The treatment of American philosophy in the Cambridge history of American literature.

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Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

THE TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE

by

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Summary

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Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to present an exposition of the treatment accorded American philosophy in the Cambridge History of American Literature and to compare this treatment with that of other leading authorities. For a complete list of the authorities consulted, see the bibliography. Striking similarities and differences among the commentaries are noted, with especial reference to the Cambridge History.

The Cambridge History of American Literature is a critical survey of the work of American authors from colonial times until the early part of the twentieth century. All fields of literature are treated by respective authorities. There are certain chapters which are devoted exclusively to philosophy.

The first of these chapters is "Edwards" by Paul Elmer More. Jonathan Edwards epitomizes the Puritan theology of colonial days. He stands as the greatest of the Puritan mystics in our country. His life and philosophy are discussed in the first chapter of this thesis.

The other leading philosophical thinkers of the eighteenth century are interpreted in the chapter "Philosophers and Divines, 1720-1789" by I. Woodbridge Riley, the leading authority for the philosophy of this period. An interpretation of his treatment is given in chapter two of this
Introduction

The purpose of this report is to summarize and expel-

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The Demographic Profile of American Immigration to a City

The Demographic Profile of American Immigration to a City can inform us about the makeup of the demographic profile of a city. This information can be crucial in understanding the cultural, social, and economic impacts of immigration on a city. By analyzing the demographic profile, we can gain insights into the diversity of the population and how it has evolved over time. This knowledge is essential for policymakers, urban planners, and community leaders in making informed decisions that promote inclusivity, economic growth, and social harmony. Through comprehensive data collection and analysis, we can better understand the challenges and opportunities associated with immigration and develop strategies to address them effectively.
The great philosophical movement in New England in the early nineteenth century is discussed in the chapter "Transcendentalism" contributed by Harold Clarke Goddard. His treatment is very general. Only brief references are made to Emerson's philosophy. Chapter three of this thesis is based upon Goddard and supplementary authorities.

The chapter of the Cambridge History which is devoted especially to Emerson is contributed by Paul Elmer More, the author of the chapter on Edwards. Our interpretation of Emerson, based upon More's treatment and that of other authorities, forms chapter four of this thesis.

The period from the middle of the nineteenth century to the time of the composition of the last volume of the Cambridge History of American Literature (1919) is given scholarly and comprehensive treatment by Morris R. Cohen. The title of Cohen's chapter is "Later Philosophy." Of living philosophers, Cohen treats only those who had written notable works before 1900. The chief philosophers discussed by Cohen are as follows: Fiske, Wright, Harris, Peirce, Royce, James, Dewey, Baldwin, Santayana, Woodbridge, and the neo-realists. In chapter five of this thesis, we present an interpretation of Cohen and other commentators in this field, as indicated in the bibliography.
The current international movement in New York in the
search for scientific safety is gaining in the center
sensation. The National Academy of Sciences, Cities Council
and various other organizations are making an effort to
coordinate their efforts. Only national laboratories, and
make to engineering's advantage. Chemical firms of this nature
are facing much opposition and are more and more interested
in the trend of the scientific and industrial world. Any new
specialty to emerge in this direction can be exploited
to the fullest extent of the possibilities of science. Our
information is incomplete, but more a statement than a fact.

And other, more radical, trends can be observed in the
behavior of the ticket gates of the universities.
In the case of the University of California, for instance,
the key of the combination of the ticket is known to all the
students and benevolent trustees. The outer bolt of the
front, corporate, and service doors is locked. The outer
locks, doors, handles, and service entrances are well
sealed. It is a matter of fact that none can enter or leave
the institution without special permission and a written
injunction to the guard.
Chapter I

The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards

A. His Early Mysticism.

Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) was by temperament a mystic. In early life, especially, he experienced a keen joy in the contemplation of nature as a manifestation of God, and he felt an earnest longing to be in harmony with the God of nature. In the Cambridge History, More treats this mystical tendency with due regard. However, he considers that it is Edwards's own fault that he is chiefly associated with sermons of a terrifying nature. Although Edwards retained the essentials of a mystical spirit until his death, his writings, for the greater part, are overshadowed with Calvinistic dogma and stern logic.

1. His Private Reflections.

In 1743, Edwards wrote his Private Reflections probably as a result of a retrospective perusal of his early meditations which he had recorded in his diary prior to his graduation from Yale in 1720. More compares these early diary reflections to Berkeley's Commonplace Book, both of
which were kept primarily in preparation for later metaphysical treatises. The Private Reflections "for intensity of absorption in the idea of God and for convincing power of utterance, can be likened to the Confessions of Saint Augustine." More regrets that this remarkable record is "not so well known as it would have been if it had not been printed with the works of a thorny metaphysician." In his early life Edwards felt that the power to damn human souls was incompatible with the goodness of the deity. Upon contemplating the absolute sovereignty of God "in choosing whom he would to life and rejecting whom he pleased," Edwards said, "It used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me." Yet, as he grew older, he experienced an increasing joy in the absolute power of God. "Absolute sovereignty is what I love to ascribe to God. But my first conviction was not so." Thus we see his early tenderness hardened by what he considered in true Calvinistic fashion to be a renunciatory love of God. What his logic, deduced from Calvinistic assumptions, could not support, he was perforce compelled to condemn. The following quotation illustrates the ineffability of his early mystical experience. "And as I was walking there, and looking up on

1 More, CH, I, 59.  
2 Loc. cit.  
3 Loc. cit.  
4 Loc. cit.
the sky and clouds, there came into my mind so sweet a sense of the glorious majesty and grace of God, that I know not how to express....I seem to see them both in a sweet conjunction; majesty and meekness; an awful sweetness; a high, a great, and holy gentleness.\(^1\) We find little of this mystical outpouring in Edwards's works. As More states, "He put little of his personal rapture of holiness into his published works which were almost exclusively polemical in design."\(^2\) Parrington agrees with More in pointing out Edwards's increasing joy in God's sterner attributes as he felt led on by the need of defending Calvinistic dogma against the undermining influences of the deists and the Arminians.\(^3\)

2. His **Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue**.

Edwards's **Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue**, More considers, combines his ethics and esthetics. Virtue is defined as the "beauty of the qualities and exercises of the heart."\(^4\) In the following words, More praises Edwards's ability for reasoning and for creating a pleasing style, but deplores the deliberate sublimation of his literary genius to dogma and to fierce denunciation of sinners:

"One cannot avoid the feeling, when his writings are surveyed

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\(^1\) More, CH, I, 59-60.  
\(^2\) Loc. cit.  
\(^3\) Parrington, CM, 156.  
\(^4\) More, CH, I, 60.
as a whole, that in his service to a particular dogma of religion Edwards deliberately threw away the opportunity of making for himself....one of the very great names in literature."¹ Long likewise deplores the fact that flashes of literary power were sternly repressed in the interests of truth.² Lewisohn considers that Edwards's mystical fervor and psychological enlightenment fade beside his dogmatic and sadistic sermons.³ Riley characterizes him as outwardly a relentless logician of Puritanism but inwardly a mystic. Despite the fact that the most fruitful years of Edwards's activity were devoted to deductive logic and theological dogma, his native mystical temperament persisted. Parrington refers to Edwards as "the last and greatest of the royal line of Puritan mystica."⁴ We form the conclusion that Edwards was endowed with a deep appreciation of the beauty of nature and the nearness of God, but that conscience led him almost to stifle the expression of this type of experience because of his adherence to Calvinistic doctrine.

B. His Preaching of Dogmatic Theology.

We now turn our attention more directly from Edwards's mysticism to his preaching. More selects the most notorious of his sermons, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God."

