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The value of emotional experience in religion

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"The Value of Emotional Experience in Religion"

Submitted by

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Preface

This is a day when the emotional aspect of experience is depreciated in value by the vast majority of students in the field of religion. The two predominant approaches to religion make such depreciation almost inevitable. The philosophical approach has a tendency to be intellectualistic and hence, lays stress upon reason and interpretation as opposed to affect. The scientific approach, though it has given the emotions more consideration than has philosophy, seems to have concluded that they are vascillating and nebulous in nature and are not to be taken seriously. Any thing which does not fit into certain fixed forms and hence, is difficult to classify, is soon discarded by science even though such procedure is not scientific.

Believing, then, that the feeling aspect of life was not being studied exhaustively enough, especially in its relation to religion, we have gone through the field and present our findings in the body of this paper. It has been our purpose to scientifically study the biological background of the emotions and to relate them to various phases of the religious experience with a view toward determining their ultimate value.
Part I
The Emotions
Their Psychological and Physiological Background
Chapter I
Psychology
The Phenomena Termed Emotional

The I, or conscious, individual, human self is not only a cognitive being. We have not exhausted its possibilities when we say that it perceives, imagines, recognizes and thinks. Neither have we accounted for all of its manifestations and reactions. If we add that the I contains volitional elements or that in its very nature it is volition and self-activating power, we have broadened its scope but have not yet reached its ultimate limits. Layman and scientist alike recognize still another function of the self. It thinks and wills but it also feels. It loves, hates, enjoys. It is sorrowful, amused, disgusted or curious. It is afraid or it is angry, pleased or displeased. In other words, there is an affective or feeling element involved which is very important and which plays a very large place in self-experience. This affective element has been termed emotion. Woodworth calls it the, "stirred-up-ness present in a state of mind," and goes on to point out that this emotional part of the total state (which contains cognitive elements also) may be so strong as to overshadow all other components or it may have less intensity down to zero.

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1. I p. 180
2. XXVII p. 118
It is readily seen that the term emotion, used in this fashion has both a wide longitude and latitude. The emotions or affective elements may be very feeble, as would be the case in mild curiosity, or they may be very intense as in great fear. They may be very simple and elementary, as in anger, or they may be very complex as would be so when intellectual, moral, or spiritual experiences were arousing them.

In spite of this very evident width of scope many attempts have been made to reduce the emotions and feelings to simple basic elements. Traditionally the basic elements have been accepted as pleasantness and unpleasantness. Love, hate, sorrow, amusement, etc., are all subsumed under these elementary feeling experiences. The two terms are held to be irreducible. They must be experienced if understood. They are ultimate. The same notion has been expressed in a more ambiguous way by using the terms pleasure and pain. There is a danger that these latter terms may be misleading. This because they tend to confuse the emotions with sensations which have similar qualities and yet should not be identified with the affective aspect of experience. There is a very distinct difference between pleasant and unpleasant sensations and pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Sensations are localized in some particular region of the body while emotions are all of "us". If we have the emotion of anger we are, "mad all over", not in any localized area. ¹ Again sensations are readily picked out

¹. XXVII p. 130
and observed while emotions grow vague under introspection and in most cases are dispelled. Finally, emotions have no known sense organs as is the case with sensations. Thus, it is seen that unless sensations and emotions are differentiated, there is serious objection to using the terms pleasure and pain in both cases. When dealing with the emotions, however, the terms pleasant and unpleasant are to be preferred.

An objection to the above classification (namely, that it is not exhaustive in accounting for the elements of emotion) has been pressed and is not easily met. James' attack on the terms pleasure and pain which are used synonymously with pleasantness and unpleasantness is significant here. He says, "The essence of emotion is pleasure and pain. This is a hackneyed psychological doctrine, but on any theory of the seat of emotions it seems to me one of the most artificial and scholastic of the untruths that disfigure our science. One might as well say that the essence of prismatic color is pleasure and pain. There are infinite shades and tones in various emotional excitements which are distinct as sensations of color are, and of which one is quite at a loss to predicate either pleasant or painful quality." 1

Carrying out this idea Royce has held that the emotions have two dimensions instead of one. These dimensions are pleasantness and unpleasantness and restlessness and quiescence. Wundt has added what he calls

1. Quoted by XIV p. 42
still another dimension, excitement and calm. Others have suggested that the feeling of correctness or of being on the right track in an investigation cannot be classed under the single division of pleasantness or unpleasantness. However, we can hardly say that these latter are pure emotions. They are cognitive judgements, though vague, and are secondarily emotional.

On the other hand, the suggestions of James and Royce and Wundt must be considered. Is the emotional life too complex to be blanketed under the pleasant-unpleasant classification? We do not think so. That it is complex must not be denied. It has countless shades and gradations and these must be recognized. But the parallelism in the classifications of the three scholars in question must also be noted. Pleasantness, quiescence and calm, are all emotionally pleasant while unpleasantness, restlessness and excitement are all emotionally unpleasant. It is true, they manifest different degrees of emotional reaction but they are basically either pleasant or unpleasant to the organism. Probably we will have to accept the pleasant-unpleasant classification as being ultimate.

Having isolated the affective element in the self and considered its possible basic components, we may well ask, "How does emotional experience influence the subject?" The most obvious manifestation here is the individualizing nature of emotion. Both the subject

1. XIII p. 501
2. See I p. 182f
In the absence of more information, it is difficult to assess the potential impact of the recent developments on the future of the company. However, it is clear that the company needs to re-evaluate its strategies and take steps to address the challenges it faces. It is essential to understand the market dynamics and identify areas for improvement. The company must be prepared to adapt to changes and seize opportunities that arise. In this context, it is important to consider the potential risks and benefits of different strategies and make informed decisions.
and object of emotion are realized as unique or irreplaceable. Now this phenomenon differentiates affect from perception and from all forms of thought for in these no special stress is laid on the self as "just this individual" or on the object as being peculiarly individual. Except in emotion one realizes that other selves see and hear as he does and assumes that they think as he does under similar circumstances. In emotion, however, we immediately recognize ourselves as unique. We find it difficult to believe there is any other lover or hater in the same sense. In other words we completely individualize ourselves in the affective experience.

So also we individualize the object of our emotion. We hate a certain man, not men in general, and feel we have reasons peculiar to ourselves for so hating. Thus, when we are angry we are, "completely angry" and at a certain individual or thing, the whole being an intensely individual experience. It cannot be objectified easily as can other forms of mental life. It is this individualizing nature of emotion, no doubt, which prompts Mac Curdy, in his definition of affect, to lay so much stress on the self. He says, "Affect is any subjective experience that, when examined introspectively, is considered to originate in or belong to the subject's individual organism." (The underlining is mine). It may be felt to be either mental or physical, to be stimulated by sense perception, by a thought, or to be causeless. But in no case is it thought to be a quality
of the stimulus, except in relation to the subject.¹

If it be suggested that crowd emotional reactions may have the common to all nature, we do not yet evade the fact that even here each individual considers his emotions his own.

The above definition brings out a second characteristic of emotion as related to the self. Emotion is receptive. In all affective experience we are conscious of being affected by our environment though not directly through end organs. The self somehow, creates the emotion as a result of environmental influence. This is, of course, similar to the experience of sensation and perception with the exception that, as brought out above, the environmental influence is indirect in the case of affect, no end-organs are apparent.

Personal objects are not the only environmental factors which evoke the human emotions. Impersonal objects often are responsible for some of the most pronounced affective states. Hence, there are what we might call social and non-social forms of emotion. The former type elicited by personal contacts, the latter by impersonal contacts. We might well reproduce here the chart of emotional forms given by Miss Calkins.

SOCIAL EMOTIONS (With Personal Objects)

I. Egoistic, Unsympathetic Emotions

a. With other self as object:

1. Happy (that is, pleasant) emotions:

   (a) Without valuation of other self:

   - - - -

1. XIV p. 44
Happiness, realized as due to other self, Liking

(b) With valuation:

Happiness, realized as due to other self, Who is,
(1) Stronger than oneself, Reverence
(2) Equal to oneself, Love(?) Friendship(?)
(3) Weaker than oneself, Tenderness(?)

2. Unhappy (that is, unpleasant) emotions:

(a) Without valuation:

Unhappiness, realized as due to other self, Dislike

(b) With valuation:

Unhappiness, realized as due to others, Who are,
(1) Stronger than oneself, Terror
(2) Equal to oneself, Hate
(3) Weaker than oneself, Scorn

b. With myself as valued object:

1. As valued by myself,

(a) Happiness in myself, regarded as worthy, Pride
(b) Unhappiness in myself, regarded as unworthy, Humility

3. As valued by others,

(a) Happiness in being admired, Vanity
(b) Unhappiness in being scorned, Shame

II. Altruistic, or Sympathetic Emotions

a. Homogeneous:

1. Happiness through shared happiness, Mitfreude

2. Unhappiness through shared unhappiness, Pity

b. Heterogeneous, or mixed:

1. Happiness through another's unhappiness, Malice

2. Unhappiness through another's happiness, Envy
NON-SOCIAL EMOTIONS (With Impersonal Objects)

I. Egoistic
   a. Sensational, Like
      b. Relational, Dislike

II. Altruistic (absorbing)
   a. Sensational
      Aesthetic pleasure
   b. Relational
      Logical pleasure
      Sense of humor, etc. 1

This chart is, of course, not exhaustive but gives some idea of the complex nature of emotion. An interesting point here is the fact that an object which causes a certain emotion in one individual may cause an entirely different emotion in another individual. This is easily illustrated at a football game when a score is made. Half the crowd has pleasant emotions aroused, the other half unpleasant. The highly individual nature of emotion is thus, brought out again.

A third characteristic of emotional experience should be mentioned. We refer to its spontaneous or automatic nature. Affective states seem to come without effort on the part of the subject. He may have to force himself to think or make a volition but no such pressure is necessary to cause him to feel. The emotions seem to be primary and the organism is immediately affected either pleasantly or unpleasantly by its environment in a spontaneous fashion.

