology, and the fact that their conclusions
were dependent upon their interpretation of the data.

From a positive point of view, the doctrine of traits
is helpful for understanding relapses from the religious code
of conduct because one realizes that the individual has ideals
other than religious ones which may conflict with the reli-
gious traits. The doctrine of traits indicates that the in-
troception of religious ideals will mobilize and localize
systems of habits for the attainment of these ideals. Rather than the situation and habit being the guide of conduct, the religious ideals incorporated into the ego system furnish the guilding lines of conduct. This accounts for consistency in religious conduct.

The fact that persons have many traits and the fact that traits may be stylistic are helpful in understanding the manner and degree of religious participation. Traits of conservatism, progressiveness, tolerance, intolerance, introversion are some examples. Traits, however, are not indices of religious experience because the varieties of religious experiences are derived from the point of view and interpretation of the observer who abstracts some attributes of religious persons and then proceeds to label personal religious experiences by the names of traits he has observed in the person experiencing religion. Individuals do not fit religious experiences; they have them. The type of religious experience that the individual has depends more upon its meaning for the individual than the meaning of his actions to the observer.

It is a distinct contribution of personalistic psychology, which leads to a better understanding of religion, that emphasis is placed upon the system of habits, traits, attitudes, and egos of particular religious personalities, rather than relying solely upon a particular cardinal trait that an individual exhibits. From this point of view, religion is another
part of the environment whose values and ideals the person may introcept into his personality for initiating and guiding his adjustments. The doctrine of traits goes beyond the momentary motivation stressed by Lewin. It dethrones the stimulus emphasized by Tolman and the behaviorists. It gives content and meaning to the unconscious stressed by depth psychologists. It shows that one individual belongs to a host of types, but that the most important thing in understanding him is the internal structure of his traits.

v. The Mature Personality. Allport sees at least three distinguishing marks of the mature personality. The first is that the mature personality has not just one, but a variety of autonomous interests and goals which represent extensions of himself. He can lose himself, for example, in work, politics, recreation, and religion with equal vigor and vitality. He can see the value of each for widening and extending his range of experience. Objectively, such a wide range of experience is a mark of the mature personality. This implies that the mature person is an active participant, not merely passive, in many affairs. He has an ego-ideal for each of his interests that helps guide him in creative living. As an ego-ideal involves intention and planning, it gives long-range purpose to life.

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31 Allport, Personality, p. 213f.
This is in contradistinction to the sign-Gestalt expectancy concept that Tolman uses to interpret unrealized goals of both rats and men. Such a concept depends upon past experience, learned cues, and mechanical reinforcements to interpret behavior. It is thus incapable of explaining the dissatisfaction of a present way of life and the setting up of new ideals and values with which to identify oneself. Extension of the self into new fields of interest would come merely by accident and not as an expressed intention or purpose of the individual.

The variety of interests of the mature person indicates that one may be religious without being mature. However, such is not the case in the Christian sense because the interpersonal character of religion is clearest in self-giving, cooperation, social participation, and its variety of interests in the social order. Religion provides a wide range of interests within its framework for the extension of self. To name a few of these, one may cite the fields of social welfare, reform, recreation, missionary work, and education. A central teaching of Christianity is that he who loses himself in services to others shall find himself. Thus, is so far as a variety of autonomous interests are concerned, the reli-

33 See above, p. 66f.

gious personality is a mature personality. 35

Allport sees the second mark of the mature personality as the capacity for self-objectification or insight. Self-insight is defined as the ability to survey and evaluate one's pretensions in relation to abilities, present objectives in relation to possible objectives, one's own equipment in relation to the equipment of others, and one's own opinion of oneself in relation to the opinions of others about him. In short, it may be defined as self-knowledge. It is closely correlated with humor, another perspective in which one views himself as he pretends to be in comparison with what he actually is; he sees his absurdity and yet enjoys it.

Insight is a prerequisite for change in personality. It makes past mistakes intelligible, shows the groundlessness of needless worries, and enables the individual to gain a more accurate perspective of himself.

Allport points out that, in one respect, humor is like religion. A religious reference enables one to see oneself and his problems in relation to a divine scheme that gives them changed meaning. 36 Humor enables one to see them as trivial and of no consequence. Both are alike in that they


36 Allport, Personality, p. 225.
are frames of reference enabling the individual to view himself and his problems in novel and sane patterns. They shatter the fixedness of literal-mindedness. Both bring perspective.

