The United States foreign policy in Santo Domingo, 1844-1930

Muir, Isabel Livingston

Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

THESIS

THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN SANTO DOMINGO
1844 - 1930

Submitted by

Isabel Livingston Muir
(A. B., Mount Holyoke, 1914)

In partial fulfillment of requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts
1930
OUTLINE

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN SANTO DOMINGO
(1844-1930)

1. Early history of Santo Domingo till 1844----pp. 1-3
   1. Because of its strategic position Santo
      Domingo plays important part in our Carib-
      bean policy------------------pp. 1
   2. Imports and exports 1927-------------p. 2
   3. Early history a troubled one due to imperi-
      al policies and natural rivalries of
      naval powers of Europe----------p. 3
      a. Under Spanish rule Indians
         are enslaved and negro
         slavery introduced-----------p. 3
      b. Early Spanish interest shifts
         to the mainland Santo Domingo
         suffers early decline but re-
         covers by the beginning of
         the 13th century-------------p. 3
      c. By Treaty of Bâle (1795) Santo
         Domingo is ceded to France---p. 4-5
      d. In 1821 Santo Domingo is annexed
         by Haiti and government is
         discouraged-----------------p. 4-5-
II. Santo Domingo (1844-1904) becomes independent but political rivalries and intrigues, foreign relations and foreign claims endanger her independence ---------pp. 6-24

1. Personal ambitions and rivalries of Santana and Baez and their attempts to get foreign aid keeps Santo Domingo in financial and political chaos -------------------------------pp. 6-14

a. Santana assumes dictatorial powers, works for United States recognition, and French or Spanish protectorate -------------------p. 6

b. Failure to realize his aims results in economic and political discontent and leads to the accession of General Manuel Jimenez -------------------p. 7

c. Jimenez, plagued with inertia and the danger of Haitian invasion is forced to call Baez and Santana to his rescue -------------------p. 7-8

d. Baez becomes president but fails to carry through a program of reform and seeks foreign protection against Haiti -------------------p. 8-10

e. United States interest in Santo Domingo is influenced by American investments there, position of the island, and by existence of negro slavery in the United States -------------------p. 10-12

f. Baez negotiates for Spanish protection and is temporarily succeeded by Santana who also negotiates with Spain -------------------p. 12-13
g. Baez returns to power and resorts to issues of paper money and stirs up political discontent --------------------------- p. 13

h. Santana, returning to power, makes Santo Domingo a Spanish protectorate, The Dominicans acquiesce ------------------------------- p. 13-15

2. Santo Domingo; a Spanish protectorate --------------- p. 15-15
   a. Spain fails to carry through a reform program.
   b. As the Spanish government becomes reactionary, a revolutionary movement forces them to withdraw and the way is paved for the return of Baez.

3. United States and Santo Domingo to 1874. ------------ p. 15-20
   a. Cazneau, the schemer ----------------------------- pp. 15-16
   b. Seward fails to secure the lease of Samana Bay on his own terms ---------------------- pp. 16-17
   c. Baez to get out of financial straits, offers to sell his country to the United States ------ pp. 17-19
      (1) Grant favors annexation but Congress and the Cabinet oppose ------------------------ pp. 18-19
      (2) A Senatorial Commission makes a superficial investigation but annexation fails -------------------------- p. 19
      (3) Baez is overthrown (1874) ---------------------- pp. 19-20
          followed by period of anarchy
   a. He secures amendment of the Dominican Constitution to lengthen his own term and to increase his power ------------ p. 21
   b. He grants financial concessions to the Westendorp Company ---------------------- p. 21
   c. The Harrison administration makes a reciprocity treaty with Santo Domingo but renewal of the Samana proposition fails ------ pp.21-22
   d. Heureaux maintains control of the government by ridding himself of political rivals and by an extensive spy system ------------- p. 22
   e. In desperate financial straits, Heureaux fails to make Santo Domingo a United States protectorate, is overthrown and assassinated--p.23-24
   f. Heureaux leaves a heritage of financial chaos, decay of industry and of agriculture, a flood of paper money, and a stifling of the spirit of liberalism. ------------------ p. 24

III. Unpaid financial obligations and the resulting threat of foreign interference in Santo Domingo lead to a United States Receivership and ultimate military occupation -------------------------------pp. 25-36
   1. The Santo Domingo Improvement Company, deprived of the right to collect customs, appeals to Washington for settlement of claims ----------- p. 25
a. An arbitration agreement (1904) calls for the appointment of a United States financial agent. ----------------------------------------- pp. 25-26

b. This agreement added to the financial crisis and mutual suspicion of president and vice-president leads to overthrow of Jimenez and the accession of Vasquez as provisional president ----------------------------------------- p. 26

2. The prosperity of Santo Domingo is destroyed by revolutionary movements (1903-1904) foreign nations press claims and Santo Domingo pledges customs receipts over and over --------------------- pp. 27-28

3. Roosevelt offers services and persuades Santo Domingo to request a United States Collector of customs ----------------------------------------- pp. 28-33

a. Roosevelt develops a vigorous foreign policy ----------------------------------------- pp. 28-29

b. Roosevelt's plan for Santo Domingo fails ratification in the Senate but is put in force as a modus vivendi until 1907 ---- pp. 30-31

c. The plan is finally ratified as the Convention of 1907 ----------------------------------------- pp. 30-31

d. Under the working of the Convention of 1907 Dominican prosperity returns ---------------- pp. 32-33

4. Assassination of Caceres brings General Victoria to power ----------------------------------------- p. 33
VI.

a. Dominican finances again become chaotic ------- p. 33
b. The Convention of 1907 is violated --------------- p. 33

5. The Taft administration adopts a commercialized policy and begins to interfere in Dominican affairs. Santo Domingo becomes virtually a protectorate of the United States ---------------------- pp 34,35

IV. The Wilson Dominican policy is idealistic in theory but results in military occupation (1916)-------pp.35-44

1. Bryan makes an unfortunate appointment in the person of James Mark Sullivan, minister to Santo Domingo. p. 36

2. Dominican elections are supervised ------------------ p. 36

3. The United States interferes and proposes plan to restore order ------------------------------- pp 36-37

4. President Jimenez, between the devil and the deep sea, is forced to keep a financial adviser against the wishes of his congress -------------------p. 37-38

5. The State Department warns the Dominicans not to violate the Convention of 1907 and demands that the United States be given charge of the Dominican finances and army. ------------------------------- pp 39-40

6. Jimenez refuses the aid of American bayonets and resigns -----------------------------------pp 40-41

7. The military occupation

a. American minister in Santo Domingo attempts to postpone Dominican elections - American marines land at strategic points ------------------pp41-42
b. Newly elected president Carvajal refuses to accept conditions laid down for recognition and payment of funds to the Dominican government is suspended.-------------------p. 42-43

c. Dominicans protest is unheeded and Sec. Lansing offers martial law as only solution--p. 43-44

IV. Military Occupation of Santo Domingo 1916-1924------pp 45-51

1. Proclamation of military occupation Nov. 1916 p. 45

2. Services rendered by the military government pp. 46-47
   a. Financial reforms and settlement of claims--p. 46
   b. Land Survey—land, titles cleared ------p. 47
   c. Improvement of education -------------------p. 47
   d. Improvement sanitary conditions and communication --------------------------------p. 48

3. Growth of Dominican hostility due to ----------pp 48-49
   a. Snowden's lack of tact -------------------p. 49
   b. Arbitrary measures ------------------------p. 49

4. First Consulting Commission fails to accomplish anything --------------------------------p. 50

5. Latin America press agitates for withdrawal and a new Dominican Commission is formed ----p. 50-51
   a. To amend Constitution -------------------p. 51
   b. To revise laws --------------------------p. 51
   c. To draft a new electoral law -----------p. 51

6. Dominicans suspicious of Commission demand complete withdrawal ------------------------p. 51

V. Hughes' negotiations for withdrawal lead to the Convention of 1924 -------------------pp. 52-65

1. Hughes preaches cooperation rather than imperialism --------------------------------p. 52
2. Conditions laid down in Proclamation of withdrawal of June 24, 1921 lead to Dominican protest and postponement of date of withdrawal pp. 53-54

3. Fabio Fallio, Dominican, and Horace G. Knowles American, criticise American plan of withdrawal pp. 54-57

4. Senate Committee makes a superficial visit to Santo Domingo and makes a report which is denounced by Horace G. Knowles pp. 57-61

5. Hughes continues negotiations but Dominicans continue hostile and withdrawal is again postponed pp. 61-62

6. Hughes modifies plan of 1921, eliminating objectionable features. Dominican accept pp. 62-65

VI. Santo Domingo Today and a New Dominican Policy.

1. The Convention of 1924 is accepted in spite of the opposition of the "Pacta Men". pp. 66-71

2. The Constitution is revised to extend the term of Vasquez p. 70

3. Dawes is invited to recommend a scientific budget p. 70

4. The Revolution of 1930—Estrella becomes provisional president—The Revolution is settled without foreign interference pp. 70-71
THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN SANTO DOMINGO.

I Early History of Santo Domingo to 1844.

Between Cuba and Porto Rico lies Hispaniola, the second largest island of the Antilles and the birthplace of European civilization in the Western Hemisphere. Here Columbus first stepped on the soil of the new world, and here his ashes still repose. This island, with an area of 29,536 square miles is somewhat larger than the combined area of Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. Because of its location, this little island has assumed an importance far out of proportion to its resources and population. Situated as it is, it commands the two great passages from the Atlantic to the Caribbean. Therefore, the great bulk of the commerce passing through the Canal to the Pacific and the Far East must pass through the Windward Passage between Hispaniola and Cuba or through the Mona Passage between the island and Porto Rico (1). Because of this strategic position, this island, containing the small republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo, has played and is still playing an important part in our Caribbean policy (2). This policy strongly opposes any foreign interference in this region, or any lax government which might threaten the well-being of the Canal Zone, or our entrance to it.

Although Santo Domingo comprises the eastern two-thirds of the island, it has only one third of the population. Fertile

soil, favorable climate, and a twelve months' growing season makes the island extremely productive. The sun always shines, except for short half-hour showers in the rainy season. The dry season is cool, while the moist heat of spring and summer fosters the rapid growth of crops. A range of temperature from the tropical climate of the lowlands to the more temperate climate of the uplands makes possible a wide range of tropical and temperate plants. The best coffee known to commerce grows wild here. Sugar cane, indigo, oranges, apples, and grapes grow with little labor or care. The wooded lands produce mahogany, satinwood, rosewood, pine, and oak. (3). About 8,000,000 acres are farm lands, 3,000,000 are suitable for grazing, and 9,500,000 are forest lands. In addition to crops produced in the other West Indies, Santo Domingo produces cacao. This crop alone in 1927 was worth over seven million dollars, and was almost wholly absorbed by the United States. In that year, the total foreign commerce amounted to over fifty-eight million dollars, twenty-eight millions of which represented imports, thus giving Santo Domingo a favorable balance of trade. Before the sugar tax of 1922, United States absorbed the greater part of the Dominican sugar crop, but since then it has gone to other markets. Tobacco ranks third in the value of exports, and coffee fourth. The imports include rice, wheat, cotton, and silk-manufactured goods, tools, and leather goods. Of these, sixty-four per cent was carried in United States ships (4). The island boasts of excellent harbors, though most of the transporation on

(4) Foreign Relations - 1929 p. 70.
the island itself is by road. There are two short railroads which at the present time suffer from keen motor competition.

The early history of Santo Domingo is a troubled one. "Before the thirteen colonies had become a nation, European imperial policies and private greed had indelibly written a great deal of Caribbean history. Spaniards, Englishmen, Dutchmen, Frenchmen and international freebooters had fought and plundered each other for centuries" (5). In 1492 Hispaniola was inhabited by approximately two million natives but, because of the cruelty and greed of the Spaniards, the natives were soon exterminated. Sugar culture began in the early 16th century, creating a demand for labor which was satisfied by the importation of blacks from Africa. The Dominican lands were divided up into huge plantations which, by the end of the 18th century, were owned chiefly by absentee landlords. The head of each plantation was virtually a dictator. The means of communication being difficult, the colonial government was prevented from maintaining an effective supervision over the colonists. For a short time after its discovery, Santo Domingo was prosperous and enjoyed the position of being the capital of New Spain, but the lure of gold attracted the Spanish adventurers elsewhere, and after Sir Francis Drake raided the capital in 1586 it began a period of decline. By the end of the 18th century, the island had become prosperous again. In 1791 and 1792 revolts occurred in Haiti, but they did not especially affect Santo Domingo. In 1793 France declared war on Spain but was too busy

(5) Knight, Melvin M. - The Americans in Santo Domingo. p. 2
in Haiti to bother with Santo Domingo. After the war was over, the Treaty of Bâle (1795) ceded the whole of the eastern portion of the island to the French in spite of the protests of the Dominicans (6).