Ladd and Woodworth recognize four great classes of human experiences which are characterized by their

1. I p. 185-186
emotional content. "(1) the sensuous feelings, or those which are dependently related to, and in consciousness blended with, the different qualities and intensities of the sensations of the more general organic functions; (2) the intellectual feelings, or those which precede, accompany, or follow the various activities of discrimination, association, judgment, reasoning, and, indeed, all the forms of functioning of the 'mind' in the narrower meaning of the latter word; (3) aesthetic feelings, or those which belong to the perception and appreciation of what we call 'the beautiful!' (in its various forms), or its opposite; and (4) the moral feelings, or those affective experiences which appertain to the good and the bad, in human conduct. To these might be added a fifth class, to be called the religious feelings, were it not for the fact that the latter may be satisfactorily treated as special forms of the combination of the intellectual, aesthetic, and moral feelings."¹

James² talks about the coarser emotions like fear and rage and the finer emotions like the aesthetic, moral and religious. Calkins³ uses the term aesthetic emotions and Woodworth⁴ lists the higher emotions as the aesthetic, social, and religious. Ribot⁵ deals with the social and moral feelings and the religious and aesthetic

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1. XIII p. 513
2. IX
3. I p. 202
4. XXVII p. 135
5. XXI p. 375f
sentiments. Probably all of these authors mean the same as Ladd and Woodworth in using these terms. In other words there are no distinct emotions which may be isolated and called religious, aesthetic, etc. but there are definite affective responses connected with religious, aesthetic and moral experiences. The most convenient way of designating such affective states is through the terms, moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, etc. It is well to remember, however, that in using such classifications we are dealing with complex phenomena and that the senses, the intellect and the will enter into all these affective experiences. Rigid classification is rather more apparent than real and is convenient rather than actual.

The discussion thus far has tended to justify the classification of the emotions as a distinct realm of human experience. There is such a realm, related very closely to the cognitive side of the self and yet distinct from it. It is the affective or feeling aspect of the mental life. Individual in the extreme, it relates all objective experience to the self in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness. It is receptive and spontaneous. We proceed to the attempt to discover the psychological processes which function in these emotional experiences.
Chapter II
Physiology
The Physiological Accompaniments of Emotion

The almost countless theories that have been advanced as physiological explanations of emotion are mute testimony to the confusion which obtains in this field. The facts are that it is almost impossible to attain assured results when we are studying the physiology of the emotions. It is not difficult to see why this is so. In the case of sensation and perception we have external end-organs which are easily observed and direct reactions can be noted. No such direct testimony is available for the affect side of life. In their very nature the feelings are obscure, indefinite and yet extremely variable and multiform. They are so closely connected to our sensations and ideas as to make absolute separation impossible and yet they are distinct enough to be treated separately. As far as we are able to determine the physiological conditions are laid in internal, rapid and infinitely varied changes within the central organs, such as cannot be observed directly or subjected to the most satisfactory experimentation. There are some observable reactions connected with affective states but since these are only part of the total state no complete theory can be built upon them alone. However, we can only record such manifestations as we are able to observe and try to project a theory from them.

One of the most evident facts in connection
The statement of the evidence shall have been
written in accordance with the practice of the
law. When necessary to the continuance of the
business, the court may permit evidence to be
presented to the jury by the solicitor. When in
the opinion of the court it is necessary to the
interest of justice, the court may permit evidence
to be presented to the jury by the solicitor.
with the emotions, as has been brought out, is that they are to a large degree automatic. They resemble the reflex in this respect since the affective tone appears without any conscious direction on our part. Now conduct which is not thought out before hand and which is automatic in nature is usually described as instinctive. In danger we have an inherent tendency to run. If insulted we may immediately strike. If a child falls, we pick it up automatically. But in these cases there is also a feeling tone present. We fear or become angry or are sympathetic respectively. The first of these manifestations are instinctive or automatic, the latter are emotion. That there is a close relationship between emotion and instinct is evident and if it were possible to explain emotion as the affective side of instinct our physiological solution would be easily secured.

Indeed McDougall has made an approach to this solution. In his "Social Psychology" he recognizes two types of emotions. The primary ones are the affective sides of instincts and the complex emotions are those which appear as combinations when two or more instincts are operative simultaneously. The emotion of fear would be the affective side of the instinct of fear and the emotion of scorn would be the affective side of a combination of the instincts of anger and disgust. Later developments of this author add a third class, the derived or new emotions. Joy, sorrow, confidence and

1. XV p. 20f
hope would be illustrative. They are neither primary emotions nor are they blends. Emotions of this class are not constantly correlated with any one impulse or tendency but may arise in the course of the operation of any impulse or tendency. They are more versatile in nature.

While these three classifications, in a rough way, at least, probably cover the large majority of affective states and bring out the close connection between instinct and emotion, they leave much to be desired. McDougall himself, in his third classification of the derived or new emotions, shows the inadequacy of the instinct as a complete explanation of affect. As we shall later see, emotion involves internal responses also, whereas instinctive action is directed outward and involves action on external objects. Again emotion is in the nature of a preparatory reaction while instinct is an end reaction.¹

A very little reflection shows us that instincts and emotions are not identical or invariably associated. We may step out of the way of an oncoming car absolutely instinctively and yet betray no fear whatever. A fly may light on our cheek - we brush it off instinctively with no particular emotional accompaniments - but if the fly returns several times the emotions begin to be aroused. We shall do well to keep the connection between emotion and instinct in mind but we cannot conscientiously explain emotion in toto as

¹ XXVII p. 134
the affective side of instinct. This finding is heartily in accord with modern behaviorism which is trying to do away with the instincts altogether and which holds both instincts and emotions to be complex and learned reactions.¹

But there are other ways of demonstrating the presence of emotion which bring to light very definite physiological accompaniments. Emotional expression is very commonly known and recognized. It appears in the attitude of the body, distortion of the face, modulation of the voice and in various gestures. Smiling, scowling, pouting, sneering, dancing and shouting are examples. All of these reactions are observable constantly and we know that they bespeak more or less active emotional states within the individual. It might be possible that the affective tone or side of such bodily expressions would account for emotion. Indeed a part of the James-Lange theory of the emotions (which we will consider later) is based on this assumption. However, it is obvious that many of these expressions may be present without any emotion. Some actors can and do assume them all without a trace of emotion. Someone records the statement of a Shakespearian actor who stabs himself in the last scene. The effect produced was most realistic and apparently all the emotions accompanying the act were present. However, on the occasion of the last presentation of the season, the actor, as he portrayed this realistic scene, muttered to the

¹. XVI p. 42f
leading lady, "I die for the 186th and last time this season". Certainly the appropriate emotions were not present though the bodily expressions indicated them to be so.

It must be admitted, of course, that the actor represents a professional type of reaction and hence, may not be representative. He is trained to artificially produce all the external manifestations of emotion whether the actual emotion be present or not. However, most of us are aware of the fact that the common reaction is somewhat similar to that of the actor. We say we, "force a smile", or "put on a bold front", even though the inward emotions are not present. Here, through reflexes, we probably do actually elicit the corresponding emotion to a limited degree. Nevertheless the emotion so aroused is not nearly so strong as the spontaneous emotion which would actually cause the same outward expressions without any conscious effort on our part.

Darwin made investigations in this field and came to the conclusion that these emotional expressions in man are relics of his animal past. They resemble the adaptive behavior of the lower animals. This would link them very closely to the instincts. There is an element of learned behavior in them for certain expressions have become associated with different instincts in the course of evolution and much modification has taken place. This explanation does not, of course,

1. V
account for the emotions which seem to accompany such bodily expressions. It simply throws the problem back on the instincts again and shows we must account for both instincts and emotion. Perhaps these outward bodily expressions are related to the organic expressions which have been discovered as operative in emotional behavior and which we will now consider.

These organic expressions, that have been studied very thoroughly recently, seem at first to give a new plausibility to those theories of the emotions which make the feelings the affective side of bodily expressions both organic and peripheral. Cannon¹, Wundt², Bain and others have made extensive researches and have discovered very noticeable organic reactions accompanying emotional states. Some kinds of the observation of bodily functions in connection with the feelings have been the following: The movements of the chest and perhaps also of the abdomen in breathing have been recorded, by the aid of pneumographs; and the relation of different feelings to changes in the rate and depth of respiration has been studied in the graphic records. The pulse has been recorded by sphygmographs applied to various arteries, among which the radial is the most accessible, though the carotid, since it supplies the brain, has appeared to many investigators as the most important for psychological purposes. Changes

1. II
2. XIII p. 506
in the volume of the arm, or of a finger - changes which are due to the varying amount of blood contained in the member, and which depend partly on the output of the heart and partly on the vasomotor condition of the member and of other parts - have been deemed specially important by many authorities, and have been recorded by means of plethysmographs. Similar instruments can even be applied to the brain itself, in cases where part of it has been exposed through removal of a portion of the skull. 1

Cannon 2 has done a most remarkable and thorough piece of work in studying internal changes and has discovered many significant facts. He began by observing the effects of certain strong emotions like rage upon the body. A dog was fed in the laboratory and all possible arrangements were made to see that normal and pleasant conditions prevailed. The digestive processes proceeded in normal fashion until a cat was introduced. The dog became excited and angry. Soon the digestive processes ceased to function and remained inactive for several minutes after the cat had been removed. Other experiments showed that certain emotions effected the pancreatic juice, the bile and the peristaltic action of the intestines. This convinced Cannon that all the means of bringing about chemical changes in food may be stopped under certain emotional situations. He says,

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1. XIII p. 506
2. II
The text on this page is not legible due to the quality of the image.
"The conditions favorable to proper digestion are wholly abolished when unpleasant feelings such as vexation and worry and anxiety, or great emotions such as anger and fear, are allowed to prevail". In addition to these changes it was found that certain emotional conditions caused an increased pulse rate, dilation of the pupil, sweating and changes in body chemistry. These latter changes are explained as resulting from the excessive secretion of adrenalin in the adrenal glands. When this substance is produced, glycogen, a starchy, fuel substance is stored in the liver and then transported rapidly to the muscles to produce new tissue and reduce fatigue. The thyroid glands of the neck also function in emotion supplying either greater or less stimulus to the brain.