By a questionnaire given to 500 students, Allport et al found, among other facts, that seven out of every ten students answering felt that they needed some form of religious orientation or belief in order to achieve a fully mature philosophy of life.37 A unifying philosophy of life is the third characteristic of the mature personality. A unifying philosophy of life is a dynamic idea, a fundamental conception of value, embracing in scope, which serves as an autonomous system wherein one's life becomes unified.38 Allport sees religion as one of the most comprehensive philosophies of life. Defining religion as "the search for a value underlying all things",39 he sees a deeply moving religious experience as one that remains a focus of thought and desire. Religion serves an integrative function in personality.

Although a religious philosophy of life may be an indication of the mature personality, Allport recognizes that there are immature persons who have an immature religion and


38 G. W. Allport, Personality, p. 226f.

39 Ibid., p. 226.
vice versa. In his Lowell lecture on the religion of maturity, Allport indicates the distinctions between the religion of the mature and the immature personality. The religion of immaturity is egocentric, magical, irresponsible, complete (static), intolerant, fanatical, and a servant, rather than master of the individual. On the other hand, the religion of maturity gives coherence and purpose to life, widening interests, entails many attitudes, but yet a stable way of life, is never complete or secure, is comprehensive and integral to personality. It is self-giving and productive of a consistent morality. It possesses motivational power. It marshals motives toward a goal that is not necessarily one of self-interest. It gives steady influence and quiets moral storm. It is on guard for bigotry and imperialism and makes for tolerance. Finally, it is co-scientific, i.e., it takes the threads of science and weaves them with those of values and morals. The mature religious sentiment is nurtured in doubt and engendered by faith.

vi. Summary. Allport's psychology indeed expands the boundaries of psychology for a picture of the total personality. The psychology of personality is a necessary supplement of general personalistic psychology for adequately understanding religious experience and religious behavior. Bowne, Cal-

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Kins, and Stern present the necessary concepts for the comprehension of experience, but it is Allport who follows Stern's lead in depicting the organization of those psychophysical tendencies which help to determine our adjustment.

For an understanding of religious persons, the tendency is away from the structure of the unconscious, environment, and types toward a knowledge of the structure of the personality as a whole as it is affected by unconscious mechanisms, stimuli of the environment, and the cardinal traits of personality. The latter constitute parts of the personality and the raw material with which it has to work. Thus religion is not understood from the point of view of unconscious desires, purposive behavioralisms, or the effect of the environment as has been attempted by depth, behavioristic, and typological psychologies. Personalistic psychology uses all these and more in an unified context for adequate understanding.

Allport takes an eclectic approach to personality study. Many concepts of other psychologies are retained, but are placed within a personalistic frame of reference. The concepts distinctive of Allport's psychology are those of functional autonomy of motives, ego-ideal, ego-system, and trait. The concepts of attitude, configuration, integration, interest, intention, congruence, and the psychoanalytic mechanisms are used in a personalistic context. These are some of the concepts vital for a psychological understanding of religion.
Traits, attitudes, and egos represent significant structural levels of personality through which a psychological understanding of the religious behavior can be understood. The constraints of the self and the functional autonomy of motives give an account of the changes and the uniqueness of religious motivation which varies from person to person although the environment remains constant. The concept of intention also indicates the uniqueness of every personal religious experience. The conscious search which characterizes religious experience indicates a personal intention.

Allport's personalistic interpretation of personality supplements Bowne, Calkins, and Stern's personalistic interpretation of experience. Religious behavior thus becomes comprehensible by means of a knowledge of the organization of psychophysical tendencies which help to determine our adjustment to the religious ideals and objects in our environment.
CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Summary

We have examined concepts from representatives of five current psychologies for their adequacy in understanding religious experience and behavior.

Psychology throws light on the understanding of religion mostly in the areas of the self, conscious experience, motivation, interpersonal relations, and personality. The basic perspective of a psychology is both a limitation and potentiality for adequate treatment of these areas.

The self is important in accounting for unity, identity, and change in experience. Religiosity is understood by understanding the functions of the self in religious experience and behavior. Although the unconscious is helpful, the area of conscious experience is more so for understanding religion because it is in conscious experience and behavior that the unconscious has its effects. Moreover, consciousness provides the one and only true verification of religious experience.

