1953

The community and the individual in the later philosophy of Josiah Royce.

Sprague, Wayne Llewellyn Carlyle

Boston University

http://hdl.handle.net/2144/9534

Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

DISSERTATION
THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE LATER
PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE

by
WAYNE LLEWELLYN CARLYLE SPRAGUE
(A.B., College of Puget Sound, 1933)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1953
Approved
by

First Reader  L. Harold DeRiel
Professor of Systematic Theology

Second Reader  W. A. Berthoff
Professor of Philosophy
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Statement of purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Primary and secondary sources</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Previous related work</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Definition of the term community</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. A SURVEY OF THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Royce as a man</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Royce's earlier philosophic relations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Royce's early system of philosophy</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Epistemology</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Metaphysics</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Ethics</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The status of the individual in the earlier Royce</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The empirical fact of social pluralism</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The empirical fact of social monism</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Synthesis of social pluralism and monism in the concept of the community</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Ideal self-extension (interpretation) is the basic process in the creation of the community</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER

i. The community is an emergent social mind: social realism ............... 51

ii. Organic pluralism ............... 57

IV. THE LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL ............... 64

1. Interpretation as the logical basis of the community and the individual ............... 64

   i. Limitation of perception, conception, and intuition ............... 65

   ii. Knowledge as mediative, triadic, and social ............... 67

2. The Community of Interpretation ............... 75

3. The elevation of the status of the individual in the philosophy of the community ............... 82

   i. Interpretation as the logical basis for individuality ............... 82

   ii. The Community of Interpretation as essentially social ............... 87

iii. The relation of the finite to value ............... 91

iv. Increased empiricism ............... 95

   v. Increased significance of the individual ............... 103

4. Personalistic organic pluralism ............... 108

V. THE RELATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMUNITY TO THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 115

1. The nature of loyalty ............... 115

2. Loyalty to the community is more concrete and personal than loyalty to the Absolute ............... 117

3. Provincial loyalty and the finite community ............... 125

4. The religious basis for the community ............... 129
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. The contrast in Royce's development</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in religious thought</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Theistic humanism</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. The immortal Beloved Community</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. CONCLUSION AND ESTIMATE</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1. Statement of purpose.

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the changes in Josiah Royce's philosophic development from the earlier concept of the Absolute to the later concept of the Community. Special reference is made to the implications of this development with respect to the status of the individual.

One of the central problems with which Royce wrestled throughout his entire life was that of reconciling the unity of the universe with the independence of its constituent individuals. This fact may be observed in his writings. His most comprehensive metaphysical treatise, the Gifford Lectures in two volumes, bears the title, The World and the Individual. Also, his last metaphysical writing, the two-volume Hibbert Lectures, although called The Problem of Christianity, is actually concerned predominantly with this same problem of the status of the individual.

Royce's mature philosophic thought has been seriously neglected by the traditional interpretations of Royce. They are based almost exclusively on his earlier writings. His latest thought, however, constitutes a departure in many important respects from his earlier philosophy, as will appear in the course of this dissertation.
The period of Royce's development may be divided variously according to the purpose of the particular interpreter. For the present purpose, his philosophic development is separated into two periods. The earlier period is defined as that before his exposition of those views that are peculiarly related to the new reorientation of his philosophy around the concept of the "community". The later period is taken to include in general those introductions of new concepts especially foreshadowing the emerging view of the community. Specifically, the later view begins with the presentation of the transitional ideas of "loyalty" in *The Philosophy of Loyalty* in 1909 and certain further suggestions concerning loyalty and the view of "the real spiritual brotherhood of the loyal" as "a superhuman and not merely a human reality" in *The Sources of Religious Insight* in 1912. Not until the Hibbert Lectures of 1913, however, is there a full flowering of his concept of the "community" and its implications, which, according to the position of this dissertation, constitute significant changes in his views and a resulting body of novel contributions to the problem of our present study.

A preliminary and general statement may be made concerning the question of possibly significant changes in Royce's development. We may refer briefly to two sources for light on this topic; Royce's own statements and those of some of his interpreters.

1. Royce, SRI, 281. All references hereafter are to Royce unless otherwise noted.
Royce states that his new rendering of his views is a "new mode of approach to the problems which he has formerly discussed."¹ And even though he qualifies this statement by saying that it is "simply a new mode of approach," it is apparent that definite changes in his views resulted from this "new mode." For example, he tells us in the Introduction to The Problem of Christianity, "there is much in it which I did not expect to say when I began the task here accomplished."² He adds, further, "as to certain metaphysical opinions stated in the second volume I now owe much more to our great and unduly neglected American logician, Mr. Charles Peirce, than I do to the common tradition of recent idealism...³ Again, he says, "In spirit I believe my present book /The Problem of Christianity/ to be in essential harmony with the bases of the philosophic idealism set forth in various earlier volumes."⁴ W. H. Werkmeister calls attention to the use of the phrase "in spirit" and adds, "Royce does not say even 'in basic conception'."⁵ One might add further that Royce refers only to the "bases" of his earlier idealism and not to the structure of it, nor to the development of those bases. In a letter replying to Miss Calkins' view that The Problem of Christianity did not materially alter his philosophy Royce compliments her on her interpretation of his earlier philosophy but

¹. POC, II, 205.
². POC, I, xi.
³. Loc. cit. It should be observed here that Royce speaks of recent idealism and also that Peirce himself owes a great deal to Hegel. Cf. index to Peirce's Collected Papers.
⁴. POC, I, x.
⁵. Werkmeister, HPIA, 165.
protests her failure to recognize the changes in his views and insists that his book represents for him a "new light" and a "new experience" and contains "ideas which are as new to him as the original form of his idealism was new to him when he first defined it." Also, in a letter written to Professor E. S. Brightman in 1913, Royce admits what might safely be regarded as an increasing trend in the direction of Bowne's pluralistic personal idealism:

I wish that somebody would tell me what my precise relation to Bowne is. I suppose that our agreements were rather on the increase towards the end of his work. I always prized him much; but each of us had too many irons in the fire. I ought to have come closer to him before he left us.

Turning now to Royce's interpreters for information as to the nature of his philosophic development, it will be found that, although not in complete agreement as to details, most of them unite in the view that Royce's development was gradual, and not characterized by marked changes. Among the most prominent of these writers are Mary W. Calkins, R. B. Perry, Woodbridge Riley, A. K. Rogers, H. W. Schneider, H. G. Townsend, and H. K. Wright.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that R. F. A. Hoernlé in Idealism as a Philosophy classifies Royce as a "Spiritual Pluralist rather than as an Absolutist." G. H. Howison also interprets Royce's latest philosophy as a "concrete and social idealism" and expresses the hope that this

2. Royce, letter to E. S. Brightman, July 16, 1913.
3. Hoernlé, IP, x.
new position is an indication in Royce of a change to "a primordially harmonic pluralism." Attention may be called also to G. W. Cunningham, who, in The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, raises critical questions concerning the harmonizing of the earlier and later philosophy of Royce.

In his recently published book, A History of Philosophical Ideas in America (1949), W. H. Werkmeister argues for the position that there was a marked change in Royce's development. He calls it a "great reorientation of his philosophy." Then, after stating Royce's conception of the community and the individual, he goes on to say:

If this is not in contradiction with ideas expressed by Royce in his earlier works, it is at least a radically new way of stating those ideas. Royce himself, I believe, took the more extreme view.  

The question of the degree of change in Royce's development is mentioned here to indicate the relationship to previous work in the field and to indicate the need for an explicit investigation of this problem. The question of the amount of change in the development of a philosopher's views is, of course, subject to the judgment of the individual interpreter as to what is essential and what is merely incidental in those views. It is sufficient at this point to recognize merely the use by Royce of different concepts and, in his own words, "a

2. Werkmeister, HPIA, 164.
3. Loc. Cit.
new mode of approach in his latest philosophy. The acknowledged fact that Royce used different concepts in his later philosophy calls for a deliberate attempt to discover the meanings and implications of these concepts for his philosophy.

2. Primary and secondary sources.

The primary source material for the subject of investigation is abundant since Royce was a prolific writer. Benjamin Rand lists over six pages of bibliography consisting of periodical articles, books, and introductions or forewords to other authors' books. Very few of these publications escape relevance to the subject of the present study. The Problem of Christianity, being the most comprehensive and systematic presentation of his second period, is, of course, the most pertinent to our problem.

The secondary source material, including expositions and criticisms of Royce's philosophy in general, is likewise plentiful. The most important collection of these appears in The Philosophical Review of 1916 on the occasion of a meeting of the American Philosophical Association to celebrate Royce's sixtieth birthday. However, attention should be called to the reviews of his various books in periodicals as well as critical discussions of his position in many published books.

1. POC, I, 295.
Material bearing specifically on Royce's later statements of his philosophy is, on the other hand, minimal. The "second period" of Royce's development, as has been stated above, attracted little attention. This was due probably, in part, to the early stereotyping of Royce and, in part, to the fact that his latest metaphysical views appeared under the possibly deceptive title, The Problem of Christianity—deceptive, that is, in the sense that, despite the instances of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy and The Conception of God, many interpreters would not expect to find major metaphysical contributions under a religious title.

3. Previous related work.

Apart from incidental passages, the specific problem of the dissertation has not been developed in previous studies. The problem of the status of the individual in the earlier Royce, of course, has elicited much discussion. Chief among these may be counted the lectures of Joseph Le Conte, G. H. Howison, and Sidney E. Mazes in their debate with Royce as published in The Conception of God. Miss Calkins in The Persistent Problems of Philosophy as well as James in his various letters to Royce and in his other writings, especially his Pluralistic Universe, have contributed to the discussion.

Jacob Loewenberg, in his introduction to Royce's Fugitive Essays, outlines briefly the development of Royce's
philosophy but with the purpose of showing the relevance of his earliest essays to his latest thought and the similarities between them. Although the position of this dissertation is in agreement that Royce's mature thought has its roots in his early thought, its chief purpose is to show the changes which took place and their resulting significance in Royce's attempt to give more place to the individual. Despite the fact that Loewenberg gives due recognition to The Problem of Christianity by designating it and The World and the Individual, as "his magna opera," he, nevertheless, overlooks the novel element in the later work. An example of this oversight is his insistence that the Absolute and the Universal Community are "identical." This identification does not allow sufficiently for the important differences between these two concepts as they are employed by Royce.

Werkmeister's summary of Royce's philosophic development is related to this dissertation in that he indicates the "reorientation" of Royce's philosophy around the idea of the community. However, he devotes only four pages to the central ideas of the community and fails to indicate the bearing of this new concept on the place of the individual.

John E. Smith's recent book on Royce's Social Infinite

1. Loewenberg, FE, 10.
2. Ibid., 12.
gives recognition to the importance of Royce's view of the Community. However, its scope is different from that of this dissertation in that its discussion is limited to the Universal Community and develops neither the historical changes in Royce's views nor the special problem of changes in the status of the individual. Smith's chief emphases are: the analysis of the Community of Interpretation, its roots in Peirce and DeMorgan, and the specific "problems of Christianity."

The most recent publications on Royce's philosophy are two collections of selected writings edited by Stuart G. Brown entitled, The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce and The Religious Philosophy of Josiah Royce. Although some consideration is given to Royce's doctrines of interpretation and the Community in the introductory essay to the first book, there are, significantly, no selections from The Problem of Christianity in the body of the text. And, although there are selections from The Problem of Christianity in the second book, there is no discussion in the introductory essay as to any significant change in Royce's social or metaphysical theory.

Only two doctor's dissertations are known to be relevant:

Joseph Howard Philp, The Principle of Individuation in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce. (Yale University, 1916. Privately printed.)
Paul E. Johnson, *Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Religion*. (Boston University, 1928).

Although the first of these shows ability, it considers seriously only the earlier Royce. Mr. Philp does hint at a marked change in Royce's latest views but curiously rejects from consideration Royce's latest position as being inconsistent with the earlier Absolute and his apparent love for unity. He proceeds, then, to a criticism of Royce's earlier attempts to harmonize the Absolute and the individual and finds that Royce fails in his purpose. Since Philp's work borders on the problem of this dissertation, it may be proper to quote his summary of conclusions in its entirety:

I. The existence of the Absolute, I have contended, has not been proved by Royce. Hence the individuation traced to the thought or will of the Absolute hangs in the air.

It is contended further that the finite individual is defined throughout in terms of 'content'. This 'content' is hypostatised as the individual. The union of 'consciousness' with its content is taken as the union of thought with the actual objects of the real world. The terms 'self' and 'experience' are also abstractions of the intellect. The only change seems to be that the latter term with 'will' marks a change of the 'content' from static to dynamic terms, from thought to thinking. Will, despite its relation, as stated, to desire, is but a clearly defined purpose, an intention to act, and hence is intellectual and abstract. 'Interpretation' also is ideal construction.

No definition or description of the individual in terms of the 'content' of consciousness can give us reality as it is. Hence such an approach to the nature of individuality casts little or no light upon that nature.

II. The theory of an Absolute and a defining of the individual in terms of intellectual content going hand in hand, I have traced to this untenable view the
defining of the moral ideal in terms which portray a vicarious or self alienating principle. The mere unity of consciousness and of ideal constructions is not adequate to the facts of real life. In the human individual, life is seen issuing from springs of desire and impulse and these, as well as explicit reflective consciousness, I regard as personal. The genius of community is harmonious differentiation of interest, not mere unification.

All of these conclusions, where relevant, differ from the conclusions that have been reached in this dissertation. As is evident from the quotations, Mr. Philp deals almost exclusively with the earlier Royce. Also, his work impresses one as unsympathetic and externally critical from the point of view of ethical naturalism and pragmatism.

Johnson, in his dissertation on Royce's philosophy of religion, naturally deals with the problem of the religious status of the individual and the nature of God. But here, too, there is inadequate recognition of the significance of the new concepts introduced by the mature Royce. To cite only one example, Johnson treats the later concept of finite individual selves' being members of a community Self as identical with finite selves' being parts of an Absolute Self.

Royce believes that his principle of individuality saves the integrity of the finite self. But any philosophy that makes finite selves parts of an Absolute Self endangers either the finite or the Absolute selfhood. He preserves the unity of the Absolute Self by fusion of finite selves there-in, which amounts to

confessing that the identity and distinctness of finite individuals is not ultimately real.

All of these internal inconsistencies arise in striving after an absolute unity that makes all things and selves parts of the one real Self. It should be stated, however, that there can be a significant difference between the relation of "parts of" and "membership in." But Johnson assumes these relations to be identical without raising the question of a possible dissimilarity. This same comment applies to his assumption of the identity of the concepts of God, the Absolute, and the Community.

4. Definition of the term Community.

Since an essential part of our study is the definition of the concept of the community, no more than a preliminary definition is possible here.

It should be pointed out that Royce occasionally uses the term "community" in a popular, non-technical sense equivalent in meaning to a particular localized society or society in general. Such usage is found as early as his first philosophic book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. It is not until the Problem of Christianity that he develops the technical usage employed in this study.

There are several levels of community life, according to the latest Royce. But a basic classification of types

2. Johnson, JRPR, 97.
3. RAP, 211.
may distinguish between limited communities and the Universal Community. It is difficult, without detailed qualifications, to formulate a definition that is applicable to both these general types. Royce himself never gives a specific general definition. The limited communities may be defined as "personal" group minds created by individual selves who ideally extend their lives to include entities shared in common in the time-order. This definition can apply to the Universal Community with two reservations. First, the Universal Community is the more immediately a resultant of the interaction of community selves rather than of individual selves. Second, the Universal Community, unlike the limited communities, has a type of being that is not so exclusively the product of social evolution.

A problem arises concerning capitalization of the term community, (meaning the Universal Community), since Royce's usage is inconsistent. Royce is consistent, however, in using the definite article "the" when referring to the Universal Community of Interpretation. In the interest of clarity and consistency the practice in this dissertation will conform to Royce's usage when he is clearly deliberate,

1. An adequate definition of this key concept must await the discussion of the development of the finite communities in the third chapter and of "interpretation" in the fourth. The social minds are essentially "communities of interpretation".
which is to use the lower case in referring to limited or finite communities and capitalization in referring to the Universal Community. The Religious or Beloved Community will always be explicitly designated as such. Royce frequently uses the term community in its popular sense even in The Problem of Christianity. For such non-technical usage synonyms such as society, social group, and the like, will be substituted in discussion of Royce.

Such expressions as the finite self, the social mind, individuation, unity, the relations of a part to its whole, and membership in another self cannot yet be defined since part of the task of the dissertation is to clarify these concepts.

The discussion that follows will attempt to show, first, the meaning of these central ideas in Royce's earlier period and then to portray the newer views of both the self and the community developed in the latest period along with their logical and metaphysical bases. Finally, the meaning of his latest ethical and religious concepts will be defined in terms of their implications for the problem of the status of the individual.
CHAPTER TWO

A SURVEY OF THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE

1. Royce as a man.

Josiah Royce was born in Grass Valley, Nevada County, California, November 20th, 1855. He received no formal education outside his mother's teaching until the age of eleven. His college training lacked a specific course in philosophy, a fact which W. K. Wright facetiously points to as a possible explanation of his life-long interest in the subject. However, he professed a "really very great and deep effect" produced upon him by the teaching of Professor Joseph LeConte, a pioneer Darwinian with a religious and metaphysical orientation. In 1875 he received his A. B. degree from the University of California. During the next year, while in Germany, he came under the influence of idealism both through the lectures of Lotze, Wundt, and Windelband and the reading of Kant. After two further years of study at Johns Hopkins and upon submitting a dissertation on the Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge, Royce received the Ph.D. degree from Johns Hopkins University in 1878. Except for the following four years, which were spent in the teaching of English at the University of California,

1. Wright, HMP, 486.
2. HGC, 128.
Royce taught philosophy at Harvard. There, as an exponent of post-Kantian Idealism, he became after the death of James, according to R. B. Perry, "the most influential American philosopher."¹ In 1914 Royce succeeded G. H. Palmer in the Alford Professorship of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity—a chair which he occupied until his death, September 14, 1916.

Royce believed himself as a boy to be disagreeably conspicuous because he was "red-headed, freckled, countrified, quaint, and unable to play boys' games."² He was always slight in build, youthful in appearance and lacking in muscular development. In later life his general bearing and large dome-like head immediately marked him out as a philosopher. James, in commenting on Royce's appearance, said that he had an "indecent exposure of the forehead."³

Royce, according to his own account, carried throughout his life a tendency to "social ineffectiveness" and "timidity" and was always "a good deal of a non-conformist."⁴ The contrast between his practical life and his theoretical emphasis on the community suggests the possibility that the latter may be at least partially a compensation for his psychological inadequacies.⁵

---

2. HGC, 126-127.  
3. Santayana, COUS, 97.  
4. HGC, 130.  
5. Cf. infra, 143.
Characteristic of Royce was his breadth of mind, his originality of insight, and his earnestness and reverence. Besides a dialectical and analytical skill, Royce had a sense of humor and a sympathy that enabled him to acknowledge the truth in the arguments of his severest critics. This latter trait helped to make him respected and loved as a teacher.

His writings were voluminous, and although expressed with dignity and clarity, were repetitious and verbose. Of this failing he was quite aware, confessing in his diary of 1883, "As usual I spin out the business a trifle too long." Royce's colorful style reveals his genius in conceiving apt illustrations, which penetrate to the heart of complex problems and portray the basic issues in simple clarity. In praise of the "moral beauty" of Royce's writings, Loewenberg asserts that the word "nobility" is the only one adequate to describe his style. Royce was a popular lecturer, holding for long periods the attention of audiences, a fair proportion of which could not possibly have been able to grasp the complex developments of his thought. He was invited to deliver lectures at both Aberdeen and Oxford -- lectures which were later published in two volumes each,

1. Perry, DAS, 211.
2. Loewenberg, FE, 5.
appearing respectively under the titles, The World and the Individual and The Problem of Christianity.