It is the belief of psychologists now, due to the findings of physiological experimentation, that the nerves concerned in these organic changes are found in the autonomic system. The autonomic system is distinct but not wholly separate from the central nervous system. It consists of outgoing axons from centers in the cord and medulla. However, these nerves reaching out from the brain or cord never come into direct contact with the gland or smooth muscle cells involved in organic reactions. There are always interposed between the cerebro-spinal neurones and the viscera extra neurones whose bodies and processes lie wholly outside the

1. II p. 9
The statistical data on the evaluation of the economic activity of individual enterprises and industries, including the analysis of the efficiency and productivity of labor, has been a subject of ongoing interest in recent years. This information is crucial for the formulation of economic policies and the planning of industrial development. The data presented in this report have been compiled from various sources, including official statistics and industry reports. It is evident from the data that there has been a significant increase in productivity and efficiency across different sectors. Further analysis is required to understand the underlying factors contributing to these improvements. The report also highlights the importance of continuous monitoring and evaluation of economic indicators to ensure sustainable growth and development.
central nervous system. It is thought that these bodies may act as transformers and modify the impulses received from the central system.

There are three divisions to the autonomic nervous system. The upper division or cranial makes its ultimate connection in the medulla and seems to favor the processes contributing to digestion. The middle division or sympathetic system connects to the central section of the cord. It has to do with the checking of digestion, hastening of the heartbeat, stimulation of the adrenal glands etc. The lower or sacral division makes its connection at the lower end of the cord and is active in the bladder, rectum and sex organs. The whole autonomic system is thus indirectly connected with the higher centers while yet retaining a degree of independent action. It is to be noted that the sympathetic division is antagonistic to the sacral and cranial divisions of the autonomic nerve tract. When it functions in certain emotional situations it may totally stifle the other two divisions.

It is comparatively easy to recognize in the above mentioned organic reactions automatic preparatory measures to meet the different situations which confront the organism. Just as bodily expressions in emotion represent preparatory measures for protection etc., so organic reactions make preparation for conflict, flight, etc. The adrenalin which is thrown into the blood with the emotion of rage, prepares the organism for fighting and protects against fatigue. The question is whether
The theory of conservation is not new, and the problems associated with it are not novel. But the potential consequences of neglecting the conservation of natural resources are significant.

In the face of increasing pressure on natural resources, it is crucial that we take action to preserve them. This includes not only the protection of existing resources but also the active management of them.

Conservation efforts should be focused on sustainable practices that allow natural resources to be used in a way that is both beneficial and responsible. This requires a collaboration between governmental bodies, the private sector, and the public at large.

The implications of neglecting conservation efforts are dire. We risk depleting the natural resources that are so essential to our survival. It is up to us to take action and ensure that these resources are conserved for future generations.
or not the emotions are the affective side of these organic changes. If we can show that each emotion is characterized by certain organic changes which remain constant, we have advanced a long way toward establishing a physiological background for the affective states.

James and Lange worked on this basis in presenting their theory. James recognized two aspects of emotion, behavior and feeling. The former he called instinctive and the latter emotion. His theory was that the instinctive reaction does not end with the contraction of the voluntary muscles but that a visceral or organic overflow took place also. When the emotional situation is presented there are the outward bodily expressions (laughing, scowling, etc.) and the inward or organic expressions of the autonomic system (changes in digestion, respiration, glandular action, etc.) which take place. The subject feels all these changes and this produces the affect. The more complex emotions, James thought, might have their affects ingrained in the very nature of the presentation itself and to borrow nothing from the reverberations surging up from below the brain.

A number of attempts have been made to classify the emotions and their various accompanying organic reactions. Wundt tried to formulate a law covering this material. He believed that the various emotional states had characteristic pulse and breathing foundations. It is commonly thought that pleasantness is characterized by a slow strong pulse, dilating arteries and bodily warmth. Unpleasantness shows a fast, weak pulse and
94
bodily chill. Breathing characteristics under the two conditions are not so well established. If experimentation could only establish invariable and distinct organic states for each emotion, then the James-Lange theory would be pretty firmly established. The feeling side of those states would constitute the emotion. Unfortunately no such distinct states can be postulated.

Cannon found that any high degree of excitement in the central nervous system, whether felt as anger, terror, pain, anxiety, joy, grief or deep disgust was likely to break over the threshold of the sympathetic division and disturb the functions of all the organs which that division enervates. Hence, as Cannon says, "If various strong emotions can thus be expressed in the diffused activities of a single division of the autonomic - the division which accelerates the heart, inhibits the movements of the stomach and intestines, contracts the blood vessels, erects the hairs, liberates sugar, and discharges adrenin - it would appear that the bodily conditions which have been assumed, by some psychologists, to distinguish emotions from one another must be sought for elsewhere than in the viscera."¹ Cannon urges the suggestion that the visceral changes contribute to an emotional complex a feeling of disturbance of which we are not usually conscious but that they do not account for distinct emotions.

If we object that the feeling tone in all such

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¹. II p. 279
extreme conditions (namely, in terror, anger, grief, etc.) is quite similar and hence, in accord with the findings, there are other more conclusive disproofs of the James-Lange theory that can be advanced. The experiments of Sherrington\(^1\) show that emotional responses occur in dogs in which practically all the main viscera and the great bulk of skeletal muscle have been removed from contact with the brain. On the other hand the decorticated dog and decerebrate cat, though all visceral nerve connections are left intact, only respond to the emotions of anger. This would indicate that anger is excited by reflex reaction or that it may be a developed organic habit and hence, is sub-cortical but that all other emotions find their physiological explanation somewhere in the cortex.

That there is some connection between bodily reactions and emotions, however, can hardly be denied. It is shown by the fact that emotions can be produced at times by reproducing their corresponding bodily states. Some of the extreme mystics use very artificial means to bring on their mystic trances, for instance. This compels us to recognize a modicum of truth in the position of James and Lange. On the other hand, it is evident that there is no longer any possibility of holding fast to the James-Lange theory or any other theory which makes the cortical areas secondary or unnecessary in emotion. An animal without a brain but with a visceral

\(^1\) Cited by II p. 280
nerve system, does not have affective experiences, except anger. An animal with a brain but without a visceral nerve system, does have affective experiences, including anger. The only possible conclusion is that the cortical areas are primary. Genetically this may not have been so but is at the present stage of human development.

We have now arrived at a very unsatisfactory position. The indications are that the emotions are not the affective side of instinct. Neither are they primarily the affective side of either peripheral or internal organic behavior. There are, no doubt, relations here but the emotions cannot strictly be explained in any of these ways. Hitherto great many psychologists have built their theories on these phenomena. If such theories are no longer valid, then just what sort of theory is valid?

Perhaps the sensations can be appealed to as an explanation of our emotional life. As was brought out in the first section of the paper there is a distinct difference between sensations and emotions. Sensations are localized, are readily observed and have end-organs. Emotions are not localized, are observed with difficulty if at all, and have no known end-organs. Nevertheless, the feeling which accompanies sensation is comparable to the feeling of emotion. The feeling of any particular sensation always accompanies that sensation but it is recognized as a way in which the mind is affected. So the affect of emotion is recognized as a
way in which the mind is affected even though the stimulus is not localized as in sensation.

Again, the self in emotion recognizes itself as affected by environmental factors even as it does in sensation. It is receptive, as sensation is, even though it cannot localize the stimulus.

These similarities have led some psychologists to suppose that a definite relation may be found between the degree and, possibly, the duration of physical stimulation and affective experience. The suggestion is that any stimulus of great intensity and many stimuli of prolonged duration occasion unpleasantness, whereas stimuli of medium intensity bring about pleasantness, and very faint stimuli may excite indifferent experiences depending on circumstances. However, this is not a true statement of the facts. Both moderate and strong stimuli which are unpleasant may be prolonged until we become indifferent to them. Workers in a boiler factory may become indifferent to the prolonged rattle of the riveter. Of course, this may be explained through fatigue of the end-organs. But the pleasantness and unpleasantness of sensational experiences depends not only on the factors of unexpectedness, intensity or intermit-
tance. The condition of the subject and his relation to the experience involved may also vary the affective reaction. Thus, just as it is impossible to find certain organic reactions which are always the same for the same emotions so we cannot suppose there are certain types of stimuli which always have the same affective or
emotional tone. There is hardly any justification for such a term as specific emotional stimuli in the sense that we speak of specific sensational stimuli. Neither can we suppose that the emotions have end-organs or that sensory brain cells connected directly by afferent nerves to the periphery are excited in emotion.

With this theory of the emotions discredited we approach the suggested explanation of Miss Calkins. She recognizes that we are driven to the brain areas for the basis of our physiological explanation. Classing her position as a composite of those of Wundt, Flechsig, and Marshall she finds the cause of pleasantness and unpleasantness in the excitation of fresh or fatigued cells in the frontal lobes of the brain. The frontal lobe is excited by way of neurones from the Rolandic area. More than adequate reaction brings pleasantness, less than adequate reaction brings unpleasantness and equal reaction brings indifference. The way the frontal lobe excitation is brought about according to this theory, is interesting but throws it open to the same objection as that launched against the James-Lange explanation. The continuity follows: (1) Stimulus (2) excitations in sense centers, (3) these spread to motor neurones in the Rolandic area, (4) downward motor neurones are excited (5) the peripheral and organic expressions and changes take place (6) excitation of end-organs of pressure by the above physiological changes (7) the

1. I. p. 210
upward spread of these excitations to the sense-cells of the Rolandic area (8) the spread of these excitations to the frontal lobe. The excitation here will be pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent according as the organic conditions aroused by the stimulus have nourished or failed to nourish the frontal lobe cells.

This is a very ingenious theory and is perhaps a good guess among many guesses (for they are all that to a degree) but it seems to have one fatal defect. The frontal lobe excitations which are responsible for the feeling content do not result until the incoming neurones have in turn been excited by organic and peripheral reaction. Sherrington's experiments using dogs with brains but without viscera and skeletal muscle explode this theory as they do that of James and Lange. The brain areas alone seem sufficient to produce emotion!

