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THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN JOSIAH ROYCE

by

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ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

Today in the uncertain and critical situation of the world and the individual, growing numbers of thinkers are turning from life-systems which are basically naturalistic to those which can be termed theistic, personalistic, or both. It is the tentative conviction of this thesis that the change of direction is not only significant but justified. Whatever one's opinion may be, however, the phenomenon is upon us, and should not only be noted, but, if possible, interpreted.

In this context, a philosopher such as Josiah Royce has particular interest. In view of the fact that human personality and its values are not only a proper but an increasingly popular object of emphasis, it seems in no wise irrelevant to turn to a detailed examination of one of the chief representatives of personalism as a philosophy.

Lest it be judged that the above references to a new (at least redirected) stream of thought are concerned with the manifestation of a superficial reaction to a transient international difficulty, consider the following as a mere sample documentation. D. Elton Trueblood in a recent book, significantly entitled, The Predicament of Modern Man, quotes with approval and applies to the second World War Albert Schweitzer's trenchant observation upon World War I.
We are living today under the sign of the collapse of civilization. The situation has not been produced by the war; the latter is only a manifestation of it.

A glance at some of the chapter headings of Trueblood's little volume probably tells more than any single quotation. In order, they are as follows: "The Sickness of Civilization...The Failure of Power Culture...The Necessity of a Redemptive Society."

Trueblood is not alone; in fact, he is far outshone (whether justly or not) by the brilliance and extent of Reinhold Niebuhr's influence. And Niebuhr, also, is more than slightly disturbed by the present situation. He sees within history manifestations of human traits which lead him to insist that man is inevitably and always, not just misguided, but sinful.

The tragedy of human history consists precisely in the fact that human life cannot be creative without being destructive, that biological urges are enhanced and sublimated by daemonic spirit and that this spirit cannot express itself without committing the sin of pride.¹

The whole continental and American "realistic" movement in theology³ testifies to an upheaval not only in modern social relations but in thought as well. There is a resurgence in our midst of interest in anything that holds out

1. Trueblood, PNM, 1.
2. Niebuhr, RN, 10-11.
3. Brunner, RR, is a representative volume.
some sort of an absolute. Catholicism is, perhaps more than ever, on the move. Orthodox Protestantism is attracting more interest from the multitudes and support in high places than in many a year. In fact, religion in general, indeed all religion, can be said to be enjoying quite a flourishing existence at this time. The whole movement is both the cause and the effect of the reassertion of man's place as centrally significant in the universal picture. This is not to be understood, however, as a refurbishing of humanism. As a matter of fact, the new stirrings have, in emphasizing man's potential, stressed (if not magnified) his weaknesses.

Thus, for a number of specific reasons, an examination of Royce's system can have definite significance in this hour. He asserts an idealistic view of the universe and man, rather than one in any way mechanistic or even naturalistic. He believes in a theistic over against a nontheistic personalism.1

The place and treatment of the problem of evil in such a position cannot help but be of interest; especially, in view of the doctrine of evil having the predominant place it does today in the many views that point man to God through despair. Whether Royce's absolute idealism is adequate to the task of truly explaining reality so as to meet the test

of empirical, growing coherence is a question which cannot fail of live attraction. It would seem that this must be particularly true at the point of its explanation of error and evil.
CHAPTER I

JOSIAH ROYCE: HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL SURVEY

1. LIFE

The parents of Josiah Royce (1885-1916) were English. The "gold rush" of 1849 lured them across the American continent. It appears that his mother was a woman of unusual ability; she organized and presided over an elementary school in her frontier home. When the family migrated to San Francisco, Royce was enabled to procure his secondary education amid slightly more favorable surroundings. Upon completion of this stage of his education, he entered the newly opened (1871) University of California at Berkeley. From that institution he received the A.B. degree two years later.

It is interesting that philosophy was not then taught in the regular courses. Perhaps with a little irony, one author suggests that this may account for his lifelong interest in the subject. Even before his graduation he had apparently been dabbling in theologicai, if not philosophic, speculation.

His graduation thesis on "The Theology of Aesculapius's Prometheus" had made such a strong impression on several prosperous pioneers that they offered him enough California gold to spend

1. Wright, HMP, 46. His interest was as wide as the ideal of philosophy itself; cf., as a sample, Royce, Art. (1914).
two years in Germany reading Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Pfleiderer, and hearing the lectures of Lotze at Göttingen.

Among other leading thinkers under whom the young scholar studied were Wundt and Windelband. At this time he became particularly interested in Kant and Schopenhauer. When he returned to America it was to receive one of the first fellowships at Johns Hopkins University. Here he heard William James lecture, and received his doctorate under George Morris, the noted interpreter of Kant and Hegel. The title of his thesis was, "The Possibility of Error." In 1878 when he received his doctor's degree, he returned to the University of California where he taught logic and rhetoric.

It was James, who, favorably impressed by Royce at Johns Hopkins, secured him a call to Harvard in 1892. The subjects of his teaching here were literature and philosophy. He was immediately popular and perhaps this was as much for his manner of instruction as for the profundity of his thought. In his lectures as in his books it seems that his method was to approach a problem a number of times from different perspectives. From a literary point of view this helped guarantee clarity of style though often at the expense of brevity.

1. Schneider, HAP, 461.
2. Most of this material appears in Royce, RAP. All footnotes, unless otherwise designated, will refer to writings by Royce.
and directness.\(^1\) In 1914 he was appointed Alford professor of religion, moral philosophy, and civil polity. He filled this position until his death in 1916. He is generally designated the leading American exponent of idealism.\(^2\)

Schneider suggests that Royce was a school of thought all by himself. He did not create a specific group following but through his several successive versions of absolute idealism he impressed deeply many kinds of philosophers in many places.\(^3\)

2. THOUGHT

1. **Background.** From these brief references to Royce's personal history elements have already appeared richly suggestive of the nature and interpretation of his thought. The relation between rhetoric and philosophy at the beginning and throughout his career is probably significant. The tie between logic and syntax in early Greek thought has been recognized as no accidental one.\(^4\) Grammatical distinctions were clarified only through the development of logic; the two disciplines were closely related to each other. It is very probably that the relationship here rests on a similar founda-

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1. Wright, HMF, 487. Wright suggests that Royce's manner of exposition as well as thinking "moves in an implicative rather than a linear order, and each separate detail throws light upon and is itself illuminated by the others." This, he suggests, is Hegelian.
3. Schneider, HAP, 481.
4. Martin and others, HOF, 88.
tion. Royce's unusually gifted English style and his later contributions to logic would seem to bear this out.

Further, in view of his lively interest in civic affairs, is it not reasonable to feel that his philosophy will, if at all representative of his activity and general thought, emphasize the value of personality both individually (cf. his Outlines of Psychology) and collectively (note his civic and social writings: California, A Study of American Character; "Duties of Americans in the Present War"; The Hope of the Great Community; Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems)? There is perhaps a more specific intimation that because of the absolute character of his philosophy this civic interest may very well lie as much or more in the state as an organism than as a collection of individuals.

Consider this expression:

It is the State, the Social Order, that is divine. We are all but dust, save as this social order gives us life. ...If we turn again and serve the social order and not merely ourselves, we soon find that what we are serving is simply our own highest spiritual destiny in bodily form. It is never truly sordid or corrupt or unspiritual; it is only we that are so when we neglect our duty.

Before turning to an examination, in survey form, of Royce's philosophical position, some attention must be given to the general background of his thought, in order that his system may be seen in perspective. Of importance is the

1. CSAC, 501, quoted by Schneider, HAP.
spirit of American philosophy in its origin and direction.

Fuller suggests that the appearance of American philosophy as such can be dated from about 1850. Though, of course, he recognizes that Jonathan Edwards and Thomas Jefferson were philosophers. But, the former was so emphatically theological and the latter so much more a transmitter of the French enlightenment than an originator of political philosophy that for the purpose of strict development they can be left aside.

Up until about the middle of the nineteenth century, philosophy was primarily the handmaid of Calvinistic theology. Fuller quite properly observes that the intellectual climate was much as in the middle ages. In a sense, it can be fairly said that American philosophy as it then existed was scholastic, at least as far as attitude and spirit were concerned.

It was not until orthodox Congregationalism felt the effects of the new Unitarian movement, that any significantly greater amount of freedom was afforded philosophic investigation. It must not, however, be thought that this later movement removed all the trammels which were impeding free speculation. The restrictions of orthodox theology were indeed laid aside, but its ethical structure was taken over almost unchanged. The result of this was that speculation in the

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1. Fuller, HOP, 565.
field of morality was encouraged no more than it had been and possibly less.

...The Unitarian movement in the name of reason, proved to be no more and perhaps less reasonable than the beliefs it discarded...Nor was it any more favorably disposed to free speculation that rejected the minimum of theology it had retained, than orthodoxy was to philosophies that rejected orthodox dogma. 1

The contribution of this whole development to philosophic investigation was to lay the ground work so that philosophy, in due time, might escape the artificially and prejudicially imposed restrictions of theology.

The philosophy that had existed up to this time was first classical and then British; although, the French Enlightenment had had some effect, even if not positive.

By the first half of the nineteenth century, new influences were coming from abroad; to mention only a few: Comte, Mill, Kant, and German idealism in general. 2 An over-all description of the result has been characterized by one philosopher as the transition from orthodoxy to idealism. 3 This same author suggests that thereby philosophy was re-established as a rightfully independent enterprise and thus was accorded due recognition in our institutions of higher learning. With the professionalizing of philosophy, individ-

1. Fuller, HOP, 567.
3. Schneider, MAP, 441.
ual systems of thought began to appear. In view then of the
new spirit of American philosophy, it is understandable that
German idealism should fit in almost perfectly. Such think-
ing was well suited to philosophy as an independent discipline.

These new influences are partially responsible for such
a group as the New England Transcendentalists. Emerson
stands forth as the most prominent of this group. Yet, in
Emerson (in spite of what has been said above about the new
influences fostering systems of thought) there is only a
vague and often confused mixture of differing emphases.
The German philosophers through Coleridge, and the Neo-
Platonists through the Cambridge Platonists make up the
two basic lines of his thought. Insight into the funda-
mental nature of reality is through intuition. When this
contact is established, the inner spiritual essence of
reality is reached; and, since man's mind is a part of this,
it is termed the over-soul.

It can be seen from the above reference to Emerson's
thought that for some time the new enthusiasm for untramm-
meled philosophical investigation came to no really clear-
cut manifestation. It was not until J. S. Stirling's work
on Hegel appeared in 1865 that a serious study of German
philosophy began.¹ The main direction of the impetus of this

¹. Thilly, HOP, 549.
new study was set by the thought of Kant and Hegel; in other words, idealism was to the fore. Green, the Cairds, Bradley, and Bosanquet were among the leaders of the new thought development. Bosanquet was a disciple of Bradley and yet he returned from Bradley's agnosticism to what amounted to an Hegelian view that the universe is a whole of spiritual meaning which can be given logical explanation.1

In this period the idealistic movement literally swept the institutions of higher learning of this country. Between 1875 and 1900 almost every professor of philosophy was an idealist. This predominance did not pass for at least a decade or two.2 Many of the names are well known: Morris, Münsterberg, Thilly, Ladd, Calkins, and Bowne.

This is not, however, to suggest that the representatives of idealism were agreed in their specific interpretations. It is true that they all insisted upon the important place of the higher values, and this over against Mill and Spencer. They also agreed in their insistence that spirit was more important than matter.

But, there were important differences. Probably the most important was that between absolute idealists and pluralistic personalists. Of the former group was Josiah Royce, in whom, it is variously asserted, we have the most

1. Rogers, SHP, 464.
2. Wright, HMP, 434-435.
brilliant American idealist. Although this appears to be, at least in some ways, an overestimate, it is certainly safe to say that he was one of the most distinguished leaders of that thought group.

ii. Materialism and idealism. It is now time to turn to an examination of Royce's system itself. It does not seem wise to turn immediately to Royce's own writings for at least two reasons. First, the plan of the paper appears to call for a survey exposition of Royce as he is commonly interpreted; this is a necessary first step in preparation for a detailed analysis of his treatment of the problem of evil. Second, an examination of the fruit of the study of many minds through many years ought to contribute to a more accurate perspective.

Randall, not without reason, has described idealism as a reaction against the naturalistic postulate of an alien world. It is not out of order, then, to begin this consideration of Royce at the point of his attempt to refute what he calls the illicit account of the universe which materialists falsely think to be a necessary implication of the natural sciences.

Much time is spent in showing the mathematical and logical inconsistencies of a basically materialistic or

1. Randall, MMM, 598f.
2. Wright, HMP, 437.
naturalistic view. Specifically, it may be said that Royce is in agreement with Kant and Spencer that space and time cannot be given the same existence as that which we normally speak of as predicated of palpable, external objects. Scientifically, Royce is an agnostic, but this is the only sense in which he is. He believes natural science to be inestimably useful, but insists that it cannot reveal the ultimate nature of the world. Royce, however, was not like Spencer, a philosophic agnostic, for he believed that one could know ultimate nature of reality through the idealistic postulate. 2

According to Royce, there is no aspect of our world of common sense that cannot be interpreted in terms of ideas. This is taken to mean that this world is of the nature of ideas. The world of matter is a system of ideas (the world of description) which is forced upon us whether we will or not. 3 Hence, the world is knowable only because there is something outside the human mind that corresponds in fact to the various aspects of the series of our experiences. 4 If the world were not of the nature of mind, there would be no possibility of understanding it; for, since I am a mind, there must be as the object of my knowledge either that which

2. SMP, 341-349.
3. SMP, 350-359.
4. SMP, 368-395.
is of the nature of mind, or otherwise, an unknowable reality. And yet, further, as far as we are concerned, the absolutely unknowable cannot exist, for it is a nonsense predication. ¹ "The real world must be a mind or a group of minds."²

The above assertions are not for Royce subject to the criticism that they are either vague or spiritual in the sense of ethereal. He feels that he can be quite specific about the spirit or mind he refers to as ultimate. The term is not empty to him for he speaks of its referent as the logos, the problem solver, the world interpreter, the absolute, and the beloved community.³ It follows from this emphasis that if man is to understand nature which is essentially mental, he ought to look within his own mind, self, or experience.⁴

Now, one of the absolutely essential aspects of the self is the memory (cf. also imagination). Through memory the self transcends the sensations of the present moment.

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¹ Whether this much can be granted to Royce or not, it must be allowed that the relationship between the real and the rational is basic. It would seem that what is can be known by man only in so far as it is by nature apprehensible by the human mind; that would seem to involve somehow being of the nature of mind.

² Thilly, HOP, 560. This is not, of course, for Royce to be taken in the sense of pluralistic personalism. Cf. COG, 327-337.

³ Wright, HMP, 439. Cf. Royce's development from the earlier concepts of RAP, through SMP, WAI, to the community concept of POL, SRI, and POC.

⁴ RAP, 354-370.
The result is the persistence of personal identity and an objective world order existing for the individual. Thus, the unity of the self involves the existence of other selves. There is both the self that acts and the self that is aware of that former self so that there is a social element even in the single individual. The societal element is further involved in any examination of the self: if man were taken out of all his social relationships, he would lose his personality completely—he would have no self.¹

A question may have arisen already in the mind of the reader: How does an individual get beyond the ideas of his own mind and make real contact with other minds? Royce asserts that since reality is of the nature of mind (and how eminently so are specific mental phenomena), it follows² that all other minds, and everything else for that matter, that constitute the real world, are already one, at least in their basal reality as being of the nature of mind.

This is the ground and explanation of real relationship. In a very deep sense, this—one world; there is one Self which is organically and reflectively inclusive of all selves since it embraces all reality.

The natural and spiritual orders, the physical and the moral orders, the divine and the human, the

¹ Wright, HEP, 490; cf. HAP, 406-425.
² SMP, 481, "The finite self knows truth beyond its own limitations, just because it is an organic part of the complete self."

fatal and the free, may, according to Royce, be reconciled on Kant's doctrine of the transcendental or extratemporal freedom and the temporal necessity of all our actions.\(^1\)

In his later works Royce places greater emphasis upon the volitional side of experience. Existence is simply a complete fulfillment of purpose as embodied in individuals. Here his concern is to guard against the loss of the individual in the absolute.

Although he believes that one of the greatest arguments for his system consists in the merits of the whole position taken as an over-all unit, Royce does not overlook the possibility of specific considerations in its favor. He believes, as has been observed, that it is impossible consistently to conceive of the world materialistically. This is in effect an argument against mechanistic evolution, for on that premise we postulate a world that exists independently of any mind and yet is productive of all mind, which is patently a most remarkable accomplishment.

He also emphasizes the world and the mind as organically related. It is a variation of the assertion of Berkeley that an idea is capable of likeness only to another idea.\(^2\)

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1. Thilly, HOP, 560; cf. SMP, 301-434.
2. Wright, HMP, 491; cf. Royce's insistence that the following insight of Berkeley be maintained, "Our thought is true by reason of its correspondence to the facts of an actual consciousness, external to our own (italics Royce's)." RAF, 342.
This is an approach which is often found in Royce. Royce sees that idealism will be, as is to be expected, accused of base anthropomorphism. It will be said that what is happening here is that man seeing the universe in terms of themselves. He replies that man will view the universe either in terms of his experience at its highest point, the mind, or at a lower point such as the physical or material. Since man must be anthropomorphic if he is to reason, let him endeavor to operate at the highest level. The only unallowable anthropomorphism is materialism.1

Thus, it is suggested that to view the world in terms of ideas need not necessarily involve the vaporous and uncertain; indeed, true ideas never are so. One need take notice only of the principles of mathematics and logic to see how rigorous and unyielding ideas can be. Is there any physical object that is as unable to be changed as are these basic forms?

There is a moral side to the whole question also. If any ethical judgment, or for that matter any consideration of truth or falsity, is ever to be introduced, there must be either an appeal to an absolute, in terms of which assertions have real meaning, or else a surrender to a self-refuting relativity of all judgments. Hence, even the denial of the

1. This argument is repeated with some characteristically unusual insights by the modern orthodox, Christian apologist, G. S. Lewis.
existence of the absolute must introduce the absolute to make sense out of its denial.

Perry\(^1\) reduces Royce's arguments for the absolute to two basic demands. First, reality must fulfill all ideas; if not, the relativity of finite ideas follows. The alternative is that they be taken up into one individual purpose which effects itself in the totality of reality. Second, there can be no facts except they be experienced. Facts suggested by finite experience but not contained within it are rescued for reality by being grounded in the absolute experience.\(^2\)

In relation to the infinite we find Royce differing considerably from Bradley. The later was troubled by the concept of the infinite and contended that the infinite is purely ideal, apparently in the sense of the Kantian, limiting concept.\(^3\) Since Royce has rejoiced in the infinite as the ground of all reality and the solution to all problems, it was up to him to show that the infinite was more than an abstract principle.

A suggestion by Charles Peirce gave him the key to the problem. This consisted in the idea of the infinite series

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1. Weber and Perry, HOP, 548.
(mathematical) and in the same field the idea of the community of interpretation. On this foundation he attempted to erect a proof that an infinite is not only rational but a manifestation of the perfect: a well-ordered series. The argument ran that the infinite is such not because it is endless but because of its structure. "Its members interpret each other in terms of the structure of the whole."¹ The thought of thought, for example, is an actual instance of a mathematically well-ordered series. The infinite actually exists. And, the world is a self-interpreting community of individuals who on the basis of community of interpretation go to make up the infinite.

One of the most typical emphases in all Royce's writings is that which distinguishes between the world of description and the world of appreciation.² In Dr. Brightman's terminology we would describe the doctrine in terms of the situation-believed-in and the situation-experienced. Immediate appreciation for Royce involves sense qualities at one extreme and values at the other.³ When an individual comes to communicate his immediate experiences, he is forced to describe his appreciations. The most common symbols that are adopted

1. Schneider, HAP, 488; cf. WAI, I, 508. This is the supplementary essay directed to Bradley.
2. For one of Royce's earlier and fullest discussions of this subject, see SMP, 361-434.
3. Wright, HMP, 494; SMP, 393-410.
are those called words: these refer, in general communication at least, to qualities that are able to be identified without great difficulty. The result is that through this process the thinker constitutes a world of description that is quite permanent.\(^1\)

Royce identifies two fundamental levels of description; there is the common sense world and the world of science, but in both cases it is an abstract world. It is not to be inferred that Royce is here suggesting that the world, as commonly spoken of, is illusory; it is, however, very inadequate: in so far as description depends upon mechanical explanation, to that extent it is superficial as regards both depth experience and values.