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¹ More, CH, I, 60.
² Long, AL, 77.
³ Lewisohn, EA, 17.
⁴ Parrington, CM, 152.
It is necessary to examine the data and make the appropriate adjustments. The importance of maintaining accurate data cannot be overemphasized. When making changes, it is essential to carefully review the impact on future forecasts. The team is currently working on improving the accuracy of the predictions.
delivered at Enfield, Connecticut, in 1741, as the epitome of terrorizing preaching rooted in Calvinistic dogma. Edwards proclaimed in this sermon that it was the mere pleasure of God which kept wicked men out of hell at any time. More does not analyze his preaching, but merely characterizes it, deplores it, and comments as follows: "Sincerity of vision may amount to cruelty, and something is due to the weakness of human nature." Although Edwards was sincere, he had a pitiful psychological effect upon some of his congregation.

McGiffert protests against the popular conception that hell-fire sermons were typical of Edwards's preaching. He admits that during periods of intense emotional excitement, he was led to emphasize such dogma, but he contends that such extreme cases were far from representative.

C. His Attitude toward the Awakening.

1. Belief in Emotional Conversion.

An account of Edwards's preaching leads to a consideration of his relation to the evangelical movement known as the Great Awakening. His apology for this movement, which started in Northampton, and was doubtless given

1 More, CH, I, 61.
2 McGiffert, JE, 84.
emotional impetus by terrifying denunciations of sinners and by vivid descriptions of hell, and which was carried on here by Whitefield, is found in the two treatises, *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion* and *Marks of the True Spirit*. Edwards set forth the opinion that hysteria was a universal accompaniment of conversion. More regrets the fact that even suicidal and melancholic mania were interpreted by Edwards as the workings of the Divine Spirit. "The saddest thing in the whole affair is the part played by Edwards. Other leaders saw the danger from the first or were soon awakened to it; but Edwards never... wavered in his belief that the Awakening, though marred by the devil, was in itself the work of the Divine Spirit."¹ More compares Edwards's direct appeal to the emotions at the cost of judgment, to the position of the apologists of the romantic movement in literature. He considers that Edwards embraced the Awakening as a means of arousing persons from a spiritual lethargy. Yet he believes that Edwards failed to distinguish between a stagnant inertia and a harmony brought about by a power higher than the imagination and the emotions. We see that Edwards does not follow the coherence criterion here. Strange that such an intellect should yield to emotional intoxication!

¹ More, CH, I, 62.
We have selected this passage as a portion of the document.
most critics witness to Edwards's intellectual prowess, Lewisohn differs, saying that he was "not a man of commanding intellect.... He was a baffled poet and stylist, baffled by the moral pathology of his kind." It does appear that Edwards glorified as evidences of spiritual rebirth, what modern psychologists would designate as pathological symptoms bordering upon insanity. But, of course, Edwards lived and died over a hundred years before modern psychology became known. "Thus for all his emotionalism, he lived under the control of an iron will, and he could not comprehend how the over-stimulation of terror and joy in a weaker disposition would work moral havoc. Nor from his own constant height could he understand how brief and fitful any mood of exaltation must be among ordinary men in their ordinary condition."

In 1746, Edwards published the Treatise concerning the Religious Affections, "a work which may without exaggeration be said to go as far as the human intellect can go in the perilous path of discriminating between the purely spiritual life and the life of worldly morality." More interprets Edwards as holding the belief that no person is religious until God plants in his heart by the free act of grace, a love for Himself.

1 Lewisohn, EA, 17. 3 Ibid., 64.
2 More, CH, I, 63.
Parrington is more critical than More of Edwards's part in the Awakening. He considers the movement as evidence that America was still in the seventeenth century, that the upper class was not yet rationalized nor the middle class commercialized.\(^1\) He considers that its results were revolutionary, that Edwards unawares overthrew the old Presbyterian emphasis on the church visible by his emphasis on the church mystical.\(^2\) He is repulsed, as is More, by the pathological condition of the converts.

2. His Resignation from the Northampton Church.

This belief of Edwards in the necessity of an emotional conversion led to a rift between him and his congregation at Northampton. Edwards contended that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper should rightfully be administered only to persons who had undergone radical conversion and experienced the affections of supernatural love. This underlying difference in fundamental belief between Edwards and the congregation was intensified by Edwards's criticism of the reading, language, and moral habits of the young people of the first families of Northampton; whereupon he was asked to resign. Concerning this matter, More writes, "Northampton has the distinction of having rejected the greatest theologian and philosopher yet produced in this

\(^1\) Parrington, CM, 161.  \(^2\) Loc. cit.
country.1 Long maintains, "Edwards was undoubtedly right. 2 We conclude that Edwards was right in his high evaluation of the mystical element in religious experience, but that he went too far in expecting every member of his church to experience emotional exaltation.

McGiffert shows how personal antagonism against Edwards because of a family rift served to intensify the opposition at this crucial time. A party division in Northampton between the wealthy landholders and the other townspeople antedated the pastorate of Edwards. The death of one of the most influential leaders, Stoddard, an uncle of Edwards, left him comparatively unsupported. McGiffert also cites, as does More, the preacher's criticism of the moral practices of the youth as a contributing factor to Edwards's dismissal. The profiteering of the businessmen and the malpractices of the employers did not escape the disapproval of Edwards. In general the people were not interested in reading Edwards's defense of his belief which he carefully wrote and had printed for them. A few years later, Joseph Hawley, a leader of the opposing faction, apologized publicly for his misconduct.


1. His Natural Inclination toward an Idealistic Metaphysics.

From very early years, Edwards maintained an interest in

1 More, CH, I, 64. 2 Long, AL, 73.
metaphysics along with his mysticism. In fact, Parrington suggests that his metaphysical idealism was undertaken as an attempt to justify his mysticism. More does not express any such view. "God-consciousness as passionate as that of Spinoza" molded his intellectual and spiritual life, writes Parrington. Doubtless a mystical type would lean toward an idealistic metaphysics. Especially would one of Edwards's deep appreciation of nature and keen intellect be led to interpret his God of contemplative companionship as a spiritual being.

2. His Relation to Berkeley.

So similar is Edwards to Berkeley in many aspects of his thinking that there is debate among critics regarding the source of Edwards's metaphysics. More refers to the possible influence of Berkeley upon Edwards as an unsolved problem, and suggests the possibilities of his originality and also of his reading of Malebranche and Locke. Riley discredits the theory of any direct influence from Berkeley, and supports his view with internal evidence which he displays in his American Philosophy. The earliest evidences of Edwards's mysticism are "Notes on the Mind," which are among his reflections while he was an undergraduate at Yale. More compares these reflections, as we have noted above, to Berkeley's Commonplace Book, both being preparatory to the composition of metaphysical treatises.

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1 Parrington, CM, 152.  
2 Riley, AP, 129, ff.
No attempt is given to develop or do much study of the
material, but rather to observe the influence of the
new material on the knowledge of the subject. The
results are then recorded for the purpose of
providing information on new educational
methods and in this way of the general influence of
the material. Such information is then used for the
studies of educational material and as a starting
point for a more comprehensive consideration of the
material used.
"Notes on the Mind" the significant basic thought reads, "Our perceptions or ideas that we passively receive by our bodies are communicated to us immediately by God."¹ More does not attempt to solve the problem of their relationship, but he gives Edwards credit for carrying on Lockian philosophy from the point where Berkeleian idealism left off. Parrington designates Edwards's early interpretation of metaphysics as distinctly Berkeleian, but he does not undertake to settle the doubt regarding the source of this interpretation.² McGiffert states more decidedly, "Edwards could not have been acquainted with Berkeley's writings when he formulated his own philosophy." Only a few major types of philosophy are possible to the human mind, McGiffert asserts, and therefore it is quite possible that Edwards's was spontaneous.³ It seems to us perfectly probable that two such similar minds on opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean might have arrived independently at their conclusions.

3. The Freedom of the Will.

Edwards's metaphysics, as developed later, concerned chiefly the nature and power of God and the problem of evil. The Freedom of the Will, written by Edwards during his six-year residence at Stockbridge, contains his logical deductions concerning these problems. More considers

¹ Quoted by More, CH, I, 57. ² McGiffert, IE, 22. ³ Parrington, CM, 153.
I remain at your service and will be pleased to perform such work as may be necessary to effect the completion of the project as soon as possible.

