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A sociological interpretation of the expulsion of the United Electrical, Machine & Radio Workers from the Congress of Industrial Organization.

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Thesis
A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE EXPULSION OF THE
UNITED ELECTRICAL, MACHINE & RADIO WORKERS
UNION FROM
THE CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
by
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

I. THE PROBLEM

In recent times, ideological issues have come to play an ever increasing role in social relations. Under certain conditions, ideological issues create conflicts within a society. At such times, groups, subgroups, and individuals, who are engaged in struggles for power, tend to use extraneous ideological issues rather than organizational efficiency to reach their objectives. The purpose of this study was to investigate the use of the ideological issue of Communism in labor relations. It will be shown how labor leaders, who were engaged in competitive struggles for power, may have used ideological issues as criteria rather than organizational efficiency in attempts to gain their objectives.

The study was not concerned with the "rights" or "wrongs" of ideological issues, or with the problem of whether or not the groups and individuals who used ideological issues were "sincere". This study was not considered to be the final answer to the problem. This approach was but one of many possible ways of ascertaining the reasons for human
social behavior. This paper will have served its purpose if its contents furnish a stimulus for further research by students of the human society.

II. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

Since the termination of World War Two, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have deteriorated. In the United States, the public was informed that the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology were external factors which constituted a threat to the American social system. The government and other agencies charged with the protection of the nation took certain measures to insure its safety.

At this time, anti-Communist and anti-union associations raised alarms and informed the public that within the nation there existed a "fifth column" whose members were in positions where they might damage the national security. Associations such as the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (Chamber) and the Social Welfare Conference of the Catholic Church, as well as some government officials informed the public that certain governmental departments and a number of Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) affiliates were either Communist-controlled or under Communist influence.
In this study, it was planned to investigate one function of the ideological issue and the effect of its use with special emphasis being given to the relationship between the various affiliates within the CIO.

In 1949, during the CIO national convention, an amendment to the constitution empowered the CIO Executive Board to remove any member from the Board who was considered to be a Communist or under Communist influence. The Board was also empowered to expel an entire union from the CIO for the same reasons.

The Eleventh CIO Constitutional Convention awarded the jurisdiction of the Farm Equipment and Metal Workers (FE) to the United Automobile Workers (UAW), revoked the charter of the Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (UE), and chartered a new union in the electrical field, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, CIO (IU E). 1

According to the press, the record in the convention proceedings, and statements of some CIO leaders, the action taken against the UE was the first of a series of actions designed to remove leaders of CIO unions who were in sympathy with or subscribed to the Communist ideology.

After the convention action, major changes occurred

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1 The CIO What It Is and What It Does, CIO publication No. 173, 4th Printing, May, 1950, p. 11.
in the leadership and in the order of relationships in the CIO. Changes also occurred in the CIO organizational structure. A new group assumed positions of leadership and new policies were introduced. The action of the CIO appeared to conform to demands or pressures which existed in the external situation.

A CIO publication \(^2\) stated the CIO's international policy, which included support of the United Nations (UN), the International Labor Organizations (ILO), the European Recovery Program (ERP), and the North Atlantic Pact (NATO). It is assumed that this policy was supported by a majority within the CIO, although a minority may have opposed the policy. It appears that the foreign policy of the CIO was in harmony with the bipartisan formulated foreign policy of the government.

Attacks upon the CIO, on ideological issues, have been made frequently since 1935 by organizations and associations external to the CIO. However, up to 1949, unions were not expelled from the CIO on ideological charges and no changes in the CIO constitution were proposed, as a result of these external attacks. In 1949, the changes to the CIO constitution and the subsequent expulsions were actions

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 8 f.
initiated and executed by union leaders within the CIO. It appears from this action that a faction within the CIO may have used the external situation to change the order of relationships between the unions. This action resulted in changes which affected the relative power of individuals within the CIO. If the unions and the leaders were guilty of the Communist charges, if they were as dangerous to the nation's safety, as they were portrayed to be, then, the situation appeared to have been a matter for the legal authorities to act upon rather than a group of CIO labor leaders. Since the CIO had no specific rules before 1949.

The UE leaders were not convicted of being Communists or of participating in activities which were considered subversive. They were not denied the legitimacy to act as representatives of a labor union. The CIO did not directly accuse the UE top officials... of being Communists. They were assumed to be pro-Communist because they failed to approve some of the government policies which the CIO had approved.

The fact that the CIO chartered a new union, the IUE, to replace the ousted UE may be an indication that one faction of the CIO leadership had sufficient power to oust the UE leaders and the union from the CIO on the ideological charges, but were unable to oust the UE leaders from the UE on the same charges. The UE is still operating, being the

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bargaining agent for approximately 310,000 workers in 1020 shops, \( ^4 \) which indicates that the union's legitimacy was not denied by the legal authorities.

A labor union is primarily an association of workers whose elected officials are empowered by the members to make contracts with employers concerning conditions upon which labor will be performed. Neither the CIO, nor the minority within the UE, charged the UE leaders with organizational inefficiency. The charges of Communism against the UE leaders were not given to the courts for decision. These fact indicate that the ideological issue may have been used by one faction as a means to gain their objectives in a struggle for power.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter II defines and describes ideologies and power and explains their use in relation to the problem.

Chapter III introduces the factors that existed in the external situation and shows how the various groups attempted to adapt to these factors. Section I explains the power structure of the CIO - Democratic Party coalition. Section II shows the relationship between Organized Labor, the Government, and Industry. Section III shows the

\[ \text{4} \] UE Convention Reports, 1951, p. 32.
organizational structure, the operation, and the objectives of the Chamber. Section IV explains some aspects of the organizational structure, operation, and objectives of the Catholic Church in the social action area. This section was included for purposes of comparison because both the Chamber and the Church used the same ideological issue against the same groups, but the two organizations have opposing views and seek different objectives in labor relations.

Chapter IV presents the relationships between the various affiliates in the CIO and shows how the use of ideological issues may have changed the order of relationships within the CIO organizational structure. Section I gives a brief description of the CIO organizational structure, shows how the organization operates, and indicates the relative positions of power. Section II describes and analyzes the relationships between the UE, the CIO, and other CIO affiliates and shows the relationship between sub-groups in the UE.

Chapter V consists of the general findings and conclusions which may be drawn from the theoretical and empirical data.

IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The material presented in the paper was obtained from several sources. The sociological data were obtained
mainly from sociological textbooks, and classes and seminars on Social Theories, Social Philosophy, Social Psychology, Human Relations, Industrial Relations, Labor Relations and Labor Economics, and Labor Programs and Labor Ideologies. The main sources of information for the empirical data were the writer's personal experiences which extended over a period of twenty-five years as a member of labor unions and as a supervisor and employer of union workers. Specific information relating to particular groups in the study was obtained from personal interviews with labor leaders, union files, correspondence, pamphlets, books, magazine articles, publications of learned organizations, labor publications, National Encyclopedia articles, Year Books, World Almanacs, and Newspapers.
CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGIES AND POWER

In recent times, conflicts between groups and individuals in our society have increased as a result of an ideological issue which has emerged from the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. An ideological issue exists when a group is confronted with divergent ideologies and is forced to take action. The ideological issue arising from the problem of Communism has played an important role in practically all areas of social relationships within the American society. Ideological issues have their genesis in the ideologies of social movements.

The ideology of a social movement may be thought of as providing a movement with its philosophy and its psychology. It gives it a set of values, a set of convictions, a set of criticisms, a set of arguments and a set of defenses. As such it furnishes to a movement (a) direction (b) justification (c) weapons of attack (d) weapons of defense and (e) inspiration and hope. To be effective the ideology must carry respectability and prestige. Character is furnished by the intelligentsia of the movement. More important... is the need of the ideology to answer to the distress, wishes and hopes of the people. 1

Ideologies and ideological issues are effective as weapons in power struggles because generally they cannot be verified as they "consist of a body of doctrine and a set of

1 Alfred M. Lee, et. al., New Outline of The Principles of Sociology, p. 211.
beliefs and myths. 2 Ideologies, so defined, may be considered judgments based on a particular set of cultural values.

Williams 3 states that culture includes among other things, a system of goals and values. Certain goals are emphasized as worth striving for, while others are considered evil or detrimental. The culture also provides the means for obtaining the desired goals, and provides the punishment and penalties for the violation of the prescribed rules.

A culture may include a complex set of beliefs about man, his nature and rights, and about the universe and its relation to man. Such beliefs generally involve (a) valua-tional elements (the good-bad, desirable-undesirable), (b) prescriptive elements (how one should act, think, feel), and (c) cognitive elements (what exists, what entities, sequences, causes and consequences). Cognitive beliefs can be divided into three main categories (a) those subject to scientific tests and refutable by such tests, (b) those outside the domain of empirical verification (the existence of heaven and hell, the superiority of American society to others), and (c) verified scientific knowledge, kinds of empirical data that fall short of "perfect" scientific certainty.

3 Robin M. Williams, American Society: A Sociological Interpretation, pp. 1 ff.
Cultural norms are appealed to as the source of authority and legitimacy for activities in many spheres of social activity. Sometimes these norms are claimed as divine revelations, the wisdom of ancestors (tradition), ideas of natural laws (supply and demand as a regulatory law in economics), or as inherent rights (the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, free enterprise). Often the authority of a norm is based on its widespread practice. 4

In this paper, groups which adhere to the existing cultural value system and embrace the ideologies of the system will be considered the in-group. The in-group's relations with other groups are determined as friendly or hostile according to the ideological concepts of the other groups. Groups with divergent ideologies are considered the out-group by the in-group, which generally regards the out-group as unscrupulous. The out-group is felt to be attacking the values which the in-group holds dear. The in-group not only feels that it is right and correct, but believes it has a common responsibility to defend and preserve the values it holds dear. 5

4 Ibid., pp. 23 ff.
When organized groups or individuals seek the support of the public, the introduction of an ideological issue appears to be a powerful means for receiving such support. This may be due to the characteristic features of the "public". The "public", unlike a population such as that of the United States, is like a crowd that lacks organization and unity of purpose. In this paper

The term "public" is used to refer to a group of people (a) who are confronted by an issue, (b) who are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and (c) who engage in discussion over the issue. The existence of an issue means the group has to act; yet there are no understanding definitions or rules prescribing what that action should be. 6

The agitators or propagandists attempt to convince the "public" in order to gain support for their causes. The above statements are important to remember when the empirical data is presented. Such a "public" existed within the CIO and therefore the ideological issue was effective as a means in accomplishing the change in the order of relationships within the CIO.

In order to divide a unified group an "issue" must be presented. Ideological issues are especially adapted for this purpose, since the contents of ideologies are generally composed of valuational elements outside the domain of empirical

6 Ibid., pp. 189 f.
verification or scientific tests. For example, it is extremely difficult to test the superiority or greater value of Christianity over godless atheism, or the superiority of the American society to others.

When an ideological issue is presented to the public, it has the effect of creating confusion of thoughts, and tends to divide the public into leaderless factions. For example, Walter Reuther's introduction of the ideological issue of Communism into his campaign for the presidency of the United Automobile Workers first split the group into factions, and later forced the workers to select their leader on a basis of loyalty to a set of beliefs, values and myths, proposed by one of the contestants. In the past, union leaders were theoretically selected on a basis of organizational competency.

If those who use ideological issues to gain the support of the public are concerned about the status quo:

They may win support for their policies by implying that the people who have a deep love for country will accept the propagandist's jingoistic ideas because of the "threats" to their security as manifest in the policies of some "aggressor" nation. 7

Homans, 8 in his study of human group behavior found that appeal to emotions caused the individual's sentiments

7 W. H. Werkmeister, An Introduction To Critical Thinking p. 82; Newcomb and Hartley, et al., Readings In Social Psychology, pp. 315 ff., and Chap. XIII.