There followed a period of political unrest which, combined with increased piracy in the Caribbean, destroyed the commerce and ruined the prosperity of the island. As a result, many of the wealthier planters abandoned their homes. The rest of the people deprived of their leaders and suffering from increased poverty, lack of discipline, and unrest, began to give evidence of active discontent that led to popular uprisings. In 1804, the Republic of Haiti was established, the second republic in the Western Hemisphere. In 1809, the Spanish colony revolted and, with the aid of the English, captured the city of Santo Domingo. In 1821 Santo Domingo made an unsuccessful attempt to proclaim its independence, but was overrun and annexed by the Haitians. Sumner Welles blames the years of Haitian domination for the anarchy, unrest, and civil disturbances which have been prevalent in the Dominican Republic ever since.

"During the years when the other Latin American republics were afforded the opportunity of learning to govern themselves, Santo Domingo was prostrate under the domination of a tyranny, which had for its chief object not only the eradication of

(6) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard, p. 17
the Caucasian race, but also the obliteration of all the foundations of European culture and civilization upon which the institutions of America would have been built" (7).

II Santo Domingo (1844-1904) gains independence, but political rivalries and intrigues, foreign relations and foreign claims endanger her independence.

On February 29, 1844, the last of the Haitians having left the capital, a provisional government began to rule until a permanent form of government could be established. Santana, who was tremendously popular with the army, was proclaimed Dictator by his troops. His government proved to be re-actionary, liberals were imprisoned, so that those who might have aroused the people were completely removed from the political stage. The following July, the Provisional Government issued a decree calling for an election to Congress. This Congress assembled, made a constitution, and elected as their president, General Pedro Santana. Because the new constitution did not give the president dictatorial powers, Santana refused to accept the presidency until the Constitution was amended to read more to his liking. This was done. The amended Constitution gave to the Dominican president full control of military forces until peace should be made with Haiti. Santana took oath of office in November 1844, and chose a cabinet that would do his bidding. During Tyler's administration, Santana sought United States recognition. Tyler's Secretary of State, Calhoun, advised joint recognition by the United States, France, and Spain, but when Spain objected, the matter was dropped. Meanwhile Santana was working to get either a French or Spanish pro-
tectorate. In 1845, Secretary Buchanan sent an agent to Santo Domingo to determine whether or not the new republic could maintain its independence. He was not entirely satisfied with the report and was convinced that recognition was not desirable unless he was certain that Santana's European negotiations had been unsuccessful. The failure to gain European protection and recognition by the United States upset economic conditions, and political discontent continued to increase. It came to a climax in a conspiracy headed by the Minister of War, Jimenez, who forced Santana to resign in his favor on August 4, 1848. In September, Congress elected Santana's Secretary of War, General Manuel Jimenez, President of the Republic. The new President was known to be by nature indolent, and therefore incapable of carrying out the high-handed policy of his predecessor. He lacked every qualification necessary for the presidency. No program of reform was formulated. No attempt was made to protect Santo Domingo from the danger of a Haitian invasion. Everything fell into confusion under a president whose sole interest was cock-fighting. When the Haitian invasion did come, the defense of the Dominican Republic was handled not by the president, but by patriotic citizens who massed troops at the frontier. The initial defeats of these troops threw the whole country into a panic. Jimenez was apparently helpless, so Congress under the leadership of Buenaventura Baez issued a decree calling on Santana to come to the assistance of the government with all the forces he could gather. Encouraged by this, the disorganized
groups of soldiers rallied around Santana until he had a following of about six thousand. With these he succeeded in routing the Haitians who fled in confusion across the frontier.

From this time on there was a constant struggle between Baez and Santana for power. Jimenez, deserted by the army, and opposed by the majority of Congress, made a last desperate attempt to get assistance from the United States, but failed. The Santana and Baez forces temporarily united and Jimenez resigned and fled. Santana having proclaimed himself Dictator now called the Congress to elect a new president. When Santana appeared before the Congress to lay down his extraordinary powers as Dictator, Baez in the name of the Congress gave him assurance "of its highest gratitude for the important services which he had rendered the republic, freeing it at the same time from civil war and terming Santana in the name of the grateful nation, a precious instrument chosen by Heaven itself" to defend the people of Santo Domingo (8). The Congress then elected Espaillet President who refused to be dictated to by Santana, the leader of the army, and Baez, the leader of Congress. After Espaillet rejected the doubtful honor, Congress elected Baez to the presidency, and adjourned. Before adjourning, they conferred on Santana the title "Liberator of the Fatherland," and General in Chief of the Armies of the Republic. He announced that he would support the new government.

Baez, on his inauguration (September 24, 1849) announced a program of reform which, if carried out, would correct many of the evils of the Dominican Republic. The only one he attempted

(8) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard. p. 94
to force through was the attempt to gain the protection of some strong European power, preferably France. Meanwhile a new threat to Dominican sovereignty appeared in the person of "Emperor Faustin I" of Haiti, who had conceived the ambitious scheme of subjugating the Dominican Republic and even extending his authority to some of the near-by islands. Fearing this, and failing in his attempt to gain French protection, Baez invited the mediation of the United States between Haiti and Santo Domingo. The French and British agents in the Republic protested because they wished to see Haiti in possession of the eastern end of the island. Baez, in desperation, petitioned for the joint mediation of all three. By October 1849, it was evident that French protection was not forthcoming, owing to British opposition, and so the United States government recognized the Republic. Baez, encouraged, renewed his negotiations for a French protectorate and took the offensive against Haiti, but again failed. Faustin then presented to Santo Domingo an offer of peace which would destroy Dominican sovereignty. The offer was, of course, rejected, and things were at a deadlock. Daniel Webster sympathized with Santo Domingo and accepted joint mediation with England and France. Fortwith the three commissioners met at Port-au-Prince to secure the suspension of hostilities. Faustin granted them an audience which is amusingly described by Robert Walsh, the American Commissioner, in a report to the State Department.

"The courtyard was filled with troops in rather
motley attire, who saluted as we passed and the hall of reception was crowded with ministers and generals and other dignitaries who made quite a glittering show. Soon after our entrance, the Emperor made his appearance, in a costume which, though rich, was not in bad taste, preceded by shouts of 'Vive l'Empereur' from his courtiers, and we were presented in due form. He seemed at first decidedly embarrassed, as if he did not know what to say or do . . . Faustin I is stout and short and very black, with an unpleasant expression and a carriage that does not grace a throne. He is ignorant in the extreme but has begun to learn to read and write and is said to exhibit commendable diligence in his studies. Energy and decision are his most important traits and no soft feelings are likely to interfere with their full display when occasion calls them forth . . . It is stated that one of the chief causes for the Emperor's intended expedition against the Dominican Republic is his desire to be crowned in the city of Santo Domingo" (9).

As far as the United States was concerned in Dominican affairs, there were several problems. The situation of Santo Domingo on the highway of empire led to the expansion of the

(9) Welles, Summer - Naboth's Vineyard. p. 115
Monroe Doctrine to political interference. The value of the island and its resources attracted American capital, but the color line prevented normal relations with a negro republic as long as the economic basis of southern agriculture was negro slavery. Neither Haiti nor Santo Domingo was recognized until after secession. The Monroe Doctrine which was intended to be primarily defensive was bound to expand due to the problem of balance of power in the Caribbean. The tri-partite agreement between France, England and the United States was not effective in protecting Santo Domingo from Haiti. The United States wanted Samana Bay but did not dare take it in the face of English and French opposition (10).

The agents of France, England, and the United States, unable to bring about peace, proposed a ten-year truce. Faustin evaded the question and issued a statement through his minister that "His Majesty will do nothing without consulting the Senate, his first duty being to God and to observe the Constitution" (11). Walsh, in reporting the affair to Webster states that with great difficulty he and his colleagues kept straight faces. The Haitian government, to delay negotiations still further, called Congress to discuss the affair. Congress assembled, garbed in fantastic costumes imported from France for the occasion. Faustin's costume was especially remarkable, topped by a chapeau decorated with several vari-colored feathers. The Congress, under the influence of Faustin, accomplished nothing, and Walsh, whose mission was

(11) Welles, Sumner - *Naboth's Vineyard* p. 115
limited to four months, left for home. The failure of the negotia-
tions persuaded Baez that he must depend on himself to prevent
Haitian aggression, so he called out the troops in the spring of
1851 with Santana at the head. Faustin, forced to withdraw, was
then informed that France and England recognized Dominican inde-
pendence.

Baez, having failed to gain the desired French protection
and jealous of Santana's popularity, now began to approach Spain
so that he might weaken Santana's position, but in February 1853
Congress chose Santana as Baez's successor. Santana had two aims
in mind: first, to eliminate Baez, who fled to Saint Thomas; and
second, to gain Spanish protection. Failing in his attempt, he
turned his attention to the United States who had sent to Santo
Domingo an agent, General William L. Cazneau, who continued to play
an important, but not commendable, part in Dominican foreign rela-
tions for some time. Pierce instructed Cazneau to obtain by treaty
a lease of the Samana Peninsula. Opposition to this developed
among the British and the French who threatened to withdraw their
continued mediation between Haiti and Santo Domingo. As this would
lead to a new Haitian invasion, President Santana was forced to
promise that he would never sell or lease any portion of Dominican
territory to any foreign power (12). Rumors were afloat that the
United States coveted Cuba, Porto Rico, and was about to annex
Santo Domingo. To prevent this, Spain modified her attitude toward

(12) Foreign Affairs 1929. p 73.
Santo Domingo, and in 1855 made a commercial treaty. A new Spanish agent was appointed who concentrated his efforts on creating an unfriendly attitude toward the United States and on engineering the return of Baez. He was successful in bringing about the resignation of Santana, and Baez, who could be counted on to take orders from Madrid, succeeded him. Baez's hopes of a Spanish protectorate were destroyed by the sudden recall of the Spanish agent whose measures were repudiated by the Spanish government. Baez, convinced now that he must depend on his own resources, and badly in need of money, resorted to an issue of paper money, and thus made a bad matter worse. Speculators bought up the tobacco crops for paper money and sold it in the European market for gold. Panic set in, the paper money became worthless, and planters were ruined. As economic dissatisfaction breeds political discontent, revolution was in the air, encouraged by Santana's agents. Santana returned successfully, laid siege to Santo Domingo City, and again assumed control.

Embarrassed by the financial condition of the country due to revolutions and to the fact that the Baez administration had mortgaged government property and flooded the country with paper money, Santana was convinced that his only hope lay in Spain, and he began to negotiate, this time successfully, for a Spanish protectorate. On March 21, 1861, Spain annexed the Dominican Republic. Among the Dominicans, there was little resentment at this turn of affairs but rather a feeling of relief. The unfortunate experiences through which the Dominicans had passed, the years of political un-
rest, the continued threat of Haitian invasion, the exile of liberals, and the desire of the commercial and agricultural classes for peace, made the Dominicans friendly to any government that could maintain order and let them pursue their agricultural and commercial interests undisturbed. Spain insisted that annexation had been forced upon her and that she had no desire to interfere with the independence of Santo Domingo, that she wished merely to protect it from the outside world.

The Spanish protectorate, however, was not all the Dominicans hoped and expected it would be. Friction soon developed between Santana, as Captain General, and the Spanish officers. Spain had promised reform, but the reform program failed to materialize. Spanish officers took the place of natives in the Dominican army. From Spain, Cuba, and Porto Rico, came office seekers, and the payroll grew. To the disappointment of the Dominicans, Spanish annexation did not make the island prosper. The Spanish government refused to redeem the paper money and even repudiated a whole issue of fifty-dollar notes as counterfeit, thus stirring up bitter protest. The harsher Spanish penal code was substituted for the more enlightened Napoleonic code. Religious intolerance took the place of tolerance, taxes were increased, and discontent spread among all classes. In 1862, Santana resigned and his successor, a man of incredible stupidity, tried to hold the opposition in check by brutal and oppressive methods. Yellow fever thinned the ranks of the Spanish troops, the revolutionary movement grew, the Dominican flag was hoisted, and by
the summer of 1865 the last Spanish forces left Santo Domingo.