[Signature]

[Date]
that "the Edwardian theology was a part of the great deistic debate which took its root in the everlasting question of the origin of evil in the world." Both Calvinists and infidels were deterministic, but the difference lay in the conception of the nature of the determining cause. The Calvinists upheld the view of a personal Creator, omnipotent and omniscient; whereas the deists conceived of the universe as a perfectly functioning machine with no room for either a personal governor or real sin. The Arminians, who composed a large proportion of churchmen at this time, believed in the freedom of the will. Their champion, Daniel Whitby, refuted Calvinism in his treatise, On the Five Points of Calvinism, published in England in 1710, and reprinted in America. It was not a difficult task for a logician of Edwards's calibre to riddle the arguments of the Arminians. It was for this purpose that he wrote his famous work The Freedom of the Will.

The basis of the argument in this book is psychological, viz., an identifying of the functions of human desire and will. He opposes Locke's differentiation of these. The Arminians accept Locke's theory, and so make man's choice of evil deliberate, unswayed by inclination. Edwards maintains that a person's will at any moment is his strongest motive or inclination at that moment.

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1 More, CH, I, 65.
moment. It is "free in so far as no obstacle is presented to our willing in accordance with our inclination, but our inclination is determined by what at any moment seems to us good." God is responsible for the inclinations which determine the human will. From this point Edwards advances beyond Calvin. The latter warned against any intrusion into the metaphysics of God, but Edwards applies the psychology of man to the psychology of God. He accepts the logical conclusion of Berkeley's theory, viz., that God is induced by external power.

"The fatal mystery of good and evil, the true cause, lies above and beyond him; he is like ourselves, a channel, not the source. The only difference is that God has complete knowledge of the possibilities of being, and therefore is not moved by threats and blank commands, but, immediately, by what Edwards elsewhere calls the 'moral necessity' of governing in accord with the best of the 'different objects of choice that are proposed to the Divine Understanding.' More continues by comparing this theory to that of Leibnitz, in which God selects for creation that system "which combines the greatest possible amount of good with the least possible admixture of evil." However, as More points out, Edwards omits from his philosophy one of the Leibnitzian inferences, viz., that of optimism and the negligible proportion of evil in reality. "On the contrary, the

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2 Ibid., 69.  
3 Loc. cit.
whole animus of his teaching springs from a deep and immediate hatred of evil in itself and apart from any consideration of its cause."¹ This argument that the intrinsic disvalue in evil is worthy of condemnation aside from the origin, sufficed as a practical reply to the Arminian contention that the doctrine of predestination eliminated the punishment of sin.


More criticizes this Edwardian hatred of evil as disastrous to his theology. He asks, "In what essential way, then, does the act of God in creating a world mixed with evil differ from the act of Judas in betraying God?"² He also deems it a logical conclusion to blame God for the evils of warfare and accordingly to hate him for this evil content. But More prefers not thus to explore into ultimate reality. He asserts that we can follow Edwards's metaphysics to the breaking point just as we can do with any metaphysics. Obviously More would advocate an avoidance of the mental task of thinking through the problem of evil; for he exclaims, "Aye, but the difference to us morally if we leave that cause in its own vast obscurity, unapproached by our reason, untouched by our pride; or if we make it into an image of ourselves, composed only of understanding and

¹ More, CH, I, 69.
² Loc. cit.
inclination like our own, and subject to our reprobation as surely as to our love!"¹

More gives Edwards credit for having forever destroyed the arguments of the Arminians for free will. He then asks if there is no escape from the apparent dilemma of theological determinism and fatalistic atheism.² He reminds us that James Boswell freed his mind by forgetting the problem, and that Dr. Samuel Johnson merely stated, "All theory is against the freedom of the will, and all experience for it."³ Such a statement reveals the rift oftentimes existing between the empirical data and formal theory. Our author suggests the theory of Isaac Watts as one which, though not silencing metaphysical difficulties, gives them an ethical turn. His is the advocacy of the suspension of volition until one is capable of judging properly. But, as More states, Edwards dismisses this view by identifying suspension itself with volition.

More concludes this discussion by suggesting a way out of the dilemma into a morally satisfying dualism within the person's soul. He prefers the looseness of the Arminian doctrine to the rigid logic of Edwards's predestination, because the former leaves an easier loophole of escape into a human philosophy."⁴

¹ More, CH, I, 69. ³ Loc. cit.
² Ibid., 70-71. ⁴ Loc. cit.

More's following words appear in a general appraisal of the life and work of Edwards: "He remains one of the giants of the intellect and one of the enduring masters of religious emotion. He had not the legal and executive brain of Calvin... but in subtle resourcefulness of reasoning and still more in the scope of his spiritual psychology he stands above his predecessor. Few men have studied Edwards without recognizing the force and honesty of his genius.

Lewisohn is not so hearty in his praise, nor would we expect him to be, with his inclination toward unrestrained expression of personality. He refers to Edwards as "a sick soul but a scholar and a man of high spiritual dignity." He deplores the fact that his "tight and tense" logic was invalidated by absurd assumptions.

Long's opinion is much loftier than that of Lewisohn and more nearly in accord with that of More. "In all her history America has never produced a man more governed by the spirit of truth." Long also credits Edwards with pioneer service in the psychology of religious experience.

As we have noted above, Edwards's interpretation of these data was very different from the modern one.

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1 More, CH, I, 70.
2 Lewisohn, EA, 2.
3 Ibid., 17.
4 Long, AL, 71.
5 Ibid., 73.
6 See page 7.
plan and scope of thought for his contemplated History
of the Work of Redemption reminds Long of Dante or Mil-
ton. In regard to The Freedom of the Will, Long says that
although we reject his system instinctively, this book
was "a work which for solid reasoning power has hardly
a peer in the English language."\(^1\) He refers to it as
the "first American book to influence profoundly the
thought of the whole world."\(^2\) Long deals in stronger
terms of praise than More.

Parrington considers that Edwards was a forerunner of
Emerson in his metaphysical idealism, but reactionary in
his adherence to Calvinism. More, also, refers to Edwards
as an earlier and perhaps greater Emerson. Cohen rates
Edwards higher than Emerson in the field of philosophy.

Riley calls Edwards "chief of New England divines" and
the "chief native exponent of the scholastic of the heart,
the dialectic of the feelings."\(^3\)

Royce discusses Edwards as the first representative
American philosopher. By interpreting his own religious
experiences, he rediscovered for the world some of the pro-
foundest ideas of God and humanity. He viewed religion
synoptically and reconciled tragic conflicts of the
spiritual realm.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Long, AL, 76.\(^2\) Ibid., 73.\(^3\) Riley, AT, 36.\(^4\) Royce, WJOE, 5.
The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image.
Chapter II.
Philosophers and Divines (1720-1789)

A. General Movements Which Undermined Calvinism.

Riley's treatment of the philosophy of the eighteenth century in America is the most extensive and authoritative we have. His large volume, American Philosophy, discusses this period in detail, and his American Thought summarizes this discussion.

Riley classifies the movements which undermined Calvinism according to the traditional classification of the mental functions, viz., the intellectual, the volitional, and the emotional. The intellectual revolt took the form of deism or rationalism, the spread of which from Europe to this country was interrupted by the emotional upheaval led by Jonathan Edwards when "Edwards the logician became, in a measure, Edwards the enthusiast." The volitional element, carried on by ethical reformers, had been heralded by the Arminians and answered by Edwards's The Freedom of the Will (1754). As discussed in the previous chapter, the chief issue was that of morality versus the theory of divine grace. The emotional element of the revolt was embodied in the Whitefield controversy. Although acclaimed as an ally to Calvinism, Whitefield proved to be an underminer by entering the opening made by the Calvinists in their emphasis upon man's passivity. Whitefield led persons to allow themselves in their passiveness to be carried away by feeling. Riley deplores this lack of balance.