8 George C. Homans, The Human Group, pp. 1 ff.
to rise above loyalties to a group. When the individual’s beliefs and basic values were threatened, he would shift his loyalties from one group to another.

It is extremely difficult to determine by scientific methods whether the agitators, who present or promote ideological issues, do so primarily to promote the cause they champion, or for altruistic purposes, or for purposes of reaching objectives of self interest. 9 One or all of the above may be involved.

The contents of ideologies are beliefs, values, and myths. These exist as objective entities, which the subjects accept or reject. Therefore, if the ideology the agitator is presenting is accepted by the "public", the objective consequences, being an integrative part of the ideology, must follow. However, the adjustment or adaptation of the system which followed as a result of the acceptance of the ideology, may also have been a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the self-interest objectives of the agitator. However, "If any given individual can be said to seek his own "self interest", it follows that he can do so only in conforming to some degree to the institutionalized definitions of self-interest". 10 Therefore, it may be said that

9 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Chap. I.

10 Talcott Parsons, Essays In Social Theory Pure and Applied, p. 170.
objective reached by the agitator occurred as a natural consequence of the events.

However, if an in-group, out-group relation is formed over ideological issues, within a group primarily organized as an agency for bargaining collectively, then the ideological issue rather than the organizational abilities of the leaders may become the basis for selecting leadership. In such cases the ideological issue may be considered to have been used as a means to secure the power of public support to reach objectives which were self-interest oriented.

A self-interest oriented objective may be a desire for success. The American criteria of "success" may be broadly stated as personal achievement, power, prestige and possessions. 11 The democratic principle of equal opportunity exists for all, but the opportunity to reach the desired goals may be blocked because the positions denoting "success" are limited and may already be occupied. A conflict pattern is automatically established in the competition for positions which are deemed symbols of success. The competitive struggle begins when the actor attempts to carry out his own will against the resistance of other parties. 12 Thus another factor becomes

11 Williams, op. cit., p. 87.

apparent, that within the principles of democracy, there exists a dominant class which has within it a tendency to establish an oligarchy. 13 The democratic structure is preserved by the principles which protect the rights of minorities to express divergent or dissenting opinions.

The formation of opposition begins with the leader of the minority group, which dissent from, or disapprove of, the actions or policies of the controlling group. Social dissent constitutes a challenge to the authority of the controlling group. Social dissent is a normative "right". Dissent furnishes a basis for the change necessary in a dynamic social system. The degree of tolerated dissent depends on the basis for the conflict, and the issues involved. If the conflict is deep and concerns or endangers the basic norms, then dissent may result in persecutions, such as occurred in the religious struggles in England and France, or in the civil war in the United States.

A dissenting group may withdraw or be expelled from a larger organization. Such action may occur when there is a struggle for power among the leaders. In such an event, the dissenting or expelled group may be permitted to continue its function in the social aggregate, since its conflict may be considered an organizational problem, and not a dysfunctional activity directed at the social system.

13 Robert Michels, Political Parties p. 390.
The "right" of minorities to attempt to become the majority is a democratic principle. The limitations as to objectives and means are prescribed by the social and institutionalized norms. Minorities, in their attempts to acquire power or control, may take advantage of the existence of external factors. If such factors constitute a threat to the social structure as a whole, minorities and individuals may attempt to increase their power by proclaiming their alliance with the groups in control.

A leader competing for control of an organization may identify himself with principles which other groups are championing, and thereby increase his power and prestige. Such activity is particularly effective if the principles involved are concerned with the preservation of cherished norms, principles, or values.

When the society as a whole is threatened by some external factor, the permissive zone of variation from the established norms, is narrowed in order to insure control, and a greater degree of cooperation. At such times of tension, a mild form of individual anomie is produced in the form of anxiety over conflicting loyalties. Taking advantage of the vacillating tendencies, the leader may influence the masses to make a selection. In this way, the leader may reach his objective.

Mental ability, lung power, and demagoguery are all qualities on which one leader wins over another. In the
struggle among leaders, loftier motives are appealed to. The leader, by presenting himself as the protector of the basic values which the masses cherish, may be selected "on the grounds that it is necessary to sustain the moral and theoretical level of the organization." 14

Thus, human action may consciously be aimed at altering certain social relationships, or be directed to the prevention of their development or continuance. In his quest for power, the leader forces the group to which he appeals to make a selection, and all struggles for power in the long run end in a selection of those who possess the personal qualities important to success. 15 The struggle for power is a process, a means for obtaining desired ends or goals which are in the possessions of others. The action of the conflict, the choice of one leader over another, simply indicates that one course of action has been displaced by another, and as a result, the order of relationships within the social structure has changed.

In the chapter which follows it will be shown how an ideological issue, existing in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, affected the relationships between groups and within sub-groups, in the United States. The empirical data will point out how ideological issues rather than organizational efficiency may have been used by leaders who engaged in competition for power.

14 Loc. cit.
15 Weber, op. cit., p. 133.
CHAPTER III

FACTORS IN THE EXTERNAL SITUATION AFFECTING THE CIO

I. THE COMMUNIST ISSUE AND ITS EFFECT ON

THE CIO - DEMOCRATIC PARTY RELATIONSHIP

From its inception, the CIO allied itself with the Democratic Party. Working in co-operation, both organizations became strengthened, increased their power, and were able to obtain their respective objectives. The Democratic Party continued as the majority party with the ensuing privileges. The CIO obtained the objectives it sought in management-labor relations. The Democratic Party's New Deal proponents, and the CIO opposed the "laissez faire" theory in government. Both favored greater participation of government in the regulation of management-labor relations.

The depression of the thirties and the failure of management to regain economic equilibrium created a situation which gave the New Deal-CIO program the public support it needed. Elected to power, the New Deal had to succeed in spite of the opposition of the Republican Party and the proponents of "laissez faire".

First, the New Deal attempted to regain economic stability through the business and industrial structure. Existing laws nullified many of the government's attempts to regulate the economy. Management in general was hostile
to any changes in managerial prerogatives. The New Deal then focused its attention on social security and labor relations. A series of acts designed to establish certain "rights" of labor were introduced into the Congress and became laws. The Wagner Act aided the CIO in its attempts to organize the mass production industries. These laws made it compulsory for management to bargain and refrain from interfering in union activity. The CIO as a new labor organization formed its organizational policies around the government regulations. The CIO depended on the government and the laws for the protection of the workers' "rights".

Differing from the AFL, the CIO was an active participant in the political field. The CIO's policy was stated by John L. Lewis when he wrote:

"With the guarantee of the right to organize, industries may be organized, but on the other hand, better living standards, shorter working hours and improved employment conditions for their (union) members cannot be hoped for unless legislation or other provisions be made for economic planning and for price, production, and profit controls. Because of these fundamental conditions, it is obvious to industrial workers that the labor movement must organize and exert itself not only in the economic field, but also in the political arena." ¹

After the economy became stabilized, opposition to the New Deal-CIO coalition and its policies increased. The CIO, in order to keep its increased power and advantage in its negotiations with management, which it had gained through

¹ Foster Rhea Dulles, LABOR IN AMERICA p. 313.
government protection, increased its political activity. The CIO, to insure the gains that it had won, depended on a government that was friendly towards organized labor. Government intervention in management-labor relations gave to organized labor more freedom and privileges than labor had been able to obtain over a long period of time. In return, the CIO, in part, lost its political autonomy.

Until the end of World War Two, the Democratic Party-CIO coalition continued to increase its power. As the union membership increased, the power of the CIO increased. During the depression and the war years, the Republican Party could offer but token resistance to the CIO-Democratic Party coalition's political power, which continued to concentrate more power, by the process of centralizing authority, within the government structure. Associations and institutions opposed to and affected by this process of the centralization of power became apprehensive concerning the potentialities of the growing power of organized labor. The Republican Party, the Chamber of Commerce, the NAIF, the "Dixiecrats", and other anti-union and anti-Communist associations raised alarms over the possible consolidation of organized labor into a political bloc or third party.

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Much literature was distributed warning the public about this concentration of power. The accusation of Communism was used against the CIO by some organizations, notably the NAM. However, it was not until after the death of President Roosevelt, the cessation of hostilities of World War Two, and the subsequent deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, that a condition was created which furnished the anti-union and anti-Communist forces with a common objective, which permitted a united effort against the power of the CIO and the Democratic Administration. As will be noted elsewhere in this paper, a campaign oriented toward alerting public opinion against the threatening danger of Communism within the government and the CIO was used. The 1946 state elections and national congressional elections, may have served as political barometers. The Democratic Party lost its congressional majority. The solidarity of the power bloc was cracked. The Communist issue appeared to have been an effective campaign weapon when used simultaneously by several associations of national importance. The Administration no longer enjoyed a majority in congress, and was forced to take measures to avoid being considered guilty of permitting Communist infiltration, or of being sympathetic toward Communism. Loyalty investigations

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3 Join The CIO And Help Build A Soviet America, 1937, NAM pamphlet.
followed and some individuals, who were considered security risks, were transferred or dismissed. Simultaneously, with the campaign against the Administration, there was a similar campaign directed against the CIO. The charges were that the CIO was Communist-controlled and that positions of leadership within the organization were held by Communists.

The external situation, both foreign and domestic, had forced the Administration to form a bipartisan foreign policy. This policy included the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact. It will be shown later that support of the Administration's bipartisan policy became a major issue within the CIO. The Administration demanded that the CIO have their delegates to the World Federation of Trade Unionists make an attempt to have the WFTU accept the Marshall Plan, which the WFTU had opposed. A group of union leaders within the CIO opposed the Administration's request and also its foreign policy. These unions had also opposed some of the domestic policies of the Truman administration which they considered as anti-union. In addition, these unions also supported Henry Wallace for president on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948. Another group within the CIO supported the administration.

The fact that the CIO, until 1949, continued its affiliation with the WFTU, which was considered under Communist control, and the fact that one faction openly supported the Progressive Party, which was also generally
denounced as Communist-controlled, furnished the anti-
union and anti-Communist groups with evidence to publicly
intimate that one faction of the CIO was pro-Communist.
Government officials, such as Secretary of Labor, Tobin,
denounced the "left-wing" unions and in particular the UE, as
being Communist controlled, and therefore, dangerous to the
nation's safety. 4 Government agencies, such as the Atomic
Energy Commission, asked the General Electric Company and
other industries, under contract to the government, to cease
bargaining with the "left-wing" unions, notably the UE. 5

The pressure created by the publicity directed against
the CIO may have forced the internal issue within the CIO to
a climax. The expulsions of the "left-wing" unions, and the
subsequent withdrawal of the CIO from the WFTU, appeared to
confirm the charges made against the CIO by the anti-union
and anti-Communist forces, and made the public more suspi-
cious of the Administration and the CIO.

The fact that the "right-wing"-controlled CIO organ-
ized a rival to the WFTU, the International Confederation

4 Statements before Subcommittee on Labor and Labor
Management Relations, March 19, 1952. Speech at IUE-CIO
Convention, Buffalo, N. Y., Sept. 20, 1951, Boston Evening
Globe.

5 L. R. Boulware, Communism In Unions, G. E. pub.,
March 21, 1952, p. 11.
of Free Trade Unions, which accepted the Marshall Plan, may be considered as an adaptive measure on the part of the CIO, to insure its friendly relationship with the Democratic Administration, and prove its patriotism to the public.