2. Royce's earlier philosophic relations.

Royce's earlier philosophic relations are suggested by his adherence to the post-Kantian idealistic tradition. Most influential besides Kant were Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Lotze. Royce felt most of all his debt to Kant, having "long paid a great deal of attention" to his philosophy. However, he departed from it in significant ways, e.g., in rejecting the Kantian Dualism and the unknowable Ding-an-sich. In addition to a slight influence by the metaphysics of the Critique of Pure Reason, the primacy of the practical reason influenced Royce greatly. Royce derived much from Fichte's ethical-religious idealism with its emphasis upon activity and will. He writes, "he knows how much he has gained from Fichte." The blending of Leibnizian Monadology with Spinozistic pantheism as found in Schelling left its marks on Royce's thought. Royce admitted also a great indebtedness to Hegel though he protested that he could not "call himself an Hegelian."

1. RAP, ix.
2. RAP, ix.
3. HGC, 129.
4. RAP, ix.
5. RAP, ix.
6. RAP, ix-x.
In fact, in 1913 he endorsed a statement made by a reviewer of his *Spirit of Modern Philosophy* in 1892 that in this book he "came nearer to being a follower of Schopenhauer than a disciple of Hegel." He adds further, "I have never, since then, been more of an Hegelian than at that time I was. I am now /in 1913/ less so than ever before." Most students of philosophy would find little basis for Royce's denial of his being an Hegelian, at least in his earlier philosophy, and would feel that there was an analogy here to Bowne's oversight of his debt to Lotze. In his latest period, however, there would seem to be justification in Royce's protest to the continuation of such designating of his philosophy. In the introduction to his *Problem of Christianity* he says:

> It is time, I think, that the long customary, but unjust and loose usage of the adjective "Hegelian" should be dropped. The genuinely Hegelian views were the ones stated by Hegel himself, and by his early followers. My own interpretation of Christianity, in these volumes, despite certain agreements with the classical Hegelian theses, differs from that of Hegel, and of the classical Hegelian school, in important ways which I can, with a clear conscience, all the more vigorously emphasize, just because I have, all my life, endeavored to treat Hegel both with careful historical justice and with genuine appreciation. In fact the present is a distinctly new interpretation of the 'Problem of Christianity'.

With respect to Schopenhauer, there could be no question that he exercised a great influence on Royce's thought;

1. *POC*, I, xii.
2. *POC*, I, xii.
Royce termed it "a very valuable influence." 1 Schopenhauer's principal contribution was probably the emphasis upon the centrality of will. Royce's optimism was, of course, a definite point of divergence from the pessimism of Schopenhauer. Lotze was, likewise, according to Royce, "a very valuable" influence upon him, being "deeply influential both by his spoken words and by his writings." 2 Royce confesses that after hearing Lotze in Germany, he "was for a while strongly under his influence." 3

The English idealists, of whom Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet were perhaps most important, can be mentioned as being distinctly related to Royce's development. He differed from them, in the main, through his view of the Absolute as a Self (Green excepted), his emphasis upon the integrity of the finite self, his acceptance of evolution, his tendency to Utilitarianism, and his more empirical methodology. His belief in evolution stemmed from the Romanticist movement and the philosophy of Spencer, his utilitarian tendency from the writings of John Stuart Mill.

In America, Royce reflected the influence of the Calvinistic faith of New England Puritanism. His philosophy

1. RAP, xi-xii.
2. RAP, xii.
3. HGC, 128.
also took a position between New England transcendentalism and the American revivers of idealism, including the St. Louis school of absolute idealism.

The Calvinistic elements in Royce's early thought are revealed by his emphasis on God as the Absolute and man as finite, in error and ignorance, and lost apart from the grace of God. All evils are reconciled in God's Being. Royce revealed pietism in his firm faith in God's goodness and justice.

Royce shared with the transcendentalists their romantic temperament and disdain for science. Their stress on moral individualism is reflected in Royce's concern for preserving the integrity of the individual. But for the most part Royce was in direct opposition to their extreme individualism and intuitionism.

The practice of collectivistic settlements bears a relation to Royce's later emphasis on the community. And yet the underlying theory of individualism which permeated the transcendentalists' ventures was repugnant to Royce's stress on the ideal interdependence and unity of the individuals, and the social group.

In view of Royce's early experiences in lawless California, he could not share the transcendentalists' opposition to institutions and government. However, Royce in practice
showed a surprising aloofness toward both the church and state.

Royce differed from Emerson in his love for the rational, logical, and metaphysical. Both made the Kantian distinction between understanding and reason. But, whereas Emerson debased practical reason to intuition, Royce, following Kant, regarded it as an ideal form of reason. Emerson is found frequently, Royce seldom, in direct conflict with faith in the rational.

Royce has much greater affinity with the St. Louis Hegelians. Both philosophies could be described as objective idealism. Both emphasized speculative philosophy and depended on logic as essential to knowing reality, thus differing from the transcendentalists' reliance and emphasis on intuition and also from the British empiricists' restrictions to psychology and biology.

Royce was influenced throughout his life by William James, and, in his later development by Charles Peirce. As disciples of these philosophers he developed his pragmatic and empirical strains. He differed from James largely through the absolutistic and rationalistic elements in his thought. Baldwin's views of the genetic development of the self and more specifically his theory of imitation left their marks on Royce's philosophy.
Although Royce, in turn, profoundly influenced his pupils and philosophic colleagues, the most curious fact remains that he won few converts to absolute idealism. Miss Mary W. Calkins and Professor H. H. Horne are the most outstanding disciples, perhaps the only ones. Hocking, though not an absolute idealist in the strict sense of the term, has been profoundly influenced by Royce. An explanation for this lack of disciples might lie in the nature of this period of thought which was marked, in part, by an upsurge of realism and pragmatism with their greater emphasis on analysis and pluralism and, in part, by the development of idealism e.g., personalism, in channels that were more empirical, pluralistic and harmonious with the growing scientific temper of the day.

3. Royce's early system of philosophy.

As a preliminary to a discussion of Royce's later philosophy a survey may be made of his earlier thought. The general structure of Royce's earlier system also provides a context or background for the development of his later view of the community.

1. Epistemology.

Royce's earlier epistemology is characterized by a blending of diverging views: rationalism and empiricism,
dualism and monism, internal and external meanings, relativism and absolutism, making and finding truth, and the roles of individual and social experience in knowing.

Royce revealed his empirical temper both by granting that experienced data make up the largest part of our knowledge and by insisting that the coherence and comprehensiveness of truth involve consistency with experience. His method, however, is also rationalistic. He affirmed with Leibniz and Kant, for example, the validity of a priori principles if they are presupposed in their own denial. By this method he derived, among other things, his proof for the truth of idealism.

According to Royce, knowledge is empirically dualistic, but this knowledge is possible only through an ultimate epistemic monism in the Absolute Knower.

The idea, rather than being something separate from the external world, actually implies it. Any act of knowing includes a purpose or internal meaning which refers beyond itself to an hypothetical fulfilment as an external purpose. It follows for Royce that "the idea is true if it possesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the idea itself wants to possess."

Royce tried to fuse pragmatism and absolutism into

1. FE, 127; WI, I, 13; Art. (1913).
2. WI, I, 349.
3. COG, 148.
4. WI, 306; cf. ibid., 32.
what he termed "absolute pragmatism" or "absolute voluntarism." Exemplifying this meeting of extremes, he held, on the one hand, "The most insignificant knowledge is in some sense an original product of the man who knows." On the other hand, he insisted, "I believe in the eternal. I am in quest of the eternal." Royce attempted to harmonize these two emphases by regarding the relativity of pragmatism as itself an absolute principle. The pragmatic elements in his epistemology are relativistic with reference to the social group, but are, at the same time, objective with reference to the individual.

ii. Metaphysics.

Royce's metaphysics grew out of his epistemology and became a solution to the epistemological problems. He opposed realism, mysticism, and critical rationalism as being inadequate definitions of reality. He argued that idealism, particularly absolute idealism, was the most coherent view of reality and that the existence of an all-inclusive self could be proved. In fact, as one proof, Royce insisted that the denial of such a being, itself referred to such a larger Self.

Error and ignorance are possible only because the finite

---

2. Art.(1904), 123.
3. WI, I, 538-554.
self is an organic member of the larger knower that includes both the knower and the known. "Being has... to be that object which makes ideas true or false." The whole universe, including the physical world, also, is essentially one live thing, a mind, one great spirit." The chief characteristic of this mind is will or purpose, the essential activity of which is to individuate or to particularize. As embodied will, the Absolute (reminiscent of the Fichtean interpretation) wills the world, differentiating itself into particular purposes, each being a unique and definite fulfilment. In this way "both Thought and Experience reach determinateness of expression." Each of these focal points of will or interest are finite selves. The Absolute is thus an Individual Whole of Individual Elements.

This essentially vital universe in its inner life is the world of appreciation. As seen from the outside, however, it is the world of description. The outer physical world is an abstraction from the world of appreciation and consists of the qualities and relations that are easily measured, described, and thus communicated. This world of description is a social product, having order, universal law and permanence and "subject to categories" and mechanical causation.

1. WI, I, 349.
2. SMP, 17.
3. WI, I, 588.
4. WI, I, 538.
5. SMP, 394-395; cf. 416.
Space, time, and the evolutionary processes belong also to this world. As a member of the world of description man is limited and determined, but as a member of the world of appreciation underlying the phenomenal world he is free and self-determined, sharing the freedom of the Absolute Self.

The world of science is not an adequate basis for metaphysics; appreciation, on the other hand, gives us true insights into the nature of ultimate reality.

The relationship between these two worlds presents, of course, serious problems. Royce tried to solve most of them by giving priority to the world of appreciation, regarding the world of description as "simply an external aspect of the true and appreciable world."¹

In Royce's view, the "whole, the Real World is the divine life."² The Absolute is a society of interacting persons, a society that is itself a personal being, or God. God is a person because he is self-conscious, eternally perfecting himself through the ethically significant temporal processes of evolution and the linked activities of finite selves.³ As an infinite Self, God is conscious of time and all temporal events but is himself not in time.

The individual finite selves express or result from

¹. SMP, 417.
². SGE, xi.
³. WI, II, 419.
God's will. They are free, though, Royce believed, because they express in their existence no will except their own.\textsuperscript{1} Their integrity is preserved not only in this life but also in the life to come.\textsuperscript{2} Royce's view of this divine-human relationship may be summarized in his own words in which he says, "God cannot be One except by being Many. Nor can we various selves be Many, unless in Him we are One."\textsuperscript{3}

iii. Ethics.

Royce's ethical system may be classified as a modified formalism. Its basis is loyalty, the "willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause."\textsuperscript{4} This might be interpreted as a teleological view if it were not for the fact that he insists that loyalty, even in its blindest forms, is an intrinsic,\textsuperscript{5} a supreme\textsuperscript{6} good and serves in a fragmentary way the cause of universal loyalty.\textsuperscript{7}

Royce qualified his formalism by introducing the teleological factor of a rational or enlightened loyalty.\textsuperscript{8} This means that the cause we choose must be in a rational, self-consistent and harmonious relationship with a system of causes. This loyalty to loyalty is "the whole duty of man."\textsuperscript{9}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] WI, II, 331.
\item[2.] WI, II, 445-452.
\item[3.] WI, II, 331.
\item[4.] PL, 17.
\item[5.] RQ, 235.
\item[6.] PL, 123.
\item[7.] PL, 375.
\item[8.] PL, 16.
\item[9.] PL, 140.
\end{itemize}
In Royce's words:

My thesis is that all those duties which we have learned to recognize as the fundamental duties of the civilized man, the duties that every man owes to every man, are to be rightly interpreted as special instances of loyalty to loyalty.

The ethical ideal is further described as the achieving of an unified person or self which is a life choosing and serving a cause in the spirit of loyalty. Loyalty to loyalty provides such a single and unifying principle and thus satisfies the ethical ideal.

---

1. PL, 139.
2. PL, 98; cf. 168-169.
3. PL, 170.
CHAPTER THREE

THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY

1. The status of the individual in the earlier Royce.

Throughout Royce's philosophic development there are certain constant views concerning the nature of the individual self and its relation to the world. On the other hand, his later views show certain changes both in emphasis and point of view.

Some of the constant views of the self that recur in Royce's writings are: its non-substantiality in the scholastic sense, the fragmentariness of the present datum self, the time-transcending nature of the true self, the organic relation of the self to the world, the activistic and teleological nature of the self, and the immoral character of the ethically isolated self.¹

The changes in Royce's later views are characterized by an emphasis on the social nature of the self with special reference to its social origin. Royce always held, at least implicitly, to a certain social nature of the self. This was true especially in the sense that the meaning of every self lay beyond itself. Also, the self was capable of social interaction. Even in his earlier stress on the all-engulfing

¹ J. Loewenberg, in his introduction to the Fugitive Essays By Josiah Royce, pp. 10-37, points out the presence of some of these features of Royce's views in his earliest writings. Cf. in Royce: RAP, 131-227; Art(1891)²; SGE; WI, II, 243ff; RQP; PL; WJ; SRI. Cf. infra, ch.5.
Absolute the individual selves were social in the sense that they were capable of knowing each other. Such knowledge was defined by Royce as one part of the Absolute pointing to another part of itself. Later, under the influence of Baldwin, Royce added still another social attribute of the self when he stressed the self's interaction with others particularly in the process of imitation. It was through imitation, Royce believed, that the self establishes a basis for successful interaction, communication, and knowledge of itself and other selves. So, although it could be said that Royce always held to the social nature of the self, there is still a marked difference in the meaning of the term social as applied to the self in the earlier and later Royce. In his earlier period the self was social in the sense that it was capable of social interaction and its status was due to its place in the context of the Absolute. In his later period, as will be seen below, the self becomes social in a new and very important sense—its social origin in the process of ideal self-interpretation. The mature self owes its constituent characteristics to this process of introjection of and identification with the processes and entities in its social environment.

The changes in his conception of the self and its relation to the world were stimulated both by the objections of his critics and by Royce's own apparently growing dissat-
isfaction with his previous solutions to this problem. A brief survey of Royce's development will indicate his reorientation in the attempted solutions.

The early Royce, with his more rationalistic emphasis, regarded the individual self as a thought of the Absolute Thinker. The problem of knowledge could be solved, according to Royce,

only if there is a thought that includes both my thought and the object wherewith my thought is to agree. This inclusive thought must be related to my thought and its objects, as my thought is related to the various partial thoughts that it includes and reduces to unity in any one of my complex assertions.¹

Contained implicitly in this view is:

the assumption that all reality, spiritual and material, is present in its true nature to an all-embracing, intelligent thought, of which mine is simply one subordinate part or element.²

This all-inclusive thought, according to Royce, is a personal Thinker or Knower³ and is the God, not of traditional theology, but of the "idealistic tradition from Plato downwards."⁴

In the Conception of God Royce broadens the ideal of an all-inclusive knower to that of a completely and perfectly organized experience or experiencer,⁵ but "this Absolute Experience is related to our experience as an organic whole to its own fragments."⁶

In the debate that followed the presentation of these

1. RAP, 377-378. 2. RAP, 378. 3. RAP, 433-434. 4. RAP, 476. 5. COG, 36ff. 6. COG, 44.
views, Howison charged, in part, that Royce's conception of the Absolute made human freedom and therefore ethical responsibility impossible. Royce's rebuttal in the "Supplementary Essay" of the published lectures, advanced the view that individuation consisted in the satisfaction of an interest and that the freedom of each self is ultimately the freedom of the Absolute. Howison still felt that Royce's Absolute Reality was actually a "continuous Unity" rather than a "system of self-active beings forming a Unity."

Royce resumed his attempt to preserve the integrity of the individual in the World and the Individual. Here he expanded the teleological or organic view of the individual self. In this view a self is a unique life-plan or purpose and is individual "... just precisely in so far as [His] life has this purpose and no other." It is God's will that each self have a unique will. These wills God or the Absolute includes as his own purposes. In answer to the objection that, by being included in the Absolute, the finite wills lose their freedom Royce replied that, on the contrary, they are by this fact guaranteed their freedom by sharing in the Absolute freedom.

---

1. COG, 98-99. 4. WI, II, 276.
2. COG, 258-265. 5. WI, II, 94.
In terms of logic or meanings Royce regards the given self as a telic or internal meaning whose fulfilment or external meaning is found in the Absolute life. In accordance with Royce's type of idealism the true individual self of any man gets its final expression only in some form of consciousness different from that which he now has. "The real Self", according to Royce, is "what every real fact in the universe is: a Meaning embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole within the unity of the Absolute life." In the "Supplementary Essay" Royce defines the Absolute as an "Individual Whole of Individual Elements."

The chief immediate criticism of Royce's revision of his system appeared in reviews of the *World and the Individual*. J. E. McTaggart felt that the finite self was reduced in Royce's Absolute to a fleeting and transitory status analogous to that of the different conscious moments in the life of a finite individual. John Dewey argued that if human experiences have no ultimate meaning and worth they cannot possibly be included as content in the Absolute. On the other hand, if they have ultimate meaning and worth the conception of the Absolute can be regarded only as the

---

1. WI, II, 269.  
2. WI, II, 268.  
3. WI, I, 538.  
4. McTaggart, Art.(1900), 258-258; Art.(1902), 557-563.  
best mode of expressing their meaning and thus constitute a system of meaning which finite beings themselves construct or constitute. These two alternatives, Dewey believes, are mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. C. M. Bakewell\(^1\) concludes his criticism of Royce's system with the assertion that the only way Royce could save the individual from complete loss of identity in the Absolute would be to regard finite individuals as "eternally real and underived" and also as being on the same ontological plane with God.

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to duplicate the voluminous discussions and criticism of Royce's earlier period, notwithstanding the great philosophic value of this material. The problem of individuation in the early Royce has been covered adequately already.\(^2\) The brief survey above is a selection of those arguments which played the most important part in influencing the direction of Royce's latest reorientation of his philosophy around the new concepts of the individual and the community.

There is a marked reversal of direction in Royce's latest attempt to solve the problem of the relation of the individual and the community. Royce throughout his life was essentially empirical in his approach to philosophical

---

2. Besides references above, cf. Philp, PIJR. COG: Mezes, 53-64; Howison, 81-132. McTaggart, Art.(1900); (1901). Calkins, PPP.
problems. But, whereas in his earlier period his procedure was to establish the existence of an Absolute first and then to struggle with the task of preserving the integrity of the finite individual, in his later period he starts with the uniqueness of the individual and then attempts to prove a type of unity in which individuals share a common life.¹

2. The empirical fact of social pluralism.

In holding to social pluralism Royce points for evidence to the "practical commonsense experience" which leads everyone to be convinced of his uniqueness and separateness.² This experience includes, for Royce, our immediate feelings, our conscious thoughts and purposes, as well as our wills and the deeds that express them. Also included are the ethical experiences of ideals, duties, responsibilities, praise and blame, rights, dignity, and inherent worth of all individual persons. These experiences individuate since they are not open to the direct experience of others. "These facts combine to show that the individual human selves are sundered by gaps which, as it would seem, are in some sense impassable."³ Apparently influenced by James, he says that individuals are "constituted" of "separate streams of feeling,--of mutually inaccessible and essentially secret trains

¹. POC, II, 58.
². POC, II, 22.
³. POC, II, 19.
They appear to resemble Leibnizian monads: "Their only windows appear to be those which their physical organisms supply." Royce's use of the word "appear", of course, is significant. In his previous view individual selves were empirically distinct. They were regarded as Leibnizian monads with windows opening only to the Absolute. So, although appearing to be distinct, they were actually or metaphysically aspects of the unitary Absolute—" ... but moments in his inclusive unity." However, the device for achieving some degree of unity of the many in the later Royce is no longer the Absolute but rather the community. Therefore, whether individualization is appearance only, or, in some degree ultimate, depends upon the relationship of the individual to the finite community and, in turn, its relationship to the Community of communities.

3. The empirical fact of social monism.

Royce raised the question, given this empirical pluralism, whether individuals have in some way and to some extent something in common i.e. some entities which transcend individuals and are shared by them. Is the appearance and conviction of mutual distinctness countered by

1. POC, II, 23.
2. POC, II, 23.
3. SMP, 409-410.
4. SMP, 410.
other evidence of experiences shared by the individuals? To these questions Royce answered in the affirmative.

