American policy and the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Middle East 1919-1948

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http://hdl.handle.net/2144/6761

Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis
AMERICAN POLICY AND THE
ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1919-1948

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

1958
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INTRODUCTION

The conflict between the Arabs and the Jews in the Palestine area goes back for centuries into the historical past. It is a conflict which was built up in a crescendo following the end of World War I, and reached its great climax on May 15, 1948 when the Israelis declared their new state to be free and independent. The joy and exhilaration which was experienced by the Jews on this eventful day in their history was matched by the sadness and depression of the Arabs. The creation of the new state was a happy event for the Jews, a disastrous one for the Arabs. The events had reached a peak which was pleasing to the Jews, repugnant to the Arabs.

What had transpired to cause these opposing emotions in the hearts and minds of the people who were fighting for a barren strip of land on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean? In essence, the Jewish peoples had displaced the Arabs as the decision-makers in Palestine, and many Arabs physically left the new state of Israel and took up their lives in desperate abodes elsewhere. The Jews took over immediately upon termination of the British mandate, and prior to that time the British actually supervised a government which had been predominantly Arab.

How did U.S. policy bear upon this conflict? Did it favor one side as against the other? Was it influenced by economic, strategic, humanitarian factors, or by outside pressure groups? How did the policy vary with administrations, with individual presidents? Did it have a rhyme
or reason, or was it inconsistent in progressing from one historical development to another in the events which led up to and which followed the creation of Israel? Could U.S. policy have been instrumental in ameliorating the tempers which flared and continue to flare on both sides?

Certainly the crisis in the Middle East as regards the Arabs and the Jews has no simple solution. The Arabs regard the Palestine problem as a simple one in nature. They consider it as "an instance of dispossessing: not one individual dispossessing another, but a whole multitude dispossessing an entire people from its ancestral home." This is the crux of the problem from the Arab point of view. They feel that they were driven from their lands by the cunning of the Jews. They feel that Palestine was a thoroughly Arab land, indistinguishable and inseparable from the neighboring Arab countries, with about 90 percent of the population Arab at the end of World War I. The number of Jews in Palestine at that time was about 57,000, many of whom were Arabs of Jewish faith. This small Jewish population in Palestine has increased to about two million during the four decades which have elapsed since World War I. In the meantime about one million Arabs have left or have been uprooted from their homes, and for the most part have been unable to take up their lives again in other countries. The depressing Arab refugee situation in camps supported by the United Nations is a sad consequence of the Arabs' departure from Palestine. This is the heart of the problem through Arab eyes, the dispossessing of an entire people.

The Jews contend that the Arabs have come to life since World War I, that they were under the heel of the Ottoman Turk prior to that time, and are today enjoying freedom and sovereignty far beyond their wildest dreams of four decades ago. They contend that:

"In Asia, where, a half-century ago, not one single free Arab or Moslem lived in conditions of political liberty, there are now twelve sovereign Arab states, extending over a continental expanse of four million square miles, in which fifty-six million members of the Arab nation live under their manifold sovereignties. This is the lavish good fortune which the Arab nation has inherited. Never since the golden days of the caliphate has the Arab people commanded such power and opportunity as has now been brought within the powers of its hands."

The Jews feel that they have brought about an exalted event in history through the establishment of Israel. They claim that the right was theirs to return to the land from which they were driven long ago; that the land always belonged to them; that they were returning to claim that which was their birthright.

The Jewish point of view goes to their belief that they have survived as a people because they have continued to remain purely Jewish and have not been permitted to become bona fide members of other nationalities such as Germans or Poles. Along with this they have maintained through the centuries an abiding tie with the holy land, their promised land. Many Jews have gone to the holy land to die, and many young Jews have gone to Palestine to seek a new life which had been denied to them elsewhere. There has been an attraction for them to the holy land for three thousand years which could not be erased by time,

2/Abba Eban, Address before the Academy of Political Science, April 22, 1957. Zionist Organization of America, New York.
and which grew stronger as the persecution of Jews in Europe reached its height during the current century. There existed, therefore, for the Jews a spiritual and psychological tie to Palestine which was turned into a political goal by Zionism. The political content of Zionism followed logically from spiritual and psychological ties.

The Jews had good reason to insist on large immigration into Palestine if they ever hoped to establish political dominance in the country. They recognized that following the end of World War I they were a small minority among the Arabs in Palestine, and that they must at least have a majority if they hoped to attain political control. When they coupled this desire with the humanitarian reason of sending persecuted Jews to Palestine, their demands for immigration became increasingly counter to the desires of the Arabs, so that the Arab and Jewish points of view reached a state of complete inviability.

While the Arab nations were torn by dynastic rivalries between Ibn Saud's house, Farouk's realm, and the Hashemite dynasty of Transjordan and Iraq, they were nonetheless all agreed on opposing the aims of Zionism in Palestine, and in pursuit of such opposition the seven Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen) established the Arab League in March, 1945.

In the chapters that follow I hope to discuss the decisions and events in which the United States participated and which had bearing on


the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Middle East commencing with the peace conference in Paris in 1919 and ending with the establishment of Israel in 1948. In the treatment of bilateral arrangements between the United States and the nations of the Middle East, which I have included for purposes of completeness, I have been forced to extend considerations of U.S. policy beyond the 1948 date mentioned above. While other policy features terminate in 1948, I trust that the reader will bear with the writer in a brief evaluation of bilateral arrangements which extend beyond 1948.

It is my intention to discuss American policies as they affected the conflict, and to analyze the contributions made by such policies. It is my hope to point out the strengths and weaknesses of American policy in regard to the conflict, and to form general conclusions to indicate what our policies might have been to more effectively support the U.S. interests.
CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES AT THE VERSAILLES CONFERENCE

KING–CRANE COMMISSION

"There must not be one law for the Jew and another for the Arabs. We must stand firm by the ancient principle enunciated in our Tanakh: 'One law and one manner shall be for you and for the stranger that sojourneth with you.'" 1/

By the time the peace conference convened in Versailles in January 1919 the brew of the Arab–Jewish conflict, which had been simmering during World War I, began to boil. The United States delegation, headed by President Woodrow Wilson, came to the conference with lofty ideals for settling the world's problems, among which was included the Palestine problem which was receiving the cross and conflicting currents set up by the Maschakon Correspondence, the Sykes–Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration.

Wilson, while appearing to maintain a reasonably objective point of view with regard to Palestine, had nevertheless been subjected to Zionist pressures in the United States before he sailed for France. He indicated an acceptance of the Balfour Declaration theme for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" after having been influenced by prominent Americans, such as, Rabbi Stephen Wise and Associate Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. Mr.

Brandeis, making a very able use of his influence at the White House, helped significantly in obtaining President Wilson's approval of the terms of the proposed Balfour Declaration.

The Arabs had been impressed by President Wilson's Fourteen Points wherein he denounced the subjection of one people by another, and supported the principle of self-determination. The United States had practically no commercial interests in the Middle East, and the Arabs recognized that they would receive unbiased treatment from the Americans at the peace conference. The Arabs were not suspicious of any American ambitions in the Middle East as contrasted to their loss of faith in the British and French due to their colonial aspirations. The Arab sentiment toward the United States was reflected in a resolution adopted by the General Syrian Congress of July 2, 1919:

"We rely on President Wilson's declarations that his object in entering the war was to put an end to acquisitive designs for imperial purposes. In our desire that our country should not be made a field for colonization and in our belief that America is devoid of colonial ambitions and has no political designs on our country, we resolve to seek assistance in the technical and economic fields from the United States of America on the understanding that the duration of such aid should not exceed 20 years."

President Wilson had approved the Balfour Declaration in a personal capacity. Although the President was not a pro-Zionist, he was nevertheless subjected to the influence of certain of his personal friends who were strongly pro-Zionist. In general, it can be said that the State Department was more objective in viewing the Palestine problem than was the President. Secretary of State Lansing was anti-Zionist. He was sus-

President Wilson appointed a committee to make a report on Palestine to the American Delegation to the peace conference at Versailles. This committee, which was pro-Zionist, made the following recommendations in its report of January 21, 1919:

(1) That there be established a separate state of Palestine.

(2) That Palestine be placed under Great Britain as mandatory of the League of Nations.

(3) That Jews be invited to return to Palestine and to settle there.

(4) That Palestine become a Jewish state, if Jews, given the opportunity, make it such.

(5) That the holy places and religious rights of all creeds in Palestine be placed under the protection of the League of Nations and its mandatory.

It is considered that the committee which made these recommendations was biased before the investigations began, and therefore the objectivity of the report is seriously questioned. The members of the committee which made the above recommendations were Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Dr. James T. Shotwell, Dr. Sidney Mezes, Dr. William Westerman, and Walter Lippman who served for a time as secretary to the committee. A strong pro-Zionist slant is recognized in the membership of this
Faisal, son of Sharif Husain, was the principal spokesman of the Arabs at the peace conference, and he was ill prepared to assume his role as such. He found himself in new surroundings and among Western diplomats, but he did succeed in making his request heard for a commission of inquiry to be appointed at the peace conference to investigate the conditions in Syria and Palestine and to determine the desires of the population there. President Wilson gave support to Faisal's request. Clemenceau and Lloyd George appeared receptive at first to a commission of inquiry, but they soon began to waiver. Wilson carried Faisal's proposal further and suggested that a commission be established of equal representation from Britain, France, Italy and the United States. On March 25, 1919 the Council of Four approved the establishment of the commission of inquiry, and President Wilson appointed Dr. Henry C. King, President of Oberlin College, and Mr. Charles E. Crane, who had a wide experience and independent outlook as regards Palestine.

Meanwhile Britain, France and Italy became apprehensive of the findings of a committee of inquiry, and stalled in making their appointments. Britain appointed Sir Henry MacMahan and Commander D. G. Hogarth. The French were suspicious lest the population of Syria should indicate that they no longer desired the French in Syria, and the British felt that an inquiry on the spot would indicate local opposition to the establishment of a British mandate in Iraq and in Palestine. Sir Mark Sykes consolidated these fears when he reported to Lloyd George, Balfour, and his French friends that Zionism was on the march in Palestine,
and that opposition to the French in Syria and to the British in Palestine was mounting. After receiving such disquieting news, it is no wonder that Britain and France objected to participating in a committee to conduct an inquiry on the spot. Italy went along with Britain and France and failed to support the committee of inquiry, which now had the sole backing of the United States. In such an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, President Wilson went ahead with the appointment of King and Crane to what soon was to be known as the King-Crane Commission.

The official designation of the King-Crane Commission was the "American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey." It exemplified the determination of a strong-willed American President to follow through on his concept of self-determination of peoples. The commission spent six weeks, commencing in early June 1919, visiting Syria and Palestine. The two commissioners made themselves available to hear the views of the local populace, and interviewed a large number of people in some 40 towns and villages. They received some 1800 petitions, and made themselves available to all who wanted to see them.

On August 28, 1919 the commission had completed its report and deposited it with the secretariat of the United States Delegation in Paris. Then Dr. King and Mr. Crane returned to the United States and made their report to officials in Washington. By this time President Wilson had commenced his speaking tour of the nation and was taking his case for the League and the Treaty to the people over the heads of the senators.
The recommendations made by the King-Crane Commission placed some question as to the Zionist aims in Palestine. The two members of the commission entered upon their investigations with unbiased points of view, and it is considered that their findings and recommendations were the first truly objective studies of a quasi-official nature which were made of the Palestine problem up to that time. The commissioners were neither pro-Arab nor pro-Jewish, and this aspect of their qualifications places added worth in their findings and recommendations. In effect, they favored a mandatory system in Syria (which was to include Palestine) and in Iraq, with the thought that the mandate should be brought to an end as soon as conditions would allow. They recommended that all of Syria be placed under a constitutional-monarchy form of government with Faisal as the monarch. This would obviously preclude the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and they recommended curtailment of the Zionist program with a limitation placed on Jewish immigration to Palestine and the abandonment of any thought of Palestine becoming a Jewish commonwealth.

It was unfortunate that the efforts of the King-Crane Commission did not represent quadri-partite action by the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy as initially intended by the peace conference. It is conceivable that such quadri-partite action may have resulted in different findings and recommendations which probably would have received official recognition by the peace conference, whereas the actual report of the commission was shelved and disregarded by the conference. The importance of the commission's report lies in its lack of
bias, and in its objectivity in regard to Palestine.

After the report of the King-Crane Commission was filed in the summer of 1919 it was pigeon-holed and completely ignored by the decision-makers of the peace conference. Nor was it acted upon in Washington. It did not become public property until 1922 when Dr. King authorized publication of the report in Editor and Publisher, issue of December 2, 1922.

In the three years that elapsed before publication of the report of the commission, Great Britain and France had imposed their wills on Syria and Palestine and had succeeded in establishing their mandates there. The results of the peace conference insofar as they pertained to Palestine were reached on April 25, 1920 when the Allied Supreme Council allocated the mandate over Palestine to Great Britain. The mandate was confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on July 22, 1922, thereby placing the stamp of international approval upon the disposition of the Palestine problem. The mandate expressly provided for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and followed the general tenets of the Balfour Declaration, and included practically verbatim the text of the Declaration. The mandate recognized the Jewish Agency which would cooperate with the mandatory power in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

The United States had offered an unbiased program for handling the Arab-Jewish conflict which was gaining momentum in Palestine. The pre-

\[3/\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 296.\]

\[4/\text{Adapted from George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, Fourth Printing, 1953, p. 263.}\]
posals were disregarded and ignored because they did not fit in with British and French colonial aspirations in the area. They were also bypassed because the advocate of the King-Crane Commission, President Wilson, lost his health and was unable to carry through with his initial thoughts for a solution. Wilson became distracted by the League-Treaty issue, and this, together with his declining health, made him a poor champion of the recommendations set forth by the King-Crane Commission. America's first attempt to contribute constructively to a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Middle East had failed.

America had attempted to guide the policy for the handling of the ferment which was building up in Palestine. She had been defeated in her attempts to do this by the power politics of the European nations which had representation at the Paris peace conference. The interplay of power politics was at cross currents with Wilson's designs, and the American President was subjected to frustrations and compromises which only thinly covered the pattern of European imperialism which was being carried forward from nineteenth century diplomacy into the halls at Versailles.

Following the death of President Wilson and the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations by the U.S. government, the United States returned to its traditional position of isolation from world politics, and this withdrawal effectively removed the United States from active participation in the politics of the Middle East for two decades.

The Zionists were pleased with the outcome of the Paris peace
In a 1942 speech, David Ben-Gurion referred back to the international action taken after World War I: "After the last war, England and America, with France and Italy — other free democracies of the time — resolved to undo the historic wrong to our people and recognize its right to be restored to its homeland."