If the original Rolandic excitation (3) above) were connected directly across to the frontal lobes as well as indirectly through the viscera, then we might have a more stable theory. In this case the frontal lobe would be excited and emotion produced regardless of organic responses and yet if these responses were present, they could reinforce the direct transfer across to the frontal lobes and cause the emotion to be more pronounced. The diagramatic representation would be: (See next page)

The arc X is the added connection. The Calkins theory does not include this.
The above addition perhaps makes this theory as desirable as any. There are almost countless theories, old and new, which might be reviewed. However, Ladd and Woodworth present a position which seems to meet the most requirements for plausibility.¹

This theory aims to account for the very complex nature of the emotions in the individual and for the wide variation in emotions in different individuals. This element of variation in emotion is very evident. Individuals differ to a far greater extent in emotional reactions than they do in sensational responses. The same objective stimulus will ordinarily convey very similar sensations to various individuals. In emotion this is not the case. Every subject will have different feeling responses although the same stimulus is applied. Sometimes the emotional responses to the same situation will be practically opposite in two different individuals. Our authors conclude then, that, "This fact suggests that our feelings are determined by the changeable relations of the neural processes to the constitution, previous habits and temporary mood of the nervous system, and by the relations of each neural process to all the others within the central system, in a more irregular way than are our sensations and our knowledge." Sensations are regular and dependable, feelings irregular and unpredictable. The complex nature of emotion suggests that it is related to the whole experience and state of the being yet experiments prove it to be very largely cor-

¹. XIII p. 533
tical. On the other hand, organic and expressive changes in the organism seem to make some contribution when they are allowed to function.

The theory which Ladd and Woodworth propound to meet these facts follows. They hold that over and above the regular and more or less uniform sensational reactions which follow a peripheral stimulus, there is a surplus of neural action occasioned in the brain centers. The general character of this surplus would depend on what the whole nervous system was, on its present state, and on what it had been recently doing. It would also depend on how the various new stimulations, running into the brain center, fit in with this current nervous state and with one another. These physiological processes have an affective, feeling side and this constitutes the emotions.

We should have to add to this theory a suggestion that the stimulus which results in the emotion need not always be peripheral. Through imagination or thought an internal stimulus might be supplied. However, the processes here would be the same. A surplus of nervous action would be occasioned and its affective side would constitute the emotion. The affect area of the brain would probably be the sense centers in the Rolandi section though this cannot of course be determined by experimentation. We may draw this conclusion from the fact that emotional affect (as far as the brain centers are concerned) seems very similar to sensation affect.
The question arises as to how tenable this theory may be. Comparison and test seems to bear out its completeness. By bringing the total neural condition of the individual into consideration, we have provision made for variable reactions in those individuals and also an explanation of why different individuals react differently to the same emotional situation.

The experiments which made the James-Lange theory and other organic theories of the emotions untenable do not nullify this one. If the viscera and skeletal muscles are disconnected, then the neural processes which remain in the other areas and in the cortex continue to function and they produce the emotions. On the other hand, if the organic and peripheral reactions are allowed free expression, they make a contribution to the total neural state and hence, probably heighten and emphasize the emotion.

The place of sensations, of intellectual elements and of previous training, is accounted for through influences on the neural system. If McCurdy wishes to give the subconscious a large place in conditioning emotions, it can be done readily here. The flow up from the subconscious would enter the mental stream and effect in varying ways the surplus of neural energy. These physiological processes would register in the same fashion as the conscious processes. Centrally aroused emotions (those resulting from imagination and cognition) would also effect the neural reaction and so make possible an affective tone. The vagueness of the emotional
experience and difficulty of localization is explained by the fact that no one stimulus determines the emotional state. It results from a fusion of all neural elements and each makes its impress. The appreciative and evaluational functions of the emotions would naturally relate stimuli to the whole organism, which fits in with our physiological theory. It would seem that there are no psychological or physiological phenomena which cannot be oriented quite readily to this conception of emotional life.

Another point of interest here is the compatibility of this theory with the new Gestalt psychology and its so-called configurations. The total situation and its configuration would correspond in a way to the total situation or coherence psychology of Ladd and Woodworth.

In conclusion it is well to recognize again the difficulty of attaining certainty in any theory of the emotions which might be presented. The difficulties in the way of direct experimentation especially in the cortical areas make absolute proof of supposed reactions impossible and throw us back on theory and inference. However, we are not content to rest in absolute uncertainty and under these circumstances the above theory is accepted as being the most reasonable and in apparent accord with the majority of the facts.
Part II

The Emotions and Religious Experience

The emotions, as certain leaders of thought, are of a preparatory nature and serve as the basis of organic change in intense emotional states such as rage and fear. Here the autonomic glands are brought into action to prevent fatigue and to give added muscular energy. The reasoning which sustains the above position must somehow be revealed. The truly elementary of emotion are considered to be pleasantness and unpleasantness, or, by pain, satisfaction and unsatisfaction and excitement and calm. Pleasantness, unpleasantness and only would constitute that state of action which created a necessary organic reaction by actively, unpleasantness, pain.
Pt. II

THE WARFARE AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES
Chapter I

The General Appreciative Function of Emotion.

With a more or less adequate physiological theory of the emotions before us, we proceed to a somewhat more practical phase of our problem. If we are to determine the value of emotional experience in religion, we must discover certain facts about the emotions. "What function do the emotions serve?" "What is their purpose and relation to the organism?" "What is their value?"

This is a day of biological psychology and of extreme emphasis on physiology as a wholesome reaction to the unscientific rationalistic psychology of the past. The new psychology would say that the emotions serve the organism in much the same way as the sensations. They warn in case of danger and satisfy in helpful situations.

That the emotions, on certain levels at least, are of a preparatory nature is shown by the facts of organic change in extreme affective states such as rage and fear. Here the ductless glands are brought into play to prevent fatigue and to give added muscular energy. The reasoning which sustains the above position runs somewhat as follows. The basic elements of emotion are considered to be pleasantness and unpleasantness or, by some, restlessness and quiescence and excitement and calm. Pleasantness, quiescence and calm would constitute that phase of emotion which denoted a satisfactory organic reaction to stimuli, unpleasantness, rest-
The question, "What is the function of life?"

With a phrase or more precise phrasing, the statement is often considered in the context of existential philosophy. However, the question may be more accurately stated as, "What is the purpose of life?"

Existentialism emphasizes the individual's freedom and responsibility in the absence of a predetermined purpose. The concept of "existence before essence" suggests that individuals create their own meaning through their actions and choices.

The question of existence and purpose has been a topic of much debate throughout history, with various philosophical, religious, and scientific perspectives.

What is the function of life?"
lessness and excitement would constitute warning phases. The parallel with sensational responses is obvious.
Pleasure and pain serve the same function. The pain aroused by sensation as one touches a hot stove causes the defensive withdrawal of the hand. In the case of emotion the unpleasantness, restlessness and excitement (elements of the affect of fear) at the seeing of a rattle snake would cause withdrawal or flight.

This explanation of the function of emotion is reasonable and in accord with many of the facts. However, it does not take a great deal of reflection to note that such simple reactions do not cover all emotional experiences.¹ For instance, there is the emotional ecstasy of an aesthetic nature which comes with the vision of a beautiful sunset. Again, there are moral experiences which bring a high degree of emotional pleasure. To cite an instance of still greater complexity, we may turn to religion with its accompanying emotional states of a very pronounced nature. All of these complex affective states cannot be dismissed with a wave of the biological baton. When we have finished with an explanation of the biological function of emotion we must press on to an evaluation of the higher ends served by man's affective nature. We believe one of these higher ends it serves is found in religion.

It is not our purpose to include the moral

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¹ XXVI p. 12
and aesthetic functions of emotion except as they enter into religious experience. There is, of course, no distinctly religious emotion any more than there is a distinct religious instinct. Religious emotion is like any other emotion biologically, except that it is aroused by what we term a religious situation. Often times religious emotion is a combination of many emotions all operating simultaneously. It is well to recognize this at the beginning as well as to note the difficulty of isolating completely the emotional nature itself.¹

Traditionally the mental life has been considered to have three aspects. These have been called cognitive, affective and volitional. Lately the volitional element has undergone revision in some minds. It is seen that volition has, and can have, no content whatever unless either affect or cognition have supplied it. Hence, will is being identified with the self, which is considered volitional, and the mental life has been divided into cognition and affect or interpretative and appreciative elements. Whichever classification is used, it must be recognized that no such arbitrary division actually exists. The arrangement is more logical than actual and serves us for study purposes only. In mental experience all the elements are woven closely together in most situations and help and reinforce one another. Thus as we study the emotions and religion it

¹ XXII p. 3
will be seen from time to time that cognitive and vol-
ttional elements often creep in. They will be accounted
for and related to the emotions as occasion arises.

We face again, now, the problem raised above. The question might well be phrased, "What are the higher functions of emotion?" This question we follow with another, "What is the function of emotion in religion?" These two questions will be considered in the order given.

First, the higher functions of the emotions in general. On the highest levels of human consciousness we have a very complex situation with which to deal. The will has begun to function as has also the interpretative and affective life and stimuli do not result in immediate reactions. The mental processes operate and often delay the response to any particular situation. The thinking aspects are active, that they may serve volition and, what is just as important, the simple affective states of pleasantness and unpleasantness are developed into a system of values which also serves the volitional life in a supplementary capacity to thinking.

Why are we justified in giving the affective or emotional elements of life, which in their simplest state manifest themselves as pleasantness or unpleasantness, so large a place in furnishing the material for cognition? The answer lies just here - the cognitive or thinking phase of mental life would not func-

1. XI p. 176f
tion unless it had something worthwhile to think about. The emotions furnish this worthwhile content. The array of objective phenomena which constantly impress stimuli upon our senses would not be considered by the cognitive functions if they were not first evaluated and made meaningful to us as individuals. The emotions — pleasantness and unpleasantness, and their complex developments, tell us where the stimuli are favorable (valuable) to us or not. Evaluation is not an intellectual process alone. Value attracts or appeals interesting us; it is pleasant or unpleasant to us and it is the affective tone which determines this attraction. In other words, our affective nature determines our appreciation of a situation. Association and even rudimentary cognition are, of course, also present. It is impossible to absolutely isolate one aspect of the mental life such as the affective experience, but we must recognize feeling as at least a primary element here. As one author says, "Feeling is as basic a mental process as thinking, and furnishes the motive not only for overt reaction, but for all of the intellectual processes as well." Cognition takes the evaluated affective material and uses it in interpretation.

The physiological phase of our study has shown us how inevitable it is that our emotions should serve in this appreciative capacity. Our emotions are

1. IV p. 85
2. See I p. 218
The problem of finding a reliable and consistent solution for a particular problem has long been a challenge in various fields. It is not uncommon to encounter situations where the data or information available is incomplete or ambiguous, making it difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion. The importance of careful analysis and critical thinking cannot be overstated in such scenarios.