The linking of the CIO and the Administration with Communism at a time when the tension between this nation and the Soviet Union was being widely publicised, made a charge of Communism against any group, a powerful weapon. The international situation furnished the condition necessary to start a chain reaction which eventually broke the power of the Democratic Party-CIO coalition. The many publications and articles on the Communist issue that were distributed at that time, had the effect of campaign propaganda against the Democratic Administration.

The Communist issue was a powerful means for obtaining the objectives sought by the various anti-union and anti-Communist forces. The election of the 80th congress demonstrated that labor programs legislated into laws can be nullified by the same means.

In the next section, the effect of the CIO-Democratic coalition on the relationship between organized labor, the government, and the CIO will be shown.

II. RELATIONS BETWEEN ORGANIZED LABOR, GOVERNMENT, AND INDUSTRY

While the government is primarily voted into power on the assumption that it will serve all the people, it is a fact that:

Back of the formal structure of the state is always an informal pattern of operating practices and relationships, which may or may not correspond to the official pattern. Back of the operating government are the groups and interests that supply the dynamic element in politics. 7

During the World War Two period, labor was represented on wartime Government Boards where decisions affecting labor and production were made. Representatives of organized labor served side by side with the representatives of industry on the Economic Stabilization Board, the Labor-Management Policy Committee, and the National War Labor Board. Labor leaders also served on many other lesser boards throughout the nation.

The coal strikes in 1943 were the only serious actions against the government on the labor front, during the war. In effect, these "strikes constituted a challenge to the government's wage policy and to the authority of the War Labor Board". 8 A series of restrictive labor bills were introduced in Congress. The Smith-Connally Bill,

which became law, was the most important. It provided statutory authority for the War Labor Board and empowered the President to take control of any plants where disputes threatened the war effort, and the national security. One of the bill's provisions prohibited all union contributions to political campaign funds. This was a rider aimed at the CIO which had contributed funds for the election of Democratic candidates. "Individual unions contributed some $770,000 to the Democratic campaign of 1936, and large sums were contributed also in 1940." 9 As a result of the Smith-Connally law, the CIO created its Political Action Committee (PAC).

The war years brought to the forefront the ever increasing role that the government was playing in industrial relations. Roosevelt's war on the "Economic Royalists" in the thirties had made the industrialists his enemies. Roosevelt and the Democratic Party depended on the support of labor, especially the support of the two major labor union federations with their fifteen million members. On the other hand, organized labor was aware that a "friendly" government was of utmost importance to it, since laws enacted by the government constitute the highest authority by which labor and industry must abide. It is necessary to have reasonable, stable laws, which will be enforced in a social

order where agreements between parties are made on a contractual basis, because without a reasonable guarantee that contractual agreements will be enforced, such a society could not function. Which major political party has the majority of votes in Congress is therefore of prime importance to both labor and industry, as the rules and regulations affecting their operational policies are enacted by the legislative branch of the government. The government has become an arbitrator, interpreter, and enactor of the laws, rules, and regulations affecting industry and labor relations.

During the war years, it was shown that government, management, and labor could coordinate their efforts and negotiate their differences on a basis of antagonistic cooperation. The government adapted its formal structure to the extent that labor relations and labor problems were expedited through government agencies. Organized labor gained its objectives because it supported and co-operated with the Democratic Administration.

The power of organized labor is an unknown quantity. At times this power has been successfully used by labor to force acceptance of its demands. Labor leaders use the potential power of their unions as a coercive weapon against politicians, and management. The strike is a power weapon. Support or opposition to political candidates is a power weapon. Government and management both realize the existence of this power. However, the liberal Democratic
government was a useful tool to labor. Close co-operation between labor and the Democratic Administration increased the power of both, while management found itself excluded and on the defensive.

The international situation was an external factor, creating a condition which offered an opportunity for anti-union and anti-Communist organizations to inform the public of the dangers of Communist infiltration in Government and labor organizations. As a result, pressure was brought to bear on the Administration. Changes in the voting habits of the population were sufficiently large to appreciably weaken the power of the Administration in Congress, and simultaneously, also weaken the numerical strength and power of the labor organization most closely allied with the Administration, the CIO.

The actions of both labor and management were oriented toward gaining control of the legislative branch of the government, because this would mean control over legislation affecting the relations between the two groups.

The next two sections will describe the means used, objectives sought, and effects obtained by two public opinion groups, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the Catholic Church.
III. THE UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

The United States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), a federation of local and state chambers, has grown in size and importance, since its inception. In 1946, there were more than 3,100 chambers of commerce and trade organizations affiliated with the national chamber. These various chambers and associations had an underlying membership of more than 1,250,000 business men and over 18,000 firms and corporations. 10

The Chamber operates as a liaison between the membership and the government administration. The chief concern of the Chamber is the continued progress of business and the perpetuation of the American free enterprise system.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America is wholeheartedly committed to private enterprise in preference to government enterprise, to free enterprise in preference to controlled enterprise, and to competition in preference to monopolistic enterprise. 11

The Chamber from the beginning was opposed to the New Deal policies. These policies were advantageous to organized labor. Organized labor in turn gave active support to the Democratic Party. This fact made the Chamber more closely allied with the opposition, or Republican Party. The Chamber


needed legislators in Congress who could present and support its policies. The Republican Party as the minority party, needed public support to become the majority party.

Since 1946, the Chamber has been using different means in an attempt to gain its objectives. The Chamber has alerted the citizens to the danger of the infiltration of Communists in the government and the labor movement. The Chamber initiated a program of public information reaching millions of citizens.

A series of publications reporting the findings of the Chamber's research department were widely distributed. These reports were unique in that they were not accusative in their content matter, but merely explanatory or advisory. They suggested possible courses of action. The first of these reports, issued in 1946, was entitled Communist Infiltration in the United States. This pamphlet describes how Communists infiltrate respectable organizations and use them as "fronts" through which Communist propaganda is disseminated. The pamphlet, among other things, informed the reader that newspapers or magazines which, since 1944, had advocated a foreign policy similar to that of the Communist press could be considered as controlled by Communists. The Nation, The New Republic, and P. M. were singled out as examples of "Red"-dominated publications. These publications are pro-labor, pro-Democrat, anti-Republican and generally opposed to the basic values inherent in the Chamber's policies.
The next publication by the Chamber's Committee on Socialism and Communism, entitled *Communists Within the Government*, emphasized three major points. First, the Communists in our midst have a unique loyalty to the Soviet Union. Second, the Communists and their followers have achieved positions in the government where they can do harm to the national welfare and security. Third, the government has shown appalling laxity in meeting the problem. Appendix V. in this pamphlet is entitled *The United Public Workers of America, CIO*. This union is charged by several sources of being Communist-controlled. It is charged that through this union it is possible for Communists to enter the employ of the government. The Chamber implied that the government was doing nothing about the fact that this union had been accused of being a "Red" union. The Chamber implied that the Administration was unable or unwilling to control the CIO and do anything about the alleged Communist infiltration in the government, because many important posts in the administration were controlled and occupied by Communists.

Simultaneously with the publication noted above, there appeared another Chamber pamphlet titled, *Communists Within the Labor Movement*. It was purported to be a general treatise on the matter of Communism in the labor movement as a whole, but was in reality directed at the CIO. Although the Chamber mentioned the fact that some locals of the AFL were Communist-
controlled, the Chamber claimed that:

In the AFL, pressure from the top, combined with trained and conservative unionism on the part of the rank and file, has tended to keep out Communist infiltration... By contrast the CIO has shown great weakness in fighting Communist inroads. 12

According to the Chamber, in Communist plans for seizing power, a primary emphasis is placed on infiltration of the "heavy and strategic industries" such as the electrical and atomic energy industries. The Chamber publications referred the reader to other publications where specific unions were named. However, the Chamber named the industries, where the UE was the bargaining agent. The Chamber maintained that "Communism was strongly entrenched in the United Electrical Workers". 13 In the publicity given to the Communist issue as a threat to the nation, the Chamber did not inform the public of its own goals or objectives concerning relations between management, government and labor.

The Chamber's interest in, and publication of, the Communist threat to the nation may have served the Chamber as a means whereby the Chamber was able to gain some of the objectives for which it was primarily organized, but had been unable to reach by other means and methods. Publicity was directed at the Democratic Administration for its laxity

12 Communists Within the Labor Movement, 1947, p. 8.

13 Ibid., p. 54.
in permitting Communists to enter government employ, for failure to purge the government of such employees, for toleration of an alleged Communist-controlled union to organize the government employees, \(^{14}\) and for acceptance of political support from the CIO which was alleged to be dominated by a group of Communist labor leaders. The administration may have been forced into taking certain measures to avoid reprisals at the polls. A close relationship existed between the CIO and the Administration. Certain unions in the CIO had been accused of being Communist-controlled. This fact may have had the effect of making the public distrustful of the Democratic Administration. In any event, the Republican Party won a Congressional majority in the 1946 elections.

During the 1946 and 1947 period, the Chamber was also vitally interested in another national issue, the problem of labor-management accord. This issue was given very little publicity by the Chamber. The public was not informed by pamphlets. However, as soon as the 80th Congress was in office:

The Chamber presented to the people the facts about the issue and the need for remedial legislation. The soundness of the Chamber's approach was clearly indicated by the similarity of views expressed by a Congressional majority in the passage of the new labor act. \(^{15}\)


The new labor act was the Taft-Hartley Law, a legislative act, curbing or limiting the power of labor. During the session of the 80th Congress:

More than 250 anti-labor bills were introduced... These bills called for repeal of the Wagner Act, repeal of the Wages and Hours Law, repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Law, revision of the Anti-Trust Law to make it apply to unions, outlawing of the closed shop, compulsory arbitration, the Ball-Burton-Hatch Bill...and the Taft-Hartley Bill. 16

Although the Taft-Hartley law contained provisions which required labor leaders to sign non-Communist affiliation affidavits, the major part of the law was directed at curbing the power of organized labor and increasing the freedom of action in labor relations on the part of management.

The Chamber may be apprehensive lest Communism acquire dominance in the trade of the countries not now under Communist control. The Chamber may fear the spread of Communism because the Chamber's policies are incompatible with the Communist theory of economics. However, the threat of Communism in the United States at the time of the Chamber's publications was not comparable to other parts of the world. That the Chamber's use of the Communist issue may have been a means to an end may be observed by the fact that after the Republican victory, and the expulsions in the CIO, the Chamber

published its 1952 Report on Communism, wherein the Chamber admitted that the Communist Party was broken and that the Communists in this country now number approximately 35,000. It is therefore questionable if the Communists ever constituted the threat the Chamber purported them to be. However, it is a fact that the Communist issue played a major part in weakening the power of the CIO. It helped to create more freedom of choice on the part of management and to establish a balance of power in favor of management. The Republican victory strengthened the power of the Chamber in the government. These were all objectives for which the Chamber had aimed. The Chamber may have taken advantage of an external situation which existed in the international relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and used the Communist threat as a power weapon to win public support for its policies against two of its opponents, the Democratic Administration and the CIO.

The Communist issue was also used against the CIO by other public opinion groups, but for different purposes and objectives. The next section will discuss such groups. Chosen for discussion is the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU), and the Catholic Church.

18 Policy Declaration 1949, U. S. Chamber of Commerce.

IV. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE ASSOCIATION OF CATHOLIC TRADE UNIONISTS

The Catholic Church has been an implacable foe of Communism since its beginning. No compromise is possible between religion and materialistic atheism. The Church's interest in the social order dates back to the time of the
IV. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE ASSOCIATION OF CATHOLIC TRADE UNIONISTS

The Catholic Church has been an implacable foe of Communism since its beginning. No compromise is possible between religion and materialistic atheism. The Church's interest in the social order dates back to the time of the Church's inception. Communism, whose basic values are expressed in the theory of man's ability to determine his own destiny and wellbeing through the common control of material resources and the products thereof, threatens the very existence of the Church as an organized institution. The struggle between Communism and the Catholic Church is for the preservation of the Church as an organized institution.

