The theory of self realization with reference to its implications for religious education

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Thesis

THE THEORY OF SELF REALIZATION WITH REFERENCE
TO ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Submitted by

Signe Marie Seaberg
(A.B., Elmira, 1927)

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Outline.

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Chapter I

Present-Day Tendencies.

"Change! That one word well describes the present age. This is not only an age of rapid change; it is also an age of clash of ideas on a large scale. The improvement in means of communication has largely contributed to make it so."1 Change necessarily involves conflict, and conflict involves adjustment. It is not strange, then, that we have so many indications of adjustments as we have in at present in world courts, in international conferences, in industrial conferences, in denominational and interdenominational conventions, and so on. All of these conferences are advocating plans and programs which are believed will make the adjustments possible. This thesis will endeavor to deal with one of these programs, a program advocated by groups of individuals rather than by conventions and conferences.

Before such a program can be adequately treated it will be necessary to consider the ailment for which it is considered a remedy. "This is an industrial, realistic, mechanistic age. Necessity has been in the saddle. Nature and society, life and mind, have all been conceived as subject to iron laws. Perhaps just because of the reign of determinism, it is time for freedom and creation again to emerge. Whatever the reason may be, on every side we see

the insurgence of full life. The world is in ferment. New forms of life are coming to birth in the realms of intellect and art, politics and industry; the revolt of ideas youth is as sympathetic of the times as it is of youth." (1) It is with this revolt of ideas as it affects the spiritual world that this thesis endeavors to deal.

There are many who believe with Herman that "for the average person of today the term 'spiritual' is equivalent to unpractical, if not illusory." Spirituality and a deeply emotionally trained nature are the antithesis of sophistication which is the aim of most moderns.

There are perhaps several reasons for this tendency. One is the great material advance that has been made during the past fifty years. It is an advancement marked by constantly new and manifold means for enlarging the range of desires, and for satisfying physical comforts. This idea is expressed by Youtz when he says, "Our modern world betrays the widespread unemployment of the spiritual resources of life and the noticeable absence of life's higher values. The social sciences are giving us visions of a new material world, but they are not giving us enthusiasm for the new men required to make this new world. Through the riches, the new comforts, the new education looks the face of complacent vulgarity." (2) P. 18.

(1) Bightman, E. S. - Religious Values, page 211.
(2) Herman, J. - Creative Prayer, page 18.
The physical sciences also contribute to make this condition prevalent. From the laboratories of our chemists and physicists comes everything that is apparently needed to make life happy. We have an attitude that nothing is too difficult to be expected from science, and consequently we look for ever new and complex discoveries from this direction. It is perhaps for this reason that many people consider science to be responsible for this one-sided development. With George Gissing they say, "I hate and fear science because of my conviction that, for long to come, if not forever, it will be remorseless enemy of mankind. I see it destroying all simplicity and gentleness of life, all beauty of the world; I see it destroying barbarism under the mask of civilization; I see it darkening men's minds and hardening their hearts; I see it bringing a time of vast conflicts, which will pale into insignificance 'the thousand wars of old', and, as likely as not, will whelm all the laborious advance of mankind in blood-drenched chaos."

Perhaps the progress of science would not have appeared so devastating had it not been interrupted by a blood-drenched and devastating war. "Ten millions killed, thirty millions of non-combatants slain, a decreased birth rate of forty millions more, the world impoverished by debt, demoralized by falsehood and propaganda, degraded by

(1) Youtz, H. A. - The Supremacy of the Spiritual, page 211.
(2) Otto, H. C. - Things and Ideals, page 179.
hatred!" It is plain to see that "men cannot pass through an experience like that and quietly return to their former circle of ideas. They cannot go back to the philosophies and creeds and ideals out of which these experiences wrenched them. And peace, which was to set us all on the way toward the social and political millennium, plunged us instead into spiritual bankruptcy and into general despair of moral purpose. Many people, especially of the younger generation, suddenly freed from the restraint of customary inhibitions, locked arms with jazz and are gayly frolicking down the green valley of life." Thus the balance of mind which would perhaps have guided the advance of science into cosmos instead of chaos was overthrown.

Materialism has colored our philosophy which alone can evaluate the descriptive knowledge produced by science. Mechanism explains, or appears to explain, our world of phenomena. Our atmosphere is permeated by a "kind of materialistic Epicureanism which, under the leadership of science, dominates the modern world." It is consistent that if matter is conceived of as the chief and highest value in our world our philosophy will necessarily be materialistic.

This same attitude is carried over into the field

(1) Eddy, S.-Facing the Crises, page 178.
(2) Otto, M.C.-Things and Ideals, page 159.
(3) ibid page 161.
of psychology where we find materialistic psychology stressed as much as materialistic philosophy in the field of philosophy. We have no soul. Our mind is nothing but sub-vocal mutterings. Our consciousness is nothing but a series of such mutterings.

It is interesting to note, however, that in these two fields of human inquiry there are those who refuse to accept this mechanistic interpretation of life, determinism, materialism. With neo-realism personalism is coming into vogue; with behaviorism, self-psychology. The philosophical recognition that is given to Professor MacDougal and to Miss Calkins would indicate that this is so. In his article "What Is a Person" Professor Marlatt brings out this same thought. These facts indicate that not all the world considers reality a "blind dance of atoms". This changing conception of philosophy and psychology is seen in the interpretation of the theory of evolution. There was a time when it was thought that the theory of evolution reduced everything in the universe to mechanistic arrangement of molecules: "that all the so-called creative novelties, richer individualities and forms of association that have emerged in the evolutionary process are nothing but the blindly shifting, spatial configurations of mass particules." Within the past twenty-five years, however, much of this attitude has been changed. Men began to ask, "Is it possible to believe that chaos

(1) Leighton, J.A. - Man and the Cosmos, page 266.
has become a cosmos without the effective cooperation of a directive intelligence or will? or that a material universe devoid of mind has produced a mind capable of judging mechanism?" Leighton answers this question when he says, "Cosmos could hardly have come from apparent chaos, unless there was order or definite tendency at work in the chaos. That which makes the evolutionary process more than a bare succession of atoms and jarring events is the continuity of its ever increasing movement towards personality.----It is a possibility so remote and unimaginitive that we may intelligently reject it, to suppose that the entire evolution process, with its eventuation in spiritual culture is simply and solely the result of a blind and contingent rearrangement of mass particles in space." Some of the greatest minds of our day have written books called "Purposive Evolution," "Emergent Evolution," "Creative Evolution," "The Road of Evolution" all of which, with Leighton, recognize the conscious direction of mind in the process.

Thus far we have tried to show that our present-day tendencies are colored to a large extent by the rapid development of materialism which has taken place in the last fifty years. It has tinged the general outlook of our practical life as well as that of our mental life. And yet, in spite of this we sense an undercurrent of anti-materialism in our world of thinking. To many people this indicates a

means by which many of our difficulties can be settled.

In religion we find somewhat the same tendency—that of break-up of old beliefs and groping around for new ones that will be adequate. Though the present strife between modernism and fundamentalism takes on anything but a spiritual aspect, it does nevertheless show signs of health. It shows us that we must first clarify our thinking about religion if that religion is to be vital for us. It is making us realize with William James that what most men need is "that their faiths should be broken up and ventilated, that the northwest wind of science should get into them and blow their sickliness and barbarism away."

But this is not all that is needed. We have succeeded to a large extent in making our religion intellectually dignified. In our effort to do this we have swung to the extreme of making religion solely intellectual. Pure intellectualism has no drive, no urge that will make it a vital element for our everyday living. Few people only are able to direct their lives according to purely intellectual propositions. These purely intellectual propositions in place of religion constitute one means by which we "are declaring our spiritual bankruptcy, since they do not give us a centralizing concept of life's meaning. Nor will we

(1) Quoted by Otto, "C. - Things are Ideals," page 23.
find this unless we can fashion new spiritual values out of the materials at hand, out of the impulses and aspirations, the emotional and mental powers of contemporary human beings, mankind must suffer the consequences of our spiritual collapse.  

From this consideration it would seem that we think that all religion is eventuating in intellectualism. Instead we have a condition in which two opposite views are present at once. That is, there are those who are not able for various reasons to conceive of religion as purely intellectual; instead many of these tend to conceive of it as solely emotional. These are they who stress loyalty in religion to the exclusion of oper-inglesness. The extreme forms of this phase make religion a matter purely of feeling, regarding critical reasoning in religion as sacrilegious.

The result of these tendencies is easy to foresee. Numerous solutions have been offered and it is not surprising to note that those which have succeeded are those which most nearly correspond to the spirit of these tendencies. That is why New Thought, Science, and mindred movements become so popular. There is one suggested solution which is very interesting in that it combines both extremes of religious tendencies without itself being essentially religious. This solution is humanism, the social-gospel

idea. Mauschenbusch practically defines it when he says that "the social movement is the most important ethical and spiritual movement in the modern world, and the social gospel is the response of the Christian consciousness to it." In this same connection he says that the social gospel "concentrates religious interest on the great ethical problems of social life." That is, our modern world is finding its chief practical religious interest is ethics, but here also lies a danger. If we consider religion solely as "interest in the great ethical problems of social life" we are leaving out what has led to the greatest religious experience we have record of, namely, an individual's relationship to his God. It is this individual consciousness of God that has motivated men so often to right conduct. If the individual gospel has failed to make men feel their responsibility for right living, is it probable that the social gospel will be able to "bring men under repentence for their collective sins" where responsibilities can so much more easily be shifted. This, of course, does not imply that the social point of view is not necessary. It is necessary, but, as Professor Brightman says, it should not be the exclusive point of view.