First of all, Royce holds that strict atomism is refuted by the facts of social intercommunication. Without some common basis the exchange of meanings would be impossible. The knowledge of the world of description on the part of the individual depends, according to Royce, upon a social order and intercommunication, along with common agreements. In fact, even the "conception of externality itself" has social origins. Furthermore he holds that self-consciousness itself in its higher human forms likewise presupposes a body of interacting persons. For, without this companionship with other persons, Royce declares, "there is nothing to indicate that he [a child] would become as self-conscious as is now a fairly educated cat." Royce not only denies strict social atomism but also ascribes to the group a type of causal action in the process of developing the individual self.

He goes a step further and asserts that in certain relationships individuals in groups appear as one being. These occasions may be represented by the instance of mob-mindedness as is found frequently in lynchings, runs on banks, wars, political gatherings, and religious revivals.

1. Art. (1894), 515.
2. Art. (1894), 519.
Further instances of groups functioning as dynamic units are to be found in the development of a language or in the creation of customs, traditions, public opinion, and their resulting forces. Royce remarks that on such occasions the "streams of consciousness... appear as if they had lost their banks altogether" and "seem to flow together like rivers that are lost in the ocean." At such times the individuals as such do not appear to be thinking and acting but rather the group seems to be thinking and acting through them.

4. Synthesis of social pluralism and monism in the concept of the community.

On the one hand, there is, in Royce, the recognition that individuals are separated by apparently impassable chasms with a whole realm of thinking, feeling and acting shut up within the confines of their own selves. On the other hand, it is seen that these individuals do succeed apparently in transcending these chasms and in acting together as a unit in such a way that they are able to create a community.

Royce faces here a fundamental problem of the self, namely, how the self can be monadic and at the same time

1. POC, II, 28.
2. POC, II, 29.
have meaningful interaction with other selves. Beginning with the Philosophy of Loyalty Royce no longer refers to an Absolute who differentiated himself into individual wills whose access to each other was through the mediation of the Absolute mind.

The individual self in the later Royce has a social origin. Influenced by J. M. Baldwin and Wilhelm Wundt, he explains the evolution of the self as being brought about by means of imitation and language and the interplay of a social group. The evoking of the same response in the individual and others gives the common content necessary for a community of meaning. Anticipating the discussion below, the process involved is that of interpretation. The gesture or symbolic activity of one individual is imitated by another. In his response a social meaning arises. This is a triadic process of interpretation which constitutes a community of interpretation.

By further analysis of the self Royce dealt with the problem of its organic structure. The process of development of the complete human self, he concluded, involved ideal self-extension or interpretation. Out of this process

1. POC, I, 363. "But this very doctrine... about the social origin of the individual self... ."
2. Royce acknowledges Peirce as his source for this logical basis of his concept of the community. POC, II, 231-232.
emerges the community, which, following through the process initiated by the individuals, becomes itself an organic self.

1. Ideal self-extension (interpretation) is the basic process in the creation of the community.

In Royce's view, the fragmentary, empirical self is all that one can find present to experience at any one time. The remainder which goes to make up the complete or coherent self must be inferred or interpreted. What he calls the present self is a life separated not only from its fellows but from its own past as well. This "merely present self" considered as such is "hardly a self at all," it is "just a flash of consciousness," a "meaningless flow of feelings."¹

From this position, Royce argues that the true, complete self or personality must be regarded as including through temporal and social extension much more than is contained in the present momentary self.

Through temporal extension the individual reaches back to include within his true self those events which have predetermined his present self. Royce believes that the self's antecedents are in fact what help to constitute reflective self-consciousness and the idea of the subject on the part

¹. PCC, II, 61.
of his fellows. The individual, then, using the present self as a basis, regards his whole life as including certain past events. This process, called "ideal temporal self-extension", in addition, establishes the primary basis for the community and the individual's life within it.

There seem to be two distinguishable phases of the process involved in the extension of the self to the past. The first appears to be a process whereby the individual recognizes his actual antecedents, which might be regarded as causal determinants. These antecedents are the elements that are necessary to account for or to interpret the present self. Royce makes an analogy to biological heritage to illustrate this point. He contends that just as a person recognizes his biological inheritance from his ancestors so may he also recognize the deeds of those ancestors as belonging to himself, together with any events which he may regard as "predetermining the sense and destiny" which are now his.

Our definition of the community presupposes that there exist many individual selves. Suppose these selves to vary in their present experiences and purposes as widely as you will. Imagine them to be sundered from one another by such chasms of mutual mystery and independence as, in our natural social life, often seem helplessly to divide and secrete the inner world of each of us from the direct knowledge and estimate of his fellows. But let these selves be able to look beyond their present chaos of fleeting ideas and of warring desires, far away into the past whence they came, and into the future whither their hopes lead them. As they thus look, let each one of them ideally enlarge his own
individual life, extending himself into the past and future, so as to say of some far-off event, belonging, perhaps, to other generations of men, 'I view that event as a part of my own life.' 'That former happening or achievement so predetermined the sense and the destiny which are now mine, that I am moved to regard it as belonging to my own past.'

There is a second and more voluntary and creative phase of self-extension: an element is included that is not actually demanded for the completion of the whole self. The individual in this case desires self-enlargement as an expansion of the meaning and significance of his life. He therefore identifies his life with some past event which he may, but need not, personally remember. Royce maintains:

The first condition upon which the existence of a community, in our sense of the word, depends, is the power of an individual self to extend his life, in ideal fashion, so as to regard it as including past and future events which lie far away in time, and which he does not now personally remember. That this power exists, and that man has a self which is thus ideally extensible in time without any definable limit, we all know.

He goes on to insist that subject to reasonable self-imposed limits there is no restriction to this ideal self-enlargement—certainly not an external restriction.

All of us regard as belonging, even to our recent past life, much that we cannot just now remember. . . No one can merely, from without, set for us the limits of the life of the self, and say to us: 'Thus far and no farther.' In my ideal extensions of the life of the self, I am indeed subject to

1. POC, II, 58-59.
2. POC, II, 60-61.
some sort of control... I must be able to give myself some sort of reason, personal, or social, or moral, or religious, or metaphysical, for taking on or throwing off the burden, the joy, the grief, the guilt, the hope, the glory of past and of future deeds and experiences.¹

In Royce's view, a community emerges in the time-process at this point. The individual who ideally extends himself to include a past event recognizes that event also as an included part of another person's ideally extended life. Many persons may thus "possess identically the same past."² Ideal social extension of selves, a further act of self-extension, occurs in this interpenetration of the extended selves. Through mutually included events the individuals constitute themselves into a community. This ideal life in common Royce calls a "community of memory." Individuals, according to Royce, may be said to constitute a community with reference to that particular past or future event, or group of events, which each of them accepts or interprets as belonging to his own personal past or to his own individual future. A community constituted by the fact that each of its members accepts as part of his own individual life and self the same past events that each of his fellow-members accepts, may be called a community of memory.³

The preliminary step, in Royce, to the creation of a genuine present community is accomplished by individuals who create such a community of memory. The second step is

¹. POC, II, 61-62.
². POC, II, 44.
³. POC, II, 50.
taken by these members of a community of memory who ideally extend their lives to include future events, expected or hoped for. This future extension is again a matter of determining the true self, for an insistent point of Royce's is that the self is dependent on and is a product of a time-process. "The genuine person lives in the far off past and future as well as in the present." When members of a community of memory mutually include identical future events and when they consciously regard these future events or fortunes of the group as being at the same time the future events or fortunes of their own lives they thereby constitute a community of expectation or hope.

A community constituted by the fact that each of its members accepts, as part of his own individual life and self, the same expected future events that each of his fellows accepts, may be called a community of expectation, or upon occasion, a community of hope.

Further, on the basis of these two steps individuals may create not only communities of memory and expectation but also communities of the present. The memories and expectations held in common by the members of a group constitute a basis for an "unquestionable consciousness of unity" and on the basis of this unity of the past and future the community of the present is built.

Thus, then, common memory and common hope, the central possessions of the community, tend, when enlivened by love, to mould the consciousness

1. POC, II, 67.
2. POC, II, 51.
3. POC, II, 79.
of the present, and to link each member to his community by ideal ties which belong to the moment as well as to the stream of past and future life.¹

The indispensable and most basic requisite for the establishing of a community of the present, for Royce, is this ability of the constituent individuals to extend themselves ideally in time.² For, as in the case of the individual, the community needs extension in the time-process to realize its true nature. It can no more have significant existence in the mere present than can the individual. In Royce's words:

The rule that time is needed for the formation of a conscious community is a rule which finds its extremely familiar analogy within the life of every individual human self. Each one of us knows that he just now, at this instant, cannot find more than a mere fragment of himself present. The self comes down to ys from its own past. It needs and is a history.

Those individuals then, who have a unity with reference to a mutually shared identical past and future may extend this common life to the present by ideal social extension of their lives in the present. This extension is accomplished by means of co-operation and love. In his view, these two processes, although variable and antithetical, as will be explained presently, are, nevertheless, complementary. They are both necessary to the construction and perpetuation of the community, even though in different ways.

¹. POC, II, 95.
². POC, II, 69.
³. POC, II, 40.
Royce here combines the active (co-operation) and the passive (love) and their respective pluralizing and singularizing processes. Although, in Royce's view, deeds or events of the past and future shared by a group of individuals is the indispensable basis for their unity in a community, they are, according to Royce, too infrequent to create or maintain a community of the present. If individuals are to succeed in forming such a community they must co-operate in present deeds. Involved in Royce's idea of co-operation is the requirement that the individual must recognize that the co-operative deed is a part of his life, that it is the inner expression of the ideals of his life (as in the case of the artist), that the deed be directed by the individuals, that the individuals observe the contributions of their fellows, and that the individuals realize that without just this co-operative combination the deed in question could not be accomplished.¹

Co-operation is essential to Royce's view of the community because the individual's perpetual effort in co-operation preserves his individuality in the community life.

In brief: We thus seem to be individuated by our deeds. The will whereby I choose my own deed, is not my neighbor's will. My act is my own. Another man can perform an act which repeats the type of my act, or which helps or hinders my act. But if the question arises concerning any one act: Who

¹. POC, II, 88.
hath done this?--such a question admits of only one true answer. Deeds and their doers stand in one-one correspondence.

The danger, though, in all co-operation is that the co-operative activities tend to become so complex and the labor so specialized that the individuals tend to lose their consciousness of the whole deed as an included part of their individual lives. The act of co-operation becomes incomprehensible to the individuals and they become like mere cogs in a vast and impersonal machine. Royce recognizes this danger and sees in it the potential destruction of the community and consequently of any future co-operation. Accordingly, Royce proposes love as a necessary corrective element:

If a social order, however complex it may be, actually wins and keeps the love of its members; so that,—however little they are able to understand the details of their present co-operative activities,—they still—with all their whole hearts and their minds and their souls, and their strength—desire, each for himself, that such co-operations should go on; . . . then indeed love furnishes that basis for the consciousness of the community which intelligence, without love, in a highly complex social realm, can no longer furnish.

The essential function of love is to view the whole as if it were part of our lives, as if we could grasp it in its wholeness. This love has not, according to Royce, an obviously human origin but comes "as if from above." It may be

1. POC, II, 24-25.
2. POC, II, 91-92.
3. POC, II, 102.
termed a quasi-mystical love. It is mystical in that it seeks union with others and yet it may be called "quasi-mystical" because it does not succeed fully in its purpose of mystical blending of selves with the attendant loss of individuality.

What our definition of the community enables us to add to our former views of the meaning of loyalty is simply this: If the universe proves to be, in any sense, of the nature of a community, then love for this community, and for God, will not mean merely love for losing the self, or for losing the many selves, in any interpenetration of selves...; and if hereupon we can come to love this real community,—then the one and the many, the body and the members, our beloved and ourselves, will be joined in a life in which we shall be both preserved as individuals, and yet united to that which we love.¹

Religion would seem at this point to have a peculiar and invaluable function in Royce's modern community since the more developed and the more complex a community becomes the more need for this contribution of religion. Royce's position here would seem to be a rebuttal to the Comtean view that with the advance in civilization the need for religion is outgrown.

The longing of the individual is a longing to be united with his beloved, be it the mystic's God, other individuals, or the community. If left to itself, Royce believes this passive love would accomplish a mystical blending of members of the community. Although Royce admits that a mystical

¹. POC, II, 103.
blending of an individual with an "other" may take place in individual and social life, he holds that the extreme of love leading to a blending is not essential to his view of the community and that the community is definitely better without it. In Royce's words:

It is on the whole better for the life of such a community if the individual member, instead of losing himself 'in a mystery,' kept his own individuality, in order to contribute his own edifying gift to the common life.¹

In fact, a mystical blending like James's "compounding of consciousness" would, according to Royce, destroy the community;² for, essential to the life of the community are the continued new deeds of co-operation. It would also invalidate the individual life; for the "ideal extension of the self gets a full and concrete meaning only by being actively expressed in the new deeds of each individual life."³

Love is the power that enables the individual to extend his life to include past and future events as his own. It further enables him to "view his fellow members' life as his own"⁴ and to extend ideally his present self to include "the present life and deeds of his fellow."⁵ Love also enables the individual to act as if he could survey the complexity and variety of life in a single unity of insight.⁶ Love arises from seeing in co-operation the

---

¹ POC, II, 68. ² POC, II, 98. ³ POC, II, 98. ⁴ POC, II, 94. ⁵ POC, II, 96.
fulfilment of the individual self. Love, in turn demands devoted work.

This synthesis of the active and the passive and the ego and alter as represented in love and co-operation together with the ideal extension of selves is the core of Royce's concept of the community. The ideal extension of the self is the fulfilment of the true self through love and co-operation. This combination of love and co-operation appears to be what Royce calls loyalty and constitutes the vital relationship of individuals within the community.

ii. The community is an emergent social mind: social realism.

From the ideal extensions of individuals Royce's community arises as an emergent social mind. This social mind is an organic unit and not a mere collection of individuals in relation.

Thinkers who classify themselves as believers in social organism hold that the social group is more than the sum of its parts. With this tenet Royce agrees: "A community is not a mere collection of individuals."¹ Neither is it a collective entity such as a group of shoppers, the human race or an external history of humanity.² In some of Royce's earliest writings he is seen to subscribe to this organic view of society. In "Shelley and the Revolution", he says

---
¹ POCC, II, 62.
² POCC, II, 405.
"The world is more than the men in it,"¹ and "the total of life is more than the sum of its parts."² In "The Nature of Voluntary Progress" he says, "a concert of individual actions produces a resultant greater than the numerical sum of the individual contributions, or else different in kind from this sum."³

Royce further regards the community as, what he calls, a "real unit."⁴ By this, of course, Royce does not mean an undifferentiated entity but rather a single integration, for Royce defines unit and unity as a oneness that preserves variety. His argument for this point, similar to that suggested by Wundt is that the community behaves as a unit, therefore it must be a unit, however its inner coherence may be constituted.⁵

Another characteristic of social organicism is the reciprocal determination between individuals and also between individuals and the social group. As has been seen in the discussion of ideal self-extension, Royce's community is essentially determined by the individual members and their contribution. Royce insists also that the individual needs the community:

When viewed as if I were alone, I, the individual, am not only doomed to failure, but I am lost in folly. The 'workings' of my ideas are events whose significance I cannot even remotely estimate in

¹. FE, 69. ⁴. POC, I, 66.
². FE, 69. ⁵. POC, II, 30.
³. FE, 111.
terms of their momentary existence, or in
terms of my individual successes. My life
means nothing, either theoretically or prac-
tically, unless I am a member of a community.1

Royce goes beyond the common views of organicism by
holding to a more literal analogy to the biological organ-
ism. In this he follows the tradition of Spencer. Royce
states that the community is a "sort of live unit, that
has organs, as the body of an individual has organs."2
Lest it be concluded that by the expression "a sort of"
Royce means a "live unit" in a Pickwickian sense, merely,
we are told "each of the two, the community or the individual
member, is as much a live creature as is the other."3
Carrying out the implications of this, he is led to go even
further to say that the community also "grows and decays."4
Royce admits that the community does not have the same form
of life as the individual self but that it has just as real
a life is a doctrine on which he insists.

The organic unity of the community is in Royce's view
analogous to that of the individual in that it is a product
of a time-process involving memory, expectation, and social
evolution. Apart from tradition or custom and a temporal
reference to the distant future a social group is not a
community. A mob or a picnic does not qualify therefore
as a community because although it may have or be a social

1. POC, II, 312-313.
2. POC, I, 62.
3. POC, I, 62.
mind, it has no history and no significant organization. It is but a fleeting mass of feelings. It is no more a true community without temporal extension than is the individual a true self.

Royce regards the community not only as a live organic unit but also as a social mind. It has, he believes, a mind of its own, follows psychological laws in its behavior, is capable of loving and acting, and can be loved and served. Royce follows a pragmatic argument in holding:

A community behaves like a mind of its own. Therefore it is a fair 'working hypothesis' for the psychologist to declare that it is such an entity, and that a community has, or is, a mind.

Royce finds evidence that the community is mental in the existence of "mental products" such as languages, customs, and religions. These social phenomena, he maintains, point to a social mind as their creator since individual human minds could not produce them unless they were "somehow organized into a genuine community." Royce believes that its creator must be regarded as "in some sense, a single intelligence" on the basis that each of these mental products is not a "collection of discrete psychological phenomena, each of which corresponds to some separate individual mind to which that one mental fact belongs, or is due," but rather that it has "intelligent unity."

2. POC, I, 95.
3. POC, I, 417.
4. POC, I, 99.
6. POC, I, 62.
7. POC, I, 62.
8. POC, II, 27.
A further view of the relationship between the individual and the community may be seen in his doctrine of the two levels of mental beings. Both the individual and the community, he holds, are merely different "grades" or "levels" of human life: the level of the individual and the level of the community. In Royce's position, "any highly organized community . . . is as truly a human being as you and I are individually human." The difference between the levels, which Royce says is "profound", is apparently to be considered as a difference in degree or extent rather than in type. He admits, of course, an obvious difference in the nature of the two levels, namely, that the community hasn't one "separate and internally well-knit physical organism of its own" through which its mind may be expressed. Royce believes that in spite of this apparent deficiency, the community is more complex, more powerful, and more enduring than individuals.

In addition to being a mind or self, the community is, in Royce's view, a self-conscious person. In his latest writing on this point, Royce insists that a true community is, in a "perfectly literal sense, a person." He adds also conversely that "any human individual person in a perfectly literal sense, is a community."

1. POC, II, 57.  
2. POC, I, 166.  
3. POC, I, 166.  
4. POC, I, 167.  
5. Art. (1916), 295; cf. POC, I, 64.  
Royce, then, accepts social realism and rejects social nominalism. The community is not just an idea referring to individuals acting in concert, nor is it merely a gestalt or pattern. But being an organically live unit, it is, nevertheless, not an independent existent but rather an emergent actual entity perpetually dependent upon its genetic elements for its existence. Although Royce's community is not independent of the sustaining functioning of its elements, it is yet objectively real and causal in its own right. Just as the individual person is dependent upon the proper functioning of the organic constituents of his body, so the community depends upon the proper functioning of its constituent elements, the individual persons. In the words of Royce:

The true community, in our present restricted sense of the word, depends for its genuine common life upon such co-operative activities...

A further implication of the concept of the community as an organic, live person is its dynamic character. The community is a continual creation of the evolutionary process. It is dependent upon and is a product of the time-process. The community that Royce proposes is no "fixed entity" such as in metaphysics could be called a "block universe;" it is a living, changing, acting, and growing person.

1. POC, I, 81. 3. POC, II, 64.
2. POC, II, 88. 4. POC, II, 99.
iii. Organic pluralism.

The system developed by Royce in his later period may be called "organic pluralism." The problem of the individual and his relationship to society, difficult for any thinker, Royce felt he finally solved. He was convinced that in the concept of the community both "human solidarity and individual destiny" were assured. Royce's very definition of the community "presupposes that there exist many individual selves" and "involves recognizing to the full both the existence and the significance of individual selves." He insists:

"... a community does not become one, in the sense of my definition, by virtue of any reduction or melting of these various selves into a single merely present self, or into a mass of passing experience."