Consequently, the world of science, as well as that of so-called common sense, must not be confused with ultimate reality. The key to the ultimate is found only in immediate reality. In inward appreciation are the only facts that are confronted without mediation, and here is found the unity of the self and the societal aspect of the individual grounded in an all-inclusive absolute self.\(^2\)

### iii. The one and the many

When one speaks of an absolute, the question always arises as to how the many are related to the one. As regards the physical world, Royce

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1. SMP, 410, 413-15.
teaches that it is an expression of God but, of course, not a complete expression. God's purposes are not expressed in the world directly, as it were, without secondary causation; in fact, as far as the world of description is concerned teleology has no place at all. And yet, the palpable, objective reality that man is so familiar with is really the outward appearance of God. He manifests himself in or through the world in a manner that is analogous to the relation between the human mind and body. Thus, nature is to be defined as spiritual in its inner reality. In this sense, Royce is a panpsychist; although, he goes much further than that position in his assertion of a personal absolute.

He recognizes also the difficulty in thinking of what is commonly called inorganic life as being alive. When life is conceived of from the point of view of consciousness or even self-consciousness, there is, seemingly, a similar difficulty in the predication of such attributes even of the mere organic. The key to the solution of this problem is introduced in terms of the time span. True life manifesting itself under the form of a time span fundamentally divergent from that to which man is accustomed would probably not be recognized as living. If a being's experience of time

1. This is, of course, a very loose usage, although it seems justified. "Nature consists of phrenic centers similar to the human mind;" this is the definition given by Ledger Wood in Runes, DOP, 223.
were sufficiently more rapid than man's, such a being might very well appear mechanical and utterly lacking in spontaneity though not, of course, in activity. If the being in question were possessed of a slower time span than man, it could very well appear dead. Thus, in both cases, the differential in the organization of perceptions, and the adjustment of life and activity thereto could result in the failure of the human observer to attribute life to such.

The suggestion of the possibility of every physical object being possessed of a mind need not be laborled.

Royce feels that it would be sufficient to say that certain objects at least are only parts of the absolute; it would then be in this sense that they could be spoken of as mental. Specifically, he has in mind that in the case of a species of animal, for example, the whole number throughout all time might well be associated with just one mind. In other words, everything in the universe is either alive or participates in a being which is. Even more can be said: the last relationship mentioned is not in any case an accidental one, since the "form of the whole composition is essential to the understanding of each phrase."  

1. A somewhat similar suggestion appears in novels by C. S. Lewis. One wonders just how much general idealism this author has absorbed. Perhaps he has also done some specific study in Royce.

2. Schneider, HAF, 489. This is important for Royce's discussion of the relation between the absolute and the individual; see WAI, II, 273-277, 286-294, 327-331.
At this point the question of freedom arises. There seems to be little difficulty in postulating freedom in the absolute. By definition the absolute is determined only by itself, so in the sense of self-determination is free. Why God chooses to express his eternal will in a particular way Royce seems almost to attribute to divine caprice. Once determined, however, Royce's God binds himself to act consistently and almost deterministically in reference to this choice. The importance of this position will come to the fore as the argument develops.

In the case of human freedom, Royce maintains that he allows man self-determination. Man is within the experience of the absolute but since he determines his acts by his own choice, he is morally responsible.\(^1\) If it be said that every human act can be seen to have its causes and that these causes as succession of events are subject to mechanical analysis, it remains nonetheless true for Royce that man is free. In somewhat of a Kantian manner he reminds his reader that mechanical, causal analysis has for its referent the world of description.\(^2\)

Further, every man has a particular value for God. In so far as the uniqueness and the world of the individual are appreciated and the individual is inspired thereby,

\(^1\) Royce, WAI, 456-70.
\(^2\) Cf. SMP, 428f.
is free. Somewhat as Spinoza, Royce is suggesting that when man considers himself as above the temporal chain of physical causation and from an eternal perspective engaged in the intellectual love of God, he is therein free.  

Royce, however, puts more emphasis upon the specific worth of the individual than Spinoza; although, as will be seen below, that emphasis was not nearly as complete as it should have been.

It is pertinent that Royce's attempted salvation of the individual from absorption in the infinite be at least touched upon. Just how can significant, metaphysical individuals be asserted upon Royce's premises? Here he turns to the idea of will and teaches that the absolute will can be expressed in a true, metaphysically separate individual because that will, with a specific or unique purpose and object, thereby creates the distinct individual. Insisting that the human self is thus essential, as a specific end of fulfillment, to the whole, he believes that he has obviated the danger of swallowing up the finite in the infinite.

After the analogy of finite ideas, Royce attempts to develop to greater precision his view of individuation. He observes that judging thought is only the internal side

1. Wright, M&P, 499.
2. This point will be treated at length infra.
of the idea, for there is always present in the idea an external element—a reference beyond the self (at least the judging self) to the object in question. Now, the object is individual only when the idea chooses and claims it. It is apparent that Royce has thus interpreted ideas as having as it were at least a will-aspect of their own.

Carrying this view of the two dimensional character of reality over into his description of the absolute, he asserts that the purpose of the absolute is to be explained from two perspectives: one internal and what is usually meant by the term idea, and the other external and what we normally mean by the term will. It would appear that this double aspect theory is among the foundational elements in Royce's attempt to maintain the integrity of the individual. He seems to be saying, as above, that man is not only an idea in the mind of God and thus a part of the whole but that he is also as such an idea a specific manifestation of the will of God and thus a part of the whole.

iv. The problem of evil. By this time it seems apparent that the last thing to be expect of Josiah Royce in reference to the problem of evil is a denial. His endeavor, whether

1. GOD, 217-272.
2. Weber and Perry, NOP, 548. Here Perry goes so far as to say that ideas are construed as having wills of their own. See internal and external meanings of ideas, WAI, 24-32.
judged successful or not, was not to explain evil away or even, alone, to corner it, but to explicate it in full. It may very well have been the influence of Schopenhauer that made it impossible for him to consider evil an illusion or appearance.¹

God has willed evil but only that the greater good might be effected. In fact, evil is absolutely necessary if the highest good is to be realized. To finite human beings, evil is evil simply because it is not seen in relation to the rest of reality. The absolute is able, comprehensively, to know and to experience all reality; so, as a result, what man knows as evil is taken up in a higher synthesis.²

Evil is, on this basis, a necessary part of the infinite and eternal good. One might feel that in the light of such a doctrine all kinds of human wickedness would be tolerated, if not encouraged. This is not the case; for, although, ultimately, evil makes possible the greater good, yet since the latter end is achieved only through the compensatory sacrifices and labors of other spirits, finite and infinite, it follows that the evildoer is not approved but condemned.

Royce's metaphysics is indeed monistic, but he was sincerely concerned to bring it into agreement with all the

¹. Wright, HMP, 500. cf. Royce's acknowledgment of Schopenhauer's influence on his thinking, POC, I, xii.
². WAI, 361, 6, 8.
multiple manifestations of experience. Evil is not approved simply because it is never really changed into the good; actually, even in the absolute, it continues to be that which has to be resisted.\(^1\) One of the reasons why evil is to be viewed not merely as a passing appearance but rather of the nature just stated is found in Royce's concept of freedom. He believes that man is really free. As a result, man is responsible, and evil is real and cannot be lightly passed over.

The same basic attitude finds expression, for example, in Miss Calkins. Her explanation of evil and responsibility is of one piece with the idealistic metaphysics of Royce. One can almost hear him speaking when she asserts that the purpose of the human self in opposition to the absolute is opposed to the specific and not the inclusive purpose of God.\(^2\) She asserts that the absolute, although his experience includes all of the individual, nevertheless opposes at least some objects of the finite will. When it is said that the absolute wills evil,\(^3\) it must be stressed that the volition is not the same as that of the finite individual, because the latter is in isolation from the whole; whereas, in the

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1. Weber and Perry, HOP, 549; cf. WAI, II, 405-11.
2. Calkins, PPS, 542.
3. Miss Calkins seems to suggest here by the terms "wills evil" a kind of allowing; it seems very close to the old theological idea of "permissive will."
case of the absolute, there are other purposes and fulfillments which counterbalance and atone for the evil volition. There is a difference between the two and the difference is the one that exists between the part and the whole.¹

v. Ethics and fruition. The basis of Royce's ethics is found in the idea and virtue of loyalty. By loyalty he means the complete devotion of an individual to a cause.² Loyalty is not just an affection; it is more a volition. As indigenous to his system, loyalty is conceived of as that which lifts a man out of his private self into the larger whole.³ That to which a person should be loyal constitutes in its multiple manifestations a system of ends. Consonance with this system will mean that, at the very least, one's individual attempts at loyalty will not cut across those of others.⁴

In the case of conflicting loyalties, Royce's answer is that we are to be loyal to loyalty itself.⁵ He believes that in this way, through tolerance, harmonious and ultimate reconciliation of all loyalties will take place. It is granted that this will involve a long process, but the

1. Calkins, PEP, 453. The absolute does not, however, qua absolute, include evil as evil.
2. POL, 15-17.
4. POL, 118.
5. POL, 118.
reminder is at hand that final and total coherence in the field of ethics is already eternally realized in the absolute. This is the spur and the guarantee that makes the expenditure of effort in this direction most attractive.

From a slightly different aspect, loyalty is the love of the individual for the community.¹ It is to a great extent in this area that Royce attempts a philosophic interpretation of Christianity. His early religious training and social interests predisposed him in favor of this religion.² He feels that the most enduring truth which Christianity has seen is that of the social relevance of loyalty. This he believes to be the essence of Christianity. It is that divine community through which the individual is afforded grace. He asserts that what is of lasting value in Christianity is in complete agreement with his idealism.

Royce goes as far as to say that the type of community he has in mind is shown forth in the church even more than it is in science.³ And when he says, as above, that the true church is a community of memory and hope, and that only through God's grace in the community is salvation through true selfhood possible, it occurs to at least one writer that

1. Wright, HMP, 503; POC, I, 100ff.
2. Weber and Perry, HOP, 547. See autobiographical chapter at close of PHJR.
3. POC, I, 193ff and II, 394ff.
Royce's idealism has reverted to Calvinism. Loyalty to loyalty is that in which the love of God consists and this involves complete submission to His will. The will of the individual is obligated to take up its responsibility as a loyal member of the great moral community.

Racial and international problems will be solved only as this spirit of loyalty becomes extended throughout the world of individuals. If the causes to which loyalty is directed are proper and thus form an harmonious system, they will not even stop in their influence with the international sphere, but rather they will, because of their very nature, make universal loyalty possible. In such a spiritual unity, all values will be preserved. Here is an ethical argument for the existence of the absolute, and it is akin to Kant's emphasis upon the pre-eminence of the practical reason and the necessity of the postulation of the perfect from the experience of the imperfect.

Because Royce is an absolute idealist, it does not follow that he is committed in advance to a belief in individual immortality. Bosanquet, for example, denies such immortality in his assertion that submergence in the absolute is eternal blessedness. This absorption comes about only

1. Schneider, HAP, 439.
2. Weber and Ferry, HOP, 549; POL, 109-159.
3. Wright, HMP, 501.
through the loss of all personal identity. Royce on the other hand is concerned to stress ultimate participation in the divine logic, and through that experience to assert the conservation of personality eternally. Thus, each individual has a beginning in time, and yet his duration is without limit. At the same time, each personality is a unique phase of the divine life. The universe is constituted of a multiplicity of individual selves all of which are eternal and all of which are included within the absolute self and yet as unique individuals. The life to come will grant a more complete appreciation of the absolute, but without any loss of personal identity.

vi. A positive statement from Royce's writings.

Briefly, it seems in order to complete this first chapter with a summary of Royce's position from his own statements of it. In his lectures on modern philosophy, he gives us a bird's eye view of his system. He divides the doctrine of idealism into two parts. The first he terms analytic (cf. Berkeley) and the second, synthetic. This last term refers to the universal self as the world thinker.

1. Cf. also the Kantian kingdom of ends.
2. Royce would not even discuss this problem, in any formal way, until some years after the publication of RAP (see WAI, II, xiii). For the discussion in his Gifford Lectures, see WAI, II, 431-445.
3. SMP, 480.
Analytically, he examines the elements of our beliefs and finds that if the real world is stubbornly maintained, and if it is to have any meaning, the transcendence both of the finite and infinite self must also be maintained. Now, even in the assertion that beyond the self nothing is knowable, there is inherent the fulfillment of synthetic idealism, for it appears that there then must be postulated the existence of but one self in the world, the world mind. The finite self has transcendence at all only as an organic part of the complete self.¹

This idealism demands not only the interpretation of experience in terms of the world mind, but that human dependence upon experience be recognized as the source of truth which points beyond the self. There is an external universe because in human experience the individual appreciates the content of another mind. Since this mind is universal, there is a standardized element in the experience of all intelligences. The world of description can be spoken of only on the assumption that the world is of such a nature as to submit to description. It must be orderly; it must conform to law. But, this description rests upon appreciation. To be describable, nature must be teleological, and consequently, possessed of worth.²

1. SMP, 431
2. SMP, 432.
In other words, the natural order is also a moral order, and the world of the absolute self, from one point of view, is temporal (law) and from the other eternal (worth). Man as involved in both these aspects is "at once temporally determined and morally free." In connection with this doctrine, flow specific considerations in reference to the problem of evil.

3. TRANSITION

From this point on, the investigation will deal primarily with Royce's writings themselves. The rest of the thesis will be composed of three basic divisions. First, Royce's over-all system will be dealt with in terms of important phases significant for the discussion of the problem of evil. By emphasis upon the phases in these terms, there will be no necessity to repeat, in any fruitless way, material already touched upon.

Second, the problem of evil in Royce will be expounded in considerable detail. No other emphasis will appear in this section except as subordinate to and interpretative of this problem.

Third, criticism and evaluation of Royce's treatment of the problem will be brought forth and treated rather extensively. The concluding section will suggest basic

1. SMP, 482.
corrections of Royce's absolute idealism at points of inadequacy or inconsistency. The perspective at this point will be pluralistic personalism.

This thesis is concerned, then, as subsequent material will disclose, with the hypothesis that absolute idealism loses the individual in the infinite. For the problem of evil, this means that the responsibility for evil is placed directly and exclusively on God. Further, in an absolute system, the concept of God, as a result, is emptied of its significance ethically.

1. A statement as yet, of course, to be substantiated. This hypothesis is formulated and placed here for introductory and explanatory purposes. It rests upon the work of the whole thesis and was introduced only after that was complete.
CHAPTER II

PHASES OF ROYCE'S SYSTEM SPECIFICALLY SIGNIFICANT FOR HIS TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

1. ROYCE'S TREATMENT OF THE SEVERAL CONCEPTS OF BEING

This chapter will not attempt to deal with matter which is actually part of the problem of evil itself, more strictly defined. Such material will make up the entire last half of the thesis. In Chapter I an attempt has been made, for the benefit of the reader and especially the writer, to sketch not only the life and activity of Josiah Royce, but to survey his over-all system. This was done primarily through secondary source material and reasons were given for this procedure in that place.1

Chapter II will investigate several areas of specific significance for the problem of evil. This will be done in terms of Royce's writings themselves. As yet, few remarks of a critical nature will appear beyond the very handling of the material involving a perspective of judgment. Criticism, as such, will begin in Chapter III, as the problem itself is reached. Therefore, this present chapter will be concerned to expound Royce's position in the general area alluded to above, without going beyond an effort to complete

1. Supra, 13.
important background material specifically germane for his
treatment of the problem of evil.

Here, the following system of examination will be used.
After references of an introductory nature to Royce's earlier
works, each topic to be dealt with will be drawn primarily
from Royce's most systematic work, The World and the Individual.
Finally, the ultimate revision of his system will be
examined in terms of the systematization of the Gifford
Lectures.

This seems to be the best procedure in view of the
fundamental divisions in Royce's thought: the period before
his Gifford Lectures, that of the Lectures, and finally the
period of ethical emphasis and ultimate redirection of his
thought. These three stages in Royce's thought are, however,
in no sense to be considered steps of the same kind. Rather,
whereas the second can be described as a development of the
first, the third appears more properly designated as a develop-
ment beyond the second.

1. **Relation of philosophy to religion.** In his earliest
published work, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Royce is
already concerned with the relation of philosophy to religion.
He observes here that he directed his attention to the prob-
lems of religion, first, because they originally drove him to
philosophy, and second, because of his belief that among all
other things they deserve the finest loyalty of man. ¹

He goes on in his discussion to observe that the relation of philosophy to religion is one which can be best described in terms of philosophy having a religious aspect: "Religion invites the scrutiny of philosophy, and philosophy may not neglect the problems of religion." ²

By the time Royce came to deliver the Gifford Lectures (1898), he was ready for a synoptic statement of his whole philosophical system. Although at this time he asserts that his basic view has not changed from that expressed in his earliest writing, it is nonetheless true that the argumentation is cast in a new form.

Werkmeister cites Royce's own judgment to the effect that he does not now call into question the validity of his previous thought, but presents it in new relations and with consequent deeper significance. The absolute, which had been designated mostly by the term "thought," is now seen in terms of the reality attributable to God, the world, and the individual. ³

What Royce actually says in the first volume of The World and the Individual is that there is a definite relation between the specific religious problems and the theory of

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¹ RAP, v.
² RAP, 4.
³ Werkmeister, HP 1A, 144.
being. He goes on to observe that the field of natural religion presents at least three basic conceptions of being. First, there is the view that nature is a path to God. Here the light of natural science is taken in its broader implications as having direct reference to the problems of religion. The second position concerns itself with the religious experience of mankind. From an historical study of the various religions it attempts to estimate faith by references to the inner consciousness. The third conception considers the object of natural religion to be the very nature of things. This is fundamentally a metaphysical view and is concerned with being as being. It is obvious that this third view is the point at which religion and philosophy meet most directly. At this point, what is perhaps the most basic philosophical question arises. What is reality?

II. The development of realism and mysticism in the history of thought. As early as his lectures entitled, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, Royce had observed that a knowledge of the history of philosophy ought to suggest, at the very least, that the world of truth must be most unlike the testimony of our primitive sense consciousness. If it is granted that there is a real world which our senses with some degree of accuracy perceive, it soon follows that what

1. WAI, I, 3.
2. WAI, I, 3-6.
3. SMP, 311.
was at first accepted uncritically, shows itself to be incapable of acceptance unless it first be transformed. Upon examination, the wonders of nature very quickly turn out to be other than they seem. The world of scientific realism is not a self-evident one. A simple reference to the complexities involved in any exposition of the nature of space and time testifies sufficiently to the abstruse character of the world as given, when subjected to examination.

In his systematic presentation of the problem, Royce asserts that philosophy of religion ought to rest upon a treatment of the basic aspects of the theory of being. Realism has asserted, both in naive and learned form, that the real is that which is independent of the idea or experience through which it is known.

Now, the ancient foe of realism was not idealism, but mysticism. Beginning in India, it early passed over into Europe. There are strains of it in Plato and Aristotle, and it constitutes a very definite element in the position of Plotinus. Probably, at least partially, it passed from this source into Christian theology, both Catholic and Protestant. The mystical conception of being asserts that what is real is

1. SMP, 313.
2. WAI, 10.
3. WAI, 47.
4. WAI, 77.
5. SMP, 430, 3.
what is immediate. Pure experience is then the means of defining the real.

In history, mysticism often appears in the person of individuals who have had much experience of suffering. Earlier, Royce had observed that the first of the mystic's reaction to evil is one of resignation. He accepts the divine order as real, and yet admits the evil of the finite world. Such will not, however, face that evil, but he attempts to avoid it by embracing the experience of God. This is not religious optimism; the mystic asserts the reality of evil, although insisting that it has no significant place in the divine order. Thus, it follows from the mystical perspective that the finite world has no part in the absolute, unless it deny itself: pessimism must be the direct result here. Still, there is worth in the position as a partial insight.

Mysticism ought to be recognized as the cessation of thought. It is the only thorough-going empiricism. Mysticism is no better and no worse than realism. They are both common-sense tendencies pushed to the extreme. Upon analysis, they collapse through their lack of internal self-consistency. But, false abstractions though they are, they are nonetheless suggestions and adumbrations of a

1. SMP, 450, 3.
2. SMP, 453.
final definition of the absolute. Such a definition will influence if not predetermine the issues of life, especially religion.1

iii. Critique of realism. Greatly influenced by Bradley, especially through that author's Appearance and Reality, Royce develops his view of reality. In his cooperative endeavor, The Conception of God, he attempts to show that the very arguments for realism pass first into an idealistic interpretation of realism and ultimately lead to a transition to absolute idealism.2

Realism, in assuming that what is real is independent of the experiencing individual, poses the question as to what the exact significance of this "independence" must be. If the evidence for independent reality is simply immediate or mediate or even some combination of these two, such realistic interpretations still have in common the recognition of the fragmentary and unstable character of consciousness in contradistinction to the postulate of an independently real world which is taken as transcending all consciousness.