Parrington, in his discussion of Edwards as an enthusiast, points out how he, just as Whitefield, undermined the very

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1 Riley died in 1933.  
2 Ibid., CH, I, 72.  
3 Ibid., 72-73.
CHAPTER II

EXPERIMENTS WITH PROCEDURES (1932-1940)

The general problem of finding effective methods for the purification of the various classes of wool fibers has been an important one. The initial work involved the development of procedures for the separation of wool fibers from mixed fibers and for the removal of impurities from the wool fibers themselves. This was followed by experiments on the refinement of the wool fibers, including processes for the removal of the natural lanolin and the greasy substances. The later experiments dealt more specifically with the mechanical and chemical properties of the wool fibers, including the investigation of their suitability for various textile applications.

The series of experiments conducted over the years have been aimed at improving the quality of wool fibers, making them more suitable for the various uses to which they are put. The results of these experiments have been valuable not only in the textile industry but also in the broader field of wool research.

The development of these procedures has required a great deal of patience and attention to detail, as each step must be carefully controlled to achieve the desired results. The success of these experiments has been due in large part to the dedication and hard work of theullow workers involved.
system which he sought to uphold.\(^1\) The Whitefield movement was condemned by the clergy and the colleges as unworthy of the age of reason, and it received particularly deprecatory treatment by the pen of Wigglesworth, and more thoughtful opposition by Charles Chauncy and Jonathan Mayhew, whom we shall discuss below.

Riley considers that, in the main, the evangelical movement soothed the New England "nervous system" by replacing the dread, judicial Deity by a benevolent God, whose goodness was inconsistent with irresistible power and its corollary of irresistible grace. The enthusiasts substituted hope for the old doctrine of eternal damnation resulting from total depravity.

B. Charles Chauncy's Benevolence of the Deity.

Chauncy's arguments for the benevolence of God have an empirical basis. To his way of thinking, the objects of creation reveal too much skill to have been destined merely for ultimate destruction. Such a purpose we recognize as unreasonable. The capacities for happiness within the creatures seem to Chauncy to indicate a less "jaundiced view of the Creator."

In his discussion of the problem of evil, Chauncy holds that evils do not necessarily constitute a defect in the benevolence of the Deity, because we cannot judge of the complete design. What seems evil to a partial view may be a part of a total good. Riley attacks the futility of this view as "naught but the old argument of a learned ignorance, much used by the upholders of the scheme of inscrutable decrees."\(^2\) Such a view is an appeal

\(^1\) Parrington, CM, 161-162.  
\(^2\) Riley, CH, I, 7.
to faith rather than to a coherent system of metaphysics.

Riley considers that the strength of Chauncy lies in his attack upon absolute causation rather than in his treatment of the problem of evil. Chauncy escapes the net of determinism into which Edwards is drawn, by an appeal to common sense, viz., that determinism is satisfactory for the beasts of the field, but that, applied to humanity, it would destroy all possibility for morality. Although this conclusion seems to us valid, the form of argument is a rationalization of the desire to uphold the possibility of character development. The same criticism may be applied to Chauncy's argument against divine intervention. He proposes the belief that a greater good can be accomplished by conformity to law.

Riley places Chauncy's chief contribution in his undermining of the harsh Calvinistic doctrines, and the substitution for an enthusiastic sentimentalism of a placid contentment with the laws of God.


Mayhew is treated briefly by Riley as a "master of ironic attack" but not as a lofty thinker. His radicalism is revealed in his rejection of the trinitarian doctrine almost two generations before the Unitarian Manifesto of 1819. His chief emphasis is upon the necessity for wisdom in God. A God who is good but not wise may commit evil deeds. He claimed that God would not in an arbitrary and wholesale manner damn human souls.

1 Riley, CH, I, 77.
but that he might reasonably resort to punitive justice, even as an earthly sovereign would do. Riley considers Mayhew's defense weak but interesting as a typical, hollow document.

D. The Philosophy of Samuel Johnson (1696-1772).

In the field of American philosophy, Samuel Johnson stands as the most important figure between Edwards and Emerson, and, as Riley observes, "one of the most attractive of colonial thinkers."1

1. His Early Radicalism.

In his early years, Johnson gave evidence of radicalism in espousing the cause of the Church of England, and in studying Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, which helped to lead him from Puritan darkness into the light. As a result of this new light, he issued the manuscript, *The Travails of the Intellect in the Microcosm and the Macrocosm*. In his next publication, *A General Idea of Philosophy*, he abandoned the metaphysics taught at Yale, and defined philosophy as "the study of Truth and Wisdom, i.e., of the Objects and Rules conducing to true Happiness."2 This thought received fuller expression in the *Introduction to the Study of Philosophy* (1731), in which the Puritan conception of the glory of God as man's chief aim, was replaced by the view of the happiness of man as the chief end of God. It seems to us more reasonable to interpret the end in terms of value rather than of happiness, but this hedonistic emphasis can be explained.

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1 Riley, CH, I, 78-80.
2 Quoted by Riley, CH, I, 81.
as a swinging from the sadism of the Calvinist to the opposite extreme.

3. His Opposition to the Doctrine of Determinism.

After returning from a trip to England where Johnson received ordination in the Church of England, he directed tongue and pen against absolute predestination, by pointing out the inconsistency between such doctrine and morality. A similar discussion was initiated, as we have noted above, by Charles Chauncy. The Presbyterian dogma of Jonathan Dickinson was accorded specific refutation by Johnson's claims that predestination imputed hypocrisy to God. Riley quotes Johnson's illustration of this point. The God of Calvinism is compared to an unreasonable earthly ruler who is intent upon taking the life of a subject, but who offers to the condemned person, as a means of escaping death by hanging, the feat of accomplishing an impossible task. Riley evaluates Johnson's constructive argument more highly than his controversial elements.


"The correspondence between Johnson and Berkeley was the most notable in the history of early American thought." 1 Johnson was first attracted by Berkeley's argument against necessity. During Berkeley's visit to Rhode Island, Johnson developed a keen admiration both for the man and for his system of thought. The denial of the absolute existence of matter meant for Johnson the

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1 Riley, CH, I, 84.
"denial of an inconceivable substratum of sensible phenomena."

The merely relative existence of sensible things meant to him the orderly combination of sensible phenomena, whereby the Divine ideas, archetypes of physical existence, caused sensations of pleasure and pain. The acceptance of Berkeleyanism led to Johnson's own interpretation in *Elementa Philosophica*, a remarkable presentation of idealism, which was seemingly impossible to most Americans of his day. Riley commends its balance between fatalism and enthusiasm.

Riley regrets the opposition and indifference accorded Johnson's idealism in this country. The commonsense realism found Berkeleyanism beyond comprehension. The times were out of joint for the reception of immaterialism. Johnson's belief in the enlightenment of all persons of all races was opposed. It was also difficult for the Puritan conception that infants were born in sin, to give way to Johnson's advocacy of the maxim, "Pueris maxima reverentia debetur."

This view of Johnson is in agreement with modern psychology. Johnson's belief in the phenomenal character of matter was interpreted by William Smith, the provost of the College of Philadelphia, as equivalent to the removal of the grounds of moral obligation. It was an ironical fate, as Riley observes, that "though he had written the best ethical treatise of colonial times, he was nevertheless charged with being fantastical, and his work with undermining morality."

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1 Quoted by Riley, CH, I, 84.
2 Loc.cit.
3 Riley, CH, I, 86.
shortsightedness is public opinion:

E. John Woolman, a Mystic (1720-1772).

"In Woolman...we have the fruits of quietism as contrasted with the fruits of controversy." ¹ Riley discusses the mysticism of this Quaker tailor very briefly, but with sincere appreciation. He points out Woolman's emphasis, contrary to the Calvinistic doctrine of depravity, on the possibilities for good in the human heart. Woolman stresses duty rather than doctrine, and opposes the social evils of war, lottery, slavery, the sale of rum, and cruelty to animals. He was actuated by the inward mystical principle which moves man to love the invisible God and all of his visible manifestations. His mysticism reminds one of Emerson in its high evaluation of each individual. The chief source for a study of Woolman's mysticism is his Journal.