The trail had been blazed which would lead to the eventual creation of a Jewish national home. This was in keeping with the ends sought by Zionism and was a good start toward the establishment of Israel. But if the Jews were pleased by the results of the peace conference, the Arabs were displeased eventually although initially they presumed that they would not suffer from the machinations of the conference. The Arabs believed that they could exist in Palestine with the Jews including immigrants whom they expected to arrive under the limitations imposed by the mandate. But the figures increased during the years following World War I, and the Arabs soon recognized that the work of the Paris peace conference was not to their advantage. Immigration increased to 2713 in 1927, 2178 in 1928, 5249 in 1929, 4944 in 1930, 4075 in 1931, 9553 in 1932, 30,327 in 1933, 42,359 in 1934, and 61,854 in 1935. The Arabs recognized that viability with the Jews was no longer possible and that the system which had been devised by the decision-makers in Paris would eventually lead them to disaster.


CHAPTER II

ZIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Zionism is defined as a modern colonization movement which aims at establishing a permanent national home for Jews in Palestine. Although the movement had its inception in Europe it spread to the United States and gained momentum there during the years of World War I. The movement has generally been supported by our Presidents, by some more than others, and by the Congress. By 1919, the pattern of American support of Zionism was clearly taking shape as evidenced by the great efforts in advancing Zionist aspirations during President Wilson’s administration. American Zionists had been particularly active during the war years, and they began to reap some of the benefits from the seeds which they had planted. Associate Justice Louis D. Brandeis was active in the Zionist Organization during this period and in a speech delivered in June, 1915 in New York City before the Conference of Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis he said:

"Zionism seeks to establish in Palestine, for such Jews as choose to go and remain there, and for their descendants, a legally secured home, where they may live together and lead a Jewish life, where they may expect ultimately to constitute a majority of the population, and may look forward to what we should call home rule. The Zionists seek to establish this home in Palestine because they are convinced that the unyielding longing of Jews for Palestine is the fact of deepest significance....They believe that only in Palestine can Jewish life be fully protected from the forces of disintegration; that there alone can the Jewish spirit

\footnotesize{1/Louis D. Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism, A Collection of Addresses and Statements by Louis D. Brandeis, Zionist Organization of America, New York, 1942, p. 24.}
reach its full and natural development; and that by securing for
those Jews who wish to settle there the opportunity to do so, not
only those Jews, but all other Jews will be benefited, and that
the long perplexing Jewish problem will, at last, find solution.

It was the position of the Zionist Organization during World War
I that Jews of every country should assist in pursuing the Zionist cause,
and that the Jews of the United States should particularly assist in this
action. The organization contended that the duty resting upon the Jews
of America was especially insistent. They numbered at that time 3,000,000
which was more than one fifth of all the Jews in the world, a number
larger than that within any other country except the Russian empire.
The Jewish population of the United States has since increased both
numerically and proportionately. It is estimated that the present Jew-
ish population of the United States is $5\frac{1}{2}$-6,000,000, and it is estimated
that the population of world Jewry has decreased to 12-13,000,000 as a
result of Nazi exterminations in World War II. World Jewry was estimated
at 18,000,000 before World War II.

Brandeis advised the Jews of America to "organize, organize, or-
organize, until every Jew in America must stand up and be counted, counted
with us, or prove himself, willingly or unwittingly, of the few who are
against their own people." Again, he said: "The work of safeguarding
the continuity of our movement is begun. Upon you depends the success-
ful issue... It requires men, it requires money. You must furnish both.
You must give of your devotion without reserve, of your means without

2/Population estimates supplied by Zionist Organization of America,
Washington, D.C. office,

3/Louis D. Brandeis, op. cit., p. 47.
The attitude of American Zionists in 1919 was not in complete accord with the attitude of Chaim Weizmann in regard to the tasks of Zionism. Doctor Weizmann expressed the following in 1919 in regard to the difference of attitudes:

"What struck me as curious was that the American Zionists, under Justice Brandeis, though fully aware of what was going on in England and Palestine, nonetheless shared the illusions of our continental friends; they too assumed that all political problems had been settled once and for all, and that the only important task before Zionists was the economic upbuilding of the Jewish national home."

Weizmann was troubled by this misunderstanding for many years following World War I, and he took it upon himself to dispel the thought that there was no political problem which had to be resolved by the Zionists. The political problem was, in fact, a long way from solution, and when this was driven home in the minds of Zionists in America as well as in Europe they went to the opposite extreme in viewing the Balfour Declaration. Some of them now considered the declaration as a useless document which was of little use and benefit to the Zionists. Weizmann had to dispel such thoughts also, and he preached for many years that the Balfour Declaration did have definite utility in the cause of Zionism, but it was nevertheless only a framework which had to filled in by the Zionists.

The attitude of the United States government has been reflected in expressions of approval given to the Zionist movement by every

4/ Ibid., p. 47.

President from President Wilson on. Some of the Presidential statements endorsing the movement are given below:

President Woodrow Wilson, October 29, 1918

"I have watched with deep and sincere interest the reconstructive work which the Weizmann Commission has done in Palestine at the instance of the British government, and I welcome an opportunity to express the satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the Zionist movement in the United States and in the Allied countries since the declaration of Mr. Balfour on behalf of the British government of Great Britain's approval of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and his promise that the British government would use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object with the understanding that nothing would be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish people in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in other countries."

President Warren G. Harding, May 11, 1922

"I am very glad to express my approval and hearty sympathy for the effort of the Palestine Foundation Fund in behalf of the restoration of Palestine as a homeland for the Jewish people. I have always viewed with an interest, which I think is quite as much practical as sentimental, the proposal for the rehabilitation of Palestine, and I hope the effort now being carried on in this and other countries in this behalf may meet with the fullest measure of success."

President Calvin Coolidge, June 13, 1924

"I have so many times reiterated my interest in this great movement that anything which I might add would be a repetition of former statements, but I am nevertheless glad to have this opportunity to express again my sympathy with the deep and intense longing which finds such fine expression in the Jewish national homeland in Palestine."

President Herbert Hoover, September 21, 1928

"I have watched with genuine admiration the steady and unmistakable progress made in the rehabilitation of Palestine which, desolate for centuries, is now renewing its youth and vitality through the enthusiasm, hard work, and self-sacrifice of the Jewish

pioneers who tell there in a spirit of peace and social justice. It is very gratifying to note that many American Jews, Zionists as well as non-Zionists, have rendered such splendid service to this cause which merits the sympathy and moral encouragement of everyone."

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 28, 1932

"As you know, I have on prior occasions expressed my fullest sympathy with the purpose of the Balfour Declaration... Jewish achievement in Palestine since the Balfour Declaration vindicates the high hope which lay behind the sponsorship of the homeland.... I shall personally watch with deep sympathy the progress of Palestine. I extend to your organization my sincerest wishes for continued success and achievement."

President Harry S. Truman gave full expression of his position in regard to Palestine many times during his career in the Senate and also in the White House, but perhaps the most forceful expression of his position came on May 15, 1948 when he announced United States recognition of the new and independent state of Israel.

There is no reason to doubt or to question the sincerity of our Presidents in their expressed feelings toward Zionism, but it is interesting to note the timing of the above mentioned public pronouncements. Oddly, the pronouncements made by Presidents Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt, and Truman were made from one week to six months before a national presidential election in which they were candidates for office. The times by which their pro-Zionist statements preceded their elections to the Presidency were: Coolidge - five months; Hoover - six weeks; Roosevelt - one week; Truman - six months.

Each of the above presidents may have been very sincere in supporting Zionism, but they also had their eyes on the Jewish votes of the country, and particularly on the Jewish votes of New York where American

7/Ibid., p. 32.
Jewry is largely concentrated when they made their pre-election statements in support of Zionism. The record shows that of the four presidents listed above, all except President Truman won the vote of New York state in the elections immediately following the dates when they made the above statements. President Truman's defeat in New York in 1948 is attributable in part to the fact that Governor Dewey was his opponent.

The Jewish vote in the United States had become a significant factor in American politics. It could not be ignored by any aspiring politician, and particularly it could not be ignored in New York city and state politics. It had become a fact of life in politics, and any politician who opposed Zionism could not hope for success in an area such as New York City where the concentration of Jews is most significant, approaching 50 percent of the population of metropolitan New York.

The American Zionists relate Zionism to Americanism and feel that their ideals are similar. Brandeis stated:

"My approach to Zionism was through Americanism. In time, practical experience and observation convinced me that Jews were by reason of their traditions and their character peculiarly fitted for the attainment of American ideals. Gradually it became clear to me that to be good Americans, we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews, we must become Zionists."

The Zionist Organization of America addressed a letter in June, 1918 to all members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives requesting their views on the Palestine issue. The general response to this letter was one of support of the Balfour Declaration and there

3/Louis D. Brandeis, op. cit., p. 49.
tended to be a crystallization of thought in the national legislature on the Palestine question. The Balfour Declaration was less than a year old at that time, and this was the first general consensus of a responsible American group on the recent declaration. In a book published by the Zionist Organization of America in February, 1919, The American War Congress and Zionism, the statements of 69 senators and 231 representatives of the 65th or War Congress are included. This book had an effect of strengthening the position of the Zionists in America. Furthermore, it provided a reference work for the American delegation at the peace conference in Paris in the spring of 1919, and it paved the way for the passage of the Palestine Lodge-Fish Resolution by the U.S. Congress in 1922.

While the United States was not a member of the League of Nations and could not participate in the negotiations of the League in giving mandatory powers to the United Kingdom in Palestine, nevertheless certain members of the Congress felt that there should be some official statement of the United States position. This issue was raised in 1922 at a time when the British Parliament was questioning the British mandate in Palestine. There was a strong anti-Zionist feeling in the House of Lords, which actually rejected the British mandate. It was at this time that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, introduced a Joint Resolution on April 12, 1922 which approved the terms of the Balfour Declaration. This became an official position of the United States government when it was unanimously passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives and signed by
President Harding on September 21, 1922. This became known as the Lodge-Fisk Resolution, and its introduction and passage is attributed in part to the work of the Zionist Organization of America in drawing out and publishing the views of the senators and congressmen in the earlier 65th Congress.

The above resolution approved the position of the British government as stated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. A later resolution, jointly introduced by Senators Wagner and Taft in 1934, disapproved the position of the British government as stated in its White Paper on Palestine of May, 1939. There was no official statement of the United States government on the White Paper until such time as the Taft-Wagner bill was considered, but during the time of the hearings on the bill the two co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council called on President Roosevelt and then issued a statement. The co-chairmen were Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen S. Wise, and the statement which they issued following their meeting with President Roosevelt was:

"The President authorized us to say that the American government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939. The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees, and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish national home for which our government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."

This action of the leaders of the American Zionist Emergency Council gave to the American public and to their representatives in the U.S. Congress the announced position of the President on the issue of the

\[\text{Reuben Fink, op. cit., p. 103.}\]
White Paper of 1939. It was "the first word of protest against the White Paper policy by a responsible official of the American government in four years, eleven months, and nine days of its operation." Here was a statement of policy originated by the President, but being given to the American people by leaders of the Zionist Organization. Certainly this statement of policy had influence upon the members of Congress who were in process of considering the Taft-Wagner Resolution, the text of which follows:

"Resolved, that the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

Since the White Paper had proposed that Jewish immigration into Palestine be stopped after a five-year period, such cessation of immigration was to be effective in May, 1944. The Congress was prompted to take action on the Taft-Wagner Resolution in view of the impending cessation of immigration into Palestine, and the concern of the American Zionist Emergency Council was mounting in this regard. It is felt that the resolution would have passed unanimously had it not been for a letter which Secretary of War Stimson sent to Congressional leaders in which he pointed out that in regard to the resolution further action at this time would be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war.


11/Reuben Fink, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
The Zionist Emergency Council referred to above came into being in 1943 as an agency having representatives of the major Zionist groups in the United States. The creation of this new agency brought a new era in Zionist activity in a period of systematic political and public-relations work designed to achieve American support for the establishment of the Jewish state. This was an era in which Dr. Abba Hillel Silver dominated American Zionism, for the years 1939-46 may be termed the Silver epoch of American Zionism just as the years 1914-20 may be termed the Brandeis epoch.

David Ben-Gurion was in the United States in connection with the drafting of the Biltmore program of 1942 and presenting it to the American Zionist Organization. He elicited support of the American Zionists as well as the support of the American government in fostering the international Zionist cause. The Biltmore program called for (1) the establishment of a Jewish state including all of Palestine, (2) the creation of a Jewish army, (3) repudiation of the British White Paper of 1939, and (4) control of immigration into Palestine by the Jewish Agency rather than by Great Britain.

The adoption of this program by the Zionist Organization of America emphasized the start of the shift of Zionist pressures from England to the United States. The Zionists recognized that by 1942 Great Britain had urgently needed the physical support of the United States in the

Adapted from David E. Hirschs, A Record of American Zionism, ZOA Pamphlet Series No. 13, ZOA, New York, 1955, pp. 21, 23.

13/The Biltmore program was adopted by the Zionist Organization of America on May 11, 1942 in the Biltmore Hotel, New York City.
war against Germany. Zionists rationalized that the United States would be the leader of the free nations at the end of World War II, and they felt that their cause, if it was to achieve any success, must have the support of the United States. As a consequence of this rationalization the adoption of the Biltmore program was accompanied by increased Zionist activity among leading American politicians, American citizens in general, and American Jews. Ben-Gurion appealed to the sympathies of American Jewry in October, 1942 when he said:

"In America itself, this community is the product of the gathering of immigrants from all parts of the world and of all social strata, and, like the general population, it exhibits a variety of divisions by origin, position, and so forth. But it can be as solidly united in its fundamental issues and ideals as is the great American nation... It looks to the national home to protect the future of the Jewish people, and to redeem its exiles and give it, in the free world, a place where distinctively to enrich civilization. Organized Zionists and myriads outside the movement are virtually one in this."

The Zionists in their attempts to bring about passage of the 1944 Congressional resolutions failed to recognize military considerations as being pertinent to the passage of these resolutions. When the Congress did not pass the resolutions, the President asked the Zionist leaders to leave the matter to him without involving Congress. David E. Hirsch comments as follows:

"At that time many Zionist leaders failed to grasp the extent to which this position of the administration was a reflection of the pro-Arab and anti-Zionist attitude of the State Department 'career men.' After these leaders yielded to the pressure of the administration the second time, Dr. Silver was forced to withdraw


from the co-chairmanship of the American Zionist Emergency Council."

American Zionists again attempted to bring pressure on the administration in July, 1945 to take the lead in opening Palestine to Jewish immigration and in establishing the Jewish commonwealth. The Zionists recalled Dr. Silver to lead them, and their fortunes rose when American policy became evident in the letter from President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee on August 31, 1945 in which the President advocated the immediate admission into Palestine of 100,000 Jews.