The withdrawal of Spain was followed by a period of anarchy. The provisional government was helpless and our minister demanded American warships to protect lives in the Dominican capital. Meanwhile Santana had died, but Baez was much alive and hoped to regain power. At first he had been opposed to Spanish annexation, but later supported it, succeeded in convincing Spain of his importance in Dominican affairs, and was granted a subsidy. While his countrymen were suffering under Spanish tyranny, Baez was living in luxury in Europe. When he learned that Spain was planning to abandon the island, he began to plot for return to power. Through the efforts of his agents, the provisional government was undermined and fell, paving the way for the third inauguration of Baez. He immediately adopted repressive measures, set aside the constitution of 1865 and substituted for it the less liberal constitution of 1854. The rule of the Dictator was short lived, and in less than five months revolution was again in full sway, Baez was forced to flee, and General Cabral was chosen provisional president.

During the period of Spanish occupation, Cazneau, Pierce's appointee, had been busy trying to make personal profit out of the political situation. He was of French Roman Catholic extraction, born in Massachusetts, but had spent most of his life in Texas. When Captain (later General) McClellan was sent to Santo Domingo to make a survey in 1854, Cazneau accompanied him. During the Civil War he was denounced as a southern sympathizer. (13)

He formed a partnership with General Joseph W. Fabens, a man as unscrupulous as himself. Both hoped that their friendship with Santana would gain for them concessions, but in this they were disappointed. When slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia, and the government was encouraging the freed blacks to emigrate, these two men formed the American West Indian Company, invested $4,000. themselves, advertised a $2,000,000. investment in Dominican lands, and encouraged immigration. His scheme in the American West Indian Company was to colonize somewhat after the early Texan method. Armed Americans who had invested in Dominican lands were to be placed between Haiti and Santo Domingo. One group of prospective settlers was driven out by a revolutionary movement and the remnant of another was sent home by the American commercial agent. The scheme worked out badly for all except Cazneau and Fabens who made a small fortune in the deal (14). After this, the partners launched other wildcat schemes, but their real opportunity came after the Spanish evacuation. Secretary of State, Seward, was trying to mend the Monroe Doctrine, which had suffered during the Civil War. He felt the need of a West Indian naval base to remove the danger of European aggression in the Caribbean. The choice lay between the Danish West Indies and Samana Bay on the Atlantic side of Santo Domingo and fairly near to the Mona Passage. Believing that Napoleon III was trying to promote the return of Baez as a step toward French annexation, Seward favored Samana and set sail himself to investigate. The American minister in Santo Domingo

(14) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard. p. 314
was habitually drunk and in no condition to be of service to the American Secretary of State, so the task of interpreter fell to Cazneau who made the most of his opportunity. He attempted to convey the idea that the Dominicans wanted closer relations with the United States. Cazneau made such favorable impression on Seward that he seriously considered naming him Minister Resident for United States in Santo Domingo. Americans living in the Republic took pains to acquaint Seward with Cazneau's past record and the opportunity was withdrawn.

Meanwhile the Dominican government, still in a chronic state of financial embarrassment, sounded the United States government on the question of a loan in return for concessions in the region of Samana Bay. Seward immediately sent his son to negotiate an agreement with the following instructions: The United States was to have the right to fortify and protect the leased property. If absolute cession was granted, the United States would pay $2,000,000. one-half cash, and the rest in munitions. If a lease was arranged, it must not be for less than thirty years; $10,000 to be paid on ratification, and $13,000 yearly rental. As the Dominican government was unwilling to grant complete control of Samana Bay, Seward rejected the Dominican offer and began to negotiate for the purchase of the Danish West Indies (15).

The failure of the negotiations, the weakness of Cabral's government, and the resulting domestic disturbances, gave Baez and his followers the opportunity to spread discontent, and Cabral's

government was overthrown by Baez. The new president showed willingness to lease Samana Bay on more favorable terms, but his position was so unstable that Seward held off. The Senate having rejected the treaty for annexing the Danish West Indies, the time seemed ripe to resume the Samana Bay negotiations. Baez was willing to sell Samana Bay and Peninsula for $1,000,000 in gold and the same amount in munitions. If the United States refused to accept, Baez would be obliged to make similar proposals to England, France, and Spain. The quarrel between Johnson and the Senate delayed action until Grant's administration. In 1869, Baez, realizing that financial conditions were bad and that he was on the verge of a downfall, again approached the State Department on the subject of annexation. He stressed the riches of his country, the poverty of his people, the undeveloped natural resources, and added that his people longed for annexation to United States "whose institutions they loved above those of all other nations" (16). Grant himself favored annexation but he met stubborn opposition in Congress. He sent an agent to find out Dominican sentiment in regard to annexation in return for the assumption of the Dominican debt by the United States and a United States protectorate until the question could be referred to a plebiscite. In spite of opposition in the Senate and in the Cabinet agreements were signed November 29, 1869, for the lease of Samana Bay and annexation (17). The treaty was laid before the Senate and in a special message to the Senate,

(16) Thomas, D. Y. - One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p 218
(17) Welles, Sumer - Naboth's Vineyard. p 379
Grant urged ratification. Sumner, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, and who was then working for annexation of Canada, threw his influence on the side of the opposition and the treaty was defeated by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-eight (18). Sumner severely criticised the corruption of the Grant administration, and in an interview given to the New York World, declared that a friend of his who lived in Santo Domingo had told him that the coast of Samana Bay was staked off into lots marked "Baez", "Cazneau", "Babcock", and "Grant" (19). Congress appointed a commission to make a visit of inquiry in Santo Domingo. On January 16, 1871, the three commissioners, Senators Benjamin Wade, Andrew D. White, and Samuel G. Howe, arrived in Santo Domingo on the Steamship Tennessee. The Commission carried on a superficial investigation, spending twenty-two days in the capital city and therefore its findings were not worth much (20). The report of the Commission transmitted to Congress, April 5, 1871, sustained Grant's point of view, but no action was taken (21). American vessels were withdrawn and Baez finally leased Samana Bay to a private company, the Samana Bay Company of Santo Domingo (1872). The following year, he was overthrown (January 2, 1874).

Then followed ten years of anarchy, a succession of military presidents who served a few weeks and were overthrown by new revolutions. After the overthrow of Baez, General Gonzalez became president, and one of his first acts was to cancel the concessions.

(18) Thomas, D. Y. - One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p.
(19) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 396
(20) Knight, Melvin M. - The Americans in Santo Domingo p. 13
to the Samana Bay Company. Because of an attempt at revolution under General Caceres, Gonzalez decided the government was too liberal and adopted repressive measures which, together with the bad financial conditions, led to his downfall and the election of Don Ulises Francis y Espaillat (1876). He was unique in that he was unselfishly devoted to the interests of Santo Domingo, advocated no foreign entanglements, insisted on only legitimate taxes, and no further issues of paper money. Baez and his followers plotted his overthrow so successfully that by March 1877 Baez was again in power. In the summer of 1878, Gonzalez was again elected and served till September when he abdicated (22).

In May 1880 a fine type of patriot, Padre Merino, was elected president and inaugurated a period of peace and material prosperity. Imports increased, more sugar lands were planted, and many immigrants came from Cuba and Porto Rico. The energetic action of the government caused the failure of a Baez-Gonzalez conspiracy. In September 1882, a regular constitutional election was held, and General Ulises Heureaux was elected. This "marks the commencement of an epoch of seventeen years during which the interests, the development and even the fate of the Dominicans as a sovereign and independent nation were obscured and merged in the destinies of one man, the negro, Ulises Heureaux (23)."

The whole administration was the struggle of one man to maintain power. His first administration was quiet and uneventful. His policy was one of conciliation. Freedom of speech and press

(22) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 431-432.
(23) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 444
was at first allowed, but when the time came for a new election in the spring of 1884, by underground methods he got rid of his opponent and secured re-election. He resorted to bribing his political opponents to keep control of the government. If this failed, he resorted to exile or assassination. He secured the revision of the constitution to extend the term of the presidency and to modify the method of election so that he might retain power. In dealing with foreign nations his policy was to play one off against the other.

The finances of the Republic had been going from bad to worse and the bonded debt had risen to such a figure that Heureaux (1888) sought relief in the European Westendorp Company, who floated a loan of £770,000 at 6%, and in 1890 another of £900,000. This company was given the right to collect customs duties, and United States did not protest. As this company was not very successful, the right to collect customs was transferred to the Santo Domingo Improvement Company organized under the laws of the state of New York (24). This gave Heureaux a short breathing space, and although there were signs of rebellion they were rapidly crushed.

The Harrison administration then succeeded in negotiating and ratifying a reciprocity treaty putting Dominican sugar, molasses, coffee and hides on the free list and giving twenty-six American commodities free entry to Santo Domingo. Germany thereupon threatened tariff reprisals which would interfere with the sale of Dominican tobacco and thus stir up active discontent in the tobacco growing provinces of Cibao. The Harrison administration

(24) Foreign Relations 1929. p 77
then took up again the Samana Bay lease, but when rumors leaked out that such negotiations were in progress, Heureaux denied them and the lease was further delayed.

Then followed a program of recklessness and wastefulness, tyranny and corruption that won for Heureaux popular hatred and eventually caused his downfall. The financial needs were pressing and the political situation at home was a menace to his peaceful election due to the increasing popularity of General Generoso Marchena, the financial agent who had negotiated the Westendorp loan. To counteract the growth of American influence in the Caribbean, he evolved a scheme to improve the financial situation by indirect intervention of European powers through a European syndicate composed of citizens of the chief European countries. In 1893, Marchena announced that he would oppose Heureaux in the presidential contest. The Dictator, who controlled the political machine, easily defeated him, imprisoned him, and finally had him shot. As time went on, Heureaux's position became more and more difficult and his administration degenerated into a reign of terror. "He forgot to conciliate and remained only to oppress" (25). He maintained an extensive spy system that reached to United States and even to European capitals, in every settlement in the Dominican Republic he kept a mistress who informed him of any signs of active resistance to the Dictator's policies. His late years were marked by loss of self-restraint, and increasing cruelty. He filled the prisons with the more promising younger Dominicans, especially per-

(25) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 515
secuting those who seemed to aspire to the presidency. Some of these he assassinated, but some saved their skins by flight.

Heureaux's final downfall was brought about by a Revolutionary Junta organized by General Horacio Vasquez aided by Don Federico Velasquez. Obtaining some financial aid from Europe they planned a revolution in 1894 and 1895, inviting Don Juan Isidro Jimenez to be the leader. Jimenez had other plans up his sleeve and not only declined the offer, but broadcast the fact that he had been so honored, to gratify his own vanity, and the Junta was forced to dissolve. In the early summer Jimenez tried to carry out his own plan, landed troops in Monte Christi, but was miserably defeated.

By 1898, Heureaux was pretty near the end of his rope. The price of purchasing his own security had been such a drain on the treasury that his money was gone and his credit, too. The country faced bankruptcy, and active discontent was everywhere. Market people refused to bring their crops to market and sell them for depreciated paper money. Heureaux, driven to desperation, suggested that though the general public was opposed to the cession of Samana Bay, the United States might seize it to satisfy a supposed claim. He also suggested that with $300,000 he might by propaganda change public opinion in favor of the cession. The United States then declared that they were not interested in the actual cession of Samana Bay, but they were willing to negotiate for a lease. In May 1899, Heureaux presented to the new United States Minister to Santo Domingo, a draft of a secret treaty
which would make United States the protector of Santo Domingo (26). This was also rejected by the State Department. But Heureaux's days were numbered and a new revolutionary movement again led by General Vasquez cut short the Dictator's career by the Dictator's own favorite method, assassination. Thus ended a shameful administration, honey-combed with corruption, characterized by unconstitutional methods, increased public debt, arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, assassination, decay of agriculture and commerce, over-issue and consequent depreciation of paper money, and worst of all the dulling of liberal feeling in the minds of the younger generation.

The assassination of Heureaux found the Dominican people in what seemed to be a state of hopeless indifference to the political situation and the revolutionary leaders were discouraged by the lack of public response. General Vasquez, who had overthrown the unpopular Dictatorship, and who could have become Provisional President, now stepped aside in favor of Don Juan Isidro Jimenez, whose sole qualification seemed to be his apparently unbounded wealth. It was commonly supposed that his wealth would remove the poverty of all. As a matter of fact, his wealth was only a myth. His ill-starred revolutionary activity and the Heureaux regime had left for him his fortune, and his chief motive for seeking office was to recoup his personal fortune. On October 20, he was elected president, with Vasquez vice-president, but harmony did not long prevail.

(26) Welles, Sumner - Neboth's Vineyard p. 330
Unpaid financial obligations and resulting threat of foreign interference in Dominican affairs leads to a United States receivership and increased interference and ultimate military occupation.