(2) Ibid, page 16.
This condition in the realm of religion indicates that the spiritual attributes of human nature are not snuffed out; but rather that they are merely trying to find logical channels through which to function. And from this consideration of the various points of view in religious thought it appears that some sort of synthesis is possible, a synthesis in which ideals can function to keep life steady. It is such a set of ideals that MacCunn speaks of when he says, "Living unity follows a firm grasp of the End. For it is only when this is achieved that the lesser ends of life begin to be seen in their true light as varied, yet kindred ways of working towards one supreme event.---It is not too much to claim that a theory of the ideal can, in addition, render high service by quickening the moral life. For each in his own way will have been led to see the vision, and as he muses in his solitary hours, the fire will burn within him."(1)

Thus it is seen that the synthesis is believed by many to be found in a system of ethics in which ideals function to produce character; a system in which there is a definite place for religion that will synthesise our present stress on sound intelligence as the basis for religion with the recognized need for the intelligent utilization of emotional resources, and with the present interest in

the great ethical problems of social life. In the words of the Ethical Society this need is stated thus: "The world today needs a constructive, progressive religion, a religion that can satisfy both the mind and the heart, and that will strengthen the will to do one's duty in every relation of life, in short, an ethical religion." Many ethical theories have been suggested as the means for giving this synthesis. Many have believed that conduct could be boiled down to a single set of complexes. This needs to be modified and perhaps as it is examined. Most people, however, still find themselves turning again to the major theories of conduct, those worked out by our greatest philosophers. It is our aim to consider the most important of these theories and to show their relation to spiritual development. Our consideration will endeavor to find which of these ethical theories best answer the present need for a synthesis of present tendencies in the realm of religion.

(1) McCunn, J. *The Making of Character*, page 214
II

Kantian and Hedonistic Theories

From the time man first began to live in a community or to have any sort of society, no matter how simple, he has developed a code of ethics. Conn says, "Under the influence of developing society the ethical instincts have universally produced codes of morals which guide the lives of members of society in such a way as to make harmony a possibility. While these codes of morals have necessarily a few points of likeness among all men, in most respects they are as widely divergent as are the social conditions under which they have developed." It is this fact that has caused so much ethical theorizing. So also most of us have considered the objectivity of goodness, whether we have designated it in those terms or not. Is goodness or morality purely a subjective and individual matter, or is there a real goodness which persists irrespective of our individual moral judgments? The subjectivists hold that goodness is a matter wholly relative to the private feelings of the individual; or considered from a social point of view it is wholly dependent on changing industrial, political, and cultural conditions. In other words, there is nothing universal, permanent, or genuinely objective about goodness.

(1) Conn, H.W.: "Social Heredity and Social Evolution" p. 281
The objectivists, on the other hand, hold that goodness is such that all minds that think reasonably ought to acknowledge it, that it is valid not only for human individuals and groups of individuals, but for the universe; that it constitutes a part of that reality on which man depends and in harmony with which he lives; that there is, as Matthew Arnold says, "an order of the universe which it is our happiness to go along with and unhappiness to go counter to."

The side we take on this question will largely determine the trend and the content of our code of conduct.

I have tried to synthesize what seems to be valid in these two views and have come to the following conclusions. No matter what goodness is, our ideas about it are always our own ideas; they exist in our own minds, and are in this sense necessarily subjective. Our standards evolve. Yet this does not necessarily prove that there is no objective value. It is evident that the crude undeveloped life of a primitive people must inevitably express itself in a very imperfect system of morality. But these imperfect moral standards, as they appear in the course of history, are justified since higher ones would neither be comprehended nor in any way answer existing needs. The code of morality, we may then say, changes as the conception of human welfare changes. It must be recognized as progressive. If this
be true, as it inevitably seems to be, strict universality, even were it compatible with facts, could be purchased only at the price of a static moral life. But this very fact, that social standards are progressive, indicates that there is some ideal towards which we are going.

Closely connected with this ideal of progress in morals lies one of the most serious arguments raised by the subjectivists against the objectivists. This argument holds that if goodness be objective then it is already real, and the universe already perfect. What then is the incentive to progress? Thus, say the subjectivists, "Objectivity of goodness arrives at self-contradiction." This answers the objectivist, holds only if man considers that existing reality is forever statically perfect. But perhaps "the very objectivity of goodness may consist in the fact that the universe is indefinitely perfectible. If this be so, and the perfectibility of the universe inexhaustible, then the objectivity of goodness is the greatest possible stimulus to progress." (2)

Two or three other arguments raised by the objectivists seem to be logically consistent with experience as we know it. One of these arguments is that "the presence

* See - Patrick G.R.W. "Introduction to Philosophy" p.415
(1) Bightman E.S. : "Introduction to Philosophy, p.155
(2) Ibid ,page 156
of erroneous value judgments in experience no more destroys the objectivity of goodness or value than the presence of illusions and hallucinations destroys the objectivity of the world of nature.\textsuperscript{(1)} Conscience may give us a clue to the nature of goodness. The content of conscience gives us evidence of some objective good. The task of interpreting goodness, I think we will all agree, is difficult. Perceptions of value cannot be measured mathematically. But does this difficulty necessarily mean that goodness is complete subjectivity, which, carried to its logical conclusions, would result in social chaos? "Which", says Dr. Brightman, "is more coherent: to assert that there are objective standards, although our knowledge of them is only approximate; or to assert that really there are no objective standards, that all value is relative to desire and that nothing is really better than anything else."

"Whole systems of philosophy have grown up in attempt to answer this question. These philosophies are extremely divergent both as to time and as to concept. From centuries before Christ to the present is the span in years. From the "eat drink and be merry", "take-the-cash-and-let-the-credit-go" \textsuperscript{(3)} ideas to the stern vigor and rigor of strict obedience to duty is the span in content. But, in all this

\begin{enumerate}
\item Brightman, W.S.: "Introduction to Philosophy", p. 157
\item ibid- page 160
\item Omar Khayyam XIII
\end{enumerate}
divergence, we can trace three main trends of thought, namely, Hedonism, Self-Realization, and Formalism. It is my estimation that of these theories Self-Realization takes into account more facts of experience, gives a more coherent explanation of experiences than do the other two. In order to show this it will be necessary to consider briefly all three. We will begin this consideration with Kant's Formalism which does not have the centuries of historical development that the other two systems of ethics have.

Kant's Formalism, then, is the theory that all morality consists in rightness of intention. Good will is the only ultimate and intrinsic good. It gives no account to ends for its emphasis falls on obedience to duty. "Nothing", says Kant, "can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will." (1) "All moral requirements, to state Kant's Formalism is other terms, are 'categorical' imperatives; they express absolute and unconditional commands," (2) that everyone do his duty as he sees it. This shows us that Kant believed in the objectivity of moral values in that he considered that all men possess an inescapable moral sense of ought. This sense of ought has certain implications.

(1) Abbot - "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals", p. 9
(2) Everett, W.G. : "Moral Values", page 41
There is no place for the feeling "I ought" unless there is "I can"; and "I can" implies some degree of choice within possibilities.

Inseparable from the formulation of Kant's theory are his maxims and postulates, which we will briefly summarize here. His maxims are, "So act as to will the maxims of thy conduct to be a universal law. And, so act as to treat humanity in thine own person or in another as an end, not as a means only." In order to make these effective one must believe in freedom, for it is not reasonable to say that man ought to do something unless he can do it. One must also believe in immortality, for one must have an endless life to continue an endless quest. And finally, one must believe in God as a guarantee for this quest. These necessary assumptions constitute Kant's "Postulates of Practical Reason."

A summary of Kant's theory indicates that:
1. No act is moral unless it is the act of good will.
2. If a person acts from good intentions and then if unforeseen consequences occur, he is not to be blamed for these unforeseen consequences.
3. There is much truth, I believe, in his Maxims and Postulates.
4. There is something inspiring to noble living in his "I ought" and "I can". It makes us feel that
"It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul."  (1)

5. With Otto, I feel, that there is "something noble and sublime about this theory. "Who do we detest more than the man who does right for what he thinks to get out of it?" (2) Are not the heroes and heroines of history those who did right for right's sake, not counting the cost?

With these merits in Kant's theory there are also certain defects.

1. Good intentions alone are not enough: an intelligent consideration of consequences is also necessary. The mother might have the best of intentions when she fed her baby French-fried potatoes; yet we could hardly say she was doing right. Duty in actual life is always embodied in conduct, and conduct means consequences. If then, we act without regard to consequences, our actions will nevertheless have consequences.

2. Inclination is divorced too much from duty. A person cannot be said to act immorally because he receives a sense of enjoyment from what he does. This finds expression in the well-known epigram of Schiller, in which he asks

(1) William Henley: "Invictus"
(2) Otto, M.C.: "Things and Ideals, page 67"
how one can morally do a service for a friend whom affection makes it a pleasure to serve.