Now, what must be meant by reality lying beyond the self is "other possible experience not here presented."3

1. WAI, I, 37.
2. COG, 141-171.
3. COG, 149.
This alone does not tell the whole story of the ideas of independent reality which are found in consciousness. The mind of man often gives consideration through memory to the past and in anticipation to the future. These are references which involve transcendence of the moment.

Here is a transcendant element which is nonetheless a content of experience. The farthest this can be pushed is only to an experience other than that of the individual immediately concerned. It appears, then, impossible to get away from the experiencing individual, or in other words, from the factors of consciousness which can be described as ideas or ideal.

If the realist varies his argumentation and insists that the very reference to possible experience is a confession of the inability of the idealist to state his position in terms of the experience of the particular individual, he has a more cogent argument. He would then go on to conclude that the admission of possible experience is the admission of factors which have some kind of an existence when no one is experiencing them. Royce insists that the only respectable answer to this position is the embracing of a thorough-going idealism.

This would issue in the assertion that beyond experience there can be only further experience, real only in the sense that present, individual experience is real. In other words
individual experience as fragmentary demands a fulfillment of the ideas acquired in the experience itself. In such terms, possible experience must mean a present, possible experience which, if reached, would explain what is actual beyond the multiplicities of the experienced moment. Only in reference to such a transcendent element would the predicates of truth or falsity have any meaning.¹

The assertions of the realist are recognized as gleams of truth, the whole of which is seen only when it is understood,

that the total constitution of the world of fact must be presented to a concrete whole of actual experience, of which ours is a fragment.²

Realism is then a position which can be maintained in part only by a transition to absolute idealism.

Royce carries out the above argumentation in spirit and essence in his Gifford Lectures. In sum, he says that since according to realism each idea would have to refer to an object, and since (as above) no idea can refer to completely independent reality, realism falls to the ground. Realism cannot refer to the one or to the many but only to the real "of absolutely Nothing."³

¹ Cf. RAP, Ch. XI; and Ch. III, 1, i of this thesis.
² CGG, 167, 8.
³ WAI, I, 137.
This follows as a necessary conclusion from the very premise of realism. According to the realist, his ideas are existences; the objects of his ideas are independent existences; and this independence is a mutual relation. Therefore, such an independence, without any links, can never be bridged. The whole theory can have reference only to an absolute void.¹

The real world must then be that which is integrated with human experience. The realm of truth will allow nothing as "absolutely independent of the knowledge that relates to it, or of any other fact in the entire universe."²

iv. Mysticism and rationalism. The philosophical mystic is always involved, Royce believes, in the use of the same general dialectical and metaphysical methods. The theoretical approach of the mystic to realism is the attempt to reduce to absurdity the latter position.³ Among other objections, mysticism finds fault with the idea of independent existences and the inadequacies of finite thought. Only in the infinite and eternal is satisfaction allowed. Even as the realist appears to be concerned only with the external meaning, the mystic knows only the internal.⁴

Finite ideas are, as above, disavowed because they are

¹. WAI, I, 137.
². WAI, I, 138.
³. WAI, I, 176.
⁴. WAI, I, 176.
believed to have no absolute, internal meaning. That which
is first experienced naively as the independent being of the
realist becomes defined according to the meaning that the
experiencing individual contributes. There is here, then,
an immediacy which asserts that "what is" is caught only in
the ineffable instant at which the individual grasps
ultimate reality. As realism seeks true being in some-
thing independent of ideas, mysticism seeks it "within
the very life of the knowing process."¹

Both positions eventuate in an abandonment of any belief
in the validity of finite ideas in reference to being. Each
in the end, therefore, defines nothing at all.² For the
mystic, the absolute is defined as the absence of finitude,
and since for the finite mind definite contents must be
finite in some sense, the absence of finitude cannot mean
other than the absence of content.³ If mysticism allows man
to have knowledge of the absolute, he must at that point
allow that finite life is not just illusory, and that the
finite is thereby in some way already in contact with the
infinite; that is, with reality.⁴

¹ WAI, I, 179.
² WAI, I, 140.
³ WAI, I, 161. There seems to be a confusion here between
an infinite idea and an idea of the infinite, but Royce
seems to be reporting the view of the mystic accurately.
⁴ WAI, I, 182.
However, it can be said of mysticism, in contradistinction to realism, that it at least is to some extent capable of self-criticism. The mystic recognizes that the locus of the criterion that distinguishes truth from error is within the individual. The positive contribution of the mystic is not, however, a discovery of being, but the recognition that the human consciousness of reality depends upon our finite experience, as contrasted with another experience which is not yet possessed but only thought. "Immediacy is [then] but one aspect of Being." But, pure immediacy can have content only insofar as ideas are present. So, both realism and mysticism are abstractions.

Now, if realism modifies its stand to teach that its previously asserted "independence" is only a relative matter, it would still follow that knowledge is in a very real sense an accident in the world. What Royce is saying here is similar to the familiar criticism of Thomas Aquinas' use of the analogy. The only element that saves the analogy from the totally equivocal is the univocal. Thus, every argument that can be brought against equivocation, conceived apart from the analogy, is also telling here.

In the same spirit, Royce goes on to object that the conception of being as only relatively independent of

1. WAI, I, 194.
thought either delivers the realist to idealism or else does not advance him one bit beyond his original assertion of the total independence of thought and being.¹

Consequently, it becomes clear that realism is not in need of modification, but transformation. Being, or reality, must be conceived of as that which is true, the standard for ideas. This brings us to that view of being which asserts that reality is the very ground of the validity of ideas.²

And, yet, this critical rationalism is itself in need of supplementation. This supplementation is not in the way of a departure from rationalism, which might be called idealism at its lowest level, but a drawing out of the implications of this as yet undeveloped position. It is true that the world of truth is an eternal world, but this does not make it personal. The fuller appreciation of the personal nature of the realm of truth will have to wait the more complete development of Royce's own idealism.

For the problem of evil, this means that the solution, according to Royce, will be found in terms of, at very least, a rational idealism that sees the Platonic realm as a justified postulate, but not as separate from this world.

¹ WAI, I, 201.
² Royce seems to be alluding here to rationalism in its more or less traditional sense. This is the context in which the term validity is used. See WAI, I, 201-211.
Plotinus does not even go far enough in his more or less theistic ultimate. The realm of the eternal must be conceived of, Royce believes, in essentially personalistic terms. Whether he successfully grounds such a position remains, at this point, to be seen.

2. PHASES IN THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ROYCE'S IDEALISM

1. Transition from the validity of experience to the idealistic concept of being. Royce had early stated¹ that his reason for accepting an absolute idealism was grounded upon his belief that the very coherent statement of the deepest agnosticism possible presupposed a transcendent-immanent world-self. He had also asserted that idealism has two aspects. It is an analysis of the world, which shows that the world of human knowledge is, in the words of Berkeley, nothing but a system of ideas which governs man's belief and conduct.²

The other side of idealism attempts the postulation of the absolute self. Such is the synthesis of idealism. Either this is the basic answer to the fundamental problem of metaphysics, or, to the extent that reality is external to man, it is unknowable. All assertions that describe reality as independent of man but constituting possibilities

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¹ SMP, 349. See also RAP, 344–435; also Ch. I of this thesis.
² SMP, 351.
of experience, merely relegate reality to the meaningless.¹

In terms of the reality of the world of appreciation, Royce expresses in the same volume² his belief in the trustworthiness of experience. The world of appreciation is the world of immediate experience. Thus, the objective world is a construct, dependent upon the amenability of the directly accessible to universal order. Such alone is describable.

Further, the world of appreciation can be spoken of as the kind of a world which an organic self of an absolute character would have presented to him at a glance—perhaps an introspective one. The world of description, which is derived by inference from the world of appreciation, turns out to demand the idealistic concept of being.

In another place,³ Royce notes again how the very belief of realistic philosophy in the integrity of the referents of human experience forces one from realism to idealism, which (for Royce) is absolute and monistic. To raise the level of experience above that of Heraclitean flux, both a unity of apprehension and the stability of the perceived must be introduced. When to the latter characteristic, knowability is added, realism has been abandoned for idealism.

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1. SMF, 367.
3. CGG, 171
It is obvious that several numerically different elements (persons, experiences, thoughts, etc.) can refer to the same external object only because this sameness of reference transcends the experience of a certain individual. But why should it then be thought as transcending all experience?  

It has been observed that for Royce the validity of experience carries one to absolute idealism. This is to assert, in other words, that the attempt to maintain an idealism less than absolute and on the level of pure validity is an impossible task. True being cannot be identified with the validity of the idea which defines that fact if that idea be short of absolute. Validity is undoubtedly a definite aspect of true being, but it is not the final definition of the constitution of the whole being of reality.

Furthermore, validity is ambiguous. In reference to ideas that are actually tested, it signifies that these ideas are concretely expressed and experienced when they are

1. GOG, 177.
2. Royce uses as equivalents, "truth, validity, or determinate possibility of experience." (WAI, I, 227). His reference is to traditional rationalism in its revised or critical form.
3. WAI, I, 227. Here in germ form is Royce's later assertion that in terms of an absolute idealism a revised form of the ontological argument is acceptable: essence and existence involve each other. See Ch. IV of this thesis, Hocking's remarks. This already suggests in the case of evil that it must be eternal for it is involved in the absolute, both essentially and existentially.
tested.\textsuperscript{1} And yet, when the realm of valid truth, not yet observed by an individual(s), is under discussion, such has a character that is not exhaustively presented in human experience.\textsuperscript{2} This would introduce two kinds of being: one present and one possible.

Royce is here dealing with a concept of being that is to be distinguished from both realism and mysticism; it claims that a given idea is to be accepted as true if fulfilled or tested in actual experience in a rationalistic sense.\textsuperscript{3} His objection is that such a truncated idealism gives no acceptable answer to the question as to what a valid (true or determinately possible) experience actually is when it is only possible—when no one is verifying it. Royce insists that this narrow rationalism must become a broad (actually absolute) idealism.

This conception would also stand in the way of the assertion that both the world and human experience were real in the same sense. In addition, it makes reality little more than an abstract universal.

This rationalistic conception of being abandons, as was seen, the belief that being is individual. "It tries to rest content with abstract universals, more or less

\begin{enumerate}
\item WAI, I, 261.
\item WAI, I, 261.
\item WAI, I, 259.
\end{enumerate}
determined by particular observations." Yet, this is in the face of the fact that individual determination is at least one basic aspect of the real.

... [The] final object sought when we seek being, is (1) a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite idea with which, in any case, we start our quest; (2) a complete fulfillment of the will of purpose partially embodied in this idea; (3) an individual life for which no other can be substituted.2

Thus, reality is trustworthy in the sense that it gives the concept of validity meaning. It is an individual life, not just form. Human experience is a confirmation of the view that the fundamental nature of reality is a concrete, wholistic life of fulfillment.

ii. The unity of the world and the universality of the idea of being. In Royce's judgment, Berkeley's fundamental contribution was the recognition that there is no such thing as matter discoverable in the world of experience. The world is a world of ideas. But Berkeley went farther; this world is made up of signs. Experience is the process of reading the language of reality; or in other words, the language of God, the omnipresent, eternal mind. Berkeley rediscovered the relevance of the inner life as an interpretive key to the nature of the experienced world.3

1. WAI, I, 295.
2. WAI, I, 340-1.
3. SMM, 87-9.
Hegel, according to Royce, sharpens this insight by the recognition that some of the most fundamental and supposedly external sense data are actually the products of self-consciousness; consider the notion of quantity.\(^1\) Hegel goes on to postulate a unitary system formed by all these fundamental notions; this system is "the divine Idea, or total thought of the world, whose full realization is the absolute self in its spiritual wholeness."\(^2\)

It is true that this is a universal, but it is not an abstraction: the several facts of reality are actually embraced within it and brought forth by it. Royce praises Hegel as one who understood the paradoxes and problems of the spiritual life. Hegel's error is seen as "conceiving the logic of passion as the only logic."\(^3\) Royce goes on to note the judgment of Principal Caird to the effect that the true infinite is not the negation of the finite but the organic unity of the infinite and finite.\(^4\)

Later, Royce observes that the idea of the absolute is usually taken as quite abstract. His purpose is to show that the true concept of being is the most concrete of all our ideas.\(^5\) Thus, the unity of the world cannot be conceived of

1. SMP, 220.
2. SMP, 221.
3. SMP, 227. Royce views Hegel's paradoxes and problems as indicative of his insight into the spiritual life.
4. SMP, 499.
5. WAI, I, 385.
in terms of the fragmentary character of human consciousness. It is true that human experience effects a living unity of many in one. Yet, this unity is only of a preliminary nature, though important nonetheless.

The unities that the human individual effects in the case of the space form and the time span are specific indications of at least the possibility of an ultimate transcendent unity. Such are specific suggestions as to how the unity of being can conceivably be obtained in the midst of variety, but they are suggestions which point the inquirer beyond to an ultimate explanation: the final unity of the whole of experience.¹

The absolute consciousness is a unity which grasps the successive facts in a manner at least analogous to the temporal form of realization. Individually, this means that the absolute life must be conceived of as accomplishing its purposes through finite selves, and, thus, the finite is exactly the contrary of being subject to the judgment of being illusory. So, the finite self is all that it knows itself to be, plus what it is as actually linked to the meaning of the whole realm of Being.²

This is one of the few hints as to Royce's defense against the charge that his inclusion of the finite in the

¹. WAI, I, 424.
². WAI, I, 427.
absolute ignores man's conscious of finitude. Yet, this is only a statement that the finite is more than it is conscious of being. The problem is, if the absolute is to know and feel as the finite (through the inclusion of the finite in the absolute), how explain this limitation for the absolute? If the limitation is real, where is the absolute nature of God at that point? If it is not real, finite moral responsibility ceases and the problem of evil becomes the problem of an evil God.

iii. The individuality and relative freedom of finite beings. In a section entitled, "The Worth of the Individual," in his earliest work, Royce manifests concern for the preservation of the integrity of the individual. There he suggests, prefiguring his later development of the absolute self, that if there is a really satisfied self anywhere, it certainly would not be found in a fleshly body.

Whatever may be the final worth of the individual, his present life is far too narrowly restricted by its finitude. To lift these limitations would be to introduce the individual to a life in which self would be taken up in a higher synthesis—the "unity of all the conscious selves." This

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1. See Ch. IV of this thesis; especially, this objection of Rogers.
2. RAP, 195-201.
3. RAP, 195.
4. RAP, 200.
would be to accept the demands of a universal, absolute will.¹

Several years after the publication of the above volume and on the eve of that milestone in Royce's development, the Gifford Lectures, he expressed himself in considerable detail in the discussions that make up a publication of the philosophical union of the University of California.² Here he sees the problem of individuation as essentially soluble only as an expression of the divine will.

A finite individual would not be absorbed into the absolute, nor would he be an opaque fact. Because of the love of the absolute for the individual, the individual in isolation would be rendered secondarily intelligible, for he would be the fulfillment of the exclusiveness of that love.³ Individuality is then basically a teleological category.

Royce now feels that the discussion has now led to the factor which is not separate from thought and experience, but which cannot be defined exclusively in terms of either. This factor is the will, and in the universal consciousness it is the individuating aspect. The individual is the object of the will of the absolute. Such individuation is not (Royce believes) in contradiction to the idea of unity.

¹ At this point the problem of freedom becomes acute.
² COG, 217-272.
³ COG, 296.
heretofore insisted upon. The several interests or objects of the divine will are in turn forms (his word) of that will itself and those elements which freely unite to make up the whole of that will. 1

Furthermore, the will of the absolute individuates in line with the absolute's own needs, so that if free individuals are needed, they will be had, while yet the unity of the absolute is maintained. In fact, the absolute is the only finally real individual because it is the only whole individual. "As such the absolute is unique, embodies one Will, and realizes this will in the unity of its one life." 2 Finite individuals are as real as is necessary for the moral order. The finite individual is unique and free since he is determined only by his own choice. 3

Royce's fundamental contention in regard to this subject, in The World and the Individual, 4 is that both the will of God and the will of man are consciously expressed in the world without any contradiction. The universe as a whole, as an expression of meaning, is the fulfillment of the will of God. In fact, Royce will allow existence only to that which embodies meaning. 5 For the individual, the signifi-

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1. COG, 270.
2. COG, 272.
3. COG, 272.
4. WAI, I, 441.
5. WAI, I, 443.
cance of his volitional action is a matter of his own consciousness in terms of the meaning of his life.¹

The whole world is the expression of a plan which demands that each factor in it, from the point of view of internal, purposeful distinction, be necessarily unique. Therefore, each finite purpose, as a partial attainment of the divine will, is still unique and, consequently, the individual's own conscious will. It might be said that, externally, finite life is an aspect of generality, but, from the point of view of the internal, it is unique. The internal is the locus of individuality and freedom.

As for the problem of causation, Royce feels that it is only a special instance of being, the ultimate problems of which can never really be explained.² The divine unity is realized by the individual through the unique activity of his will. The individual's uniqueness in an act is his freedom.³

iv. The problem of the reconciliation of the one and the many. When Royce postulates the absolute as the "one" which grounds and gives meaning to the many, he is fully

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1. WAI, I, 444.
2. WAI, I, 445. This is reminiscent of his earlier expression in SMP (4.12), to the effect that man as part of the natural order is temporally determined, while as a part of the moral order he is free. Cf. Kant.
3. But is the individual yet any more than an idea in the mind of God? If not, the significance for the problem of evil is obvious.
aware that he is compelled to face all the objections commonly brought against the concept of the infinite. After many skillful and highly detailed engagements with certain mathematical criticisms brought against the usual significance of infinity, Royce initiates his attempt to reconcile infinity with determinateness. This he bases on the insistence that reality must not be conceived of as merely infinite. It is true that the absolute must be thought of as an infinite system, but with that he maintains it is also unique and individual.1

At this point, he introduces material presented in The Conception of God, in the section entitled "The Relation of the Will to the Absolute."2 Here, as there, he argues that the absolute has in the individual whole of its selfhood that which is truly infinite, as a system of the experienced, because it is self-representative.3

The real, then, expresses the wholeness of universal ideas from the point of view of their ultimate fulfillment.4 The absolute is an absolutely self-expressive self; on such a view alone, according to Royce, can the infinite be con-

1. WAI, I, 562.
2. COG, 193. See Ch. IV infra and the objection that all Royce has here is an indefinite, finite, growing series. If so, then good and evil, bereft of any ultimate, time-transcending reference of any sort, are merely meaningless distinctions of a relativistic universe.
3. WAI, I, 564.
4. WAI, I, 565.
ceived of so as to guarantee individual embodiment. The reconcili-
ation of the one and the many in this way is the universal law of being. Royce is thus embracing the view that the real must not be considered finite because it excludes the possibility of excursion beyond itself; it must be viewed as infinite in the sense that it includes an infinite content within itself.

Thus, the infinite appears to be endless in one sense while, in another, precise and determinate. The determina-
tions are unique, for they are the very multitude novelty of its own nature. The negative character of an infinite series is not, then, the fundamental nature of the infinite, but merely a negatively stated aspect of the whole system. The basis of the union of the one and the many is seen to be the expression of purpose of the self-representa-
tion of the infinite, necessitating an infinite multiplicity for expression. The many, as constituent individuals, are not to be thought of as absorbed, in the sense of violated, in and by the whole. The absolute is one self, depending for its selfhood or the integrity of the individuals that go to make it up.¹

v. An idealistic epistemology and a philosophy of nature. All our knowledge refers to matters of experience.²

¹. WAI, I, 539. Yet, this must be a metaphysical integrity, or it is no integrity at all.
². WAI, II, 11.
Presented experience is truly a human being's only guide, but it points beyond itself. Without that external reference, immediate experience itself would be self-contradictory. When experience is rationally criticized, it soon becomes clear that the only facts which can be allowed, in view of indirect demonstration, are those which in some sense can be described as transcending the given. In the largest sense, what is given points beyond itself to the absolute totality of reality. In turn, then, it follows that the world of facts exists only in so far as it is given, conformable to absolute experience. Questions of being are thus questions of the organization of experience in an ultimate sense.

The facts of experience involve not only the passivity of given content, but also the activity of one individual in volitional grasp. In this specific sense, an external fact is what is implied and presupposed other than what is actually immediately being produced. And yet, in this very context, the human will is coerced by facts because it is willing to be so dealt with.

Here enters the "ought": a fact is at any moment what ought to be recognized as limiting what the will is attempting. Particular facts are consequently seen only in relation

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1. WAI, II, 23.
to particular action. The external world is taken as existing because such acknowledgement fulfills best the purpose of any moment of rational consciousness. Only in this way can concrete knowledge of facts be elicited. The world of recognized fact turns out, in a very real sense, to be the embodiment of will.