Secretary Hay, anxious to show a friendly attitude toward the new government, instructed Mr. Powell, the American minister, not to press the payment of American claims. Powell disregarded the instructions and thus provoked hostility toward the American government. This was demonstrated by an order which excluded the Improvement Company from collecting the customs (27). The Improvement Company appealed to Washington. Jimenez sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Washington to represent the Dominican interests. The Company claimed $11,000,000. for bonds still held, and its interest in railroads, and other rights. Vasquez, who had overthrown Jimenez in 1902, signed an agreement with the United States fixing the amount due as $4,500,000. and leaving the method of payment to be determined by a board of arbitration composed of two Americans and one Dominican (28). This board met in Washington and handed down an award in 1904 which provided that Santo Domingo should pay to the Improvement Company and certain other companies four and a half million as full indemnity for their property rights and claims. It marked out three customs houses as security and appointed the Vice President of the Improvement Company as a financial agent. Payments were to be made in monthly installments of $25,000. each. If the Dominican government failed to pay said installments, the financial agent was to take over the customs houses in certain

(27) Welles, Summer - Naboth's Vineyard p. 530
(28) Foreign Relations 1929 p. 78
ports. Until the debt was paid there was to be no reduction in duties (29).

A bitter political dispute resulted. Vasquez, though loyal to the government, opposed the contract and it was soon evident that the breach was widening between President and Vice-president. This was partly due to the disagreement over the contract and party due to inability of the government to solve the financial crisis. Salaries were unpaid and a deficit resulted. The followers of Jimenez were known as the Jimenistas and those of Vasquez, the Horacistas. Jimenez was accused of failing to account for expenditures of a large part of the yearly revenue. The financial confusion was made worse by a presidential decree increasing the salaries of government employees by fifty per cent. Congress protested by passing a vote of censure charging that the president had exceeded his powers. Vasquez tried to persuade Jimenez to modify his course and with every intention of supporting the administration offered an armed force to put down a revolutionary movement then in force. Jimenez, suspicious of Vasquez's motives, refused and soon the Jimenistas and the Horacistas were up in arms against each other resulting in the overthrow of Jimenez. Vasquez thereupon came to power as provisional president and immediately proposed an ambitious program of reform, including a budget, encouragement of agriculture, a plan to discourage revolution by disarming individuals, a hope to establish credit abroad, and above all a promise for an honest administration. In spite of the promising program the Vasquez government was not destined to live long. When the government was less than six months

(29) Thomas, D. Y. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p. 222
old it had a revolution on its hands which helped to create a
deficit. Many were dissatisfied because Vasquez refused to continue
the subsidies granted by Jimenez to local politicians. The followers
of Heureaux did their best to increase dissatisfaction by reminding
the Dominicans of the peace of the Heureaux administration. A large
number of political prisoners were collected in the capital and they
finally succeeded in gaining control of the city. American and Ger-
man troops were landed to protect the American and German consulates.
Vasquez, ill and discouraged because the people were apparently will-
ing to accept the followers of Heureaux, fled to Cuba.

After the overthrow of Vasquez, the political situation
of the Dominican Republic became more confused than ever. In April
1903, General Wos y Gil became provisional president. The follow-
ing July he became constitutional president, but was overthrown in
November by a revolution under the leadership of General Morales
who became the head of the provisional government. While Morales
was president there was a three-cornered revolution in progress,
the government party, followers of Wos y Gil, the Jimenistas, and
the Horacistas. This condition lasted until 1904. Outlaws roamed
the country and much property was destroyed, including sugar planta-
tions. Italy and Germany were pressing their claims and the Dominicans,
to satisfy them, signed an agreement promising them part of
the customs house receipts. American interests were especially
heavy. Investments in sugar and banana plantations alone amounted
to over $20,000,000. The United Fruit Company held more than 18,000
acres representing an investment of half a million. Americans were exporting woods, developing oil fields. Foreigners owned wharf rights in three main ports and owned commercial houses and steamship lines (30). Santo Domingo's foreign policy had been a dangerous one for her peace and prosperity. She had dodged her financial obligations, made worthless pledges, and kept her accounts carelessly. In late 1904 she became bankrupt. No one knew the extent of her debt, but it was estimated between twenty-five and fifty million. Commerce was stagnant due to high wharf and harbor charges. Two-thirds of her income was devoted to putting down revolutions. Three-fourths of the debt was owed to foreigners who continued to clamor for payment, and the same revenue and customs were pledged over and over again to different countries (31). With the coming of Roosevelt we have a new and more vigorous, but withal a practical policy in dealing with the Caribbean. Howard Hill summarizes it as follows:

"Roosevelt Imperialism as manifested in the Caribbean was opportunist in character, not planned or predetermined . . . . Roosevelt was led from one action to another by the swift current of events, which during his administration seemed to change with kaleidoscopic rapidity . . . . Launched upon the project of an isthmian canal, which he had advocated for years, he soon found himself engaged in problems arising from the relationship which that enterprise
bore to the wider circle of the Caribbean. Thus he became involved first in Colombia, next in Venezuela, then in Santo Domingo and finally in Central America. With each problem he dealt in the manner of a practical man of affairs rather than in the fashion of the doctrinaire or the man of pre-determined policies. In his relationship with the backward peoples of the tropics, with the exception of Colombia, his attitude was paternalistic, his policy that of benevolent imperialism. With him the old era of isolation passes forever and the new era of world influence comes to the full dawn" (32).

The success of the United States financial agent appointed in 1904 led other foreign states to press their claims. France, Belgium, and Italy, losing patience, threatened to seize the customs houses which might lead to the danger of occupation for an indeterminate period. In his extremity, the president of the Dominican Republic appealed to the United States for assistance in freeing it from its difficulties with European creditors. While Morales was seeking American intervention, Germany was considering the purchase of Spanish, Italian and Belgian claims against the Dominican Republic. Roosevelt determined to act swiftly. He instructed Secretary Hay to call the American Minister in Santo

(32) Hill, Howard C. - Roosevelt and the Caribbean p. 192 - 212
Domingo to see if the government would request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties in order to bring about a settlement with creditors. Fearing that it would lose everything, Santo Domingo agreed to make the "request". An agreement was reached providing that all ports be taken over by the United States, that the United States should direct the collection of the customs, paying 45% of the receipts to the government for expenses and the remaining 55% to the creditors. A commission was to be appointed to determine the amount of indebtedness to each creditor (33). Roosevelt submitted the treaty to the Senate justifying himself as follows:

"It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers . . . . The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse itself to take any other steps. The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign nations, but also concern the prosperity of the people of the island as well

(33) Foreign Relations 1929 p. 80
as the security of American interest of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion of which commerce lies in that direction" (34).

Roosevelt further warned that temporary occupation would lead to permanent occupation and that the United States could not see any European power permanently occupy any of these republics. Furthermore, if the United States refused to render assistance in regulating Dominican finance, and foreign states resorted to compulsion, the American creditors would lose everything. He denied any intention of taking any part of Santo Domingo or exercising any other control over the island. The Senate unconvinced, adjourned in March 1905 without taking action. The failure of the Senate to ratify the treaty endangered the stability of the Dominican government and made it impossible for them to obtain sufficient revenue. The creditors were weary of delay, and the Dominican government was helpless. Roosevelt determined, on his authority as chief executive, to carry the agreement through and drew up therefore a modus vivendi carrying practically the same provisions as the protocol. Under this agreement he sent down collectors and warships to give them support. For a year this scheme was in operation without senatorial consent and with encouraging results. Creditors ceased pressure, commerce increased, and with it the revenues. The United States government then commissioned an expert to determine the amount of the Dominican debt.

(34) Roosevelt - Special Message to Senate - Feb. 15, 1905.
Meanwhile, Morales had been overthrown and was succeeded by General Caceres, who gave the Dominican government five years of orderly government. He had all the qualities of a popular leader but was not a statesman. He wisely depended for executive ability and technical knowledge on Don Federico Velasquez y Hernandez who had played an important part in the ranks of the Horacista party, but who was never popular with the people. These two men gave to Santo Domingo an administration superior to any the republic had ever known. With the modus vivendi in operation the government was running without deficit for the first time (35). In June 1906, Velasquez came to the United States and in collaboration with Dr. Hollander, a financial expert, framed a plan that called for a bond issue of $20,000,000 to pay the total claims against the government which had been scaled down to $17,000,000. The President of the United States was to appoint a Receiver General of Dominican Customs who, on the first of each month was to pay to the fiscal agent for the loan, $100,000. If the receipts in any one year exceeded $3,000,000 one half of the surplus would be applied to a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds. Until the whole debt was paid, the public debt should not be increased except by agreement of the United States and Santo Domingo (36). So bitter was the opposition to the Convention in Santo Domingo that ratification seemed hopeless but it was finally accepted and was approved by the United States Senate February 25, 1907. Although Dominican credit had been destroyed by various defaults on bond issues, these bonds guaranteed by the

(35) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 643
United States were considered a good investment. So successful was the scheme that the entire debt was paid by 1927. Wharf and harbor concessions were cancelled, internal improvements were built, commercial and industrial conditions were good (37). Increase in trade meant increase in revenue. In 1908 Caceres was re-elected to serve until 1914. During his administration, a program of public works was started and sanitary conditions were improved.

In spite of general prosperity, rebellion still persisted but the government, now firmly established, was not greatly alarmed. The armed forces were now properly fed, clothed and paid. The president was popular though there was growing opposition to Velasquez. Realizing that the government was too strong to be overthrown, a conspiracy was set on foot to capture the president and force his resignation. A small band of conspirators, determined to go even further, lay in wait for him while he was enjoying his daily ride and shot and killed him. To these conspirators may be attributed the anarchy of the years that followed.

General Victoria seized power and compelled the election of his uncle by the same name. The entire country relapsed into confusion. All gains of the preceding five years were swept away. Rebellion was everywhere, and in a few months the Victorian government had wasted the surplus left by the preceding administration and increased the public debt by $1,500,000 thus violating the Convention of 1907 (38). General Vasquez and Senor Velasquez were now determined to support any government that was strong enough to

(37) Foreign Relations 1929 p. 88 or Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 664
(38) Foreign Relations 1929 p. 85
overthrown the Victoria government.

With the accession of Taft and Secretary Knox, we have the American policy in Santo Domingo completely changed. In place of the courteous, helpful spirit shown by the Roosevelt administration, we have a commercialized policy which showed complete lack of understanding of the Dominicans and which served to foster a suspicion of the imperialistic aims of the United States. Roosevelt and Root had treated the republic as a sovereign state. Taft and Knox treated it as a sort of protectorate. The new minister to Santo Domingo, Mr. William W. Russell, in a letter to Secretary Knox, advised complete control by our government as the only way to establish a permanent peace and suggested that the United States occupy the customs houses. "Having once landed men for the protection of the customs houses in accordance with our rights under the Convention we might be able to dictate a policy beneficial to the Republic" (39). As a result of the report two commissioners and 750 marines were sent to investigate. Victoria was negotiating for a new loan to cancel the indebtedness of his government, a request which was refused unless the government would assume the responsibility for misappropriation of government funds and agree to appoint an American financial advisor. The commissioners charged the government with violation of the Convention of 1907, demanded a new election, a loan and the appointment of an American financial advisor. Moreover, they threatened, if the demand were refused, to impose a military government on the Dominicans. The Commission

proposed Adolfo A. Nouel, Archbishop of Santo Domingo, as provisional president. General Vasquez was forced to accept, and the revolutionary movement subsided. Victoria at once offered his resignation which was immediately accepted. Shortly after, Nouel was elected provisional president for two years (40).

The solution proposed by the Commission did not remedy the situation. The new president tried to give his country an impartial administration but the demand for favors and criticisms of his appointments discouraged him. There was much factional strife especially between the Jimenista and Horacista parties. Nouel, realizing that the only hope of averting anarchy lay in a general election, asked the United States support. Knox, under the impression that he understood the Dominican situation, insisted on reform of the electoral system before the election. Nouel, helpless, resigned and fled to Europe leaving Velasquez and Don Juan Isidro Jimenez struggling for the presidency.

Wilson, who came to power in 1913, stated his Latin-American policy as follows:

"What we desire to do and what we shall do is to show our neighbors to the south of us that their interests are identical with our interests, that we have no plans or any thought of our own exaltation, but have in view only the peace and the prosperity of the people of our own hemisphere" (41).

(40) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 700
(41) Wilson - The New Democracy p. 121
He attacked the commercialized foreign policy of Knox and announced that the United States would never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest (42). But in spite of Wilson's idealistic policy he was not successful in carrying it out. The problems that were troubling Santo Domingo were the sort that needed a representative of experience and ability who knew local conditions. Bryan secured the appointment of James Mark Sullivan, "a deserving Democrat"(43) as a political reward. He was a man who has been characterized as gaining all his political experience in ward politics.