'The friends whom I love I gladly would serve,
But to this inclination incites one;
and so I am forced from virtue to swerve since my act, through affection,
delights me.'

From Kant's standpoint the only answer can be:

'The friends whom thou lov'st, thou must first seek to scorn,
Into no other way can I guide thee;
'Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform
The act to which duty would lead thee.'

3. The term "Good Will" is ambiguous. To be implies to be good for something. Thus it fails to give us content.

We now pass to the second of the major theories, namely, Hedonism.

Hedonism is of two kinds, psychological and ethical. The latter is by far the more popular con-

(1) Everett, J.G.- Moral Values, page 42.
ception. Psychological hedonism holds that pleasure or happiness is the only possible motive of action. Altruism it believes is only self-deception. It becomes deterministic in that it says that we must seek happiness. Unless there were some merits to the theory it probably would not be held by so many people. While most of my evaluation will deal with its defects, I must nevertheless recognize certain merits. Certainly there is something appealing in this "take the cash and let the credit go idea; and yet I am reminded of the saying, "Don't pursue pleasure, you'll scare her to death." That is, most of our actions are prompted by objects in view, pleasure coming from pursuing these objects. Thus whenever one does a good deed it always brings a sense of satisfaction. But we must distinguish between satisfaction that comes after as a by-product and satisfaction as a motive. If one seeks satisfaction as a motive one overlooks the significance of consciousness in forming ideals of what ought to please us. And, lastly, if psychological hedonism were true it would destroy all moral distinctions in that it puts everything on a greater or lesser basis. It leaves no room for qualitative differences.

Ethical hedonism we said was the more popular view. It holds that pleasure and happiness are the only

(1) Oma Khatyam XIII.
(2) See Patrick, G.T., Introduction to Philosophy, page 411.
values we ought to strive for. Instead of saying that we must seek happiness, it says we ought to seek it. Ethical hedonism has a long history of development. It will be necessary to give a sketchy survey of this development. We find that we can trace it back to the Greeks who recognized Aristippus as the first representative of hedonism. "To Aristippus it seemed that the pleasure of the individual was the only end for which things were ultimately useful, and accordingly he pronounced it to be the sole good, and the sole end of life." Aristippus and his followers were called Cyrenaics. The emphasis of their teaching fell upon "a simple and by no means lofty doctrine of personal gratification as the guiding principle of conduct." In other words, pleasure is the only good and differs only on a quantitative basis. Consequently there will be more pleasures of the body than of the mind. Present ones are always to be chosen in preference to future. The Cyrenaics are the typical "eat, drink, and be merry" advocates. They identify virtue with pleasure. Yet it is curious to note that one of their central ideas is that of prudence. One must exercise prudence, they say, to possess pleasure, but not to be possessed by it.

This doctrine of pleasure was perfected and given its final form by Epicurus and his followers. In this

(1) Everett, G. Moral Values, page 60.
(2) Ibid, page 61.
completed form it had an unbroken existence of six centuries or more. Epicurus gave it a loftier conception. He held the greatest pleasure comes from the simplest, most natural joys. He himself lived a most simple and natural life, one that many of his followers did not wish to take as an example. He further recognized qualitative difference in pleasures by holding that pleasures of the mind are greater those of the body, and that present pain is to be endured for a more lasting pleasure. "Epicurus sought according to his light to see life steadily and see it whole." He and his followers put great stress on freedom of the body from pain and of the soul from trouble. There is just one thing that makes it impossible to be made a world scheme and that is the stress it makes on the idea that one must free himself utterly from social responsibility, even from marriage. Free love and companionate marriage, we find, is by no means a new idea, but goes back for centuries for its origin.

From Epicurus and his followers it was centuries before hedonism was further developed. Its modern development began with Hobbes in the seventeenth century. Hobbes' most significant contribution was his emphasis upon universal, as distinguished from individual, happiness. This led to his formation of the automic social contract theory in which

(1) ibid. page 62.
he held that men entered into social contracts to obtain a higher degree of self-interest. For Hobbes man remained fundamentally selfish and institutions were only a means for the satisfaction of egoistic impulses.

Bentham was not interested in the individual's relation to society. He was interested primarily in the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Because of the egoistic nature of human motives, Bentham "appeals to external sanctions to bring due pressure to bear upon the individual in performance of those acts which make for general happiness." These are the things that motivate our conduct rather than urge our conscience. Bentham is also noted for his "Hedonist Calculus" a mechanical scheme by which he measured pleasure quantitatively. According to this calculus pleasures differ only in degree of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, and purity.

The last and probably the greatest hedonist we will consider is John Stuart Mill. It is to him that "we owe the most forceful statement of universal as distinguished from egoistic hedonism. Mill insists that 'the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.'" According to Mill, then, the test of what is

(1) ibid., page 66.
(2) ibid., page 67.
good is the general utility of our acts in the increasing of the total happiness of mankind. He refuted Hobbes' theory of the autonomic conception of society by asserting the organic nature of society. And he opposed Bentham in that he held that pleasure can be measured qualitatively; that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. This implies that in the conscientious urge of mankind we find certain internal sanctions that operate just as surely as do the external sanctions of Bentham.

Though there have been more hedonistic theorists than those mentioned the others have but slightly modified or added to the theories we have discussed. They have not added enough to make the theory different from the one we have just outlined. To evaluate this many sided theory is necessarily difficult. We have tried to take into account the various aspects of the theory when we list what seem to us to be the merits of hedonism:

1. All men desire happiness. In an ideal society everyone would have it.
2. If the universe is good and just, goodness must in some way be related to permanent happiness.
3. Hedonism, if not carried to its ultimate conclusion, refutes pessimism.
4. Its appeal to the motives of pleasure and
pall is useful in education.

5. Altruistic hedonism advocates virtuous living and has had much concrete influence.

With these very potent merits I shall also list what seems to me to be the defects of this system:

1. It is one-sided in that it makes agreeable feeling the only test of goodness. It thus recognizes only one desire and value as legitimate. But we must not forget that life is complex, with many desires and values.

2. It is ambiguous in that it must introduce a standard or ideal as to what kind of pleasures are worthy. But as soon as it does this it becomes inconsistent.

3. It cannot escape from the hedonistic paradox: if pleasure is sought as an end, the end so often escapes. Happiness, in actual life, is more likely to come if some other motive is made the end sought. In the working out of the theory this thwarting often turns to a pessimistic outlook. Thus egoistic hedonism is likely to be self-destructive, and altruistic hedonism introduces the ideal of service which is not consistently hedonistic.
4. Hedonism rests upon feeling which is always a passing impression.

5. Hedonism fails to see that so often pleasure is the "accompaniment of value rather than the essence of it."

6. On a purely hedonistic basis there is always a tendency for pleasure to be conceived as physical.

In summing up this discussion it may be said that with the hedonists we agree that everybody should be happy. But we have still to ask, "What are the things that will make us happy?"

(1) Harkness, G.-Lecture on Theoretical Ethics, Elmira College, 1927.
The last theory for our discussion is what is called the theory of perfectionism, more modernly, self-realization. As in the case of hedonism, so in that of perfectionism, we find its first expression with the Greeks. From that time down to the present new and various forms of this theory have developed. This diversity makes both a definition and an historical sketch difficult. As complete a consideration of its definition as I have seen anywhere is found in Dr. Brightman's book, "Religious Values", where he says, "Perfectionism holds that moral value consists, not in pleasurable feelings only, nor in rational will only, but in the development of personality as a harmonious whole, in accordance with the most complete and highest ideal of personality that our minds can form. The good life, then, is the whole life—the life that aims at the richest and fullest development of its capacities. The basis of moral obligation is self-respect. Altruism is a duty because no self can develop alone, and no self can respect itself without respecting others." (1)

In other words, perfectionism is the full harmonious development of the self. It makes the criterion of goodness the kind of person one is. Self-realization is like formalism

(1) Brightman, E.S.-Religious Values, page 270.
in that it stresses duty and conscience. But it goes beyond formalism in that it says that duty must promote an end, that end the best possible person.

Like hedonism, self-realization did not start out as a complete system. It, too, has had centuries of development. This development began with the Cynics, though this group cannot be said to be typical of self-realization since it is one sided in that it has no regard for other values save that of virtue. For them only reason and virtue can be said to give value to life. The most typical representative of this group is Diogenes, "looking for an honest man." His attitude is also typical; for the Cynics became rather embittered in that they could not find the truly virtuous person. They became distrustful of other peoples' virtue. This is the connotation that has popularly come down to us and that makes it difficult for us to realize that they belong to the perfectionistic group.