Woolman's belief in the brotherhood of man led to his publication of the treatise Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes (1754-1762). He maintained that liberty was the right of all, and that negro slaves were deserving of their snare in the profits derived from their labors.

Riley calls Woolman "a logician of the heart" and a "Phers Plowman." Long upholds this sentiment by the words, "a friend who makes us know and trust the saints of all ages." ²

¹ Riley, CH, I, 87.
² Long, AL, 154.
Chapter III

Transcendentalism

Goddard treats the many aspects of transcendentalism: theological, literary, social, and philosophical. It is the last-named manifestation which we shall discuss here. Philosophically transcendentalism was a defense of man's practical and imaginative faculties against encroaching rationalism and skepticism.

A. Germanic Influence.

German influence was brought directly from Goettingen in 1819 by George Ticknor, George Bancroft, and Edward Everett; but the influence of Schelling, indirectly through Coleridge, was even greater. Parrington interprets the relation to German philosophy as follows: Transcendentalism "went to Germany to find confirmation of its faith, not to re-examine its foundations." ¹

B. Emerson's Contribution.

Of the members of the Transcendentalist Club formed in 1836, Emerson was the only real philosopher. His Nature is called by Goddard "the philosophical constitution of transcendentalism"; his address The American Scholar, the application of the same theory to the realm of letters; and the Divinity School Address, its application to theology. Goddard does not treat this

¹ Parrington, RRA, 381-382.
² Goddard, CH, I, 333.
philosophy in detail, as there is a separate chapter on Emerson by More.

C. The Origin of the Term.

Although Goddard does not consider it his purpose to give a complete exposition of the philosophy of transcendentalism, he does treat the origin of the term. He explains how it appeared in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and assumed a new shade of meaning in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The meaning used by Kant, viz., the reference to the way the mind "constitutes" its world of sense, was generalized by the New England thinkers and applied to whatever transcends the experiences of sense or is independent of them, i.e., including the innate, original, universal, *a priori*, and intuitive.

D. The Metaphysics of Transcendentalism.

The transcendentalists opposed the Lockian theory, which they considered as a denial of innate ideas or as "sensation-alism." They insisted upon the soul's inherent power to grasp truth. This theory led to a metaphysics similar in structure to the Platonic and other idealistic theories of the past. Although, as Goddard points out, their chief interest did not lie in building a system, but rather in cultivating an attitude and pervading spirit, he mentions the following principles: the Over-Soul which unifies all being and gives life to all, the microcosm containing within itself the laws of the whole, and the adoption as the purpose of life, the realization of the
potentialities of one's being directly through mystical rapture and mediately through the goodness, truth, and beauty revealed by nature. The derived teachings are as follows: self-reliance and individualism, the identity of moral and physical laws, the essential unity of all religions, the negative nature of evil, the spirit of complete tolerance and absolute optimism, and the defiance of tradition and all external authority. However, it is not in metaphysics, but in the "spirit of uplift" and "moral impulsion" that Goddard finds the heart of New England transcendentalism. Rogers refers to this spirit as "stimulation without precision." As Parrington observes, transcendentalism "was a faith rather than a philosophy; it was oracular rather than speculative, affirmative rather than questioning."


The affinity of these Concord thinkers for mysticism rather than for metaphysics is revealed by their preference for the oriental "Scriptures." Goddard says very little on this point. Christy's The Orient in American Transcendentalism discusses the role made by Emerson, Thoreau, and Alcott of Hindu, Egyptian, and Persian writings, and in turn the Hindu acknowledgment of Emerson and Thoreau as true mystics. The influence of Thoreau on Ghandi through his "civil disobedience" is interesting. Goddard cites the similarities of New England transcendentalism and oriental meditation as suggestive of

1 Goddard, CH, I, 336.
2 Rogers, EAP, 214.
3 Parrington, RRA, 381-382.
4 Christy, OAT, 264-265.
evidence of weakness in the former. He refers to the following elements: the tendency to neglect proximate for ultimate causes, the neglect of the material in the search for the spiritual, the substitution of passivity for alertness and creative force, the traces of a paralyzing pantheism and fatalism, and the atrophy of will. Lewisohn observes in this connection, "And so the New England Transcendentalists projected a world in which everything was intellectually dared but in which practically (except in the matter of anti-slavery) nothing was done."\(^1\) However, Goddard cites the following qualities of the New England movement which offset the ineffectiveness of the orientalism: "a dash of Yankee practicality, ... sturdy Puritan pugnacity, ... and a grasp of facts underneath its serenest of Olympian detachments."\(^2\) Christy summarizes the essential similarities and differences between the Concord School and the Oriental mind in the following words: "The pervading consciousness of the Infinite was a supreme reality to them, but they also recognized the reality of the individual soul."\(^3\)

F. The Attitude of the Transcendentalists toward the Abolition Movement.

The principle underlying the interest of the transcendentalists in the abolition movement was the emphasis on the divinity of every human soul. Even Emerson, we note, though averse personally to active participation in reform, was disturbed keenly by the Fugitive Slave Law.

\(^1\) Lewisohn, EA, 119.  \(^2\) Goddard, CH, I, 347.  \(^3\) Christy, OAT, 268.
G. Amos Bronson Alcott, Mystic and Teacher.

Of the leaders discussed by Goddard, the only one save Emerson, who is connected with our discussion, is Amos Bronson Alcott. He is noted for applying the Platonic conception of education. He is mystical and oriental in spirit. Goddard leaves the question unanswered as to whether Alcott was an "active and elevated but withal ordinary mind" or whether there was a "touch of real genius in him." In Rogers's discussion of him, he states that the conversational ability is "the issue to which transcendentalism seems naturally to gravitate." Christy considers that no fair appraisal of Alcott has been made, "because so little of his personality ever found its way into the printed page." Christy treats him as a propagandist of orientalism. We are led to believe that he was an enthusiastic and sincere person, but rather undisciplined intellectually.

H. Misunderstanding of the Movement.

Goddard points out how transcendentalism was misunderstood because of excesses among the initiated, some of whom interpreted transcendental to mean "transcending common sense," and also because of the confusion by those on the outside of this movement, of transcendentalism with other currents of social and religious unrest. Long agrees on this point and he goes beyond Goddard in criticizing the movement.

1 Goddard, CH, I, 339. 3 Christy, OAT, 238.
2 Rogers, EAP, 214. 4 Goddard, CH, I, 336.
for a neglect of the past and for fanaticism.¹

I. The Foundation of Transcendentalism on Puritan Character.

Goddard evaluates highly the decisive actions of Emerson, Thoreau, and Alcott, in regard to church, state, and school, respectively. "The Puritan character was the rock on which transcendentalism was built."² Despite their differences, Goddard believes that Edwards, Emerson, and William James display "a something central and controlling," a certain community of spirit.³ Royce also regards these three as the American classic philosophers because they were original and creative thinkers and because they interpreted their ages.⁴

¹ Long, AL, 281.
² Goddard, CH, I, 347.
³ Ibid., 347-348.
⁴ Royce, WJOE, 3-45.
Chapter IV

The Philosophy of Emerson

A. His Outstanding Position.

More opens the chapter on Emerson with the statement: "It becomes more and more apparent that Emerson, judged by an international or even by a broad national standard, is the outstanding figure of American letters." More considers that he owes this distinction to his personal genius and to his embodiment of the "transient experiment" of New England transcendentalism. Likewise Gay writes: "Emerson presented a universe seen through a temperament, ... one of the most friendly, courageous, and serene the world has known." 2