A new election was soon called in Santo Domingo and in spite of Dominican protests United States agents took it upon themselves to secure an election by "free and fair ballot". The Knox Commission had been sent only to advise, but the supervision in elections was taken over the protests of the Dominicans, with no justification and is the first evidence of the gradually increasing disregard for the sovereign rights of Santo Domingo. This action on the part of the United States was interpreted as a proof of the lack of confidence of the United States in the Dominican government and served to encourage revolution under the leadership of the habitual revolutionist, General Arias. By the middle of April 1914, insurrection was again general, all semblance of constitutional government having disappeared. The contest narrowed down to a siege of Puerto Plata which, though held by the revolutionists, was declared a neutral zone by the United States. The Commander of the

(42) Welles, Sumner Nabothe's Vineyard p. 716
United States vessel forbade the bombardment of the city. President Bordas ignored the order and his forces were fired on by the United States forces. Bitter resentment on the part of the government forces resulted, as they interpreted the action as showing sympathy with the revolutionists.

In the meantime General Vasquez secretly returned and reached an agreement with Don Juan Isidro Jimenez which would have resulted in a successful revolutionary movement if all factions had not been informed that the United States was about to propose a plan to restore order in Santo Domingo. This plan, sponsored by Wilson, called for the resignation of Bordas, a new election under United States supervision, a demand that revolutionary movements cease, and reaffirmed the right of the United States intervention (44). Dr. Ramon Baez was named provisional president. Arias did not wish to recognize him but, on threat of arrest by American marines, did so. After the inauguration, Baez entered an agreement with the American Commission providing that an election for a constitutional president and congress be held six weeks later, that at this election observers appointed by the United States should be present and should be afforded the fullest opportunity to observe the casting of ballots. The new provisional president sympathized with the Jimenista party which supported Don Juan Isidro Jimenez, who was elected by a small majority in the regular election held October 25, 1914. The Horacista party protested that the result was due to partiality, that the electors were not

(44) Knight. The Americans in Santo Domingo p. 59
distributed according to population, that the election was corrupt and therefore should be annulled.

By this time, Baez was loath to turn the government over to the new president and became Horacista in sympathy, but Vasquez insisted on orderly procedure and Jimenez was inaugurated December 1914, appointing both Arias and Velasquez members of his cabinet. Jimenez had promised to keep the American financial adviser, and Mr. Charles M. Johnston was appointed by Secretary Bryan as "Comptroller of Finances of the Dominican Republic", instructed to provide a budget and to approve and countersign any payment made by the Dominican government. The president was to place the collection of internal revenue in the hands of the Receiver and the United States was to assist in organizing a constabulary in the Republic to replace the Dominican army. Jimenez tried to gain congressional approval but was vigorously opposed by the Horacista and Arias forces, who defeated the agreement in Congress. Jimenez was in a most difficult position. He dared not dismiss the financial minister for fear he would offend the United States. If he allowed him to remain he would displease the Dominican Congress (45). Because Mr. Johnston was retained, Congress adopted a resolution of impeachment and Jimenez was forced to appeal to the State Department at Washington. Bryan's appointment of Sullivan to the post of Minister to the Dominican Republic was a bad mistake. What Santo Domingo needed was a man who possessed a knowledge of Dominican history and a sympathetic understanding of Dominican problems. Bryan's instructions show a

(45) Knight - Americans in Santo Domingo p. 61
lack of understanding of Dominican affairs. They pay no attention to the fact that for two years the little republic had been torn by anarchy and revolution (46). Bryan warned the Dominican Congress not to attack Jimenez and proceeded to discuss the situation with two commissioners sent to Washington by Jimenez, Don Federico Velasquez, Don Jacinto Velasquez, and Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, but no satisfactory agreement was reached and soon after, Bryan resigned. "Sullivan and Bryan had completely undermined American prestige. To many Dominicans, Uncle Sam was a wolf looking for a lamb to devour, and to most of the rest he was an ass whose capricious heels had to be watched"(47).

In the spring of 1915, local rebellions occurred and general revolution threatened. Secretary Lansing informed the leaders through the American Charge d'Affaires, that President Jimenez would receive from United States all the assistance necessary "to compel respect of the administration" (48). At the same time he accused the administration of spending too much keeping armed forces in the field. By midsummer, due to political unrest and continued fear of assassination, Jimenez was very near a mental and physical breakdown. In September of the same year, Mr. William W. Russell, who had been Taft's appointee as Minister to Santo Domingo, was again appointed with instructions to warn the Dominican Republic that the United States would no longer tolerate the violation of Article II in the 1907 Convention, which forbade the increase in the "public debt". The term "public debt" was interpreted differ-

(47) Knight - Americans in Santo Domingo p.64
(48) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p.756
ently by the United States and Dominican authorities. To the Dominicans it meant the bonded debt; to Washington it meant all outstanding indebtedness. The United States justified its interpretation on the ground that increased indebtedness in backward countries might produce internal unrest and foreign complications. The Dominicans insisted that a financial adviser appointed by the United States and an American organized constabulary would be "an inextinguishable germ of trouble" (50).

On November 19, 1915, one week after Haiti had ratified a treaty giving United States military and financial control, a similar note was presented to President Jimenez. The note formally demanded that the United States be given charge of the finances and the army which would make Santo Domingo a protectorate. These demands were rejected and an appeal was made to President Wilson who was extremely busy with the European situation and whose reply was unsatisfactory. Because of Jimenez's inability to come to some satisfactory agreement with the United States, opposition increased and the following April a disagreement sprung up between Jimenez and his Minister of War, Desidero Arias. Arias had adopted the policy of constant pressure brought to bear on the government to force the resignation of Jimenez and secure his own election. Jimenez needed funds to check this movement by force but this could not be done without the consent of the United States so he made appeal to Wilson who answered his appeal by a promise to give "friendly advice and continued support to any wise reforms"(51).

(50) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 762
(51) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 765
This was not very satisfactory to the president who needed, instead of "friendly advice", money and troops to combat the plots of Arias who now succeeded in getting control of Santo Domingo City.

On May first the Dominican Congress started impeachment proceedings against Jimenez. Arias had control of the capital. The American minister, insisting that Jimenez needed the assistance of American marines, on May 14 landed troops to protect the legations and to aid in the restoration of peace and order. Troops were offered to Jimenez but he hesitated to maintain his authority by means of foreign bayonets and requested munitions alone, but his request was denied. Convinced that the landing of marines was a violation of Dominican sovereignty Jimenez resigned and set sail for Puerto Rico.

Arias was persuaded to confer with Don Federico in the American legation, where he was offered certain favors and some remuneration if he would use his influence and his soldiers to bring about the election of Velasquez, but he refused and retired into the interior where his forces disbanded for lack of pay. The Dominican Congress wished to elect a new president but was requested not to meet until the city had "assumed its normal aspect" (52). On May 18, the Congress was requested not to elect a president for fear it would give rise to political disturbances. Meanwhile marines were landed at various strategic points penetrating the interior, establishing order and disarming the inhabitants. The only serious opposition was in the north where the Arias faction was

(52) Knight - p. 75
strong. On July 18, the Receivership was directed to collect internal revenues as well as customs and the Receiver General became the disbursing agent for the Republic.

The American Minister was determined to postpone the election of the provisional president by Congress until he was sure Arias would not be elected. The Dominican Congress, impatient of delay, expressed willingness to accept a compromise candidate, satisfactory to both Vasquez and Arias, Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal. The American minister was determined that this candidate should not be elected because he refused to grant the United States the powers her representatives were demanding. It looked as if Carvajal would be elected in spite of the protests of the United States, but he finally withdrew his candidacy. The American marines continued to occupy strategic points "for the purpose of supporting constitutional authority and to put a stop to revolution and to consequent disorders detrimental to the ordered progress and prosperity of the country" (53). The United States government denied their intention of acquiring territory or of attacking Dominican sovereignty but insisted that they would remain until revolutionary movements had been put down and until needed reforms had been introduced (54).

Congress ended the deadlock by electing on July 25, 1916, Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, the brother of Don Federico and a distinguished physician, the provisional president for six months until a general election could be held. Washington refused

(53) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 727
(54) " " " " " 777
to recognize him unless he would sign the treaty which had been presented making Santo Domingo a United States protectorate. The provisional president had no intention of giving in to the American demands and so the Receiver General of Customs was directed to suspend payment of government funds. As a result the government was penniless. No salaries were paid and the whole government machinery was paralyzed. The president and cabinet asked for a compromise but Washington refused to consider it. Conditions gradually grew worse. Troops assumed police functions. American officers attempted to censor the Dominican press, the overbearing attitude of some of the officers caused resentment. In other words, this high-handed policy changed the attitude of the Dominicans toward the United States from one of friendliness to one of general hostility. The Dominican minister at Washington was instructed to make a final appeal. His plan emphasized four points:

1. a plea for United States recognition of Dominican sovereignty,

2. a protest that the withholding of government funds was contrary to the Convention of 1907.

3. a criticism of the fact that American employees of Dominican government had been paid, and

4. an assertion of the readiness of the Dominican government to discuss and reasonable terms. (55).

(55) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p.789-790
Secretary Lansing, in a memorandum to Wilson on November 22, 1916, summarized the Dominican situation as follows:

1. An election in Santo Domingo would put Arias in control. He has been a disturbing element in Santo Domingo for many years.

2. Santo Domingo has refused to allow the United States to establish financial control and a constabulary.

3. An economic crisis exists due to the withholding of funds by the United States.

4. The only solution seems to be martial law for Santo Domingo (56).

(56) *Foreign Relations* 1929 p. 91
IV. Military Occupation of Santo Domingo by the United States 1916-1924.

At this time President Wilson's whole attention was occupied with European problems and he reluctantly approved. On November 29, 1916, a proclamation of occupation was made by the United States and signed by Captain H. S. Knapp. He assured the people that he was not trying to destroy Dominican sovereignty, but to bring about order. The following reasons for military occupation were given:

(1) Santo Domingo had failed to live up to the Convention of 1907 (57)

(2) The United States had tried to aid the Dominican government but the latter had refused to adopt the suggested measures.

In a Navy Department memorandum the reasons for occupying Santo Domingo were given. As it was desirable to have peaceful conditions close to our boundaries, the United States had prepared a new treaty with Santo Domingo to maintain order and guarantee the payment of Dominican financial obligations. The treaty was the price of recognition of the new government but as it was refused the United States refused to pay revenue to the government. From August 1916 to November, things were at a deadlock. The United States, failing to persuade the Dominican Republic to conduct its government in a manner conducive to peace, resorted to military occupation.

(57) Welles, Summer - Naboth's Vineyard p. 794
days later the Dominican Minister at Washington protested on the ground that such an act could be justified only as an act of war. (58)

When we entered the Great War, our interest shifted to the problem of finishing the war in Europe and making a lasting peace. Reports came that the military government in Santo Domingo was busy building roads and schools, keeping order, keeping down corruption, and paying the public debt though complaints against the military government became more and more common. Charges were made that martial law was enforced, public meetings suppressed, the press censored, that trials were by court martial and that all government functions had been taken over by United States marines, that all the Dominicans killed in action were classed as bandits, that military government had expected the Dominican chiefs to cooperate with them, but when they refused the government posts were filled with navy officers.

Knapp's primary aims were (1) to liquidate the outstanding claims; (2) to survey the country to establish legitimate land titles; (3) to establish a Dominican Civil Service. With this program in view a claims commission was appointed which pared the claim against Santo Domingo from $12,000,000. to $3,500,000. The claims under fifty dollars were paid in cash while the large creditors received bonds. A better and simpler system of accounting and auditing was introduced, and graft in the purchase of supplies and salaries was abolished. A study was made of the tariff and as a result a new tariff was passed in 1920 which re-

(58) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 796
duced the rates about 38%, a reduction which incidentally benefited United States industries (59).

The land survey was difficult because there was much confusion regarding land titles, the original grants having been made from time to time by Spanish monarchs, who left the boundaries vague and inaccurate. There was no efficient system of transfer and many records had been destroyed or set aside. Land titles were further confused by a communal system of land tenure where there were a number of heirs. In the confusion that resulted from the successive occupation by France, Haiti, and Spain, and from chronic revolution, the few titles that were registered were lost. To clear up this confusion a land registration law was enacted which gave clear title to land occupied for ten years previous to 1921. In view of the fact that in 1925 the assessed value of the principal sugar plantations was over forty million dollars, and that these were chiefly owned by Americans it would seem that the clearing of land titles like the tariff would react to the benefit of United States and her citizens.