For some reason we seem to associate the Cynics and the Stoics. And in many respects they are similar. But before Stoicism arose Plato had developed his system of philosophy which dealt largely with ethics; and his ethics constitutes a system of philosophy in itself. Plato had "regarded 'the good' as the highest principle of both knowledge and being; it is the end for which everything exists; it is the sun whose warmth vivifies, whose light
illuminates the whole universe." This highest principle considers the supreme goal of life to be a unified personality in which the lower elements are subordinated to the higher for the perfection of the whole. The highest good must therefore be judged by reason rather than by pleasure. Plato considered mental life to be made up of three divisions: first, the reason, occupying the place of honor and authority; below it the active, or spiritual part (sometimes called the irrational); and lower still the appetitive element. Upon this division depends the Platonic scheme of virtues, in that for each division there is a corresponding virtue so that we might diagram the individual's program as follows:

"The Soul 1. Rational (which rules 2 and 3), leads to virtue and wisdom.
   Justice (the all-embracing virtue) 2. Irrational will--leads to the virtue courage.
   appetites--leads to the virtue temperance."(2)

From this well-worked out view of the individual's life it was easy for Plato to pass to parallel divisions for the state. To Plato the state is the individual "writ large." The corresponding division of the program of this individual "writ large" he worked out somewhat as follows: Justice constitutes the virtue that gives the state its harmonious wholeness. The rational division of the individual is paralleled in the state by its philosophers, the logical

(1) Everett, G. - Moral Values, page 50.
(2) Harkness, G. - Lecture on Theoretical Ethics, Elmira College, 1927.
rulers of the state. The active division has a division in its warriors, who defend the state with courage. And the appetitive division is paralleled in the state by the artisans, who support the state with temperance and industry. This conception of the state makes for an undemocratic type of government. We do not, however, need to stress too strongly this phase of Plato's doctrine since his system of ethics deals primarily with the conception of the individual for whom "philosophical living is also a dying, a constant negation of all those tendencies of our bodily life which hinder the realization of truth, beauty, and goodness." This realization of truth, beauty, and goodness is, in Plato's estimation, what constitutes true happiness.

These more or less poetic and imaginative utterances of Plato are strikingly in contrast with Aristotle's prosaic and scientific interpretation of Greek morals which constitute the first really systematic treatise of morals. His treatise, as it is found in the "Nicomachean Ethics", begins with the assertion that all human activities imply some end, or good. This end or highest good is the perfection of function, doing the thing one is best fitted for. Thus, "man's true excellence, or virtue, consists in the proper functioning of the soul." This soul is conceived of as expressing itself in two spheres: the higher or reflective, intellectual; and

(1) Everett, W.G. - Moral Values, page 82.
(2) Ibid. page 84.
the lower, the impulsive and appetitive. This psychological division leads to a corresponding classification of virtues: the intellectual virtues of prudence, wisdom, and insight; and the practical virtues of temperance, courage, and liberality. All virtue involves choice guided by reason. The moral virtues represent Aristotle's well-known "golden mean". For example, modesty is the mean between the two extremes, bashfulness and brazenness. This "mean that constitutes virtue, however, is no absolute or mathematical mean, the same for all individuals, but in strictly relative to persons and circumstances."(1) "That is why it is so hard to be virtuous,---. Anybody can get angry - that is an easy matter - and anybody can give and spend money; but to give it to the right persons, to give the right amount of it at the right time and for the right cause and in the right way, this is not what anybody can do, nor is it easy. That is the reason why it is so rare and laudable and noble to do well."(2)

Another essentially Greek characterization that we find in Aristotle's treatise is what is known as the theory of Eudaemonism, a sort of combination in spirit of happiness and goodness. To live happily and beautifully is the slogan for such an attitude. Like Plato, Aristotle believed that happiness accompanies normal, healthful activity; the more perfect this activity the greater the happiness. This

(1) ibid. page 85.
(2) Nicomachean Ethics, Book II page 55.
points to the doctrine that moral conduct implies a disposition rather than a series of single acts.

In Aristotle, then, we have perhaps the most complete typically Greek system of perfectionism. It is true that the Stoics developed their system after Aristotle's death, but their system is not as typically Greek as are Plato's and Aristotle's. The system of the Stoics has, however, appealed to the imaginations of all people. "In its lofty devotion to a purpose, to a supreme end, in its exaltation of man's spirit above the material conditions of life, as also in its social and humanitarian teaching, it has had, in spite of its rigor and its paradoxes, a message for earnest minds in every age. In the thought of the Stoics the whole scheme of things was unified and harmonized by all-pervading law, a reason immanent in the material world." (1) From this it will be seen that the ethics of the Stoics appears as a "pronounced rationalism," as Everett calls it. In essence it is the opposite extreme from Epicureanism. Its goal is the virtuous wise man. To be virtuous one must curb the emotions; crush them completely were even better. This necessity of conquering outward forces through sheer force of will has a tang of Kant's formalism. The force of the will is expressed by fearlessness; fearlessness to do right, to suffer consequences, to face death. Yet despite all this rigor, our duty is to cultivate serenity

and cheerfulness under all circumstances.

The Stoics, we said, considered reason as the underlying principle of the universe. It is also the social principle that binds men together in a universal brotherhood. Everyone is considered to possess a degree of reasoning ability, and this common possession is what constitutes the Brotherhood of Man. And yet, in spite of this great principle of brotherhood, the Stoics believed men to be either wholly good or wholly bad. It was their lack of sympathy that kept Stoicism from being grasped by the masses.

The message of the Stoics, to quote again from Everett, "is, in brief, to yield ourselves unreservedly to the laws of nature and of society; to subdue our passing moods and clamant passions to the rule of reason; to expect no reward in life except the joy of right living; to scorn the meanness of selfish ends, to shun evil thoughts as well as evil desires and deeds; to be slow to take offense and quick to forgive; to cultivate dignity and sweetness; to be cheerful even in pain and sorrow; and to fear nothing in God's universe except cowardice and disloyalty to duty."(1)

With the formulation of the Stoic system of ethics the classical contribution to ethical theories ended. But before we pass to the modern self-realization theories we will stop a moment to consider the contributions to the

history of the theory by one who did not designate himself as an ethical theorist, namely, Jesus. In his teachings we do not find any well-worked out system of theories. Rather do we find principles, the most complete body of which is found in the Sermon on the Mount. It is therefore impossible to give a systematized consideration of his teachings; rather, we will have to list some of his main principles and consider their classification in the light of our present discussion. "Whatever else the record discloses it is clear that the young Nazarene who taught for a brief but glorious season in Palestine regarded it as his mission to arouse mankind to the possibility of a more abundant life on earth."[1](1)

This shows that the major emphasis of Jesus' ethical teaching consistently falls upon the exaltation of personality, on the dignity and worth of human life. "When he said, 'Where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also' (Matt. 6:31) he distinctly recognized that a man's scale of values is the determining factor in his life......Always the supreme value for which he lived and taught and sacrificed was personality."[2](2) The things that give life its more abundance are such things as altruism (it is more blessed to give than to receive); the motivation of virtue by inner sanctions, rejecting the idea of the oft-used quotation, "God does not pay cash for goodness every Saturday night"; inner spirit

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(2) Poadick, H.K.-Anthood of the Master, page 188, 189.
placed above outward codes (as is seen in his discussion on Sabbath observances); emphasis on the fundamental virtues of sincerity, courage, justice, etc; love as more powerful than force ("Love your enemies"). "The insistent emphasis of his discussion life was that the true riches were not money but character, and that no sacrifice could be too great, if it is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the spirit and to achieve the subordination of all secondary things." These things are consistent with self-realization; in fact, they are much the same as the items in the well-worked out systems of ethics we have already considered. Furthermore, Jesus clearly rejected hedonism as a goal of life. Consider, "If any man will follow me...." Another fact that is brought out in connection with Jesus' teaching is the relation of love to the theory of self-realization. In Jesus' life it takes the form of respect for personality and of cooperation with persons in the realization of the highest values implicit in their personalities.

From the Greek period to the present time of Kant there is no philosopher quite so interesting as Spinoza. His ethical system constitutes a distinctive and important place among the typical forms of the perfectionistic theory. Like Plato, Spinoza's ethical concepts are inter-

(1) Fosdick, H.B.-Manhood of the Master, page 140.
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of the perfectionistic theory. Like Plato, Spinoza's
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osophy. Durant gives an interesting characterization of
this philosophy when he says, "Order is against the grain
of our minds; we prefer to follow the straggling lines
of fantasy, and to weave our philosophy precariously out
of our dreams. But Spinoza had but one compelling desire-
to reduce the intolerable chaos of the world to unity and
order. He had the northern hunger for truth rather than
the southern lust for beauty; the artist in him was purely
an architect, building a system of thought to perfect
symmetry and form."(1) This system of thought is monistic.
"One substance, nature or God, is the only ultimate real-
ity. All particular things are its expressions or modes."(2)
And man most fully manifests God in the exercise of his
reason. "The Greatest Good", he said, "is the knowledge
of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature."(3)
This whole nature is conceived of as active and passive.
We have both of these aspects in our conscious life. In
the active phase we exercise reason. In the passive we

(1) Durant W. Story of Philosophy. page 186.
(2) Everett, E.C. Moral Values. page 92.
(3) Durant W. Story of Philosophy. page 203.
are swayed by our passions and emotions. An ethical person, in Spinoza's estimation, is one whose active life rules his passive nature; "we are free only when we know." When our passions and emotions rule us we have only a partial, fragmentary view of things. Rather we must see things "sub specie aeternitatis," and to do this implies the control of emotions through reflection. "To be great then is not to be placed above humanity, ruling others, but to stand above the partialties and fulfills of uninformed desire, and to rule one's self."(1)

Spinoza's ethics concludes with a profoundly religious concept, namely, "Amor intellectualis dei." This makes all knowledge sacred, as the manifestations of God. And people will be truly free in accordance with the degree of this sacred achievement they possess. "We need not wonder," says Everett, "that the victory is rarely won, for, in the closing words of his 'Ethics' 'all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.' But that such a triumph was no idle dream for Spinoza, his own life, if we may trust his biographers, affords instructive evidence."(2)

From the time of Spinoza so many idealistic systems have developed that it would take chapters to out-

(1) Ibid. page 203.
(2) Everett, C. Moral Values. page 96.
line their variations. However, Hegel, who is considered one of the greatest of modern idealists, so greatly influenced contemporary ethical thought that he merits consideration here. "Hegel's interest lay primarily in ethical institutions, in the concrete and objective expressions of morality, rather than in the intricate problems of moral psychology. Profoundly influenced by Greek ideals, he saw in the slow unfolding of social institutions, and particularly of the state, the even larger realizations of human freedom and perfection. The necessary condition of a worthy life, in his view, was that one should be the citizen of a state with good laws." The prerequisite to this is the desire to follow implicitly the dictates of the inner voice, "to do right though the heavens fall."