In fighting Communism, the Church claims it is striking a "blow for the liberty of men, as well as for her own peace and survival in many countries". The end sought by the Catholic Church is its own preservation through a social order free from destitution and oppression, which the Church maintains stimulates a spirit of revolt against society and compels some in the direction of crime, and others to movements such as Communism. Hence, the Church has a direct and an indirect interest in crusading for a just and peaceful social order. Directly, she seeks justice and charity in all fields of life. Indirectly, she is concerned over the evil roots of injustice and exploitation.

21 Ibid., p. 25.
In the United States, the Catholic Church has a membership of 28,634,878²² of which the majority may be considered as Democrats in their political affiliation.²³ It is therefore unlikely that the American Communist Party which had a numerical strength estimated at 73,000 in 1945, and 35,000 in 1952, constitutes a serious threat to the Church in the United States. The threat of Communism is further removed since the expose' of Communism, and the subsequent public alertness to any possible Communist moves.

Interference with the function of the Catholic Church in countries under the Russian sphere of influence, has given the Church cause for concern. The Church is sensitive to the status, role, and trends of organized labor, for the Church has found that in the labor unions is found the greatest numerical strength of Communism. This is especially true in the European unions. The Church discovered that, to the extent that Communists can claim power in the labor movement, their positions in the government are strengthened. Officials who do not co-operate can be threatened with reprisals at the polls. The Church, in order to survive, needs a government in power that is in sympathy with the Church's social theories, and labor unions which will accept the Church's social program. It becomes evident why Pope Leo XIII, as early as

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²³ Paul Lazarsfeld, et al., The People's Choice, pp. 1 ff.
1891, advocated the formation of Catholic labor organizations through which the Church could put its social theories into practice, and thus test them against the secular theories of Marx and Engels.

In the United States, where there is a separation of Church and State, the Catholic Church had to adapt its program to the prevailing institutionalized patterns of the socio-political structure. In the field of labor, the Church is not engaged in forming a Catholic union. Up to the time of the organization of the CIO, the Church was content to play a passive role regarding labor activities. In 1937, the Church changed its role from a passive to an active participant in labor's organizational activities. The time of this change coincides with the time of the organization of the CIO by John L. Lewis, who because of a time element and a shortage of organizers accepted help in organizing the CIO from individuals, who had gained organizing experience and knowledge of labor problems by attending classes in labor schools. Such classes were conducted by Schools of Social Science, Colleges, Universities, Unions, and individuals with experience in the field. Some of the teachers were Marxian oriented in their views. It is possible that some of the CIO organizers were Communists. The fact that in 1945 the CIO helped organize, and was a member of the World Federation of Trade Unionists of which the Soviet trade unions
also was a member, may have caused the Church to consider it a possibility that the CIO's policies might be influenced by the European Communist unions' policies, which were anti-clerical and anti-Catholic.

The Catholic Church in the United States, through its Department of Social Action, in the spring of 1937 organized the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU). The aims of the organization are based on the 1931 encyclical of Pope Pius XI which states in part:

Wherever it (is) impossible for Catholics to form Catholic unions...they (Catholic workers) seem to have no recourse but to enroll themselves in neutral trade unions...Side by side with these trade unions, there must always be associations which aim at giving their members a thorough religious and moral training that these in turn may impart to the labor unions to which they belong the upright spirit which should direct their entire conduct. 24

Pope Pius' dictum of "thorough religious and moral training" has been translated by the ACTU as meaning job security, collective bargaining, and a share in profits after reasonable wages and return to capital has been paid. ACTU members are admonished that they must respect private property, co-operate with honest employers, and attempt to secure industrial peace through management-worker associations which desire a voice in the operation and a share in the profits of industry. "The ACTU tells its members they must reject completely the Marxist principle of class struggle as

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24 "The Upright Spirit" Fortune, Nov., 1946, p. 188.
an indispensable feature of present day society". 25

To accomplish its aims, the ACTU conducts Catholic labor schools, prints labor newspapers such as The Labor Leader, holds conferences with industry and conducts spiritual activities among its members. 26 The teachers at the ACTU labor schools are generally priests.

The Department of Social Action of the National Catholic Welfare Conference has conducted many meetings and schools for priests...many priests have taken formal academic training on social questions to supplement the courses now being given in seminaries. 27

There were approximately 10,000 Catholic members in the ACTU in 1946. They were distributed in seven chapters in New York, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cary, Cleveland, San Francisco, and Oakland. These trained members are sent to work within the United States trade unions to impart to the members the "Upright spirit" called for by the Vatican. 28

The ACTU was successful in Detroit in 1946. Its 1,000 members, 80-90 percent of whom belong to the CIO, principally the United Automobile Workers, supported Walter Reuther and were a major factor in the defeat of the Thomas-Addes-Leonard slate. George Addes, although a Catholic, opposed the ACTU, along with Communists, Socialists, and

26 What Does the ACTU Mean to You, ACTU, 327 Lex. Ave., N. Y.
27 Cronin, op. cit., p. 25.
28 Fortune, op. cit., p. 138.
Trotskyites of being tightly knit factions...(which) attempt to use the union as a vehicle for achieving their respective organizational or political goals. This statement offended Catholics and left-wingers almost equally. 29

This statement however, was not denied by the ACTU.

"ACTU members have tried determinedly to unseat the leftist executive body of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers - a campaign that failed during the union's recent (1946) convention". 30 The attempts by the ACTU to dislodge the leadership of the UE continued and failed consistently. The ACTU attempts to change the leadership of a union, whose policies are not in sympathy or conformity with the principles and programs of the Church's social program, and labor policies. An effective means used by the ACTU members is to charge the opposition with being Communist, Communist-controlled, or with being in sympathy with Communist policy in world affairs. The ACTU, working within the CIO, also attempted to eliminate their opposing candidates by parliamentary or political maneuvers. In the case of the UE, the ACTU worked with Carey in his unsuccessful attempt to split the UE into small factions. 31

The ACTU takes no official position on specific labor issues. One of its primary interests is action against

29 Loc. cit.
30 Loc. cit.
Communism. The ACTU seeks to control the area in the social structure where the ideologies of the Church and its organization are threatened. By developing labor leaders who are in sympathy with the aims and policies of the social program of the Church, the Church may indirectly exercise a certain amount of control over the unions' policies and thus eliminate the possibility of a threat arising against the organizational structure of the Church.

Although the Chamber and the Catholic Church may both have used the threat of Communism as a means to an end, they have divergent views on labor. The Chamber was one of the sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Bill. The ACTU and the Social Action Department of the Church actively condemned and opposed the T-H Bill. The Church supports the rights of workers to strike. The Chamber does not. Pope Leo XIII, in his Rerum Novarum in 1891, went so far as to advocate "the formation of Catholic labor organizations". Many such unions exist today in several European countries. The ACTU in co-operation with departments of the Church conducts labor schools and prints labor publications. The Chamber does not. On May 15, 1931, Pope Pius XI issued his encyclical on the Reconstruction of the Social Order. In this encyclical, he


33 Carl Eckhardt, The Papacy and World Affairs, p. 250.
denounced the basic tenets of capitalism, recognized the rights of workers to organize, and gave several proposals for the control of social and economic problems. The Chamber, on the other hand, is the defender and supporter of free enterprise capitalism. However, both the Chamber and the Church conducted a public campaign against a number of unions in the CIO, including the UE, which were alleged to be Communist controlled. Based on the objectives sought by these organizations respectively, the Communist issue appears to have been used to obtain organizational objectives. The aim of the Chamber may have been to weaken the power of the CIO politically as well as numerically. The Church neither favored or desired to weaken the power of the CIO, but wanted the "Communists" replaced by "bona fide" union leaders, preferably leaders trained by the ACTU. The Chamber and the Church, in spite of their divergent views on social and economic issues, used the threat of Communism to the nation as a means of winning public support against the CIO-Democratic Party coalition. Through this support, they may have hoped to gain control over legislative measures which affected their respective objectives. The United States Chamber of Commerce appeared to have used the Communist issue as a means to obtain economic ends. The Catholic Church appeared to have used the Communist issue as a means to insure organizational survival.

These activities on the part of public opinion groups
had their effects on the relationship which existed between the CIO and the Democratic Party. Political parties which depend on the electorate to support their candidates for office are naturally sensitive to public opinion.

As the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union became strained, and the existing international relations deteriorated, the external situation furnished the anti-Communist and anti-union associations with material for their campaign to mold public opinion. Once such a campaign is set in motion it has an accumulative effect and reaches into all areas of public life.

How these activities on the part of the Chamber, the Church, and other associations affected the relations within the CIO will be presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV

RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

I. THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE CIO

The CIO is a confederation of local unions, national unions and internationals. There are thirty or forty unions in the CIO. The unions exercise a great deal of autonomy. Ultimate decisions and power rest with the membership, which decides whether or not the union shall affiliate with or secede from any federation. The unions have their own constitutions, which in the CIO affiliated unions, vary little. The constitutions guarantee certain rights to the union members. A member may appeal adverse decisions from his local to the union or to the membership at large. In the same manner, under the CIO constitution, the union may carry its appeal to the membership at the National CIO Convention.

The convention is the highest authority in all CIO unions. The convention, which meets annually or bi-annually, is the supreme legislative body of the internationals and unions. The delegates to the conventions are elected directly by the members they represent. Generally, the elections are by secret ballot. Delegates are free to express their opinions and cast votes in proportion to the number of workers they represent. Generally, such conventions are open to the
Proportional representation is important to note because it means that the larger the local or union is, the greater is its vote. In the national CIO conventions, the larger the union, the greater is its number of voting delegates, and the greater is the influence of its representatives on the CIO Executive Board. It will be shown later how important this fact is in the matter of control in the CIO.

Direction of the unions rests with their top officers and their General Executive Boards. The officers are nominated and elected by the members, or by delegates representing the members at the union conventions. Most of the officers are elected to terms of not more than two years, and five unions elect their top officers every year. Among these five unions is the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE).

The locals of the CIO unions collect monthly dues. A portion, rarely exceeding one dollar, is turned over to the union and is called the "per capita" tax. Eight cents of the monthly "per capita" tax is kept by the national CIO to support its nationwide activities. The unions also pay "per capita" tax to local and state CIO councils. CIO state councils have a formal structure similar to the national CIO, but their primary activity is political in nature. The "per capita" tax keeps the CIO financially solvent. The CIO could not operate without the financial support from its affiliated
unions. It will be noted later that withholding of the "per
capita" tax by a union may be tantamount to the severance of
affiliation. Withholding the tax may be used as a means in
an attempt to obtain action on urgent matters, vital to the
union, which have been delayed by the national CIO.

The national CIO consists of an Executive Council com-
posed of a president, secretary-treasurer, and nine vice pre-
sidents. "In 1948 the Executive Council included the presi-
dents of the textile workers, rubber workers, electrical
workers (UE), and oil workers." 1 The power of these men
rests on the strength of their respective unions. Each man
has an effective veto over any proposal which might affect
his union adversely and can exercise his veto power by
threatening to withdraw his union from the federation. 2
These men formulate the policies of the CIO. These policies
are then presented to the General Executive Board (GEB),
which consists of forty to fifty representatives of the CIO
affiliated unions. Some members of this Board are also
salaried members of the staff of the CIO. The members of
the GEB are nominated and elected directly by the members or
by delegates representing the members at the national CIO
conventions. 3 The GEB conducts the affairs of the national

1 Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Rela-
tions, p. 142.