Political pressure was in the main theme of American Zionist activity from the time of 1939 when the White Paper was issued by Britain up until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. At that time the emphasis shifted to material support of Israel. American Jews have been most generous in support of the new state, in fact, about half of the support which Israel receives comes from American Jewry. Hirsch comments on American contribution to Israel as follows:

"In the first five years of its existence a total of one billion dollars was reported to have been raised for Israel from all sources throughout the world. Almost half of this, 416 millions, was contributed by American Jewry; 136 millions came from United States grants; 135 millions from the United States Export-Import Bank; and 311 millions from Israel bonds, loans, private investments, and gift campaigns in other countries."

The Zionist Organization of America has had a decisive influence upon gaining private and governmental support in the United States for the cause of Zionism. It is considered that the creation of the new state of Israel would have been considerably delayed, and may not have occurred, unless American Zionists gave the support which they did.

Zionists in government as well as Zionists in private life all played an important role in bringing their influence to bear upon America for support of their cause:

"The American Zionists have an unbelievably tremendous organization creating sympathy for their cause. Their financial standing, political power and fanatical devotion gained the attention of pivotal political figures. Their men in the Supreme Court, in Congress and in the White House made the big men in the government of the United States accessible to them."

In a word, the Jews were strongly entrenched in the United States, they had vast resources of money at their disposal, and they were masters of the art of lobbying. They achieved their ends through a spirit of devotion to their cause, supported by a unified organization which was pointed toward the achievement of a single purpose.

Zionists do not feel that their work terminated with the creation of Israel. They feel that there is much that remains for them to do to contribute to the welfare of the Jews, and they consider that in the new era which opened with the creation of Israel, Zionists will understand their new challenge and will rise to meet it.

CHAPTER III
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Joseph C. Grew, while Under Secretary of State, summed up his impressions of how President Roosevelt felt in regard to Palestine during World War II as follows:

"Although President Roosevelt at times gave expression to views sympathetic to certain Zionist aims, he also gave certain assurances to the Arabs which they regard as definite commitments on our part. On a number of occasions within the past few years, he authorized the department to assure the heads of the different Near Eastern governments in his behalf that 'in the view of this government there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.' In his meeting with King Ibn Saud early in 1945, Mr. Roosevelt promised the King that as regards Palestine he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs."

Mr. Roosevelt, judging from Grew's analysis above, appears to have straddled the fence in regard to his treatment of the Arabs and the Jews. His meeting with Ibn Saud a few months before his death crystallized for the record his views toward the Arabs. With the realization of the new strategic and economic importance of Saudi Arabia, President Roosevelt was careful to establish a close personal relationship with Ibn Saud. He valued and courted Saud's favor, but at the same time was careful not to do so in a way that would cause the loss of the Jewish vote in the United States. He was fully aware of the potential hazard of a Jewish state in Palestine, for in March, 1945 he stated that a Jewish state

in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and main-
tained only by military force.

The last statement attributed to President Roosevelt makes one won-
der whether he would have been as eager to recognize an independent Jew-
ish state as was his successor. He apparently foresaw the military strife
which was to ensue from the establishment of Israel, and if he had lived
to see the creation of this new state it is doubtful that he as chief
executive would have acted with the precipitousness of Mr. Truman.

The strategic role which Mr. Roosevelt played in World War II im-
pressed upon him the importance of petroleum products in a global con-
flict such as World War II. It was the age before nuclear propelled
ships and other vehicles of war; and tanks, planes and trucks as well
as ships were all propelled with oil during that war. President Roose-
velt recognized the importance of petroleum products for fighting the
war and hence made overtures to remain on good terms with the Arabs,
particularly the Saudi Arabians. It is felt that the Roosevelt admin-
istration cautiously guarded the oil interests in the Middle East, and
when it came time for the Congress to consider the Congressional reso-
lutions of 1944 objections were raised by the administration which de-
clared that the resolutions will create difficulties in the prosecution
of the war. This objection was highlighted in a newspaper editorial:

"Congress is under strong pressure to pass a resolution, now
introduced in both Houses, reiterating the principles stated in
the Balfour Declaration of 1917....The resolution is prompted by
Americans' sense of justice and great sympathy for the Jewish
people. However, Congress has been requested by Secretary of War

2/New York Herald Tribune, March 1, 1944.
Stimson and Secretary of State Hull to drop the resolution. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, has backed their request in closed hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We do not know the precise basis for the request, but no doubt it turns on the protests of the Arab states, and no doubt it is the conviction of our highest military authorities that the resolution will create difficulties in the prosecution of the war. It is our considered opinion that the advice of the military authorities must be accepted.

1944 was a time of great national stress. Much depended upon the events of this decisive year that would decide the outcome of the war. It is true that the Battle of the Atlantic turned in favor of the Allied cause in 1943, and the German U-boats were fairly well under control by 1944, but they were still a major menace. The landings in Normandy were to be made on that eventful day in June, 1944. The United States was in no position to irritate the touchy Arabs, and yet for political reasons President Roosevelt could not declare himself against the Jewish homeland in Palestine. He handled the "resolutions" problem of 1944 in a way which would offend neither the Jews nor the Arabs. If he recommended approval of the resolutions, the Arabs would have been offended and the Middle East oil supply might have been jeopardized. If he recommended against the resolutions he might have jeopardized his political position with American voting Jews. So while he wanted the Middle East oil, and at the same time did not want to offend the Jews, he decided upon a middle course which would meet all his requirements. This course was to have two of his Cabinet members who were most concerned with the problem to declare that on military grounds it would be inexpedient for the Congress to pass the resolutions. This action permitted President Roosevelt to appear as a bystander while he was actually
calling the signals. The action assured the continued flow of oil from the Middle East, and it saved face for him with the Jews.

And yet, President Roosevelt was not always so hesitant to declare himself on the Palestine issue. For in prior years when the international situation was less pressing he unequivocally expressed himself in 1932 in favor of the Jewish national home in Palestine as referred to in the preceding chapter. Also in July, 1938 he stated:

"It gives me great pleasure to reiterate all the friendly sentiments which I have expressed to the Zionist Organization of America. I have watched the rehabilitation of the Jewish homeland with deep interest through many years and trust that the forthcoming convention of your organization will be fruitful of wise counsels and constructive action towards the realization of a noble ideal."

This was the politician Roosevelt speaking in 1932 and again in 1938 when he spoke so strongly in favor of the Zionist cause, at the same time keeping a wary eye out for the votes of American Jews. And it was the politician Roosevelt remaining silent in 1944, when the strategist Roosevelt gave the nod to his Secretaries of State and War to squelch the pro-Jewish resolutions which might impede and possibly endanger the progress of the war. The President's political sense adroitly bowed to the predominant U.S. interest of safeguarding the supply of oil for the allies from the Middle East.

President Roosevelt was always faced with the pressures of five million American Jews clamoring for U.S. support of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. On the other hand he was faced with the prospect of displeasing sixty million Arabs in an area where

their help in the pursuit of the war was so important. His road, and
that of his Secretary of State, was a difficult one to traverse and to
still keep a balance between the Jews and the Arabs that was beneficial
to American interests. The Palestine issue first really came up in Roose­
velt's administrations in 1936 when a conflict broke out in Palestine
between the Jews and the Arabs. The Roosevelt position taken at that
time was a mild one, and it consisted of Secretary of State Cordell
Hull sending a cable to Ambassador Bingham in London telling him:

"Influential Jewish groups here had informed the President
that Britain was thinking of suspending Jewish immigration into
Palestine. Saying that Jewish leaders here feared that such action
might prove hard to revoke might close the German and Polish Jews'
only avenue of escape, I asked Bingham to mention this entirely
 unofficially and personally to Foreign Secretary Eden."

Another telegram followed to Bingham a year later informing him
that America, along with Britain, represented a democratic form of gov­
ernment, and that Jews in America felt that the Jews who were being per­
secuted in eastern Europe were looking to the democratic governments of
the West for fair and equitable treatment in their efforts to enjoy a
new freedom and a new life in an independent Palestine.

Still another cable was sent in 1938 to Ambassador Kennedy telling
him that the White House and the State Department had received thousands
of letters and telegrams from Americans who protested the alleged inten­
tion of the British government to curtail Jewish immigration into Pales­
tine. This, the protests continued, would jeopardize the position taken
by the British government in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 of promising

a national home to the Jews. In each of these telegrams the Secretary of State informed the U.S. Ambassador in London that the U.S. government was not in any way questioning Britain's responsibility for Palestine's administration or presuming to interfere in that administration. The latter qualifying instruction typified the position taken by our government and by President Roosevelt as regards the British mandate in the years before World War II. It was a position of weak expression with no really strong feelings one way or the other. The Jewish vote was significant, it is true, but there was no great American interest in Middle East oil nor was there yet any sizeable pressure from the Arabs. This was to come later in the years of World War II.

President Roosevelt reacted strongly and non-publicly to the British White Paper of 1939 in a memorandum which he sent to Secretary Hull on May 17, 1939, saying:

"I have read with interest and a good deal of dismay the decisions of the British government regarding its Palestine policy. Frankly, I do not believe that the British are wholly correct in saying that the framers of the Palestine mandate 'could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country.' My recollection is that this way of putting it is deceptive for the reason that while the Palestine mandate undoubtedly did not intend to take away the right of citizenship and of taking part in the government on the part of the Arab population, it nevertheless did intend to convert Palestine into a Jewish home which might very possibly become preponderantly Jewish within a comparatively short time. Certainly that was the impression that was given to the whole world at the time of the mandate. My offhand thought is that while there are some good ideas in regard to actual administration of government in this new White Paper, it is something that we cannot give approval to by the United States."

It is noted that the President expressed himself "frankly" on the

5/Ibid., p. 1530.
White Paper, but the expression of frankness only went as far as the State Department. There was no official position of the government condemning the White Paper, and it was not until 1943 when the position finally came out in Congressional hearings while the Taft-Wagner resolution was being considered, and even then the government's position had to come from the lips of two Zionist leaders, Dr. Silver and Dr. Wise. The only expression made to the British government in 1939 was one of disappointment which Ambassador Kennedy was instructed to make to Foreign Secretary Halifax, and the disappointment was qualified as coming principally from Zionist circles.

Our State Department representatives in Arab nations sent reports to their home offices in 1942 and 1943 to the effect that continuing Zionist pressures in the United States were stirring up the Arab nations and that the outbreak of strife in the Middle East area would certainly endanger our war plans. President Roosevelt sent an Army officer as his personal representative to investigate the conditions in Arab nations. This investigation was conducted in late 1942 and early 1943 and it led to the conclusion that unless some action were taken to reduce tensions, a conflict might soon break out between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine before the end of World War II, and that this conflict would throw all the Arab Middle East into turmoil.

In 1943 King Ibn Saud wrote to President Roosevelt and said that although he was concerned over the Palestine question as an Arab and Moslem leader, nevertheless he refrained from making representations to the United States or to the United Nations of World War II. He gave
as reasons for doing this that he did not want to embarrass the United States or to jeopardize the aims of the United Nations. He asked President Roosevelt if he approved of his position of silence in regard to Palestine, and asked the President to advise him in advance of any actions which the United States intended to take in the Palestine issue. President Roosevelt replied that he approved of Ibn Saud's silence in the matter and advised him that it was the U.S. government's view that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Jews and Arabs.

This last thought which President Roosevelt passed on to King Ibn Saud became in my mind the cornerstone of his Palestine policy. He repeated the context of this thought on many occasions throughout the war, and the last recorded time that he made such a statement was in the personal meeting which he had with King Ibn Saud early in 1945, a few months before his death. He also had some slight hopes that a friendly understanding on Palestine might be reached before the end of the war, and that if such would come to pass it would be highly desirable. Such Rooseveltian hopes were noted by Admiral Leaky in his wartime memoirs:

"During the conversations at Malta (February, 1945), Roosevelt brought up the question of Palestine, outlining his hopes that an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews in that part of the world could be obtained. Churchill was better informed on this complex controversy than the President, and was somewhat doubtful that the Roosevelt goal could be achieved. At this time the British Empire had a far more vital stake in the Middle East area than did the United States."

This was the optimist Roosevelt hoping for the Arabs and the Jews

to settle their differences in Palestine, and it was the realist Roosevelt who at another time predicted that a Jewish state could only be created in Palestine by direct military force. It was also Roosevelt the optimist who, in 1943, suggested that the Palestine mandate should be under the control of three responsible trustees, a Jew, a Moslem, and a Christian.

Summer Welles has stated that President Roosevelt was a strong advocate of the cause of Zionism:

Except for Woodrow Wilson, no President of the United States has shown greater sympathy for Zionism than Franklin Roosevelt. He was also determined to find some rapid means of helping European Jews who wished to emigrate. It had been his expectation... that a solution might be found by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. When that agency was stalemated by the war, President Roosevelt gave increased thought to Palestine as a haven for immediate resettlement."

President Roosevelt had the more pressing problem of fighting World War II, and this prevented him from really coming to grips with the Palestine problem. He wanted to do nothing that would rock the boat on the stormy sea of Arab-Jewish relations. He tried to put off the eventual settlement of the real problem, and as it turned out this was left to his successor insofar as U.S. participation in the settlement was concerned. He wanted to do nothing which would jeopardize the war effort, nor did he want to do anything which would jeopardize his political position with American Jewry. His was a delaying action which never had to be fought while he was the Commander-in-Chief. He manifested many facets of his personal endowments in his handling of the Palestine...
problem; he displayed himself as optimist, realist, politician, and military strategist.
CHAPTER IV
U.S. POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II

The United States foreign policy during World War II was geared principally to winning the war; first, the war against Germany, and then the war against Japan. Any considerations of foreign policy which could hasten the achievement of these goals received top priority; those considerations which did not hasten the achievement of these goals were relegated to their appropriate positions down the priority list of our foreign policy goals. Such was the case of the U.S. policy as regards the Arab-Jewish conflict in the Middle East. Our policy was pointed to the settlement of the conflict at an appropriate time some time after the termination of World War II. With this in mind, the policy-makers performed a delaying action as applied to those facets of the Arab-Jewish conflict which had no direct bearing on the outcome of the war.

However, there were two principal considerations of the conflict on which the United States did take a positive stand. One of these was the newly-recognized importance of Middle East oil to the Western powers in pursuing the war. The other was the aroused American opinion against the Nazi atrocities committed against the Jews in eastern Europe. The first of these two major considerations acted to the advantage of the Arabs in their conflict with the Jews, while the second major consideration acted to the advantage of the Jews in their conflict with the Arabs. Both had major implications in the development of U.S. policy.
Aside from these two major considerations, others of lesser importance were put aside by U.S. decision-makers until after the war.

The United States, while not dependent upon Middle East oil, nevertheless recognized that it was to her advantage to keep this oil flowing to her allies in Europe in order to keep the war machine going. Hence a close alliance was nurtured between the United States and these Arab governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, which could produce oil that would be used to fire allied boilers generating power which could be used against the common foe. The oil reserves of the Middle East were of such significance that the United States was compelled to take them into consideration in its strategic planning: "The estimated oil reserves of the Middle East (principally Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) amount to nearly 33 billion barrels, some 42 percent of the world total."