Progress, to Hegel, is the upward movement of this human will becoming crystallized in institutions. These institutions, he believed, point to an objective social order. It follows, then, that man's purpose and will are a part of the Infinite purpose and will. As man progresses through his conscience and institutions he gradually turns the human will into that of the universal. Thus through the objective moral order the individual will can find concrete union and harmony with the universal will. A further consideration shows us that Hegel believed that

(1) Ibid. page 97.
"Life is not made for happiness but for achievement." (1)

But this achievement is never complete; the ideal is never fully attained. "Morality, as such can never complete itself or attain its goal. From morality and all secular relations the spirit of man struggles upward towards the infinite idea. Only in conscious relation with the Absolute Personality does it find its fullest realization. Ethics completes itself in Religion." (2) This is made clearer when we consider that the task of ethics is to "unify character and conduct," while that of religion is to "reach and feel that Absolute in which all opposites are resolved into unity. . . . God is the system of relationships in which all things move and have their being and their significance." (3)

This brief sketch of Hegel's ethical theory is, perhaps, sufficient to suggest the importance of his influence. He had many followers, many of them well known in the field of philosophy. One who seems to have most consistently followed his line of ethical thought is T. H. Green. For Green the true self is a rational and social self. The divine element in us is the rational, social element. As this comes to the fore we are coming nearer this universal will or goal. Our institutions

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(1) Durant, W. Story of Philosophy. page 323.
(2) Everett, J. O. Moral Values. page 100.
(3) Durant, W. Story of Philosophy. page 322, 323.
constitute a stage toward attaining this goal. This leads us to what Green considers to be the chief business of life, namely, to reproduce God in human existence. And this objective ideal requires immortality for its completion.

Although the ethical theorists we have mentioned are by no means all that represent their systems of ethics, they are the representative ones showing the gradual growth and development of each ethical theory. They show the many degrees of variations in each of the theories, their general background and developing tendencies. These sketches show how highly complex and intricate is our ethical inheritance. They point to never-ending avenues of new directions and new sources of ethical thought. Our present task, however, demands that we now examine this perfectionistic theory, that we test it by all the facts we know; that we consistently try to consider whether the total rational self is to be preferred to the partial, fragmentary self of appetite and sensuous desire.
In the preceding chapter we have tried to show that man inevitably builds a code of conduct, and that this code usually falls under the category of the three major ones we have discussed. This uniformity is probably due to the fact that the raw material of moral conduct is the impulsive life of man, and the impulsive life of man is, in general, after the same pattern. The morality that results depends, not upon the presence of impulses, however, but upon the outcome of the conflict between these impulses. "Human life may thus be said to present a "howling mob of desires, each struggling to get breathing-room for the ideal to which it clings." The result is that choice is made inevitable; and this, the necessity of choosing, lays the foundation of the moral life." In choosing which set of desires should have the emphasis we automatically set up a goal for achievement. "The moral life," to quote from Otto, "demands devotion to a specific goal of life and discipline in the interest of that goal." It is with this specific goal that we have been concerned in our discussion. We have tried to show the merits and the defects of obedience to duty and to happiness as this goal. Our present concern is to consider whether the theory that holds "that the end of moral effort

(2) ibid. page 121.
is the enlargement of life, the full and harmonious development of human capacities is adequate for this goal of achievement."

Its adequacy we have tried to measure by considering what in our estimation are its merits and defects. Its merits we have summed up somewhat as follows:

Self-realization of perfectionism emphasizes the worth of values to human life. It is a most fundamental principle that says that persons are the highest value. It consistently follows that respect for persons, treating every individual as an end, not as a means, is its corner-stone when it comes to the practical application of the theory. Hedonism may practice this, or it may not. If it seeks happiness for the greatest number it will; if not, an individual may be considered as a means to one's own happiness. But if one is to believe in the full and harmonious development of human capacities for one's self the only consistent conclusion is this same opportunity for development of other selves, unless one is a solipsist. Perhaps some will believe that this is not a merit, but in my opinion it is the basis for any sort of a social order. Its violation sooner or later will lead to social chaos.

Self-realization, further, emphasizes the value of reason in subduing our passions and emotions. At present the tendency is to "obey that impulse". However, if everyone were to follow each

of his own conflicting impulses we can see that there would soon be nothing left but discord.

Self-realization gives an objective goal toward which to work by obligating oneself to become the finest person one can. It also has a metaphysical implication in that this goal is conceived of as the will of God.

We have suggested before that self-realization is compatible with altruism. If one believes in self-development one must believe that others have this same opportunity, which will lead one to consider other persons as ends rather than as means. It is likely to lead to the best kind of altruism, that of giving others opportunity for their development, rather than giving them merely superficial consideration. "Though every act", says Otto, "is self-expressive, it is not necessarily self-centered. Acts have a source and a termination. The source is always the acting self," If the acting self which constitutes the source is to be of any service to another acting self, it must be a developed self, one that can render service. It is this consideration that Prof. Marlatt has in mind when he says that "respect for self is the basis for any true altruism or love for others. That is, it is a splendid thing to develop a self worth giving. That alone gives worth to the gift." It is the same idea that Lowell had in mind when he said, "The gift without the giver is bare." If then, the self to be developed is to know the dignity and joy that comes from every source it must

1. Otto M.C. "Things and Ideals" page 123.
21 Marlatt E. Lecture on Metaphysics B.U. 1928
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1. Otto M.C. "Things and Ideals" page 123.
21 Marlatt E. Lecture on Metaphysics B.U. 1928
know it as it comes from service as well as from other sources. But in order to do this it must be a self that can render true service, a self with rendering.

Self-realization links up easily with religion. Jesus, we have seen, gave principles upon which perfectionistic theories have been built. It seems that there can be no mistake about this when He says, "I came that ye might have life, and that more abundantly," Other perfectionistic theorists have considered religion as the consistent conclusion to ethics. If one's philosophy allows one to believe in a personal God religion becomes the more closely related to self-realization.

This theory further harmonizes with progress. Development, the key-word in self-realization, is itself almost synonymous with progress. The self cannot be fully and harmoniously developed unless it represents the very highest and finest we know. Thus, we have an advancing goal, one that is never really fully achieved since we are continually discovering new horizons of possibility. This may, to some, be disheartening. Its antithesis, however, a static goal, would be even more disheartening. There would not be that urge that drives us forever on, continually seeking new worlds to conquer and new tasks to accomplish.

And, finally, self-realization, in our estimation, combines the merits of formalism and of hedonism but goes further than either of these. It holds with formalism that obedience to duty and conscience is important. But it goes beyond formalism in that it holds
that duty must promote an end. Likewise, self-realization includes happiness in the good as its goal. The correlation of happiness and perfection has been denied on the ground that happiness is so largely dependent on natural forces. This is true. But so also is perfection largely dependent on native endowment. Perfection, however, does hold that happiness is the accompaniment of value rather than the essence of it. "In conclusion," says Everett, "candor requires the frank acknowledgement that neither happiness nor perfection, nor both combined, can yield, for our practical conduct, a guidance which does not leave much to be desired. They are at best principles which only serve to point the way one is to go; they do not free one from perplexity where ways converge and cross."

In these conflicts perfectionism holds that the ideal of goodness is a more worthy goal than the ideal of happiness.

It is just here, some hold, that one finds the greatest objection to the theory of self-realization. Goodness is so vague and indefinite a goal or ideal that it gives one no guidance or standard whatever of what is best, This is true I admit. But there is no theory that can give us an absolute sure guide. "Ideals vary to such an extent," says Prof. Markness, "that there is no clear-cut, final guide to conduct. The goal set up by self-realization is no more subjective, we believe, than is the one set up by hedonism. Rather we believe that it gives us a more direct standard in that happiness is so largely a matter of feeling while self-realization rests upon an all-around development of personality."