2 Ibid., p. 143.

3 The formal structure of the CIO is based on excerpts
from The CIO. What It Is And What It Does, CIO publication,
1951.
CIO between conventions. The GEB also carries out the policies adopted at the national conventions and may formulate policies for adoption at the next convention. The Board also passes on matters concerning questions on jurisdictional disputes between the unions. At times, one union will attempt to organize a group of workers, who ordinarily would come under the jurisdiction of another union. In some cases where the GEB has not been successful in settling the disputes, the National Labor Relations Board, a government agency, has been called upon to hold elections, thus giving the union members the choice of determining which union should be the bargaining agent representing them. The Board must also make decisions on problems arising when one union attempts to "raid" local unions away from the national or international union. Raiding is one of the more serious, and as yet, unsolved problems confronting labor federations. Raiding can be serious to the union being raided, because the loss of several of its local unions may mean the reduction in status of the union itself. As one union loses some of its locals, another union gains in relative importance and power. A union, with major representation on the GEB and major voting strength at the national convention, may be reduced to a union of minor importance if it is subjected to raids. Raiding of its unions may have been one of the major factors that may have forced the leadership of the UE to dissent in
order to prevent dismemberment of the international union.

The CIO Political Action Committee (PAC) is a semi-autonomous committee which receives financial support through voluntary contributions from the members of the various CIO unions throughout the nation. The president of the CIO is a member of the PAC. Most of the larger CIO unions have representatives on the PAC Executive Board. The PAC carries out the political policies of the CIO. Technically the PAC is non-partisan. Generally it has given unqualified support to the New Deal policies and has supported New Deal candidates for office. It will be shown later that one faction on the CIO Executive Board attempted to change the authority of the PAC Executive Board, on matters concerning the control of the political activities and policies of the CIO affiliates. This action was opposed by some of the CIO unions, and led the UE to dissent from the rulings of the PAC Board.

In considering the action of the CIO against the UE, the contention was that a series of events precipitated the final action of the CIO. Therefore, it seems logical to continue the study investigating the relationship between some of the CIO unions, particularly the UE-CIO relationship.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CIO AND THE UE

Until the end of World War II, the internationals and other unions of the CIO appeared to work together without serious difficulties arising in their relationships. However, at the end of the war, there was a noticeable change in the relationship between some of the leaders of the CIO unions. This change eventually led to the expulsion of several CIO affiliates from the CIO. These unions were accused by anti-union and anti-Communist associations of being Communist-controlled. The unions were:

- Farm Equipment and Metal Workers
- United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
- Food, Tobacco, and Agricultural Workers
- Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
- Office and Professional Workers
- United Public Workers
- American Communications Associations
- Fishermen and Allied Workers
- Fur and Leather Workers
- Furniture Workers
- Longshoremen and Warehousemen
- Marine Cooks and Stewards

A group of union leaders in the CIO, representing twenty-nine national and international unions, also considered the unions named above to be Communist-controlled.

1 The CIO, What It Is and What It Does, CIO publication #173, 1950, p. 11.
Thus, for purposes of identification, it may be said that two factions existed within the CIO, a left wing faction made up of the unions that were accused of being Communist-controlled and a right wing faction composed of the anti-Communist unions. The left wing faction "represented approximately six and one-half percent of the dues-paying membership of the National CIO." ² It constituted "less than ten percent of the total membership." ³ The largest union of the left wing faction was the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE). The UE was the third largest of the CIO affiliates. The leaders of the UE may be considered the leaders of the left wing faction. The largest right wing union was the United Automobile Workers (UAW) and by 1949, it had become the largest of the CIO affiliated unions. Walter Reuther, president of the UAW, was recognized as the leader of the right wing or anti-Communist bloc. ⁴

All of the unions involved had representatives on various committees within the CIO and many of them were represented on the Executive Board of the CIO. This is an important fact because, as noted in Section I, the Executive Board is a policy making body and also conducts the affairs of the CIO between conventions. The size of the Executive Board is important because it must be large enough to represent the interests of all the affiliated unions. The size of the Executive Board is determined by the number of affiliated unions, with each union having a certain number of representatives based on the number of dues-paying members.

² CIO Convention Proceedings, 1949, p. 278.
³ Ibid., p. 54.
⁴ Communists Within the Labor Movement, Chamber of Commerce Publication, 1947, p. 6.
Board varies, depending on the number of unions entitled to representation on the Board. Therefore, the Executive Board was also divided, eleven or twelve members representing the left wing faction, and approximately thirty members representing the right wing faction. The power of the left wing members on the Executive Board was much greater than the power of the ten percent they represented in the membership. The left wing representation on the policy making Board of the CIO constituted a formidable minority, when discussion of policy arose. According to Philip Murray, president of the CIO:

The Executive Board meetings of the CIO since the fall of 1946...focus themselves upon one issue, and one issue alone, and that is the issue of Communism. These 11 or 12 unions...supported the foreign policy of the Soviet government against the government of the United States of America at every meeting of our Executive Board. 5

Specifically, these unions were charged with having voted against the CIO's international policies and against CIO support of Harry S. Truman for President. In the expulsion proceedings against the UE, part of which follows, it was charged that:

1. The CIO and the American people support the Marshall Plan...

The Soviet Union, the Communist Party and their highly placed agents in the UERMWA (UE) unite in denouncing the Marshall Plan.

2. The CIO along with the American people support the Atlantic Pact to prevent any further expansion of the Soviet Unions rule...

The Soviet Union, the Communist Party and the UE leadership attack the Atlantic Pact as war-mongering.

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3. In the field of political action, the UE leadership, crying aloud for unity and autonomy, joined with Wall Street...to defeat liberalism and democracy in the United States. Against the desire and interests of the American Labor Movement, the UE leadership joined with the Communist Party in creating the mis-named Progressive Party.

5. In cynical and outright defiance of the CIO, the UE leadership secretly arranged a merger with the United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America (FE) which had loudly proclaimed its demand for independence, when ordered by the CIO Executive Board to merge with the UAW. This merger of FE and UE was the first step in the long range plans of the Communist Party to establish a Communist-dominated labor federation in America.

7. The final stage in the UE leadership program for leaving the CIO and establishing a Communist-dominated labor federation was reached on October 7, 1949. When the officers of the UE served an ultimatum upon the President of the CIO...demanding that the CIO change its policies, that CIO subordinate itself to the UE, and that President Murray plead guilty to false and defamatory charges. 6

Section 4 and 6, omitted in the above quotation, stated that the UE charged the CIO's fight to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act, a sellout and that the UE also attacked Murray's handling of the steel strike in 1949, "while hypocritically calling for financial support to the strikers."

The CIO officially had endorsed and supported the policies, which the UE was charged with opposing. The policies were a part of the CIO program and therefore, the minority had been out-voted. Whether or not the minority supported the policies had no effect upon the policies.

6 Ibid., pp. 303 f.
The expulsions may be an indication that the right wing faction took advantage of the ideological issue existing in the external situation. The right wing faction, by its action, conformed to the demands of the administration, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and other anti-Communist associations which demanded that the CIO purge itself of Communists.

By deciding to withdraw from the World Federation of Trade Unionists (WFTU), the right wing faction satisfied the demands of the Administration and the Catholic Church's Social Welfare Committee. The right wing faction had the support of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU). The ACTU actively supported Walter Reuther in his rise to power within the UAW and the CIO. The ACTU was a major factor in bringing about the defeat of the Thomas-Addes-Leonard slate in the UAW. The ACTU members have also tried determinedly to unseat the leftist body of the UE.

Three points in the expulsion proceedings were of interest to the problem of the paper. The first was the fact that the UE was expelled from the CIO on charges based on an ideological issue. The second was the statement by Philip Murray that the difficulties began in 1946. The third was the statement in the resolution to expel the UE, in which the Resolutions Committee reported that on October 7,

7 Ibid., pp. 59; 176-180.
8 "The Upright Spirit", Fortune, November 1946, p. 188.
1949, the UE officers served an "ultimatum" to President Murray demanding that the CIO subordinate its policies to the UE.

Concerning Murray's statement, a question may be asked. If the situation had existed in the CIO since 1946, why was action delayed until 1949? According to Murray, "from December 7, 1941 until August 7, 1945, he received the united support of the left wing elements." Murray's dating of 1946 as a crucial year in the CIO history may have been due to several events, which occurred, during that year. It was a turbulent year in CIO history.

The end of the war brought a rapidly deteriorating relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The public was informed of the danger of Communism. The arms aid to Greece and the Marshall Plan were issues with which the CIO had to deal. The Marshall Plan was accepted by all in principle, but some of the practical aspects of the plan were opposed by the left wing faction. The acceptance of the Marshall Plan involved the WFTU because the Russian and other Communist unions voiced their opposition to the Marshall Plan. It was a difficult problem for the CIO, for Philip Murray and James Carey both had been the principal movers in helping to organize the WFTU in 1945.

The CIO was also facing the wave of post-war reaction

to controls, restrictions on wages, and unemployment, resulting from war production cut-backs. The conception of the post-war wage campaign and its practical application was largely the work of the CIO. At this time, Walter Reuther, the director of the General Motors division within the UAW, initiated the campaign by opening negotiations, which included several innovations. Since the campaign was for wage increases for the entire CIO, the CIO, to show unity of purpose had to support Reuther. As a result, the Steel, Automobile and UE workers became involved in long and costly strikes. 10 In his action, Reuther took the initiative away from the Steel Workers, the traditional pattern setters, for the CIO.

In the political field, the CIO faced other difficulties. In the 1946 elections, support of candidates by the CIO Political Action Committee (PAC) proved to be more of a handicap than a benefit. In the national and local elections, Republicans were swept into office. The change in the political party representation exposed the CIO to the threat of local and federal legislation, regulating the powers of labor unions.

The CIO also lost two powerful supporters in the deaths of President Roosevelt and Sidney Hillman. Hillman was one of the CIO's most experienced and astute leaders. He had

10 Leo Wolman, "Labor and Unemployment", Colliers Year Book, 1947, p. 311.
been the founder and moving spirit of the powerful PAC. On his death, there was no one with comparable capacity within the CIO to succeed him. Within several of the CIO unions and within the CIO organization, there existed factional differences between the leaders, which were partly doctrinal and partly personal. Through all the differences, ran the fact of Communist infiltration and the fear of Communist domination. 11 The difficulties were brought before the public in 1946.

In the UAW, in 1946, Walter Reuther, leader of the anti-Communist forces defeated R. J. Thomas for the presidency and assumed political control of that organization. Similar contests for political supremacy were waged in the Maritime, Electrical and Radio and other unions. 12 In the UE, James E. Carey, secretary-treasurer of the CIO and one time president of the UE, waged an anti-Communist campaign against the UE leaders, Albert Fitzgerald, Julius Emspak and James Matles. Carey was assisted by the ACTU-UE members.

It is seen that a combination of events in the external situation may have created a condition that made the use of the Communist issue a powerful means for the right-wing faction to use in an attempt to change the order of existing relationships in the CIO. The external situation was

11 Loc. cit.
12 Loc. cit.
political in nature, therefore, the activities of the right-wing faction in the CIO and its affiliates were politically oriented. The right-wing faction justified its actions on the grounds that it was eliminating Communism from the CIO. However, the fact that the right-wing faction, three years later, had to amend the CIO constitution and resort to expulsions may indicate that some of the campaigns were unsuccessful. The membership of the left-wing unions may have judged organizational efficiency to be of greater importance than political beliefs or ideologies.