The problem of motivation in religion is concerned with helping us to understand the dynamics of religiosity. It helps us to understand the psychological causes of the unique,
personal, and dynamic experience, and behavior in religiosity. The area of interpersonal relations helps us to comprehend the degree to which social and other environmental relationships affect personal religion. The area of personality gives an understanding of the organization of tendencies to religious experience and behavior. These five areas serve as a frame of reference for examining psychologies for the adequacy of their concepts helpful for a psychological understanding of religion.

Personal religion is defined as experience and action upon personal values directed toward cooperation or communication with the Creator and Sustainer of values.

An examination of typological psychology as represented by Eduard Spranger reveals a marked concern for understanding the religious man. However, religiosity is so broadly defined as to be almost meaningless in the Christian sense. Although Spranger uses a religious self in his psychology, the five other selves of the ideal types he postulates blur any understanding of the single, whole individual, who is practically always a "mixed" type. Spranger emphasizes conative-cognitive aspects of conscious experience. But his theory of motivation is based on a simple set of instincts based on the attitudes of his six types. This is far too simple to account for the great varieties of attitudes in religiosity. The personality structure of the religious person in typologi-
cal psychology as represented by Spranger is abstract and ideal, rather than concrete and practical.

Gestalt psychology as represented by Kurt Lewin has much to commend it for a psychological understanding of religion. The dynamic concepts set forth are very helpful. The concepts of ego and ego-systems, fields of force, valence, tension, inner personal region, and goal regions throw much light on religious behavior. However, Lewin sees no need of a self and holds that the various egos are sufficient. This is confusing to one who has observed and experienced continuity in persons who seek to unify their behavior. Lewin also confines himself to only momentary situations that the person finds himself in. This is enlightening as far as it goes, but it does not seem to go far enough.

Behaviorism of the purposive type is represented by E. C. Tolman. As most of his conclusions about human beings are the results of inferences from rat behavior, there is very little light to be thrown on religiosity, a phenomenon with no parallel in the behavior of lower animals. The question of a unifying agent is dismissed as a metaphysical question. The concepts of sign-Gestalt expectancy and need-cathexis come nearest to any concepts for understanding religion. However, the former is non-conscious and the latter is a result of conditioning instincts. They are stimulus-bound and his other concepts also lack explanation of the deeper, future-
oriented, and conscious aspects of behavior with which religion is concerned.

Depth psychology has been both stimulating and productive for a psychological understanding of religion. Carl Jung, the representative examined, leans toward an idealistic philosophical position. His concepts of the unconscious, psyche, collective unconscious, introversion, and extroversion and his other concepts lead to an understanding of some aspects of the religious person. However, practically all of his concepts are concerned with explaining the dynamics of the unconscious. The unconscious desires and impulses are the result of repression, on the one hand, and of instincts, on the other. The collective unconscious explains the instincts. Jung underestimates the power and value of consciousness. All aspects are subjugated to the unconscious. Although the unconscious is valuable for understanding religion, it is not the whole story. Religious ideas, beliefs, and symbols do not just demonstrate unconscious motivation. The other areas of the person must be brought to bear for a full understanding of religion. Jung does not do this.

The psychologists who represent the personalistic view do not exhibit the radical departures that are found among psychologists in some schools of psychology. Although there are differences among the personalists, they are minor and are overshadowed by the wide areas of agreement.
Borden Parker Bowne, the first representative of the personalistic view in America has been largely overlooked as far as his psychology is concerned by historians. An examination of his writings reveals facts that have been developed by later personalistic psychologists. Bowne emphasized empiricism in psychology. Although he held to the supremacy of the introspective method, he emphasized the importance and legitimacy of other methods of studying the mind. This is an early indication of the eclecticism that characterizes personalistic psychology. Bowne emphasizes the importance of action and conduct and a consistent morality as the important aspects of religiosity. If mysticism leads to that end, and does not become an end in itself, he saw it as worthwhile and important for understanding religiosity. He recognized the dynamic character of emotions. He stressed the conscious striving of the individual as an important aspect of religiosity. He notes the importance of habit-formation around ideals. He notes also that once they are formed, they become either a help or a hindrance to conscious striving for religiosity.

Mary Whiton Calkins developed her personalistic psychology from clues given by Josiah Royce and William James. The self or soul had been taken for granted until mechanistic emphases came into psychology. The self was then thrown out with the soul. To clarify and reinstate the self in psychol-
ogy was Calkins' greatest aim.