It may be asked, though, was the unity which Royce conceived successful in maintaining individuality? In answer, within the scope of this dissertation, it may be said that despite any flaws that may be found in Royce's latest solution, the reorientation of his philosophy around the concept of the Community has removed many difficulties of his former system and incidentally has contributed fruitful suggestions to the solution of this difficult problem.

1. \textit{POC}, II, 75. \hfill 3. \textit{POC}, II, 52.\hfill
One of the changes in the latest Royce, which has already been noted, is that the individual self is no longer described as being the differentiated thought or will of the Absolute. Previously the self required contrast with a not-self and interaction with society to develop self-consciousness. But in this case social interaction was necessary to awaken an individual to what he already basically was, namely, a differentiated part of the Absolute Self. The process was similar to that of Platonic reminiscence. In the later Royce the individual self is held to have a "social nature"¹ and a "social origin."² Experience has a social dimension. The individual is given in a social situation with others. The evolvement of both the human self and the community is an emergent product of their mutual interaction. Royce details how finite individuals acquire the capacity of self-consciousness, of thinking, of purposive behavior, of moral devotion—in other words, how the true, complete self arises.

A question may be asked in this connection whether the individual selves are antecedent to the social process as in Wundt. It would seem in Royce that the individual is not a self in the first instance, but becomes a minimal self only when it has developed such a self in a context of social experience. A distinction should be made here, as

1. POC, I, 376.
2. POC, I, 363.
it is by Royce, between the social group and a "community" in his technical sense. After a minimal self arises in the social situation, it then creates a community out of its social environment. This community is then in turn the prerequisite to the fullest development of the individual personality. This process of the evolution of the minimal self could be regarded as the position of evolutionary critical naturalism except for Royce's idealistic framework. As it is, his view is still in harmony with his previous idealism and provides for a more reasonable solution than naturalism to the problem of how the personality can arise. Influenced by J. M. Baldwin and C. H. Cooley, Royce developed his later thought in the direction of the social-interactionalist school. This movement, accepting the constitutional factors as given, insist that the personality is fundamentally a social-cultural product.

G. H. Mead, a student of Royce, developed this thought into what he called "social behaviorism." Their chief emphasis was on the process by which the mature personality arose out of social interaction. Both John Dewey and Mead developed Royce's view that knowledge was a social activity (interpretation) by emphasizing that thinking and hence knowledge itself was essentially a social-cultural process.

1. Mead, MSS.
This reciprocal creation or determination of the individuals and the community is, in Royce's view, a continuous process each being continuously interdependent for its life, self-consciousness, self-enrichment, and the creation of values. "The true community" according to Royce, "depends for its genuine common life upon such co-operative activities."¹ Furthermore, "the community is a being that attempts to accomplish something in time and through the deeds of its members."² The community, therefore, can never be said to be the sole result of the individuals in it nor can the individuals be solely the result of the community of which they are members. Both individuals and communities have personalities which are in some degree separate and distinct. In the theoretical event that a mystical merging of the individuals and the community should occur, Royce insists:

Such an immediate presence of all the community to all the members would be indeed, if it could wholly and simply take place, a mere blending of the selves, —an interpenetration in which the individuals vanished, and in which, for that very reason, the real community would also be lost.³

On these grounds Royce suggests: "Let your community be as a chorus, and not as a company who forget themselves in a common trance."⁴

1. POC, II, 88.  
2. POC, II, 64.  
3. POC, II, 97-98.  
4. POC, II, 96.
Another basis for assuring the individual's integrity as a member of the community lies in the previously mentioned voluntary nature of his ideal self-extensions and his consequent memberships in the various communities. There is, in Royce's view, no externally authoritative control of one's extensions. There is, to be sure, a demand that the individual have some rational basis for his ideal self-extensions, but Royce insists:

I must also myself personally share in this task of determining how much of the past and the future shall ideally enter into my life, and shall contribute to the value of that life.

These self-extensions do not invalidate the pluralism of selves since in Royce the individuals make these extensions and construct the unities on the basis of their own natures and as an outgrowth of their search for self-realization.

The concept of self-extension, although not with all the implications attached to it by Royce, is currently accepted by members of psychological schools as far apart as the "Social Interactionalists" and the "Personalists." Gordon W. Allport, a self-psychologist, discussing the extensions of the self and their "introception" by the self in a chapter on "The Mature Personality", says:

What one loves becomes a part of him. And anything one can admire, feel sympathy for, appreciate, revere, deliberately imitate, or become unconsciously identified with, may become introcepted into the personality, and remain ever after a vital part of it.

---

1. Cf. above, 47.  
2. POC, II, 62.  
3. POC, II, 92.  
4. Allport, PER, 217.
The idea of community provides a fruitful basis for the solution of current problems of the relationship between the individual and society. A critical evaluation will await a more complete analysis of the concept in the next chapter. However, a few comments may be made now on the question of "proof" or "disproof" of a social mind. Paul E. Johnson, for example, states:

To establish Royce's position it would be necessary first to prove the actual reality of a Group Mind. But this is generally recognized as an abstraction which we use only as a figure of speech. There is no real evidence for this mysterious Social Mind that is not any one of us, yet something more than all of us.

It may be asked what kind of "real evidence" would be necessary to "prove the actual reality" of such an entity. It would seem that the evidence need not be of a much different kind than that required to substantiate any other philosophical or theological hypothesis such as, for example, the existence of God, immortality, or even the existence of other persons. Also, Johnson's appeal to consensus gentium reflects much current criticism of the concept of a social mind. A great deal of recent criticism of the concept centers around the view that a mind or self cannot exist without a nervous system. And yet many of these same critics believe in the existence of God or the individual self after death. Legitimate criticisms are con-

concerned with the possibility of sharing any part of selves. And yet, without any kind of sharing, it would seem impossible to avoid extreme monadism. Whether or not Royce's view is the most acceptable hypothesis is, of course, a matter for further evaluation. The paradox is described by Melvin Rader when he says:

The more men are truly united the more they respect each other's differences. People who are in love treasure each other's individualities. Human beings should be both more differentiated and more united than they are now; and the unity that is the legitimate goal of human aspiration is the unity of difference.¹

Some compromise between extreme pluralism and monism seems to be indicated; Royce felt he had arrived at that successful solution. The paradox of how an individual may be a member of a community mind is no more serious than that of how the "specious present" may become a part of a continuous experience of a person. In fact Royce believes that this is the manner in which the community comes into being. The resolution of the paradox, if there is any, will come not as "proved" but as the most coherent interpretation of our private and social experience.

¹ Rader, EAS, 158.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The logical and metaphysical questions raised in the discussion of the development of the self and the community need further analysis for an adequate understanding of Royce's latest philosophy.

1. Interpretation as the logical basis of the community and the individual.

The basic process involved in ideal self-extension and the life of the community is that of "interpretation." This is a social method of knowing and was developed by Royce, under the influence of Peirce. Royce gave generous acknowledgment for Peirce's contribution but took responsibility himself for his own metaphysical generalizations.

Those ideas of Charles Peirce about Interpretation to which I shall refer, never, so far as I know, attracted William James's personal attention at any time. I may add that, until recently, I myself never appreciated their significance. In acknowledging here my present indebtedness to these ideas, I have to add that, in this place, there is no room to expound them at length... Moreover, it is proper to say that Charles Peirce cannot be held responsible for the use that I shall here make of his opinions, or for any of the conclusions that I base upon them...

Abandoning, then, any effort to state Peirce's case as he stated it, let me next call attention to matters which I should never have viewed as I now view them without his direct or indirect aid.

1. POC, II, 115-117.
1. Limitation of perception, conception, and intuition.

Royce criticized the traditional methods of perception, conception, and intuition as inadequate methods for understanding human life and the world. Increasingly in his later philosophy Royce became convinced of the social character of existence. Therefore, what was needed, he felt, was a social method for understanding it. Whitehead, in his doctrine of "prehension" does the same thing for all particular objects that Royce does here for minds engaged in the process of understanding the significance or meaning of events and other minds.

Royce's criticism of the exponents of perception and conception was based on the view that perceptual and conceptual knowledge was not complete until communicated.\(^1\) He differed, therefore, from Bergson, who regarded intuitive perception as the ideal method of knowing, conception being necessary only because of gaps in the method of perception.\(^2\) Here, Royce follows Peirce's repudiation of intuition. Peirce maintains that the self and all introspective data are inferred:

*Introspection is wholly a matter of inference. One is immediately conscious of his Feelings, no doubt; but not that they are feelings of an ego. The self is only inferred. There is no time in the Present for any inference at all, least of all for inference concerning that very instant.*

---

1. POC, II, 148.
2. POC, II, 124.
Consequently the present object must be an external object, if there be any objective reference in it.  

Elsewhere, he denies that "a knowledge of the mind may be obtained, which is not inferred from any character of outward things." Royce likewise differed from the Platonic idealization of conception with its disparagement of perception as a vain show. He went further to deny the view that even a synthesis of perception and conception is adequate:

But a dual antithesis between perceptual and conceptual knowledge is once for all inadequate to the wealth of the facts of life. When you accomplish an act of comparison, the knowledge which you attain is neither merely conceptual, nor merely perceptual, nor yet merely a practically active synthesis of perception and conception. It is a third type of knowledge. It interprets. It surveys from above. It is an attainment of a larger unity of consciousness.

Pragmatism is defective at this point, he thought, since ideas are actually limited by social boundaries and so what is needed to cross beyond is an interpreter in order to mediate the estranged concepts rather than a simple cash value to correspond to a credit value.

All such dual classifications of the knowing process are in Royce's view individualistic, unsocial, static,

---

1. Peirce, CP, V, 313.  
2. Peirce, CP, V, 149.  
3. POC, II, 188.  
4. POC, II, 188.  
5. POC, II, 131-132.
and are confined largely to externally supplied data. Royce felt that Kant most nearly approximated his view of interpretation in his doctrine of judgment (Urteilskraft.) However, Kant's distinction between sense, understanding, and reason does not parallel Royce's distinction between perception, conception and interpretation since in Royce's opinion Kant's "reason" merely performs a higher degree of conceptual function.

ii. Knowledge is mediative, triadic, and social.

The method that appealed to Royce was that of "interpretation" which he derived from Peirce and generalized into a metaphysical theory of the world.

According to Peirce, the traditional two categories of thought include universals and individuals and may be known by conception and perception respectively. In addition, though, there is a "third" object of knowledge, "signs," which call for comparison, mediation, or interpretation. It may also be called an expression of a mind, or, it may be regarded as, in its essence, either a mind or a quasi-mind,—an object that fulfills the functions of a mind. The reason for regarding signs in this way is that they express a mind and call for an interpretation through some other mind, which acts as a mediator between

1. POC. II, 120.
the sign, or between the maker of the sign, and some one to whom the sign is to be read. In addition, since the interpretation is a mental act and is an act which is expressed, the interpretation also becomes a sign which calls for further interpretation.

Royce, adopting this Peircean view, offers examples of obvious matters in our experience that fall into this third category of signs that need to be interpreted: A translation of a text written in a foreign language; a judge's construction of a statute; a man's interpretation of himself and of his own life; our own philosophical interpretation of a religious idea; the practical interpretation of our destiny, or of God; or, a metaphysical interpretation of the universe.

Royce uses a specific example of bank notes to illustrate his view of the need for interpretation, and incidentally, to show the inadequacy of pragmatism. Bank notes may be treated in terms of credit value or cash value when in one's own country. But at the border a further transaction becomes necessary—an interpretation of the cash-values of one country in terms of the cash values in the other country. So, Royce proceeds, many of our attempts in knowledge are those of exchanging the values

2. POC, II, 112-113.
of our own lives with those in foreign spiritual realms; credit values and the cash values are not always easily exchanged.\(^1\) He insists that we have many such critical passings of boundaries even in our own inner life which must leave perception, conception, and intuition behind and take up the work of interpretation.\(^2\)

Quotations from Peirce will show more exactly the source of Royce’s doctrines of comparison and interpretation:

Empirical psychology has established the fact that we can know a quality only by means of its contrast with or similarity to another. By contrast and agreement a thing is referred to a correlate, if this term may be used in a wider sense than usual. . . . The occasion of reference to a correlate is obviously by comparison.\(^3\)

Peirce uses an example of a translation of a word in a foreign language to show the need for a mediating representation which represents the relate as standing for a correlate with which the mediating representation is itself in relation:

Suppose we look up the word *homme* in a French dictionary; we shall find opposite to it the word *man*, which, so placed, represents *homme* as representing the same two-legged creature which *man* itself represents. By a further accumulation of instances, it would be found that every comparison requires, besides the related thing, the ground, and the correlate, also a mediating representation which represents the relate to be a representation of the same correlate which this mediating representation

---

1. POC, II, 134.
2. POC, II, 136.
itself represents. Such a mediating representation may be termed an interpretant, because it fulfills the office of an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he himself says.¹

Interpretation, for Royce, is essentially comparison and depends upon mediation. The contrasts, conflicts, and estrangements in our everyday experience need a mediating idea, a mental process to compare their likenesses and differences. Knowledge of others, or of oneself, or of the time process, or, in fact, awareness of the meaning and significance of anything, is impossible except that it be interpreted. Fundamental in the process of interpretation is the inventing or discovering of the third idea by which the two distinct ideas are compared. As soon as data or facts are communicated, there arises a minimum language situation which is social and involves an interpreted element, an interpreter, and someone to whom the interpretation is made.²

Royce has, in this third method of knowing, an epistemology that is in harmony with the conviction culminating in his latest philosophy, that life and the world are essentially social in nature.

Essential to the social nature of interpretation is its triadic structure. "Interpretation," says Royce,

1. Peirce, CP, I, 293.
2. POC, II, 140.
"is a conversation, and not a lonely enterprise." It is a communication from someone to someone.

The triadic structure of every interpretation is nonsymmetrical, i.e., the functional relations are definite and permanent for this particular act of interpretation. However, the members of one act of interpretation may exchange places in subsequent processes, thus providing a dynamic, evolving, and directional process. Royce maintains:

The new community will be in a perfectly definite relation to the former one; and may grow out of it by a process as definite as is every form of conscious interpretation.

The superiority of a triadic relation, such as is involved in this third type of knowledge, over the purely dyadic ones in the traditional methods becomes apparent, Royce believes, at this point. First, the nonsocial character of the dyadic relation makes it inadequate to grasp the meaning and significance of dynamic social processes. Secondly, when the dyadic relation is completed the process stops and as a result becomes subject to the criticism that knowledge is sterile or static.

In contrast to these defects of the dyadic relation, the triadic relation is active, close to the changing life

1. POC, II, 143.
2. POC, II, 141.
3. POC, II, 213.
4. POC, II, 213.
5. POC, II, 148-152.
it interprets and is infinitely expandable to include all possible meanings in the world.\(^1\)

Interpretation is, then, in Royce’s view, ideally an infinite process. The natural course of the process is unending, for each interpretation becomes a sign which in turn calls for another interpretation. Termination of the process, if it occurs, comes only through something "arbitrary or external" such as the death or separation of a member from the social group.\(^2\) Royce goes further to say that interpretation is intimately involved in the time order and "is strictly analogous both to the psychological and to the metaphysical structure of the world of time."\(^3\) "The present", he believes, "potentially interprets the past to the future, and continues to do so ad infinitum."\(^4\)

It is interesting to note that Royce acknowledges a similarity between his view of interpretation and Hegel’s dialectical process. He says, though, that Peirce’s theory of comparison and the mediating idea or "third" which interprets it "is, historically speaking, a theory not derived from Hegel."\(^5\) He holds that Peirce’s view of interpretation is an "extremely general process, of which the Hegelian

---

1. POC, II, 270. 4. POC, II, 146.
2. POC, II, 150. 5. POC, II, 185.
3. POC, II, 147.
dialectical process is a very special case.\textsuperscript{1} Although Royce denies the historical connection of the views, he doesn't deny their similarity.

There is no essential inconsistency between the logical and psychological motives which lie at the basis of Peirce's theory of the triad of interpretation, and the Hegelian interest in the play of thesis, antithesis, and higher synthesis. But Peirce's theory, with its explicitly empirical origin and its very exact logical working out, promises new light upon matters which Hegel left profoundly problematic.

One of the chief differences between Royce's use of the dialectic and Hegel's is the emphasis Royce places on the individual "will to interpret."

From the individual's point of view and with reference to his inner psychological processes the will to interpret, according to Royce, arises out of a basic personal urge to be "self-possessed." For, by its expression, the individual comes to self-knowledge and knowledge of the meaning of life.\textsuperscript{3} By discovering or inventing a "third" or mediating idea a person may "survey from above" and attain "a larger unity of consciousness."

The will to interpret succeeds in discovering or creating a realm of conscious unity which constitutes a community of interpretation. Through this community only, according to Royce,

\begin{enumerate}
\item POC, II, 185.
\item POC, II, 185-186.
\item POC, II, 183.
\item POC, II, 188.
\end{enumerate}
can an individual understand his own life and its meaning and compare and interpret his own ideas.

The will to interpret, in Royce’s view, constitutes an essential part of an individual’s social nature. It is this will that prompts him to make a community of interpretation with his fellows. “I am discontent”, Royce says, “with my narrowness and your estrangement. I seek unity with you.” This will to interpret may be regarded as the logical aspect of the motive of ideal self-extension, which, in the previous chapter, was seen to be the basis for the creation of the finite community. The finite community or the social mind, then, turns out to be, for Royce, essentially a community of interpretation. Royce holds that if at least three persons seek unity of understanding and thereupon will that one be an interpreter, another the interpreted, and another receive the interpretation, they may together constitute a community of interpretation. However, their ultimate goal of spiritual unity—complete understanding—is an "ideal event," "unattainable under human social conditions, but definable as an ideal, in terms of the perfectly human experience which every successful comparison of ideas involves." 1

1. POC, II, 209.
2. POC, II, 211.
But Royce sees at present many such communities in varying degrees of approach to this ideal event, each made up of many persons co-operating for perfect understanding. The goal of us all—the fulfilment of our will to interpret—is the actualization of the Community of Interpretation. Royce believes that such a social organization fulfils his definition of the Community since "we shall be many selves with a common ideal future event at which we aim."¹

2. The Community of Interpretation.

The real world, according to Royce, is the Community of Interpretation. As will be seen presently, he no longer in his later philosophy finds his earlier concept of the Absolute a satisfactory concept to designate his social universe. This social universe is an endless process of interpretation for it is made up of real signs and the process of their interpretation. There are for him two essential but contrasting ideas—"present experience" and the "goal of experience."² These contrasting ideas, constituting an antithesis, have a wide variety of expression as they appear in the world process: The contrasts in epistemology are between ignorance and

¹. POC, II, 213.
². POC, II, 264-266.
possible enlightenment. The contrasts in metaphysics are between appearance and reality, the actual and the possible, and the real and the ideal. In ethics the contrast is between the actual life and the ideal life.

The problem of the world, he believes, to solve the contrasts within it. These contrasts need a counsel, a mediator, or an interpreter. The world contains, Royce believes, such an Interpreter and is the process of their interpretation. ¹ In defense of this view Royce declares:

You have no reason for believing that there is any world whatever, except a reason which implies that some interpretation of the antithesis both exists and is true. A real and a true interpretation occur only in case the corresponding community exists and wins its goal.²

He defines the "real world", therefore, as "the true interpretation of the problematic situation."³

Royce derived from Peirce his view of the need for a community of interpretation.