The world of facts in its multiplicity is classified by the individual, as acknowledged facts are capable of being formed into an ordered series. These are described by the postulation of the laws of nature, constituting in Royce's words the world of description. But, such a world cannot be viewed as expressive of the ultimate nature of reality. The world of description, which is a construct, depends upon the activity of consciousness for its being.

The real facts must be the facts of life. In other words, the world of description depends upon the world of the will or appreciation (immediate presentation—given), and this is to say that it depends upon our consciousness. At least two observations are hereby suggested: first, that physical laws are only relatively invariable, and second, that the fundamental relations of man to nature are social.

1. WAI, II, 30.
2. WAI, I, 33. From the perspective of the finite individual, internally the will of the individual, externally the will of the absolute. (These relations can be reversed by approaching the matter from the perspective of the absolute.)
3. WAI, I, 46.
4. WAI, II, 40.
Now, where does time fit into this picture, or how is the finite individual capable of acknowledging at any moment those facts, past and future, which constitute the whole or the absolute? For Royce, time is a practical concept, while the eternal is closely related to the fundamental significance of the practical.\(^1\) Time is our consciousness of succession, of which the individual's time span is the time-keeper.

Further, the temporal form of experience is particularly the form of the will.\(^2\) The perspective of the eternal is already indirectly touched upon in the discussion of time. The temporal world in its completeness must be an eternal world.\(^3\) The totality, of which the finite life is a fragment,\(^4\) is also the goal of that life. Thus, a finite, internal meaning has its final expression in its complete embodiment. It is granted that the steps to this end are through temporal succession, but the whole, as a whole, introduces the eternal. Conversely, time contains the expression of the absolute and eternal will.

It must be born in mind, however, that the completion of the finite in the infinite comes about only because,

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1. WAI, II, 112.
2. WAI, II, 121.
3. WAI, II, 133.
4. This kind of language very strongly suggests that the absolute and finite sustain no mutually transcendent relations.
among other things, a multiplicity of selves are said to be brought together in the infinite. ¹ Now, considering the world of description with specific reference to nature, it appears incontrovertible that human ideas about nature have a basis in extra-human truth. ² Here, as elsewhere, the contrast between consciousness and "unconscious matter" fades.

3. LATER REVISIONS

1. Selective summary of Royce's development to this point. Royce's idealistic theory of knowledge as set forth in his Gifford Lectures (the point through which this summary goes) is based upon a portion of the studies which made up originally his doctor's thesis. A further stage in his inquiry ³ saw him in 1881 publishing a paper on Kant's "Relation to Modern Philosophical Progress." In this paper, he developed the view that the interpretation of the knowledge of finite facts is due to an active acknowledgement or grasp, the significance of which was ethical.

When this material was incorporated, in 1885, in his Religious Aspect of Philosophy, he tells us that he had

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1. WAI, II, 172.
2. WAI, II, 228.
3. For a survey of this development, see WAI, II, Preface.
definitely passed over from his earlier, \(^1\) skeptical position to a constructive idealism. In 1892, in his *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, the material appeared in association with the terms, world of description and world of appreciation. In the paper on self-consciousness which was published in his *Studies of Good and Evil* (1898), he attempted the application of his position to the characteristics of human knowledge and the physical world. \(^2\)

In the case of the problem of immortality, Royce's first published statement appears in his earlier works. \(^3\) He confesses, however, that there he was not sure how his general idealism ought to apply in the instance of the finite individual. \(^4\) By the time of the Gifford Lectures, he had come to the conclusion that the problem of individuation (its nature and end) is the most central one for a thoroughgoing idealism. Later, in *The Conception of God* (in discussion with Professor Howison) and in *The Conception of Immortality* (1900), and finally in *The World and the Individual*, he moved, in his development, basically in terms of the ethical implications of the self.

The problem of evil, as it appears in *The World and the Individual*, is mainly a restatement; although, the theory of

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1. Previous to his Ph.D. thesis.
the temporal and the eternal is new. The question of freedom and the union of God and man are to a great extent original also. It is significant that in the preface to the second volume of *The World and the Individual*, Royce acknowledges his indebtedness to Charles Peirce. Royce confesses a continuing influence "remote as [Peirce's] views often are from his."\(^1\)

ii. Contemporary critical reactions to Royce's position at the time of the lectures. Here use will be made of Werkmeister's recent and excellent summary.\(^2\) This author states that Royce's position at this point received criticism similar to that of Howison's response to his earlier statement in *The Conception of God*.\(^3\) Dewey, for example, believed that Royce had confused three notions which Kant had kept carefully separated: the real as the given determined by thought, the true idea which is not directly experienced but is a possible experience, and possible experience as that which tests the idea. Dewey maintained that Royce's error lay in treating these three as synonymous.

In substance, Dewey is saying positively that if human

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1. WAI, II, xvi.
3. Ibid., 154.
experience justifies us in maintaining our idea of the infinite as valid, then, finite individuals cannot be mere fragments of the infinite.¹ In his review of Royce's second series of lectures,² Dewey, following Howison, maintained that either finite experience has ultimate meaning and the absolute is a system of meaning which the individual posits, or our experiences have no ultimate meaning and cannot give content to the absolute.

Bakewell commented that Royce could not guarantee the integrity of the finite individual, unless the many selves, the many finite and the infinite, were alike eternally real and underived.³ McTaggart saw Royce as including finite selves in the infinite, even as several conscious moments are included within each finite self. Why could not finite individuals, then, be but passing phases in the infinite self?⁴ Werkmeister interprets Royce's reaction to and development from such criticism as a recognition on his part that his system was inadequate and needed supplementation, if not complete revision.⁵

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1. Werkmeister, HPIA, 154. The thought here seems to rest upon the difficulty of conceiving an absolute who is omniscient and who includes individuals who are subject to ignorance, etc.
2. Ibid., 158.
3. Ibid., 159.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. But the new doctrine did not effect a complete revision.
iii. The new doctrines of loyalty and community.

This section will omit (as above) what will later occur in direct connection with an exposition and criticism of Royce's treatment of the problem of evil, to which subject the last half of the thesis is given over.

In the preface of his last great work, The Problem of Christianity, Royce sketches to some extent the background of the final form of his system. He states that his studies, which came to fruition in that last expression, were the result of the development of what first appeared in his Philosophy of Loyalty in 1908.¹ These same problems appear in William James and Other Essays (1911). There, Royce asserted that the spirit of loyalty can be the source of a philosophy of life consistent with a truly rational view of the world. In 1911, The Sources of Religious Insight carried on this theme.

Royce himself viewed the development of his philosophy of loyalty as furnishing a defensible, metaphysical idealism.² He believed that his insights were now essentially new. He further believed that his final expression was in spirit in harmony with his earlier position, and especially, his expression in the Gifford Lectures. However, he was quick to state that there was much in his last work which he did

¹. POC, I, vii.
2. POC, I, ix.
not expect to say when he began it. And he went on to observe that in certain, metaphysical aspects he owed much more to Charles Pierce than to modern Idealism in general.

He further insisted that he owed even less, at that time, to what might be accurately described as Hegelian. ¹ He even quoted with favor a reviewer who in reference to his *Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (1892), observed that Royce was closer to Schopenhauer than Hegel. Royce then added that he was not any more Hegelian than than he was earlier. ²

In his last work, as in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, Royce expounded the position that human salvation consists in devotion to the community. ³ This is his meaning of loyalty: "the practically devoted love of an individual for a community." ⁴ Loyalty is a concrete interest and form of spiritual life.

Royce's development of the concept of loyalty was as Werkmeister has observed, ⁵ an attempt to face the problems of ethics to which he had given little attention up to this time. Royce defines loyalty as "the fulfillment of the whole moral law." ⁶ One is loyal when he willingly and thoroughly

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1. POC, I, xi.
2. POC, I, xii.
3. POC, I, xvii.
4. POL, 15.
5. Werkmeister, HP1A, 160.
6. POL, 17.
manifests his devotion to a cause in a steady and practical way.

The idea of a cause, for Royce, introduces the social element. A good cause is differentiated from an evil one by the test of loyalty to loyalty.¹ Proper loyalty is conducive to the support of other loyalties, the "improper" involves disloyalty to the very cause of loyalty itself.² When one faces the decision as to the goal of loyalty, he must decide in agreement with the wholistic expression of his nature, conscious and unconscious. This seems to be quite close to the test of empirical, growing coherence.

Royce's concept of Christianity in terms of the beloved community has definite implications for his solution of the problems of metaphysics. Finite individuals are forced to posit a real world because of the fragmentary nature of the finite self. This imperfection demands an interpretation and resolution of the situation. The real world is the true interpretation of the situation.³

Part of the metaphysical problem is expressed in the many antithesis which inform the human situation. The contrast between the present and the goals of the future appears all along the line in various forms. However, this anti-

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1. POL, 118.
2. POL, 119.
3. POC, II, 264-5.
thesis is stated, it is a presentation of a problem, the interpretation and resolution of which, is none other than the postulate, the real world.

The general problem is, then, the problem of the world: the significance of the wholistic postulation of the world in contrast with the fragmentary nature of the individual self.¹ The members of the dialectic need an interpreter. In terms of metaphysics, the contrast is between appearance and reality.² The real world expresses that mediating principle which takes the members of the contrast up in a higher synthesis.

But an interpretation is real only if the appropriate community is real, and is true only if that community reaches its goal.

In brief, then, the real world is the Community of Interpretation which is constituted by the two antithetic ideas, and their mediator or interpreter, whatever or whoever that interpreter may be. If the interpretation is a reality, and if it truly interprets the whole of reality, then the community reaches its goal, and the real world includes its own interpreter. Unless both the interpreter and the community are real, there is no real world.³

In this background, the question of evil would appear to demand understanding and solution along social lines. That a truly social situation is not what Royce makes possible will be seen farther on.⁴

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¹. POC, II, 267-8.
². POC, II, 268.
³. POC, II, 269-70.
⁴. See especially Ch. IV infra, the evaluation of this last phase of Royce's thought.
4. SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to complete important background material that does not actually enter the problem of evil itself.

The chapter began with a consideration of Royce's view of the relation between philosophy and religion. Philosophy is deemed to have a religious aspect. Specifically, Royce allows a definite relation between the problem of religion and a theory of being.

Realism and mysticism are then set forth as oversimplifications lacking internal consistency, but suggestive for an ultimate solution to the problem of the nature of reality. Especially is mysticism fruitful, since it contains an internal principle of criticism—an intuitively arrived at consistency. Consequently, the outgrowth of mysticism is rationalism.

The result of the argument thus far is the positing of the necessity of an idealism that will include the emphasis of rationalism, but will also introduce a synoptic, metaphysical perspective. In the search for a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite idea, Royce introduces the absolute as the concrete wholistic life of fulfillment, including the finite and uniting individuals in the highest synthesis.
Freedom is said to be guaranteed the individual since the latter is construed as an exclusive and unique object of the absolute will. The absolute, as inclusive of individuals, is described as infinite; that is, absolutely self-expressive through self-representation. The absolute, as experience, is experienced by the individual in terms of his time span. This brings the development of Royce's thought up through the time of the Gifford Lectures.

The new doctrines of loyalty and community of Royce's last phase set down the relation of the individual to the absolute in terms of the absolute conceived of as a multiplicity of selves. This introduces an ethical element which is centered in the idea of loyalty. Paradoxically, this means that Royce attempts to eternalize the social in terms of an all-inclusive absolute; what was originally Thought, and then God, is now the Beloved Community.
CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROYCE'S TREATMENT
OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

This chapter will attempt to deal in detail with the
historical development of Royce's treatment of the problem
of evil. The specific aspect of struggle with evil, lead-
ing out into the consequences of this doctrine for ethics,
will be treated in the following chapter.

The divisions here will follow the order of Royce's
thinking, beginning with his first book, examining the
subsequent development prior to and including the Gifford
Lectures, and examining finally the ultimate issue of his
doctrine in his ethical period.

1. FIRST FORMULATION

1. The nature and possibility of error. In a way,
it can be said that the problem of evil or error1 was
Royce's first concern. Traces of interest therein might
even be traced to his A.B. thesis.2 In his first published
work, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, the section that

1. For Royce these problems are exceedingly close if not
   synonymous. The possibility of either, although involv-
ing slightly different perspectives, has the same funda-
mental implications for his view of the nature of the
finite, the infinite, and their relation.
2. "The Intention of the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus."
deals with the question of error is an incorporation of what was first developed for his doctoral thesis in 1878. The argument is essentially as follows.

Royce opens his discussion\(^1\) by reminding his reader that the question of truth and error is a very difficult one. Even skepticism itself in suggesting the possibility of doubt is assuming the possibility of error in reference to an external world. This immediately introduces a paradox: In a sense it would appear that every sincere judgment is true. The matter of perspective or point of view could make many supposedly conflicting judgments actually true.

Further how can different judgments in different minds at different times have any truly common object at all? And if they don't, how can there be any question of truth or error?\(^2\) Yet, if the argument is pressed to embrace the total relativity of truth, it is self-refuting. This brings back the assumption that there are external objects with which it is possible for our thought to agree or disagree.

Now, it is necessary that there be some mediator between the thinker and the object: a thought which includes both the thought and the object. Only in this way can the

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1. RAP, 375.
2. RAP, 375.
relation that is implied in truth and error be established. In other words, what is assumed is that all reality is present to an all-embracing thought, of which an individual's is but one subordinate part.¹

Such must be the case unless it be asserted that the individual mind can be concerned only with its own ideas without any outside reference. The latter would, of course, be deliverance to relativistic chaos, for in this case the objects of some ideas would be nothing more than, or in any way representative of anything else but other ideas of that same individual. If these were all that were referred to, then the thinker could hardly fail to make correct assertions about them. If this were the situation, even skepticism itself would cease to have any meaning.

If, however, the human thought in an individual instance is related to a higher thought, as the parts of any one thought are related to that whole thought, then, meaningful judgment is possible, since the individual's thought and the object of that thought (both as it is and as it is thought) are brought together in the highest synthesis of the universal thought.² Finite ideas are elements of and have their being in universal thought.

¹. RAP, 378.
². RAP, 378-9.
Further, the unity that attends the individual's thoughts demands that the totality of thoughts and objects be posited as in unity in the absolute, or universal thought. The higher thought brings together what is separate for the individual: his ideas and the objective existence of their objects as they really are. On this rests the basis of the distinction between the true and the false.

Conscious individuals are included as elements in the universal thought. The reality of the individual is then as a fragment of a higher reality; yet, this higher reality is not to be conceived of as producing individuals, so much as completing the existence which, in the individual as such, possesses no rational completeness.

This universal thought must also properly be considered the moral arbiter of the universe: the universal thought, embracing all truth, is capable, and alone so, of just judgments. Virtue is "the infinite thought of the universe." The absolute is thus the one that knows infinitely and is above all powers. This is the basis of the assumption on the part of science of the rationality of

1. RAP, 379.
2. Royce's term.
3. RAP, 380.
4. RAP, 381.
5. RAP, 381.
the universe, and the assumption on the part of religion of
goodness.¹ But, this does not mean that Royce follows the
usual attitude of popular religion toward evil.

ii. The religious insight and the problem of evil.
Contrary to the systems usually put forth to satisfy
religious desire, Royce will have none of the opinion which
asserts that though there is evil in the world as a whole,
the process of progression is toward goodness. Further,
Royce characterizes as insipid the view of the ultimate
disappearance of evil in the consummation of the afore-
mentioned process.² Such a view, in Royce's words, is not
alone insipid but superfluous. Moral goodness for him is
not the absence, but the subordination, of evil. Evil,
as subdued, is present in the good will.³

Therefore, Royce's rule is that for the world to con-
tain moral goodness, it must contain, in organic unity,
moral evil. This is both an in-spite-of and a because-of
situation. This is the testimony of moral experience as to
the nature of the good will. By the destruction of evil,
Royce insists that the only thing that can be meant is the
transcendence of evil, or "of the evil will by the good will"
as a moment in the life of the good will.⁴ The absence of

¹. RAP, 382.
². RAP, 404.
³. RAP, 495.
⁴. RAP, 495.
evil would be the absence of content. ¹

One must not confuse Royce's position with the idea that finite man needs evil to contrast, in an external fashion, with good, in order to appreciate the good. Rather, Royce considers that evil constitutes part of the very organic unity of the good act.² Evil, as an essential part of goodness, recognized in the religious insight of the good man, shows that the conflicts of morality are essential and therefore eternal.³ If they were not, and the destruction of evil were allowed, then the distinction between good and evil would itself be destroyed for the infinite.

In a sense, however, evil is not only subordinated, but can be spoken of as being lost in the universal good. This, for Royce, is the testimony of moral experience. "Progress in this world as a whole is therefore simply not needed."⁴ Royce does, however, allow for progress in a part of the universe such as ours. This means that since the human individual is not perfect or complete, as is the absolute, the good will being in the former case a temporal fact must be viewed in its activities as ideally deserving

1. See infra: the conflicts of morality are viewed as essential for the content of the good will.
2. RAP, 465.
3. Such a concept may well be regarded as fundamental in Royce's thinking. Whether his absolutism gives rise to this view or vice versa seems a moot question.
4. RAP, 466.
of progressive realization. It might be asked at this point how there can be real progress for the parts without an equally real progress for the whole. If there is no real progress for the whole, how, then, any progress for the parts?\(^1\)

The goal is the complete expression of the good will in the individual and in time.\(^2\) In fact, this is what makes the good will good. It attempts to perfect the finite individuals in whom it is found. Here is what is meant by progress. Progress is in time, and so cannot be predicated of the absolute, who does not appear to be in time so much as time in the absolute.

The religious insight, as the source of Royce's resolution of the problem of evil at this point, is, as is easily observed, no other than an aspect of consciousness. The very possibility of error demands an inclusive thought. The human individual can appreciate what this world means since human consciousness can bring together the true and the false in the unity of a true thought.\(^3\)

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1. Part of Royce's difficulty here appears to be the bifurcation of the finite and the infinite: the former in time, the latter in eternity. What significance can a timeless whole have for parts in time?
2. RAP, 446.
3. RAP, 457.
Further, the unity of the conscious moral act is conceived of as taking place in the victory of the good will. Human consciousness, thus pointing beyond itself, directs the inquirer to an absolute rest, which is in the midst of real strife, yet perfect. Royce concludes this thought with terms that are more characteristic of his later period: the perfect world is called, "world of the true Life of Good."¹

iii. Some evaluation and criticism. There are several points of interest, by way of criticism, available in Werkmeister's volume, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America*. He observes² that Royce seems to have a tendency to shift the significance he gives to "infinite thought." At first, it appears to designate an absolute system of thought, but later it seems to signify a conscious agent.

One might suggest, at this point, that Werkmeister can be criticized himself for failing to appreciate the difficulty (both for himself and for Royce), if not impossibility, of conceiving of thought without thereby positing a thinker, who would appear in some sense, necessarily, as a conscious agent.

1. RAF, 468.
2. Werkmeister, HPIA, 135.
Werkmeister also recounts the classic criticisms of Howison. Howison asks: Who is referred to when Royce asserts that absolute experience pronounces less organized experience fallacious? Whose absolute experience is this?\(^1\) Howison's own answer is that to whomever the absolute judgment may refer, it is the finite thinker who does the judging.

Howison's insistence is, further, that Royce's proof of the absolute is built solely upon the power of the finite mind to organize elementary experiences in a critical fashion.\(^2\) Whether Howison is right when he says that man's reason may be a witness to God, but cannot (in Royce's sense) be God himself, it is certainly true that the emphasis upon immanence, as it is found everywhere in Royce's writings, poses a fundamental problem, not only in reference to responsibility in the case of moral action, but for the possibility of any significant individuation at all.

What about the immanence of God in reference to the concept of God as a person? Howison believes that a total immanence of the Absolute and a view of the Absolute as a person cannot both be maintained at the same time. We would agree that this is true, but only if one fails to conceive his idealism in pluralistic fashion. In other words, the objection to Royce at this point cannot properly

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2. Ibid., 139.
be that he insists on the immanence of God, but that he insists upon it in terms of a monism.\(^1\)

Riley\(^2\) suggests another objection to Royce's argument from the knowing experience, in agreement with William James, that there may very well be no necessity of a connecting medium between individual and object. Perhaps, he has in mind similar objections raised against Plato's ideas, and the belief that if one introduces a connecting medium in such a place, he must face the interminable multiplication of third terms. Riley's position is, however, deficient in his failure to appreciate that if matter is postulated as something completely foreign to idea, there is and can be no knowledge connection.

2. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

1. Freedom and moral order. It seems clear that at least one ingredient for the establishment of the world as a moral order has been obtained when a general idealistic position is espoused. So, when Royce insists that the world must be conceived in terms of infinite thought, one step away from materialism and toward a moral idealism

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1. That this is not the only possible expression of idealism is seen in pluralistic personalism where a transcendent element is insisted upon in the relation between God and man.