B. Nature.

In Nature (1836), Emerson presents the view that the phenomenal world is a beautiful symbol of the inner spiritual life, and that discipline is taught by nature to the attentive soul. Goddard calls this work "the philosophical constitution of transcendentalism." 3 In regard to this theory, Gay says, "He was unshaken in his belief that noumenon is the only reality but, as he said, he had no grudge against matter or phenomenon, because he found it fascinating. Besides, was not phenomenon still the symbol of the divine?" 4 Gay goes further than Goddard in analyzing this theory; that nature and man must not be divorced but must be considered in harmony and unity. 5 Firkins adds that Emerson was an idealist, not in the sense of disbelieving actuality of matter, but in the sense of

1 More, CH, I, 349.
2 Gay, E, 244.
3 See page 25.
4 Gay, E, 117.
5 Ibid., 119-120.
believing that sense-impressions depended on character and intelligence.¹

C. His Essays.

Of his Essays (1641-1644), More says that they were the forms "into which was distilled the very quintessence of the volatile and heady liquid known as Emersonianism."² More mentions the subjects: self-reliance, compensation, and the Over-Soul; but he does not give any detailed exposition, such as we find in Gay³ and Firkins.⁴

D. The American Scholar.

The American Scholar, the Phi Beta Kappa Address at Harvard in 1637, More considers as "a high but scarcely practical appeal" to the scholar to raise himself above pedantry, out of routine, and to reach after the inspiration of the Divine Soul. Judging from Cohen's observation concerning the dust of pedantry which covered the academic work of this period, this exhortation provided good balance.⁵ Riley considers that the warmth of inspiration was sadly needed by the cold New England reasoning.⁶

E. The Divinity School Address.

In The Divinity School Address (1838), Emerson condemned the emphasis of historical Christianity upon the person of Jesus. He believed that all persons could experience an intuition like that of Christ, but not through instruction and

¹ Firkins, RWE, 343.
² More, CH, I, 352.
³ Gay, E, passim.
⁴ Firkins, RWE, 297-359.
⁵ Cohen, CH, III, 229.
⁶ Riley, AT, 141.
ritual. This replacing by Emerson of the person of Jesus by a "chorus of thoughts and hopes" aroused much opposition.  
However, Emerson was indisposed to engage in argumentation to support his views. His thoughts were given to him immediately by the Spirit of which he was a part.

Some critics have considered that Emerson was incapable of argumentation. Firkins, however, says that he was not incapable of formal logical processes, but that he considered them delaying and boring. He cites many examples of his use of argument in the writings of his early years. In regard to his dislike of mathematics and logic, Firkins writes: "The reason is not overtasked, but the imagination and the sensibilities are underfed... He was not beaten; he was starved."  

In discussing Emerson's attitude toward religion, Firkins says, "The peculiarity of Emerson might be defined in these terms: he brought into the service of the religious instinct a larger amount and greater variety of material than was ever applied to that function by any other of the sons of men."  

F. His Resignation from His Church.

One of the turning points in Emerson's career was his resignation from his church in Boston. More reminds us that it was nearly a century earlier that "the greatest of American theologians" was forced to resign in regard to the same issue, viz., the Eucharist. Riley says of this incident, "In the words of an English critic, he left his church with a yawn."

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1 More, CH, I, 353.  
2 Firkins, RWE, 298-302.  
3 Ibid., 301.  
4 Ibid., 307.  
5 Riley, AT, 145.
G. Influences, Ancestral and Foreign.

Concerning the influences, ancestral and foreign, upon Emerson, More says that "with all the divinity of Massachusetts in his veins," he could not get away from the Puritan emphasis upon religion and character. Parrington shows how this divinity formed a great part of Emerson's childhood character, but how he gradually freed himself from its barrenness and restrictions.¹ We add here a reference to the emphasis which Brooks places upon the influence of Mary Moody Emerson, aunt of the philosopher, who encouraged him from his earliest years.²

The foreign influences were chiefly Greek, oriental, and seventeenth-century English. Kant, Schelling, and Fichte became known to Emerson in his later years after his theories had already been molded. More agrees here with Riley, who explains that Emerson's knowledge of German metaphysics was "slight and secondary."³ More points out that the evidence of his Journal shows that the main issues of his doctrine were relatively independent of external influences.

H. Emerson's Style.

More speaks briefly of the spontaneity of Emerson's style, especially as revealed in the exceptional quality of his ethical epigrams in quatrains. Here he shows the fine art of combining gravity of thought with simplicity of expression.

¹ Parrington, RRA, 386-388. ² Riley, AT, 159-161. ³ Brooks, LE, passim.
I. Excessive Optimism.

More's chief criticism of Emerson is his excessive optimism which apparently ignores the problem of evil. He quotes Charles Eliot Norton's opinion that in his declining years Emerson became dogmatic in holding to his optimism and unawareness of evil. Carlyle believed that Emerson failed to see the "hand of the devil in human life." Lewisohn says, "Angry dualists, like Mr. Paul Elmer More, have blamed Emerson for neglecting so wholly the evil that is under the sun."\(^1\) He admits that it is a defect to neglect human suffering, but a blessing to omit evils in the Puritanic sense of sin, morals, laws, prisons, etc. Lewisohn is glad to see one American of those early days who does not overemphasize the sense of sin. "But that he drops sin from his vision of things is all but his highest claim as a prophet and a teacher of his time and folk."\(^2\)

Parrington, however, emphasizes the selections from Emerson's Journal which do bear upon evil. He shows that such passages reveal no "jaunty optimism."\(^3\)

Riley points out how Emerson courageously triumphed over adversities of ill health, family losses, and poverty, and how despite them, he upheld a radiant optimism.\(^4\) This opinion is borne out by Firkins's belief that Emerson forestalled pain by concentrating on stronger interests.\(^5\) Furthermore, Firkins claims that his depreciation of wrong and guilt is intelligible in the light of his faith in an all-powerful benevolence.

\(^1\) Lewisohn, EA, 120.
\(^2\) Ibid., 121.
\(^3\) Parrington, RRA, 398-399.
\(^4\) Firkins, RWE, 348.
\(^5\) Riley, AT, 149.
ALT.<br>

I PROFESS MY DUTY TO THE HONEST MEN OF THE COMMUNITY TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE EVILS OF THE LAW.

The citizens of this community are entitled to the same rights and privileges as any other citizens of the state. They have the same responsibilities and duties as any other citizens.

The police force of this community is charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order. They are required to enforce the laws of the state and to protect the citizens from harm.

The community has a right to be safe and secure, and the police force is responsible for ensuring that this right is upheld.

The police force is composed of trained and experienced officers who are dedicated to serving the community.

The police force is equipped with the latest technology and equipment to ensure that they can effectively enforce the laws of the state.

The police force is committed to respecting the rights of all citizens, and they work closely with the community to ensure that everyone is treated fairly.

The police force is supported by the community, and they are relied upon to protect the community from harm.

The police force is proud of their service to the community, and they are committed to serving the community with integrity and dedication.

The police force is dedicated to serving the community with honor and integrity.

The police force is a community asset, and they are committed to serving the community with honor and integrity.
and his reliance on the instincts of the individual.¹ "Emerson's sense of social evil was keen and multifarious; its multifariousness decreased its intensity.... For Emerson the totality of the evil demonstrated and derided the partiality of the reform."²

More thinks that Emerson's probable recognition of the existence of evil was unaccompanied by a seriousness regarding its consequences for philosophical thought. His appeal is chiefly to the youthful mind, for, as More says, the mature judgment turns to sages who have grappled with the evils of existence. Christy claims that Emerson does not deny the existence of sin and failings, but says that they do not touch the Absolute.³ More characterizes Emerson's emphasis upon hope reaching even to the assurance of present happiness, as unique in American thought.