The third point of importance was the "ultimatum" sent to Mr. Murray by the UE leadership. It was the last of several communications that had been sent to Murray. The "ultimatum" was a resolution against raiding and dictatorship in the CIO. The resolution was passed at the 14th Convention of the UE-CIO in 1949. Parts of the resolution, which are considered pertinent to the problem of the paper follow:

From the beginning of April 1948, until the end of July 1949, the National Office of the CIO, the CIO Auto Workers, the United Steel Workers and the CIO Communication Workers of America have attempted to raid 456 UE shops. In 418 cases these efforts were defeated. Thirty-eight raids conducted in collusion with employers were successful...

Gradually over the years, individuals in the top leadership of the CIO and some of its affiliated unions have sought...to transform the CIO from an instrumental-ity and servant of the unions and their memberships to a dictatorship over unions and members alike...Two years ago, this group used the CIO Executive Board to decree that the CIO should henceforward subordinate itself to the political interests of the Democratic Party leadership...This group...demands absolute and complete con-
formity on all matters of politics as a condition for remaining in the CIO. This policy of subordinating the interests of the CIO unions to the political dictates of the CIO leadership is defended on the ground that it represents the will of the majority. The majority referred to actually consists of some 30 members of the CIO Executive Board, a substantial number of whom are paid or subsidized directly from the treasury of the CIO. Because they could not hope to win voluntary compliance with (this) policy...and because they could not impose dictation from the top, the CIO officialdom has turned to threats, compulsion, raiding and union wrecking to impose their policy on CIO unions, including the UE.

Representatives of the national office and the leaders of the UAW at a UAW Executive Board meeting in March 1948 plotted to raid and dismember the UE. The raids were commenced in Hartford and Brooklyn with raids by the UAW upon a number of UE organized shops.

Between March 12, 1948 and January 7, 1949, the UE addressed itself to President Murray upon this subject on six different occasions and conferred with him four times. No moves of any kind were made by him to halt the raids. The UE submitted to the last convention a resolution condemning the raiding within the CIO. This resolution was never permitted to reach either the Resolution Committee or the floor of the CIO convention.

In May (1949), the CIO Executive Board made it official CIO policy that representatives on the CIO Executive Board had to comply or get out.

Continuing the resolution the UE presented its demands, which in abbreviated form follow:

1. All raided unions will be returned and charters restored.

2. The President of the CIO is to direct affiliated unions to stop raiding, promoting secession and dual unionism against the UE. If not stopped, the President will file appropriate charges with the Executive Board.

3. The CIO officers who have participated in promoting raids, secessions and dual unionism against the UE shall be removed from the payroll in accordance with Article V, Section 3 of the CIO constitution.
4. The President of the CIO is to immediately direct CIO secretary-treasurer, James B. Carey to cease and desist from wrecking activities within the UE and to stop spending funds of the CIO for purposes of undermining the UE. The President should take this action in accordance with his repeated statements to the General Officers of the UE since 1941, in which he condemned these activities of Carey and promised to take action.

In the event the UE Executive Board does not receive assurances from the President of the CIO, the convention authorizes the Board to withhold per capita tax from the CIO for such time as it deems necessary... 13

In his reply to the request, Murray stated:

Gentlemen, there is no way under the sun in which you and I could ever hope to resolve these issues — not the issues that you have presented to me alone, but the fundamental issue, the big issue, the issue of Communism. So I have therefore, decided to refer your communication and your requests to the Committee on Resolutions, and in due course, they will present their formal recommendations to the National Convention. 14

In the 1949 CIO convention order of business, the Constitution Committee was the first to report. It recommended the adoption of the CIO constitution with the following amendment:

Page 10: Article IV concerning Officers and Executive Board is amended by insertion of a new Section 4, which reads as follows:

Section 4. No individual shall be eligible to serve either as an officer or as a member of the Executive Board, who is a member of the Communist Party, any fascist organization or other totalitarian movement, or who consistently pursues policies toward the achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party, any fascist organization or other totalitarian movement rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the Constitution of the CIO. 15

14 CIO Convention Proceedings, op. cit., p. 322.
15 Ibid., p. 240.
The amendment was debated and adopted.

Next, Walter Reuther, chairman of the Resolutions Committee, reported the recommendations of the committee on the matter of the UE, which follows in part:

Resolution No. 58

On The Expulsion of the UE

We can no longer tolerate within the family of the CIO, the Communist Party masquerading as a labor union. The time has come when we must strip the mask from these false leaders whose only purpose it is to deceive and betray workers....These Communist agents cry out against "raiding and secession". What they call raiding and secession is simply a movement of workers throwing off the yoke of domination. The workers seek refuge from a gang of men who are without principles other than debased loyalty to a foreign power....Therefore, in conformance with the provisions of Article III, Section 6 of our Constitution, this convention hereby expels the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America from the Congress of Industrial Organization. 16

The Resolutions Committee ignored the grievances and requests of the UE. The UE was in possession of conclusive evidence showing that raids were conducted by the UAW. Furthermore, the members of the right-wing faction within the UE were against raiding. Delegate Michael Fitzpatrick who spoke for the minority report, which favored the CIO policy said, "We are opposed to raiding in all shapes and forms....We don't want to see a single, solitary local going to UAW, Steel or any other union." 17

The UE had also

16 Ibid., pp. 302 f.
17 UE Proceedings, 1949, op. cit., 112.
participated in several National Labor Relations Board elections, where their opponents were known.

Later at the 1949 convention, James B. Carey stated in part,

I was subject to a trial on charges of secession. I engaged in secession, yes. I make no bones about it. I honestly feel I have the right, inherent right, to revolt against an intolerable situation. 18

When the CIO convention, elected the General Executive Board members, Murray stated,

We are departing from the usual procedure in the election of our Executive Board members by having the convention vote upon each of the candidates who are offered for membership on the Board. 19

Previously, all nominees had been presented and voted upon en masse. In 1949, right-wing nominees were presented first and voted into office. Then the nominations of the eleven left-wing unions were presented and each was rejected by invoking the new amendment to the CIO constitution. Thus, the left-wing unions were without representation in the CIO and the right-wing faction was in complete control of the CIO. The expulsion of the left-wing Executive Board members did not cause the members of the left-wing unions to turn to the right-wing faction.

The action described in the foregoing pages leaves a number of questions unanswered. Why did the right-wing faction find it necessary to change the CIO constitution in order to expel some of their unions and thus weaken the power

18 Ibid., 212.
of the CIO, when, as a matter of recorded fact, the right-
wing as the majority in the CIO had all of its policies
accepted? Why were all the charges against the left-wing
faction based on the ideological issue of Communism? Why
was the problem of raiding ignored and never presented at
previous conventions and Executive Board meetings? Why were
none of the charges based on organizational inefficiency?
Why was the UE the first union to be expelled, rather than
the International Fur and Leather Workers, whose leader,
Ben Gold, was admittedly a Communist Party member? Why did
the UE leaders permit the expulsion in preference to sub-
mitting to the rules of an established majority? The answer
to these questions may be found by asking another question.
Was Communism the real problem in the UE-CIO controversy?

It appears that the ideological issue of Communism
may have been used by the right-wing faction in the CIO as
a means of eliminating competition and gaining control of
the CIO. It appears that various individuals, factions,
and associations injected an ideological issue, which existed
between the United States and the Soviet Union, into the
field of labor relations. This may have been done primarily
to provide a means whereby specific objectives could be
reached. The Chamber of Commerce and the Catholic Church's
Welfare Conference have been cited as examples.

In the UE-CIO controversy, the danger of Communist
control of the CIO may not have been the primary reason for
the expulsions, since the right-wing majority had complete control over the policies of the CIO, while the left-wing unions were still members of the CIO. It appears that the controversy within the CIO was an organizational matter of a competitive struggle between the leaders for power. If the Communist leaders had constituted a clear and present danger to the nation and the CIO, it would have been a matter for the legal authorities to judge.

To further illustrate that the Communist threat may not have been the real issue in the UE-CIO controversy, part of Walter Reuther’s remarks at the 1949 convention, concerning the constitutional amendment follow:

At Atlantic City, ... I, along with Emil Rieve...and Ben Gold...sat on the resolutions sub-committee....We passed a resolution unanimously...that they...the morally degenerated Left...cease and desist in their interference. But, they didn’t, and we went to Portland, and there we got a little bit stronger and we said, “Boys, you have either got to get all the way into the CIO or all the way out.” At this convention, since these brothers have not been able to make up their minds for themselves we are going to have to make up their minds for them. 20

Reuther then went on to state that with other fellow trade unionists it was possible to disagree on a number of trade union issues, but, if their loyalties were with the CIO, they would support the policies of the CIO because it represented the will of the majority.

But this is not true of the Communist minority because...they want to be able to take Phil Murray on and

20 Ibid., p. 269.
say he sold out on Taft-Hartley. They want to accuse him of collaborating with Wall Street and selling out the Steel Workers. 21

This statement indicates that criticism of the right-wing leaders' activities may have been one of the major points at issue. Reuther made this point clearer when he stated:

We don't challenge the Communist Party's right to stand up in America and have their say. We don't challenge the right of these few people in the CIO to go out and peddle the Communist line... We challenge and we are going to put a stop to their right to peddle the Communist Party line with a CIO label on the wrapper... Let them peddle the line; let them stand up wherever they can get an audience and peddle the Communist Party line to their hearts content. But... put the Party label on it. Don't put the CIO label on it. That's the basic question before us. It has nothing to do with the democratic rights of the minority. It has everything to do with how a free, democratic, voluntary association of working people handle their internal affairs. 22

Reuther expressed no objection to Communists being labor leaders, but he objected to the left wing leaders controlling CIO unions. This may indicate that Reuther's primary objectives were to make his own position secure, eliminate opposition to his policies, and gain control of the CIO. However, as shown elsewhere, he was not inconsistent.

Murray and Reuther both maintained that the main issue within the CIO was Communism. Reuther was elected president of the UAW in 1946 on his promises to clear the UAW of Communist influence and control. However, after the election, a series of activities on the part of Reuther appear to have

21 Ibid., p. 270.
22 Loc. cit.
been oriented toward the objective of making the UAW the largest and most powerful union in the CIO rather than eliminating Communists or Communism from the UAW. In any event, no locals were expelled from the UAW because they were Communist-controlled and no individuals were expelled for Communist activities, although some leaders were displaced. Thomas, whom Reuther defeated for the presidency of the UAW, continued as a Vice President and a paid employee of the national CIO office staff.

Further evidence that the elimination of Communist-controlled unions was not the primary objective of Reuther may be observed in the controversy between the Farm Equipment Workers Union (FE) and Reuther. Reuther opposed the proposed merger of the FE union with the UAW in 1946 on the grounds that the FE was Communist-controlled. At this time, Reuther was seeking the presidency of the UAW and he was not supported by the FE. However, after his election, at the 1949 convention of the CIO, Reuther demanded that the FE, which was one of the ten unions considered to be Communist-controlled, merge with the UAW, thus adding to the size and power of the UAW.23 Reuther's failure to return the unions that the UAW had raided from the UE to the non-Communist CIO-chartered, IUE union, indicated that Reuther's interest in eliminating Communist-con-

trolled unions from the CIO may have been primarily for purposes of the control of the CIO by Reuther and the right-wing faction. Reuther's failure to purge the UAW Ford Local 600 of Communist control until the year 1952, when a public hearing by the Un-American Committee disclosed that the local was Communist-controlled, may be an indication that conformance with Reuther's policies had priority over the removal of Communist leaders in the UAW. Reuther's declaration at the 1949 CIO convention, that he had no objections to Communists being in the CIO, but that he had objection to them being leaders of CIO unions, pointed out that it was not the Communist threat to the nation which was of prime importance to Reuther, but that his main objective may have been to make ineffective any opposition to his power and policies.