In these cases, it is essential to approach the problem with an open mind and a willingness to consider multiple perspectives. This may involve consulting with experts, reviewing existing literature, or conducting additional research to gather more information.

Once a clearer understanding is achieved, it is possible to develop a strategy or solution that addresses the underlying issues effectively. This process may require iterative adjustments and revisions as new insights or data become available.

In summary, the key to tackling complex problems is to remain adaptable, open-minded, and persistent. By taking a thorough and methodical approach, it is often possible to overcome obstacles and derive meaningful outcomes.
individualizing and relate all stimuli to the self in an appreciative way. They are responsive or receptive and make us sensitive to our environment so we may appraise its value. Lastly they are automatic in immediately evaluating every situation. The emotional life, in its very nature, is tuned up for appreciative functions.

The important contribution which emotion makes to life is readily illustrated with a mathematical proposition. Take the simple sum $3 + 3 = 4$. I see this and it has no particular emotional effect. It is a simple proposition and I am absolutely neutral emotionally to it. But supposing a man borrows 3 dollars from me at two separate times and then, when he comes to pay me back, tries to say that the $2 + 3 = 3$. The proposition $2 + 2 = 4$ immediately begins to have a high feeling content for me. The new interest is accounted for by a new evaluation of the proposition to the self. We do not suggest that the abstract proposition becomes the interest but what it represents does have a new meaning for us. My intellect and volition begins to operate at once because of this new appreciative appraisal. Thus, it is that the emotions function in every phase of life to give it meaning. The beautiful sunset, the service of worship, the noble moral character, all appeal to me because they effect my life emotionally and are so evaluated. As Valentine observes,¹ it is our feelings

¹. XXVI p. 135
that give life its color, "what mollusks we would be without it". Jastrow says that it is feeling which makes man "more than a machine".\(^1\) and another author characterizes feeling as "the leaven of personality". Without feeling, man would become an automaton, operating like a spring actuated mechanical toy; he could be likened to a cold, calculating machine.

It follows very naturally that unless an object or idea is emotionalized it will have little or no value for us and hence, will not attract. The higher function of the emotions now becomes plain. Religion, morality and ethical idealism must be regarded as values and be filled with emotional content before they will become directive in life. "The development of an ideal is both an emotional and an intellectual process, but the emotional element is by far the most important. Ideals that lack emotional coloring are simply intellectual propositions and have little directive force upon conduct."\(^2\)

A brief but direct reference to religion and emotion may be made here and enlarged upon later. The idea of God, with its moral and spiritual content, must sometime be accepted by the complete individual as of great worth to him. Then will he be able to fill his full place in social and individual development, by virtue of the new emotionalized value. And let it be clear-

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1. XI p. 310
2. Quoted by XXVI p. 87
ly understood that as long as the idea of God and the religious possessions of a man are only considered objectively, as cold intellectual propositions, there will be no power in them, no more than in the abstract proposition $2 + 3 = 4$.

There are yet other contributions which affective experience makes to life and indirectly to religion.

(1) Emotional attitudes give direction to attention. They determine our interests, religious or otherwise. When much material is presented and assimilated our emotions also serve as focal points around which this material can be oriented. They help crystallize our beliefs, ideals and faiths.

(2) Emotion furnishes the driving power for much of our behavior. This is so much the case that some have erroneously identified motive with emotion. As Jastrow points out, emotion moves us to action.¹

The psychological theory of dynamogenesis holds that all ideas tend to express themselves in action. A similar theory might be propounded as regards our affective life. Our feelings are filled with driving power and tend to cause us to act. One author says, "Our emotions are forces, and we have to study them as such."² Another remarks, "The feelings both deliver mind from being merely a clear, cold logic engine, and furnish

1. XI p. 111
2. XXII p. 1
the motive force which drives the engine.1

(3) Emotion has a subjective value in that it contributes directly to personal happiness. Our happiness depends on our level of appreciation. We must have a unity between the intellectual, emotional and volitional elements of consciousness subjectively and a unity between ourselves, society and God objectively. This unity and harmony cannot be brought about unless the emotional element is present.

(4) Lastly, emotion and appreciation, which have been developed properly, insure a broad minded, liberal, complete individual. The qualification, "which have been properly developed" is very important here. The rankest reactionism may be highly emotionalized also but if the higher type of experience is ever attained and cleaved to eagerly it will be because emotion has made its appreciation possible. The values of life which are noblest and highest may be shut off entirely from that individual in whom the appreciative faculty does not function. The narrow, small, and penurious individuals are those in whom the appreciative and emotional content, as far as the higher values are concerned, is sadly lacking.

It is readily seen how these contributions of emotion concern the religious life. The direct connections will be pointed out in the divisions presented later in the paper.

1. IV p. 89
Perhaps a word of warning against an over emotionalism may be in order since we have been emphasizing the value of the emotions so strongly. Here it is that we become aware of the fact that not only does the intellect need the emotions but also that the emotions need the intellect. The emotions may give life to the intellectual machine but the intellect protects the emotional life from doing serious damage as well as often supplying an interpretation of a situation so the emotions can function. The emotions of fear, anger and hate, for instance, may prove disastrous to the individual if he does not allow them to be directed by his intellectual life. This is not so true of the finer emotions like sympathy or joy or grief, of course, but even in these, the intellect functions in an interpretative fashion before the emotion makes its appreciation and the affective tone results. In short, the emotions and the intellect are entwined inextricably together and function simultaneously to the advantage of each other. Because there is danger in a scientific age like ours of stressing the intellect disproportionately, we are attempting in this paper to appraise the true value of the appreciative side of the mental life especially in the realm of religion.

Quite often it is customary to classify the emotions and sentiments on the basis of the kind of problems presented. Intellectual emotions would be those aroused by questions of logical truth; aesthetic emotions are those aroused on a question of beauty;
moral emotions those functioning on a question of goodness and religious emotions those coming to light in religious experiences and contacts with God. It is this latter type of appreciative life that we intend to treat more fully in the rest of the paper. We will deal, in order, with the value of religious emotions in conversion, worship and mysticism.

It will be noted that we deal with the emotions and sentiments together under the term emotion. As we have qualified the term emotion it is perfectly legitimate to do this. No one would maintain that the emotions which are feeling and feeling alone operate without stimulus or content. There is always some intellectual content. Ordinarily sentiment is the term used to express the complexes and emotional tendencies which cluster around certain ideas and which are more or less enduring. However, the emotional life in its complete and comprehensive scope covers the whole ground and it is in this sense that we will use the term emotion.
Chapter II

The place of the Emotions in Religious Conversion

Before beginning our study of the emotions as they manifest themselves in the various phases of the religious life, it may be well to attempt to formulate a working definition of religion. We are at once faced with a difficulty that is most pressing. The definitions of religion which have been propounded are legion. Some are psychological, some theological and all have flaws. We must guard against theological definitions - those which define religion as a system of beliefs - for it is with the psychic nature of religion that we are concerned.

But there are difficulties to be met even in psychological definitions because of the diversity present. There are those who have defined religion in terms of intellect. Max Muller writes, for instance, "Religion is a mental faculty or disposition, which . . . . . enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names and under varying disguises." Again religion has been defined in terms of emotion and the famous definition of Schliermacher comes to mind. "The essence of the religious emotions consists in the feeling of absolute independence." Rudolf Otto makes the emotions the basis of his conception of religion also. Finally religion has been defined in terms of will.

1. XVIII
The results of the calculations in Chapter 11.

The analysis presented in previous chapters focused on the theoretical aspects of the problem. In this chapter, we will perform numerical calculations to verify the theoretical results. The calculations will be based on a modified version of the theoretical model, taking into account various parameters and conditions.

The results of these calculations will be presented in the following sections. Each section will include a detailed description of the calculations performed, along with the relevant data and results. The conclusions drawn from these calculations will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
Kant held that, "religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commands", and hence, the will attitude determined man's religious attitude. It is most obvious that there is no agreement even in psychological definitions.\(^1\)

Probably the proper conception of religion lies somewhere between these three above notions. Religion involves the whole of the mental life and a proper balance must be attained in it. Religion involves some relationship to higher supernatural powers. It is comprehensive. Professor Pratt's definition might serve. He says, "Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies".\(^2\) It might be well to add that there are certain more or less common elements in the above conception of controlling power which are found at practically all levels of religious life. According to Strickland these are, "(1) superhuman power, (2) goodness or beneficence, (3) the element of mystery which is common to all spiritual or superhuman beings, and (4) the idea of control or det-

1. See IV p. 1 f
   VII p. 48 f
   XXIV p. 45 f
   XXV p. 1 f
   III p. 59 f

2. XX p. 2
ermination in some way of the destinies of the lives of men."¹ The ideational content of religion becomes much more sophisticated among an advanced people but Pratt's definition and the four above mentioned basic elements will suffice for a general statement of even the advanced idea of religion with which we are to deal.

We proceed now, to a consideration of conversion, especially as it manifests emotional elements. There is some necessity, in the first place, of clearing up the idea of Christian conversion. It too, is variously defined. One author² says it is "the experience of entering the Christian life" and recognizes a "Christian life" as one which is dominated and controlled by Christian ideals and a recognition of God the Father. Another writer says, "The distinctive thing about religious conversion is that it involves the relation of the human being to the Divine Being".³ We might say, in general, that conversion is the experience of the dawning of the God consciousness. It is a sort of "new birth" when the life seems to find a new purpose and goal in the person of God and is definitely committed to the religious ideal.

It is true that the word conversion is not always used in this sense. Because the experience is confined quite largely to the adolescent period and has

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1. XXIV p. 46
2. XXIV p. 110
3. VII p. 230
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so many accompaniments, it is considered by many to be a social experience rather than a religious one. Coe stresses this social element and Pratt also considers the term conversion in a pretty comprehensive fashion. He believes, "... that the great task of the adolescent is to grow out of thinghood into selfhood", and says, "... the essential element in conversion is nothing else than this new birth."¹ Now there is no doubt but that the social element and the growth into selfhood are essential elements in conversion but they are not all there is to religious conversion. In the religious type of experience, the new social growth in the individual takes place but also the individual is related very definitely to God and the religious ideal. No doubt every adolescent's experience is conversion in one sense. That is, he experiences a tremendous growth and new birth and new orientation to his environment. However, if God and religion are not a part of the accepted environment, the conversion is not a religious one and we have no dealings with it here.