Royce emphasized the social character of knowledge and the resulting need for a community of interpretation. It is interesting and informative to note the source of his position in the thought of Peirce. Peirce held that a community of interpreters was necessary to arrive at

---

¹. POC, II, 324.
². POC, II, 275-276.
³. POC, II, 267.
truth through the inductive process. Induction, he holds, is probable or statistical inference from the parts to the whole. He cites the example of a bag of black and white beans from which a few handfuls are taken. On the basis of this sample he maintains that a person can judge approximately the proportions of black and white in the whole. He concludes:

This is identical with induction. Now we know upon what the validity of this inference depends. It depends upon the fact that in the long run, any one bean would be taken out as often as any other. For were this not so, the mean of a large number of results of such testings of the contents of the bag would not be precisely the ratio of the numbers of the two colors of beans in the bag.¹

His emphasis here upon the "long run" suggests the important function of the community. He adds further:

We cannot say that the generality of inductions are true, but only that in the long run they approximate to the truth. This is the truth of the statement, that the universality of an inference from induction is only the analogue of true universality. Hence, also, it cannot be said that we know an inductive conclusion to be true, however loosely we state it, we only know that by accepting inductive conclusions, in the long run our errors balance one another. In fact, insurance companies proceed upon induction; -- they do not know what will happen to this or that policyholder; they only know that they are secure in the long run.²

This function as illustrated by the insurance companies is the function of the community in establishing cognitions

that are real. Peirce explains his point further, in another connection where he says:

And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge.

Peirce's notion of the unlimited nature of the logical community also suggests the basis for Royce's view of the infinity of the Community of Interpretation.

Royce and Peirce reject the view that the inductive process is based on faith in the uniformity of nature. Royce insistence that the objective facts alone should reveal the uniformity; it must not be assumed. He believes that a good sampling is probable due to the discoveries by logic through its examination of pervasive and fundamental order systems. Both Royce and Peirce agree that a community is the only secure way of validating the inductive process.

As the process of interpretation the Community of Interpretation is temporal and infinite. It is also teleological, social, and historical. Royce insists that the world is an evolutionary process in which there is "true development." Being temporal, it is also social, since the triadic nature of the time-process is, like interpretation, a social process. It is teleological because the very nature of time and the problems of the world consist in the endless pursuit of the ideal goal of interpretation which each new event and resulting interpretation requires.

The world process is throughout, in Royce's view, the expression of the divine consciousness. In his words: "The whole process of the temporal order is the progressive expression of a single spiritual meaning..." God is most evident as the Interpreter or the Spirit of the Community. The world, according to Royce, is the Community of Interpretation:

Its processes are infinite in their temporal varieties. But their interpreter, the spirit of this universal community,--never absorbing varieties or permitting them to blend,--compares and, through a real life, interprets them all.

Royce developed a theory of mathematical and log-

1. POC, II, 374.  4. POC, II, 393.
2. POC, II, 280.  5. POC, II, 324.
3. POC, II, 375.
ical order systems along with his theory of the community. He holds that there is a system of order in nature that is the precondition of orderly thinking and is found, not made. It is not subject to "personal and private caprice." There are three fundamental principles in his view: the realm of the Universals or Ideas is a System; objective momentous relations exist in the world and are the basis of inference; and the order and connection of rational processes copies an objective order and connection, which is found, not made.

The order systems, according to Royce, in abstraction from the physical world, are ideals that our thought at once creates and finds as the facts or entities of a purely logical world. The physical world, he believes, exhibits this order only approximately.

In this view, which may be called a logical realism, Royce holds that relations presuppose classes of entities and that classes presuppose relations. Both are fundamental and each is impossible without the other. Royce also insists: "We have an absolute logical need to conceive of individual objects as the elements of our ideal order systems." There are four elements in his concept of order system and they are necessary in the following

1. Art. (1913), 72-73.
3. Art. (1913), 94.
5. Art. (1913), 96-97; 106.
order of logical importance: Objects, as unique individuals, to have classes; classes to define relations; relations to have order; and order systems, ideal and real, to be reasonable.¹

Holding a position which he describes as Absolute Pragmatism, he says that the individual classification is "arbitrary" but the general laws of logic are absolute. He reconciles these contrasting principles by saying: "The logical principles define precisely the nature of the 'will to act in an orderly fashion' or in other words of the 'will to be rational.'"² He adds: "We 'construct' relational systems and classes in our ideal world. But we also 'find' that at least some of these constructions are necessary."³ There are, he says, modes of action and laws of the rational will that are known not by their success but by attempting to suppose that the modes of activity do not exist or that the laws are not valid.⁴

Royce's Community of Interpretation may be regarded in one way as a pervasive order system within which the will to interpret may find its fulfilment.

We must now turn to an analysis of the ways in which Royce's latest thought contains novel elements or emphases which, according to the position of the present

1. Art.(1913)¹, 107.
2. Art.(1913)¹, 111.
3. Art.(1913)¹, 121.
4. Art.(1913)¹, 122.
dissertation, result in a system best described as an organic pluralism.

3. The elevation of the status of the individual in the philosophy of the community.

There are several respects in which Royce's latest philosophy of the community provided for a greater significance of the individual than did his previous philosophy of the absolute. The most important of these are: the method of "interpretation", the essentially social aspect of the world, his provision for the experience of value, and his greater emphasis upon the empirical.

1. Interpretation as the logical basis for individuality.

Interpretation, the third form of knowledge which Royce adopts in his latest philosophy, is epistemically dualistic throughout and thus provides a basis for increased status of the individual self.

Royce always objected to any epistemological identification of the finite knower with the objects referred to. The epistemological problem for him was to bridge the dualistic gap between the finite subject and the object referred to. But this was accomplished in the earlier Royce through the immediate awareness of our thought or internal meaning and its object or external meaning by the Absolute Knower whose experience we shared.
In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy the solution offered was our finite unity with the Absolute Thought of which our thought was a part. In The World and the Individual our finite ideas or "internal meanings" became fulfilled in their "external meanings." These external meanings of ours are internal meanings to the Absolute—the "Other." For any of our finite ideas to be fulfilled or to be "means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas,--a system, moreover, which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary." In The Conception of God he holds that our experience finds its object through the absolutely Organized Experience: "To assert a truth as more than possible is to assert the concrete reality of an experience that knows this truth."

Thus it may be seen that, in the earlier Royce, although epistemological dualism holds for finite beings, epistemological monism is the ultimate basis of any individual's success in knowledge. Such monism in epistemology leads logically to singularism since the very being of individuals as immediate objects of the absolute thought become logically exhausted in the consciousness of the

1. RAP, 371.
2. WI, I, 339.
3. WI, I, 24.
4. WI, I, 36.
5. COG, 41.
absolute mind.

With the rejection of epistemological monism in the later Royce, a logical barrier is removed for the conception of a truly monadic constitution of the individual self.

Interpretation, as has been seen, is, according to Royce, a socially infinite process. The triadic and temporal character of every act of comparison or interpretation is important to the determinateness or individuality of the selves involved in the process. Royce insists that there can be no merging of selves if the interpretation is to be successful. He says:

There remain the three distinct mental functions ... All these minds or functions must be real and distinct and must form one real community, if indeed the sign-post is a real sign-post at all.

He illustrates this point by the example of a trial in court wherein no successful interpretation of justice could be reached if either the litigant or defendant exchanged places or if either became the judge in the case.

Considering the relation of interpretation to the time-process, it may be seen that each moment is in a definitely determinate relation to every other moment. What would happen to the time-order would happen to

1. POC, II, 149.
2. POC, II, 283.
processes of interpretation if there should be any blending or merging of the members.

Even the knowing activity of God, the Interpreter of the Community, is dualistic. Denying that "the divine consciousness is timeless," Royce holds that the Interpreter's "endless task" of comparing or interpreting the essential antithesis of the world is a discrete triadic process in time in which the three "selves" cannot merge if the interpretation is to be a success.2

Royce does conceive of a totum simul with respect to God's synoptic vision of the world process but this still does not involve an identity of God's consciousness and the process known. After insisting that the Community of Interpretation expressed its life in an "infinite series of individual interpretations" "each of which occupies its own place in a perfectly real order of time," he says that if the community of interpretation reaches its goal, the whole time-process may be spanned in some way by one insight which could survey the unity of its meaning. However, he insists: "Such a viewing of the whole time-process by a single synopsis will certainly not be anything 'timeless.'" Royce thus abandons the ultimate epistemological monism formerly ascribed to the Absolute,

1. POC, II, 378. 3. POC, II, 271.
2. POC, II, 375. 4. POC, II, 271.
which logically resulted in a metaphysical monism. For, Royce denies anything immediate or intuitive in this synoptic survey by God, the Interpreter. This synoptic interpretation of the whole time-process is, like any of our finite human interpretations, mediate, comparative, and epistemologically dualistic. In the words of Royce: "Its nature is the one empirically known to us at any one moment when we clearly contrast two of our own ideas and find their mediator."¹

The interpretative process is essentially the same for God as it is for man, even in his synoptic survey of the struggles of the world process in the light of his ideal plans. Royce, putting himself in the position of an interpreter in a community of interpretations and, assuming it would be possible to win his goal of complete interpretation, insists that we "should indeed not interpenetrate," "our functions would remain as distinct as now they are," there would be "no melting together, no mystic blur, and no lapse into mere intuition."² He proceeds to say that the vision of the successful interpretation, for God as for himself, would simply be the fulfilment of his goal as interpreter. He concludes: "This attainment would as little confound our persons as it would divide our substance. We should remain, for me, many, even when

¹. POC, II, 271.
viewed in this unity.”¹

This synoptic survey by God is best interpreted in Royce, therefore, as God’s dualistic self-knowledge rather than his monistic self-experience. The consequences of Royce’s adoption of dualistic and inferential interpretation as the ultimate form of knowledge are significant with respect to the freeing of the finite individual from being engulfed in the being of God.

ii. The Community of Interpretation as essentially social.

Since the social, temporal, and triadic nature of interpretation provides a logical basis for the pluralism of selves, as has been shown, and since the process of interpretation is in Royce’s view the essential nature of the Community of Interpretation, there is a basis for affirming its social nature. The Community is, in other words, not a single Absolute Self but a social process of the inter-relations of its members. In the words of Royce:

The universe, if my thesis is right, is a realm which is through and through dominated by social categories. Time, for instance, expresses a system of essentially social relations. The present interprets the past to the future. At each moment of time the results of the whole world’s history up to that moment are, so to speak, summed up and passed over to the future for its new deeds of creation and of interpretation.²

2. POC, II, 280-281.
The Community is more on the order of a comprehensive unity than an all-embracing whole of fragments of itself as was true in the case of the Absolute. When Royce in *The World and the Individual* describes the nature of being, he says, "... whatever is, has its being, once more, only as a fact observed, and exists as the fulfillment of a conscious meaning. That is our definition of Being." The fate of the individual and the nature of the all-engulfing Absolute can be observed when we remember that any known fact is a "fact present to some consciousness, namely, precisely to the consciousness that fulfills the whole meaning of whoever asserts that this fact is real." The only consciousness meeting this requirement is, of course, the Absolute.

The individual, despite Royce's assertion that he is not "lost in God," is still a sort of differentiation of the Absolute Will. For, "when I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here am God's will, or who just here consciously act for the whole."

After revising his position somewhat in the "Supplementary Essay" in *The Conception of God*, he still says: "I shall, then, also strenuously insist that the individual, as I define him, is free,—free with the identical freedom of God, whereof his freedom is a portion."

1. WI, I, 398.  
2. WI, I, 397.  
3. WI, I, 468.  
4. COG, 294.
In the discussion of the relationship of the individual to the Community, Royce no longer uses terms such as fragments of, parts of, or portions of. The relationship which he reiterates is that of "membership in the Community" rather than parts of a Whole or Totality.

Royce refers to:

The sense in which there can be, in individual human beings, despite their narrowness, their variety, and their sundered present lives, a genuine consciousness of the life of a community whereof they are members... Far from the emphasis on the individual self as being a sort of differentiation of the Absolute Will, the later emphasis of Royce is upon the social origin. The individual self is more like the "self-created creature" of Whitehead. The individual datum self, as has been shown in the previous chapter, determines its true self by ideal self-extension or interpretation in a social situation. As Royce points out, a true community can be maintained only if the individuals preserve their self-identity and make continual contributions to the group. He insists:

Unless each man knows how distinct he is from the whole community and from every member of it, he cannot render to the community what love demands,—namely devoted work.2

1. POC, II, 99.
2. POC, II, 98.
Another aspect of the truly social character of Royce's Community can be seen in the active eternal process of communication that constitutes the very life of the Community. "Interpretation," for Royce, "is not a lonely enterprise." It is, rather, "a conversation."  

The historical and teleological character of this process, along with the nonsymmetrical nature of the triadic relation of every act of interpretation, keeps the world's process moving on in a linear fashion in the time-order. Any interpretation by one mind becomes a sign to be interpreted to another mind in a ceaseless process. According to Royce:

Since the interpretation is a mental act, and is an act which is expressed, the interpretation itself is, in its turn a Sign. This new sign calls for further interpretation. For the interpretation is addressed to somebody. And so, at least in ideal, the social process involved is endless.  

In contrast to his view in The World and the Individual that "the goal of every finite life is simply the totality whereof this life, in its finitude, is a fragment," the later Royce insists:

The system of metaphysics which is needed to define the constitution of this world of interpretation must be the generalized theory of an ideal society.  

1. POC, II, 148.  
2. POC, II, 141.  
3. POC, II, 149.  
4. WI, II, 135.  
5. POC, II, 281.
And he adds: "not the Self, not the Logos, not the One, and not the Many, but the Community will be the ruling category of such a philosophy."\(^1\) The reference to the Self as not being the "ruling category" clearly refers to the Absolute as he formerly conceived it.

The world cannot be a truly social universe without the interaction of "free" individuals, that is, persons with some privacy of selves along with their common ties. Royce is seen to propose a view of the world as a Community which requires for its own essential process, and thus existence, the individual integrity of its members.

iii. The relation of the finite to value.

With his increased emphasis on the reality and significance of time and evolution Royce appears faced with the problem of value. His definition of the world as an infinite process of interpretation would seem to force him logically into a conception of an active unending process without provision for completed perfection or for concrete experience and conservation of value.

In answer to the need for a goal of completed perfection, he posited as an ideal the complete interpretation of the antithesis of the ideal and the actual. This goal

\(^1\) POC, II, 281.
for the world process, however, would be unattainable in time.\(^1\) However, God, as the world's Interpreter, is able to experience any current stage of synthesis at any time and through interpretation experience the achievements of the world process toward its ultimate goal.

The need for finite experience of creation and conservation of value he answered by means of the finite communities and by regarding individuals as interpreters.

The finite communities, or social minds, are, for Royce, communities of interpretation. They are dynamic and always in pursuit of the goal of ultimate interpretation. They are flexible in that the three elements, or functions, or selves of the community may exchange their roles at any time. According to Royce, "You, or my other neighbor, can at any moment assume the function of interpreter, while I can pass to a new position in the new community."\(^2\)

The communities, regarded by Royce as persons, represent in all likelihood an attempt to provide centers of concrete value experience within the infinite process and below the level of the infinite being. As has been shown in the previous chapter, Royce believes there are certain values in and by the finite community. As

---

1. POC, II, 272.
2. POC, II, 213.
personal centers, these communities conserve value in a way more concretely related to the needs and interests of the individual.

An illustration of their function could be indicated by the value of having a hierarchy of governments from the city through the county and state governments within the framework of the federal government. Or, perhaps, the process should be carried through federal governments to the United Nations, or the Great Community as Royce would want it developed. It is interesting to note here that Hegel glorified the nationalistic state and, although revealing traces in his Philosophy of Right, failed to carry his dialectic to a world community, whereas Royce, although less singularistic than Hegel, exalted the idea of the Great Community.¹

The function of the Spirit of the Community as the Interpreter is to relate and to synthesize the ideal and the actual in the world process. The synthesis or interpretation of the goals and their achievements in the finite community could be regarded as part of the process the World Interpreter was engaged in but taking place on an ontological level close to the life of the individual.

The finite community, of course, could preserve

¹ HGC.
the past in its rich diversity within the dialectical process. Royce seems to believe that each interpretation owes part of its essential nature to the forces, events, and the deeds which give rise to it. Therefore a temporal and personal designation such as may be found in the finite communities is essential to each act of interpretation or each achievement of value in the life of the community. Each interpretation, he says, "occupies its own place in a perfectly real order of time"¹ and "each of these real events has ... a value which concerns the whole universe."²

Royce's interest in conserving each value achieved in the historical process of the world is similar to Hegel's. In the synthesis of the dialectical process the thesis and antithesis as well as previous syntheses are not lost sight of. Royce insists that "deeds once done are irrevocable."³

The finite deeds of interpretation both in the individual and in the community have a permanence for Royce and find a stable individual existence at a concrete point in the time-process.

The question of the personal character of the finite communities need not be a crucial difficulty with Royce.

---

1. POC, II, 271.
2. POC, II, 313.
3. POC, II, 294.
The will to interpret, or in other words the ability to rise up above our isolated or uninterpreted self, could be regarded as due to God, the Interpreter, immanent in the life of man. Royce apparently feels the need for some personal mediation between the actual (what man is) and the ideal (what he can be). What he suggests in the process of creating the finite communities is some "nisus", to use Alexander's term, to foster the actualization of the ideal.

The important considerations for Royce appear to be: that the "larger unity of consciousness" attained by interpretation, that the process of the realization of the universal in the particular, and that the cooperative evolution toward a coherent goal, in every instance be personal, and an integral part of the life of the individual.

The finite communities or social minds as they emerge in the evolutionary process could be regarded as concrete embodiments of the ideal in time and under the influence of the Spirit of the Community.

iv. Increased empiricism.

The later Royce shows an increased emphasis on

1. POC, II, 188.
the empirical and, in thus giving greater recognition to the things of finite experience, tends to enhance the status of the individual.

Royce always strove to be empirical in his approach to philosophic interpretations. In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy he holds that: "The truth of religion and reality can be known to us only in our human experience." And in The World and the Individual he says: "All knowledge is of matters of experience." In The Problem of Christianity he continues his empirical emphasis declaring:

We have no ground whatever for believing that there is any real world except the ground furnished by our experience, and by the fact that, in addition to our perceptions and our concepts, we have problems upon our hands which need interpretation. Our fundamental postulate is: The world is the interpretation of the problems which it presents.

Royce always felt that mysticism was inadequate. But in regarding it as an inadequate method in his later philosophy, he did so because he thought of it as not social enough. "Mysticism," he says, "is the always young, it is the childlike, it is the essentially immature aspect of the deeper religious life." He adds also:

No mystic can become truly religious unless, like all the really greatest mystics,—beyond all his illuminations, and besides all his mere experi-

1. RAP, 231. 2. WI, I, 11. 3. POC, II, 323. 4. WI, I, 47-87. 5. POC, I, 401.
ences of fulfilment, or of the immediate presence of the Divine,—he attains to a strenuous, active loyalty which can overcome the world only by living in the community.

Of course, neither Royce nor any other philosopher of his profound breadth could be contained within the limits of scientific demands for scientific verification. However, although Royce was not empirical in this positivistic sense, he was definitely empirical in the sense that he started with the facts of experience and developed his metaphysics as an interpretation of them. Royce’s increased interest in the importance of the social led him to be more concrete in his later empiricism. Along with this was his increased confidence in man’s ability to make discoveries about his world through scientific and empirical processes.

If, then, you seek for a sign that the universe contains its own interpreter, let the very existence of the sciences, let the existence of the happy inventive power which has made their progress possible, furnish you such a sign. A being whom nature seems to have intended, in the first place, simply to be more crafty than the other animals, more skilful in war and in hunting, and in the arts of living in tribal unities, turns out to be so attuned to the whole of nature that, when he once gets the idea of scientific research, his discoveries soon relate to physical matters as remote from his practical needs as is the chemical constitution of the nebulae, or as is the origin and destiny of this earth, or as is the state of the natural universe countless ages ago in the past. In brief, man is not

1. POC, I, 401-402.
what he seems, a creature of a day, but is known to be an interpreter of nature. He is full of aptitudes to sound the depths of time and of space, and to invent hypotheses which it will take ages to verify, but which will, in a vast number of cases, be verified.

A notable shift in emphasis can also be noted with reference to his earlier contrast between the world of appreciation and the world of description. Royce regarded appreciation as individual and as dealing with reality. Description was social and communicable but dealt with the world of appearance. He exalted the activities of appreciation and, in harmony with his more or less disdain for the world of the physical sciences, disparaged activities of description and gave them a place inferior to appreciation. The later Royce, in accord with his increasing emphasis upon the empirical and the social as well as his greater respect for science, dropped the distinction between these two activities. His emphasis turned to the social and dualistic process of description, and this method he exalted in his view of interpretation.