Her writings reveal a penetrating analysis of the various schools of psychology and their abstractness without a unifying agent. She shows how these schools could profit by and be reconciled with self psychology. She defined psychology as the science of the self in relation to, or consciousness of, its environment. Religiosity is understood only as we understand the self in its relation to other selves. The relationship between a human self and a divine self comes under this consideration. As many of her other concepts are now outmoded and there was not sufficient integration of the useful concepts of other psychologies, we examine Stern's psychology for a modern personalistic approach.

William Stern develops his personalistic psychology almost unaware of Calkins and Bowne although he was probably aware of their philosophical personalism. Except for the psychological neutrality of the person, which he holds, he is fundamentally in agreement with Bowne and Calkins. However, Stern expands and deepens the understanding by the wealth of concepts adequate for a psychological understanding of religion. This is in relationship to the stage of psychology at the present time. His concepts of convergence, introception, expansion of the realm of feeling, and his concern for understanding such an experience as the religious, go far beyond the concepts of most psychologists to-day. As
with Bowne and Calkins, Stern is concerned with the conscious striving of the self toward higher goals than mere biological adjustment.

So far, the personalistic psychologists have not adequately treated the field of interpersonal relations nor developed a theory of emotions, both of which are important aspects of religion. Calkins made an attempt at interpersonal psychology but was not systematic in her treatment. The adjustment between two individuals is quite different from the adjustment of the individual to the material environment. These two areas are not adequately treated by personalists nor any of the other psychologists whose works we have examined.

Gordon Willard Allport follows the suggestion of Stern that the relatively persistent behavior tendencies of the individual be studied objectively. Allport points out that this is the individual's personality, which when judged by some ethical code is called character. It is composed of a hierarchy of levels consisting of habits, traits, and egos. Also fundamental to the development of personality are many of the concepts of the depth psychologists, some of the behavioristic psychologists, and many of the Gestalt psychologists. The typological approach is helpful for a start in understanding the various persons as is the Gestalt approach. In short, Allport exhibits the zenith of personalism's eclecticism. The concepts of functional autonomy of motives, intention, and
traits and attitudes are fundamental for understanding religiosity.

2. Conclusions

(1) Personalistic psychology provides a wider range of concepts covering a larger and longer (in time) area of the individual than the other four psychologies examined. The areas of the self, conscious and the unconscious, motivation, and interpersonal relations having such a vital importance for understanding the religion of the individual, religiosity can best be understood by the concepts presented from representatives of this view. Their eclecticism does not preclude, but includes concepts from the other psychologies, yet in a broader perspective.

(2) Personalistic psychology is not adverse to religion. The four main representatives give considerable treatment to religiosity, a fact that is not prevalent in contemporary psychology, except in social psychology. Preoccupation with phenomena peculiar to only biological adjustment or the momentary environment are insufficient for understanding religion. By actively and purposely attempting to account for the higher needs, personalistic psychology has thereby developed concepts that will apply to religious experience and conduct.
(3) Mystical religious experiences are important for a psychological understanding of religiosity only as they result in a relatively consistent morality. As some psychologists, notably J. H. Leuba, have attempted to understand and evaluate religiosity by the mystical experience, personalistic psychologists, notably Bowne, place the mystical experience in its context, the living and acting personality. Not the origin of the mystical experience, but its effects on the ideals, intentions, and behavior tendencies prove a better criterion for understanding and evaluating mystical experience.

(4) Personalistic psychology leaves the problem of the truth, and validity of religious dogma to the philosophers. The depth psychologists, notably, occasionally forget the scientific method and intermingle psychological facts with philosophical speculations, thereby rendering confusion about religiosity. Although most of the personalists have speculated on such problems, their speculation was confined to their philosophies. It did not occur as a psychological treatment of religion.

(5) Religiosity, however it may be motivated, is a form of introception. It is the meaningful and conscious incorporation of values into the self. Introception of religious values may occur without a perceptual
medium. It may occur by the personification and reverence of ideas. And it may occur in the comprehension of God in persons. Mysticism is another means of attempting to comprehend and coalesce values from the divine into one's own selfhood. The divine reference makes values religious.

(6) Although no one is in a position to state exactly the ultimate cause of human behavior in persons, personalistic psychology indicates more clearly than any other psychology the dynamics of change in religious behavior at the level of consciousness. Although religiosity may start from unconscious wishes, propensities, or organic tensions, the theory of functional autonomy of motives provides an understanding of the selectivity and relative freedom of the conscious self to regulate and guide religious behavior. This theory is coextensive with the axiom that origin does not determine value. By the concept of intention, the initiative of the person himself gives a clue to the freedom and responsibility of the individual in religiosity.