In all of his activities, Reuther used the ideological issue of Communism as a justifiable reason for his actions. As noted elsewhere, the FE and the UE were the first CIO affiliates to have their charters revoked. Why were Reuther's main attacks directed against the FE and the UE? The answer to this question may be found in the relationship as it existed on the organizational level between the FE, UE and UAW. The expulsion of the two unions indicated Reuther's power and leadership over the right-wing faction in the CIO. However,

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the expulsions may have occurred because raiding, secessions, ideological charges, and right-wing organizational efficiency failed to affect the left-wing unions' status and organizational advances.

The reason that the left-wing unions were not affected by the attacks to the point of disintegration may be that the membership of these unions did not consider that the ideological charges leveled against them gave the right-wing faction the license to raid their unions. The organizational efficiency of the left-wing leaders apparently satisfied the majority of the members in these unions. The organizational efficiency of the left-wing unions may have caused the right-wing faction to resort to expulsions as a means to protect its own status in the CIO, as well as in its own unions.

Philip Murray stated that the dissention in the CIO began in 1946. This was the year that Reuther involved the CIO, particularly the UE, in costly strikes. Reuther's seizure of the initiative at that time may have caused resentment against Reuther on the part of the UE leaders. As long as Reuther was president of the General Motors Division of the UAW, there were no raids conducted against the UE. The fact that Reuther became president of the UAW by introducing the ideological issue of Communism into his campaign, made the campaign a political issue instead of a contest between two leaders on issues of organizational competence. The UE leaders may have resented this also.
Reuther's competence as a negotiator was challenged by the left-wing unions, notably the UE:

In 1947, the General Motors Corporation succeeded in signing an agreement with the UE while it was still negotiating with the UAW...whereupon the UAW signed up for the same wage increases. 25

According to Reynolds, this action broke the united labor front. This action on the part of the UE, indicated that the UE challenged the supremacy of the UAW in the General Motors plants. The action of the UE was a defeat for Reuther and damaging to his position as the newly-elected president of the UAW. His plurality in the election had only been 12½ votes over Thomas. It is a well known fact that in the field of organized labor:

Gains or even demands in one sector of the AFL or the CIO tend to repeat themselves elsewhere. It must be remembered that the labor movement is intensely political. If non-Communist leaders do not gain as much as their opponents, they may soon find themselves with an active Communist opposition in their own union. 26

Reuther may have expanded his anti-Communist campaign against CIO affiliates, especially the UE, in an attempt to overcome gains made by the UE. Reuther had to be aggressive to retain control of the UAW and prevent the left-wing representatives on the UAW Executive Board from sabotaging his policies and position in the UAW. 27


26 Communists Within the Labor Movement, United States Chamber of Commerce publication, 1947, p. 6.

27 Loc. cit.
In addition to the internal situation, Reuther had to offset the effects of the post war decline in employment. While the CIO unions generally declined in membership, the UE, in spite of layoffs during 1947 and 1948, reported their membership to be six percent above the previous year's record membership. The UE also reported continued progress in their contract provisions. 28

During the 1947-1948 wage contract negotiations, which included the second round of wage increases since the end of World War Two, the UE attempted to unite with the UAW in the demand for wage increases in the General Motors plants. However, "the UAW leadership broke with the past history of the union; instead of uniting with other workers to secure wage increases, it cooperated with employers to raid unions." 29 Thereupon, the UE undertook the wage campaign alone and after a considerable amount of delaying action, "on May 25, 1948, the no-wage increase conspiracy was broken, when General Motors agreed to settle." 30

Once more the workers were afforded the opportunity of comparing the organizational efficiency of the UE leadership with that of the UAW. The UE leaders maintained that:

The United Auto Workers and several other CIO international unions developed a campaign against the UE... The disrupters within the UE worked hand-in-glove with

29 Ibid., p. 22.
30 Ibid., p. 23.
the UAW leadership. National representatives of the CIO participated in meetings with the UAW leadership, and other unions, where raids on the UE were being plotted. 31

In spite of the raids and other activities against the UE, it continued to gain in memberships. For the year 1948-49, the UE showed a gain of 61,102 workers and it won recognition in 128 plants. The UAW showed a gain of 40,000 workers and it won recognition in 102 plants. 32 Gains of the UE became losses for the UAW. Furthermore, the largest CIO affiliate, the Steel and Automotive Workers, was nearly expanded to its limits, while the electrical industry was still expanding. Thus, there existed the possibility that the UE could progress to the point where it might become the second largest or possibly the largest of the CIO affiliated unions. It is possible that the expulsions of the FE and the UE from the CIO by the right-wing faction were promoted as a preventative measure to curb the continued growth of these unions.

Apparently, the use of ideological issues against the UE for purposes of raiding was not as successful as anticipated. This may indicate that the membership at large did not sanction the raids, based on ideological grounds, and that the members of the unions judged their leaders on their organizational accomplishments. That the anti-Communist campaign did not reach anticipated expectations may be ob-

31 Ibid., p. 48.
served in a question asked by the United States Chamber of Commerce five years after its 1946-47 campaign.

Why do workers vote for Communist unions? It is felt that at the present time, everyone should be aware which unions are Red... Why then, are (Red) leaders often voted in by huge majorities? The answer to the above question must be complex. One important point is technical competence of some Communist union leaders... It often happens that individual Communist leaders are aggressive and skillful. In the language of the worker, they deliver the goods. They are militant fighters for labor's claims.... It is often difficult to convince workers that their leaders are actually Communists or their tools. The union members suspect other unions of being interested primarily in raiding. 33

If this statement issued by an anti-union, anti-Communist association is true, then the UE leaders may have demonstrated a greater degree of organizational efficiency than the UAW leaders. This may have forced Reuther to use the ideological issue of Communism rather than organizational efficiency in the competitive struggle. Failing in obtaining his desired objectives, it appears possible that Reuther attempted to accomplish in the CIO organization, what he failed to accomplish in the competitive struggle between the leaders of the unions. This may explain why the FE and the UE, the two unions, which were Reuther's competitors, were the first to be expelled from the CIO. In the power struggle between two factions within the CIO, the anti-Communist faction was in the majority.

33 Communism, Where Do We Stand Today, United States Chamber of Commerce publication, 1952.
Since the UE leaders could not be accused of mal-administering the UE, the only other point on which the UE leaders could be attacked was on the political activities of the UE leadership. In this, Reuther and the right-wing faction were aided by the anti-Communist campaigns waged by a number of public opinion groups, some of which directly accused the CIO of harboring Communist-controlled unions within its organization. Reuther and the right-wing faction accepted and endorsed the Truman Administration's policies. The UE leaders opposed some of the endorsements made by the right-wing faction. This action on the part of the UE leaders, at this particular time, may be an indication that they wished to create a situation, which would result in a show of strength to determine which faction was to gain control of the CIO Executive Board. The 1948 and 1949 UE conventions approved the UE leaders' resolutions to act against the activities of the CIO Executive Board.

If the UE leaders with the support of the left-wing faction had hoped to win control of the CIO, their hope was dashed at the 1949 convention. Out-voted at the pre-convention Executive Board meeting and at the convention, with no opportunity for redress of their grievances against raiding, the UE leaders may have permitted the situation to deteriorate and thus may have permitted the UE's expulsion. This may account for the absence of the UE delegates at the convention.
In the struggle for power in the CIO, that Communism may not have been the problem and that the Communist issue was used as a means, was further emphasized in a published letter, dated March 21, 1952. The letter was written by L. R. Boulware, public relations manager of General Electric Company (GE), and sent to the Senate Sub-Committee on Labor and Labor Management Relations. Excerpts of this letter are presented for purposes of comparison. The importance of this letter lies in the fact that the GE was the largest employer with whom the UE had labor contracts. Thus, the GE, as an employer, was in a position to directly observe the behavior of the UE, and other unions of the CIO. The GE has not been accused of being Communist-controlled, or of being an organization with a favorable bias toward labor unions.

In the Government-Labor Union controversy, the GE was the third party affected by both Government and Labor Union regulations and demands. What follows is in part what the GE Labor-Management directorate discovered in its day to day relations with the UE, concerning the Communist issue in the UE and the CIO. In the letter, the GE points out the confusion which exists around the Communist accusations and the lack of evidence for the accusations. In order to be able to take legal or authoritative action against a labor

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34 What To Do About Communism in Unions, General Electric publication, March 1952.
union on grounds of Communist control, there must be proof showing the union to be a Communist front organization primarily working in the interest of a foreign Communist power or Communist party. 35 The letter states in part that:

As early as 1939 testimony was given before a Congressional Committee concerning infiltration and control of unions by Communists. Some of the same unions were expelled from the CIO only in 1949.... Those who warned against the Communist danger in 1939 were called Red batters by those in power including many who are now prominent anti-Communist and "right-wing" leaders.... For example, there is testimony under oath, before the House Un-American Committee in October 1939 that Mr. James E. Carey, Secretary of the CIO and now President of the UE-CIO, who is quite vocally opposed to Communism and Communists, was a member of the Communist Party. (Hearings before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, H. R. 76 Cong. 1st Session Vol. 9, pp. 5760-5794 (1939).... Furthermore, prominent non-Communist leaders refused to sign the non-Communist affidavit of the T. H. bill... while the expelled unions, whose officers signed the non-Communist affidavits have continued to enjoy the full protection of Federal law.... The Atomic Energy Commission's request (in 1949) that the GE withdraw recognition from the UE-CIO brought law suits and protests from the UE and the CIO... yet later that same year the CIO itself expelled the UE from any further representation or membership in the CIO... which leads us to feel that unions are likely to be influenced by the political or emotional factors bearing on their immediate interests at a given moment.

The motivation for action against Communist unions by Congress is a fear of strikes for "political" purposes during an emergency. In practice, certainly in the present defense period, the various "anti-Communist" or "right-wing" unions are at least neck-and-neck with any "left-wing" unions - publicly suspected of subversive tendencies or dangers - in their threatened or actual interruption of critical defense production in our own (GE) atomic, electronics and aircraft plants...

35 Ibid., p. 17.
Our day to day negotiations have not provided us with any conclusive evidence that one or more of these unions were in actual fact under Communist domination. In certain anti-Communist unions, we so often find ourselves dealing with substantially the same leaders in a new role who only yesterday and for years past were in the camp they now denounce....However, as we read the CIO 1949 convention record, it seems to us that the organizations were expelled not because they were found to constitute a danger or threat to the country, but chiefly because they had refused to follow the political and other policies which had been adopted and endorsed by the CIO. The record appears to indicate that the CIO was not objecting to the rights of "Communists" to function as labor leaders, their objections were against these men as leaders of CIO unions.