As early as 1941 the Arabian American Oil Company, which had acquired considerable interest in oil fields and refineries in Saudi Arabia, proposed to the administration that:

"....the United States government provide Ibn Saud with an annual grant of six million dollars, the amount the King requested from the company, in return for petroleum products at greatly reduced prices, including discount of the King's royalties. 'It has now come to the point where it is impossible for the company to continue the growing burden and responsibility of financing an independent country, particularly under present abnormal conditions,' the company's memorandum to President Roosevelt observed. 'However, the King is desperate. He has told us that unless


necessary financial assistance is immediately forthcoming, he has grave fears for the stability of his country."'

This proposal was turned down by the U.S. government in 1941 on the grounds that the British had primary interest in the area at that time and it was their responsibility to support the Saudi Arabian King to obviate "fears for the stability of his country." In 1941 it was our position that the British government had greater strategic and political interests in the Middle East than did our government, and that the British government should support King Ibn Saud. However, as the United States became enmeshed in the war in which the British had been fighting for more than two years at the time of our entry, our strategic and political interests in the Middle East increased.

Along the lines of the 1941 proposal mentioned above, a similar proposal was made in 1944 which was much more costly than the 1941 proposal but which the United States government initially supported. In support of this new 1944 proposal, Harold L. Ickes, president of the government-owned Petroleum Reserves Corporation, issued an agreement in principle with Aramco for the construction of an oil-transporting pipeline system between the Persian Gulf area and the eastern Mediterranean, such pipeline system to cost 130-165 million dollars. The proposed pipeline would provide a one-billion barrel reserve for the U.S. armed forces.

Reaction in the U.S. oil industry to this proposal for a Middle East pipeline built by American funds was violent, and the opposition which was expressed to the government caused the proposal to be dropped. But the important point to note is that just three years before, the U.S. government was all for staying out of oil in the Middle East because of
Britain's predominant interest in that sphere, and now in 1944 the U.S. government was willing to support oil interests in the Middle East. The government was tending to give financial support to the Arab nations for the petroleum which they could supply in furtherance of the U.S. defense effort.

The rapprochement effected between Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt further exemplified the change in U.S. position in support of Arab nations which had come about during the war years, and it pointed out the newly-discovered strategic importance which the U.S. government accorded to the Middle East. Sumner Welles commented upon this strategic importance as follows:

"The war had emphasized the strategic value of Palestine as a key to the eastern Mediterranean, as a base which affords air and naval supremacy in the areas adjacent to the Suez Canal and in the Red Sea, as by far the safest and cheapest outlet for Arabian oil fields, and as the only possible alternative bastion for Great Britain's naval and military forces when these had to be withdrawn from Egypt."

The United States participation in World War II necessitated certain activity in the Middle East theater which brought our country into more intimate relations with the nations of the area. American supplies were funneled into southern Russia through Iran, which called for American troops in the area to handle the supplies. American troops also were sent to Egypt and Palestine on technical tasks in connection with American equipment which had been sent to the British in these areas. The U.S. Navy escorted merchant ships to the Middle East area for the delivery of war supplies. The Air Force had a string of bases from

3/Sumner Welles, op. cit., p. 28.
northern Africa extending eastward through the Middle East to the Burma-China theater. These military ties with the Middle East were supported by economic measures of assisting most of the Middle Eastern countries which were receptive to aid and which were in favor of inflicting the death blow on the Axis. American responsibilities in the area grew as the war effort progressed, so that by 1944 our responsibilities had progressed to a degree which prompted the President to appoint James Landis as United States economic minister to the Middle East.

The Arabs suffered very little during the war, nor did they receive the effects of Hitlerism which so many other peoples unfortunately received. They did enjoy some good fortune as a result of the activity of foreign troops spending their wages in the Middle East, but they did not amass large amounts of money as a result of the war effort in the Middle East. The Arabs did not contribute much to the war. Very few of them became combatants in active fighting forces. Their lands did not see wartime action with the exception of Egypt. The Arab leader, Hajj Amin el Husaini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, added disgrace to the Arabs in the eyes of the allies by going over to the Germans and giving them what little help he was able to offer. When the war broke out in 1939, the Mufti considered that he was at war with the British. This action by Arab leaders contrasted sharply with the actions taken by the Jews during the war.

A great change was noted by the Zionists as the war progressed.

This change was manifested to them as a shift in power center from Great

Britain to the United States, which they readily recognized and which they supported in Zionist policies. Izzeddin has the following to say in regard to this change which was reflected in Zionist policy:

"During the war, the Zionists transferred the center of their political activity and pressure from Great Britain to the United States. Until then they had looked to America mainly for financial support while Great Britain enforced and protected the Zionist scheme in Palestine. But as the war progressed it became evident that Great Britain would emerge from it greatly weakened. A weakened Britain would not be so free to formulate her own policy but would have to obey the United States, the stronger power whose help Britain needed. The Zionists therefore shifted to the stronger party."

While the persecution of the Jews was being pushed by the Nazis with increasing vigor and hate, the Jews in Palestine responded gloriously to the cause of supporting the United Nations with troops and supplies of war. President Roosevelt noted this contribution to the war effort as recorded by Ben-Gurion as follows:

"The war effort of Jewish Palestine, the quota it has already given in production and man-power, have inspired feelings of pride and respect in American Jewry and won appreciation, too, from American leaders who regard the national home as a stronghold of democracy. In his most recent message to the American Zionist Convention President Roosevelt said: 'When the United Nations are at war, it is fitting to note the substantial contribution from Palestine to the United Nations war effort. This contribution is due greatly to the work of your organization in the past and present.'"

The Zionists through Chaim Weizmann expressed their willingness to support the United Nations. Although they pressed for pure Jewish units, the British thought it wise to open the auxiliary units in the Middle East to volunteers among both Arabs and Jews. It was not until 1944 that


the British acceded to the Jewish requests for a separate Jewish brigade which was formed in time for the latter stages of the Allied campaign in Italy. It is understandable that the Jews responded to the call to arms in World War II with more enthusiasm than did the Arabs. But nevertheless the Arabs did respond to the British call for help, and they desisted from agitating against Britain as mandatory power during the war. It might be said that the war put an end to a rebellion by the Arabs in Palestine, and this only was due to the urgency of the hour.

The Jews in Palestine became aggravated by the conditions of handling immigrants who were fleeing Europe and seeking refuge in Palestine. They were arriving in overcrowded, leaky ships, trying to gain entry into Palestine, but were too frequently sent to Cyprus by the British authorities to wait in immigrant camps. The Jews rebelled against such actions in 1943 which ended the truce that had been in effect since the beginning of the war. Extremist Jewish elements hoped to influence the British authorities to change the immigration laws by resorting to armed attacks on the British. While the American government took notice of such actions, it nevertheless did not express itself one way or the other in regard to the increasing conflicts between the British and the Jews.

However, the American Zionists did help to bring about the passage of a pre-Zionist resolution by the American Zionist Organization. This organization, in a meeting in New York on May 11, 1942 adopted the Biltmore program which was referred to in an earlier chapter. This con-

stituted a formal program which stirred the hearts of Zionists everywhere, and particularly American Zionists since they adopted the program. It was the Biltmore program which fired American Zionists in their attempts to influence American Congressmen and Senators to adopt the resolutions of 1944 introduced by Senators Taft and Wagner which called for free and unrestricted immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. This resolution has been referred to in an earlier chapter.

In regard to the ire which was aroused in American hearts by the calculated program of extermination of Jews devised by Hitler and his associates, it all acted in favor of the Jews, insofar as the achievement of their aims in Palestine was concerned. In effect, what this amounted to was a program of extermination of about six million Jews which acted in behalf of the Zionists in achieving their national home. American sympathy had been kindled during the war years, but American policy reacted cautiously toward implementing the action toward which such sympathy pointed, and as a consequence the official American policy during the war years was to do nothing which would change the situation in Palestine until full consultations had been held with both Jews and Arabs. Our policy was playing both sides of the fence, without doing anything which would offend either side. We were primarily interested in winning the war, and everything else had to await its turn until the goal of winning the war had been first achieved. However, forces were being aligned on both sides, and American oil interests and American Zionist forces were preparing for the eventual day when American policy
could turn toward resolution of the differences which were building up between them.
CHAPTER V
PRESIDENT TRUMAN

World War II left in its wake a debilitated Europe, a strong Soviet Union, and a strong United States. The United States had definitely come of age, and in doing so found itself in a position of having to make decisions which would influence not only the Western Hemisphere but also the Eastern Hemisphere as well. The nation had to abandon its former position of isolation and had to enter upon the wider stage of international relations and politics. The United States concern for the affairs of the Middle East was largely a by-product of the new role which had been cast upon it by the outcome of World War II. Prior to 1945 the Middle East had been regarded as a sphere of influence of European powers, particularly Britain and France, but these two nations were in no position to claim their old leadership in the area after the war ended. The United States had exerted influences in the Middle East through missionaries, educators and business men, but these emissaries had not brought back to the American people a consciousness of the problems associated with the Middle East. Therefore, the sudden change brought by World War II for more active participation in Middle Eastern affairs found America ill prepared for the role which it was now to assume. The Soviet Union was eager to move its sphere of influence to the southward into the nations of the Middle East. The strategic importance of the area in oil reserves, intercontinental communications, and world security gave reasons to the
Soviet Union to become interested, which in turn compelled the United States to assume some of the responsibility for conditions in the Middle East formerly shouldered by European countries.

The United States embarked upon a policy of establishing the security of the nations of the Middle East, a policy of raising these nations far beyond any previous conditions of economic maturity and welfare which they had enjoyed in the past. The Middle Eastern nations had to retain their newly-acquired independence which followed in the wake of the war to guarantee the security of the area as a protection against Soviet extension of their influence. The solution of the Palestine problem was associated with the security of the entire Middle East, and the United States was forced into making policy decisions in regard to Palestine which had great influence upon the outcome of the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs. Many of the decisions which were made in this new era seemed to be made on an “ad hoc” basis with no thorough planning for the long range objectives which may have been sought. In fact, it is inconceivable that long range planning entered into the decisions which were made by the American government in regard to the Palestine conflict.

President Truman found himself in the unenviable position of directing much of the post-war U.S. policy in Palestine, and if the United States government was poorly prepared for the new role which had been forced upon it by the events of history, then the new President was much more poorly prepared for the discharge of his duties in connection with the Arab-Jewish conflict. He had to deal with problems in the Middle
East which were initially geared to support American economic interests in the area, but which soon "came to embrace political objectives, such as keeping a watchful eye on the activities of Communist agents, encouraging the developing and strengthening of local governmental regimes, giving countenance to Zionism aims in Palestine, and latterly, inaugurating aid programs having political overtones." These were some of the problems associated with the Middle East with which President Truman had to deal following the end of World War II.

Harry Truman's early feelings toward the establishment of a Jewish homeland were expressed to his fellow senators while he was serving in the Senate. He records his thoughts in his memoirs:

"I was fully aware of the Arabs' hostility to Jewish settlement in Palestine, but, like many Americans, I was troubled by the plight of the Jewish people in Europe. The Balfour Declaration, promising the Jews the opportunity to reestablish a homeland in Palestine, had always seemed to me to go hand in hand with the noble policies of Woodrow Wilson, especially the principle of self-determination. When I was in the Senate, I had told my colleagues, Senator Wagner of New York and Senator Taft of Ohio, that I would go along on a resolution putting the Senate on record in favor of the speedy achievement of the Jewish homeland."

When the Palestine resolutions were up before the Congress in 1944, the then Senator Truman had the following to say regarding them:

"My sympathy, of course, is with the Jewish people and I am of the opinion that a resolution such as this should be very circumspectly handled until we know just exactly where we are going and...


why. With the difficulties looming up between Russia and Poland, and the Baltic States and Russia, and with Great Britain and Russia, it is absolutely necessary to us in financing the war. I don't want to upset the applecart, although when the right time comes I am willing to help make the fight for a Jewish homeland in Palestine."

In these early statements there was no indication of the strong stand which President Truman was later to take on the Palestine issue. And yet, the feelings which the President developed during the early days of his Presidency were to have a great influence on the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. As soon as the war was over the President declared himself in favor of the persecuted Jews of eastern Europe who were seeking refuge in Palestine. His correspondence with Prime Minister Attlee indicates a strong pro-Zionist point of view which ran counter to the British interest in restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine. The British began to recognize the problems which would ensue if Jews would come to Palestine in large numbers. They recognized that a conflict with the Arabs would extend itself into a strong tempest which the British were of no mind to handle. They had just completed a six-year war in Europe and were of no inclination to pursue a new war in the Middle East. They wanted to demobilize, and a gathering storm over Palestine would not permit the British to go about the peacetime activity of reconstruction at home following a long and hard war.

President Truman became entranced with the thought of getting one hundred thousand Jews into Palestine. In fact, in February, 1947 he admitted that this had been the cornerstone of his Palestine policy since August, 1945. The policy became one of extreme sympathy for a people who had just been released from excruciating torment at the hands of the
racist German dictator who intensely hated Jews. The President wanted to relieve from its misery a people who had been through trying years of concentration camps and persecutions. He wanted to see the Jews have a home which they could call their own. But he failed to foresee the bloody struggle which would ensue from the creation of such a home. He failed to see that someone would have to be replaced, both politically and physically, to make room for the immigrants who would flock into Palestine. He failed to see that a viable government would not be possible which would be operated by Jews and Arabs. He failed to see that the numbers of Jews entering Palestine would cause a tide of immigration which would gain momentum as a chain reaction and which would have to culminate in a violent explosion. He lacked the statesmanship of his predecessor who more equally weighed the Arab point of view with the Jewish point of view. The writer thinks of President Roosevelt straddling a fence between a field of Arabs and a field of Jews, but he thinks of President Truman jumping with both feet on the Jewish side of the fence.

In 1946 the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was formed as mutually agreed upon by the two governments to objectively inquire into the Palestine situation and to make recommendations to the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. The U.S. representation included six members: Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Bartley C. Crum, Dr. James G. McDonald, Dr. Frank Aydelotte, William Phillips, and Frank W. Burton. President Truman briefed the Committee in Washington before it departed for its investigations in Europe and
the Middle East. Bartley Crum reveals the following guidance as given to the committee in its briefing by the President:

"Later we made an official call upon President Truman. He told us that never before in the history of the White House had there been such a tremendous volume of mail as that dealing with the displaced persons. There was no problem which concerned him more deeply, he said; he stressed the obligations of the democratic world to give these people who had wronged no one a chance to rebuild their lives; and he told us that he and the American government would do everything in their power to carry out a solution. He hoped, he said, that we would be able to complete our investigations and present our recommendations within 120 days."