The military government found the educational system in bad shape. Teachers and schools were miserable, enrollment small, and attendance poor. The government of occupation, built and equipped new schools, engaged better teachers, and as a result the enrollment increased 18,000 to 100,000, and attendance increased from 21% to 85% (60)

(59) Foreign Relations 1929 - p. 94
(60) " " " - p. 96
The military government also claimed the credit for keeping peace, improving the sanitary conditions in the towns and improving the telephone, telegraph and postal systems. The length of time it took to send a letter across the island was reduced by third.

An excellent highway system was planned which called for arterial highways connecting the chief cities. Public buildings were repaired, wharves extended, harbors dredged. The charge has been made that the military government spent large sums on public improvement but had little to show for it, that the work was put in charge of young and inexperienced engineers who squandered money in impracticable labor saving devices which when purchased were found unusable and were left to rust (61). The result was that funds ran out and the work stopped. It must be remembered that road building in Santo Domingo was an expensive proposition. Because of the heavy rainfall, roads must be solidly built, stone must be hauled by long distances over swampy land and expensive delays occurred through no fault of the military government. This road building program made possible the development of agriculture in the interior provinces which are the richest.

At first, the majority of Dominicans did not look on occupation by the United States as an unfriendly act, but rather as a relief from continued revolution and welcomed the peace and order which it brought. In the first years of military occupation, Admiral Knapp was assisted by disinterested and loyal officers and the treasury showed a surplus. As time went on, the United States government failed in its opportunity to create a lasting

(61) Krippene, H. P. Santo Domingo's Title to Independence Current History April 1921 p.808-812.
and favorable impression so that in four years of military administration the advantage we once held was lost. Dominicans began to demand complete withdrawal.

In 1918 Knapp was succeeded by Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden who lacked the forceful personality of his predecessor, and who was guided by the advice of subordinates. His administration increased the irritation and hostility of the Dominicans by completely ignoring their prejudices and desires. The new officials refused to associate with the Dominican leaders and so fostered misunderstanding and apprehension. While the World War was in progress the United States paid little attention to affairs in Santo Domingo so the Navy Department was able to assume absolute control with Snowden as practical dictator. After the United States joined the allies, most of our best officers were sent to France. Rumors began to circulate of excesses committed by some of the officers left in Santo Domingo. Undoubtedly there was an element of truth in these stories but there is always a tendency to magnify this sort of thing so that the excesses of a few may appear to be the excesses of all. Because of much outspoken criticism of the military government Snowden and his advisers unwisely censored the press and prohibited freedom of speech. Some time later he made a general statement to the effect that the military government would continue "until the Dominicans in their cradles had reached adult age" (62). The Dominican leaders who had looked upon the occupation as temporary now began to believe that it might result in a more permanent control and became more uneasy.

(62) Welles, Sumner - Neboth's Vineyard p/ 820
It gradually dawned on Secretary Lansing that the continued occupation was worrying other Latin American republics. From all sides came the demand that United States withdraw her army of occupation. In the face of growing opposition the State Department in Washington instructed Snowden to appoint a Consulting Commission so that the Dominicans might express their point of view. Such a committee made of four of the ablest Dominicans was appointed consisting of Monsenor Nouel, Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Don Jacinto de Castro, Don Francisco J. Peynado, and Don Federico Velasquez. On November 12, 1919, the committee of four made a series of reports which included a protest against the new foreign loan of $5,000,000 proposed by the military government (63). They recommended among other things that the decrees censoring the press be suspended. The military government replied by more strict censorship and the Commission, feeling that the government of occupation was trying to double-cross them, resigned January 9, 1920.

began a

The press of Latin America therupon/determined campaign against the military occupation of Santo Domingo. Agitation for withdrawal continued. A Dominican poet, Fabio Fallio, was imprisoned for attacking the military government. Dominicans went on lecture tours through Latin America and Europe and were bitter in the denunciation of the United States policy. Wilson was ill at the time and did not know the Dominican situation but Secretary Colby issued a proclamation on December 23, 1920, authorizing another Dominican Commission as the first steps in the direction of eventual withdrawal. The Commission was composed of seven members headed by Monsenor Nouel, and Judge Ostrand of the Dominican Land Court was to act temporarily as the technical adviser of the Commission (64).

(63) Welles, Sumner - Naboth's Vineyard p. 826
(64) Current History April 1921 p. 147
This Commission was to amend the Constitution, revise the laws of the Republic and draft a new electoral law. In spite of the fact that the State Department had emphasized the hope that the American technical adviser should be purely advisory, the Dominicans refused to admit that United States cooperation was necessary and demanded simply evacuation. They had come to believe that any attempt to cooperate with the United States was an act of treason. They even charged the Commission with treason for accepting the appointments, and when Wilson's term was ended the Dominican problem was still unsettled.
American

V. Hughes' Negotiations for the Withdrawal of Marines Leads to the Convention of 1924

In a campaign speech of August 28, 1920, delivered at Marion Ohio, Harding, a propos of the Dominican problem, put himself on record as follows:

"... I will not ... misuse the power of the Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated acts of unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little republics of the Western Hemisphere, such as in the last few years have not only made enemies by those who should be our friends, but have rightly discredited our country as their trusted neighbor" (65).

Secretary Hughes further stated the administration policy on November 30, 1923 in an address delivered in Philadelphia:

"With respect to the Latin American republics it is our policy not only to seek to adjust any differences that may arise in our own intercourse, but as I have said to extend our good offices to the end that any controversy that they may have with each other be amicably composed. We are seeking to establish a Pax Americana maintained not by arms but by mutual respect and good will and tranquilizing processes of reason" (66).

(65) Quoted in Welles, p. 837
(66) Hughes, Chas. Evans. The Monroe Doctrine, A review, its relation to American Foreign Policy in 20th Century - The Pathway of Peace. p. 159
Again, in a later address broadcast January 20, 1925, he said:

"Pan American cooperation rests upon the conviction that there are primary and mutual interests which are peculiar to the republics of this hemisphere and that these can best be conserved by taking counsel together and by devising appropriate means of collaboration"(67).

In accordance with this policy Hughes, June 24, 1921, instructed the military government to issue a proclamation promising that the military forces would be withdrawn in eight months under certain conditions. A peaceful election must be held under "supervision of authorities designated by the military governor" to choose a president and members of Congress. The Convention of Evacuation must contain provision for

(1) Ratification of all acts of the military government.

(2) Validation of a loan of $2,500,000 to complete the public works.

(3) The extension of the duties of the General Receiver to apply to said loan.

(4) The extension of the duties of General Receiver to the collection and disbursement of internal revenue if customs duties are insufficient to meet the obligation of the foreign debt.

(5) The new president must send a request to the United States President for a military mission to organize

(67) Hughes, C.E. Pathway of Empire - Address Latin American Relations p.164-165
a national guard (68).

A storm of protest immediately arose. The Dominicans demanded freedom without qualification, refused to ratify the acts of the military government which included a loan which carried an interest varying from 9 to 19%. They demanded unconditional sovereignty claiming that the revolutionary disturbances were purely political and minor in character and did not affect American lives and property, that revolutions were usually more strategic than bloody, that victory was gained by display of superior force and that little life was lost. The revolutionists have ever been known to suspend hostilities to let foreign business men pass goods through.

The refusal of the Dominicans to accept these proposals led to a deadlock. A period of political uncertainty resulted, building programs were abandoned, economic depression resulted, and political resentment increased. In April 1921, Washington announced that the United States was seeking an orderly and careful method of withdrawing the marines from Santo Domingo which would satisfy nationals and at the same time protect the interests of United States and other countries (69). Rear Admiral S. S. Robinson was detailed on May 13 of the same year to be military governor of Santo Domingo (69). The attitude of many Dominicans was well expressed in an article by a Dominican poet, Fabio Fallio, in Current History (May 1921).

"The plan referred to provides for the creation of

a "Consultative Commission of Representative Dominicans

(69) Current History June 1921 p. 291
to which is assigned by the will of the military government an American technical adviser. The Commission is charged to draw up reforms in the laws of the republic in accordance with the 'minutes' presented to it by the technical adviser. In case any one of these reform projects for the change of the national law should itself necessitate the adoption of a constitutional amendment by reason of any divergency from the Constitution already in force, it will be the adviser's duty to draw up the Constitutional Amendment in question" (70).

Fallio prophesied that the work of the Commission would degenerate into the work of the American technical adviser. The new reforms would be at the mercy of the military governor who could approve them or change them or declare them in force. After the proclamation was made, the military government was to call a general election of a Congress to consider the constitutional amendments. After the amendments were approved an election would be held for the election of the president and this would mark the withdrawal of the military government. Fallio branded the whole scheme as only an "illegal stratagem to an appearance of legitimacy" (71).

The Consultative Commission was to have no power to veto or obstruct the will of the governor. The government had the power to amend any changes without consulting the Commission while there was no proof that the election would represent popular will.

"The true object of the whole plan seems to be to awaken personal ambitions and rivalries in the expectation that the various political factions,

(70) Current History May 1921 p. The Evacuation of Santo Domingo—Fabio Fallio.

(71) Same as 70 p. 292-293
impelled by degrading enticement, will abandon every consideration of respect of decency and of the safety of the republic's sovereignty, in order to vie with one another for the favor of the omnipotent authorities of the occupation even though the price of such favor will be in very fact an injury to that sovereignty" (7$).

There was moreover no assurance that the military occupation cease for the vague promise to "withdraw from the responsibility assumed in connection with Dominican affairs certainly contains no specific promise in this regard and leaves this vital question enshrouded in ominous obscurity" (7$). Such were the sentiments of Fabio Fallio and such were the sentiments of many of his compatriots.

Dominican opposition became more and more bitter. They demanded immediate evacuation, distrusted any election held under the direction of the military government, declared the whole thing to be a trick to continue the military government. The political leaders announced that they would discourage participation in the proposed election so the State Department, at loss as to the best course to follow, authorized the military government (July 27) to announce postponement of the election and further delay in the withdrawal of the military forces until the Dominicans were ready to cooperate. (72)

(71) See page 55
(72) Foreign Affairs 1929 p 101.
Of course these events attracted much attention in the United States and elsewhere. Individuals visited the island and reported on conditions. The Haiti and Santo Domingo Independence Society was organized in New York and Horace G. Knowles, former Minister to Santo Domingo, and who had also served as Minister to Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Bolivia, became the spokesman (73). He was the author of a "blistering denunciation of the continuation of American occupation in Santo Domingo" published in Current Events (June 1921). He sharply criticized the Wilson policy for blundering unto the policy of invasion and military occupation. He blamed Harding for not fulfilling his promises made in his campaign speeches in regard to Santo Domingo. He denied that the Convention of 1907 had been violated and blamed the "maladministration and extravagance of the American military government" for bringing the little republic to the brink of ruin" (74). In the meantime the lack of a definite United States policy was causing commercial economic and financial conditions to go from bad to worse.

On July 27, 1921, the Senate voted to have an investigation and a committee of five was appointed to investigate the American occupation and administration in Haiti and Santo Domingo. The committee included Senators McCormick (Chairman), Oddie, Pomerene and Jones. The coming of the Committee was known long beforehand and the military government had plenty of time to get ready for inspection. It prepared a statement of the measures it deserved credit for and to

(73) Thomas, D. Y. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p. 231
(74) Knowles, C. Santo Domingo's Bitter Protest. Current History June 1921 pp. 397-398
turned it over to the Committee.

1. It had kept up payments on the loan of 1908 which they claimed would be paid thirty-three years before it was due.

2. Had paid in full the 1912 loan of $1,500,000.

3. Reformed the financial system.

4. Standardized the currency.

5. Reformed the banking laws.

6. Reformed the customs and port regulations.

7. Made a survey of natural resources.

8. Made a new mining law.

9. Carried out a program of public works.

10. Passed a law/ eminent domain.

11. Made a pension law.

12. Improved the police force.

13. Improved sanitation and public health.

14. Improved education - The number of rural schools was raised from none to 647 and the enrollment increased from 18,000 to 100,000. The average attendance grew from 40% to 80% while the salaries were increased from $8. to $60. per month to $55. to $150. (75).

As for the political situation the Navy Department statement read as follows:

(75) Hearings before a Select Committee of Haiti and Santo Domingo 67th Congress.
"Fortunately the election of Jimenez who took office on December 5, 1914 was followed by a period of comparative calm in the Dominican Republic. The elements of disorganization were present, however, awaiting favorable opportunity for expression. In April 1916 General Desiderio Arias, Secretary of War, executed a coup d'etat, deposed Jimenez, seized the executive power. At this point the United States government intervened and with the consent of the rightful, but deposed Jimenez, landed naval forces on May 5, 1916, and pacified Santo Domingo City, the capital. Jimenez then resigned and the Council of Ministers assumed control of affairs" (76).