In his later philosophy he provides a central place for time and causality. "The time-process," he says, "and the ideal extensions of the self in this time-process, lie at the basis of the whole theory of the community."

1. POC, II, 417-418.
3. POC, II, 99.
Royce does not say specifically that the never-ending process of interpretation is merely coextensive with the time-order, as Bergson would say, or, whether it is contained within it. Concerning the relation of the Community to time, he says, "The concept of the community, as thus analyzed, stands in the closest relation to the whole nature of the time-process. . . . And with reference to God's relation to time he adds, "We do not declare, in our metaphysical doctrine, that the divine consciousness is timeless."  

The time-order, for Royce, is never ending, for "... the present potentially interprets the past to the future, and continues to do so ad infinitum."  

Causality assumes an important place in his emphasis on the significance of activity and the whole evolutionary process of the Universal Community.  

This concept of the Community as an infinite temporal system constituted an important advance in Royce's thought. It is true that there are developments toward this view in the Conception of God and later in the "Supplementary Essay" to the World and the Individual. In  

1. POC, II, 52.  
2. POC, II, 378.  
3. POC, II, 146.  
4. POC, II, 147.
the latter work Royce states:

The true Infinite, both in multitude and in organization, although in one sense endless, and so incapable in that sense of being completely grasped, is in another and precise sense something perfectly determinate. Nor is it a mere monotonous repetition of the same, over and over. Each of its determinations has individuality, uniqueness, and novelty about its own nature.

However, he goes on to maintain that this ordered experience is a totum simul:

In consequence, the whole endless series, in so far as it is a reality, must be present, as a determinate order, but also all at once, to the Absolute Experience.

In his Conception of God he falls short of the idea of the infinite process of interpretation developed in the conception of the community. According to Royce:

An Omniscient Being would be one who simply found presented to him, not by virtue of fragmentary and gradually completed processes of inquiry, but by virtue of an all-embracing, direct, and transparent insight into his own truth,—who found thus presented to him, I say, the complete, the fulfilled answer to every genuinely rational question. Observe the terms used. I say, the answer to every question.

The marked change in Royce’s latest thought is apparent when he says:

After the foregoing discussion of the nature and the processes of interpretation, we are now secure from any accusation that, from this point of view, the real world is anything merely static,

1. WI, I, 568.
2. WI, I, 568.
3. COG, 8.
or is a mere idea within the mind of a finite self, or is an Absolute that is divorced from its appearances, or is any merely conceptual reality, or is 'out of time,' or is a 'block universe,' or is an object of a merely mystical intuition.¹

After emphasizing the importance of individual deeds, Royce insists on the metaphysical reality of time:

If, then, the real world contains the Community of Interpretation just characterized, this community of interpretation expresses its life in an infinite series of individual interpretations, each of which occupies its own place in a perfectly real order of time.²

Considering the possibility of the community of interpretation reaching its goal, Royce admits that the whole time-process would be spanned in some way by one insight which would survey the unity of its meaning. However, it has been made clear that Royce discarded the former idea of the totum simul, for this synoptic survey is a discursive, interpretative, or mediated insight of a type identical with any act of interpretation on the part of any finite individual.

Such a viewing of the whole time-process by a single synopsis will certainly not be anything 'timeless.' It will not occur, on the other hand, at any one moment of time. But its nature is the one empirically known to us at any one moment when we clearly contrast two of our own ideas and find their mediator.³

1. POC, II, 270.
2. POC, II, 270-271.
3. POC, II, 271. Italics not in original.
This change by Royce in the direction of greater empiricism becomes more noticeable when his views in the foregoing discussion are compared with his earlier denial of the metaphysical reality of human progress. In discussing the human pursuit of knowledge and goodness, Royce declares:

For us this is progress. This progress is the form taken temporarily in us by the good will. But for God this is no real progress. Therefore is it indeed true that the moral insight in us must lead us to aim at progress in goodness, just as, on the other side, the rational element in us leads us to aim at progress in knowledge. But, meanwhile, our moral progress and our rational progress, mere minor facts happening at a moment of time, are but insignificant elements in the infinite life in which, as a whole, there is and can be no progress, but only an infinite variety of the forms of the good will and of the higher knowledge.

Also, either as the cause of, or the effect of, the increased concreteness of Royce's empiricism was his new interest in and respect for science and the world of the sciences. It is likely that Peirce was responsible in part for this development in Royce's thinking since Peirce pointed out to him among other things the metaphysical import of the fruitfulness of scientific induction. 2

Royce, far from disparaging science in his later philosophy, regarded the community of scientists as not

1. RAP, 467.
2. POC, II, 393; cf. POC, II, 417-418.
only a model for the nature of the Community of Interpretation, but as a chief contributor among all the types of communities to the creation of the Community.

In the words of Royce:

If the spirit of scientific investigation, or of learned research, shows signs—as it already does—of becoming one of the best of all forms of unifying mankind in free loyalty, then regard science not merely as in possible harmony with religion, but as itself already one of the principal organs of religion.¹

Further, he says, "the scientific spirit is indeed one of the noblest and purest forms of loyalty."²

Associated with Royce's increased interest in science and the individual's status is his concrete interest in events, things, and selves, which he regarded as "signs" or "quasi-minds." In Royce's later philosophy the knower's ideas in the act of interpretation had a more concrete quality and were not regarded so much as entities in the mind apart from the world of things.

v. Increased significance of the Individual.

Royce's increased interest in the concrete gives more significance to the finite individual. He still maintains a Calvinistic attitude, though, of minimization of the unextended or uninterpreted life. He says: "My

1. POC, II, 431.
2. POC, I, 423.
life means nothing, either theoretically or practically, unless I am a member of a community.\textsuperscript{1} But for the individual who extends himself, he declares: "Full of wonders is nature. But the most wonderful of all is man the interpreter,—a part and a member ... of the world's infinite Community of Interpretation."\textsuperscript{2}

It is important to note that the method of salvation depends not on a principle of self-renunciation but on ideal self-extension. It is voluntary and the individual selects the type of life he wants to be by selecting or creating communities which give the type of meaning he wants for his life.

There is, then, an important difference in the goal for the life of the individual in the community in contrast to the former Absolute. In The World and the Individual he says: "The goal of every finite life is simply the totality whereof this life, in its finitude, is a fragment."\textsuperscript{3}

In the later Royce, the communities that he is loyal to and serves are those determined by his own ideal self-extension. Although the goal for man in the later Royce is to further the coming of the Universal Community or the Beloved Community, this ideal is based on the will

1. POC, II, 313.
2. POC, II, 418.
3. WI, II, 135.
of the individual. "The will to interpret," he says, "is the will to be self-possessed." ¹

Royce's emphasis on the significance of the individual is revealed in his view that man himself constitutes a finite community and can perform the function of a community. With the abandonment of his basically monistic epistemology and the adoption of the dualistic method of interpretation Royce has allowed the individual increased status in the world. "Man," he says, "is known to be an interpreter of nature. He is full of aptitude to sound the depths of time and of space, and to invent hypotheses which it will take ages to verify." ² Royce no longer regards it as necessary that the individual knower be identified with an inclusive infinite consciousness in order to understand his world. ³ Any individual can help from a community of interpretation and be the interpreter.⁴ Considering Royce's position of "absolute voluntarism", however, it must be kept in mind that, although "the expression of the will to interpret constitutes itself an actual life," ⁵ "there are absolute standards for the will." And this "right attitude of the will towards the universe . . . when once assumed, is essentially creative of its own realm of deeds." ⁶

---

1. POC, II, 193. 4. POC, II, 213; 205.
2. POC, II, 418. 5. POC, II, 294.
Along with Royce's increased emphasis on time there is also an emphasis on the creative deeds and activities of the individual. The individual seems to be engaged in a vital, meaningful, and constructive activity in the world process with actual achievements towards a real goal.

It is noticeable, too, that in the relation of the individual and the community there is a strong sense of mutual interdependence and reciprocal benefit. The relation of the individual to the community is not that of benefit to one at the cost of the other. It is not, in other words, a question of the individual versus the community. "Loyalty fulfils the individual, not by annulling or quenching his individual self-expression," Royce insists, "but by teaching him to assert himself through an active and creative devotion to his community."\(^1\)

It has been shown how the individual's life and meaning depends upon his ideal self-extension (interpretation) or what may be called his self-realization within the community. But it is equally true that the community is dependent upon the individual. The community, for Royce, "depends for its very constitution upon the way in which each of its members interprets himself and his life."\(^2\)

Also Royce insists that we are "helplessly dependent on

1. POC, I, 401.
2. POC, II, 111.
human fidelity for some of our highest goods..."¹

Another factor which has significance for the status of the individual is the voluntary relation which he bears to the Universal Community. Royce states that "we are members, if we choose, of the truly universal community."² There is an important ethical matter involved since to belong by nature as in his view of the Absolute does not involve an ethical choice. Whether an individual participates, then, in the Universal Community depends upon the individual.

One or more individuals can, in fact, destroy communities. Of course, the probability of the destruction of all communities is remote since the Spirit of the Community (God) should guarantee a measure of community. The Spirit of the Community could be regarded as a priori just as Kant's categories of the understanding are. The Spirit of the Community is expressed in the social nature of the individual—the will to interpret.

We may be said to be born with tendencies to interpret and thus to be capable of becoming a member of a community. But these tendencies are not mandatory and as a result the individual's initiative is preserved. The individual's choice is real and not just a mere appearance.

¹. POC, I, 299.
². POC, II, 388.
It is, in James's phrasing, a "live option."

4. Personalistic organic pluralism.

The previous analysis of the genesis of the self and the community concluded that Royce's system was essentially what might be called an organic pluralism. The analysis of his logical and metaphysical views confirms this position.

Philosophic labels are difficult of application. It would be difficult to find a philosopher who would admit that he was either a strict singularist or a strict pluralist. Philosophers vary from one another within the extremes largely with reference to their degree of emphasis. The same is true as regards the comparison of the earlier and later Royce. It is the position of this dissertation that Royce in his latest philosophy could be said to have developed in the direction of pluralism and away from his former position. The shift in his position is significant enough so that his latest philosophy should properly be called a personalistic organic pluralism.

Since Royce believes that the universe in its process of evolutionary development is the expression of the divine self, an orientation of his metaphysical position

1. POC, II, 217, 374.
may be made around that concept.

Royce regards God as the Community of Interpretation, which is the eternal process of reconciling or interpreting the essential contrasts or antitheses between the actual and the ideal in all its variations. He also regards him as the Beloved Community or what he means when he speaks of the "truly" Universal Community. This is the ideal goal of all interpretation but is a term used by Royce to refer undoubtedly to the religious community or what is the same thing, -- the successes already achieved in interpretation or in the actualizing of the ideal. He speaks repeatedly of the infinite process of interpretation seeking to achieve its goal. In one connection he says: "'Create me,' -- this is the work that the Church, the Beloved Community, viewed as an idea, addresses to mankind."

There is an element of serious confusion in Royce's use of the word "interpretation" to mean both the process and the result of the process. But a distinction such as just made is necessary for clarity.

Royce apparently, then, holds a somewhat trinitarian view of God. For God is thought of also as the Spirit of the Community or the world Interpreter. God, the Interpreter, like the interpreter in any community, is the chief

1. POC, II, 284-286. 3. POC, II, 375.
2. POC, II, 386. 4. POC, I, 54.
member. Royce asserts: "The interpreter appears, then, as the one of the three who is most of all the spirit of the community, dominating the ideal relations of all three members."  

As the Interpreter, he should be thought of as a personal God. The fact that he is also expressed as the world process of interpretation in which individual selves and finite communities are members should not detract from his monadic nature since he is dominant and has a superior role as the Interpreter. Royce says:

But the one who is, in ideal, this Chief, is so because he is first of all servant. His office is to conform to the mind which he interprets, and to the comprehension of the mind to which he addressed his interpretation.

The universe, as the Community of Interpretation, is the process of interpretation and contains the Beloved Community so far as it has actualized the eternal goal of complete interpretation of all estrangements of the actual from the ideal. The Community also contains as its chief member, God, the Interpreter. According to Royce:

And, if, in ideal, we aim to conceive the divine nature, how better can we conceive it than in the form of the Community of Interpretation, and above all in the form of the Interpreter, who interprets all to all, and each individual to the world, and the world of spirits to each individual.

---

1. POC, II, 219.  
2. POC, II, 216.  
3. POC, II, 216.  
4. POC, II, 389.  
5. POC, II, 219.
The finite communities constitute phases in the dialectical process in a position between the level of the infinite and the level of the finite individual. They may be interpreted as being stimulated by God, the Interpreter, but created or not by the voluntary action of the individuals. To the extent that they achieve interpretation they and the individual members become members of the Beloved Community. Royce does not make a distinction between a strictly religious and a secular will to interpret. It is interpretation "which makes the purest forms of love for communities possible." Any person who is loyal to the spirit of true interpretation and wills to interpret must be in love with the community and is meanwhile engaged in the process of interpreting the world. In this task he is co-operating in a divine-human process and is bringing into existence the truly Universal Community in the form of the Beloved Community. In Royce's words:

When Christianity teaches us to hope for the community of all mankind, we can readily see that the Beloved Community, whatever else it is, will be, when it comes, a Community of Interpretation.

The concept of the Community is the substitute—certainly not the equivalent—of Royce's former concept

1. POC, II, 218.
2. POC, II, 219.
of the Absolute. Royce uses the term Absolute only three times in *The Problem of Christianity*, his latest metaphysical writing. He says in one instance:

> This essentially social universe, this community which we have now declared to be real, and to be, in fact, the sole and supreme reality,--the Absolute.

His meaning here indicates merely his view that the Community of Interpretation is equivalent to the world. Another reference to an Absolute is somewhat unclear:

> "In him [God, the Interpreter] the Community, the Individual, and the Absolute would be completely expressed, reconciled, and distinguished." This passage indicates, at least his loss of respect for the Absolute as an all-sufficient description of all reality. In the third reference to an Absolute Royce says that on the basis of his view of interpretation,

> We are now secure from any accusation that the real world is anything merely static, or is a mere idea within the mind of a finite self, or is an Absolute that is divorced from its appearances, or is any merely conceptual reality, or is 'out of time,' or is a 'block universe,' or is an object of a merely mystical intuition.

> "The system of metaphysics," he says, "which is needed to define the constitution of this world of interpretation must be the generalized theory of an ideal society."

He adds: "Not the Self, not the Logos, not the One, and not the Many, but the Community will be the ruling category of such a philosophy."¹

A final point must be made clear concerning Royce's own reaction to the changes in his philosophic system. In answer to charges by his critics that his philosophic system became inconsistent with the publishing of The Problem of Christianity he replied in a letter to Miss Calkins:

These two ideas, the Community, and the Spirit /the Holy Spirit of Christian theology/, have been growing ever since /the prophets of Israel/. They are growing today. They certainly have assumed, in my own mind, a new vitality, and a very much deeper significance than, for me, they ever had before I wrote my Problems of Christianity. That book records the experience and the reflections which have been working in my mind daily more and more ever since I wrote it. These reflections constitute for me, not something inconsistent with my former position, but a distinct addition to my former position, a new attainment, --I believe a new growth. I do not believe that you change in a way involving inconsistency when you reinterpret former ideas.²

Here and elsewhere ³ Royce speaks of his "novel" views, his "developing" ideas, his "new growth," and his "new attainment." And yet at the same time he seems to object to the thought that his latest views are inconsistent with his former position. Perhaps he feels that throughout his life he has been searching for an adequate solution to

1. POC, II, 281.
3. Supra, 2-6.
the problems he had recognized from the beginning. The various stages in what may be called this dialectical or interpretative process were not, in his estimate, inconsistent, but rather in their developing manner working toward the final synthesis. In other words, he undoubtedly feels that he has finally accomplished what he had long ago set out to accomplish. It is certainly apparent from his curiosity as to his "precise relationship to Bowne" and his statement that he supposed that their "agreements were rather on the increase towards the end of his work"¹ that Royce would admit arriving at a more pluralistic personal idealism.

¹ Royce, letter to E. S. Brightman, July 16, 1913.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE RELATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMUNITY TO THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Royce's concept of the community has a significant influence on the status of the individual with reference to his ethical and religious life.

1. The nature of loyalty.

The central concept of Royce's ethics is loyalty. The one great practical lesson of the moral life, Royce says, is this: "In loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined, is the fulfilment of the whole moral law."\(^1\) Since, according to Royce, virtues such as justice, charity, industry, wisdom, spirituality can all be defined in terms of enlightened loyalty, a person can truthfully center his entire moral life around a rational conception of loyalty.

The question of just how adequate this concept is in ethics depends, of course, on the definition of it. For Royce it is "the willing and practical and thorough-going devotion of a person to a cause."\(^2\) He would emphasize the voluntary aspect and the practical and sustained devotion to whatever cause was selected. As examples of loyalty, Royce mentions the devotion of a patriot to his

---

1. PL, 15.
2. PL, 17.
country, the devotion of a martyr to his religion, and the devotion of a ship's captain to the duties of his office.

"Loyalty is never mere emotion," according to Royce. He concedes that adoration and affection may go with loyalty, but these alone can never constitute loyalty. Furthermore, the devotion of the loyal man involves a sort of restraint or submission of his natural desires to his cause. It is impossible to express loyalty without self-control. By this, Royce means, that the loyal person does not merely follow his own impulses, but rather looks to his cause for guidance. This cause tells him what to do and he does it. This devotion to his cause is entire, for he is ready to live or to die as the cause directs.

It would appear that this cause which a person served would be completely external to him and autocratically dictating his duty to him. Royce does want to guarantee that when a man loyally serves his cause, he is not seeking his own advantage. However, Royce believes that if a man is devoted to a cause he must necessarily value the cause personally, take interest in it, love it, and be well pleased with it; otherwise he could not be devoted

1. PL, 18.
to it.

On the other hand, loyalty, for Royce, never means following one's own pleasure viewed as his private pleasure and interest. For, he argues, if a person is loyal, his cause is viewed by him as something outside of himself. It is much larger than any private self. It has its own value and this essential value it would keep even if the loyal person's private interest were left out of account. A truly loyal person believes that his cause is objective i.e. is beyond his private self, and has its own value even if he dies. And this is the reason that a person is ready to die for his cause. "Loyalty, then," according to Royce, fixes our attention upon some one cause, bids us look without ourselves to see what this unified cause is, shows us thus some one plan of action, and then says to us, 'In this cause is your life, your will, your opportunity, your fulfilment.'

With this preliminary definition of loyalty in hand it will be possible to see more clearly the advancement Royce made over his earlier ethical views.

2. Loyalty to the community as more concrete and personal than loyalty to the Absolute.

The ethical views contained in Royce's philosophy

---

1. PL, 19.
2. PL, 19.
3. PL, 42.
of the community provided an advance over his previous ethics in the direction of more concreteness as well as more consideration of the individual as an ethical end.

The earlier ethical views of Royce were largely formalistic. "Loyalty," he said, "is the whole duty of man."\(^1\)

Royce's earlier formalistic ethics had serious defects. It was not specific enough, for example, about how to resolve conflicts between loyalties. He did try to relieve its strict formalism by introducing the element of enlightenment in the motive of loyalty.\(^2\) But, if loyalty is an intrinsic\(^3\) and a supreme good,\(^4\) rational enlightenment should not be able to increase its value or to guide its direction. "Enlightenment" actually appeals to a standard more ultimate than loyalty.

There is an analogy here to the problem Kant faced. The *summum bonum* seems to represent Kant's attempt to escape from the strict formalism of his fundamental doctrines. But Kant gave no proof from the moral law that happiness ought to be proportional to virtue. The omission of any such proof is more marked because he based morality on Reason alone; for this reason the proof would be impossible, because happiness involves feeling.