1. Everett W. G. Moral Values. 177
2. Markness G. Lecture on Theoretical Ethics. Elmira College. 1927
It is in this sense that self-realization gives guidance in that those values are guides which are consistent with the scheme of values inherent in the theory. Furthermore, past experience and reason should function as guides for these values.

Another objection raised against the theory of self-realization is that it fails to show why we should develop ourselves. This, however, is begging the question since it asserts that either obedience to duty or happiness is the only thing intrinsically desirable. We can answer this objection by the same sort of assertion, namely, that personality is the only intrinsic value.

In another connection we have tried to show that the objection that this theory tends to selfishness is not valid unless the self we are trying to develop is a narrow, selfish self, which is in itself inconsistent with the theory. The general welfare must certainly include social welfare, and so must seek to develop the welfare of every individual. Furthermore, the pursuit of happiness is more apt to make people selfish than is the pursuit of ideals, of nobility of character.

Self-realization has also been objected to because it gives an unattainable goal. We have tried to show before that getting to a state of self-satisfaction means lethargy. True, self-realization does give a "flying goal" but this in itself is a challenging endeavor. Moreover it is possible to obtain satisfaction from achieving approximate goals, and this satisfaction acts usually as a spur to still further achievement.
We have tried to take all the facts into account in our test of the theory of self-realization as affording the goal of conduct. It is our conclusion that this theory affords a more comprehensive view of things than do either of the other two theories; it includes the merits of both of those theories but goes beyond them. And the objections raised against the theory can either be answered or are of such a nature that we do not have sufficient data with which to prove them. The objections of this latter class are, however, equally applicable to the other theories of ethics. I admit that it does not give the satisfaction that we should like, but we hold that it takes more facts of experience into account than do the other theories; and thus it "seems more in accord with our present habits of thought to place the emphasis upon function and activity than upon the pleasure which accompanies them. We get a very good working plan for practical ethics and for social effort if we say that the highest good is a social order in which every person shall have a fair field for his activities and the fullest opportunity for self-realization without infringing upon the right of every other person, not excluding those of generations to come, to the same privileges." At first glance this presents a discouraging task; but upon further consideration we see "that the epic of

(1) Patrick, C. T. - Introduction to Philosophy, page 423.
personality is as yet only imperfectly unfolded constitutes not a ground for pessimism but for hope. The process is a slow and severe one, but when man casts his reflective gaze backwards he may well be cheered and nerved to his tasks by the long vista of progress behind him.\(^{(1)}\)

An objection has been raised which holds that under this theory it is as consistent for a bad self to realize itself as it is for a good self to do so. But if one considers that a self is "an organic whole of reality, consisting of a psycho-physical complex, organized about an active, rational, dynamic center and capable of carrying and creating and perpetuating values,"\(^{(2)}\) this objection does not hold. According to the definition we have just given character is the sum-total of values which eventuate when ideals are realized. Thus, a bad self seeks to realize disvalues and so cannot be said to be self-realizing.

Survey of Values.

In the present chapter, as well as in the preceding one, we have often referred to values that constitute what we mean by the good. In fact, the perfectionistic theory tends to become vague and meaningless unless we know rather definitely what the values are that go to make up a personality that is harmoniously developed. "By value or worth or good is meant whatever is desired, of enjoyed,

(1) Leighton, J. A. *Man and the Cosmos*.
(2) Marlatt, E.- Lecture on metaphysics, B.U. 1928.
or prized, or approved, or preferred; the normative appreciations of a supreme mind that ought to be known and appreciated by human minds.\(^{(n)}\) For purposes of evaluation these values have been classified as follows:

1. Economic values.
2. Bodily values.
3. Values of recreation.
4. Values of association.
5. Character values.
6. Aesthetic values.
7. Intellectual values.
8. Religious values.

"No finality or exclusive validity is claimed for this table, but it is believed that it offers a serviceable classification of the good of human life. These are not, it is to be observed, separate and independent values; rather are they aspects under which it is convenient, for purposes of evaluation, to survey the unity of life." So interdependent are they, and so deeply do they interpenetrate the organic structure of experience that no absolute scale is possible. Furthermore, as individuals we tend to emphasize the importance of a few values, to specialize.

Some critics will hold that morality is to be con-

(1) \textit{Brighman, E.S.} - \textit{Introduction to Philosophy}, page 126.
(2) \textit{Everett, C.} - \textit{Moral Values}, page 183.
cerned only with the character values. But a wider conception of morality holds that it is to be concerned with all the interests of life as these are found to further or hinder the fulfillment of its purposes. Thus it is seen that these values represent only parts, not the whole, of life since man is not merely any one of these, but all and more. So conflicts arise between the various values of which man's welfare consists. Hence the necessity of an evaluation, an appraisement and organization of all competing values. To do this fulfills the definition of ethics as it is usually given: "the science of values for the conduct of life as a whole." (1)

Ethics does not claim to specialize in the fields represented by each of these values. It accepts the laws found by those who do specialize in each field. Thus, ethics is not concerned with special problems of economic theory. But "ethics is vitally concerned that economic activities shall be ordered in the true interests of humanity" since each of these interests profoundly affects the worth of human existence. In the present economic order it is to be noted that all of the higher values have become dependent to a greater or less degree upon the economic values. So that while economic values are purely instrumental, they are nevertheless significant, since the ethical ideal,

(2) Ibid. page 188.
according to the perfectionistic theory, would be to have wealth so distributed "that it should be possessed by individuals according to their real needs, which obviously vary with capacity for the realization of life's intrinsic goods." Practically applied it means that "wealth should be distributed according to production and needs and not according to accident of fortune."(2)

Closely associated with the economic values are the bodily values which include everything that ministers to the health, efficiency, and beauty of the physical life. Although the bodily values must be prized chiefly as instrumental to the higher values, yet there is a certain amount of intrinsic value to be found in them. The Greek idea of perfection included perfection of the body. They considered the body the outward representation of health and beauty of the soul. Today we are stressing again the intrinsic value that is to be found in the enjoyment of physical health and vigor. "Here, then, as in the case of economic values, we have the task of more perfectly moralizing the life of the body, of so developing and controlling it itself, that it shall be a thing of ordered excellence and beauty in itself, and a fit instrument in the service of higher values."(3)

The values of recreational activities have been recog-

(2) Markness, G.-Lectures on Theoretical Ethics, Elmira College 1937.
nized by advocates of hedonism and self-realization alike. Even the most serious minded people acknowledge with Spinoza that we should seek every kind of relaxation that can be enjoyed "without injury to one's neighbor" for body and mind. Most people are willing to admit that play is of intrinsic value, an immediate enrichment of life. The value that comes from play, from pleasureable activity carried on for its own sake must be guarded lest it degenerate into mere frivolity and dissipation. The task of moralizing the life of recreation, then, consists in "cultivating it to precisely that degree which secures the free, joyous expansion of human nature, and the nice balance of our powers in the service of a life purpose."

If this task is accomplished it will enrich the values of our next group, namely, those of association. These are the values having to do with relationships between individuals and between groups of individuals. They begin in the family and culminate in international relations. The values thus derived are both instrumental and intrinsic; instrumental, in that through them we can realize many forms of good otherwise impossible; intrinsic, in that they offer immediate satisfaction. It is interesting to note that the values of association are more dependent on other sets of values than is any other single set of values. That is, associations become valueless unless they have the content of other values. Friendship devoid of intelligence can
hardly be conceived of. We must also note that all of the other sets of values tend to assume associational form.

This is most certainly true of the character values. Temperance, truthfulness, sincerity, justice, courage. These values are of intrinsic worth enriching the life of the person who possesses them as well as the lives of those with whom he associates. They radiate through all human activities and thus have implication for all human values, "They bring life to a focus through the activity of the will."(1)

The aesthetic values are those concerned with beauty as it appears in nature and art. Beauty of this sort has a very vital place in the scale of values. It affords one of the purest forms of intrinsic value that we have: "art for art's sake" the saying goes. Art has also a very real place among the instrumental values. "Like every other fundamental instinct it colors and transforms all our activities........it stimulates but does not regulate, quickens but does not control our powers......in its nobler forms art is one of the great quickeners of moral endeavour."(2)

In this sense it will be seen that art corresponds much with recreation in that they both give a deeper meaning to life and show us more clearly a unified life.

Like the values derived from art those de-

derived from knowledge have very real intrinsic values. A sound education is a good in itself, a constant source of joy, a means to never-ending interests. The real worth of knowledge, however, is determined by its significance to the general scheme of human welfare and interest as a whole. Someone has said that living is thinking, right or wrong. This is another way of saying that right thinking and right conduct ought to and usually do go togethers, for right conduct must have right thinking as its basis. However, it must be remembered that virtue and knowledge are not identical even if they are connected. The instrumental worth of knowledge shows further the necessity for educating the emotions so that our feelings will not shrink from thinking, nor our thinking from feeling.