The Commission was instructed to investigate two main points, to determine whether the original landing and occupation were valid, to investigate certain alleged atrocities. The Dominicans made denial of four main points made by the Navy Department: (1) that General Arias executed a coup d'etat and deposed Jimenez; (2) that Arias seized executive power; (3) that United States forces pacified Santo Domingo City; (4) that Jimenez consented to the landing of American troops. They denied that they had violated the Convention of 1907, insisted that interest had been paid regularly and that the deficit of $14,000. was owing in salaries to soldiers and public officials and was brought on not by mismanagement but by the world crisis. They further claimed that the military occupation was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, of the Convention of 1907, and of Wilson's fourteenth point, and complained that the American foreign office was on Wall Street. They brought

(76) Nation January 4, 1922 p. The Senators visit Haiti and Santo Domingo. Ernest H. Grusning, Managing Editor Nation p. 9
charges of oppression and a few mutilated victims to Port au Prince to testify, but the Committee had already left.

The Commission spent two and a half weeks on the island "leaving a trail of hope, anticipation, doubt and disappointment" (77). The Committee, after investigation, advised against removal of the American troops on the ground that the conditions laid down by President Harding in the summer of 1921 had not been fulfilled. These recommendations had provided that an election be held under American auspices, that a loan floated by American bankers be validated. Senator McCormick in a preliminary report admitted that the program of public works was perhaps a "bit too ambitious" (78), urged a new loan to refund the two previous ones of which he said the services "including the provisions of their amortization are unusual and crushing", crippling an ordinary administration. The loans, however, he believed had been necessary and were due to Dominican violation of the Convention of 1907 and the situation had been further complicated by the slump in business which had decreased revenue. The report stressed the need of good roads which would help keep down disturbances (79). The Committee commended the financial situation under the military government though the slump in business had resulted in a slump in revenue which could not have been foreseen.

Horace G. Knowles, who acted as counsel for the deposed government on December 30, 1921, issued a statement denouncing the report and charging that abuses, cruelties, and murders were com-

(77) Nation January 4, 1922 p. 7
(78) Thomas, D. Y. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine p. 235
(78a) Current History Feb. 1922 p.875
(79) New York Times July 12, 1922
mitted by the marines. He claimed that the military occupation was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and announced that since American occupation banditry had increased ten fold due to the acts of irresponsible young marines (80).

The next February, Secretary Hughes made new proposals including one for a loan of $10,000,000, which the Dominicans refused to consider, so Hughes proclaimed continued military government at least until January 1, 1924 (81). On March 6, 1922, Rear Admiral Robinson announced the annulment of the proclamation of June 24, 1921, which had stated the terms of withdrawal and announced that the military government would continue its program of public works, education and training of a military force. The proclamation of the military government said (1) that the Dominican people having been given ample time to consider the proclamation of June 1921 had shown no willingness to accept the terms: (2) that it would be detrimental to the Dominican people to permit the present state and suspense in governmental affairs to continue, therefore the military government would continue according to the proclamation of 1916 and would negotiate a loan for public works. (82) The loan referred to was for $6,700,000, its validation guaranteed by the military government as a "legal, binding and irrevocable obligation" of any government set up in the Republic (83). When the program of public works was complete and the government had proven itself able to maintain order, the United States would consider withdrawal on the following condition: (1) a fair election under supervision; (2) the ratification of a treaty providing for extensive

(80) Current History April 1922 p. 179
(81) Foreign Affairs p. 102
(82) Proclamation of Military Government of March 6, 1922
Nation 114 (1922) April 19 0. 480
(83) Current History May 1922 p. 338.
duties of the receiver general until the loans were paid; and (3) the "making of such other provisions as may appear to be of mutual advantage to the United States and Dominican Republic". A protest again was raised by the Dominicans especially against the loan, but little attention was paid to them (84).

On April 15, it was announced that the United States marines would not be withdrawn from Santo Domingo until July 1, 1924. Rear Admiral Robinson stated that the withdrawal would depend on the Dominicans themselves (85). The Dominican government must enter into Convention with the United States to secure a loan because the political unrest and business depression had reduced the treasury so that it could not meet the government payroll, and officials and employees were drawing half pay. On July 11, 1922, Secretary Hughes announced in detail another plan for the withdrawal of American military forces from the Dominican Republic and the restoration of full governmental powers to the Dominican people (86). This was the plan of 1921 modified and formulated in conference with Senor Federico Velasquez and Dr. Francisco Peynado, former Dominican Minister to the United States. The plan provided that a provisional government composed of Dominicans and elected by Dominicans would be installed to make necessary legislative reforms and amendments to the constitution. When that was accomplished a general election would be held without the intervention of the United States to set up a permanent government. When the provisional government was established the executive departments of the Republic would be turned over to the Cabinet ministers

(84) Nation 114 : p.480
(85) Current History June 1922 p 543
(86) Current History Aug. 1922 p 742
appointed by the Provisional President. The Military officials who
had managed the various department during the occupation were to
cooperate with the new members of the cabinet to set the new govern-
ment in motion. As soon as the Provisional government began to
function the military government would deliver to that government
the national palace and at the same time would concentrate the
military forces in two or three places. From that time peace and
order would be maintained by the Dominican National Police under
the orders of the Provisional government unless there should occur
serious disturbances which in the opinion of the Provisional Govern-
ment could not be suppressed by the Dominican National Police.

A convention was to be ratified between the Dominican Re-
public and the United States containing the following provisions:

1. Recognition by the Dominican Republic of the
validity of all executive and departmental
orders promulgated by the Dominican government
with specific recognition by the Dominican
government of the bond issues authorized in
1918 and 1922.

2. An agreement between the two governments that
the Convention of 1907 should remain in force
as long as any bonds of 1918 and 1922 should
remain unpaid and that the duties of the Gen-
eral Receiver of the Dominican Customs ap-
pointed under the Convention/1907 should be
extended to include the collection and application of the revenues pledged for the service of the bond issues (87).

The above-mentioned Convention must be ratified by the new Congress before elections would be held in accordance with the Constitution. After the inauguration of the Constitutional President, he must approve the Convention and the Provisional Government would terminate. Immediately after, the military forces would leave the Republic.

The State Department had withdrawn its demands for a financial adviser to collect the internal revenue and a Dominican police force under United States officers. Withdrawal was as nearly unconditional as could be without creating confusion. Harding appointed Sumner Welles, the former chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department, to go to Santo Domingo with the rank of minister to report on political conditions there and to find out if the plan was acceptable to the Dominican people. Welles reported that the agreement was satisfactory. A Commission made up of Dominicans representing the various factions was appointed. Mr. Welles, as a member of the Commission, displayed a rare tact so that the work of the Commission was not wrecked by the unsympathetic attitude of the military authorities or the jealousies of the Dominican politicians (88). Even Horace G. Knowles, the most severe American critic of our foreign policy in Santo Domingo, (87) Current History Aug. 1922 p. 742 (88) Foreign Affairs 1929 p. 104
announced his acceptance of the plan for the withdrawal of the United States military forces. He said the plan was more than he expected (89).

(89) Current History Dec. 1922 page 526
VI. Santo Domingo Today and our New Foreign Policy.

The Dominican members of the Commission chose a neutral in politics, Juan Bautisti Vicini Burgos, for provisional president and selected a cabinet to assist him. Burgos took oath of office as Provisional President October 21, 1922, thus ending the regime of American occupation (90). The United States forces were concentrated at various points and took no further administrative part. Their commander remained on good terms with the new government and did some excellent work in training the Dominicans to take charge of the new national police which was now well organized.

President Harding cabled his congratulations to the new republic, the executive offices were turned over to the new cabinet and the National Palace was handed over to the Provisional Government. The military governor, Admiral S. S. Robinson, sailed with his staff October 24 leaving General Harry Lee in command of 1500 marines, who remained until the Constitutional government succeeded the provisional government (91). When final withdrawal of troops was delayed by difficulties over the new electoral law, Sumner Welles hurried to the island to help straighten out the difficulty, and by his tact prevented an open rupture. The Provisional President, Vicini Burgos, proved a good administrator, and in March 1924 general elections were held. The National and Progressive parties allied and elected Horacio Vssquez President, and Velasquez, Vice President, and they were inaugurated July 12, 1924. The United

(90) Current History Sept 1922 p. 1094
(91) Current History Dec. 1922 p.526
States Senate on January 21, 1925, ratified the treaties with the Dominican Republic by which the withdrawal of American Military forces from the Dominican Republic was confirmed and the method of refunding the $25,000,000 debt was described.

In 1925 it looked as if the Dominican troubles were over though there were many who were pessimistic. The Nation (Feb. 11, 1925) in a skeptical vein commented on the situation in an article entitled "What Price Freedom". Though Santo Domingo was restored to the "glory of independence" and admitted into the family of the League of Nations, attention was called to the fact that the "price of freedom" was the validation of "several of the executive orders and resolutions" and "administrative regulations". Included in these orders and resolutions were 593 executive orders, 65 department resolutions, 34 department orders, 26 water titles, 6 international treaties, a sanitary code, a treasury circular, 41 treasury contracts, 11 other departmental contracts, and the bond issues of 1918 and 1922.

The 1924 Convention authorized the Dominican government to borrow a maximum of $25,000,000. The President of the United States appointed a Receiver General of Dominican customs to collect the customs and apply them to the service of the outstanding bond issues and pay the balance to the Dominican government. If receipts exceeded $4,000,000 in any one year, 10% of the excess was to be applied to the redemption of outstanding bonds (92). The Dominican government promised not to increase the public debt

(92) Foreign Relations p. 104
except by agreement with the United States and not to modify the customs duties unless the new rates provided \(1\frac{1}{2}\) times the amount necessary for the interest on the public debt. Article II which reads the same as a clause in the Convention of 1907 says, "The Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment of all customs duties to the General Receiver and his assistants and will give them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to the extent of its powers. The government of the United States will give to the Receiver General and his assistants such protection as it may find to be requisite for the performance of their duties". This clause is vague and might be interpreted to make the United States the arbiter of what obligations and privileges are permitted.

When the Convention was made public, seventeen of the thirty members of the Chamber of Deputies expressed their opposition by signing the "Pact of Honor", charging that the new treaty was a violation of Dominican Sovereignty, that the loan of twenty-five million would prolong the state of Dominican subordination to the United States. They therefore pledged themselves to vote against the treaty and loan.

In the Upper House a redistribution of government patronage served to get a sufficient number of votes for ratification but the Pact of Honor halted it in the lower house. The Dominican Constitution requires the presence of two thirds of the members for a quorum to do business. A smaller number may adjourn to a fixed day. At the next session after the second adjournment a bare majority

may act. Those who had signed the pact were absent at the session of the Chamber which was to decide the question of the Convention. Those present twice adjourned to a day fixed. The meeting after the second adjournment was held on May 25. There were twenty-nine deputies present including the "Pacta Men" (94). Those who favored the Convention wore red ribbons and three of those who had signed the pact also wore red ribbons. Thus, there were fourteen who opposed the Convention and fifteen who favored it. Many of the group that approved the Convention carried arms and the Pacta Group demanded the removal of those armed from the floor. The presiding officer refused to do this and the Pacta Group of fourteen withdrew leaving fifteen members in session - not a majority. The fifteen left could not legally take action but considered taking it illegally when one of the Pacta group returned to protest and while he was present a hasty vote was taken. The records showed sixteen present, fifteen ayes, and one not voting. The government then informed the United States of the ratification (95).

The opposition of course protested not only to the method by which ratification was obtained but to the fact that the convention provided for the settlement of international disputes, first, through diplomatic channels, and if that failed, by arbitration. They claimed that an attempt to settle disputes through diplomatic channels would react to the disadvantage of their country in dealing with a more powerful country. As the Constitution provided

(94) (95) Norton, Henry Kittredge, Current History Oct. 1925 pp 67-70
for settlement of disputes by arbitration the opposition group served notice on both governments that the treaty was invalid and therefore not binding on the Dominican Republic. Records in Washington showed that the official notification had been received from the Dominican Government and the Convention went into effect.

According to the revised Constitution of January 9, 1929, the President and Vice President are elected for four years. The president cannot be re-elected or elected Vice President immediately following his term of president. On June 16, 1927, the Constitution was revised to extend the term of President Vasquez and Vice President Velasquez and the members of Congress from 1928-1930. The Vasquez administration has continued the program of public works, commerce has been encouraged, natural resources have been developed and irrigation projects planned. The biggest present day problem is the regulation of foreign capital so that it will not infringe on Dominican sovereignty. In 1929 President Vasquez invited Sumner Welles to bring a Commission to Santo Domingo "to recommend a scientific budget system"(96). The Commission headed by General Dawes concerned itself only with the expenditures and was unofficial as far as the United States was concerned. The fact that the invitation from Santo Domingo would indicate that it no longer feared United States intervention, The Committee worked for three weeks intensively, made a report of conditions, suggested recommendations and left Santo Domingo free to do what it would with it(97).