Long's main criticism of Emerson, viz., his inconsistency in ignoring the past, is not discussed by More.⁴ But Riley says that Emerson was not unmindful of his debt to the past.⁵ Brooks bears out Riley's view: "None was more passive than he before Shakespeare, Goethe, Plato: he became a mere organ of hearing before them and yielded himself to the laws of these mighty beings."⁶

More discusses Emerson's dualism in regard to his synthesis of the many and the one, and in regard to the transiency and yet the unalterable nature of reality. Gay also mentions this problem: "He has reached the eternal paradox of the one and the many and he makes no attempt to solve it."⁷

1 Firkins, RWE, 350. 3 Christy, OAT, 122. 5 Riley, AT, 155. 7 Gay, E, 125.
2 Ibid., 345. 4 Long, AL, 334. 6 Brooks, LE, 47.
Chapter V

Later Philosophy

A. Dearth of Speculative Thought in America until the Post-Darwinian Unrest.


Cohen makes clear his opinion that there is no original American philosophy, distinctive, such as one might expect of our nation with its unique political history and frontier life, but that it is almost wholly based on the English and Scottish tradition. He mentions the two waves of French thought which passed over this country. The former, that of free thought, he identifies with English deism and Locke. The second, that of the eclectic philosophy of Cousin and Jouffroy, he labels as the Scottish realism of Reid and Stewart. Riley agrees with Cohen's belief that the French thought did not maintain a permanent foothold here. It never penetrated and was soon defeated even in the work of Jefferson and in the strongholds of the Carolinas, by the wave of Scottish Presbyterianism which swept southward from Princeton.

Cohen discusses the lack of German influence upon American thought. He claims that the German terms and mannerisms brought here from Germany by American professors were applied

1 Cohen, CH, III, 226-229.
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to the prevailing British tradition. We see how this was true in the case of New England transcendentalism. He cites the apologetic character of Marsh's introduction to Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* (1829) as evidence of the entrenchment of Locke and Reid in this country. He admits that such radicals as Theodore Parker showed an acquaintance with German philosophy, but that American transcendentalism, though merging bits of Schelling's romantic nature-philosophy, is really a form of Neoplatonism. Cohen cites Hickock's *Rational Psychology* (1848) as the only American work in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century to reveal direct Kantian influence, and this no more than the British writings of Hamilton and Whewell. He claims that the Hegelian influence evident in the work of William T. Harris was even more patent in Great Britain.

2. Orthodoxy and Absorption in Material Conquest.

As obstacles to the spread of free speculative thought in America, Cohen presents the absorption in material conquest and the prevalence of narrow orthodoxy, which suspected idealism as a road to pantheism, and empiricism as a road to atheism. Such narrowness appealed to the uncritical consciousness as a way to eliminate doubts, and it elevated disputable opinions to the status of indubitable principles.

To such a type of mind, the Scottish commonsense realism was welcome as the democratic philosophy. Cohen explains this condition on the grounds that it was in harmony with established
beliefs, such as a literal interpretation of the Bible and so with the popular, uncritical views of the soul, the world, and God; and above all, that it was "eminently teachable." The last reason was a great advantage since clergymen held all the chairs of philosophy, and a premium was placed upon orthodoxy in educational institutions. It was indeed shortsighted to neglect the search for truth in the supposed interests of pedagogy.

3. Comparison of Riley's Position with That of Cohen.

Riley's statement, "The German influences on American thought have been the most significant and the most weighty of all the foreign forces," leads us for a moment to wonder why he stands in such apparent disagreement with Cohen. But as we probe further into Riley's exposition, we find that he is really in substantial agreement with Cohen. Although Riley is aware of the long period during which German thought seeped into America, he agrees with Cohen that it was most indirect, not philosophical, but literary, and that Kantian influence was not felt directly in the eastern part of the country until 1876. Riley gives the St. Louis School the pioneer credit for the direct introduction of Kant. Riley agrees with James Murdock, who considers that much of the reputed obscurity and unintelligibility of German thought in English translation is really because of the inability of the English language to form clear

1 Riley, AT, 229.
metaphysical expression. Riley and Cohen both cite temperamental differences and a "servile deference to English judgment" as obstacles to the adoption of German thought here. Riley observes that the "frigid condescension characteristic of New England nipped the growth of the foreign plants." In the last analysis, Riley agrees with Cohen in the direct predominance of Scottish influence: "It overran the country, and had an exclusive and preponderant influence well beyond the centennial of the country's independence." He too states how powerfully the church and college combined to uphold orthodoxy and to hinder free speculation.

B. Exceptional Minds during This Period of Pedantry.

Cohen considers the second quarter of the nineteenth century as an arid period in the field of philosophy, but he cites as exceptions, the "acute" minds of Bowen, Mahan, Bledsoe, and Tappan, and the "powerful" minds of Shedd and Hickock. He recommends Albert Bledsoe's Philosophy of Mathematics as still worth reading, and cites Shedd's Philosophy of History as evidence of the independence of an evolutionary conception of history from the work of Spencer and Darwin. Cohen rates Hickock high in the statement that "for sheer intellectual power and comprehensive grasp of technical philosophy," he was the foremost figure in American philosophy from Jonathan Edwards to the Civil War. If we wonder why Cohen does not mention Emerson, we must remember that the latter was not one who formed a system.

1 Riley, AT, 235.  
2 Ibid., 231.  
3 Ibid., 234.  
4 Ibid., 119.
of technical philosophy. In fact, Cohen, in a later reference to Emerson, designates him as a seer or prophet.\footnote{Cohen, CH, III, 254.}

C. The Beginnings of Modern American Philosophy.

Cohen places the genesis of modern American philosophy in the controversy over evolution which followed the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) and Lyell's *Geology.* Thought divided into the right wing, or the dialectic evolution-ism of Hegel, and the left wing, or the positivistic philosophy of Comte, Mill, Lewes, Buckle, and Bain. The arguments based upon evidences of design in the organic world gave place to the theory of natural selection. The older deism was revived in the view that the world manifested an immanent power which expressed itself in general laws revealed to reason. The pioneers of the modern movement were John Fiske in the field of evolutionary philosophy, Chauncey Wright in the field of scientific empiricism, and William T. Harris in the field of the Hegelian dialectic. Cohen proceeds to discuss these thinkers in the order named.

D. The Philosophy of John Fiske (1842-1901).

1. **Teleological Evolution.**

Fiske was a disciple of Spencer, and neither, Cohen thinks, has presented new ideas in the realm of pure philosophy, but they have emphasized the relativity of human knowledge and the theory of universal evolution. Evolution is made teleological,
human perfection being its goal. In his Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, delivered as lectures at Harvard (1869-1871), Fiske defends Spencer's agnosticism against anthropomorphic theism. Thus he incurred the wrath of the orthodox, and rendered a permanent position in the department of philosophy impossible. This is one of Cohen's numerous references to the restraint of free expression in American institutions, because of their theological background. Fiske deals with the problem of reconciling evil with a "benevolent, omnipotent, quasi-psychical Power." This, we note, was the problem which led to Chauncy's Benevolence of the Deity, and to Edwards's placing the cause of evil beyond God. Fiske is not content to leave the infinite unknowable as Spencer does. He observes an incompatibility between the personality and the infinity of God. His conclusion is that of a cosmic immanence. It is interesting to note here that Riley points out how Joseph Cook, a lecturer, attached the term, creative evolution, to Fiske's view—a significant term in the light of Bergson's later contribution.

2. Ethical Implications of His Evolutionary Theory.

Fiske conceives of man's spiritual development as the goal of evolution. His ethical teachings are considered commonplace by Cohen. Fiske adopts the popular conception of morality as the yielding to the "dictates of sympathy" rather than to
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"dictates of selfishness." He condemns the philosophy of Voltaire as socially subversive. He also opposes Comte's view of organizing society on the basis of scientific philosophy. He conceives of social progress as an evolutionary amelioration of the human heart. His aperçu is related, not to a theory of education, but to his theory of social and moral evolution. Fiske's interest in history led him to accept evolutionary philosophy as a clue to the complicated mass of facts presented in history.