As was brought out before, adolescence seems to be the "flowering time of conversion". It is true that some few conversions occur earlier and some later than the adolescent period but they are the exception rather than the rule. However, regardless of the time when the experience comes, it is a time of "new birth" and new orientation to God and the religious ideal.

¹. XX p. 122
There is a new dawning of responsibility and a new realization and acceptance of values. Still another very important factor enters in. Conversion is usually preceded by a period of doubt and stress. Things do not seem to be in harmony and there is a conscious seeking out after peace of mind and soul. The various phenomena of life in this period of stress and doubt cannot be evaluated and put in their proper places. The individual feels "out of place" and is uncertain of his attitude toward life and purpose in it.

There is no need of our going into the adolescent background of conversion at this time. The psychological factors involved can easily be shown to cause the stress period. The great development in physical growth, the increased mental advancement and capacity for thought, the new power of rational judgment and control of action, all of these throw the life into a turmoil. Another important factor is the enlarged emotional life which makes itself evident at this time. How an individual could progress through such a period of physical and psychical change without being thrown into a ferment would be hard to understand. Life would be changing so rapidly that a new adjustment to environment would be absolutely essential.

The situation is somewhat different as far as adult conversion is concerned. The growth of the adolescent period has all passed. Maturity has been reached. It is not physical and psychical growth changes which cause the usual turmoil before the "new birth".
A new valuation makes the one once accepted, inadequate. There is, however, a similarity between the turmoil period of adolescence and maturity. It is the feeling of "being out of place" in relationship to environment. One's system of values seem insufficient and there is a demand for revision. This "out of place" feeling may be described as a sense of sin or as an experience of mental and spiritual unrest but, however named, it is essentially the same in its influence and result.

In somewhat reverse order, than we have given the two essential elements in religious conversion. They are, the period of unrest and uncertainty, followed by the "new birth" or acceptance of a personal God and the religious ideal. In some cases the conversion experience seems to be immediate and epochal in character. In others it is gradual in its development and not nearly so pronounced. But, in any event, there is a change from an old to a new attitude toward life. The old becomes insufficient and is replaced by a new set of values as a personal God and religious ideal is accepted. With this data before us we now approach the problem of the place and value of the emotions in the total experience of religious conversion.

If the emotions, as the early part of the paper demonstrated, perform the appreciative and evaluational functions of the mental life, their value in religious experience is at once obvious. The basal change manifested in the "new birth" of conversion is one of new evaluation. The old becomes inadequate and is replaced
In the same manner that she views the question of the nature and extent of the power of the Executive, the question of the nature and extent of the power of the Legislature is not free from difficulty, and it is, therefore, necessary to consider the question in its various aspects.

First, it may be said that the power of the Legislature is derived from the people. The people, as a sovereign body, have invested the Legislature with the power to make laws. The power is, therefore, said to be "derived from the people." This is the general theory of government, and it has been adopted by almost all nations.

Secondly, it may be said that the power of the Legislature is limited. The power of the Legislature is subject to certain limitations, such as the Constitution, the laws of the land, and the principles of right and justice. The power of the Legislature is not unlimited, and it cannot do whatever it pleases.

Thirdly, it may be said that the power of the Legislature is essential. The power of the Legislature is essential to the maintenance of the Constitution, and it is necessary for the protection of the rights of the people.

Fourthly, it may be said that the power of the Legislature is elastic. The power of the Legislature is elastic, and it can be expanded or contracted as the circumstances may require.

In conclusion, it may be said that the power of the Legislature is a necessary evil. The power of the Legislature is necessary for the protection of the people, but it is also a source of danger. It is, therefore, necessary to limit the power of the Legislature, and to prevent it from doing harm.
by a new system of value which has come to be appreciated through emotional experience. Now, some might contend that there is no reason why this new evaluation cannot take place through the cognitive processes. Starbuck says, for instance, "It is significant that girls first awaken most frequently on the emotional side and least often to new insights into truth. The boys, on the contrary, have the emotional awakening least frequently, but organize their spiritual world most often as a moral one." He seems to think that most boys have a predominantly intellectual and interpretative experience and that the emotions play a minor part except among girls. It is our belief that the so-called intellectual processes which here function among the boys would never be brought into play at all unless the affective life had first functioned. What actually happens is that cognition begins to interpret the moral experiences after they have been evaluated by the emotions. The moral ideals that operate in conversion, the concept of a personal God, the religious stimuli that are made upon the individual, are evaluated first by the appreciative capabilities of the affective life. They are pleasant to the individual because they are prime factors in a needed readjustment. Hence, he feels them as valuable. Then, and then only, are they referred to the cognitive function for interpretation and judgment. The cognitive judgment is a secondary one - the experience has already

1. XXIII p. 198
been judged valuable by the emotions and is given attention for that reason.

The same process, with an opposite result, is present in the stress period which may precede conversion. The stimuli which have heretofore sufficed, become unpleasant to the affective life. Hence, they are felt to be disvalues and the seeking for a new orientation takes place. These "felt" disvalues may then be referred to the cognitive life and there, through interpretation, be judged to be intellectual disvalues also. The essential thing is that it is the affective experience which is primary and directive here regardless of what intellectual elements may be brought into play in a regulative capacity later.

The individualizing and spontaneous elements in emotion go far to explain the above processes. The religious or moral stimulus is given. At once, automatically, the self begins to feel deeply and these feelings are related to the self. It reports in consciousness that the stimulus is pleasant (valuable) or unpleasant (disvaluable) to the self and, having served this appreciative function, the intellect and will are free to do with the report what they will. How important the emotions are in this regard is seen when we recognize that, unless they react to the stimuli in a forceful way, those stimuli would never be given our attention in cognition and volition.

This leads us to take up from the standpoint of religion the four other contributions which we found
the emotions made to life.¹ The first has already been discussed in brief. It is, the power of emotion to direct our attention. The affective life determines our interests in this way, whether they be religious or otherwise. Our affects interest us in things. Once our interest has been aroused and judgments formed, then our emotions give us stability and serve as focal points for future experience. Thus, we see how dependent any religious interest is upon the affective side of life. Religious conversion comes because of a new interest in God and religious ideals and it will not come without this interest. Conversion continues to exert influence in life if our sentiments are aroused and formed adequately. These sentiments will not be aroused unless there is emotional content. The emotions determine interest and sentiment and, through them to a degree, the experience of conversion.

Another distinct service which the affective life renders to religious conversion, lies in its ability to furnish driving power for much of our behavior. As we have pointed out, emotion moves to action. The feelings are forces and in this regard approach the volitional phase of the self. They tend to prompt behavior and to express themselves in actions. They will not permit us to lie dormant when stimuli are impressing themselves on the end-organs. It is readily seen how this tendency of emotion would at least facilitate religious conver-

¹ See p. 39-40 above
sion. When the religious stimuli are present, they are evaluated and, if found valuable, the impulsive power of affect drives us to want to accept the religious ideal. It is very doubtful if pure intellect would ever move any individual to accept religion. The most logical arguments for God and the religious ideal might be propounded and accepted but reason does not have the compelling power possessed by feeling. Affect drives the individual to accept the stimuli as true. This probably accounts for the tremendous strength of religious conviction and loyalty found in many subjects who have had a very dramatic and emotional conversion. Men like Wesley and Bunyan got their driving power largely from emotion. On the other hand, predominantly intellectualistic and critical churches and theologies, like the Unitarian, for example, are comparatively sterile in sheer religious fervor. This does not mean that they are necessarily sterile emotionally in other lines of activity. For instance, Unitarianism has been tremendously emotionalized about higher education and biblical criticism. But because their emotions do not direct them toward piety we may say their religious fervor is weak.

We may consider, now, two practical values which the emotions contribute to life through religious experience. First, they bring personal happiness. Our happiness depends on our level of appreciation. When we have accepted religion as a personal possession then our level of appreciation is heightened and life made
more radiant. Again the emotions insure a complete individual, broadminded and properly developed, by making religion available. Thus, a whole new realm of noble experience is opened up which would otherwise be a hidden book.

These latter two practical contributions are not the least of the many values which we have seen the emotions bring through religious experience. Religion and morality are the highest values of life. No personality can be said to be complete which does not appreciate them. When this Kingdom of values has become a personal possession there is a radiance, purpose and poise to life that can come in no other way! In making this possession possible through religious experience the emotions serve in the noblest possible capacity.
Chapter III

The Emotions and Religious Worship

It is not our intent here to deal with the worship experience in a historical way. It is not necessary that we should do so. The essential principles of worship can be presented and our conclusions drawn from them. Nothing whatever would be gained by tracing the various manifestations of worship from primitive times until the present. Some authors seem to feel that if they can deal with the subject from the standpoint of primitive life they have solved all the problems that arise in connection with it. This accounts for the mass of almost gruesome material which usually faces us in such discussions. Now it is true that the investigations incident to such findings are important and necessary in a study of the history of religion but that is beyond the province of this paper. We take the findings of the historian — deduce certain general principles that may be found in all types of worship — and then relate the emotional life to them. It is safe to say that, though the technique of worship has varied among all people and all ages, the basic principles are the same and so provide us with a good working foundation.

What, then, is religious worship? One author has defined it as, "any exercise through which man feels that he comes into a special relation with his divinity."¹

¹. VII p. 346
Another says worship means, "approaching or seeking relations with the Divine".\textsuperscript{1} Some hold worship to be a group activity only and would so define it as a, "group of persons trying to get into relationship with God".\textsuperscript{2} The latter writers would differentiate between worship and prayer also, at least between worship and private prayer. It is doubtful, however, if such a division is either necessary or actual. We may have private and public worship, group or individual worship, private and public prayer and group and individual prayer, yet all may be called attempts to come into contact with the Divine and in this sense are identical in purpose. Worship tries to bring Divine contacts; prayer is Divine communion and, as such, is a part of and the fruition of worship. There are technical differences in the objective activities in all of these cases to be sure, but the attitude is similar and for the purpose of our present discussion we will class them as one.