The Vasquez administration lasted until March 4, 1930 when a revolution lasting less than a week forced President Horacio Vasquez to resign in favor of General Rafael Estrella who will hold office as Provisional President until the regular election on May

(95) Current History August 1927 p. 805
(96) Nation March 13, 1929 p. 298
(97) Literary Digest Apr. 13, 1929 p. 13
15. Recently President Vasquez announced his intention of running for re-election in May but certain Dominican factions were determined to give the Dominican people the chance for a free and fair election, and to do this staged a bloodless revolution against the established government. This revolution started suddenly in the northern provinces on February 23 and within five days the insurgents were almost in complete control of the capital and elsewhere. Charles B. Curtis, the American Minister to the Dominican Republic went into the field to urge the revolutionaries to avoid fighting. The Associated Press announced that only one casualty occurred and that was not officially reported. The Vice President, Jose Alfonseca promptly resigned and President Vasquez was forced to take refuge in the old fortress of Santo Domingo City. Two days later he sought protection in the American legation where a conference was held representing both the government and the insurgents who came to an agreement along constitutional lines. On the same day when the Hoover Commission arrived in Haiti President Vasquez signed a decree naming General Rafael Estrella Urena Secretary of State for the Interior which would, according to the Constitution, put him in line for the provisional presidency in case Vasquez resigned. Then Vasquez asked permission to leave the country "for his health". The new president took office on March 4. It is interesting to note that this revolution unlike so many of the earlier ones really involved a constitutional question and that it was settled in an orderly fashion by the Dominicans themselves, without American interference.
Summary and Conclusion.

The problems of the Dominican Republic have been of the sort easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. After discovery by Columbus it enjoyed prosperity which was gradually destroyed by the fact that the lure of gold attracted the early settlers elsewhere, by the subsequent attacks of the English adventurers and the raids of the pirates that infested the Caribbean. The Dominicans survived the early difficulties only to fall prey to the Haitians who dominated them for years, a domination which according to Welles, was responsible for their lack of training in self government that resulted in later misgovernment. Even after the Dominicans declared their independence the threat of Haitian invasion and reconquest hung over them like Damocles' sword and contributed to the political instability which has plagued the Republic ever since.

Since Dominican independence the Republic has been unfortunate in the character of many of its leaders. Self-seekers, ambitions for power or for the more material benefits they might gain, their inefficiency, has been either because of their indolence, arbitrary actions, or dishonesty of administration. Intrigues by those politically ambitious seemed to breed there as abundantly as the tropical vegetation. Governments have spent their revenues to keep themselves in power and when the taxing possibilities were wrung dry, in desperation they turned to foreign powers to intervene and save them, insisting all the time that what they desired was also the will of the Dominican people. This is the explanation of the ill-starred Spanish protectorate which the Dominicans at first accepted passively but which proved such a bitter disappointment. The various appeals to the United States did not come
because the Dominican people desired them but because some government had reached the end of its rope and used these appeals as the last resort.

There have been short periods of peace and prosperity in Santo Domingo but when this happened and the revenue began to increase and things began to run smoothly, the temptation was too great for some ambitious leader to come from seclusion either in his country estate or in one of the neighboring islands where many a plot was hatched, rally his followers around him by promises of material gain and attempt to overthrow the government. If successful, the insurgents then proceeded to squander the profits of good government and bring about a deficit. Too often Dominican statesmen were dominated by the hope of personal gain and not enough by the spirit of self sacrificing devotion to the interests of his country. If, by chance, an honest, well-meaning man came into power he proved too weak to control the various political factions and leaders and did not last long.

The geographical and climatic conditions have done their part to prevent the establishment of a stable government. A mountain range divides the island into a northern and southern section and the lack of communication has developed a strong feeling of sectionalism. The northern part, chiefly devoted to tobacco culture has been the hot bed of many revolutionary enterprises. The south produces much sugar.

There are those who claim that real democracy can never exist in the tropics. This is the belief of Captain Cecil Sherman Baker of the United States Navy in an article in Current History for February 1930. He maintains that the inhabitants of the temperate zone to survive must develop foresight, courage, persistence,
and cooperation. On the other hand, the tropics abound in a multitude of food crops that need only to be picked. One may here gain a living with the least possible effort. The climate is hot and discourages sustained effort and the natives are plunged into a state of inertia. To prove his point, he comments on the fact that during the American Revolution many loyal British migrated, some to Canada and some to the Bahamas. In Canada they prospered and built a stable government. In the Bahamas they degenerated into poor whites. He is pessimistic about the future of Caribbean peoples because he says that four hundred years of contact with Europeans has not bettered their condition. "The unrelenting hand of Nature in its kindest mood lulled them to economic sleep. From this they were unable to emerge unaided (15) Occasionally the white man has attempted to give to the Caribbean peoples some degree of democratic government but because of their ignorance and temperament they were unable to carry on. Hume Wrong, the leading authority on British government, makes the following statement in the same vein.

"No social contrast could be greater than that between Canada and Jamaica, within the one a virile and politically minded people, in the other a handful of white oligarchs, a smaller number of colored demagogues, and a huge black residue in a state of complete political inertia". 95

Great Britain recognizing this made Jamaica a crown colony in 1865.

"Three hundred years of experimentation in

94

95 Shad p 9.2

95 Shad p 9.2
governmental machinery in many of the Caribbean islands still finds the Governor in control. For there a good Governor with a sympathetic heart is of more value than a good legal code. The wise employment of laws by such an official frequently offsets faults in his administration. In Caribbean America the native looks up to authority wisely employed and firmly administered. If there be no respect for law as such there is respect for authority. This is the rich political soil in which dictators grow and flourish.\(^{[16]}\)

The appointment of an outsider to govern works far better than the votes of the ignorant and indifferent voters who have lost initiative and the spirit of cooperation. They need therefore the white man’s help as they are temperamentally unable to maintain a stable government. Moreover, much benefit can be obtained by a small retaining force of responsible men. There is undoubtedly some truth in this belief and the degree of truth should help determine the degree of United States help or intervention.

If it were not for the fact that Santo Domingo lies at a crossroads of the world’s commerce, her history might have been different. Because of that our foreign policy has been much concerned with the Dominican problems, both internal and foreign. Here again the United States policy is easy to criticise, but not so easy to correct. Our Latin American policy has been a shifting one, changing with the administrations. The wave of

\(^{[16]}\) Current History February 1930.
territorial expansion that preceded the Civil War and obtained for us the Mexican cession led to some interest in Dominican annexation in Pierce's administration. Such an annexation would have increased slave territory and would have been popular in the South, but nothing came of it. Seward and Grant continued to wrestle with the problem of Dominican annexation but by this time the wave had spent itself and there was little enthusiasm for such a move except among certain American speculators who were encouraged by Dictator Baez who was in desperate straits and looked to annexation by the United States as the last resort.

Another wave of territorial expansion came in the last century decade of the nineteenth and resulted in the annexation of Porto Rico and the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba. By this time the United States foreign policy seemed to be to accept "the white man's burden" to educate and civilize the uneducated and uncivilized and to clean up America. By the time Roosevelt became President, the Dominican problem had become acute because she had ignored her financial obligations and had brought upon herself the dangers of foreign interference. Much is said of the Roosevelt Corollary, "to speak softly and carry a big stick". As a matter of fact Roosevelt handled the Dominican situation with remarkable tact, common sense and clear-sightedness. The aim of the Roosevelt administration was to correct the evils in Santo Domingo so that the arguments of the annexationists might be destroyed. He persuaded the Dominican government to request a receivership so that the whole affair looked perfectly legal and so that the national pride of the Dominicans was not injured. In all the negotiations he was careful to treat the little republic as an equal and a sovereign state and as a result carried through his program
with little friction and little resentment on the part of the Dominicans. His program was one of cooperation rather than one of exploitation or intervention and through the Convention of 1907 was able to establish Dominican credit. The only false note is the suspicion bred in Latin America because of his alleged high handed policy in Panama, but even here there is some justification for his action.

With the policies of Taft and Knox, we enter the era of "dollar diplomacy" in dealing with Latin America and others. The United States here adopted an irritating, patronizing, and superior attitude and tried to force on the Dominicans an unpopular government.

The Wilson administration was one thing in theory and another in practice and was handicapped as far as the Dominican policy was concerned by the fact that we were using our best energies to straighten out the European situation and did not have time to solve the problems nearer home. The policy proclaimed the necessity of winning the confidence of the Latin American peoples but bungled in its application to Santo Domingo because of lack of understanding of the Dominican people and because of unwise appointments of those to carry out our policies. As a result, the Dominican situation got wholly out of control and the problem was handed over to the Harding administration for solution.

Hughes tried to gain the friendship of the Dominicans and get rid of the causes for unrest, but by this time the little Republic had lost confidence in the friendship of the United States and were not willing to cooperate. Hughes demonstrated great
patience and a spirit of compromise and by 1924 some sort of a settlement was made and the army of occupation was withdrawn. Apparently Washington has learned its lesson from the Dominican difficulties and there appears to be in the process of formation a more definite Latin American policy, the basis of which seems to be the fostering of a friendly spirit, cooperation, non-interference unless such interference is absolutely necessary. The time has come for us to realize that the problems of the Western Hemisphere can be solved best by Pan-American cooperation rather than by United States paternalism.
Bibliography


2. Current History:

July 1921 United States issues Proclamation of Withdrawal Ed. P. p.716

Aug. 1921 Demonstration against United States Occupation Ed. P. p.902

American Exit from Santo Domingo - Text of Proclamation pp. 813-815

Sept. 1921 Junta of Electoral Absenteeism Ed P p. 1081

June 1921 Robinson is appointed Military Governor of Santo Domingo - Spain protests at Continued American Occupation Ed P. p.540

April 1922 Horace G. Knowles Attacks American Occupation Ed. P. p. 179

May 1922 Dominican Loan Offered Ed P. p. 338

June 1922 Announcing postponement of withdrawal of American troops Ed P. p 543

Sept. 1922 Horace G. Knowles, counsel for defense of deposed Dominican Government accepts plan for withdrawal p. 1094

Jan. 1923 General Harry Lee Left in Command p 526

May 1923 Withdrawal of United States Troops Ed P. p.350
Nov, 1924  Commercial Agreement United States
        and Santo Domingo  Ed P. p.268
Aug. 1927  Revised Dominican Constitution  Ed P. p 805
Apr. 1930  Political Disaffection grows out of
        intention of Vasquez to run for re-election
        Ed P. p. 144

3. Fallio, Fabio:  The Evacuation of Santo Domingo - Current
        History May 1921 pp 291-294.

4. Fish, Carl Russell: American Diplomacy; American Historical
        Series - N. Y. Henry Holt and Co.
        1919. Chapters 17, 27, 31.

5. Fish, Carl Russell: The Path of Empire, Chapters 1, 16, 17.
        Yale University Press. 1919.

6. Forty First Congress - Summer's Speech on Proposed Annexa-
        tion of Santo Domingo Dec. 21, 1870.

7. Forty Second Congress- First Session. Senatorial Report of
        Commission of Inquiry in Santo
        Domingo.

        Nation Jan. 11, 1922. p 42.

9. " " " Conquest of Haiti and Santo Domingo
        Current History March 1922. pp385-896

10. " " " The Senate Visits Haiti and Santo Domingo

11. " " " Haiti and Santo Domingo Today
        Nation. Feb. 15, 1922. p. 188
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Howland, Chas. Prentice</td>
<td>Santo Domingo written for American Foreign Relations</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Address on Latin American Relations Radio Address</td>
<td>Jan. 30, 1925.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


23. Literary Digest April 13, 1929 p. 13


27. Nation:

Jan. 4, 1922. Dominican Feeling Toward American Marines Ed. P. p. 2

Apr. 19, 1922 Robinson Annuls Promise Ed P. p.456

" " " Proclamation of March 6, 1922 extending the period of American military occupation. p. 480.

Feb. 11, 1925 What Price Freedom Editorial p. 132
March 13, 1929. Dawes Requested to Revise Fiscal Organization in Santo Domingo. p. 58


N. Y. Appleton and Co. 1923.

N. Y. Thomas Carroll 1927.

N. Y. The Century Co. 1922.

32. Thomas, David Yancy One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine

History Aug, 1922. p. 849-852

34. Welles, Sumner Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic. 1844-1924. 2 Vol. N. Y. Payson
and Clark, Ltd. 1928.

35. Walsh, Frank P. American Imperialism, Nation Feb. 1, 1922
p. 115-116