(7) Religiosity is best understood as a set of personality traits. The religious person has other traits beside the religious. The degree and extent of his religious habits determine the strength of the religious traits. Strong
religious traits will affect non-religious behavior. Religious traits initiate behavior guided by ideals rather than particular situations or conventions. They thereby affect the volitional activity of the person. A religious trait is an integrated system of habits of cooperating and communicating with God (peculiar to the individual) capable of initiating and guiding consistent and equivalent forms of adaptive and expressive religious behavior. It may and usually does include moral habits.

(8) The organization of the dominant traits of the religious person will reveal the position of his religious traits and attitudes. The apparent inconsistencies in his behavior will thereby be clarified by understanding what other traits are stronger within him and may be the guiding factor in the situation.

(9) Personalistic psychology indicates that the person, as responsible, in part at least, for his attitudes and behavior, is best able to change them. He does so to the extent that he himself is free to recognize and introcept the values most important for him that are suggested by the environment.

(10) Personalistic psychology views human nature as neither good nor bad, but capable of becoming either. It indi-
cates that good and bad persons depend upon ability, intelligence, temperament, the objective and conceptual environment, the type of values introcepted, and his conscious and unconscious drives. These factors affect the individual in the process of growth.
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ABSTRACT

There are conflicting interpretations of the psychology of religion. Because this is so, there is apt to be confusion as to which of these psychologies is relevant and adequate for interpreting personal religion. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the concepts of representatives of five current psychologies for their implications, or their relevancy and adequacy, in interpreting religion. By religion is meant personal cooperation or communication with a conceived Creator and Sustainer of values.

Psychology throws light on the understanding of religion mostly in the areas of the self, conscious experience, motivation, interpersonal relations and personality.

The self is important in accounting for unity, identity, and change in experience. The functions of the self provide interest and integration in religious experience and behavior. Although the unconscious is contributary, the area of conscious experience is more so for understanding religion because it is in conscious experience and behavior that the unconscious has its effects. Moreover, consciousness provides the one and only
true verification of religious experience.

Motivation has to do with the psychological causes of the unique, personal, and dynamic experience as expressed in religious behavior. The area of interpersonal relations helps us to comprehend the degree to which social interactions and relationships affect personal religion. The development of personality leads to the organization of religious tendencies into habitual attitudes and traits of character. These five areas serve as a frame of reference in examining psychologies as to the adequacy of their concepts for a psychological understanding of religion.

An examination of typological psychology as represented by Eduard Spranger reveals marked concern for understanding the religious man. However, religion is so broadly defined as to be almost meaningless. Although Spranger uses a religious self in his psychology, the five other ideal types he postulates blur any understanding of the single, whole individual, who is practically always a "mixed" type. His theory of motivation is limited to a simple set of instincts based on the attitudes of his six types. This is far too simple to account for the great varieties of attitudes in religiousness. The personality structure of the religious person in typological psychology is abstract and ideal, rather than concrete and practical.

Gestalt psychology as represented by Kurt Lewin has
much to commend it. The dynamic concepts of ego and ego-systems, fields of force, valence, tension, inner personal region, and goal regions throw much light on religious behavior. However, Lewin sees no need of a self and holds that the various egos are sufficient. This is confusing to one who has observed and experienced continuity in persons who seek to unify their behavior. Lewin is confined to momentary situations in which the person finds himself. The stability of the religious person himself is therefore overlooked.

Behaviorism of the purposive type is represented by E.C. Tolman. As most of his conclusions about human beings are the results of inferences from rat behavior, there is very little light to be thrown on religiousness, a phenomenon without parallel in the behavior of lower animals. The question of a unifying agent is dismissed as a metaphysical question. The concepts of sign-Gestalt expectancy and need-cathexis come nearest to any concepts approaching religion. However, the former is non-conscious and the latter is a result of conditioning instincts. They are stimulus-bound and his other concepts also lack explanation of the deeper, future-oriented, and conscious aspects of behavior with which religion is concerned.

Depth psychology has been both stimulating and productive of a psychological understanding in religion. Carl
Jung, the representative examined, has concepts of the unconscious, psyche, collective unconscious, introversion, and extroversion and other concepts to lead to an understanding of some aspects of the religious person. However, practically all of his concepts are concerned with explaining the dynamics of the unconscious. Although the unconscious is valuable for understanding religion, it is not the whole story. Religious interests, attitudes, beliefs, symbols, and activities are also consciously motivated.