It would appear then that worship is the process through which man approaches and communes with what he considers the Divine forces of the world. In the case of the Christian religion, worship means an approach to, and communion with, God. That this God must be considered a personal God goes almost without saying. It is true that some students do not admit this but it is

\begin{enumerate}
    \item XXIV p. 179
    \item XXV p. 159
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difficult to see how any other position can be true. For instance, an old University of Nebraska professor of mine defines prayer as, "ritual observance designed to bring man into nearer relation with the unseen powers of nature". But what man prays to or worships the, "powers of nature", as inanimate forces? The crude anthropomorphisms of primitive people show how impossible such an abstract attitude is. Always there is the transformation of the unseen forces into terms of human personality. Otto says, "It is essential to every theistic conception of God, and most of all to the Christian, that it designates and precisely characterizes Deity by the attributes Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Good Will, Supreme Power, Unity, Selfhood. The nature of God is thus thought of by analogy with our human nature of reason and personality . . . " This statement is well in accord with that of Professor Strickland who finds that the idea of God at all levels includes certain common elements. These are, (1) superhuman power and wisdom, (2) goodness, in the sense of being favorable to man, (3) mystery and (4) the idea of ability to determine, in some degree, the fortunes and destinies of man. Only a personal being could encompass such demands. Thus, worship is the process of coming into contact and communion with a God conceived as personal in nature.

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1. VI Vol. X "Prayer"
2. XVIII p. 2
3. XXIV p. 177-178
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If this conception of worship be true, it is obvious at once that an emotional judgment, or act of appreciation, has to be made before worship can ever begin. This is not true of the mechanics of worship, of course, Mechanically worship may be engaged in at any time but true personal communion, which is the true act of worship, is dependent on an emotional judgment of value. This explains our purpose in dealing with religious conversion before we take up the experiences of worship and mysticism. One who has never made an evaluation of God and accepted the religious way of life will never worship. This puts the whole emotional content of religious conversion behind worship and makes it necessary for it. Rudolf Otto says a significant thing as he begins the third chapter of his "Idea of the Holy". His words follow, "The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no further; . . ."¹ This writer knew that those without the experience could not understand. In the same fashion, those who have not experienced God as a pleasant (in the noblest sense) emotion and so evaluated Him as indispensable to life, need not consider the matter of worship. Indeed they will have no desire to do so. Why should they worship that which they do not value? The

¹. XVIII p. 8
emotions become the foundation of worship, then, for the value judgment concerning God can come only through them.

If a value judgment (based on the human affective life as appreciative judgements are) is necessary as a foundation for religious worship, it is no less necessary for the continuation of worship. "People continue to practice the cult (of worship he means) not only because society insists and because they believe their God is pleased by it, but also because they find it pleasant or profitable or both, in its immediate effect upon themselves."¹ No better proof of the necessity of emotion as an explanation for worship could be asked or given. The emotions are pleasant and unpleasant, etc., in their simplest elements. Those stimuli which are pleasant we hold to be valuable. Once this appreciative function is served we think and act accordingly. In the case cited by Pratt, our emotions in worship are pleasant. Hence, worship is regarded as valuable and is participated in accordingly. If the emotions do not serve their appreciative function and record the experience of worship as pleasant and valuable, men will not worship. This makes it appear that both the beginning and continuance of worship are dependent on the emotions for their driving power. Men do not worship because it seems logically reasonable to worship. They worship because their feelings tell them that it is

¹ XX p. 271
reasonable and desirable (volitional urge) to do so. Though perhaps Hickman did not intend it so, his definition of worship brings out the above proper emphasis upon the emotions. He says, as recorded above, "worship is any exercise through which man feels (the underlining is mine) that he comes into a special relation with his divinity."

It has been stated above that man continues to worship because he feels he is benefited thereby. If this is so, he must realize that God is a greater and mightier being than he and is capable of helping him. No doubt this is one of the fundamental attitudes of man in worship and it is preceded by a feeling of man's own smallness and insignificance. As a man beset by thugs might run to others for aid, so a man beset by a feeling of his own weakness might go to God for companionship and strength. This feeling of weakness and inadequacy is called the "creature feeling" by Otto and it finds its explanation in the emotional life of man. It is his affective nature which first warns him that all is not well. There is a feeling of uneasiness and lack of peace which is unpleasant. He begins then to seek that environment which will replace unpleasantness with pleasantness and turmoil with peace. Through worship and communion with God he finds that a new peace comes. The great power and security of God brings him individual power and security. The miracle is wrought. Thenceforth, he attempts constantly to be in contact with this new found strengthening power. He cannot
maintain it constantly, he finds, but when he is performing the acts of worship he feels his greatest satisfactions. Worship results, then, partly from the "creature feeling" of man. And we must keep firmly in mind the fact that it is a "creature feeling". Worship appears rational to the religious man, it is true, but rationalization of feeling content has made the intellectual position possible. What he feels precedes what he thinks about worship.

Psychology will not permit us to actually divorce these two experiences absolutely as this statement would indicate. As has been pointed out before, the various mental processes are so closely woven together as to be practically simultaneous but the feeling element, which assures us worship is pleasant, does have a precedence here even though it probably could not be measured by any man made machine.

In the above mentioned "feeling of dependence" there is perhaps a partial explanation of the fact that worship so often takes the form of group activity. The social bond is everywhere evident in man's doings. Men study, hunt, travel and live together. This association comes, no doubt, because man finds comfort and assurance in the fellowship of his fellows. He feels more sure of victory in his undertakings and more confident when numbers are present. May this tendency not be an explanation of a part of the satisfaction of group worship? When an individual enters a church, there to come into communion with his God, it is comforting to find many
The page appears to contain a paragraph of text, but the content is not legible due to the quality of the image. It seems to be discussing some form of scientific or technical topic, but the specifics are unclear.

To summarize, the text is not readable enough to extract meaningful content. A higher quality image or a clearer scan would be required to provide a proper transcription.
of his fellows there with the same intent. Joining with them in worship brings confidence and assurance that God will hear his prayer. Who has not felt the sway and lift of the devotional spirit in a company of worshippers repeating the Lord's Prayer together? Probably not the least value of creeds is the conviction which comes from hearing them repeated by a great mass of men. Yet none of this feeling of content in the religious social group can be attributed to the cognitive activity. It is something more primal than that which strikes these spiritual assurances into a man's soul. The affective life supplies this content and conviction. Social worship is highly dependent upon it.

There are two other elements, quite common in worship, which bring out the importance of the human emotions. The first is the "feeling for the sublime" or tendency to idealize a world which is nobler than this; a tendency quite common to the religious individual. He has seen visions of a higher and more perfect sphere, itself a creation of his mind, (the values of which have been supplied by his emotions) and he feels cramped and handicapped in this present realm. The desire comes at times for his soul to be freed from its earthly prison that it may find expansion and power in the more glorious ideal world. This ideal world is built up as a result of a feeling of dissatisfaction with this world and a feeling of higher values that has come through religious experience. Now in the experience of worship the straining individual finds a
The following lines are the same incoherent and seemingly meaningless text. The text appears to be a jumbled collection of words and phrases that do not convey a coherent message. It is difficult to determine the intent or context of the text due to the lack of logical structure or meaningful content.
compensation for the limitations of the terrestrial sphere. Communion with God opens the door of spiritual opportunity to the restrained life. There is no distinction of persons before God. Rich and poor, educated and unlearned, stand before Him, alike. All material limitations are dispelled and the idealistic fight to the throne of God is achieved. Probably not all types of worshippers have the same intense idealizing experience as is here described but it is undeniable that the tendency may be found in all worship. There is little need to point out that these reactions are all manifestations of our emotional or affective life and, as such, increase the dependence of worship on the appreciative function.

The second element of the worship experience which we wish to mention here has to do with man's sensitivity to the aesthetic. It is pretty well established that our aesthetic nature is dependent upon the emotions. It is the feeling of beauty or lack of beauty that determines our aesthetic reactions. Aesthetic stimuli are pleasant or unpleasant and hence, beautiful or ugly. What this may have to do with worship is another question. Perhaps it has nothing whatever to do with it. On the other hand, there are many indications that there is a direct connection between the aesthetic appeal and the experience of worship. A simple question or two may bring out this connection. Is it easier to worship in beautiful surroundings than in ugly ones? Why not have church in a bare board building? Why in-
 stall expensive organs in the temples of worship and have elaborate music? Why have attractive religious symbols in our sanctuaries?

The suggestion is obvious. Most of us find it easier to worship in an atmosphere which is aesthetically pleasing. Of course, contrary cases can be cited. The Quakers seem to prefer simplicity and yet no one would depreciate their spiritual attainments. Individual cases can be cited of men with no aesthetic appreciation who, nevertheless, lived in spiritual ecstasy. But this is apt to be the exception rather than the rule. Beauty of environment usually adds to worship appreciation. It is true that there is indefinite proof here of emotional reinforcement. However, with our findings thus far indicating that the emotions play a very large part in worship and with our knowledge of the dependence of the aesthetic life on the emotions assured, we may safely conclude that it is natural for aesthetic appreciation to reinforce the experience of worship. We may also conclude that this reinforcement takes place because of the similarity of the two experiences.

It would appear from these findings that just as the emotions play a primary part in the experience of conversion, so they play a fundamental part in the experience of worship. Indeed we may say that without the appreciative function, worship would neither develop or be continued.

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1. See VII p. 356, 362
Chapter IV
The Emotions and Mysticism

We have now dealt with the emotions as they affect the best known and most common forms of religious experience. There is another phase of the religious life called the mystical, which should be given at least a degree of attention. Here again we are not dealing with the subject critically. We accept the facts as they are recorded in personal experiences and then attempt to determine the value of the emotional element in them. Whether mysticism is objective or subjective, real or illusory, is none of our concern now. We deal with what seem to be.