The last on our scale of values is religion. The values derived from this source do not require consent to doctrine or creed; they do not depend on a special type of theology. The thing that constitutes their basis is our personal attitude towards God, which in itself shows us that these values are primarily intrinsic. The sense of communion and spiritual refreshment from worship; the sense of cooperation with a Great Power; the comfort we find in sorrow from dependence on God; and the faith we obtain in the final conservation of values,...these are primarily valuable in themselves. But religion has instrumental values as well as intrinsic. This is found in its
application to moral conduct. This function of religion has been recognized by all ethical religions, which have held that "religion does not stand apart from practical life. It has the task of transforming by its spirit all the activities in which men engage, and of furnishing the support and fulfillment of the moral ideal so imperfectly emboldied in actual life."

This function of religion as the most unifying idea that brings life to a focus through religious experience is what Dr. Brightman speaks of when he says, "The true function of religion is found in the development of the whole personality, which finds itself and realizes itself through a consciousness of its relation to God..., and thus brings life to a coherent whole." (2)

(1) Everett, W.G. Moral Values. page 216.
(2) Brightman, E.S. Religious Values. page 199.
Chapter V

Implication of the Theory of Self-Realization to Religious Education.

Many will hold that religious education is not concerned with the philosophical conception of ethics as we have considered it; they hold that religious education gives theoretical ethics but very minor consideration. In order to answer fairly this objection it will be necessary to know exactly what we mean by religious education. Professor Earl Marlatt has defined it as follows: "Religious Education is the application of sound psychological, pedagogical, sociological, ethical, metaphysical, and theological principles to the production of character; the conversion of desires into values, or the process by which desires are so deepened as to yield by their own dynamic the higher values; the introduction of God into experience so as to develop ideals, ethical conduct, persons,--free spirits." Thus we see that one's ethical theory constitutes one of the basic principles for religious education. We see that value plays a most important role in its program; that one's philosophical ethics profoundly affect one's whole attitude and aim in religious education.

"It is all but incredible that any theory of religious education should ever be worked out without taking cognizance of the philosophical and moral values. It is evident that ethical theory profoundly affects one's conception of the aims of religious education.---The hedonist will seek to develop pleasures, recreations, optimistic attitudes, cheerfulness; the formalist will strive to discipline his will and to inculcate a high-minded and even fanatical disregard of consequences; the perfectionist will make well-rounded personalities his aim, and will therefore have a more difficult, but a more rewarding task than the hedonist and formalist. The perfectionist theory alone commands unambiguously the realization of religious values as part of the moral task."

Thus it will be seen that one's ethical theory makes considerable difference as to the goal and program one advocates for religious education. It will be necessary to consider the goals of religious education as they have been set up by some of the foremost religious educators. According to Rose and Stevick the aim of religious education "is to help the individual in his continuous reconstruction and readjustments of his experience increasingly to understand, appreciate, and participate in the Christian way of living." Bettel says that the goals

(2) Rose and Stevick, J. E. - Principles of Religious Education, page 75.
to be striven for in the child's expanding religious knowledge are: (1) fruitful religious knowledge; (2) right religious attitudes—interests, ideals, feelings, loyalties; (3) the application of this knowledge and these attitudes to daily life and conduct." Ethical theories that seek to develop pleasures and recreations, or to discipline the will can hardly be said to be compatible with these aims of religious education as they have been defined by two of the foremost leaders in this field. They have, however, a very definite place in the ethical system which has as its goal the whole harmonious development of personality.

The subject-matter chosen to accomplish these ends also depends upon one's system of ethics. The program of religious education according to the hedonist will be made up of such activities as will yield pleasure and recreations, the aim of the whole program being happiness. For the formalist the program of religious education will be so constituted that every possible means available for the disciplining of the will will be utilized. As the aim of the hedonist's program is happiness, so the aim of the formalist's is strict obedience to duty, while that of the perfectionist is well-rounded personalities. The content of his program is largely shaped by the eight values inherent in the theory of self-realization.

It is true that programs of religious education are not actively concerned with the economic values. But though religious education cannot concretely direct the activities that lead to the realization of this value, it can create attitudes regarding it. This, in fact, constitutes one of the major emphasis in the practical ethics involved in a program of religious education. As in the scale of values set out by self-realization so in religious education, the economic values are presupposed before any of the other values can be realized; they constitute a groundwork upon which the values that have intrinsic worth can be based. We see, then, that though religious education is more concerned in enabling people to make a life than a living, it is nevertheless interested in having them make the best sort of living possible, as is self-realization.

The relation of the theory of self-realization to programs of religious education is still further exemplified in the realization of bodily values. In the recreational programs of religious education athletics play a big part. The cultivation of bodily values are closely connected with the cultivation of associational and recreational values; the bodily values constitute one means for realizing these latter values. And beyond that all well developed programs of religious education have, as one of their necessary functions, the direction of play. This phase has not been carried out extensively among primary age children. But with juniors, intermediates, and young people we see how this phase of the
work is being carried out. The clubs, established for this purpose, afford means for organization, for social relationships, for outdoor activities. In many cases the church supervises summer camps, Girl and Boy Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, etc. If young people are to learn to cultivate recreational and associational values is it not advisable that they do it under supervision that will afford clean, wholesome recreation and favorable associates?

The aesthetic values are perhaps more definitely related to programs of religious education than are the values we have thus far considered. A modern program of religious education uses music, art, dramatics, etc. as essential means for the conveying of its message. "The use of art in religious education is not a luxury. It is a plain, everyday necessity. It is a means, the use of which makes possible a larger measure of religious growth with the least waste of time and energy and the greatest satisfaction to all concerned. The nature of religion is such that it cannot be taught by the use of methods which ignore the appeal to the emotions. The material as presented must appeal to the affective states of consciousness. While learning religion, the pupil must be in a religious attitude. This attitude is most easily, naturally, and effectively assumed through unconscious sympathy with the central figures portrayed by the masters of religious art. It is because the pupils assume appropriate and learningful
attitudes through its use that this method is so successful." Not only is art to be used as a method for conveying religious messages; it also deepens our spiritual life by teaching us to enjoy and reverence things spiritual as they are portrayed in art in all of its forms.

No less than the aesthetic values are the intellectual values related to religious education. The very definition of religious education is such that its application in a program depends upon sound thinking. The intellectual values are inherent in this program. That is, if a parallel system of education—secular and religious—is to be carried out, religious education must be of as high scholastic standing as that of the public schools if it is to receive the same academic credit. It is for this reason that the lesson plans for week-day schools of religion and for Sunday schools are constantly being revised so that they will conform to sound psychological and pedagogical principles. If religion ever needed this intellectual grounding, if people ever needed reasonable arguments to support their religious beliefs it is today, when agnosticism characterizes the religious attitude of so many people.

The deeper the intellectual value is realized, the more concerned is religious education, because to be truly

scientific and logical religion must search for truth by all possible means. Thus knowledge from all fields is utilized in a sound program of religious education, for it will be recognized that in religion as well as in science we are striving to attain truth.

Character values, it has been said, bring life to a focus through the will. But the will must have something to will before it can perform this function. It is this something, coupled with the direction of the will, with which religious education is concerned. Children are no longer conceived as "born in sin"; "rather they have very rich endowment of tendencies toward good, wholesome, social, and valuable behavior patterns." 1 It is these behavior patterns that religious education must so direct as to attain desired ends in character formation. This can be accomplished only if "exalted ideals can be developed, with which immoral action will be clearly seen to be inconsistent; and if moral instruction, before largely impersonal, can be strongly tinged with inspiration." 2) This latter consideration is made possible if we believe that "the ideal should be reinforced and confirmed through as many channels of emotional functioning as possible,-that is, through the forms of aesthetic, intellectual, and religious sentiment. Art, literature, music, and religion are the great media

for the transmission of ideals, and as such fulfill an educative function far more fundamental than our didactic pedagogy has ever realized.¹ Two considerations are to be noted from this discussion. The first is that ideals function to produce character because they transmit stimuli through the sensory neurons, which, in turn, make expression through the motor neurons necessary.² In other words, ideals tend to direct the will and to furnish the content that is directed. The second consideration to be noted is that character values are dependent upon the other values for their realization. They are the aim of both self-realization and of religious education.

And finally religion, according to this theory, is an essential factor in the development of personality. It is conceived of as the highest value because of the fact that the idea of God is a most unifying idea. It brings life, and so all the other values, to a focus through religious experience. Religious experience that can do this, it must be remembered, has to be consistent with the harmonious development of the other values. That is, religious experience cannot be purely emotional if it is to be consistent with the intellectual values. Nor can it be purely intellectual if it is to be consistent with appreciation for beauty or if it is to produce character.

Religion performs an important function in that it lightens the moral burden by supplying motives to righteousness for "religion teaches us that the Universe is friendly,

¹ ibid, page 224.
² Note: See Voelker and Koffka.
that God is love, and that deeper down than that law of competition there is the law of cooperation—
that the struggle is not vain."

Furthermore, religion is significant for self-realization in that it affords an ultimate goal for the development of personality by belief in immortality. The development of personality, we have said, presents a flying goal, an endless quest. This quest makes consistent a life after death in which this quest can be continued. Thus, belief in immortality gives self-realization an ultimate goal; self-realization, in turn, gives reasonableness to belief in immortality.