2. Riley, AT, 258.
appears to have been taken. But this is, of course, not necessarily so. Some or many of the elements of a moral order seem to be present when the world is conceived of in an idealistic fashion, but if this idealism is absolute and even monistic, as Royce's appears to be, then the question of freedom and moral order becomes a very real one.

In his *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, Royce dealt specifically and at length with the problem of freedom. He began in a somewhat Kantian fashion by dividing the aspects of experienced reality in two. Cause he allowed to be predicated of the world of description, while that category is held to be meaningless, at least at first blush, for the world of appreciation.¹

There is, however, a kind of cause which he allows for the world of appreciation.² He says that there can be a justification for the type of will and self-consciousness that man experiences, and this is the only sense in which the world of appreciation can be spoken of as possessing a cause.³ The world of description, however, is a world of

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2. This reference is to be understood in terms of Kant's realm of things-in-themselves; except, of course, that the God who is a limiting concept for Kant is for Royce, by virtue of his idealism (absolute) a verifiable postulate.
3. Cf. volitional causality.
causation in space and time. Here the given appears inexplicable; but from the perspective of appreciation it can be posited as the free but reasonable act of the logos.

Caprice is here only in the sense that the will of the absolute is intuited only by himself. If this be caprice, however, it appears to be a necessary element of rational will in the sense that there is no reason beyond it. The world of appreciation is one of freedom. As man is conscious of his choices, he is a part of that world. Finite individuals are "conscious bits of the self." The human will is part of the freedom of the world will. In so far as the individual is not conscious of his choices, he does not participate in this freedom.

This introduces the question, only the more keenly, as to how a free self can act upon an organism which is found within the causation of nature. This seems impossible, and yet how then could freedom be maintained? Royce's answer is to the effect that the whole time order as known to the absolute self, expresses one law, and "is present in one time-transcending instant to the insight of the logos." The time-transcendence of the human individual is an analogy of what is here asserted of the logos. Thus,

1. SMF, 429.
2. SMF, 430.
3. SMF, 430.
although the finite being experiences that transcendence which has its dependence on the physical brain, its significance is already a part of the eternal.

If the critic is disposed to find fault, and suggest that, after all, the possibility of freedom has not yet been explained, Royce has a ready answer. He reiterates that the temporal order is only one of many possible orders. The Absolute chose not to conceive those unrealized possibilities; rather, the Absolute chose this particular order.

This order is one in which the world will has delegated to man the power to participate in the determination of what the temporal world shall be. Thus, the physical and moral orders are reconciled. Man thus partakes of the divine order in more than one fashion. He is truly a part of the temporal scene, but that temporal order is for the absolute but one approach to reality. Further, man is a part of the absolute and the absolute has chosen outside of time,¹ (in an act by which the finite, through participation in the infinite, shares) to conceive of this particular order, which latter also contains the individual.

¹ What choice outside of time could mean is by no means clear. Choice outside of space is conceivable (see Brightman's view in Ch. IV), but choice outside of time, in no way involving time, renders the concept meaningless.
The reason for the absolute's choice of this order is its worth. Man is then free, not to change the laws of nature, but free as part of the world conceived who elected to think the world of description, which, from the point of view of its completeness, is the world of appreciation.¹

ii. The absolute and evolutionary explanation of the problem of individuation. In the volume entitled, The Concept of God, Royce attempted an answer to Howison and the antinomy of the moral world. The thesis of this antinomy runs as follows. The world of truth in its entirety is present to the absolute consciousness. Unless real relations between things in themselves are allowed, and such appear to be meaningless, there must be a world of truth which constitutes an organic idealistic whole.²

In contrast to this, of course, is the antithesis.³ The moral world must have a true variety of individuals, and such could not be present in the unity of one consciousness. For individuals to be independent, they cannot be severally part of a whole of reality, and they certainly could not be free and be the fulfillment of the ideas of one being.

1. SMP, 431. Freedom for the individual is, then, at most, a freedom to conform willingly or unwillingly.
2. COG, 329.
3. COG, 329.
Royce maintains the thesis absolutely. He maintains that the attribute of omniscience involves other divine attributes: the the absolute is an organic whole. The absolute, as absolute experience, implies something other than experience, which is experienced. With immediacy there must be mediation.¹

Royce rejects the antithesis because of its harboring an illusion. He admits that its picture of moral freedom is accurate, but insists that it goes on to develop a false separation of individuals. Individuation is not segmentation.² Individuals, as Royce conceives them, can participate in the unity of consciousness together. Simply to separate them, in such an aforementioned fashion, is to postulate the ability of a chasm to individuate.³

Individuation rests upon a life fulfilling a specific and exclusive interest in such a way as to deny the possibility of more than one system of facts furnishing that fulfillment.⁴ If two individuating interests are part of the contents of a unitary absolute experience, and are also interests of the will which in wholistic fashion individuates the entire contents of the world, it does not follow that individuation is undermined.⁵

1. COG, 330.
2. COG, 330.
3. COG, 331.
4. COG, 331.
5. COG, 331.
Freedom remains in Royce’s mind as long as the interests of individuals are not absolutely predetermined in reference to their formulation or expression. He, of course, allows here only a relative independence.¹

In approaching the comments of Le Conte, Royce reiterated his observation that omniscience implicates other attributes.² The completion of knowledge involves a factor in the consciousness that is incapable of purely theoretical definition. This factor is the will. It individuates the absolute and the world of the absolute, and by it the absolute becomes a person.³ Here is the source of dependent, moral selves, which are capable of life, unlimited by definite, temporal bounds.⁴

In reference to Le Conte’s defense of evolution, Royce confesses inability to see universal philosophical significance in the temporal process, which he allows as only an aspect of reality.⁵ He would grant, however, that evolution indicates a real, finite world, able to be viewed by man in perspective.

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1. COG, 332. This differs from creationism in terms the ultimate reference. Absolutism posits an all-inclusive infinite; pluralistic personalism a creator of finite minds which are no part of the absolute (See Brightman’s discussion Ch. IV).
2. COG, 349.
3. COG, 349.
4. This would seem to involve the individual becoming a different person with each new purpose espoused.
5. COG, 352.
According to his hypothesis, nature suggests, at every point, finite life other than that of man. Only a difference in time span separates portions of the finite world, which man calls lifeless, from personal life. Nature at certain points might be uncommunicative but hardly dead.¹

Evolution is not even a process of diffused energy passing into individuated form, but is rather a process by which finite human life has been made distinct from other individuals which stand next to human individuals in the time-span of their consciousness.² As a parting consideration, Royce reminds his readers that, to him, natural evolution seems far too ambiguous to offer in itself any solution to such a metaphysical problem as that of evil.³

iii. Application of Royce's post-Kantian metaphysics in concrete aspects of good and evil. In the same year that was to give birth to his Gifford Lectures, Royce composed a volume entitled, Studies of Good and Evil. In his introductory remarks, he called attention to the fact that the common character of those essays was their ethical perspective.⁴ Two of these are directly concerned with the question of evil.

In the first essay, Royce faces the question of the extent to which the experience of evil can be taken as adding

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¹ COG, 353.
² COG, 353.
³ COG, 354.
⁴ SGE, v.
to intellectual ability. He is immediately willing to grant that when moral goodness is describable as an attainment, there is something there far different from innocence, since the former arises only out of conflict with evil. This, of course, would involve a rather inclusive knowledge of evil. It follows that maturity of a kind and moral defect (at least potential) will be frequently closely related.

This does not appear to be out of harmony with the truth that organic processes, and perhaps all others as well, involve a balance of opposing forces. Yet, even here, since the end product of organic development is ideally life, it obviously would not follow that because the struggle with death is present in the process, the victory of the latter must be accomplished in the product. This would suggest that in the former instance any conclusion as to the desirability of the morally deficient as an end product cannot be allowed.

The preceding more general question becomes quite practical when it is compounded with the element of choice. Royce feels that virtue is, to a great extent, proportionate

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1. SGE, 90.
2. SGE, 90.
3. SGE, 91.
4. SGE, 91.
5. SGE, 94-5.
to the exercise of the will in choice against a background of genuine moral problems. In moral situations, the matter of lack of knowledge is not an outgrowth of virtue; rather, ignorance is none other than the limitation of virtue.

However, the other side to this is that within an individual's limitations, the more that is known of life, the greater the virtue potential. Royce seems to be saying that there is a sense in which the extent of an individual's experience determines the limit of his accomplishment in virtue, while, at the same time, within definite limitations, an individual's extensive knowledge does not necessitate increment for the increase of virtue, so long as an intensive knowledge is brought to bear.

Another question that confronts any student of the problem of the relation, in an individual, between the knowledge of good and evil and the realization of virtue, is the matter of the value or disvalue of conscious awareness in virtuous activity. It will, perhaps, be remembered that Aristotle argued that the more unconscious the expression of purpose, the greater testimony to the skill and depth of the purposer. His illustration was the nonchalance of the accomplished, or skillful individual.

1. SGE, 106.
Royce would be in agreement at least to the extent of the assertion that the growth of active virtue does in a sense, by the establishment of virtuous habits, aim at its own extinction.¹ This is, however, no more than is the case with intellectual skill, or the desire of the will for fulfillment. It does not mean that when the individual can be said to cease to possess virtue and be now possessed by it as an instinct, that active moral goodness has ceased; rather, the foundation has been laid for even greater accomplishment. Thus, even more, conscious virtue is possible, because there is more unconscious virtue upon which to build.²

Moral deficiency is a part of progressive growth in virtue, only in the sense that it supplies the negative background and impetus. It is, as the intellectual deficiency which makes learning possible. Future growth is dependent upon the forgetting of many past and unnecessary (though temporarily necessary) details. The knowledge of evil and the presence of it are but moments in the consciousness and so in the life of virtue.³

The second problem that Royce faces, in this collection of essays, which seems most germane for this discussion, is

1. SGE, 110.
2. SGE, 110.
3. SGE, 112.
concerned with the relation between human consciousness and nature, from the point of view of their significance for good and evil. Royce's hypothesis is that the apperceptive limit of the finite individual is a quantity which is more or less common for human beings in general, but is vastly variable in the cosmic realm.¹

In nature, then, the more extensive span establishes for man what appears as final uniformity.² This is an integral part of Royce's idealism, for he goes on to assert that one can postulate a continuous series of types of experience between man on the one hand and the most extensive cosmic span on the other. Thus, nature is neither a world of fixity or novelty, but rather, one of experience.³

It is to be allowed as much permanence and change as is conceivable for ideal rather than material being, which latter neither Berkeley nor Royce are able to discover anywhere in experience. Therefore, the problem of evil must be dealt with in the case of the relation between nature and human consciousness, not as if two independent factors, totally different in quality, were involved, but rather in terms of elements whose difference lies in degree.

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1. SGE, 246.
2. SGE, 247.
3. SGE, 248.
iv. Evaluation and criticism. Werkmeister\(^1\) brings us back to Howison's contention that Royce's view of the absolute makes freedom impossible. Howison argues that if the absolute is construed as including all individual experience directly in its own unity, and if the same self is the final self for all individuals, personal responsible reality cannot be predicated in any significant sense of the individual. The absolute alone is the real agent.\(^2\)

In Royce's attempts to answer Howison's objections,\(^3\) he attempted to maintain that the idea of personality is directly if not necessarily dependent upon his idea of God.\(^4\) Howison, however, still believes that Royce has made the individual self nothing but a part, without freedom, of the world-will. Howison's fundamental objection is that in order to have significant individuation, there must be many minds. In such an instance, the absolute would be a unity formed as a system of self-active beings.

On Royce's system it would appear that all that is left is a continuous unity. Royce, however, insists that the immanence of his God does not destroy the true individuality of finite beings.\(^5\) It would seem that Royce should admit

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1. Werkmeister, HPIA, 139.
2. Ibid., 140.
3. GOD, 328-337.
4. Werkmeister, HPIA, 140.
5. Ibid.
that a position such as Bowne's (and Howison's) touches upon something fundamental in the question of individuation and freedom.

Bowne believes that whereas the immanence of God in the case of things can be allowed and yet some sort of distinction made between the several members of the so-called natural world, in the case of finite beings there must be a sense of mutual transcendence in the relation between them and God in order that true freedom may exist. Whatever may be said for Royce's formulation, there seems to be little evidence that he has faced this necessity squarely enough.

It is true that Royce is asserting in substance that his system resolves this problem. However, a specific treatment of this matter in so many words (an engagement which Royce seemed to be unwilling to be forced to by Howison) does not seem to appear in his writings.

That there is a definite deficiency here is suggested in one reference work, with words to the effect that Royce never attached great importance to the question of free will and intentional sin. Finally, it ought to be mentioned that part of Royce's difficulty may very well lie in too great a

1. See Bowne, MET, 344-380 and 404-420.
2. If this observation be correct, it seems of fundamental importance: perhaps Royce sensed the very inadequacy of his own position.
3. Trent and others, CHAL, 246.
willingness to believe that certain items of experience are inexplicably given. It is possible that his explanation at such points would be more incisive if he entertained more seriously the possibility that some so-called regulative principles might have a prospective and eventual referential.

3. THE POSITION OF THE GIFFORD LECTURES

1. The world as moral order. In view of the fact that much of the chapter thus far, although dealing with earlier publications, is a fairly accurate representation of Royce's Gifford Lectures, the section immediately at hand will not be as extensive as it would be otherwise. Since the question of moral order is singled out by Royce\(^2\) as an advance, it will be the most direct concern of this section.

At this point, Royce is willing to allow that the world, from the perspective of the eternal, is not subject to change.\(^3\) However, this is granted only because he insists at the same time that the eternal perspective includes all time, and, consequently, a knowledge of all time, as far as the activity of finite agents is concerned. This activity, being temporal,

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1. Dewey, PSHR, 26. For example, Royce's view of an inclusive absolute allegedly making place for the freedom of finite selves, might be viewed not so much as an inexplicably given ultimate, but rather as an inadequate postulate that should give way to a pluralistic person-

2. WAI, II, xv.
3. WAI, II, 369.
is therefore in terms of a future which vouchsafes a potential of accomplishment.

In all of this, the deeds of finite individuals are subject to their will.¹ In this sense, the totality of the temporal is static, in that there is no other series outside the complete, temporal succession;² this does not disavow but rather establishes "morally significant novelties."³ Within the limit of the novelty allowed by the world, the measure of finite freedom is established.

The distinction between the individual and the absolute is maintained by the assertion of the possibility of the coexistence of identity and difference. In the specific instance of the relation between finite and absolute meaning, the former is to be conceived of as identical with the latter, but only in the sense of being included in one whole with all its multiplicity of endless differences.⁴ The activity of the finite, it is admitted, is never anything but one of the incidents on the way to the perfection of the absolute.⁵

¹. WAI, II, 369.
². See criticism of this position at the close of section 1, ii at the beginning of this chapter.
³. WAI, II, 369.
⁴. WAI, II, 370.
⁵. And yet, paradoxically, Royce asserts that the Absolute is always perfect in its completeness.
Royce does not, however, allow the conclusion that the finite is always what it ought to be. The finite is an incident, but such an incident might very well be an evil deed. If so, it follows that because the process is in its wholeness good, such an incident is capable of being adjudged good, only in terms of atonement. Its consequences must be overcome through the ongoing, temporal process.

Consequently, there is true failure, as far as finite individuals are concerned, while the absolute takes up in the highest synthesis, both the condemnation and the resolution of the evil. Royce's illustration is of the hero who attains the virtue of courage in the very condemnation of and triumph over his own dread, which latter is in no wise unreal, in that it is part of a wholistic process that effects its transcendent reversal.

Further, upon closer examination, it turns out that the very idea of evil itself cannot be conceived of in isolation. Yet, the individual, considered in himself, is only to be condemned if his deed is evil. Though the evil is transcended in the absolute, the individual, as such, can be conceived of as better: not having committed the evil, emendation would not be necessary. If it be

1. WAI, II, 370.
2. WAI, II, 371.
3. WAI, II, 372.
said that the absolute is working through the individual when evil is done, and therefore the absolute is responsible and not the individual, Royce replies:

The Absolute Will wrought in you, as Absolute Will, in so far as it was indeed well that you, as temporal individual actor, should just then be, in your own measure, free and individual... But the Absolute Will, as such, was just what, in the evil deed, in so far as it was your free deed, you denied at the moment of your act.¹

There is a real ought in the temporal order, but the reality of the ought in that order does not preclude its goal from also being real, simultaneously, in the eternal whole.² This reality is in its ultimate sense the eternal victory of the good. The essence of the moral order is that the finite individual comes freely, in eternity, to the perspective of the absolute.³

As for the question of the resolution of the old problem of divine omniscience and human freedom, Royce replies that the problem does not even exist for him. God has not created a world real beyond himself, so it is not a question of God temporally foreknowing, except as he has expressed himself in finite beings.⁴

Foreknowledge in time is only a matter of the causally

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1. WAI, II, 372. If disobedience is rebellion against the will of the Absolute, is this not an instance of the Absolute rebelling against himself?
2. WAI, II, 373.
3. WAI, II, 374.
4. WAI, II, 374.
predetermined and not of the free. But, the absolute does possess complete knowledge of the whole of the temporal order; this is eternal knowledge.¹ An individual’s free acts, then, are his own, just because God’s will is in him as the heart of his freedom.²

11. Evaluation. Against this later formulation of Royce’s position, as in the case of the earlier, Dewey reaffirmed his objection that either finite experiences have ultimate worth, and the absolute is a system of meaning which the individual constructs, or individual experience has no ultimate meaning, and, therefore, cannot be taken together to give content to the absolute.³ Bakewell responded that God and persons must be kept on the same ontological plane.⁴

Dykhuizen observes that the moral order cannot be maintained, unless the plan that the individual has is of his own choosing.⁵ To this end, Royce says that the goal of the individual is set by the individual himself. Yet, in the face of the assertion that the individual’s plan is identical with God’s plan (as a part of it), it would appear that the absolute and not the individual lays down the plan

¹. WAI, II, 374.
². WAI, II, 375.
³. Werkmeister, HPIA, 159.
⁴. Ibid.
⁵. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 40.
of the individual.¹

Royce appears to be aware of this difficulty and attempts to resolve it by claiming that the individual fits into the plan of God in terms of the exercise of his free will, either by co-operation, or by having his deeds transcended by the overruling of the absolute. It would seem, however, that Royce is not saying enough, in the light of many of his previous statements. What he does say now might be at least partially true, if a multiplicity of minds were allowed; but, how he can take this later position, at the same time embracing a monism, is certainly not clear.

Kraushaar observes that Royce's treatment of evil provides a good measure of the validity of his thought, since his philosophy is so dependent upon his handling of the moral and religious problems.² Kraushaar feels that Royce was controlled by a tragic sense of life. His view of the necessary existence of evil appears akin to the doctrine of original sin.³

To the stock objections to his system, Royce's rejoinder was an emphasis upon the whole of his thought taken together, and an insistence that his absolute was not a

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1. Dykhuisen, CGJR, p.0.
3. Ibid.
block, but a community of organic, purposeful activity. His stress was thus upon the social nature of his metaphysics, ethics, and religion.¹

IV. FINAL EMPHASES

1. Loyalty as the theoretical and practical solution to the problem of evil. Royce advances the belief that in loyalty alone can be found the fulfillment of the rational nature of the finite being.² Such loyalty must be seen in terms of an individual choice of the personal cause to which one is loyal. The only cause which is determined for each individual is the general one: loyalty to loyalty.³

The moral law according to the philosophy of loyalty would be stated as follows.⁴ The moral individual must be loyal in terms of a specific cause(s), which constitutes the individual's personal goal. The cause is to be chosen according to the general principle, but also in accordance with the endless variety of individual differences. The general principle means that each individual is to do all within his power to produce the maximum of devoted service to causes which are proper.⁵

¹ Kraushaar, CAP, 194.
² POL, 199.
³ POL, 200.
⁴ POL, 201.
⁵ The criterion of choice at this point seems to be almost in terms of empirical, growing coherence.
The individual who has nothing to be loyal to is false to his duty. From one point of view the requirements of the philosophy of loyalty are rigorous, while from another, they allow considerable latitude. The individual must be rigid with himself in principle, but his judgment of others allows, from his point of view, a wide latitude, as far as their specific choices are concerned.

ii. The religious mission of evil. The whole of human tribulation is to be viewed, according to Royce, not alone as a barrier to insight, but also as a source of religious insight. Man is capable of idealizing evil: the alternatives for destruction and hostility are often growth and assimilation. Man's ethical loyalty, in situations that are viewed from the point of view of creative idealization, is the more effective, because it is the way to make ills ultimately parts of a good whole.