These thoughts expressed by the President to the committee removed any thought of complete objectivity which may have been in the minds of the committee members. At least it gave them reason to question the President's objectivity in regarding the Palestine situation. There was no thought expressed by the President as to any rights which the Arabs might have had in Palestine, and no thought expressed as to possible wrongs which might be committed against the Arabs. It was a thought somewhat less objective than that which was traditionally expressed by President Roosevelt during the war years.

The committee was intended by the two governments to bridge the "gap between the Attlee government's sensitiveness to Arab demands and the Truman administration's sensitiveness to Zionist demands." In its report, the committee recommended that new homes should be found in other countries as well as in Palestine for displaced persons, particu-


larly Jews who were persecuted by the Nazis; that 100,000 certificates be issued for the admission of Jews into Palestine; that an Arab-Jewish state be formed in Palestine which would not be dominated by either people; and in which the rights of Jews, Christians and Moslems should be equally protected; the government in Palestine be administered by a U.N. trusteeship until such time as Arab-Jewish rivalry disappears.

The committee went along with President Truman's desire to admit 100,000 Jews, and it also looked after the interests of the Arabs in any forthcoming government which would be formed in Palestine. It was indeed a compromise between the British and the American positions which prevailed at the time, and the committee therefore recommended a unitary, binational (Arab-Jewish) state, which under the existing circumstances had no prospect of successful realization.

President Truman was subjected to certain pressures by the Zionists during the time immediately prior to the U.N. partition plan of November, 1947. Chaim Weizmann came to the United States and personally approached the President in regard to the partition. The United States delegation to the United Nations had recommended that the southern part of the Negev, including Akaba, should go to the Arabs in the partition plan. This would be desirable from the Arab point of view, but definitely prejudicial to Jewish interests. Weizmann brought this matter to the attention of the President, explaining that if the Jews did not have Akaba they could be cut off by water route from India and the Far East. Weizmann had the foresight to recognize a possible closing of the Suez Canal to a future Jewish state, and he had forebodings concerning the
maritime isolation which might be forced upon the Jews if they did not have access to the Sea of Akaba. President Truman reacted with a characteristic quickness to the points brought up by Weizmann, and sent instructions to the U.S. delegation at the United Nations headquarters, "telling them that he considered the proposal to keep Akaba within the Jewish state a reasonable one, and that they should go forward with it." This decision by the President provided the necessary guidance to the United States representatives at the United Nations headquarters, as well as to representatives of other U.N. nations, to permit them to proceed with a firm recommendation for the partition plan which culminated in the resolution of November 29, 1947. Definite guidance had been given by the President of the United States, thereby breaking a log jam which appeared to exist in regard to partition.

During the months following the partition plan of November, 1947, the American policy as manifested at the United Nations headquarters became wavering, and did not firmly point in the direction of partition. For example, Senator Warren Austin, the American representative in the Security Council, announced the reversal of what had been believed to be American policy when he proposed that implementation of the partition plan be suspended, that a truce be arranged in Palestine and a special session of the general assembly to be called to approve a trusteeship for Palestine which would go into effect when the British mandate ended. Weizmann was in the United States at the time of this announcement in

March, 1946, and he took the case to President Truman, who promptly reversd the announcement made by Warren Austin. The Jews were greatly affronted by the Austin proposal and felt that they had by now outgrown the tutelage of foreign powers and that they were now ready for their independence.

In following the activities of the United Nations during the months immediately preceding the end of the British mandate, the Zionists kept close touch with the policy of the United States in the Middle East. They felt that the United States could make or break a new Jewish state, and they placed much store in the way the President felt about such a new state. Weizmann wrote to the President a little more than a month before the declaration of the new state of Israel, and in the letter he stated that "perhaps the most telling argument against us was that in proclaiming a Jewish state in the face, apparently, of American disapproval, we would be alienating a powerful friend." Again he wrote President Truman on May 13, 1948 and stated that "what is needed now is an end to the seeking of new solutions which invariably have retardd rather than encouraged a final settlement."

President Truman consulted long with his advisers on May 14 and stood up adamantantly against those who would not have him recognize a new Jewish state. He had his mind resolved in the matter, and instructed the delegation at the United Nations headquarters to state that "the United States recognized the Provisional governmen as the de facto authority of the new state of Israel."

2/Ibid., p. 476.
This announcement by Philip Jessup to the United Nations at the instance of President Truman was the culmination of the ends which had been sought by Zionists since the end of World War I. They had achieved their end of gaining official recognition among nations of a free and independent Jewish state, for the United States as the leader of the free world of May 15, 1948 paved the way for recognition by other nations, thereby giving Israel a position of respectability among the family of nations.

Total comments on the establishment of Israel, and associates American politics as a factor in helping the creation of the new state as follows:

"One congressman hit the nail on the head as to why he always took the side of the Jews against the Arabs. 'I have no Arab voters in my state,' he said. There are hardly any Arab voters as a block. They have no organizations, no pressure groups, no lobby, no vote-getting influences. So, when the fate of Palestine came up in the United Nations, everything, except right and justice, was loaded in favor of the Jews. No less an individual than the President of the United States, Harry Truman, took up the case and railroaded the partition of Palestine through."

The action of the President as described above brings out certain inconsistencies in a policy which was geared to the necessity of cultivating the good will of the Arabs on the one hand and of being politically wise in the treatment of the Jews. "The White House, with an eye to internal politics, seemed to ignore the interests of Arab policy, while the Department of State was reputed to favor the Arabs as against

The United States destroyed much of the goodwill which had been
arduously acquired over the years through educational and missionary
work among the Arabs. It has been observed that the United States suc-
ceeded in four years to do what it took Britain thirty years to do, name-
ly to antagonize the Middle East. This is somewhat of an exaggeration of
the true sentiment toward Americans in the Middle East following the crea-
tion of Israel in 1948, but it does indicate a trend which was given vig-
orous support by the recognition action. American prestige among the
Arabs reached a new low, which was in striking contrast to the respect
which was enjoyed by Americans in 1919. The pendulum of Arab respect to-
ward Americans had gone through the full swing between 1919 and 1948,
from high to low where it appeared to be destined to remain for some
time.

The President of the United States really held the fate of Israel
in his hands. He tipped the scales in favor of Israel when he declared
his de facto recognition of the provisional government in Tel Aviv. This
really settled the partition issue. Hockins comments:

"Further confirmation followed within three days with the de
jure recognition of the new nation by the Soviet Union. Other states
presently followed suit in recognizing the new state, although many,
including Great Britain, preferred to await the outcome of the Arab–
Jewish war that already was in progress."

Therefore, it seems that the President played a very decisive role

2/George Lenczewski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University

in the establishment of Israel. Whether his role was a wise one will be left for the historians to decide, but at this juncture of history it appears that his policy lacked soundness and objectivity. His personal policy disregarded the Arab point of view, and it failed to foresee the grave consequences which would follow large Jewish immigration into Palestine. His policy lacked vision. It favored the democratic spirit for the Jews but it foredoomed the Palestine Arabs to a choice of bending to the Jewish will or of leaving Palestine. This latter choice brought about the untenable refugee problem which has yet to be solved. President Truman's precipitousness in his de facto recognition of the new state of Israel only confirmed the policy which he had been advocating since August, 1945.
CHAPTER VI
UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

When President Truman suggested to Prime Minister Attlee in the summer of 1945 that the British government should admit to Palestine 100,000 homeless Jews from Europe, the British government responded by inviting the United States to participate in the joint Anglo-American committee which was mentioned in the last chapter. The ten recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry are described by the Royal Institute of International Affairs as follows:

"The first, declaring that Palestine alone could not meet the needs of the Jewish victims of persecution, was for an international effort to find new homes for all displaced persons. The second was for the immediate authorization, as far as possible in 1946, of 100,000 immigration certificates for Jewish victims of persecution. The third was for a statement of principle that Palestine was to be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state. The fourth and fifth were for the indefinite continuance of British administration under trusteeship, but 'looking towards a form of ultimate self-government.' The sixth and seventh were for the revocation of the immigration and land settlement restrictions of the 1939 White Paper; the eighth and ninth concerned economic development and educational reform; while the tenth was against the use of force and terrorism, and for the resumption by the Jewish Agency of active cooperation with the mandatory."

While President Truman wanted to have the 100,000 certificates issued immediately, the British government wanted the report of the Anglo-American committee to be implemented in its entirety. The Palestine Arabs and the Jews could not be brought into agreement on a settlement and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East, Oxford University Press, London, 1950, p. 294.
British government began to despair of being able to handle the problem with any degree of success. Accordingly, in February, 1947 the British government referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations as the successor to the League of Nations under whose authority Britain was given its mandatory powers.

On April 28, 1947 the General Assembly convened in special session to consider the Palestine question. At this session the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee were authorized to present their views to the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly. The General Assembly authorized the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which was to investigate all questions pertaining to the Palestine situation and to report to the General Assembly at the next regular session.

As a result of the recommendations made by UNSCOP, the General Assembly adopted on November 29, 1947 a Plan of Partition with Economic Union. This plan divided Palestine into the impossible hour-glass configuration with three Jewish areas joined together at two points where the adjacent areas were contiguous. Likewise, the Arab state was divided into three areas which were connected at the same two points which connected the Jewish areas. Jerusalem was internationalized. The Partition Plan was sponsored jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union, and it set off the signal for the Arabs to launch their operations to "drive the Jews into the sea." This was the beginning of the first phase of the United Nations attempts to solve the Palestine problem.
The first phase was the attempt of the United Nations to peaceably divide Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews; the second phase was the United Nations' attempt to localize and terminate the war; the third phase was the United Nations' attempt to reach a final peace settlement, which has not yet been achieved.

The first period commenced with the opening of the United Nations General Assembly on April 28, 1947 and ended when Israel declared its independence on May 15, 1948. During this period the United Nations attempted to resolve the differences between the Arabs and the Jews on a basis of peaceful partitioning of the land between them. The United States in general supported the United Nations attempts to reach a peaceful settlement along these lines, but in retrospect it may now be said that the partition attempts merely supplied kindling to a fire which was already smoldering. During this period the United States and the Soviet Union were getting into more advanced stages of their developing cold war in the spring of 1948, and due to differences between the Big Three a unified position on Palestine became more remote as the end of Britain's mandate approached. In regard to the Partition Plan, Frye comments:

"The United States, which had endorsed the partition proposal without qualification the previous fall, attempted to reverse its position in the spring of 1948 by advocating a temporary trusteeship. This about-face weakened American prestige among the smaller powers, whose support was indispensable for the adoption of such a proposal, and failed to elicit the backing of the United Kingdom, which resisted — both in the Security Council and the second special session of the General Assembly — American suggestions for

even a brief extension of Palestine's tutelary status."

As the fighting proceeded between the Arabs and the Jews, the tide began to turn in favor of the latter, due in large part to the financial assistance which they were receiving from American Jewry. In the heat of the conflict which developed, the opposing sides began to pay less attention to the United Nations, which practically lost all control of the situation in the winter of 1947-48 and the spring of 1948. Meanwhile the Jewish community in Palestine established a Provisional government, and on May 15, 1948 this government announced the independence of the newly-created state of Israel.

The second phase was one in which the United Nations attempted to prevent the war from spreading, and it was marked by a series of cease-fire orders from the United Nations some of which were completely ignored by the belligerents, others of which were heeded after some delay. The United States, during this period developed further differences with the United Kingdom which was supplying arms to some Arab governments. American public opinion reacted violently against the British for their supplying arms to the Arabs, and there was a strong possibility of the United States suspending its loan to Britain in response to public indignation against the British. Count Folke Bernadotte was appointed as U.N. mediator during this period, and following his assassination in September, 1948 he was succeeded by Dr. Ralph Bunche as acting mediator. In this capacity Dr. Bunche was successful in negotiating differences between the Arabs and the Israelis and in the spring of 1949 he brought the opposing sides together to cease hostilities. Four armistice agree-
ments were negotiated by Dr. Bunch between the Israelis and the Arabs, and since peace in some form appeared to be in sight the office of mediator was abolished in August, 1949. This action terminated the second phase of the United Nations participation in the conflict. In general, the United States supported the measures taken by the United Nations during this phase. The phase was characterized by a series of cease-fire orders and by armistice negotiations.

The third phase, which still continues, consists of the attempts which the United Nations has made to bring about a final peace settlement. This phase commenced in the fall of 1948 when the United Nations considered the posthumous report of Count Bernadotte. The resolution of a final peace settlement is intimately tied to the problem of the Arab refugees. This is the crux of the problem as it continues to exist today. With the passage of time the frontiers are becoming more and more permanent, but the problem of the displaced refugees continues.

In November, 1948 the United Nations adopted a resolution to assume responsibility for the care of the displaced Arabs. In consonance with the adoption of this resolution the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) was established. A budget of $32 millions was agreed upon by the specialized relief agency, such budget to be raised by the participating governments, and about 50 percent of the total budget was underwritten by the United States government.

In December, 1948 the General Assembly, acting upon a recommendation made posthumously by Bernadotte, established the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine. The United States, France and Turkey were
designated as members. This new body was to integrate the duties which
had been assigned to the mediator and to the U.N. Truce Commission. The
United States made a poor show on this commission as stated by Frye,
since:

"...neither France nor Turkey could take the lead, yet the
two governments sought in vain for guidance from Washington. This
was due in part to the continued ambivalent attitude toward Palæstine
on the part of the United States government, which alternated
its sympathies and favors between Israel and the Arab states, in-
stead of following an independent and consistent policy. It also
derived from the initial inability of the United States to find a
representative who was willing to devote himself to the commission's
work. Washington appointed four successive representatives in less
than a year. The first resigned before reaching the field; the sec-
ond left immediately after the opening contacts with the parties
were made; the third remained for just a few months; and finally
the United States had to resort to appointing a career diplomat to
assure that there would be no further turnover."

It has been claimed that the United States dominates the United
Nations, making it an instrument of its foreign policy and using it as
it sees fit to further the national interest. As a consequence of such
alleged American domination of the United Nations, the United States
has been accused of taking unilateral action and pulling the United Na-
tions along in its wake. Tugwell alleges that the United States acted
4/ unilaterally in the United Nations in regard to Palestine:

"The United Nations as an institution was, in fact, obscured
from view by the mists of conflict. Not much was heard of it dur-
ing the year [1943] -- except for its action on Palestine, and, in
that, it was shamefully abused. The United States was by now so
used to taking unilateral action that it did not hesitate to act
unilaterally through the United Nations, thus, completing the
degradation of the supposedly international situation."


4/Ref. G. Tugwell, A Chronicle of Jeopardy, 1946-55, University of
The American policy-makers had so many conflicting pressures brought to bear upon them in 1948 that they felt that the decision of Palestine could not be left to the whims of the United Nations. The oil interests, the Zionists, the politicians seeking office in an election year—all these had pressures to bear upon the policy-makers. Then too the conflict in Palestine was in a borderland between East and West where the cold war could break out into a hot war. These considerations gave the American policy-makers reasons to handle the Palestine problem with the utmost care in 1948, in fact they insisted on handling it more or less unilaterally and dragging the United Nations along with them. Their policies were confused and contradictory, and they injected their confusion and contradictions into the United Nations, thereby giving a classic example of how not to treat an international agency, and how not to act in the best national interest of the United States.