1. PL, 140.  
2. PL, 17.  
3. RQ, 235.  
4. PL, 123.
Kant appears to assume that happiness is good if united with virtue. Thus moral excellence, regarded as a quality of will, becomes a subordinate (though still an essential) element in the highest good (sumnum bonum); the satisfaction of desires and feelings is found to be also essential; and the moral law remains binding only because God rewards those who obey it. Therefore, one must conclude that obedience to a universal abstract law, without any reference to concrete ends, is no longer the sole basis of obligation; it is not the supreme end, but only a part of that end. But this view is inconsistent with Kant's starting point. His primary doctrine is that obedience to the law is unconditionally good apart from its effects; but later, he asserted that the highest end must include happiness, and receives part of its worth from the satisfaction of desires and feelings. This inconsistency arises from Kant's abstraction of duty from the well-being of man. Kant argued that so long as happiness is ignored and virtue alone is pursued happiness will ultimately be attained. But either happiness is a worthy object of pursuit (or, as Mill would say, the only object of pursuit) and hence should be incorporated into the original and direct end, or happiness is not a worthy object of pursuit in which case virtue cannot be improved by any reward.
As a matter of fact the end of action was wholly secondary in Royce's early view. The principal concern was to be loyal. He says: "Decide, knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you must, but in any case decide, and have no fear."¹

He developed his philosophy of loyalty by adding the stipulation that: "In choosing and in serving the cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, loyal to loyalty."² This condition does not add very much by way of an end to ethical action, but, by implication, it does bring in considerations of a cause as an object of loyalty. He interprets this cause as a "tie."³ "So far as in me lies," he says, "I will be loyal to our tie, to our cause, to our union."⁴

In the philosophy of the community Royce redefines loyalty in such a way as to add more definiteness to the object of our loyalty. He says, "by loyalty I mean the practically devoted love of an individual for a community."⁵

Loyalty came to be regarded in the later Royce as essentially the conscious expression of the will to interpret. According to Royce:

Loyalty to a community of interpretation enters into all the other forms of true loyalty. No one who loves mankind can find a worthier or more

1. PL, 189. 2. PL, 121. 3. PL, 140. 4. PL, 226. 5. POC, I, xvii.
significant way to express his love than by increasing and expressing among men the Will to Interpret.\(^1\)

This connection, or perhaps identification, of the search for truth and the moral life has its roots in Peirce's position when he says:

If a man has a transcendent personal interest infinitely outweighing all others, then, upon the theory of validity of inference just developed \(\text{that truth is a product of the long run experience of the community}\), he is devoid of all security, and can make no valid inference whatever. What follows? That logic rigidly requires, before all else, that no determinate fact, nothing which can happen to a man's self, should be of more consequence to him than everything else. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively. So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.\(^2\)

Since loyalty is basically inseparable from interpretation, loyalty to the community becomes at once an enlightened process. Since rational coherence of one's will is at the very center of the will to interpret, it does not need to be added as an external and logically foreign element as was the case in the earlier Royce. Loyalty to the community as the will to interpret means that throughout the process a successful mediating principle be sought for.

Loyalty to the community makes an advance over his previous view by being more concrete and by giving more

---

1. POC, II, 218.
consideration to the individual as an ethical end.

Since the community is in part the ideal self-extension of the individual member, his service to the community is essentially a process of contributing to his own true self. In this way Royce solves the ethical demand that one's duty must somehow be based on the condition that he will experience value as a result of his action. This demand could be said to be the element of truth contained in egoism. To regard a person as a means only must be regarded as unethical and any duty based on such a principle is not morally justified. Royce's earlier more formalistic ethics failed to give due consideration to the individual as a moral end.

Loyalty to the community is thus Royce's contribution to the "ego-alter" problem. The spiritual unity which is the product of the loyal will to interpret resolves the conflict between selfishness and altruism, for

in the love of the community the individual obtains for his ideally extended self, precisely the unity, the wealth, and the harmony of plan which his sundered natural existence never supplies.¹

One's momentary self is divisive; one's true self is inclusive of a great deal of the true self of others.

1. POC, II, 99-100.
When one is loyal to one's self or to another person's larger self he is at once serving both himself and others. According to Royce:

Such love--such loyalty--depends not upon losing sight of the variety of callings of individuals, but upon seeing in the successful co-operation of all the members precisely that event which the individual member most eagerly loves as his own fulfillment.

Essentially the ethical result of Royce's ethics is meant to be self-realization.

Although Royce's later ethics is more concrete, the question may still be asked whether it is sufficiently definitive to be a guide in practical ethical situations. It probably is not. But it is practically impossible to set up an ethical system which will apply to all situations and still be definitive in particular cases. The logical law that intension is in inverse ratio to extension is applicable here. Not much could be said about the class dog. Much more could be said about a particular dog, but very little detailed information could be given about a particular dog which would help one in his knowledge of other dogs. So it is with ethical universals.

The essential problem here is again that of relating or mediating the universal to the particular, or the

1. POC, 99-100.
ideal to the actual. Royce tries to solve this problem through the finite community. The function of the finite community here is to mediate and interpret the estrangements and bring the lives of members into an actualization of a coherent ideal.

It is interesting to note that J. B. Pratt in his recent book, *Reason in the Art of Living*, defines the moral ideal in a way very similar to that of Royce. (Though his "interlocking personalities" are not identical with Royce's finite communities, they represent Royce's ideal.)

The *sumnum bonum* may well be pictured in some such all-inclusive society made up of interlocking personalities--beings each of whom had fought free of moral provincialism, and each of whom had unified his life round the one dominating principle of the service of humanity, a principle which each one shared with all the rest.

Proceeding with the idea that the "highest good" is not to be found in economic welfare nor pleasant feeling, he goes on to say:

The preponderating factor in the ideal society is rather to be sought for in the moral nature of its members and in their close interconnection, cooperation, and sympathy.

He concludes that what we need is:

1. Pratt, RAL, 249.
2. Pratt, RAL, 249.
can best be described by the word love . . .
This, then, is the supreme ideal of the ethical philosophy which this volume has sought to present.1

Thus Pratt comes to conclusions strikingly similar to those of Royce. Pratt's "interlocking personalities" sounds like an echo of Royce's finite communities.

3. Provincial loyalty and the finite community.

Royce applies his view of the community to the political realm. In Royce's very early period he tended to identify the social order with the political community and felt that the state promised the possibility of personal salvation. In Royce's experiences in the lawless frontier life of California he felt the great need for law, order and a strong government that would enforce these values. In one of his earliest books California he writes in Hegelian fashion:

It is the state, the social order that is divine . . ., if we turn again and serve the social order we find that what we are serving is simply our own highest spiritual destiny in bodily form.2

Royce regarded the strife in political and economic relationships as being a source of social development. However he differed from Kant who regarded strife as the main source of human reasonableness by insisting that,

1. Pratt, RAL, 249.
2. CAL, 501.
rather than the main source of justice, it was the
condition for it. Royce's point is that conflict pres-
ents problems, the only solution for which is found "when
a loyalty takes the place of this natural turbulence."\(^1\)
The early Royce held that crises and tragedies are found
to be simply outward symptoms of the "past crimes of dis-
loyalty to the social order . . . .\(^2\)

In his latest view he still says "we are saved
through the community."\(^3\) But here he no longer thinks of
it as identical with the political community but rather
the Universal Community. And so he says, "the community
of mankind as total community is my highest interest."\(^4\)

Royce tried to solve the political problem by
treating it in the light of the process of interpretation.
The two members of a conflict whether nations or parties
to economic competition were to have a mediator who would
be the insurer of peace. This mediator's function, how-
ever, was not so much to interpret the differences as to
preserve peace by an artificial device of making conflict
uneconomical. Through such restraint he believed nations
would gradually be required to have a conscience and a
definite loyalty to the community of nations.\(^5\)

---

1. WAR, 85.
2. CAL, 277-278.
3. HGC, 131.
4. HGC, 14.
5. WAR, 94.
with its credit system he felt was "both a result of loyalty and a trainer of loyalty." ¹

Royce in his later thought tried to preserve a pluralism in his social organicism by insisting on the provincial approach or what may be called a grass roots loyalty. He insisted that national loyalty or loyalty to the world community depended upon provincial loyalty. ² Without continued loyalty to the ties close at hand the more universal loyalties could not be sustained. The point he emphasizes is that the finite community is a threshold to larger loyalties and ultimately to the realization of the hope of the Great Community.

A clarification of what the finite community is not must be made. Once the finite community is created it is capable of setting ideal goals for the loyal members. The finite community is called a "social mind" by Royce. But this term is misleading because of the connotations popularly attached to the term. It is neither a collection of minds nor the collective opinion of a social group.

The criticism that the social mind is not worthy of ideal loyalty because its goals would be synonymous with the collective opinions of the majority misreads Royce's view. There is a failure here to distinguish properly

¹. WAR, 60.
². PL, 247.
between the social mind as a collective entity and as an objective personalized being. Royce insists that his social mind is not like a mob mind. One important distinction is that his social mind has a history and a planned future. The unique character of the community appears at this point. It can constitute ideal goals because its ideals are synoptically related to the Community of Interpretation.

It is true that the opinion of the majority is probably inferior to the insights of some persons who constitute a minority, and it is true that it is often second best to follow the majority, to say nothing of being loyal to it.

It is also probably true that the masses ordinarily, at least in their present state of enlightenment, do not reflect their needs in their desires nor their ideal values in their value claims.

But Royce is not subject properly to this criticism. The community interprets the conflicts and the contrasts within the community and does not merely reflect the thesis or antithesis represented by the greatest numerical strength. It has been shown that Royce regards the community of Interpretation as based logically on an objective order system which is therefore an aspect of the divine nature. The finite communities, then, should
be regarded as the interaction of individuals within the framework of a logical order system or the mental expression of the World Interpreter.

Our relation to this order system is voluntary within the framework of Royce's view of Absolute Pragmatism.

4. The religious basis of the community.

Royce holds that even though there is a close connection between ethical and religious ideas, a contrast may be made. "Ethical ideas," according to Royce, "define the nature of righteous conduct," whereas, "religious ideas have to do with bringing us into union with some supremely valuable form or level of life."¹ Morality helps direct us to our duty, whereas religion tries to show us some way of salvation. Ethical teachings, he points out, show us a better way of living. Religion, on the other hand,

undertakes to lead us to a home-land where we may witness, and if we are successful, may share some supreme fulfillment of the purpose for which we live.²

Royce's latest views of religion are expressed in terms of the Christian religion which he reinterprets in terms of his doctrine of the community. As thus viewed,

---

1. POC, I, 327.
2. POC, I, 327.
the essential and vital features of Christianity are harmonious with his philosophy of the community.

Christianity, according to Royce, was the product of extensive processes of religious evolution. It was a redemptive religion, which condemned the mind and the sins of the "natural" man, assuming, as it did, that the very essence of the human self is, prior to the saving process, a necessary source of misery and evil. It is an important element of Royce's thought that the individual human being is "subject to some overwhelming moral burden from which, if unaided, he cannot escape." When "rightly interpreted" he feels that this moral burden is not only an "essential feature" of Christianity, but "an indispensable part of every religious and moral view of life."

In harmony with Royce's departure from his earlier Calvinistic tendencies, Royce rejects the notion that man is sinful by nature. He believes, rather, that at birth man has only untrained instinctive predispositions, which may, under training, turn out well or badly, but which, until training turns them into conduct, are "innocent."

This moral burden, from which Royce believes man must be saved, is a product of social training. His

1. POC, I, 332-335.  3. POC, I, 121.
2. POC, I, 111.  4. POC, I, 148-149.
argument is as follows:

Man is awakened out of his "natural unconsciousness" about his own conduct and comes to more and more complex types of self-consciousness through the various forms of social interaction, especially those involving social interference and conflict. The comparison and contrast involved in social interaction lead us to see ourselves as on the one side and the social will ("the law") on the opposing side. The more aware a person is, then, of the social will, the more highly conscious of himself he becomes. This is a reciprocal process, for the better one knows himself, the more clearly he estimates the "dignity and the authority of the social will." Upon the chaos of these social contrasts," Royce says, "my whole later training in the knowledge of the good and the evil of my own conduct is founded." As a matter of fact man's moral self is built upon the foundations of the troubled social life that he must lead. He cannot escape nor does he really want to escape the social will because he is a social animal and needs the security of this external authority as the only alternative to chaos. In Royce's words:

For, if I indeed am intelligent, I also learn that, in a highly cultivated civili-

1. POC, I, 132.
2. POC, I, 134.
3. POC, I, 137.
zation, the social will is mighty, and daily grows mightier, and must ordinarily and outwardly, prevail unless chaos is to come.¹

A person not only wants to be confronted with the discipline of the social will in order to escape anarchy, but may also, if he is sensitive, feel the importance of the social forces and want them to become more powerful so that they may be used by the individual himself.²

But for the most part, according to Royce, the individual reacts to this external authority in a mood of active rebellion with intensified self-will. He becomes "an individualist among mutually hostile individualists, a citizen of a world where all are consciously free to think ill of one another . . . "³ He thus finds himself in a divided state and the more he struggles to escape through his moral cultivation, the more he sees his divided state. The result is a feeling of distraction and inner despair.

This conflict between the feeling of one's own inalienable rights and the need to submit to the collective will is common to humanity as a social race. The rebellion is not due, Royce concludes, to any instinct but to the very conditions to which the development of self-consciousness is subject.⁴ The individual is trained by a process which taints his conscience with the sin of self-

¹ POC, I, 150. ² POC, I, 153. ³ POC, I, 150. ⁴ POC, I, 155.
will, of clever hostility to the very social order upon which he more and more consciously depends.\(^1\)

This self-will, constituting man's moral burden, finds the solution for its plight in a loyalty to the community, which is "the love of a community conceived as a person on a level superior to that of any human individual."\(^2\) This loyalty, through the miracle of love, results in a new type of self-consciousness which transplants or overcomes that which is fostered by social training. In the words of Royce:

Love that community; let its spirit, through this love, become your own. Let its Lord be your Lord. Be one in him and with him and with his Church. And lo! the natural self is dead. The new life takes possession of you. You are a new creature. The law has no dominion over you. In the universal community you live in the spirit; and hence for the only self, the only self-consciousness, the only knowledge of your own deeds which you possess or tolerate; these are one with the spirit of the Lord and of the community.\(^3\)

Royce believes this account is the essence of Paul's views. But, apart from Paul's religious faith, he insists it is securely grounded in human experience. "Loyalty," he says,

is the only cure for the natural warfare of the collective and of the individual will,—a warfare which no moral cultivation without loyalty can ever end, but which all cultivation, apart from such devoted and transforming love of the community, only inflames and increases.\(^4\)

---

2. POC, I, 159.  
3. POC, I, 158.  
4. POC, I, 159.
5. The contrast in Royce's development in religious thought.

There is a contrast in the later Royce's religious thought between theistic humanism on the one hand and the concept of the immortal Beloved Community on the other hand. Whereas it is not uncommon for person-affirming philosophies to include doctrines of personal immortality, the usual tendency in humanist circles is to emphasize social immortality rather than the faith in an other-worldly heaven and personal immortality. Both tendencies in Royce, however, are consistent with the thesis of this dissertation since they both tend in the direction from the abstract to the concrete.

1. Theistic humanism.

The movement in Royce's philosophy of the community away from an other-worldly absolute theism toward a this-worldly theistic humanism took many forms.

Royce, in his later philosophy, as has been shown, tended away from the Calvinistic disparagement of man and toward the exalting of him and his potentialities. A sharp contrast is apparent between his earliest and his latest thought. In an entry in his diary in 1879 he wrote, "I am thinking and writing face to face with a mighty and lovely Nature, by the side of whose greatness I am but as a worm."¹ But in The Problem of Christianity he said,

¹. PF, 7.
"Full of wonders is nature. But the most wonderful of all is man the interpreter. . . "¹

It is true that Royce in his latest thought disparaged the unextended or uninterpreted life. A man as a mere individual is the basis, for Royce, of all moral evil.² The tendency to such non-social thought and activity is due to his natural tendencies. But as has been shown, when he mingles with society and thus develops his self-consciousness he also experiences an increase of self-will.³ Social life, then, by intensifying self-will adds to man's burden, which is isolation from the community.⁴

Royce insists, as a central feature of his doctrine of the Community, that moral evil must be atoned for by the Beloved Community and that man's only means of salvation is through membership in and devotion to this Community. "We are saved," he said, "if at all, by devotion to the Community."⁵ We cannot save ourselves; we are dependent upon our religious community. This, so far, is in the direction of humanism, since the emphasis is definitely on the individual's dependence for salvation on his social group and not on a metaphysical God.

In The Sources of Religious Insight he brought the point out clearly when he said, "Normally the way to salvation, if there be any such way, must lead through social experience." Again, he said, "The redeeming divine spirit that saves men dwells in the Church."

The function of religion, then, is not only to provide salvation through the Beloved Community, but also to realize social ideals of brotherhood and to enlarge the social conscience of its members. Royce speaks of the disloyal "traitor" who "destroyed by his deed the community in whose brotherhood, in whose spirit, he had found his guide and ideal."

Another function of religion is to bring the "Beloved Community into visible existence, to create the Kingdom of Heaven on earth." Royce said, "the office of religion is to aim towards the creation on earth of the Beloved Community." He criticizes the churches for failing to do more in the direction of accomplishing this goal.

Another humanistic strain in Royce is his lack of emphasis on the distinction between the secular and the divine. Nothing human struggling upward is alien to the religious life, for Royce. "All the higher forms of loyalty," he says, "are, in their spirit, religious." He

---

1. SRI, 75. 5. POC, II, 430.
3. POC, I, 294. 7. POC, I, 183.
4. POC, I, xviii.
concludes his views on the Christian churches by giving
them a "practical maxim": "Simplify your traditional
Christology, in order thereby to enrich its spirit. The
religion of loyalty has shown us the way to this end."1

In his glorification of science, which has already
been pointed out, and in his love for the scientific
spirit,2 he indicates again a tendency in common with
humanists. Royce seems to be at home with nature and
feels an optimism in man's ability to understand and con-
trol nature in the service of man.3

The present existence, then, and the rapid
progress of the inductive sciences, have been
rendered possible by an instinctive aptitude
of the human mind to shorten the labors of
testing hypothesis through some sort of native
skill in the invention of hypotheses such as
are capable of bearing the test of experience.4

Royce's praise of the scientific community of interpre-
tation as the highest form of community, as the one most
nearly like the Community of Interpretation, and as an
"organ of religion"5 is definitely humanistic in character.

In general, the trend in The Problem of Christian-
ity is toward an increased appreciation of the humanist
position. However, it was not atheistic humanism toward
which he tended.

He insisted, for example, that "natural science can

1. POC, II, 424. 4. POC, II, 414.
2. POC, II, 432. 5. POC, II, 431.
never displace religion or do its work"\(^1\) and that there is "a connection between philosophical idealism and natural science."\(^2\) He also did not believe in a "worship of the mere natural being called humanity."\(^3\) Furthermore, it has already been shown that Royce believes in a personal God in the form of the World Interpreter or the Spirit of the Community and regards him as both transcendent and immanent.

ii. The immortal Beloved Community.

In sharp contrast to the tendency of Royce toward appreciating the position of humanism is his concept of the immortal Beloved Community.

The Beloved or Universal Community was, for Royce, the ideal goal of all striving.

God's love towards the individual is, from the Christian point of view, a love for one whose destiny is to be a member of the Kingdom of Heaven. The Kingdom of Heaven is essentially a community.\(^4\)

It has been shown that, according to Royce, the individual must retain his identity in the community in order to maintain the life of the community. With this established, Royce is prepared to offer in his latest philosophy of the community a doctrine of personal

\(^1\) POC, II, 430. \(^2\) POC, II, 393. \(^3\) POC, II, 429. \(^4\) POC, I, 342.
immortality.

To this community [Beloved Community] in ideal all men belong; and to act as if one were a member of such a community is to win in the highest measure the goal of individual life. 1

The trend in Royce is from an Absolutistic and other-worldly theism to a humanistic and this-worldly theism on the one hand. On the other hand there is also a trend in Royce away from pantheistic immortality in which the individual fragmentary person is merged in the Absolute toward an immortality in the Beloved Community in which the individual is preserved eternally. Yet in both trends the yearning in Royce remains the same. It is for concreteness. Even as theistic humanism is more concrete in its concern for the individual than absolute theism, so is the Beloved Community more concrete in its preservation of the individual than is the Absolute of the early Royce.