According to the ethical theory we are discussing it will be seen that tolerance becomes the corner-stone of our religious attitude. That is, for those who tend to specialize in the intellectual values, the intellectual phase of religion will receive the emphasis; for those who appreciate the aesthetic values the corresponding phases of religion will receive the emphasis; and so on. Nevertheless, the very fact that moral duty is to be conceived of as an harmonious development of all values makes tolerance of emphasis inevitable. When this tolerance is broadened to include creeds as well as forms, we shall be able to say with Levinger that "perhaps the future unity of mankind may come at last through a summation of its highest ideals and the rational toleration of diverse

(1) Patrick G.T.W.—Introduction to Philosophy, page 425.
interpretations, different personalities, and widely contrasting group customs and manners."  

The cultivation of religious values, then, according to the theory of self-realization allows for religious experience and an attitude of tolerance; it tends to produce what Levinger calls "the rarest object in the whole museum of history, namely, the man who has profound convictions of his own, and yet is tolerant of those who differ from him."  

Thus it will be seen that the eight values inherent in the theory of self-realization have very definite relation to programs of religious education. They are the values religious education is also trying to conserve—bodily health and strength, sports, recreations, friends, appreciation of works of art, rational thought, wonder and worship eventuating in character. It is true that all of the values do not receive equal emphasis, for in a program of religious and moral education the religious and character values will receive particular emphasis. In our discussion we have shown how interdependent the values are. This is significant for religious education. It means that it cannot deal with only religious and character values.

(1) Levinger L.J. Anti-Semitism in the United States. page 44
(2) ibid page 45.
which are so largely limited by, and dependent upon the other values. The relation that programs of religious education hold to these other values shows that religious educators have recognized this fact.

In our consideration of the character values we spoke of the function of ideals to produce character. "Ideals can be made operative through four elements: the imagistic, the rational, the emotional, and the volitional." All four of these elements can be made effective in programs of religious education. The imagistic element can be made "operative through the positive pull rational imitation. The emotional element can be made operative through a proper education of the impulse. The volitional elements can be made operative through the positive pull of loyalty plus values." Rational imitation, in programs of religious education, finds expression in the fine arts: in pagentry and art; the rational element is fostered by means of the teaching and preaching; the proper education of the impulse is made possible through the use of literature, music, and worship; the volitional element is fostered by means of the recreational activities directed by religious education. And "the combination of these elements should insure motor reactions such as motivate behavior by purpose and transmit ideals into values." Thus religious education affords very specific means for the development of ideals which tend to produce character, a

most important value in the scheme of self-realization.

Thus, we have tried to show that self-realization is the most satisfying of ethical theories, since it takes more facts of experience into account than does hedonism or formalism, we have tried to show that one's ethical theory makes a difference in one's program of religious education; that the values inherent in the theory of self-realization have very definite implications for religious education if its program is to be effective. We have one more consideration to take into account, namely, the significance of this theory for religious education.

First, self-realization dignifies religion. It is the only theory that recognizes that a person is not fully "realized" until he takes religion into account. To do this, according to this theory, means that religion must be grounded in the most comprehensive knowledge we have. This necessary intellectual basis for religious programs inevitably gains respect for religion in the eyes of the world.

The theory of self-realization further dignifies and enriches religion by the use of aesthetic values. We have shown that it recognizes the need for appreciation of aesthetic values for a well-rounded personality. Programs of religious education adhering to this theory will find in art a very necessary means for the teaching of religion and morals.

The emphasis on the scale of values as a whole will
have great practical significance for religious education. The key-note in the practical ethics resulting from this theory is respect for persons. If programs of religious education that adhere to this theory effectively teach this principle its application in the economic and social order will have far-reaching effects, the ultimate result of which can only be guessed at.

Thus it is seen that self-realization is not only compatible with programs of religious education, but that it is a prerequisite, having significant implications for such programs. It was this thought, I believe, that Prof. Brightman had in mind when he said, 'He who knows the history of philosophy—will realize that conduct is only a part of life, and not all, that there is an inner life of consciousness, when the mystic spirit communes with God; where conscience and duty dwell, where ideals and thought have their home; and he will know that conduct alone, behaving alone, is futile and empty as thought without conduct is. In other words, conduct and character, which constitute the aim of religious education are empty without this inner thought background of logical reasoning that is found in a system of theoretical ethics. It was the strength that this inner thought life gives to our active life that T. F. Cameron Wilson spoke when he said, "Always lead a double life. Keep in your heart a

secret room. In the midst of traffic, at tennis, in offices and restaurants, exalt that there wait for you great ghosts of your creation. And when you shut the door of your bedroom let them crowd round you—the splendid brothers of the mind. Then you will go out to the world again clothed head to foot in the armour of beauty that they have put on you in secret. And someone passing you in the street will catch benediction from you and go on his way not knowing why a glimpse at your eyes has made him almost merry in a world of little content. Moreover, when life slaps you in the face, you may remember your hid haven, and laugh at the rowdy world, and so go rejoicing, as a philosopher should, to the things that matter. \(^{(1)}\)

(1) Wilson, T.P.C. - Taste-Paper Philosophy X
Comprehensive Summary:

Change, more than any other word, characterizes present day conditions. Change involves conflict, and conflict adjustments. The great advance of materialism during the past fifty years, the stress on materialistic philosophy and psychology have appeared to reduce everything to mechanistic interpretation. There is however, a current of anti-materialism in present day thinking. The same trend is found in religion. On the one hand there is the tendency for religion to eventuate into either intellectualism or emotionalism, and on the other into social ethics. This thesis endeavors to show that a synthesis which combines these trends can be found in a system of ethics in which there is a definite place for a religion that enlists the whole personality: mind, emotion, and will.

This means that we must consider, as fairly as possible, the major systems of ethics: formalism, hedonism, and self-realization. The validity of these three systems depends to some extent upon the way one answers the problem of the objectivity of value. We hold that the arguments for the objectivity of value are as sound as are the objections to it.

Formalism, the first of the ethical theories to be considered, was formulated by Kant who held that all morality consists in rightness of intention. Good will and strict obedience to duty constitute the only ultimate and intrinsic good. Kant's maxims and
postulates are inseparable from this theory. There is something inspiring and noble in this stern system of conduct. Nor can an act be considered moral unless it is an act of good will. Furthermore there is much truth in his maxims and postulates. There are also certain defects. An intelligent consideration of consequences is as necessary as good intention. It divorces inclination too much from duty, and the term "good will" is ambiguous.

Psychological hedonism holds that pleasure or happiness is the only possible motive for action. This theory tends to destroy all moral distinctions; it fails to distinguish between satisfaction that comes as a by-product and satisfaction as a motive for action.

Ethical hedonism holds that pleasure and happiness are the only values we ought to strive for. This theory began with the Cyrenaics, whose ideas were given final form by the Epicureans who recognized pleasure on a qualitative basis. It was not until the seventeenth century before hedonism was further developed. Hobbes' significant contribution was his emphasis upon universal, as distinguished from individual, happiness. Bentham was interested primarily in the greatest happiness for the greatest number; and, in his "Hedonic Calculus", a quantitative measuring of happiness, John Stewart Mill advocated utilitarian hedonism and qualitative measuring of happiness. The merits of hedonism may be summarized as follows:
1. Desire for happiness is universal.
2. Goodness and permanent happiness are related in a just world.
3. Hedonism effectively refutes pessimism;

and its defects as follows:

1. Hedonism is one sided.
2. It is ambiguous.
4. Fails to distinguish between pleasure as the accompaniment of value rather than the essence of it.

The last ethical theory to be considered is self-realization, the theory that has as its aim the full and harmonious development of the self. This theory began with the Cynics who held that virtue is the only good. Plato stressed the idea of unified personality, the perfection of the whole which is possible by the subordination of the lower element to the higher. Aristotle's "Golden Mean" and his emphasis on the perfection of function mark the next step in the development of this theory. The Stoics considered the essence of ethics to be a pronounced rationalism, their goal being the virtuous wise man. Jesus can also be considered as contributing to this theory since the emphasis of his principles is the exaltation of personality. The modern self-realizationists are typeified by Spinoza, Hegel,
and T.H. Greene, the essence of whose teachings is the idea of progress as the upward movement of the human will, especially as it becomes crystalized in institutions.

The merits of this theory may be summarized as follows:

1. It emphasizes the worth of value to human life.
2. It is compatible with altruism.
3. It has a definite place for religion.
4. It harmonizes with progress.
5. It combines the merits of formalism and hedonism.

The objections to the theory are:

1. It gives no standard of what is good.
2. It fails to show why we should develop ourselves.
3. It tends toward egotism.
4. It gives an unattainable goal.

For the harmonious development of personality self-realization depends on a scale of values ranging from the purely instrumental to those having intrinsic worth. These values have been arranged as follows: economic, bodily, recreational, associational, aesthetic, intellectual, character and religious.

One's ethical theory determines to a large extent the goals and programs one establishes for religious education. Self-realization is more consistent than formalism of hedonism with the goals and programs of religious education as they have been worked out by some of our foremost religious educators. Programs of religious education afford opportunity for the development of the values inherent in the theory of self-realization. Both religious education and self-realization emphasize the worth of
ideals in producing character. Self-realization is further significant for religious education in that it gives it intellectual dignity, it recognizes the contributions of aesthetics to religious education, and it makes possible certain practical results in religious education.
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