In the United Nations assembly in New York the Arabs and the Jews came into direct contact. They both professed obstinacy toward each other, and were unable to work out their differences at the council table. In the negotiations in New York, however, the Jews generally had advantages over the Arabs which they carefully guarded:

"Zionist representatives at the United Nations spoke in a language which was their mother tongue, while the Arabs spoke in English with an accent as foreigners and were not as impressive. To be sure, the Arabs had many valuable cards, but they did not use them. Forty-two percent of the world's oil was in their possession, they occupied a most strategic area on the cross-roads of the world."

The pressures brought to the United Nations by American Zionism

were indeed more significant than whatever pressures American oil interests were able to muster. These pressures were reflected toward the U.S. Executive who was apparently regarded by the Zionists as the real leader of the United Nations. Chaim Weizmann was particularly active in eliciting American support during the months immediately before the termination of the British mandate in Palestine. He recognized that whatever America decided, the United Nations would follow suite, and therefore he eagerly and repeatedly appealed to the United States. On April 9, 1948, just a little more than a month before the mandate was scheduled to terminate, Weizmann wrote to President Truman a letter which included the following: "The choice for our people, Mr. President, is between statehood and extermination. History and Providence have placed this issue in your hands. I am confident that you will decide it in the spirit of the moral law."

This was a frank and open admission by the Zionist leader that the American government, and in particular the American executive, controlled the destiny of the Jewish people. He tacitly admitted that the United Nations did not control the future of the Jews, although it might outwardly appear that such was the case. And yet, it was only six years before that Ben-Gurion sought the aid of the United Nations (the wartime alliance which preceded the formal international organization) and implied that the destiny of Palestine rested in its hands. This was prior to the time when it became evident that the United States would play so strong a hand in the postwar United Nations organization.

In October, 1942 he said:

"We reaffirm our belief that the United Nations owe the Jewish people the continuance and maintenance of this homeland as a relief from inhuman persecution, as a guarantee of their cultural unity and continuity, as an instrument of their legal and international standing in the Court of Nations, as restitution of their national dignity, honor and creative energies. We urge the United Nations to remember in the postwar period the claims of the suffering Jewish people."

The United Nations has made a contribution toward restraining and keeping within certain bounds the Palestine conflict. Its work reached its peak in the second phase described above, and in this as in other phases of its operations the United Nations has had the general support of the United States. The United States government has supported the international organization in its efforts to negotiate a settlement, and it has more than adequately carried its share of the load in supporting the relief agencies under U.N. auspices which were set up to assume some responsibility for the care of the Palestine refugees.

CHAPTER VII

REFUGEE PROBLEMS

Perhaps the most distressing and lingering after effect of the Palestine War is the problem which has been created by the Arab refugees who fled Palestine in 1947, 1948 and 1949. This is a case of the physical displacement of a people from their homes to new and temporary camp areas which have become quasi-permanent over the last decade. The refugees are an economic liability to the nations of the world. They are not wanted in Israel, nor are they wanted in the surrounding Arab states. Meantime, they remain in a state of suspended uncertainty, relying on international charity for subsistence, clothing and shelter, and living under deplorable sub-human conditions. There are two unsettled problems which carry over from the Palestine War: one is the permanent settlement of boundaries, while the other is the adjudication of the refugee problem. Of these two needs which require solution, that dealing with the Arab refugees is by far the most severe and apparently the most enduring.

While the exact number of Arab refugees is unknown, it is estimated that it ranges between 500,000 and 1,000,000. The Israelis place the number at the lower figure. The U.N. report of the secretary general issued on November 4, 1949 placed the number of Arab refugees eligible for relief at 940,000, distributed as follows: Lebanon, 127,800;

Syria, 78,200; Transjordan, 94,000; Arab Palestine, 357,400; Israel, 37,600; Gaza Strip, 245,000.

Of the total number of Arab refugees who found themselves in refugee camps or separated from their farm lands in 1949, it has been estimated by Kirk that:

"...less than one fifth were temporarily self-supporting or otherwise provided for while the remainder were destitute. The refugees naturally demanded to be reinstated in their homes and property, and the political leaders of the Arab world had not the courage to tell them that they were asking for the impossible. It remained a stubbornly maintained Arab political principle (from which it might be physically dangerous for an Arab statesman to express public dissent, whatever he might do privately) that Israel must make full restitution of their homes and lands to this unhappy multitude."

It would seem that a logical place to which the displaced Arabs would look for resettlement would be the neighboring Arab states. But these states were having their own economic problems, and in general they opposed the influx of thousands or even smaller numbers of displaced refugees into their land. Jordan, however, showed some receptivity to having the refugees become integrated within the country.

The Arab governments were sorely perplexed as to what they should do about the Arab refugees. They insisted that the refugees should enjoy the right to return to their homes if they so desired. This was a legalistic attitude which they assumed and which deterred them from making any firm and constructive plans for properly caring for the refugees. There were consequently no long range Arab resettlement programs which were devised by Arab governments. The social and economic structures

of the Arab nations were not sufficiently flexible nor were they adaptable to handling the many thousands of refugees who suddenly appeared in the various nations. Also, each Arab nation treated the refugees somewhat differently from the others. There was no uniform policy for treatment of the refugees among the Arab nations. For example, Jordan granted citizenship to all her refugees. Egypt took the extremely opposite approach and forbade the refugees the right to work. The denial of this right in itself is a cause of trouble and acts against any solution of the problem.

The refugees were given some small solace by the creation in 1949 of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This agency became the official organ of the United Nations which looked after the welfare of the Arab refugees. While its contribution has not been as great to the cause of the refugees as some of its proponents would like, nevertheless it did help in easing in some small way the unfortunate plight of thousands of refugees. The relief agency had built up a contribution of $27 per capita by 1956, based upon some 922,000 refugees who were receiving aid. Of this number, 200,000 were temporarily encamped in the Gaza Strip, 500,000 in Jordan, and the rest in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.

While the refugee population increased over the years, the United States has continued to play a more significant role in the care of the refugees. Twenty-three national governments contributed $23,646,275 directly to Palestine refugees in 1956. Of this amount the United States

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government gave $16,700,000, or 70 percent of the total governmental funds for Arab refugees.

The United Nations adopted a resolution in December, 1948 which provided that "the refugees willing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date." In spite of this resolution the government of Israel took the position that the Arab refugees had not been expelled from their homes but had left voluntarily and consequently Israel felt no responsibility in repatriating them. Israel further contended that she already had 180,000 to 200,000 Arabs within her borders and to repatriate additional thousands of Arab refugees would create a minority problem which would be difficult for the newly-created republic to handle. Israel felt that since the Arab governments had not negotiated peace treaties with Israel, any large repatriation program would constitute an internal security problem for Israel, and she was unwilling to run the risk of inviting such a threat to her national security.

The attitude of the Arab governments in not recognizing Israel's right to legal existence had made any settlement of refugees extremely difficult if not impossible. By denying Israel's legal existence and by continuing a state of economic war with Israel, the Arab governments have inhibited any actions which might lead to resettling the refugees. The Arab governments are inflexible in their attitude, and they are apprehensive of Israel's intentions to expand her borders beyond those which tentatively appeared in 1949 when hostilities ended. Therefore, the aid

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 277}.\]
which might be forthcoming most probably will emanate from the United Nations, particularly from the United States.

The Jews place responsibility for the Arab refugee problem upon the Arabs and give the causes of the problem as the Arab refusal to accept partition, and the invasion of Israel by Arab forces when the British mandate in Palestine ended. The Jews contend that they gave instructions to their armed forces not to move against the Arabs, but that the Arabs instructed their forces to move against the Jews. When action appeared to be imminent the Jews say that they urged the Palestinian Arabs not to move but that the Arab commanders ordered these Arabs to leave the area so that it would be free for combat. The Jews further maintain that the Arab commanders promised that the Palestinian Arabs would be able to return to their homes which they had left after the Jews "had been driven into the sea." Some Arabs also fled from Israel after their leaders had fled leaving confusion and fear for the future in the minds of the Arabs.

The Arabs contend that they left Israel in large numbers to avoid Jewish terrorism which was rampant and which reached a climax in the massacre at Dar Yessin. The resultant fear which built up in the minds of the Arabs gave them good reason to depart. Other reasons which the Arabs give for their departure are the chaotic state of the country, the advice of the British, and the evacuation of border villages for security reasons.

The Arabs and the Jews both claim that they are willing to cooperate

in the settlement of the refugee problem but neither is willing to accept financial responsibility for the settlement measures. As a consequence of this refusal by Israel and the Arab governments, the responsibility has diverted to the Western powers through the agency of the United Nations. The Arabs feel that the policies of the Western powers and the partition plan of the United Nations have caused the refugee problem in addition to the actions of the Jews. For these reasons they insist that the United Nations organization must help to resolve the deplorable refugee conditions. The United Nations organization has admitted some degree of responsibility in the matter, and as a consequence of this admission and also as a humanitarian service to mankind, it has undertaken measures of relief.

The United States has consistently backed the United Nations in whatever relief measures have been undertaken, and it has been the leading supporter of the financial requirements of such support. Our policy has been based primarily upon humanitarian aspects associated with the relief of refugees, and it has not been based upon responsibility for the plight of the refugees. However, the evidence points up the fact that the policy which the United States consistently followed in advocating the establishment of Israel indirectly contributed to the creation of the refugee problem, and on this basis it is contended that the United States is therefore liable for the care of refugees. However, this rationale is not completely justified, for although the United States may have contributed to the creation of the new state of Israel, the departure of the Palestinian Arabs from Israel was a voluntary act
of the Arabs which was not encouraged nor supported by the United States government.

The departure of thousands of Arabs from Israel has made it easier for the Israelis to administer their new government without a significant Arab minority problem. The departure of the Arabs and the immigration of other Jews into Israel have made the remaining Arabs a definite minority, whereas if the Arabs had not fled this minority would not have been so small. In the meantime, the Arabs who have stayed behind have not found their lot to be too untenable. Regarding this, Speiser says:

"These Arabs who stayed in their homes have since discovered that they have nothing to fear from the Israeli administration; they now have representatives in the new Constituent Assembly (Knesset). The fate of the misled refugees, however, must now be the joint concern of Israel, the Arab states, and the nations of the world. They are the miserable victims of the circumstances for which others must bear the primary responsibility."

While the withdrawal of Arabs from Israel left the country with a relatively homogeneous population, nevertheless this been to Israel is offset by moral considerations which are put to a severe test in both the government of Israel and the governments of the Arab states. To date the moral considerations of these governments have been placed in positions which are secondary to the welfare of the individual governments.

The role of the United States in supporting the United Nations efforts to solve the refugee problem has been one of temporarily easing the hardships which have been cast upon the refugees. While this is not the real solution to the problem, nevertheless it is a temporary

one which is a humane measure in the absence of a permanent solution to the refugee problem. Relief is only part of the solution, for the full solution consists of repatriation, resettlement, and relief. Sayegh has stated that the solution of the problem can be found as follows:

"The only just and lasting solution of the refugee problem lies in the direction of repatriation. Repatriation is the absolute right of all the refugees — and must be made a practical possibility for every refugee willing to return home." He further holds that those refugees who choose to stay in the lands of their enforced exiles must be resettled, and that the responsibility for such resettlement rests with the international community to facilitate with the countries concerned the means by which a program could ensue which would accomplish this. Compensation for property which was left behind in Israel should be made by the Israeli government as determined by an international agency.

The general conclusions which may be reached regarding the refugee problem are that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis have shown receptive attitudes to settle the differences which have dug the vast gulf between them in regard to refugees. Neither accepts responsibility for the refugee situation, and as a consequence of this non-acceptance the United Nations has logically been drawn into the issue and has accepted a humanitarian role of effecting temporary relief. It has moved toward more permanent political solutions of repatriation and resettlement, but has in the main been unsuccessful. The United States has generally supported the United Nations in its endeavors to cope with refugee

solutions, especially in humanitarian relief which has been significant. But the entire problem is complex and holds no easy solution. It remains as a malignant cancerous growth from the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, which will probably remain for many years to come, but which may be accepted by future generations of refugee descendants as a way of life which will be ingrained in their heritable through the passage of time.
CHAPTER VIII

BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

A number of bilateral arrangements are in effect between the United States and the states of the Middle East, both the Arab nations and Israel. These bilateral treaties and agreements have a wide range extending from postal matters to mutual defense and security, and technical cooperation. A tabulation of the general areas in which treaties and agreements are in effect is shown in Appendix A. The areas which are of particular interest in our study are listed in a further breakdown for individual countries in Appendix B.

Generally speaking, the areas of administrative cooperation, i.e., customs, postal arrangements, extradition, narcotic drugs, passport visa fees, et cetera, have been in effect for some time with the nations of the Middle East. It is considered that these cooperative efforts lead to general good will among nations, and do not contribute to any external conflicts which may exist between nations, but rather help to bring nations together and to avoid conflicts. It is in areas of defense and technical cooperation that the underdeveloped nation may bring itself up to a level which will permit it to stand up against a potential enemy. In this field of international cooperation, it was not until 1951 that a new wave of bilateral agreements were negotiated between the United States and the nations of the Middle East. Defense agreements were negotiated with Saudi Arabia in 1951, with Egypt and Israel in 1952,
with Lebanon in 1953, and with Iraq in 1954. These bilateral arrangements all followed the 1950 Tripartite Declaration of the United Kingdom, France and the United States in which the three signatories expressed opposition to an arms race in the Middle East, but at the same time recognized that certain levels of armaments were required for internal security. In keeping with the spirit of this declaration, the United States followed a program of providing military assistance and cooperation to the nations of the Middle East so that these nations could maintain their internal security, and also so that they could develop a capability which would lend to the mutual security of the area against outside aggression. Any arms which would be provided as a result of the premises which had been laid down in the Tripartite Declaration were not to be used in an act of aggression against another state.

Referring to the military assistance agreement which was negotiated between the United States and Iraq on May 21, 1954, for example, the United States agreed to provide certain military grant aid to Iraq with the proviso "that the government of Iraq will use such equipment, materials or services as may be provided solely to maintain its internal security and its legitimate self defense, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state." This agreement was to remain in force until one year after notice by either government that it desired to terminate the agreement, otherwise to remain in force until otherwise agreed by the two governments.