Obviously what the country is interested in is not the particular politics of the moment as between factions in unions, or as between competing unions, but in the prompt exposure and elimination of Communists from positions in which they can injure the country....We yield to no one in our hatred of Communism. However, likewise we yield to no one in our desire to protect innocent individuals from false accusations and injury. The problem of protecting minorities or unpopular groups is always present in any regulatory legislation and may be an even more serious problem in this area where unadorned struggles for power exist, both within the unions and between rival unions. We know that feelings run high, and the strategy and tactics are often rough and unrestrained. Legislation must not be based on remote and speculative dangers which might result to a particular organization or in shifts in the competitive advantages enjoyed by various union leaders. 36

The statements above by the GE Labor Relations manager indicate that the GE did not find the UE the Communist threat it was purported to be according to Reuther, Carey, Tobin, and the anti-union and anti-Communist associations. The fact that the UE is operating a labor union today appears to indicate that the UE leaders were directing their activities

36 Ibid., pp. 1 ff.
toward objectives of obtaining bargaining contracts on the best possible terms for their members. The contents of the GE letter point out the confusion and lack of clear delineation, concerning who are Communists and what constitutes a Communist-led union. The letter also explains why the Communist charges and the issues involved were not brought before the legal authorities for disposition. The letter also explains why the UE was not denied the legitimacy to present itself as a labor union.

The facts presented in the foregoing pages indicate the inadequacy of the evidence upon which the charges were made against the left-wing unions, particularly the UE. Those who presented the ideological issue reached objectives, which were primarily objectives of self-interest. Therefore, it appears that those who were engaged in struggles for power used the ideological issue rather than organizational efficiency as a means to obtain desired goals.
CHAPTER V

GENERAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem of the paper was that under certain conditions, when there is a critical, ideological conflict in a society; groups, sub-groups, and individuals, who are engaged in struggles for power, may use ideological issues as criteria rather than organizational efficiency in their attempts to reach certain objectives.

In chapter II it was shown that ideologies were composed of valuational judgments, which influenced the beliefs and behavior of individuals in their social relationships. It was noted that a "public" was a leaderless group, facing an issue upon which it had to act. The presentation of an ideological issue to a "public" tended to produce confusion over conflicting loyalties. Agitators furnished solutions intended to change public opinion in the direction desired by the agitators. Ideological issues presented to a "public" within an organized group tended to produce factionalism within the group. The effects which resulted from the use of ideological issues made it difficult to determine whether or not their use were manifest or latent functions.

The empirical data pointed out that the introduction of an ideological issue to a "public" enabled the various individuals and groups, who presented the issue, to reach certain objectives of self-interest.
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States (Chamber) in 1946 and 1947, introduced the problem of the existence of Communism in the nation, the Democratic Administration, and the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO). After the presentation of the issue, the Republican Party was victorious in the 1946 elections. The Democratic Party, the Democratic Party-CIO coalition, and the CIO were weakened. A number of restrictive labor laws, which were part of the Chamber's organizational objectives, were enacted into law. Later the CIO was further weakened by the expulsion of some of its unions.

The Catholic Church presented the problem of world Communism and of the danger of Communists controlling labor unions. The objective of the Church was to prevent the Communist control of labor unions, so that unions could not be instruments for attack upon the Church organization. To protect itself, the Church, through the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, trained union members for positions of leadership within the unions.

The empirical data pointed out that Walter Reuther and the right-wing faction within the CIO made extensive use of the ideological issue. The fact that the CIO was split into two factions showed the existence of a "public" within the CIO and the effect, which ideological issues have on such a group.
Some of the factors which may have caused leaders of
the right-wing faction to use the ideological issue were, (1)
a situation of ideological conflict existed in the society as
a whole, (2) the ideological issues were adaptable for use as
a means for obtaining objectives of self-interest, (3) right-
ing wing leaders were unable to oust the leadership of the left-
ing unions, (4) right-wing leaders were unable to compete
with left-wing leaders on the level where organizational
efficiency was of greater importance than the ideological
issues, (5) left-wing unions continued to increase their
membership and power, and (6) union members disapproved of
the right-wing faction's illegal activities of raiding.

Some of the activities for which the ideological issue
was used in the CIO were, (1) Walter Reuther's campaign for
the presidency of the United Automobile Workers of America
(UAW), (2) justification for raids upon the United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers (UE) and other unions within the
CIO by the UAW and the United Steel Workers of America and
other right-wing unions, (3) secession movements within the
left-wing unions by right-wing minorities, and (4) expul-
sion of the UE and several other left-wing unions from the
CIO.

Some of the results of the use of the ideological
issue were, (1) factionalism and division within the CIO,
(2) consolidation of power and control of the unions by
right-wing leaders, (3) elimination of organizational com-
petition between left-wing and right-wing leaders, (4) con-
solidation of power and control of the CIO by the right-wing
faction, and (5) conformity to pressure from organizations,
external to the CIO, thereby, establishing the CIO as an in-
group.

A series of facts pointed out that the Communist issue
may have been used as a means in a power struggle between the
leaders. The left-wing group was a small minority in the CIO
and right-wing policies were the official policies carried
out by the CIO. Therefore, the expulsions appeared to be
unnecessary. No conclusive legal evidence was presented by
the right-wing faction which indicated subversive activities
on the part of the left-wing faction. The action was between
two factions of labor leaders. Right-wing leaders did not
return raided unions to the CIO-chartered, non-Communist unions.
Communist controlled unions were ordered to merge with right-
wing unions. Communist-controlled locals were permitted to
operate within right-wing unions. After the expulsions former
left-wing leaders changed over to the right-wing and con-
tinued to function in the same capacities.

The dissent, registered by the UE, was against the
raiding and dictation of the right-wing faction in the CIO. The UE failed to obtain redress from the CIO on its complaints, concerning the raiding, secession, and interference with its autonomy. The action of dissent on the part of the UE appears to have been a measure aimed at preserving the organizational identity of the UE. It does not appear to have been an action directed by the Soviet Union. The facts presented appear to give evidence in support of the theoretical hypothesis, that under certain conditions, ideological issues rather than organizational efficiency may be used by those participating in struggles for power.

From the material presented it must not be assumed that the left-wing faction avoided using ideological issues to reach their objectives, because ideological issues generally play important roles in all power struggles. For example the UE's opposition to the CIO policies were on ideological grounds. It was not the intent to show, in this paper, that the ideological issue was the single factor determinant. It was the intent to show that the ideological issue was an important factor in changing the order of relationship between the leaders of the CIO. The right-wing faction's activity was chosen as subject matter because they successfully used the ideological issue. This hypothesis may be applicable to power struggles in other organizations and is therefore of broader relevance than merely for the present problem.


B. PUBLICATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS

Association of Catholic Trade Unionists

Here Is What The ACTU Stands For. n.d.


Chamber of Commerce of the United States

Communist Infiltration in the United States. 1946.

Communists Within the Government. 1947.

Communists Within the Labor Movement. 1947.


Congress of Industrial Organizations.


The Truth About The CIO. Publication No. 132., September, 1945. Washington 6, D. C., CIO., 718 Jackson Place, N. W.

National Catholic Welfare Conference


United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers


C. PERIODICALS

Editorial "The Upright Spirit", Analysis of the ACTU, Fortune, November, 1946, 188.

D. PUBLICATIONS OF LEARNED ORGANIZATIONS


Herberg, Will, "Bureaucracy and Democracy In Labor Unions", Antioch Review, Fall, 1943.


E. ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES


F. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Statements of Secretary of Labor, Maurice J. Tobin, before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, March 19, 1952.

G. NEWSPAPERS


BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
An Abstract of a Thesis
A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE EXPULSION OF THE
UNITED ELECTRICAL, MACHINE & RADIO WORKERS
UNION FROM
THE CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
by
VIGGO H. NIELSEN
(A.B., Boston University, 1951)

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1953
In recent times, ideological issues, arising out of the problems presented by Communism, have come to play an ever increasing role in social relations. At times of critical ideological conflicts within a society, groups, sub-groups, and individuals, who are engaged in struggles for power tend to use the extraneous ideological issues rather than organizational efficiency as a means to reach their objectives.

In the United States, the public was informed by anti-Communist and anti-union associations that some governmental departments and a number of affiliates of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were either Communist-controlled or under Communist influence. Among the unions accused was the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE).

In 1949, the UE and several other left-wing affiliates were expelled from the CIO. The expulsions came as a climax to a struggle for power between the leaders of the right-wing and left-wing factions in the CIO. The right-wing faction used the issue of Communism as a means for gaining the support of the members in the CIO unions, rather than relying on their efficiency as organizers and labor leaders.

Ideological issues are effective as power weapons. Ideological issues are composed of valuational judgments, which influences the beliefs and behavior of individuals
in their social relationships. The introduction of ideological issues to a "public" within an organized group tended to produce factionalism within the group.

Two organizations, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the Catholic Church, were engaged in a power struggle with the CIO and the Democratic Party. The Chamber, in 1946 and 1947, introduced the problem of Communism in the nation, the Democratic Administration and the CIO. After the presentation of the issue, the Republican Party was victorious in the 1946 elections. The Democratic Party, the Democratic Party-CIO coalition, and the CIO were weakened. A number of restrictive labor laws, which were part of the Chamber's organizational objectives were enacted into law. Later, the CIO was further weakened by the expulsion of some of its unions.

The Catholic Church presented the problem of world Communism and of the danger of Communists controlling labor unions. The objective of the Church was to prevent the Communist control of labor unions, so that unions might not become instruments for attack upon the Church organization. To protect itself, the Church, through the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists trained union members for positions of leadership within the unions.

The empirical data pointed out that the introduction of an ideological issue enabled the various groups, which pre-
sented the issue, to reach certain objectives of self-interest. The empirical data pointed out that Walter Reuther and the right-wing faction in the CIO made extensive use of the ideological issue.

Some of the factors, which may have caused leaders of the right-wing faction to use the ideological issue were, (1) a situation of ideological conflict existed in the society as a whole, (2) the ideological issues were adaptable for use as a means of power for obtaining objectives of self-interest, (3) right-wing leaders were unable to compete with left-wing leaders on the level where organizational efficiency was of greater importance than the ideological issues, and (4) left-wing unions continued to increase their membership and power.

The activities for which the ideological issue was used in the CIO were, (1) Walter Reuther's campaign for the presidency of the United Automobile Workers of America (UAW), (2) justification for raids upon the UE and other left-wing affiliates by the UAW and other right-wing unions, (3) secession movements within the left-wing unions by right-wing minorities, and (4) expulsion of the UE and several other left-wing unions from the CIO.

The use of the ideological issue resulted in, (1) factionalism and division within the CIO, (2) consolidation of power and control of the unions and the CIO by right-wing leaders, and (3) conformity to pressure from organizations, external to the CIO, thereby, establishing the CIO as an ingroup.
A series of facts pointed out that the Communist issue may have been used as a means in a power struggle between leaders. The left-wing group was a small minority in the CIO and right-wing policies were the official policies carried out by the CIO. Therefore, the expulsions appeared to be unnecessary. No legal evidence of subversive activity was presented by the right-wing group. The entire action in the CIO was between a group of labor leaders. Neither the left-wing unions nor their leaders, were denied the legitimacy to continue functioning. Power and control appeared to be the objective of the right-wing leaders because raided unions were not returned to CIO-chartered, non-Communist unions. The right-wing CIO leaders ordered Communist-controlled unions to merge with right-wing unions. Communist-controlled locals were permitted to function within right-wing unions. Some alleged Communist leaders were not expelled, but displaced, and continued in office in the CIO in other capacities. Others continued as members. After the expulsions, some left-wing leaders became right-wing leaders and continued in their former capacity under a new label.

The dissent, registered by the UE, was against the raiding and dictation of the right-wing faction in the CIO. The UE failed to obtain redress from the CIO on its complaints, concerning the raiding, secession, and interference with its autonomy. The action of dissent on the part of the UE appeared to have been a measure aimed at preserving the
organizational identity of the UE. It does not appear to have been an action directed by the Soviet Union. The facts presented appear to give evidence in support of the theoretical hypothesis, that under certain conditions, ideological issues rather than organizational efficiency may be used by those participating in struggles for power.