Borden Parker Bowne, the first representative of the personalistic view in America has been largely overlooked as far as his psychology is concerned. An examination of his writings reveals principles that have been developed by later personalistic psychologists. Bowne emphasized empiricism in psychology. There is an indication of eclecticism in his writings that characterizes personalistic psychology. Bowne emphasizes the importance of purpose and conduct and a consistent morality as the important aspects of religiousness. If mysticism leads to that end, and does not become an end in itself, he saw it as worthwhile and important. He stressed the conscious striving of the individual. He notes the importance of habit-formation around ideals.

Mary Whiton Calkins developed her personalistic psychology from clues given by Josiah Royce and William James. The self or soul had been taken for granted until
mechanistic emphases came into psychology to challenge it. To clarify and reinstate the self in psychology was Calkins' aim. Her writings reveal a penetrating analysis of the various schools of psychology and their abstractness without a unifying agent. She showed how these schools could profit by and be reconciled with self psychology. She recognized that religiousness arises in the interaction of the self with other selves. As many of her other concepts are now outmoded and there was not sufficient integration of the useful concepts of other psychologies, we examine Stern's psychology for a modern personalistic approach.

William Stern is fundamentally in agreement with Bowne and Calkins except for his view of the psychophysical neutrality of the person. His concepts, resulting from attempts to reconstruct general psychology around the person, are empirical, holistic, and activistic. His principles of convergence, intropection, expansion of the realm of feeling, and his concern for religious experience, go beyond the concepts of most psychologists to-day. Stern, Calkins, and Bowne are concerned with the striving of the self toward higher goals than mere biological adjustment.

Gordon Willard Allport emphasizes the relatively persistent behavior tendencies of the individual when organized as personality. He points out that personality is composed of a hierarchy of levels consisting of habits.
traits, and egos. He utilizes concepts from Gestalt, behavioristic, depth, and typological psychologies for depicting the unique individual person and his behavior. His concepts of functional autonomy of motives, intention, attitudes, and traits are fundamental for understanding the unique and common religious behavior of persons.

The following conclusions are drawn from this study of the religious implications of personalistic psychology.

1. Personalistic psychology provides a wider range of concepts to understand religious persons than the other four psychologies examined. It includes concepts from other psychologies, yet in a larger and better integrated perspective. It is therefore more empirical for religion.

2. By actively and purposely attempting to account for the higher needs, personalistic psychology has thereby developed concepts that will apply to religious experience and conduct. Its relevancy is thus more distinct.

3. Personalistic psychologists place the mystical experience in its context, the living and acting personality. Not the origin of the mystical experience, but its effects on the ideals, intentions, and behavior tendencies prove a better criterion for understanding and evaluating mystical experience.

4. Personalistic psychology leaves the problem of reality and the truth, the validity of religious dogma, to the philosophers and thus avoids confusion of aim and fields
of investigation.

5. Personalistic psychology indicates more clearly than any other psychology the dynamics of change in religious behavior at the level of consciousness. This is accomplished by the process of functional autonomy of motives.

6. The theory of traits indicates that behavior may be initiated and guided by religious ideals despite particular situations or conventions.

7. Religiousness develops by means of introception, the conscious and meaningful incorporation of values into selfhood by worship, mysticism, and other religious experiences. It is aided by interest, intention, learning, and needs.

8. Inconsistencies in religious behavior are understood by the position of religion in the dynamic organization of traits within the individual. The person has many traits.

9. The principles of ego-involvement and intention point to the freedom of the person in recognizing and introcepting religious values considered most important for him.

10. An understanding of the religious person is more empirical, holistic, and adequate in terms of consciously integrated high-level concepts than in stimulus-bound, present-oriented, and reductionistic concepts.
The author was born July 4, 1919 at Beaumont, Texas. He is the seventh of nine children of Edward and Myrtle Sprott. He is a product of the public schools of Beaumont, graduating from high school in 1936. After working a year, he entered Wiley College to take a pre-ministerial course. Two years later he again left school to work a year in order to participate in the communal venture of educating nine children. Entering college again in 1940, he had been persuaded to change to a pre-medical course. He graduated from Wiley College in 1942. He unconsciously and conveniently lost two application blanks to medical school.

He was able to enter Gammon Theological Seminary. He graduated in 1945. He entered Boston University in 1946. He met and later married Yolande C. Meek of Kansas City, Missouri who is a graduate of the University of Kansas (B.Mus.) and the New England Conservatory of Music (M.Mus.).