In this way, obstacles become sources of religious insight and contribute toward a more thorough comprehension of the spiritual unity of our world. What may appear at a certain stage of the process as worthy of only complete destruction, may be seen farther on as a stage in

1. POL, 202.
2. POL, 208-10.
4. POL, 236.
5. POL, 236.
the larger life, and, therefore, can function in the former instance as indicative of larger spiritual processes. The hope of the spiritual triumph of the good would not, then, be viewed as an illusion, but as consistent with the facts.

Now, although for the most rational type of life, adversities are necessary, they do not excuse indolence in their presence. They are a suggestion as to how the divine will experiences perfection, not merely through the destruction of evil, but through suffering. If the ill or evil which is called sorrow were destroyed, the inspiration of ambition, and the desire to be one with God would also be destroyed. This is a source of insight which leads to a doctrine very close to the Christian view of atonement.

iii. Evil in terms of guilt and atonement. The problem of atonement arises daily in the instance of human sorrow in the face of broken communities of relationship. But, it would appear that the greater the calamity, the greater the opportunity for the most triumphant loyalty of human kind. Such is the triumph of the creative will. This takes its rise on the part of, out of, or on behalf of the community.

1. POL, 236-7.
2. SRI, 237.
3. SRI, 238.
4. SRI, 239.
5. SRI, 254.
6. POC, I, 305.
7. POL, I, 308.
In the last instance, an individual, so related, could well be described as the faithful and suffering servant of the community. Creative work by such a one would undoubtedly include what could not have been, apart from the very opportunity furnished by the evil itself.

Further, the resultant transformation, through the creative deed, is an accomplishment which stands above the level at which a community would have existed if the evil had never entered in. The deed of the suffering servant is, then, not only a creative expression, but the manifestation of a reconciling will.

The ethical implication of all this for the human individual is as follows. No matter how deep the evil may be, loyal love can oppose to it the deed of atonement which lifts the level of human relationship higher than it ever could have been if this evil had not presented itself as an obstacle.

iv. Evaluation. Royce's new doctrine fared no better in many quarters than his old. Werkmeister quotes Sorley to the effect that Royce's ethics of loyalty was a merely

1. POG, I, 307. This is the language of theological redemption: the suffering-servant concept of Isaiah.
2. POG, I, 308.
3. POG, I, 308.
4. POG, I, 322.
formal affair.\textsuperscript{1} Thilly further observed that the virtues and the duties that Royce was able to derive from his idea of loyalty were merely what he had previously read into it, as a concept standing as a repository for all the virtues.

Thilly further noted that the fundamental criterion that Royce was really employing was the social.\textsuperscript{2} It might be added if it is not already contained, at least implicitly, in Thilly's judgment, that this social criterion seems itself to be undefended, as if Royce were putting it forth as a kind of ultimate which could not be established in terms of anything higher. It would appear, however, that some relation between the doctrine of the elemental worth of society and such a law as that of consistency should at least have been attempted.

Singer\textsuperscript{3} has a positive and laudatory judgment to pass, as far as Royce's ethics of loyalty are concerned. It is especially in regard to the problem of individuation that he finds in Royce's equating love and loyalty the key to an understanding and establishment of an adequate uniqueness for being both finite and infinite. Singer expresses his view by describing love as completely defined when it is asserted to be that which individuates. For, he sees

\textsuperscript{1} Werkmeister, HPIA, 163. Sorley is right in so far as Royce's emphasis is taken in the restricted sense of traditional rationalism; pressed out to the total logic of empirical, growing coherence, it is not, of course, subject to the same criticism.

\textsuperscript{2} Werkmeister, HPIA, 164.

\textsuperscript{3} Singer, PRJR, 34.
love as wanting the will and desire of the beloved to prevail.

Whether one can agree with Singer's conclusion, it is certainly true that this is one of the significant and explicit formulations which, in its broadest sense, appears to be a fruit of Royce's redirected thought. It does not, however, in spite of all the color and depth that it gives to Royce's previous attempts at an exalation of individuation, succeed in making good the case for the distinctness of finite beings in an idealistic monism.

No matter how definitely the parts of the absolute may be delineated in terms of this and other insights, they still seen but mere, dependent parts—in no fundamental sense more than immanent in the absolute. To stop short of a plurality of minds, allows for the introduction of such plurality at no subsequent point.

Dykhuizen doubts seriously whether the community concept of Royce's later thought is to be considered the same as his earlier absolute. Royce, he feels, at first postulated a finite individual who was temporal only; who exists in eternity, ultimately, only as a memory in the mind of the absolute. Here, the absolute appears to be a single will which appears plural in time. Community then would

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1. Dykhuizen, CQJR, 62.
When Kraushaar attempts an evaluation of Royce's philosophy, he is constrained to judge Royce a monistic idealist, who is attempting a solution of the problems of philosophy in terms of the moral environment of the eighteenth century. But, it must be observed, whether Royce is attempting a solution in the spirit of the eighteenth or the first century, the only legitimate points of debate can be those at which he fails to make good his case. His view is that Royce's idea of the whole never succeeded in bringing the absolute and the particular together in a manner which did justice to both. Now, there is certainly difficulty in the question of individuation in a monistic system. But it does not therefore follow that one ought to reject every attempt at an idealistic view of reality, simply because the temper of the times is more interested in, for example, Dewey's contextualism. All idealism is not monistic, nor does pluralistic personalism face the same problems as absolutism. He further believes that one of the greatest weaknesses of Royce's position was that it neglected the working, in actual experience, of the whole in the part. His attempt to construct the absolute in terms

1. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 63.
2. Kraushaar, CAP, 197.
3. Ibid., 198.
of a community of interpretation failed because he was unable to transcend his earlier rationalism.

However, pluralistic personalism with its emphasis on empirical, growing coherence, stresses actual experience in a way that Royce did not, in so far as his emphasis was more rationalistic. And further, to suggest that Royce laid too much stress on this latter element is not to make good the case for naturalism in the same breath.

5. SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CHAPTER

With this chapter, the treatment by this thesis of Royce's handling of the problem of evil begins. The plan of development has been an examination of Royce's first formulation of the problem, the further additions of his earlier works, his position at the time of the Gifford Lectures, and the last emphasis of his thought. Each section is concluded with criticism. Typically this has resulted in the following development.

Royce's first formulation was in terms of the nature and possibility of error. His conclusion was that the only conceivable resolution of the isolation of thinker and object must come in a thought which includes both. This thought is the absolute who is the ground of both the rationality and the goodness of the universe.

Evil is viewed as an essential part of goodness—the conflicts of morality are essential and therefore
eternal. This poses the fundamental problem of responsibility in regard to moral action; indeed, for significant individuation at all.

Further developments in Royce's thinking introduce the question of freedom and moral order. Royce's resolution takes the form of a Kantian bifurcation of reality into a world of appreciation and a world of description. In discussion with Howison, Royce insists, further, that his concept of individuation is valid, since individuation is not to be viewed as segmentation.

Specifically, in reference to evil, Royce, at this stage in his thinking, maintains, that virtue is proportionate to the exercise of the will in choice against a background of genuine moral problems. Moral deficiency is part of the progressive growth of virtue in that it supplies the negative background and impetus. Further, in reference to nature and man, evil must be viewed, not in terms of a relationship between two different kinds, but in terms of elements whose difference lies in degree.

Howison's basic objection appeared at this point as yet unanswered: for significant individuation there must be many minds; the absolute should be viewed as a system of self-active beings. No evidence is forthcoming to the effect that Royce meets this objection squarely: he merely asserts negatively that chasms do not individuate. In
sum, Royce seems too anxious to accept certain aspects of his own system as inexplicably given.

With the Gifford Lectures, Royce systematizes his position. The world from the perspective of the eternal is viewed as moral order; finite activity (cf. evil) is an incident on the way to the perfection of the absolute. Critically, it was observed that the absolute can still be viewed, contrary to Royce, as a system of meaning which the individual constructs. Further (and conversely), if the plan of the individual and the absolute are the same, it must mean that both are the one plan of the absolute. Royce's emphasis here on community seems hardly consistent with a monism. Royce's final emphasis turns to ethics, and loyalty as the theoretical and practical solution to the problem of evil. Loyalty is viewed as the fulfillment of the rational nature of man. The ethical and religious mission of evil is as a source of insight: the idealization of evil through growth and assimilation. This idealization comes about through the triumph of the creative will. Royce now states his position in the language of theological redemption.

There is some doubt as to the synonymous character of Royce's later conception of community with his earlier absolute. Whatever the answer, it is certain that with individ-
uals who never appear to be more than ideas in the mind of God, Royce at no point has the right to assert that the social is more than an "as-if" concept.
CHAPTER IV

THE STRUGGLE WITH EVIL AND BASIC CRITIQUE

Chapter I of this thesis was concerned with a general introduction to Royce's life and thought. Chapter II examined Royce's system firsthand from the perspective of material directly significant for an understanding of his treatment of the problem of evil, although not dealing with that problem directly. While Chapter III was concerned with the problem of evil as such, the subject in its most central setting is reached only in this final chapter.

Criticism, which began in Chapter III, receives its major emphasis here, as peripheral matters recede. Specifically, in addition to an evaluation of the material presented for the first time in this chapter, a general critique of the whole scope of the thesis will be set forth. The device employed to this end will be a detailed examination of what are considered the most fundamental issues, from the viewpoint of the problem of evil, in Royce's thought.

1. THEODICY: ROYCE'S SYSTEMATIC ACCOUNT

1. General formula to account for the presence of evil in the temporal order. The larger an individual's ideals, the less capable the temporal order appears of satisfying
In terms of this, Royce's formula states: All finite processes inevitably involve dissatisfaction. If it were not that the temporal order could be thus described, there could be no significant struggle toward completion; this is to say, the absolute seeks in finite individuals, through temporal striving, the peace which is in eternity alone.

The temporal order is the region where the absolute appears as struggling with evil. The temporal and eternal orders are not, however, divided in their being. Although in terms of temporal succession, there is struggle with evil and no fulfillment at any one present instant, the temporal order in its wholeness is identical with the eternal. The temporal order, in its entirety, is one life-process, completely present to the absolute: one in which the absolute will reigns supreme.

Dykhuizen, on the contrary, believes that Royce's description of absolute experience renders it either empty of content or completely different from that of finite individuals. Royce, himself, suggests this when earlier he refers to the life of the absolute as "superhuman experience, of which ours would then seem to be only the remote hint.

1. WAI, II, 383.
2. WAI, II, 385.
3. WAI, II, 386.
4. WAI, II, 386-7. Royce uses the term "identical" to signify identity in being.
5. Dykhuizen, 28. Man suffers from natural evil, then that God may be good.
6. Ibid., 32.
It might be suggested, on Royce's behalf, that he has already asserted that his description of the absolute involves the inclusion of finite experiences, as such, in no way transformed. With this he asserts that his system makes a place for the recognition that all finite selves, taken together, plus all that goes to make up the absolute, would yield just this kind of experience of which finite experience taken by itself is only a hint.

The difficulty is, if finite experience is in no way transformed by its inclusion in the absolute, that it would seem to follow that the experience of the absolute would be much more than hinted at by the experience of the finite, since absolute and finite experience would be the same. If no more than a hint is allowed, then has not a transformation of some sort taken place? If it be argued that the whole must be reckoned in some sense, greater than its parts, would Royce be any better off? Would not this, in turn, militate against Royce's suggestion that absolute experience is no different than finite? This would seem to follow from the fact that the whole as greater than its parts would be in some sense different than the parts. How then could absolute experience be the same as finite?1

1. Further, Royce's argument for the necessity of postulating the absolute because of the incompleteness of finite experience would be refuted by the chaos and error and evil in human experience.
Rogers feels that this view of finite-infinite relations seems to be a contradiction in Royce's thought. How can finite experience, as it is, be present in God's life, especially at the point of the consciousness of limitation? Such would involve believing something to be true at the same time that it was seen to be false. If God is omniscient, how can human error, as error, be included in his experience?

Further, this same writer voices his conviction that Royce's failure to take the finite feeling of dependence and limitation into consideration is a fundamental difficulty for the monistic inclusion of the finite in the absolute and dooms his whole discussion in reference to the individual to the realm of abstraction. Man seems to be little more than an idea in the mind of God to which God gives purposive attention.

Royce's attempt to account for the presence of evil in the temporal order further poses the difficult problem as to how the temporal order can be completely present to the absolute. If there is any succession in God, then God is subject in some sense to time. If there is no succession, is Royce not faced with a block-God and a block-universe?

1. Rogers, EAP, 289.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 296.
4. Ibid.
5. Supra, 116-7.
In other words, it appears impossible to say that time is completely in God without at the same time affirming that God is sufficiently in time to make the complete presence of the temporal order to the absolute inconceivable. How can the future acts of even relatively free creatures be foreknown?

ii. **Relation between moral defect and ill fortune.**

Royce views the moral order, according to his idealistic premise, in terms of solidarity. Therefore, he posits an inter-relation between evil action and ill fortune, so that the universe is affected by the exercise of human freedom. Since the absolute life is one, every area of this life has unique relations to the whole, so that although uniqueness, or freedom, is real, no self is wholly independent of any other of its fellows, or of the absolute.

Thus, the existence of physical evil is justified on the same basis as moral evil. Royce asserts that without both moral and physical evil the perfection of God's life would be lacking. Moral evil makes for God's moral perfection and physical evil for the triumphant life of God. That is through the defeat of evil in time, as in the former case.

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1. WAI, II, 393.
2. WAI, II, 394.
3. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 32; COG, 12.
But, can it be seriously asserted that the implications of Royce’s formula are successful in facing the problem of surd evil? Hasn’t Royce failed to say enough about this problem here and in other places, to escape the charge of introducing a retreat into ignorance?¹ Theistic absolutism has been charged with the introduction, in its concept of the infinite God, of an amorphous ultimate which could serve to account for anything, conceivable or inconceivable.² There is much truth in the charge.

Now, is not Royce at least partially guilty of such an appeal when he postulates his rather sketchily defined absolute? Even if it were granted that Royce had a right to postulate the inclusion of evil in his absolute in the way that he does, would it not then be impossible for him to go on to assert that his absolute is God? The referent would seem to be a more likely candidate for Descartes’ omnipotent demon than for the God of Christianity.

iii. Implication of foregoing for the problems of theodicy. The struggles of the temporal order are, as expressed above, the exercise of the absolute will, while the eternal order is the final triumphant expression of that will.³ Since, in the temporal order, there is relative

1. The aesthetically unified is introduced at the expense of morality.
2. Brightman, FOR, iii.
3. WAI, II, 398.
freedom, there is always the possibility of finite "resistance of the will of the world by the will of the individual."¹ The result is that all individuals, and the absolute itself, are potential sufferers. Justification for this comes in the value of the life that overcomes the evil: a temporal victory, through moral conflict in finite wills, of both the finite and the infinite.²

Dykhuisen underlines, as the most important element in Royce's proffered solution to the problem of evil, this idea that confronting evil and overcoming it is the highest moral experience possible.³ In this way, evil is viewed as becoming part of the individual's moral virtue and will.⁴

It is not a matter of evil's necessary existence, as if good would have no significance otherwise. Rather, through evil alone, and its transcendence, the good will comes to have existence in the individual's consciousness.⁵ If this were not so, mature goodness would not be possible, only innocence.⁶

iv. Realistic theology. This view comes out quite specifically in scholasticism and its doctrine of the created

¹ WAI, II, 398.
² WAI, II, 398.
³ Dykhuisen, OJIR, 26.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid., 27.
world.\(^1\) Evil is explained as due completely to the finite will of beings who are essentially independent. Yet, this independence is soon negated by the assertion that there is a direct connection between the introduction of evil on the part of man and the righteous judgment of God which ensues.\(^2\)

Thus, either the thorough-going realism of the original premises is violated, or, if it is not, a moral fatalism must ensue; for, judgment and rectification of ill are made inexplicable, having no connection with an absolute which alone would have the power to bring it about. Either, then, an absolute idealism is introduced, or on a realistic basis, the old dilemma of the limitation of the goodness or the power of God remains.\(^3\)

Royce's conviction is that, in contrast, absolute idealism completely circumvents the difficulty. But, is it not true that if the realist has such a problem (cf. Epicurus' alternatives), Royce has it even more keenly? The realist (and the non-absolute idealist) may, if he so desires (which Royce cannot do and still maintain his thorough-going absolutism), limit the power of God and save his goodness, which is of course ethically respectable. Royce appears forced to deny the goodness of God in retaining the doctrine of omnipotence.

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1. WAI, II, 399.
2. WAI, II, 399.
3. WAI, II, 404-5.
If evil is included in the absolute, as Royce says it is, if it is not a given element of the divine consciousness but something which the absolute allows by choice,\(^1\) then the question must be asked, Why could this all-powerful being not have accomplished the same ends without suffering, sorrow, and the like? Royce's only reply seems to be that God could have chosen other possible world-system manifestations, but he chose this specific one because of its making possible the highest of moral experiences.\(^2\) Just why only one alternative is open to an infinitely powerful and wise being does not seem clear.

Leighton, in a discussion of individuality and value, states that either the universe contains an impersonal surd, outside the personal creating ground and against which the latter struggles; or, the surd is within the supreme self.\(^3\) The latter is Dr. Brightman's "Given", which limits the creative development of both the cosmic and the finite person.

This second alternative Leighton rejects, insisting that if God is not perfect, the concept has no meaning or

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1. It is positively willed in finite individuals, since individuals are the result of the absolute will. Cf. WAI, II, 297, for each result, there is in the absolute a purpose. Since the realm of the absolute is the realm of freedom (SMP, I:2), the above conclusions follow. See also discussions infra, beginning on the following pages: 21, 26, 56, 59, 84, 91.
2. WAI, II, 398.
3. Leighton, GIA, 165.
Leighton's own suggestion is that God is the perfection of personality, and finite in that he does not include all reality; Leighton does not feel prepared to assert that the basis of the entire universe is the "Principle of Individuality." A cosmic dualism is a plausible theory.

This he believes to be consistent with a personalistic idealism. He rejects absolute idealism, for, although he is willing to allow that the universe is in some sense one, he is unwilling to postulate an all-inclusive mind. Such, he is convinced, would provide no place for unique selves. Reality must be a community of inter-related selves, for, if not, if only one is ultimately real, then individuality is denied the rest.

Now, what Leighton says in regard to a pluralistic personalism ought certainly to be applauded; however, the suggestion that this position is consistent with a dualism that postits a surd external to God cannot be as readily allowed. Would not such a position deny the basic assertion of idealism and introduce an inexplicable matter? If this difficulty, and others implicit in such a dualism, force one

1. Leighton, CIA, 165.
2. Ibid., 166.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
to reject Leighton's full position, is not the only alternative left, in his own words, the specific finitism of Brightman? Brightman's finitistic personalism does not ascribe evil to the will of God, but makes Good as free of responsibility for its existence as he is responsible for it on Royce's system.

V. Royce's idealistic theodicy. Finite individuals suffer because they are agents whose will is not fully expressed in the temporal sphere. The sorrows of human finitude are identically God's sorrows. Their purpose in the divine life is as the stages through which ultimate triumph is guaranteed. The individual who is faithful, expresses in time "the triumph whereby God overcomes in eternity the temporal world and its tribulations." 2

The only basis for a true theodicy is, according to Royce, absolute idealism, in which the sorrows of the finite are identical with those of the infinite: the absolute knows what the finite knows just exactly as the finite knows it. The finite is not absorbed in the absolute; rather, the finite is faithfully and accurately included in the infinite. 4 Divine fulfillment is seen as

1. WAI, II, 405.
2. WAI, II, 406. Little significance remains for "stages," if the temporal is already complete in God.
3. WAI, II, 406.
4. WAI, II, 406.
possible only through sorrows in time; even human experience testifies that the most significant perfection includes struggle, by which opposing elements become clearly conscious in the resulting contrast.1

Thus, even the unrepentant sinner is a part of the good will, this very relationship visiting judgment on his sin. The hatred of the individual's sin on the part of God is one aspect of God's holiness.2

Now, it must be observed that when Royce speaks of the sorrows of the individual as being identically God's sorrows; the finite being as accurately included in the infinite; and the absolute knowing what the finite knows just exactly as he knows it, he fails to consider the problem of the relation between the whole and the part. Royce maintains that the temporal order and its contents are contained, as such, within the absolute. How can it be said that the absolute knows what the finite knows exactly as the finite knows it unless the absolute becomes the finite?

It is a commonly recognized fact that in a philosophic system every fact involves the philosophy of that fact.