1. POC, I, 73.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND ESTIMATE

The conclusions to which this investigation has led are as follows:

There was sufficient change in Royce's development in the direction of providing for the integrity of the individual so that his latest philosophic system based on the concept of the "Community" would best be described as a personalistic organic pluralism.

This general conclusion was justified on the basis of further specific conclusions as follows:

First, "Interpretation," the method of knowing derived from Peirce and developed by Royce, is essentially dualistic in epistemology and thus guarantees determinateness in the world. God, as the Interpreter of the world, does not become identical with the world in his act of knowing it. God's knowledge of the world is epistemically dualistic. His knowledge of the world as an expression of his purpose takes the form of dualistic "self-knowledge" rather than monistic "self-experience."

Second, value theory was given a more concrete place, especially with reference to the creation and conservation of the value experiences of the individual selves. A fac-
tor in this was the concept of the finite community of interpretation which constituted creators and conservers of value experience in the dialectical process.

Third, his philosophy exhibits increased empiricism with its emphasis on the centrality of time, evolutionary development, and the importance of active contributions by individuals. He shows increased interest in science and exalts the scientific community as a model for his Universal Community.

Fourth, Royce grants greater powers and responsibilities to the individual. The individual can perform the functions of a community in discovering truth and in creating value. God works through the individual in the realization of his eternal goal. But the individual is not coerced. God must win the loyalty of the individual to his cause.

Fifth, Royce grants more importance to personality and thus makes a contribution to the solution of the problem of relating the actual and the ideal in all its forms. All activity and loci of value are individual persons. They are universalizing particulars.

Sixth, self-interpretation or self-realization as a basis for the world's dialectical process is also a basis for his ethics. Royce's ethical ideal of loyalty to the community provides a metaphysical support to his ethics,
overcomes largely his earlier formalism, and tends more to acknowledge the individual's need of self-realization. He has softened the conflict of individual versus society on a basis that provides for more recognition of the individual as an end.

Seventh, his view of God as the Interpreter and as the Beloved Community emphasizes God's immanence and his redemptive power on a level closer to the area of the individual's personal and social values.

Royce's latest philosophic system, attempting as it did to mediate between absolute idealism and pragmatism offers contributions which are important today in solving the philosophic problem of the individual's relation to society and to the world. The world is in need today of some form of a "Great Community."

It has been shown that Royce's philosophy underwent such changes that the historical stereotyping of him as an absolute idealist throughout his life is unwarranted.

We come now to an estimate of his contribution, i.e. brief comments on the accuracy of Royce's perception of the philosophic data or problem and the veridity of his interpretations or solutions. In other words, how do Royce's views correspond to the life situation with which he attempts to deal?
It was suggested previously that Royce's emphasis upon the community was related to his own personal inadequacies. It may be argued that views may be true or false irrespective of any conscious or unconscious motivations on the part of their proponent. However, Royce laid claim to an accurate analysis of the human self and in fact any intelligent human race. After interpreting the problem as he saw it, he judged whether the interpretation was satisfying to him or, in other words, solved the problem as he saw it. This is, of course, true of all philosophizing. However, everything but the interpretation is observation. It becomes relevant, therefore, to inquire as to the ability of the observer to be accurate in his observation.

A survey of Royce's own comments on his psychological development will reveal a possible clue to his failure adequately to describe the human self. He reveals an excessive family control fostering a need for dependence and at the same time a smouldering rebellion. His repressed hostility arising from the violent rejection by his fellows lay at the basis of his apparent basic distrust in and lack of personal love for individual persons. The "moral burden" of self-will, which he wrongly ascribes to all people, he reveals in himself when he says:

So much of the spirit that opposes the community I have and have always had in me, simple, elementally, deeply. Over against this natural

1. Supra, 16.
2. HGC, 122-136.
ineffectiveness in serving the community, and over against this rebellion, there has always stood the interest which has taught me what I nowadays try to express by teaching that we are saved through the community.1

Royce describes the human self as essentially thought, will, or purpose, but never in terms of love as a vital feeling relation between persons. Loyalty, which he often calls love, is seen to be an abstract intellectual process in the form of the will to interpret. It is never a relation to an individual. His distrust of personal love is shown when he says:

For human unions can become stable and fruitful only through the establishment of relations which are very different from the dangerous dyadic relations of lovers, of rivals, and of warriors.2

Royce describes the human self inadequately not only by neglecting the feelings, but also by regarding the "divided self" as necessarily characteristic and universal. Apparently seeing no basis in the self for security and antono mous dignity and value, Royce finds a substitute, first in the individual’s identity with the Absolute and, finally, in his membership in the community.

A more correct basis for interpersonal relations than Royce used would involve starting with the normal healthy personality. Accepting each individual as a locus

1. HGC, 130-131.
2. WAR, 39.
of his own personal value would encourage an outgoing love, which would form the most valuable basis for a "Great Community."

Thus, while the establishment of values by each individual may seem to suggest a complete anarchy of values, experience indicates that quite the opposite is true. Since all individuals have basically the same needs, including the need for acceptance by others, it appears that when each individual formulates his own values, in terms of his own direct experience, it is not anarchy which results, but a high degree of commonality and a genuinely socialized system of values. One of the ultimate ends, then, of an hypothesis of confidence in the individual, and in his capacity to resolve his own conflicts, is the emergence of value systems which are unique and personal for each individual, and which are changed by the changing evidence of organic experience, yet which are at the same time deeply socialized, possessing a high degree of similarity in their essentials.1

1. Rogers, CCT, 524.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, George P.—Art. (1916)
"The Interpretation of Religion in Royce and Durkheim."

Alexander, S.—STD
Space, Time, and Deity. 2 vols.

Aliotta, Antonio.—IRAS
The Idealistic Reaction Against Science (La reazione
Idealistica contra la scienza), 1912, tr. Agnes McCaskill.

Bacon, B.W.—Art. (1916)
"Royce's Interpretation of Christianity."

Bakewell, Charles M.—Art. (1916)
"Novum Itinerarium Mentis in Deum."

----------Art. (1917)
"Royce as an Interpreter of American Ideals."

Baldwin, James Mark—DE
Development and Evolution.

----------DH
Darwin and the Humanities.

----------SEI
Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development. 5th ed.

----------MD
Mental Development in the Child and the Race. 3rd ed., rev.

Barrett, Clifford (ed.).—CIA
Contemporary Idealism in America.
Bergon, Henry.--CE
Creative Evolution (L'Évolution créatrice, 1907, tr. Arthur Mitchell).

-------TSMR
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion, 1932, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton).

Boodin, John Elof.--TR
Truth and Reality.

Bosanquet, Bernard.--PIV
The Principle of Individuality and Value.

-------VDI
The Value and Destiny of the Individual.

Bradley, F.H.--ETR
Essays on Truth and Reality.

-------AR
Appearance and Reality.

Brightman, Edgar Sheffield.--RV
Religious Values.

-------(ed.).--P6IC
Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy.

-------ML
Moral Laws.

-------Art. (1937)
"An Empirical Approach to God."
   Phil. Rev., 46(1937), 147-169.

-------POR
A Philosophy of Religion.
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield.--SL
The Spiritual Life.

Bronstein, D.J.--Art. (1934)
"Royce's Philosophic Method."
Phil. Rev., 43(1934), 471-482.

Brown, Stuart Gerry.--RPJR
The Religious Philosophy of Josiah Royce.

"The Problem of Christianity."

Buchler, Justus.--CPE
Charles Peirce's Empiricism.

Calkins, Mary Whiton.--Art. (1916)
"The Foundation in Royce's Philosophy for Christian Theism."

"Neo-Realism and the Philosophy of Royce."

Cunningham, G. Watts.--IA
The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy.

Dewey, John.--SLT
Studies in Logical Theory.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903.

Dewey, John.--PIP
The Public and Its Problems.

Dewey, John.--EN
Experience and Nature. 2nd ed.

Dictionary of Philosophy (ed., Dagobert D. Runes).--DP
New York: Philosophical Library, 1942.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor.--BK
The Brothers Karamazov. (1880) (Tr. Constance Garnett)

Encyclopaedia Britannica.--EB
The 14th ed. 23 vols and Index Vol.

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (ed., J. Hastings).--ERE
12 vols and Index Vol.

--ESS 15 vols and Index Vol.

Ewing, A.C.--ICS

Fullerton, George S.--SM
System of Metaphysics.

---------WWLI
The World We Live In.

Hartshorne, Charles.--DR
The Divine Relativity.

Hegel, Georg W. Fr.--SW
Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1928.

Hoernle, R.F.A.--SCM
Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics.

---------IPD
Idealism as a Philosophic Doctrine.
"Royce's Idealism as a Philosophy of Education."

Horney, Karen--NHG
Neurosis and Human Growth.

James, William.--VRE
The Varieties of Religious Experience.

-------SPP
Some Problems of Philosophy

-------PU
A Pluralistic Universe.

-------ERE
Essays in Radical Empiricism.

-------PRA
Pragmatism.

-------CER
Collected Essays and Reviews.

Johnson, Paul E.--JRPR
Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Religion.
Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Boston University, Boston, Mass., 1928.

-------Art. (1935)¹
"The Religious Philosophy of Royce."

-------Art. (1935)²
"A Social Universe."
Personalist 16(1935), 347-356.

-------PR
Psychology of Religion.
Kant, Immanuel.—CPR
Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, tr. N.K. Smith).

Karpf, Fay Berger.—ASP
American Social Philosophy

Leighton, Joseph A.—ISO
The Individual and the Social Order.
New York: Appleton, 1926.

Leuba, James H.—PRM
The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.

Lewis, C.I.—Art. (1916)
"Types of Order and the System Z."

Loewenberg, J.—Art. (1916)
"Interpretation as a Self-representative Process."

-------(ed.)—FE
Fugitive Essays by Josiah Royce.

-------Art. (1937)
"The Remoteness of the Individual."

Lotze, Herman.—MET

Mead, George H.—MSS
Mind, Self and Society.

Miller, Gustave.—Art. (1935)
"Josiah Royce. Ein Amerikanischer Kantianer."
Kantstudien, 38(1933), 155-170.

Moore, A.W.—Art. (1905)
"Some Logical Aspects of Purpose."
In Dewey (ed.), SLT, 341-382.
Moore, George Edward.--PE
Principia Ethics.

Morris, C.R.--IL
Idealistic Logic.

Peirce, Charles Sanders.--CP

Perry, Ralph Barton.--PPT
Present Philosophical Tendencies.

--------TCWJ
The Thought and Character of William James.

Philp, Joseph H.--PIPJR
The Principle of Individuation in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce.
New Haven: (Privately Printed)1916.

Riley, Woodbridge.--AT
American Thought.

Robinson, Daniel S.--PR
The Principles of Reasoning. 3rd ed.

Rogers, Arthur Kenyon.--EAP
English and American Philosophy since 1800.

Rogers, Carl R.--CCT
Client-Centered Therapy.

Royce, Josiah.--PLA
Primer of Logical Analysis for the Use of Composition Students.

--------Art. (1881)
"'Mind Stuff' and Reality."
Mind, 6(1881), 365-377.
Royce, Josiah.--Art. (1882)
"Mind and Reality."
Mind, 7(1882), 30-54.

--------RAP
The Religious Aspect of Philosophy.

--------CAL
California from the conquest in 1846 to the second vigilance committee in 1856.

--------Art. (1888)
"Hallucination of Memory and 'Telepathy'."
Mind, 13(1888), 244-248.

--------Art. (1889)
"Is There a Philosophy of Evolution?"
Unitarian Rev., 22(1889), 1-29, 97-113.

--------Art. (1890)
"Dr. Abbot's Way Out of Agnosticism."

--------Art. (1890)
"A New Study of Psychology (James)."
Int. Jour. Eth., 1(1890), 143-180.

--------Art. (1891)
"Two Philosophers of the Paradoxical: Hegel, Schopenhauer."
Atlantic Monthly, 67(1891), 45-60, 161-173.

--------Art. (1891)
"The Outlook in Ethics."

--------SMP
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy.

--------Art. (1893)
"On Certain Psychological Aspects of Moral Training."
Int. Jour. Eth., 3(1893), 413-436.

--------Art. (1894)
"The External World and the Social Consciousness."
Phil. Rev., 3(1894), 513-545.
Royce, Josiah.—Art. (1896)
"Certitudes and Illusions."

and others.—COG
The Conception of God.

SGE
Studies of Good and Evil.

Art. (1898)
"The Social Basis of Conscience."
Addresses & Proceedings of National Education Association, (1898), 196-204.

CI
The Conception of Immortality.

WI
The World and the Individual. 2 vols.

Art. (1902)
"The Concept of the Infinite."

OP
Outlines of Psychology.

Herbert Spencer.

Art. (1904)
"The Eternal and the Practical."
Phil. Rev., 13 (1904), 113-142.

Art. (1906)
"The Present State of the Question Regarding the First Principles of Theoretical Science."

RQP
Race Questions, Provincialism, and other American Problems.
Royce, Josiah.--PL
   The Philosophy of Loyalty.

-------WJ
   William James and other Essays on the Philosophy of Life.

-------SRI
   The Sources of Religious Insight.
      New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.

-------POC
   The Problem of Christianity. 2 vols.

       Art. (1913)¹
   "The Principles of Logic."
      In Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences 1(1913), 67-135.

-------Art. (1913)²
   "An Extension of the Algebra of Logic."

-------WAR
   War and Insurance.

       Art. (1914)
   "Professor Royce on his Reviewer."
      New Rep., 1(1914), 23.

-------Art. (1914)²
   "The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical."
      Science, N.S., 39(1914), 551-566.

-------Art. (1916)
   "A Reply to Miss Calkins."

-------HGC
   The Hope of the Great Community.

-------LMI

-------FE
Ryle, Gilbert (ed.).--P7IC
London: Humphrey Milford, 1931.

Santayana, George.--CO
Character and Opinion in the United States.

Schopenhauer, Arthur.--WWI
The World as Will and Idea (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819, tr. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp).
Eighth ed. 3 vols.

Singer, E.A.--MTTP
Modern Thinkers and Present Problems.

Smith, John E.--RSI
Royce's Social Infinite.

Sturt, Henry (ed.).--PI
Personal Idealism.

Townsend, Harvey Gates.--PI
Philosophical Ideas in the United States.

Whitehead, Alfred North.--PR
Process and Reality.

Wisme, Henry Nelson and Bernard Eugene Meland.--APR
American Philosophies of Religion.
Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1936.

Wright, H.W.--Art. (1920)
"The Basis of Human Association."
Jour. Phil., 17(1920), 421-430.

---------Art. (1929)
"The Metaphysical Implications of Human Association."
Phil. Rev., 38(1929), 54-68.
Wright, William K.--SPR
A Student's Philosophy of Religion. Rev. ed.

Wundt, W.M.--ETH
Ethics. 3 vols.

-----EFP
Elements of Folk Psychology.

Young, Kimball--PPA
Personality and Problems of Adjustment.
An Abstract of a Dissertation

THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE

by

WAYNE LLEWELLYN CARLYLE SPRAGUE

(A.B., College of Puget Sound, 1933)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

1953
The problem of this dissertation is to investigate the changes in Josiah Royce's philosophic development with special reference to the bearing of these changes on the status of the individual.

The method adopted in this research was first to divide Royce's development into two periods. The earlier period is defined as that before his exposition of those views that are peculiarly related to the new reorientation of his philosophy around the concept of the "community." The later period has explicit expression with the publication of the Hibbert Lectures as The Problem of Christianity in 1913.

His philosophic systems as developed in each period were contrasted with reference to the features which contributed to an enhancement of the status of the individual as found in his latest philosophy. The contention is made that Royce's latest philosophy has been seriously neglected by students of Royce. Conclusions are reached, therefore, in the hope of correcting the historical stereotyping of Royce on the basis of his earlier period and in the confidence that his later period contains worthwhile contributions for dealing with current philosophical problems.

The research was based primarily on the writings of Royce in order to clarify the contrasts in his earlier and later period; a contrast which some of his critics called
inconsistency, but which Royce himself called a new growth. First, his views of how the individual and the community came into being were analyzed. Then, following a description of the logical and metaphysical aspects of the individual and the community, the gains for individualism were shown. Finally, the meaning of his latest ethical and religious concepts were defined in terms of their bearing on the increased status of the individual.

The conclusions to which this investigation has led are as follows:

There was sufficient change in Royce's development in the direction of providing for the integrity of the individual so that his latest philosophic system based on the concept of the "Community" would best be described as a personalistic organic pluralism.

This general conclusion was justified on the basis of further specific conclusions as follows:

First, "Interpretation," the method of knowing derived from Peirce and developed by Royce, is essentially dualistic in epistemology and thus guarantees determinateness in the world. God, as the Interpreter of the world, does not become identical with the world in his act of knowing it. God's knowledge of the world is epistemically dualistic. His knowledge of the world as an expression of his purpose takes the form of dualistic "self-knowledge" rather than monistic "self-experience."
Second, value theory was given a more concrete place, especially with reference to the creation and conservation of the value experiences of the individual selves. A factor in this was the concept of the finite community of interpretation which constituted creators and conservers of value experience in the dialectical process.

Third, his philosophy exhibits increased empiricism with its emphasis on the centrality of time, evolutionary development, and the importance of active contributions by individuals. He shows increased interest in science and exalts the scientific community as a model for his Universal Community.

Fourth, Royce grants greater powers and responsibilities to the individual. The individual can perform the functions of a community in discovering truth and in creating value. God works through the individual in the realization of his eternal goal. But the individual is not coerced. God must win the loyalty of the individual to his cause.

Fifth, Royce grants more importance to personality and thus makes a contribution to the solution of the problem of relating the actual and the ideal in all its forms. All activity and loci of value are individual persons. They are universalizing particulars.

Sixth, self-interpretation or self-realization as a basis for the world's dialectical process is also a basis
for his ethics. Royce's ethical ideal of loyalty to the community provides a metaphysical support to his ethics, overcomes largely his earlier formalism, and tends more to acknowledge the individual's need of self-realization. He has softened the conflict of individual versus society on a basis that provides for more recognition of the individual as an end.

Seventh, his view of God as the Interpreter and as the Beloved Community emphasizes God's immanence and his redemptive power on a level closer to the area of the individual's personal and social values.

Royce's latest philosophic system, attempting as it did to mediate between absolute idealism and pragmatism offers contributions which are important today in solving the philosophic problem of the individual's relation to society and to the world. The world is in need today of some form of a "Great Community."

In a concluding estimate, from the standpoint of external criticism, it was pointed out that throughout Royce's philosophic development he maintained an inadequate conception of the self. And, although his later philosophy did allow more integrity to the individual, it failed to provide a completely satisfactory solution due to his
neglect of feelings, particularly love. He describes love as an abstract and intellectual process—as a loyalty to groups or as the will to interpret. Nowhere does Royce seem to recognize love as a vital feeling relation between persons. With a more adequate view of the self, Royce could have enriched his views both of the self and the community.
Wayne Llewellyn Carlyle Sprague was born on November 17, 1911, in Tacoma, Washington, the son of Dr. Roy L. Sprague, a minister in the Pacific Northwest Conference of the Methodist Church. It was in Tacoma that Wayne L. C. Sprague received his elementary and secondary education and, in 1933, graduated from The College of Puget Sound with an A. B. degree. After one year of graduate work at the University of Washington, he entered Boston University where,
between 1934 and 1936, he did his residence work for his Ph. D. degree under the supervision of Professor Edgar S. Brightman. Between 1937 and 1946 he did part-time graduate work at The University of Washington.

In 1933, Mr. Sprague was married to Miss Carrie Raffelson, of Bremerton, Washington. They have two children, Ronald, born in 1934 in Stafford Springs, Connecticut, and Marilyn, born in 1936 in Seattle, Washington.

Between 1934 and 1946 Mr. Sprague served a series of five churches in Connecticut and Washington and is now a member of the Pacific Northwest Conference of the Methodist Church. Between 1946 and 1951 he taught philosophy and psychology at Multnomah College in Portland, Oregon.