All authors seem to realize the difficulty faced in defining the word mysticism. It has been used in multiform ways. Coe\(^1\) gives a list of various historic usages and a reading of this record only increases the general confusion. There is "mild mysticism" and "grand mysticism", "normal mysticism" and "abnormal mysticism"; in fact, there is no end of varieties of the experience. With these facts in mind, we will present a few definitions which seem to get at the heart of the matter as well as it can be done. Jones says mysticism is the, "type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Pre-

\(^{1}\) III p. 263
Chapter IV

The POBOL and Occupation

We propose now, with the same confidence with which we are prepared to face the collision of Our Cataract, to call attention to the uncomfortable reality that We are called the passengers. A reflex, in accordance with the pain it engenders, and the need of being seen as having heard, is to demand that we be heard in a sense in accordance with the pain it engenders. And we do ask that this be seen as a separate issue to the whole question of the political and economic, and the political and economic to the whole question of the political and economic. It is not an interest in where we are, but a concern as to how we are.
sence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage."¹ Another author says, "In the most general sense the mystical type of religious experience is that in which the subject believes he is in immediate touch with the divine."² Pratt is quite explicit, saying, "I propose . . that . . mysticism be defined as the sense of the presence of a being or reality through other means than the ordinary perceptive processes or the reason. It is the sense or feeling of this presence, not the belief in it, and is not the result of sight or hearing or touch, nor is it a conclusion one reaches by thought; it is, instead, an immediate and intuitive experience."³

It is evident, from these definitions, that mysticism has a relationship to worship and prayer but that it goes beyond them in both certainty and content. The object of the experience is the same, of course. It is a personal Divine Being which is experienced but the relationship is more immediate and forceful. Those who have made any attempt to give the content of a mystical experience have been sure of one thing and one alone. There has been an immediate flash of insight in which they have been momentarily lifted into the very presence of God. Their physical senses have not born this testimony. It is some sort of inner feeling that brings

¹ XII p. XV
² XXIV p. 242
³ XX p. 337
the conviction.

James says that the experience has four characteristics. It is ineffible (cannot be described readily), noetic (gives deep insight and knowledge without cognition), transient (cannot be sustained for long) and passive (the subject's own will is in abeyance).² The particular phase of mysticism with which we are concerned is the feeling element or what James calls the noetic. It is to be noted that practically all students of the subject acknowledge mysticism to be primarily a feeling or affective state. It is not reason that brings the assurance of immediate divine presence, it is a sort of inner intuition. Yet that the experience is real, cannot be doubted for there are almost countless cases of testimony as to its reality. The effect which the experience has upon the subject is another testimony to its actuality. The subject is sometimes lifted into a great ecstasy and when the experience is faded there is a desire to have it return. This because the brilliant nearness to God and contact with the higher realm has brought great peace and joy.

The conviction which the mystic shows is another factor to be noted. Many contend that they are more sure of the spiritual realities experienced in the mystic state than they are of physical realities recognized as being brought to them through the senses. In extreme mysticism the body is forgotten. There is no

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1. See p. 380-381
realization of sense stimulation at all. The soul seems freed from the physical body and seems to have an immediate and independent contact with the Divine which is felt to be very real. It is obvious that the mystic is dependent upon the same sense impressions for his experience as is any other individual. What really happens is that the emotions give such a convincing proof of the worth of the experience that the senses are forgotten. The mystic is made so certain of reality by his emotions that he forgets the vehicles through which he gets his content.

Whatever else we may say of the mystic experience, it is evident that affect plays a very large part in it. It is emotion, feeling, which gives the reality sense. This being so, we must recognize that without emotion the mystic state would be impossible, even as worship that was vital and warm, would not be possible without it. No realm of religion is quite so dependent on emotion as is that of the mystic.

The one question which must be answered in this connection is concerned with the feeling of reality. Can the emotional life provide it? It seems to have an intellectual or cognitive content. If it is cognition which makes mysticism possible, then emotion has no large place in it. Perhaps we had better recognize here that there are two kinds of rationality. The one is mediated through the logic of ideas and symbols, the other depends upon insight into the meaning of the same ideas and symbols of a direct and immediate kind.
This latter type would be operating in mysticism, as is evident. But some might not acknowledge it as rationality at all and, strictly speaking, it is not conventional rationality. May we not call it a higher rationality, recognizing, of course, that it is not technical rationality at all but above it? It is more immediate in its results than conventional cognition. It is more sure and certain of its results — they are most real, though less easily described. Why, then, should we not call it a higher rationality? It is the rationality of feeling and emotion. It comes when the emotional nature reacts so favorably and pleasantly that there is immediate surety of well being. The experience does not need to be turned over to cognition for verification and regulation. It is so desirable to the emotions as to carry its own proof.

Such rationality — that based on feeling and immediacy — might be called affect-rationality. The judgments based on it have been called value judgments and are recognized as playing an important part in religious experience. They give the feeling of worth and in the case of mysticism they manifest a relationship in which the subject is in immediate contact with reality.
Summary

Part I

Chapter I The human self has emotional aspects as well as those of cognition and will. These emotional phases of experience may be reduced to the elementary feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Affect is individualizing in nature; it is receptive and may be aroused by either personal or impersonal objects and, finally, it is spontaneous, being almost instinctive in nature. We may speak of intellectual, moral, aesthetic or religious emotions depending on the type of situation which arouses them. Altogether we must recognize the emotions as constituting a distinct and important aspect of mental life.

Chapter II In propounding a physiological theory of the emotions, one is handicapped by the difficulties of observation and experimentation in the field. One possible theory is that the emotions are the affective side of instinct. McDougall sponsors this position. It is untenable, however, for instincts and their supposed accompanying emotions are not identical or invariably associated. The outward bodily expressions such as frowning, smiling, etc., do not account for emotion for they can be indulged in without the affective state being generated.

One quite plausible explanation of the affective life is that it is the feeling side of certain organic reactions such as increased heart beat, endocrine
activity etc. Much experimentation has been done along this line and it is very obvious that there is a close connection between emotion and organic activity. The autonomic nervous system controls these activities. The James-Lange theory of the emotions holds to the above thesis. However, when an attempt is made to classify the affective states which accompany certain types of organic reactions some difficulties are met. Often times different emotions follow practically the same organic reactions. Also Sherrington has found that emotional responses occur in dogs when the visceral and skeletal muscle has been disconnected. This makes it appear that the cortical areas are primary in affect.

The supposition that the sensations can be appealed to as an explanation of our emotional life is untenable when a complete study is made. Objective stimuli do not always arouse the same affect as they do in the case of sensations.

Miss Calkins theory of the emotions gives a primary place to the cortical areas although the fundamental initiation of feeling is grounded in the organic processes as is the case with the James-Lange theory. Sherrington's experiments discredit this position. If, however, Miss Calkins will give the cortical areas a place in initiating emotion there is little fault that can be found with the theory.

The Ladd and Woodworth physiological theory presents the most plausible explanation of the emotional aspect of experience. It accounts for the very com-
Due to the nature of the text, it is not possible to transcribe it accurately.
plex nature of affect and gives the cortical areas their proper emphasis. The theory follows:

Over and above the regular and more or less uniform sensational reactions which follow a peripheral stimulus, there is a surplus of neural action occasioned in the brain centers. The general character of this surplus would depend on what the whole nervous system was, on its present state, and on what it had been recently doing. It would also depend on how the various new stimulations, running into the brain center, fit in with this current nervous state and with one another. These physiological processes have an affective, feeling side and this constitutes the emotions.

This position seems to stand comparison with the other theories that have been propounded and with the facts. It includes all of value in other explanations and also some necessary approaches not elsewhere found.

Part II

Chapter I  The function of the emotion of the lower planes is preparatory. Feeling prepares the organism for certain types of reaction. But there are higher planes of feeling experience, namely, aesthetic, moral and religious. In general we may say the higher function of emotion is appreciative and evaluational. The feelings valuate stimuli and turn those considered worth while over to the cognitive aspects of mental life for interpretation and comparison. The feelings give life its
Chapter I

The Importance of the Position of the Foreman

In management, testing the foreman's abilities is critical. The foreman is often responsible for:

- Implementing policies and procedures
- Managing day-to-day operations
- Ensuring safety and compliance
- Motivating and supervising employees

To succeed in this role, the foreman must have strong leadership and decision-making skills. In this chapter, we will discuss the key attributes of an effective foreman and strategies for developing these skills.

Note: If the page contains any illustrations or tables, they are not included in the natural text representation.
color and make man more than a machine.

If stimuli do not effect the organism pleas-
antly, they will not be considered valuable. Hence,
the emotions direct attention, furnish driving power
(interest), contribute to personal subjective happi-
ness and insure complete individuals. The emotions
should not be emphasized, however, to the complete
discredit of cognition and volition.

Chapter II  Religion is defined as, the serious and so-
cial attitude of men toward the personal power or pow-
ers which they conceive as having ultimate control over
their interests and destinies. In conversion we find
individuals, after a period of stress, reorganizing
their lives and showing allegiance to this Divine Pow-
er. This means that they value God and accept him as
a personal possession. The emotions make possible this
new evaluation. The old values are felt as inadequate
(unpleasant) and the new values as adequate (pleasant)
and, hence, the conversion takes place.

In addition to this function the emotions
serve in directing attention toward God, in furnishing
driving power (desire) for His acceptance and in bring-
ing personal happiness through the widened outlook of
the converted individual.

Chapter III  Religious worship is any exercise through
which man feels that he comes into a special relation
with his divinity. In the case of the Christian it
means the approach to and communion with God. Now,
the act of worship will never begin unless the sub-
ject values God. This appreciation is made possible through the human emotional life. The continuation of worship, once it is begun, depends also upon the feeling of worth (pleasantness) in the experience. Probably no individual worships until he has felt his own insignificance and, by contrast, the greatness and power of God. This is an affective experience and prompts him to seek God for help. Otto calls it the "creature feeling". What man feels precedes what he thinks about worship. The close relationship of the aesthetic experience to worship also stresses the value of emotion in this regard. The aesthetic experience is an affective experience. Beauty aids worship. We conclude from this that worship may also be largely dependent upon emotion.

Chapter IV  Mysticism is the sense of the presence of a being or reality through other means than the ordinary perceptive processes or the reason. It is the sense of feeling of this presence, not the belief in it, and is not the result of sight or hearing or touch, nor is it a conclusion one reaches by thought; it is, instead, an immediate and intuitive experience. Thus, it is seen, that mysticism has a relationship to worship but that it goes beyond it. In mysticism there is an immediate flash of insight in which the subject is lifted momentarily into the very presence of God. The physical senses do not give this testimony. It is something felt. Usually the experience is one of great certainty. What we have in mysticism then, is a value
judgment in its purest state. It is practically all emotion that enters into the immediate state of ecstasy. We may call the mystic experience one of a higher rationality - the rationality of pure feeling.
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