The negotiation of this agreement with Iraq was a bold departure

from the policy which the United States had followed during the post-
war years in regard to military assistance in the Arab-Israel zone:

"The policy of caution was premised on the assumption that the
individual states concerned were too preoccupied with their imme-
diate rivalries and disputes seriously to sense any danger from
the Soviet colossus and therefore to make common cause with the
West; and that the movement of American arms into the area would
upset the tricky military equilibrium. Under the 'northern tier'
dispensation the original caution gave way to the bold experiment
of entering with Iraq into....military arrangement (of April 21,
1954)."

While the United States refrained from providing military assis-
tance to these nations prior to 1951, it began to realize at that time
that measures must be taken to provide some degree of resistance to a
Soviet infiltration movement into the area. Before that time the Soviets
were preoccupied in healing their World War II wounds and in consolidat-
ing the satellites which ringed the Soviet Union on its western border.
But in 1951 and thereafter, the United States policy veered in the di-
rection of providing some degree of military aid and assistance to the
nations of the Middle East.

The Dhahran Air Base Agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United
States was concluded on June 18, 1951. This followed work which had com-
menced during World War II when the United States expressed a desire to
the Saudi Arabians to construct an air base at Dhahran to accommodate
large aircraft. The British objected to the United States moving into
this area with an airfield at that time, and construction was delayed
through such objections by the British. However, when these objections
were overcome, construction was commenced in August, 1945 and completed

2/Tbid., p. 346.
in March, 1946. The period for American use of the base ran for three years, which period expired in 1949 and was renewed several times on a six-month basis until 1951. At this time the United States desired to have a more permanent arrangement with the Saudi Arabian government and began to press for the agreement which was approved on June 18, 1951. This agreement provided for construction and operation rights of the United States government at the airfield near Dhahran, with certain military training to be provided by the United States to the Saudi Arabian government through United States missions stationed in the country.

The curtain went up in the area of technical cooperation even more dramatically in 1951, for in that year agreements of technical cooperation were negotiated with Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon. This program of technical cooperation went hand-in-glove with the defense agreements, for technical cooperation was geared to improve conditions inside the nations of the Middle East so that they would be more resistant to Soviet pressures. While technical cooperation existed with these nations prior to 1951, nevertheless in that year the tempo of such cooperation was significantly increased.

U.S. assistance to the Arab states came in some measure from the Export-Import Bank and also from the government Point-Four program. Egypt began to receive assistance from the Export-Import Bank shortly after the war ended, and in 1947 the bank granted the fertilizer and chemical industries of Egypt a loan of $5.6 million, later increased to $7.2 million.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce:

"American assistance to Egypt during the period 1940-51 totalled $19,983,000. Of this, $2,049,000 represented grants of the American Red Cross, technical assistance and UNRRA appropriations, and $17,934,000 represented credits of the Export-Import Bank and surplus property. During the 1951-53 period Egypt's share of the Point-Four appropriations totalled $3,425,000. In 1954, Egypt received $25,000,000 as an outright grant from the United States, supplemented by $3,400,000 in technical assistance."

Ibid.

Iraq likewise received some assistance from the United States, which was meager during the war years, but which built up to sizeable proportions during the early 1950's:

"U.S. assistance to Iraq has been principally in the form of technical assistance, surplus property credits and Point-Four aid. Surplus property credit totalled $889,000 for the period 1940-51. Point-Four assistance for the period 1951-53 totalled $2,065,000. In 1954, U.S. technical assistance amounted to $2,200,000. In June, 1950, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development granted Iraq a loan of $12,800,000."

Jordan, the Arab state which suffered the greatest impact from the Palestine war, became encumbered with the bulk of the Palestine refugees who fled Palestine during the years of active conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. Like other Arab countries mentioned above, Jordan also received Point-Four assistance from the United States. During the period 1951-53 this assistance amounted to $6,456,000, and in 1954 U.S. technical assistance amounted to $2,200,000. Since the largest number of refugees were encamped in Jordan, that country received the largest share of the U.N. funds made available for the relief of such refugees, and of these funds more than half were supplied by the United States.


4/Ibid., p. 52.
While the United States provided economic assistance to the various Arab nations, it also provided funds which played so large a part in the economic build-up of Israel. Israel as a new country had much building to do during the years of active fighting and especially from 1949 on when conditions began to settle down to a quasi-peace time economy. As part of her building program, Israel received $51,000,000 in U.S. investments during the period 1950-52. These investments were comprised mostly of building materials, machinery, textiles and transportation equipment.

The U.S. economic aid provided to the Middle East has taken the form of aid coming from the Export-Import Bank, the Point-Four program, and private investments. The aid has been provided to both the Arabs and the Israelis, with no clear discrimination between the two recipients. It appears that the primary objective of U.S. governmental funds has been to permit the countries to build up their home industries and resources so that they could permit some degree of economic independence in future years. Therefore, such assistance may be considered to fall within the category of friendly aid from a "have" nation to a "have-not" nation. Although a good deal of this help has been provided in the spirit of friendly assistance, nevertheless it is felt that a part of the motive of supplying it stemmed in no small part from the fact that the Soviet Union would have an easier road to traverse in extending its influence into the Middle East if the United States did not provide such assistance. Therefore, security has played an important role in determining the extent to which the United States provided economic and
technical aid to the Middle East nations, both Arab and Israeli.

The magnitude of U.S. governmental aid to the Middle East during the period 1945-52 is summed up by Mattison as follows:

"From 1945 to 1952 approximately $2.5 billion worth of aid had been undertaken by the American government in the Middle East. The Export-Import Bank of Washington provided the major share of this aid....By June 30, 1952, the Export-Import Bank had given loans and authorized credits to....Israel totalling $135 million."

The aid supplied through bilateral arrangements to the nations of the Middle East has not contributed to the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. It has improved conditions in these nations, has brought them closer to the West, and has given them improved military capability, which may be used differently from what was intended by the United States. The hope that such military capability will be used only for internal security may be too lofty and unrealistic, but nevertheless such was the intent of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. In general, it is believed that the bilateral programs to which the United States has subscribed have benefitted the recipient nations of the Middle East, and that they have not aggravated the Arab-Jewish conflict in that area.

CHAPTER IX
ANALYSIS OF U. S. POLICY

Although the United States today has a number of interests in the Middle East, both strategic and economic, nevertheless the foreign policy required to handle such interests has not been firmly established. We have been concerned with the Middle East, and with Palestine in particular, since the end of World War I when President Woodrow Wilson proceeded to the peace conference in Paris. The policy was vacillating then and it has been vacillating through the years. There have been conflicting pressures brought to bear on the Congress and on the administrations which have made for instability in any established foreign policy in this area.

In general, it may be said that the time between 1919 and 1948 can be broken up into three periods: (1) 1919 - 1941; (2) 1941 - 1945; and (3) 1945 - 1948. In reviewing these periods Lenczowski has commented as follows:

"The political approach of the United States up to 1941 could be described as one of indifference, good will, and a conviction that the area was a British preserve where no major American interests were involved. . . . During the period /1941 - 1945/ the United States developed multiple contacts with the Middle East as a result of the war emergency. The conduct of the war in this area ceased to be a purely British affair. . . . In the postwar period this increased interest in the Middle East expanded. Oil, Palestine, and the Soviet menace provided three avenues of approach."

Before we can adequately analyze the U.S. policy in the Middle East

as it pertains to the Arab-Jewish conflict, let us first investigate our principal interests there.

In the years after World War I Americans first became conscious of the vast quantities of oil in the Middle East. British and French interests were in the oil fields of the area first, but Americans won a part interest in the oil fields of Iraq and Kuwait, and then complete control in Bahrain and Kuwait. In World War II it was recognized that the security of Europe was hinged to the oil fields of the Middle East, and possibly the security of the United States was dependent upon these oil fields. If the Middle East were to be in hospitable to the United States then our security would be jeopardized. Our interest became as simple as that. Speiser comments:

"The prodigious drain on our domestic petroleum reserves which was brought about by the Second World War finally made the oil of the Near East an urgent concern of national United States policy. An attempt was made in 1944 to give the country a direct stake in Arabian oil in the form of a government-financed pipe line from the Arabian oil fields to some Mediterranean outlet. For a variety of reasons that attempt failed. Meanwhile, the national need for insuring an adequate future oil supply has been growing progressively more acute."

While the events of World War II brought out the importance of oil in fighting a global conflict, they also pointed out the strategic importance of the Middle East relative to its position, its focal point in world communications, and its potential influence on war or peace. France and Britain operated their Middle Eastern foreign policies for years with these points in mind. Now that they have been effectively removed as influential powers from the Middle Eastern scene, the Soviet

Union has attempted to move into the area to fill the vacuum which has
been created by the departure of the British and the French. In regard
to Russia’s desire to dominate the Middle East, Julius Pratt comments:

"That Soviet Russia, like Czarist Russia before it, aspired
to such domination was no secret. One reason for the Russian break
with Hitler in 1941 had been Stalin’s demand that Hitler agree to
Russian control of the Caucasus and the Dardanelles and recognize
the area stretching from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf as the
center of the aspirations of the Soviet regime."

It is in regard to Soviet aspirations in the Middle East that the
interest of the United States in this area has been particularly arous-
ed. We have been forced, by default of the British and the French, to
move into the area lest we through default allow the Russians to extend
their sphere of influence into this area which is so strategically and
economically important in both peace and war.

While the U.S. policy stemming from interests which we developed
in the Middle East did not form systematically and logically, it began
to take a definite trend when President Roosevelt had his dramatic meet-
ing with Arab leaders in February, 1945 in Egyptian territorial waters.
This meeting indicated that we were forming long range commitments with
the Arab nations, and had more than a passing interest in the oil which
lay beneath Arab soil.

And yet, long before President Roosevelt entered the White House,
the United States declared itself in a position on Palestine by an un-
aminous resolution which was passed by the Congress on June 30, 1922,
and which was signed by President Harding in the following September.

3/Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, Prentice-
This resolution stated:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."

The above resolution leaves no doubt as to the position taken by the U. S. government in regard to Palestine in 1922. The resolution provided an unequivocal endorsement of the Balfour Declaration, and gave support to the cause of Zion.

The United States policy has been naive and not wholly consistent in the matter of independence of nations. While it has generally been our goal to permit nations and peoples to attain independence, we have been inconsistent in trying to achieve this goal. Our policy became somewhat besclouded by the sympathy built up in American minds for the persecuted Jews in Nazi Germany. The British White Paper of 1939, which proposed to bring Jewish immigration into Palestine to an end within a five-year period during which period the limit of Jewish immigrants would be 75,000, did not receive general approval in the United States. By 1939 the Hitler pogroms had aroused the American public to a point whereby we eagerly fostered support of a "home" to which the persecuted Jews of Germany and eastern Europe could migrate. It was a policy to ease the persecution of the Jewish people, but at the same time it would jeopardize the freedom and independence of the Palestine Arabs.

As ships brought thousands of Jewish immigrants to Palestine after
World War II, Britain as mandatory power attempted to control such flow to avert further complications between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. We acted counter to British action at that time, as expressed by President Truman in a letter to Prime Minister Attlee dated August 31, 1945 in which he said:

"It is suggested that the granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria, and for other Jewish refugees who do not wish to remain where they are or who for understandable reasons do not desire to return to their countries of origin."

This was a clear indication that our policy was pointed toward consideration for the Jews, with no indicated consideration for the Arabs. There was no advanced planning to determine what repercussions such large immigration would have among the Arabs in Palestine. We were well along the road to granting independence to the Jews which was in keeping with our general policy to permit nations and peoples to attain independence, but we lacked the foresight to recognize that by directing our policy toward independence of the Jews we would be depriving the Arabs in Palestine of their independence. The culmination of this policy was reached on May 15, 1948 when President Truman gave de facto recognition to the newly-proclaimed independent government of Israel, which was so proclaimed by the provisional government of Israel when the British mandate in Palestine expired at midnight on May 14, 1948.

This action by President Truman manifested the position of the government during the post-war years. It was in keeping with the UNSCOP

(United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) recommendation to bring the British mandate in Palestine to an end and to grant some form of independence under U.N. auspices.

President Truman has been accused of adopting a Zionist policy in his desire to see the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel. However, he contends that his policy was not a Zionist policy but an American policy. In his memoirs he stated:

"My purpose was then and later, to help bring about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour Declaration and the rescue of at least some of the victims of Nazism. I am not committed to any particular formula of statehood in Palestine or to any particular time schedule for its accomplishment. The American policy was designed to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of the promised Jewish homeland and easy access to it for the displaced Jews of Europe."

President Truman held further that the policy was American because it aimed to a peaceful solution, and because it purported to keep promises that had been made to relieve human misery.

A footnote to President Truman's recognition of the new state of Israel points out the precipitate nature of the President's announcement. He took this action without full consultation with the State Department; in fact, the President's position had been reached 24 to 48 hours prior to the announcement of recognition. Secretary of State Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett were informed of the President's decision at a meeting which they attended with Clark Clifford, David K. Niles, and other members of the White House staff. In his Diaries, Secretary of


Defense Forrestal points out that the President had thereby taken the Palestine problem out of the hands of the State Department as firmly as he had taken the defense budget out of the hands of the Defense Department.

James Forrestal was opposed to the partition plan adopted by the United Nations on November 29, 1947. He contended that such a plan would not work, and that:

"...it was against American interest to supply arms to the Jews while we were embargoing arms to the Arabs, or to accept unilateral responsibility for carrying out the U.N. decision, and that the United States should take steps as soon as possible to secure withdrawal of the partition proposal."

Forrestal had taken the oath as the first Secretary of Defense on September 17, 1947, just two months before the United Nations adopted the partition plan. He foresaw danger in supporting such a plan. Palestine became such an issue in the months immediately following his assumption of this new office that the matter entered into the strategic planning of the Department of Defense. Forrestal made a strong attempt to have the Palestine problem removed from politics and handled on a non-partisan basis.

The Defense Department in the spring of 1948 was considering the danger of the Soviet Union stepping into the breach that had been created in Palestine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that even if there were no official fighting by either side, there would nevertheless continue to be actions by extremists on both sides which would not respect the truce. The Joint Chiefs concluded that to meet such a possibility

7/Ibid., p. 360.
of extensive violence by irresponsible groups, a minimum force of 104,000 troops would be required in Palestine. The Joint Chiefs had estimated that in the spring of 1948 the United States could not send more than a division — about 15,000 men — anywhere without partial mobilization, and therefore could not support the requirements in Palestine to preclude excessive violence.

When the Palestine problem was turned over to the United Nations by Britain in 1947 the United States adopted the view that it would do whatever it could to work for a viable solution. As the leading nation of the United Nations organization, the United States supported the recommendations of the Security Council and the General Assembly. A member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations stated:

"The United States delegation supports the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan which provides for partition and immigration....The United States is willing to participate in a U.N. program to assist the parties involved in the establishment of a verifiable political settlement in Palestine."