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1. WAI, II, 408-9. Evil, then, appears eternally necessary for contrast.
2. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 27, cf., Ibid., SMP, 460. If the sinner as a self is a separate purpose of the absolute, it would appear that God hates himself.
Items which appear the same in unreal, abstracted isolation are quite different, at least ultimately, when they are oriented within different systems. If the absolute is in any way different from the finite, how can it accurately be said that any experience of the absolute is exactly as that of the finite? If this is taken to mean that there is nothing missing to the absolute, it still would not make the two experiences the same, since there is a different experience in each case.

In other words, the finite, with an absolute reference, must be different than the finite without that reference. Perhaps Royce means that the absolute embraces the finite in its understanding, and just because it is infinite and the finite limited it is capable of both perspectives, while the finite can have only one. But this would not be to know exactly as the finite knows.¹

Nor does Royce show how it is possible for absolute being (not viewpoint) to include finite being without either an absorption or a transformation of the latter, when the finite is defined as the temporal manifestation of the absolute. Whence individuation and responsibility?

¹ And yet Royce says the infinite includes finite experience as such; the two realms are identical in being, WAI, II, 286-7. The infinite is thus said to include the finite experience as the finite experiences it.
2. ROYCE'S POSITION IN HIS FINAL PUBLICATIONS

1. Introduction. Rogers is unwilling to admit with Werkmeister that Royce's later writings were more than a
shift of emphasis.¹ He points out that the emphasis upon
the social had played an important part in Royce's think-
ing all the way along.² Yet, Rogers is willing to allow
that Royce's later view of community as a higher form
of self had a tendency to displace his emphasis upon the
more abstract absolute.³

Kraushaar (in agreement with Werkmeister) considers
the last stage of Royce's development the most revolution-
ary.⁴ It was a period that found him again deep in the
study of logic. His position was, of course, one of logical
realism. Kraushaar observes that in this respect Royce was
closer to Plato than to Hegel.⁵ Logic is a clue to reality
because it reveals the connectedness of things.

However, Royce's rationalism was to some extent miti-
gated by his voluntarism. Here, Royce follows Schopenhauer
in affirming the central place of will and purpose in reality.⁶
But, Royce does not go as far as Schopenhauer, for he stressed

¹. Rogers, EAP, 289.
². Ibid.
³. Ibid.
⁵. Ibid.
⁶. Ibid., 195.
the importance of cognition as being absolutely necessary for the fulfillment of purpose.\(^1\)

ii. The Philosophy of Loyalty. Royce here faces the problem as to why a person should seek good if the world-will is certain of success anyway.\(^2\) He answers that the individual good that would be involved in a specific person's loyalty is not gained unless that person is actually loyal. Royce insists that it is not a matter of the world-life being eternally complete and then asking the finite individual to copy its perfections. Rather, he expounds his view as involving the unique deeds of each individual making up the totality of life in its completeness.\(^3\)

His emphasis is that the unity of the absolute does not absorb the individual, but is the arrangement by which an absolute life is made possible through the totality and unity of individual lives.\(^4\) The individual self is a true self only in so far as it attempts to do its part in the whole. This is the view of the philosophy of loyalty.\(^5\)

iii. The Sources of Religious Insight. Royce now stresses the process and result of the idealization of sorrow; creative synthesis vs. destruction. Sorrow and

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2. POL, 394.
3. POL, 394-5.
4. POL, 395.
5. POL, 396.
evil in general are thus potentially sources of religious insight and accomplishment.¹

iv. The Problem of Christianity.

(1) The publication itself. This was Royce's last extensive work. In it he dealt specifically with the moral burden of the individual and his escape through loyalty. At this point, his concept of loyalty and community is very close to the Calvinistic concept of the universal church of Christ. In fact, Royce observes that the apostle Paul's psychology teaches in essence that the moral self-consciousness of the individual is cultivated by the social order.² Further, Royce goes on to interpret Paul's remedy for an awakened moral consciousness which is continually frustrated and defeated, as a new social insight: a "divinely instituted community. Loyalty ... is the love of a community conceived as a person on a level superior to that of any human individual."³

(2) Criticism of the idea of community. Rogers asks whether a morality so dependent upon society, as over against the concept of individual liberty, would be either possible or wise. Although he does not say so, it would seem that Rogers is touching in a specific and practical fashion the fundamental problem of Royce's ethics and metaphysics. In

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¹ SRI, 232-241.
² POC, 1, 156. Smith, PSI, 129.
³ POC, 1, 157.
the face of such a tremendous emphasis upon the social, where
is the individual in either being or morals?

Bakewell, on the other hand, finds this new note in
Royce's later philosophy quite acceptable. Royce still in-
sists upon the social nature of truth, but now the real world
becomes a community of interpretation. The difference be-
tween individuals and communities in common experience is
described as only the difference between two levels of life.

For Bakewell, this new emphasis saves the absolute from
being an abstraction. Such a judgment seems to go beyond
the facts. It is true that the new perspective portrays
Royce's ultimate more vividly. The theoretical difficulties,
however, still remain. The original structure is not saved
by the new approach.

(3) Epistemology and ethics. Royce's theory of
knowledge is not to be considered traditional. He adopts
Peirce's view of "signs" which are not percepts nor concepts
but "symbols invested with meaning by the accumulating
experience of the community." Peirce called this process,
which is inexhaustible, and which Royce considered the founda-
tion of community—the fellowship of spiritual solidarity.

Consequently, the absolute is redefined as "the world-community

1. Bakewell, PRJR, 32.
2. Kranshaar, GAP, 195.
3. Ibid.
of mutually interpreting persons.  

Ethically, this meant that Royce's monistic metaphysics, which insisted that the individual seek the good in the whole, now takes on as a specification of the latter goal the promotion of unity in the ideal community.  In effect, it may be said that the ethical result of this ultimate redirection of Royce's thinking was not to reject the old idea of the absolute, but to lay new emphasis and stress on the positive manifestation of a life of loyalty as a sign of the way to the realization of the goal of community.

This means that Royce re-emphasized his insistence upon the necessity and propriety of finite, ethical activity in a monistic universe. This new emphasis did not, however, remove the theoretical difficulties which face absolutism; in fact, his emphasis upon the social in the last stage of his thought raises afresh the problems of individuation and finite responsibility.

3. GENERAL CRITIQUE OF ROYCE'S WHOLE SYSTEM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Two basic aspects of Royce's philosophy are perhaps, most important, both for his system in general and for his treatment of the problem of evil. The first concerns his

2. Ibid.
original and basic argument for his idealism. Throughout the several successive formulations of his view, no reasons are given to suggest that the system at any point rests less basically upon this groundwork than it did in the beginning.

Second, the relation between the absolute and the finite is probably the most critical aspect of his and any monistic system. It is of primary importance for any general appreciation of Royce’s idealism and for that which touches primarily the ethical and introduces the problem of good and evil. In view of these facts, an examination of each of these fundamental concepts seems to be in order. In fact, criticism over these two areas will pretty much cover all that is basically significant, either directly or indirectly, for this thesis.

1. Royce’s argument for idealism.

(1) The union of individual and object. Rogers is quite specific in his evaluation of this argument. He insists that Royce’s entire philosophy rests upon its validity. Royce had argued in his Religious Aspect of Philosophy that there is a gap between individual and object which can be bridged only if the two can be brought together in the unity of the ideal. Rogers sees a definite

1. Rogers, EAP, 290.
2. Ibid.
relationship here to English empiricism and its view that an object can be real, when not perceived, only as a possible experience. This follows from the fundamental premise that all reality is justified only in and through experience.¹

Rogers says that in the beginning Royce introduced his premise with a recognition of its hypothetical nature but as he progressed he lost sight of the hypothetical character of his postulate and considered it the only verifiable interpretation.² Rogers further scores the more developed form of this doctrine. He cannot see how the relation of a purpose to its fulfillment can represent in essence the relation of an idea to its object.³ In fact, Rogers believes that the relation between desire and satisfaction in the sense in which Royce describes the situation actually presupposes the existence of the object.⁴

Royce's refutation of realism, Rogers maintains, depends upon his definition of realism as the complete absence of relation.⁵ Rogers insists that the independent existence of an object for a realist does not mean that such inde-
pendence actually constitutes the existence of the object. Its independent existence is rather only one consequence of its reality.\textsuperscript{1} Rogers believes that this view, on the part of Royce, is just one specific instance of the tendency of the idealist "to absorb existence in logic."\textsuperscript{2}

At least two observations must be made in reference to Roger's criticisms. First, it is quickly granted that the theory that all reality must be reduced to experience is, confessedly, an hypothesis. But, that all that is given is experience is not so much an hypothesis as an immediately given datum.

What else does a human being have but experience and inferences therefrom? And if there are realms of which he has no experience, either directly or indirectly, how could an individual ever be aware of them? Rogers' contention, at this point, hardly seems justified.

As to his further complaint that the cogency of the idealistic view gains much of its plausibility from a false definition of realism, further objection must be raised. When Rogers says that realism, in speaking of objects wholly other than ideas, need not be construed as excluding characters of a descriptive nature, he seems, himself, to indulge in false definition. If an object can

\textsuperscript{1} Rogers, \textit{FAP}, 291
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
be spoken of, from the realistic point of view, as somehow participating in the ideal, does it not look as if realism has undergone, in Rogers' definition, a transmutation that makes it, in essence, indistinguishable from idealism?¹

In agreement with Royce, and making much better sense than Rogers' sometimes realistic, sometimes idealistic position, is Dr. Brightman's view. The sense experience of the self is indicative of a realm beyond the single individual.² Will in the self is, simply, choice.³ A self, which is also a person, possesses as part of its essence the ability to think; God is then a person, though superhuman.⁴ In the unity-multiplicity of the self, Dr. Brightman believes is the clue to the nature of reality.⁵ The breadth of reality is explicable in terms of the breadth of consciousness.

The world is a world of experience and no reference to ostensive definition can make good the case for the view that the universe is extra-mental. Objective reality must always be explained in terms of reference to a self.⁶ Even ostensive definition involves purpose.⁷ As Royce insisted,

¹ This is more Platonic than theistic.
² Brightman, PMS, 10.
³ Ibid., 11.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., 12.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid.
ideas are not only the nature of cognition, they are also volitional.

(2) Finite epistemology. Rogers also maintains that absolute experience does not save human knowledge, which Royce is attempting to explain. He repeats Royce's affirmation that knowledge implies that the recognition of something beyond one has no meaning unless the self already has this transcendent fact. Now, says Rogers, if the self that makes knowledge intelligible is a self of which finite experience falls short, how can it illuminate human knowing? In other words, when Royce says that an individual does not judge a real object, but his idea of that object, he must be corrected by the assertion that the logical content of an individual's idea is exactly what the individual does judge about the real object.

Yet, what can Rogers possibly mean by this objection? Is he suggesting that the correspondence criterion is a possible test of truth? Can the object actually be brought into the mind? If not, then is Royce not correct? Further, is not Rogers' statement that the logical content of an individual's idea relates to the object, a confirmation of Royce's thesis that all we have are ideas?

1. Rogers, EAP, 292.
2. Ibid., 292-3.
3. Ibid., 293.
Rogers goes on to say that if Royce's analysis of a single judgment as a starting point is accepted, it is fatal to his conclusion. He states that if the object of an individual's judgment is only an idea, the finite individual could not be sufficiently transcendent to possess any meaning.

Now, is this not a loaded definition? Is Royce not actually arguing that although all we have are ideas, these ideas nonetheless have a reference, which is only satisfied and validated by the hypothesis of a larger mind? If Rogers insists in continuing to speak as if somehow an external, independent object could be brought within the mind, and if he demands that acceptability rest upon this test, has he not, even if successful, proved too much and made untenable his own position?

Kraushaar notes how Royce's distinction between internal and external meaning rose out of his voluntaristic view of ideas. As expressions of purpose they are to be conceived of as internal in character. Their correspondence with the objective is their external side. Royce called his theory at this point absolute pragmatism: the test of the truth

1. Rogers, EAP, 293.
2. The word transcendent has not been used because Royce's inclusive ultimate seems to necessitate a type of epistemological monism.
4. Ibid.
of an idea is the degree to which the facts fulfill the purpose of the idea.¹

Pressing farther on, Royce offered the hypothesis that what is conceived by the finite individual as outer fact is an expression of the purpose of the absolute. The only ideas that will work are those that are in agreement with the purposes of the absolute.² It is in this connection that Royce further developed his argument for the existence of the absolute.

(3) Logic and volition. In order to show in opposition to Bradley that his argument for the absolute did not simply defend its ideal possibility and that the existence of an infinite multitude is not logically indefensible, Royce depended to a great extent upon the insights into logic which he obtained through Peirce.³ His effort was to establish an analogy between the mathematical concept of a determinate infinite and his view of the absolute as many in one.

Such a mathematical system is called infinite when the relations between the members are similar to the structure of the series as a whole.⁴ This, of course, is only ideal;

1. Krausnaar, CP, 190.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 191.
4. Ibid.
to establish the actuality of the absolute, Royce introduced self-representation (the thought of a thought for example) as a progression necessary for the systematic ordering which makes truth possible. Thus, without the absolute, self-represented in an endless variety of persons, there could be no truth and no reality.  

The argument by which Royce attempts to establish the reality of the absolute comes at this point to rest upon the illustration of purpose, for it does not seem to be much more than an illustration, making possible indeed the conceivability of Royce's ultimate, but not its actuality. Royce himself attempts to face and resolve the necessity of establishing the actuality of the absolute through an explanation in terms of the analogy of mathematics. This is, of course, only an analogy, even in Royce's presentation, until he attempts to show that the idea of self-representation is a necessary principle of thought.

Kraushaar is convinced that Royce still has established no more than the theoretical possibility of the existence of ultimate unity; that there is an absolute in fact does not appear to him as a justifiable inference from Royce's argumentation.  

Kraushaar's position seems to be rather well 

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2. Ibid., 198.
taken. Royce's arguments are very helpful illustrations, even keen suggestions. It would seem however, that they cannot be taken as establishing (Royce attempts to show that the idea of self-representation is a necessary principle of thought) the existence of the absolute. But, they do have very great value and certainly are worth while for pointing up the postulation of the actuality of an ultimate.\(^1\) The only legitimate fashion in which they may be used is heuristically.

Returning to the earlier form of Royce's argument for the absolute, that from the internal and external meaning of ideas, certain specific difficulties are encountered. Dykhuizen notes that Royce viewed internal meaning as primary so that reality is the embodiment of true internal meaning.\(^2\) It would appear, however, that the two meanings are co-ordinate and that experienced reality is the result of both meanings.\(^3\) Royce seems to fall into the error of the separation of the two meanings—a danger which he himself warned against.\(^4\)

Further, if internal and external meanings are in constant interplay, how can it be asserted that an absolute

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1. His arguments also indicate a real difficulty in the concept of an external relation.
2. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 45; cf. WAI, II, 297.
3. Ibid., 47.
4. Ibid., 46.
A system of external meaning is clear and fixed. Dykhuiizen feels one is led to suspect, in the face of these and other difficulties, that the absolute is merely an abstraction of the element of wholeness in finite experience. At least, it is his conviction that if the above objection cannot be sustained, the concept of the absolute certainly proves to be externally and unnecessarily related to finite experience.

Dykhuiizen's objections and conclusions can be allowed to stand if Royce's arguments are taken as establishing with rigorous necessity the existence of the absolute. Taken as heuristic hypotheses, it does not seem that they can be as completely laid aside.

There are further objections which can be leveled against Royce's development of his position under pressure of Bradley's criticism. In a sense, the mathematical series which Royce puts forth as an example of the infinite is not actually infinite at all, rather an endlessly growing finite. It appears that what Royce is attempting to do is deduce the infinite from finite experience; from the time of Hume on such has generally been regarded as an impossible task. If on the other hand, Royce had introduced his concept as an hypothesis which seems to be the most coherent in the organization of man's total experience, he would have avoided many

1. Dykhuiizen, CGJR, 43.
2. Ibid., 52.
of the difficulties which seem inherent in his system as actually stated. Royce believed that his positions saved the reality of time.\(^1\) As a matter of fact, his discussion seems to be so completely a matter of logical implication that in a very real sense time is actually given up.

In fact, only as Royce does give up an appreciation of time, is his relatively easy assertion of the perfected self-representative system made possible.\(^2\) Yet, there seems to be a sense, and a basic one, in which the giving up of time must mean the giving up of sequence; in fact, it appears that the whole idea of order at all in the finite or the infinite becomes meaningless.

\(^{(4)}\) Demonstration of God's existence. In reference to Royce's attempted proof of the existence of God, Werkmeister\(^3\) is in agreement with Novison. Not only is Werkmeister unable to accept the validity of the proof,\(^4\) but even if the proof were allowed, he sees difficulties. First, it seems highly dubious as to whether Royce's God is truly personal; second, there is doubt as to whether Royce's conception of God is

1. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 52.
2. Ibid., 53. The time span of the absolute is said to embrace all time, such is its inclusiveness (even as the human span would embrace that of certain insects—of Bowne's similar position in his Metaphysics). See the objections above; also note that such a position still leaves the absolute in time.
3. Werkmeister, HPIA, 139.
4. Ibid.
compatible with the moral autonomy upon which personality rests.

Werkmeister's general argument against the sufficiency of Royce's position opens with a specific recognition that Royce set forth the synthetic character of human reason in a new perspective. He will not allow, however, that he demonstrates the existence of God.\(^1\) In other words, Werkmeister is willing to grant that man's reason may be a witness to God, but that is all.\(^2\)

What he seems to be saying is what has been set down above, to the effect that much if not all of Royce's argumentation in this issue would fit very well into supplementary argumentation for the existence of God, if that proposition were first established on other grounds. Consequently, Royce may advance his theory as a good hypothesis, but he cannot be allowed to claim that it has the compelling force of necessary inference.

Hocking feels, basing his opinion on a stenographic report of some of Royce's last lectures, that for Royce the ontological argument contained in essence the central doctrine of idealism.\(^3\) In these remarks, Royce varied his earlier emphasis to the extent of insisting that it is not

\(^1\) Werkmeister, HPIA, 139.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Hocking, CIA, 45.
the egocentric predicament which is basic to the issue between realism and idealism; rather, the question of whether it is "any part of the essence of a thing that it exists."¹

This is to assert, contrary to Perry, that idealism is concerned with the objective world; although, of course, its ultimate conclusion is that the world of reality is the world of spirit.²

Royce believed that there was a definite relation between essence and existence. To understand that essence is not existence one would have to know the meaning of the latter. To find this meaning one would have to find the essence of existence. A complete bifurcation, such as Santayana attempts, is unsuccessful because essence appears on both sides of the gulf.³ It turns out, as Hocking sees it, that Royce's argumentation is this last phase is not so much an attempted proof of God's existence, as a concern with the general ontological consideration of the possibility of arguing from essence to existence.⁴

Appreciating the classic refutations of the ordinary form of the ontological argument, Royce stated that nonetheless a type of ontological argument is exactly what is used,

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1. Hocking, CMA, 45.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 47. Hocking's source was a transcription of notes taken in some of Royce's classes.
4. Ibid.
when, in answer to the question as to whether there is a real world or not, the really is forthcoming "that something has to exist...you know there is a world from the nature of the case, from the very definition of the world."

The same, Royce believed, is the case in reference to the past or future. If it is said that it is of the essence of the past that it was, and of the future that it will be, such is an example of reasoning from essence to existence. This also applies to the principles of the structure of reality upon which induction depends: the realm of existence is defined by reference to the essence of law.

Royce calls this a "relational form of the ontological proof." "Whoever appeals to evidence for existence is using some form of the ontological proof." In other words, the basic problem of metaphysics is whether reality is of such a nature as to be understood. Hocking observes that the purport of Royce's remarks is that for a thing to be real is for it to fulfill rational purposes.

Royce's term "interpretation" is suggestive of a tentative (conceptual) essence; although, he holds in the case of the world that "the essence of world is such that it must exist." At the same time Hocking believes that

1. Hocking, CIA, 34.
2. Ibid., 54.
3. Ibid., 55.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 56.
6. Ibid., 57.
7. Ibid., 57-8.
Royce has not ignored the distinction between essence and existence. For, says Hocking, Royce allows for conceptual essences which may be in the mind without being in the thing, and categorical essences to which this argumentation has reference.¹

Hocking, however, admits that even if its validity is granted, Royce's argument is incomplete. As he sees it, what would be further required is an examination of each category separately, showing that its essence demands its existence (and that the essence of the contrary postulate is such that it cannot be); or, a deduction from an essence the objectivity of which is demonstrative of the categories. In other words, Royce has, in a way, reversed the classic form of the ontological argument by claiming that existence has an essence.