The United States was willing to cooperate with the U.N. organization to the maximum extent possible. It did support the partition plan which followed within a few weeks after the above statement was made, and in the following March the United States representative in the Security Council proposed that "Palestine be placed under a temporary trusteeship of the Security Council....President Truman in a statement six days later reiterated the trusteeship proposal." It was the posi-


tion of the United States that under a temporary trusteeship arrange-
ment the Arabs and the Jews would have time to reach an agreement re-
garding the future government of Palestine.

But this position was dropped during the weeks prior to the announce-
ment of Israel's independence. For during this crucial time the admin-
istration was subjected to Zionist pressures, and in particular Presi-
dent Truman was directly contacted and influenced by Chaim Weizmann, so
that the tide turned in the direction of de facto recognition. By May
15, 1948 the President had been completely convinced regarding Israel
and he was determined to recognize the new government.

Emotionalism and a perverted appreciation of Jewish nationalism,
with a rather thorough disregard of Arab nationalism, undermined the
American policy so that it favored the Israelis at the costly expense
of the Arabs. Although our policies in Palestine purportedly gave con-
sideration to the Arabs, to their strategic-geographic position, and to
their rich resources, nevertheless such consideration seemed to be lack-
ing from the policy as it existed in May, 1948. The policy had wavered
throughout the years following the end of World War I, but during the
spring of 1948, there was no question but that it had settled down on a
precise course.

Kermit Roosevelt relates the Middle East policy objectives of the
United States to those of Great Britain, and analyzes these objectives
as follows:

10/Kermit Roosevelt, Arabs, Oil, and History, Harper and Brothers, New
York, 1949, p. 248.
"In a broad sense, the objectives of the United States and Great Britain in the Middle East are identical. Both countries want to preserve free access to and passage through the area which, as the hub of three continents, is one important key to world communications and transport. Both countries want to preserve the right of free access to and development of the economic wealth of the area, in which they have secured for themselves an extremely fortunate role. And both countries want to see peace and stability assured to the area. They recognize that if an aggressive power should become dominant there, whether by conquest in time of war or by infiltration and revolution in what is technically a time of peace, the security of a far wider zone would be threatened."

Now that Americans are beginning to gain an appreciation of their interests and objectives in the Middle East, they are manifesting an increasing desire to advance such interests and objectives. This they are doing through a policy which is taking a more fixed shape, and it includes advances through the political, social and economic progress of the people of the area, both Arab and Jewish.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS

The defeat of the Arabs and the victory of the Jews in the conflict over Palestine has been a revelation of the weakness of the Arabs and the strength of the Jews. But in addition it has been a revelation of the external forces which aided in the establishment of Israel: "Much of the blame for Arab defeat must be laid at Arab doors, but not all of it. First, Britain, then the United States, and through its pressure, the United Nations, are mainly responsible for what happened in the Holy Land." While it is not contended that Israel would not have been established without U.S. aid, nevertheless it is contended that U.S. aid made the establishment of the new state easier than it would have been had such aid not been forthcoming. American policy since the end of World War I has favored the Jewish side of the Palestine question, beginning with the declaration by President Wilson that he endorsed the Balfour Declaration because it was in keeping with his policy for the self determination of peoples. This applied to the self determination of the Jews, but it failed to include the self determination of the Arabs in Palestine. This was the start of the one-sided policy which culminated in the recognition of Israel by Harry Truman in 1948.

Zionism in the United States was a strong contributing factor to

1/Khalil Totah, Dynamite in the Middle East, Philosophical Library, New York, 1955, p. 207.
American support of the cause of the Jews. American Zionism had a three-pronged front which was especially effective in gaining aid for the Jews in Palestine. First, the cause of Zionism appealed to American politicians in that if they supported Zionism they could expect political gain at the coming elections. If they failed to support Zionism they could expect political death at the coming elections in some parts of the country. Second, the appeal of Zionism to wealthy segments of American society was very significant, especially the appeal to wealthy Jews. While this appeal definitely existed for this narrow segment of society, it also existed for large numbers of American Jewry who freely contributed to the cause until it hurt. Third, Zionism in America had a detailed organization which left no stone unturned in searching for aid and assistance to the Jewish cause in Palestine.

In the United States, the politicians on the local, state and federal levels have traditionally supported the Jewish cause. The cause has had political sex appeal, while the cause of the Arabs has been barren and devoid of such appeal.

The Arabs lacked an effective lobbying organization in the United States, and could not match the fine organization of the Jews. This resulted in political support of the Jewish cause with a lack of such support of the Arab cause. The Arabs were as disorganized in the American organization as they were in their various and sundry armies which were mobilized against the Jews in the war of 1947–49.

The American oil interests in the Middle East, which had their inception in the 1920’s, developed in the 1930’s, and matured in the 1940’s,
were nurtured by private American business organizations. The system of free enterprise as fostered by our governmental policies permitted private business to exploit the oil interests for the most part without any government interference or intervention. Hence the oil interests of the United States, while they could have served as a sharp cutting edge in influencing American policy in favor of the Arabs, really did not have an effective part in strengthening the Arabs. The Arabs were also remiss in their failure to use their trump card, oil, to their advantage in gaining some American support in their struggle with the Jews.

The Nazi persecution of the Jews before and during World War II proved to be a most fortuitous event for the cause of the Jews, for it consolidated American public opinion to a position of fervid support of the Jewish national home. Therefore, the Nazi racial issue became a rallying point behind which the Jews could march forth knowing that the United States was solidly behind them. The Arabs had no such rallying point.

Perhaps the most significant feature of American contribution to the conflict was the avid support of Zionist aims by President Harry Truman. The President made foreign policy himself, often without benefit of consultation with the State Department, and his policy consequently lacked complete and thorough study which would have predicted some of the dire results of the establishment of the new state of Israel.

The United States found at the end of World War II that she was one of the two remaining great powers of the world. The security of the Near East, and a barrier against Soviet expansion to the southward depended
up on United States influence in the area. Baldeau comments:

"Certainly the most embracing and fundamental objective of the United States is to keep Soviet Russia out of the area....In all instances we are equally resolute in our determination to prevent Russian incursions in the Middle East. Indeed, it was this basic issue that first changed America's historic interest in the Middle East to a positive responsibility."

America's position had so changed on the global scene during World War II that by 1945 there were two currents of thought which contributed to the American attitude on Palestine:

"One, coming chiefly from the State Department and armed forces, stressed the importance to the United States of the Arab world....The other current, coming from American Jews, from the press and from Congress, dwelt on the sufferings of the Jews and their right to a home in Palestine."

Whereas the past interests of the United States extended primarily to private business and philanthropic institutions, by the end of World War II new emphasis had been placed on the strategic location of the Middle East and on the oil resources of the Arab states. Likewise, Zionism had in the past appealed to American interests for sympathy and financial support, by 1945 the United States was called upon for official action and to exert pressure upon Great Britain. Although President Roosevelt was able to put off action for a solution in Palestine during World War II, the American postwar position became one of implied action in Palestine, either by Great Britain or by the United States.

When it became apparent to our decision-makers that Britain was not


receptive to acting in accordance with American thought, then the bur-
den in Palestine rested increasingly upon American shoulders. The res-
ponsibility which the United States took on made it almost mandatory to
take a strong stand on the Palestine issue. Israel represented a greater
responsibility for the United States than it did for our European allies.
It represented our eldest interest in the Middle East, other than sec-
secondary interests which had developed in the last century in missionary
and educational fields. Our foreign policy became interlocked with the
establishment of Israel to a degree which almost made it impossible to
recede to a position of non-recognition.

The strategic importance of the Middle East, as a link and as a
barrier between oceans and between continents, and as an ideal base for
any counterattack by air or by land against Soviet aggression, had in-
fluence in compelling American assertion in the area. The United States
could ill afford to stand off and allow the Soviet Union to extend its
sphere of influence into the area. It felt that it could aid its stra-
tegic position in the area by supporting the Jewish national home, but
it failed to recognize that by so doing it would do irreparable harm to
Arab-U.S. relations. The American policy was, therefore, short sighted
in failing to foresee the full implication of future relations with the
Arabs. It failed to see that the United States, in supporting Israel,
would be looked upon by the Arabs as an imperialistically minded replace-
ment of Britain and France. Arab nationalism ran counter to the concept
of imperialism in the Middle East, and the United States was represen-
tative of such imperialism when it extended its influence into Palestine.
The U.S. policy was especially loathsome to the Arabs when it ran counter to the aims of Arab nationalism.

While our policy was attempting to perform political niceties towards the Jews, it at the same time was attempting to perform economic niceties towards the Arabs. Such was not enough to gain the support of Arab nations at a time when they had become emotionally aroused over the Palestine problem. We believed that a program of economic and social development among the Arab nations would permit us to by-pass the political questions which needed answering. We had answered the political question in Palestine but left it unanswered in the Arab nations, and thereby allowed conditions to develop which made the ground fertile for Soviet planting.

Our policy failed to foresee the consequences of the displacement of Palestinian Arabs by Jews. It failed to foresee that there would be a refugee problem of no small proportion, which would carry over into future years after active hostilities had ceased, and which would serve as a deterrent to eventual peace in the Middle East.

The United States, as the Western leader in the United Nations, led the way among the members of the U.N. organization towards partition in Palestine and recognition of the new state of Israel. Once the United States had committed itself in this direction, it became almost impossible to divorce itself from the United Nations action. Hence our policy became uniquely tied to support of Israel, partly because of the United Nations action in the case, and partly because of the voluntary action which our policy-makers chose to take. Snyder and Furniss comment...
as follows:

"The U.S. government has played an important part in the creation of the new state of Israel from the Palestine mandate. It was the first government to recognize the de facto existence of Israel as a politically independent entity, at the same time, it must be acknowledged that the economic difficulties of Israel would be much greater if not completely insurmountable were it not for the financial assistance given by millions of private Americans. The interest which public officials have manifested in this private venture is evidence of recognition that without this vital financial support the national stake which the United States has in the preservation of Israel, as part of a general policy looking toward a new foundation of Near Eastern stability, would be seriously in jeopardy."

The United States has contributed significantly to the creation of a problem in the Middle East which may not be solved for many years. We thought that we were solving a problem by creating a Jewish national home, but this merely created a greater problem. The Jews waited several thousands years for a propitious time to return to Palestine. They never forget that they had been evicted from "their" land. The Arabs also are not likely to forget that they too have been evicted from "their" land. The problem will be an enduring one. American policy-makers during the years 1919-1948 will be responsible to history for the significant contribution which they made to the monstrous problem which exists today and which will exist for many years between the Jews and the Arabs.

### APPENDIX A

#### BILATERAL TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS IN EFFECT

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APPENDIX E

DEFENSE, MUTUAL SECURITY AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS IN EFFECT

Egypt:

DEFENSE

Agreement relating to mutual defense assistance; entered into force April 29, 1952. 7 UST 841; TIAS 3564.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION

General agreement for technical cooperation; entered into force August 15, 1951. 3 UST 2960; TIAS 2479.

Agreement for a cooperative program for public works development. Entered into force March 12, 1953. 4 UST 1746; TIAS 2842.

Agreement for a cooperative program of community development and rural rehabilitation in the provinces of Buhaira and Fayoum. Entered into force March 19, 1953. 4 UST 1761; TIAS 2843.

Agricultural, forestry, and fisheries joint committee program agreement. Entered into force May 21, 1953. 4 UST 1716; TIAS 2840.

Agreement for a cooperative program in the field of education. Entered into force June 18, 1953. 4 UST 1733; TIAS 2841.


2/UST - U.S. treaties and other international agreements (volumes published in calendar years beginning January 1, 1950).

3/TIAS - Treaties and Other International Act Series, Department of State.
Agreement for a cooperative program in the field of public health. Entered into force June 18, 1953. 4 UST 1928; TIAS 2852.

Agreement relating to development assistance. Entered into force November 6, 1954. 5 UST 2985; TIAS 3156.

**Iraq:**

**DEFENSE**

Military assistance agreement. Entered into force April 21, 1954. 5 UST 2496; TIAS 3108.

Agreement relating to the disposition of military equipment and materials furnished pursuant to the agreement of April 21, 1954. Entered into force July 25, 1955. 6 UST 2227; TIAS 3289.

Agreement confirming understanding of the government of Iraq that paragraphs 1 and 4 of the military assistance agreement apply to equipment or material transferred by the United States to Iraq, on a reimbursable basis. Entered into force December 3, 1955. 6 UST 6014; TIAS 3447.

**TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

General agreement for technical cooperation. Entered into force June 2, 1951. 3 UST 541; TIAS 2413; 151 UNTS 179.

Agreement for a cooperative program of community welfare. Entered into force March 2, 1955. 6 UST 701; TIAS 3209.

Agreement for a program of economic development in Iraq. Entered into force November 15, 1952. 3 UST 5882; TIAS 2757.

**Israel:**

\[\text{UNTTS} - \text{United Nations Treaty Series.}\]
DEFENSE

Agreement relating to mutual defense assistance. Entered into force July 23, 1952. 3 UST 4985; TIAS 2575.

MUTUAL SECURITY

Agreement relating to assurances and economic assistance as authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Entered into force December 7, 1951. 3 UST 2874; TIAS 2462.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION

General agreement for technical cooperation. Entered into force February 26, 1951. 3 UST 379; TIAS 2401; UNTS 57.

Joint Fund program agreement. Entered into force May 9, 1952. 3 UST 4258; TIAS 2570.

Agreement relating to economic assistance. Entered into force May 9, 1952. 3 UST 4174; TIAS 2561.

Jordan:

TECHNICAL COOPERATION

General agreement for technical cooperation. Entered into force February 27, 1951. 2 UST 812; TIAS 2233; 141 UNTS 55.

Jordan program agreement. Entered into force February 12, 1952. 3 UST 3747; TIAS 2505.

Agreement relating to special economic assistance. Entered into force May 13, 1954. 5 UST 1772; TIAS 3051.

Lebanon:

DEFENSE

Agreement relating to reimbursable military aid. Entered into
TECHNICAL COOPERATION

General agreement for technical cooperation. Entered into force December 13, 1951. 3 UST 2843; TIAS 2457; 160 UNTS 49.

Agreement relating to the assurances required under the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Entered into force January 5, 1952. 3 UST 4751; TIAS 2639.

Technical cooperation program agreement. Entered into force June 26, 1952. 3 UST 4860; TIAS 2659.

SAUDI ARABIA:

DEFENSE

Agreement relating to the extending of procurement assistance to Saudi Arabia for the transfer of military supplies and equipment. Entered into force June 18, 1951. 2 UST 1460; TIAS 2289; 141 UNTS 67.

Agreement relating to the use of facilities and services at Dhahran airfield by the transient and supporting aircraft of the United States. Entered into force June 18, 1951. 2 UST 1466; TIAS 2290.

Agreement providing for a military assistance advisory group. Entered into force June 27, 1953. 4 UST 1482; TIAS 2812.
### APPENDIX C

ANNUAL OIL PRODUCTION, 1919-1948 (MILLION TONS)

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