Hocking himself attempts to relate essence and existence by insisting that existence is "the field for the realization of essence."² The question now, in reference to Royce, is, Is there a specific and necessary relation between the essence or the concept of the absolute and its existence? If, as Hocking suggests, the relation between essence and existence is as above, then it would appear that Royce's argument for the existence of God is made conceivable along

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¹ Hocking, CIA, 49.
² Ibid., 62.
these lines.

But, can more be said? Does Royce establish the existence of God? Again it appears that Royce's argument is very suggestive, but, as with the other classic arguments for the existence of God, it can be allowed force only if the thinker first asks himself what he would expect if his theistic postulate were true. Then, Royce's argument would seem to be a valuable part of the process of the accumulation of evidence on a probability basis.

ii. The absolute and the finite.

(1) Individuation and the time-sean. Kraushaar observes in reference to this topic, Royce's special stress on individuality: the essence of reality is individuality. The absolute or the whole is, however, the only perfect individual. For the individual in the finite world, time is relative to the tension between purpose and fulfillment. From one point of view the individuating element of the human self is the unique life span which needs both other personalities and the natural order for its fulfillment. A true self could not exist in isolation, for then it could not realize a life and would not be free. Freedom arises when the self, in proper relationships, attempts its fulfillment.

1. Kraushaar, CAP, 190.
2. Ibid., 192.
3. Ibid., 192-3.
Brightman holds that the self is an experience of a time span which is also at the same time a transcending of time; as for space, the self may or may not involve an experience of it.\(^1\) Thus in contrast to Royce, it is insisted that without time there could be no experience. If this position be justified, not only must it be judged that Royce's absolute-beyond-time is inconceivable, but the freedom of finite beings, which Royce defends as a participation in this timeless realm, is left completely without support.

Kraushaar comments that whereas Royce called this view theism, his critics considered it much closer to pantheism.\(^2\) He also views Royce's doctrine of the infinite as leaving a chasm between the absolute and the world of particulars.\(^3\) What he, perhaps, should have said is that Royce's view of the absolute does not appear to leave the slightest chink of mutual transcendence between the absolute and finite beings, although in reference to the time-eternity separation, Kraushaar's judgment is accurate.

(2) The will of the absolute. Dykhuizen says that if Royce were to apply the principle of individuation which he at many points seems to suggest, it would seem that the

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3. Ibid., 198.
absolute attains individuality because it loves itself above all others. Royce has applied this to the finite individual and the world itself as individuated, through an exclusive interest of the absolute.

Royce makes much of love, indeed, Christian love, but he places a burden upon love that it cannot bear. He inadequately insists that love itself accomplishes individuation, and, hence, moral responsibility; however, love needs a structure in terms of which to function; it can flourish or even exist, only in an environment which itself grounds human freedom—a personalistic, pluralistic universe.

Perhaps sensing this inadequacy, Royce does not now make love the individuating element in the case of the absolute, but suggests that unity of plan, or the possession of a life plan is the basis of moral individuality in the case both of the absolute and of the finite.

Dykhuisen sees a difficulty in Royce's concept of purpose or will and the fact that the goal of the absolute is eternally realized. Will, in the case of finite beings, seems to depend for its significance upon the possibility of future satisfaction. How either will or thought exists for the absolute in a sense analogous to these experiences

1. Dykhuisen, CGJR, 37.
2. Ibid., 36.
3. Ibid., 37.
in finite beings, is not clear for Dykhuizen.

It is obvious that they cannot be the same, and it is also true that Royce's case is far less explicitly stated at this point than one might desire. However, to some extent, similar difficulties are shared wherever the concept of an infinite of any sort is allowed. But, it would be quite proper to insist that Royce's monistic formulation pitches these problems in the highest key.

A recognition of an adequate individuation for finite beings introduces the necessity of a pluralistic personalism over against an absolute idealism. It is true that Royce insists upon a teleological and organic view of the self. However, it is only in terms of such a precise delineation as that of Brightman, and a metaphysics which allows for fundamental significance to be attached to this view, that a truly organic view of the self is actually achieved.

With due consideration to all Royce's contributions to idealism, it must still be insisted that Howison, Bowne, and Brightman make available an idealism which corrects the specific deficiencies of Royce at the point of the problem of evil, and there especially at the point of significant, finite freedom. In the last thinker, the ultimate, metaphysical reference of the problem of evil is also resolved

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1. Brightman, CIA, 172.
in a fashion which, for most ethicists, saves the true meaning of God.

(3) Individuation and its dependence on society. Royce goes on to state that the requisite for a self-conscious self is a social environment. Only in this way can a true self come about: through an ideal at which the individual aims. Empirically, the individual is the totality of his conscious mental states; metaphysically, he is the significance of his experiences for the struggle toward his ideal.¹

Now, this has definite implications for the absolute: if the above insistence that selfhood depends upon society is allowed, it does not seem that the absolute can be conscious. Dykhuizen notes how Royce has shifted from a theory of one absolute with a multiplicity of functions to an absolute of many selves.² Royce has assumed that function and self can be equated. Dykhuizen denies that there is any empirical basis for this. The only self known in experience is a self with a multiplicity of functions; self-consciousness depends not upon plurality of selves but a plurality of functions.³

In contrast to this and other inadequate views of the finite self on the part of Royce, Dr. Brightman gives a

¹. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 38.
². Ibid., 39.
³. Ibid.
rather complete definition of a position that recognizes the fundamental uniqueness of individual, finite selves. He views the self as "organic, mental, monadic, and active." The organic principle, as the leading one of idealism, governs in the case of the self.

The self as mental, or conscious, emphasizes its temporal aspect. Whether space may be involved or not, time is always involved. Yet, since the time-transcending nature of the finite self (cf. Royce's time span) is as real as its consciousness which always involves time, it appears that the mental experience of the self takes place in terms of a temporal structure of an organic nature.

The unities of systems of moral activity and other experience, which are possible in the case of the self, arise out of the fact that the several experiences focalize upon and from the monad. A further illustration of the organic nature of the self is found in the case of the various forms of unity additionally possible in terms of the inter-relation between unity and variety.

Even the activity of the mind is a testimony to the organic nature of the self. The mind is not completely self-

1. Brightman, CIA, 192.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 193.
4. Ibid., 193-4.
5. Ibid., 194.
determining. It rather selects conscious content.¹ And further, the inter-relation between the self and the world that is given in experience is additional evidence of the wholistic nature of reality.²

Here is a delineation of the human self which is not only consistent with idealism, broadly conceived, but which properly represents the fundamental uniqueness, self-activity, and consequent responsibility of the self. This is the very thing that Royce's system cannot make place for.

(4.) Voluntaristic ideation. Dykhuizen further observes that a more consistent position would cast its lot in favor of the individuality either of the absolute or the finite, but not both. He feels that the preference goes to the absolute (in Royce's presentation) while human beings are only bits of the infinite.³ Dykhuizen maintains that the only way Royce is able to bring finite ideas into any sort of relation with absolute experience, while at the same time holding to the purposive or voluntaristic character of ideas, is "by introducing ambiguity into his notion of the idea as purpose."⁴

He suggests that ideas are viewed not only as being

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1. Brightman, GIA, 1911.
2. Ibid.
3. Dykhuizen, GGJR, 19.
4. Ibid., 48.
purposes but also as having purposes. The latter is the attempted correspondence to the absolute standard for ideas. Royce's criterion of truth, to test the finite idea in reference to the absolute system, is the fulfillment of its purpose.

The difficulty arises as to how a finite purpose is to be fulfilled by an absolute experience. Royce seems to explain this pretty fully in terms of finite experience so that the introduction of an absolute seems superfluous. To Royce's view that present fulfillment is only partial, Dykhuizen opposes the assertion that finite fulfillment does not become partial until an absolute is brought in. As long as Royce explains the criterion of correspondence to the absolute in terms of the fulfillment of finite life, the absolute seems unnecessary.

Royce says that, in propositions whose denial involves their affirmation, absolute truth is reached. Dykhuizen insists that the problem of a two-fold test for truth still remains: first, correspondence to the absolute, second, solving finite problems. Such a duality cannot, obviously, be allowed.

1. Dykhuizen, GGJR, 46.
2. This and the statement below (designated by the same number) suggest the element of impracticality in Royce's system through a tendency to be too formalistic.
3. Dykhuizen, GGJR, 49.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
In the light of all this, Dykhuizen is convinced that Royce's explanation of the relation between God and man is not satisfactory. Besides the problems connected with the finite will as free and yet at the same time a realized part of the absolute, the place of the individual in this latter relationship itself, is not clear.\(^1\) If significant morality is dependent upon seeking to attain a goal, and if at the same time the goals are already attained in eternity, how can Royce escape the loss of moral selfhood?\(^2\)

(5) Finite freedom. Royce's assertion that it is possible for a man to be free in the world of appreciation and subject to mechanical law in the world of description is for Dykhuizen a manifestation of his failure to bring eternity and time together.\(^3\) It might also be added that if by this Kantian device Royce is said to have saved the possibility of the predication of good and evil, it can at best be in the Kantian, "as if", sense.

Rogers takes the position that Royce, in his attempt to justify human freedom, appealed to an analogy which, although it was his only evidence, was, yet, essentially deficient.\(^4\) The analogy is that between the finite as part of the infinite and the unity of impulses in the finite self.

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1. Dykhuizen, GJHR, 53-4.
2. Ibid., 54.
3. Ibid.
4. Rogers, FAP, 296.
Rogers insists that the analogy fails because an impulse is not a self-conscious individual, recognizing other things as external to it, but is, rather, "an impulse in a self, and is not an I." The only time an impulse can be said to be in any sense independent is in the case of a dis-organized self, and this just what the absolute is not supposed to be.

Rogers maintains that if, as Royce properly demands, there must be a ground in experience for the idea of an absolute containing a number of wills and allowing each a degree of freedom, then Royce's absolute is unthinkable, for the only possible analogy breaks down. Rogers' judgment is that when Royce really faces the metaphysical problems in his system, he has to leave the world of concrete experience and take refuge in abstract, logical devices which are at best unrealistic.

Without sharing the metaphysical bias of Rogers, it can be said that he has touched upon what is probably the fundamental difficulty of Royce's system. Because Royce failed to make good his case for morally significant individuation the problem of evil makes it impossible for him to maintain an ethically significant God concept.

1. Rogers, EAP, 296. Contrast Dykhuizen's treatment of "function" and "self" above.
2. Dykhuizen, CGJR, 296-7.
3. Ibid., 297.
In a publication entitled, *Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self: Its Distinctive Features*, Dr. Brightman deals specifically from a more adequate base, with this problem of the relation between the finite and absolute self. Brightman's pluralistic personalism is the viewpoint which delivers him from a fate similar to that of Royce. This position defines reality as a society of persons with a cosmic person at the core. The personality is viewed as a "unified and self-identifying self-experience."  

The data of this personalism are as follows: It starts with given experience and attempts to include the whole of experience. Its method is synoptic, and its criterion is empirical coherence. At this point, a consideration is introduced which from one point of view is a basic distinction between the spirit of personal and that of absolute idealism. In contradistinction to Royce, personalism does not claim or attempt absolute logical necessity. At this point it departs from traditional rationalism and from Royce. Epistemologically, personalism is dualistic, consistent with its emphasis upon the mutually transcendent aspects of the finite and cosmic person. Its core is metaphysics.

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1. Brightman, PMS, 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 5.
5. Ibid., 5.
6. Ibid.
Personalism can be described as a qualitative monism; quantitatively, however, it is pluralistic.\textsuperscript{1} This means that the universe is viewed as a society of interacting selves. It is not a single self in respect to which the many are part. This latter is the position of Royce, Hegel, and others who are quantitative monists.\textsuperscript{2}

The plurality of persons is emphasized because, if God is to be called good, human error and evil must be excluded from him.\textsuperscript{3} It is also felt that the failure to insist upon a multiplicity of persons is, in effect, to settle for a monism in which there could be no such thing as real social relations.\textsuperscript{4} "The cosmic self is an experience of values."\textsuperscript{5} Thus, the goal of the personalistic universe is reason and love.\textsuperscript{6} And the cosmic person is in never-ending interaction with finite persons.\textsuperscript{7}

A self, capable of rational judgment and ideal value experience, is a person; a self is any complex of consciousness aware of itself.\textsuperscript{8} The minimum self would be an experience of real duration.\textsuperscript{9} "One, unitary conscious grasp comprehends,

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Brinton, PMS, 7.
\item[2.] Ibid.
\item[3.] Ibid., 8.
\item[4.] Ibid.
\item[5.] Ibid.
\item[6.] Ibid.
\item[7.] Ibid., 15.
\item[8.] Ibid., 8-9.
\item[9.] Ibid., 9.
\end{itemize}
as its own structure, a multiplicity of details."\(^1\)

In sum, and in vivid contrast to Royce, personalism, as Brightman expounds it, guarantees true self-hood for both the cosmic and finite person(s). The individual is self-identical in all his experiences.\(^2\) He is relatively free. His responsibility rests upon this freedom—the limits of which are set by his own past and by the God-given data of nature and society.\(^3\)

The goal of the universe is not an ineffable monism, as one feels Royce's philosophy to involve, in spite of all his protestations. It is rather "the interpersonal development of all persons in the creation and enjoyment of values."\(^4\) In a truly significant social sense, the goal of the universe is inexhaustible love.\(^5\)

(6) Summary of chapter. The very heart of the problem of evil is reached in this chapter; criticism is to the fore. The presentation began with a consideration of Royce's systematic account of his theodicy and then turned to an examination of his final publications from this point of view. The chapter thereupon reached its major and final section: a general critique of Royce's whole system from the point of

2. Ibid., 17.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
view of the problem of evil.

Specifically, this meant a study of Royce's general formula to account for evil in the temporal order: aspiration rests upon finite dissatisfaction. Natural and moral evil are related in terms of the unity of all reality. Royce claims his absolute idealism as the only basis for a true theodicy: the absolute includes and transcends temporal evil.

In the last phase of his thought, Royce introduced a new emphasis on volitional ideation and loyalty as its ethical counterpart. In addition he came to interpret loyalty in its broadest and ideal expression in terms of the divine community. In epistemology the absolute is further seen as a world community of mutually interpreting persons.

The over-all critique of Royce's system from the perspective of the problem of evil revolves about two fundamental issues. The first is Royce's basic argument for idealism; realistic criticisms and idealistic commendations are examined. The second issue has to do with the relation between the finite and the infinite. The conflict between the social and individualistic is expounded throughout this last section, resolutions and corrections of what are judged to be Royce's deficiencies are presented in terms of Brightman's pluralistic personalism.
CONCLUSIONS

It is the judgment of this thesis that the problem of evil has two fundamental aspects: the finite and the cosmic. A third element enters in terms of the basic system of philosophy to which one appeals for a solution. When the first two points are brought together in one, there are two basic questions for examination in reference to any system and the problem of evil: the nature and defense of the specific system, and the relation in that system between the individual and the ultimate.

Royce has been examined in these areas and the conclusion seems clear. First, his defense of idealism in general, while subject to the objection at points of insufficient emphasis on experience in the face of an excessive rationalism, is fundamentally acceptable. Second, his view of the absolute and finite, both in themselves and in relation to each other, leaves Royce open to two charges. The absolute and the finite are separated by an impossible gulf, since he puts one in eternity and the other in time. They are at the same time, from a different point of view, brought together into an indistinguishable blending, in that the finite is not given true selfhood and is thus swallowed up in the absolute.

Man is thus not responsible for evil; God is. But
God chose evil, and evil is eternally, by choice, of the nature of God. What meaning then do the terms good and evil retain on Royce's system? All is good; but, then, all is evil. The terms are meaningless. The problem is not only not solved, it cannot any longer be stated.
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Abstract of the Thesis
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN JOSIAH ROYCE

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1951
ROYCE'S CENTRAL THESIS. Royce's argument is twofold. His first contention is that absolute idealism alone stands as an acceptable, over-all, world view. Second, he maintains that the problem of evil is not adequately met by any other system.

His defense of his idealism. The logical beginning of his argument lies in his rejection of all types of realism as both unacceptable in themselves and as necessitating, in their very formulation, an adoption of idealism. To raise the level of experience above that of Heraclitean flux, both a unity of apperception and the stability of the perceived must be introduced. When knowability is added, realism is abandoned for idealism.

Royce conceives of attempts at the maintenance of an idealism short of absolute to be subject to the weaknesses of traditional rationalism. True being cannot be identified with the validity of the idea which defines that fact, if that idea be short of absolute. Only absolutism said to give an acceptable answer to the question as to what a valid (true or determinately possible) experience actually is when it is only possible--no one is verifying it.

If rationalism in its traditional sense is adopted, the assertion that the world and human experience are real in the same sense could not be allowed. Further, reality would be made little more than an abstract universal. The
fundamental nature of reality must be a concrete, wholistic life of fulfillment; an absolutely self-expressive self, individually embodied.

The problem of evil. Perhaps Royce's most transitional argument, linking his general idealism with a specific concern for the problem of evil, is found in his view of the nature and possibility of error. In answer to the question as to how different judgments in different minds at different times can have a common object, he maintains that there must be a thought which includes both the individual's thought and its object. This is the unity of absolute, universal thought. Embracing all truth, this absolute is the moral arbiter of the universe.

Moral goodness is stated as consisting not in the absence but in the subordination of evil: present as subdued in the good will. Freedom is postulated of the world of appreciation (Kant's realm of things-in-themselves). The whole time order is viewed as present in one time-transcending instant to the insight of the logos. The absolute chose this particular temporal order as one of many possibilities; and, this order is one in which the world will has delegated to man the power to participate in determining what the temporal world would be.

Individuation is asserted to rest on a life fulfilling an exclusive and specific interest. If two
individuating interests are part of the contents of a unitary, absolute experience, and are also interests of the will which in wholistic fashion individuates the entire contents of the world, it does not follow that individuation is undermined.

The absolute seeks in finite individuals, through temporal striving against a background of evil (which makes this striving possible), the peace which is in eternity alone. Finite experience, as such, is included in the absolute, but is said to be in no way transformed. Royce insists in his ethics of loyalty that the individual self is a true self only in so far as it attempts to do its part in the whole. The whole is a world community of mutually interpreting persons.

EVALUATION.

His argument for his idealism. Royce's several arguments both for idealism in general and the existence of the absolute self are fundamentally sound. That is: if Royce's assertions are not taken as demonstrating his position with rigorous necessity but as heuristic hypotheses pointing to the probability of his conclusions, then, his position is acceptable. His tendency to present his system as logically necessary cannot, therefore, be allowed. This judgment applies to such arguments as that drawn from the distinction between the internal and external
meaning of ideas, from the mathematical idea of the self-representative series, and the relation between existence and essence.

It may be further noted that Royce's mathematical and logical arguments increase his tendency to lay an insufficient emphasis on experience in the face of an excessive rationalism. Specifically, this leads to his discussion of time becoming so much a matter of logical implication that he virtually abandons the reality of time. Thus there are introduced many unsolved problems in connection with the meaning of sequence and order both in the finite and the infinite. Finally, it appears doubtful that Royce, from his highly abstract perspective, has made good the case for a personal God or formulated a God-concept compatible with the moral autonomy upon which personality rests.

The problem of evil. Finite freedom, as grounded in participation in a timeless realm beyond experience, appears without support. Will, for example, in the case of finite beings, seems to depend for its significance upon the possibility of future satisfaction. How either will or thought can exist for the absolute in a sense analogous to these experiences in finite beings is far from clear.
Royce insists that the individuation of a self-conscious self rests on a social environment. On this basis it does not seem that the absolute can be conscious, for such reasoning involves an equating of the absolute conceived of as a multiplicity of functions with an absolute of many selves. But, in experience, self-consciousness is found to depend not upon a plurality of selves, but a plurality of functions. An adequate statement of finite individuation would recognize it as grounded in that unity of experience which arises out of the fact that the pluralities of experience focalize upon and from the monad. Only such a view recognizes the fundamental uniqueness and self-activity which makes possible as a consequence the responsibility of the self.

The only way Royce is able to bring finite ideas into any sort of relation with absolute experience, while at the same time holding to the purposive or voluntaristic character of ideas, is by introducing ambiguity into his notion of the idea as purpose. Ideas are viewed not only as being purposes, but having purposes. The finite idea is tested in reference to the absolute system by the criterion of its finite fulfillment of its purpose. But as long as the criterion of correspondence to the absolute is explained in terms of the fulfillment of finite life, the absolute is not necessitated.
Further, in this connection, if significant morality is seen as dependent on seeking to attain a goal, and goals are already attained in eternity, how can Royce escape the loss of moral selfhood for God and for creatures whose freedom is a participation in this realm? Royce is thus unable to maintain an ethically significant concept of the finite and infinite and their relations. Rather than the interpersonal development of all persons in the creation and enjoyment of values, the goal of Royce's universe appears to be an ethically indifferent, ineffable monism. The terms good and evil are now meaningless.