Cohen's judgment of Fiske's lucid and vigorous style is higher than that of his logic. He considers that the influence of the sixteen editions of Cosmic Philosophy was very extensive. However, he criticizes his use of two inconsistent arguments, viz., Berkeleianism and psychical parallelism. Riley does not mention this inconsistency in his discussion of Fiske in American Thought. Cohen credits Fiske with making fashionable "the evolutionary myth," and for replacing the old "static" point of view with a new "dynamic" orthodoxy. Riley considers that Fiske provides the clearest summary of the conflict between special creation and derivation. Because of this controversial spirit, Royce calls his account rancorous. 1

E. The Philosophy of Chauncey Wright (1830-1875).

1. His Rejection of Spencer.

Wright gave promise of developing Mill's logic when he was 

Riley, AT, 211.
cut short by an untimely death. His writings are scarce, comprising only one volume, most of which was published in *The North American Review* (1864-1873). He rejects the evolutionary philosophy of Spencer as an inadequate grasp of modern physics, and an extension beyond the bounds of known fact.

2. His Attitude toward Metaphysics.

Wright considers that a metaphysical picture of the universe is properly a function of religion or of poetic and myth-making art. Nevertheless, he does not discredit metaphysics entirely, but interprets its value pragmatically as instrumental to human happiness. He assigns theological defense and hedonistic satisfaction as the motives of religious and metaphysical philosophy. These motivations, we note in passing, are discussed by D.S. Robinson as some reasons why men philosophize. But, of course, we know that the true metaphysician seeks openmindedly for a comprehensive interpretation of the nature of reality and the meaning and goal of life. Wright concludes that the choice of metaphysical dogmas is a matter of character, not of logic. This belief we find in James's philosophy.


Wright is treated briefly but most appreciatively by Cohen, witness his following statement: "If the test of a philosophy be intellectual keenness and persistent devotion to the truth rather than skill in making sweeping generalizations plausible, Chauncey Wright deserves a foremost place in American philosophy."  

1 Robinson, ILP, 15-30.  
2 Cohen, CH, III, 234.
This criterion is typical of Cohen's sincerity and originality of appraisal. He views with contempt superficial generalizations, and although very comprehensive in his exposition of all types, he favors the positivistic and the empirical more than the theological and the metaphysical. Cohen's championship of Wright is not borne out by Riley, who does not discuss him at all. Cohen admits that he is attractive only to the select who do not expect philosophy to confirm beliefs and to offer a simple system. He points out Wright's anticipation of James and Dewey in his interpretation of general laws as finders, not as summaries, of the truth. Cohen rejoices in the direct and fruitful influence of this devotee of scientific speculation upon Charles Peirce.

F. The Philosophy of William T. Harris (1835-1909).

Cohen values the influence of Harris as an interpreter, enthusiast, organizer, and editor, rather than as an original thinker. Riley agrees in emphasizing his instrumental value.¹

1. His Dialectical Refutation of Spencerian Agnosticism.

Cohen discusses the attack made by Harris against the agnosticism of Spencer, viz., the assumption that we cannot conceive the infinite. His psychological argument accuses Spencer and Hamilton of confusing the processes of conception and imagination. His objective argument is dialectical. The finite particular of sense-perception is not the ultimate reality, but is given on the stage of atomism. The understanding, on the stage

¹ Riley, AT, 248.
of pantheism, views the activity of every finite object to be gained from some other object. The reason, on the stage of theism, views the ultimate source as unlimited by any external object, and therefore infinite or self-limited Activity. Cohen imputes to Harris the Hegelian intellectualization of religion and art by interpreting their function as the revelation of philosophic truth. He accuses him of the fallacy, which he thinks is common to "all Hegelians and most believers in the adequacy of one system," viz., of thinking "he has gained insight when he has translated a fact into his own terminology." Cohen appears to be anti-Hegelian in his sympathy.

2. The Influence of Harris in Education and in Journalism.

Cohen considers that the influence of Harris is greater than one would expect from reading his works which sound "rather obsolete and somewhat mechanical" today. He is to be noted chiefly as the intellectual leader in the profession of education in the United States from 1867-1910, the chief organizer of the School of Concord, and the editor, from 1867-1893, of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the first journal in the English language which was devoted exclusively to philosophy. Through this organ and other writings, Harris brought before the American people an exposition of Greek and German philosophy. Riley evaluates highly the work of the St. Louis School in its pioneer interpretation of Kant in the United States. The Journal also was of value, Cohen notes, in publishing the first papers of Peirce, Royce, and

1 Cohen, CH, III, 238.
2 Ibid., 236.
In the introduction of the next section, the three years of the
1875-1878, the three years of the middle period, the three
years of the retirement period, and the three years of the
transition period, are described in detail. The figures on
the following page show the extent of the
information presented in the three years.

In the beginning of the second section, the
three years of the middle period, the three
years of the retirement period, and the three
years of the transition period, are described in
detail. The figures on the following page show the
extent of the information presented in the three years.
James. Riley adds the name of Howison to this list. Riley calls Harris "the interpreter of the thought of his country, whether East or West." 1 Certainly such pioneer work in the interpretation of German thought was of value in supplementing the influence of Scottish realism in the United States. Riley considers that Brockmeyer, an unlettered but speculative thinker, was the oracle which Harris interpreted. Cohen does not discuss Brockmeyer.

G. Systems of Philosophy in the Leading Colleges in the Late Nineteenth Century.

1. Slow Progress in the Field of Education.

Cohen calls attention to the lag of educational institutions behind the development of thought. Progress was made late in the nineteenth century through the appointment of a layman, Charles Eliot, as president of Harvard (1869), and the establishment of post-graduate instruction at Johns Hopkins (1876). This latter date is the one adopted by Riley as the beginning of the direct German influence in the eastern part of the United States. Cohen discusses the spread of German idealism through the English and Scottish universities, and the triumph of idealism in this country during the first decade of the publication of The Philosophical Review, founded in 1892, with Jacob Gould and James Creighton as editors. As Cohen considers this journal "open to scholarly contributions in all the various fields of philosophy,"2 he judges its articles as weighty evidence of

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1 Riley, AT, 248.
2 Cohen, CH, III, 240.
the dominance of Kantian and Hegelian thought.

2. At Harvard.

At Harvard College, Francis Bowen's opposition to dialectic Hegelianism and the mind-philosophy of the British empiricists, was followed by George H. Palmer's acceptance of Hegelianism introduced at Harvard by C. C. Everett in 1869.

3. At Princeton.

At Princeton, James McCosh defended Scottish commonsense realism according to tradition. Riley points out the influence here of Witherspoon, a descendant of John Knox, who came from Scotland to accept the presidency of Princeton in 1768, whereupon he drove out Berkeleianism. Cohen explains McCosh's attempt to reconcile evolutionary philosophy with orthodoxy, and his attacks upon all opponents including Hegelians. McCosh, according to Riley, considered that realism as taught at Princeton was what an American philosophy should be. This sentiment, we note, would accord with that of the man on the street, but not necessarily with that of the philosophical type of mind. In criticism of McCosh's attempt to harmonize religion and evolution, as Cohen mentioned, Riley observes that he "transmogrified mechanical evolution into what he called a Christian evolution." Riley considers that in substituting Providence for creation and in failing to grasp the idea of immanence, McCosh held the eighteenth, not the nineteenth century, view of evolution. Ormond, according to Cohen, expanded realism with Berkeleian and Kantian elements.

1 Riley, AT, 123-135.  
2 Loc. cit.  
3 Ibid., 417.
4. At Yale.

At Yale, Noah Porter, whose works reveal a clear understanding of German idealism as well as British empiricism, adhered substantially to Scottish intuitive philosophy, and opposed popular agnosticism and materialism.

Although Cohen recognizes the profession of George Trumbull Ladd to eclecticism, he declares that he is a follower of Lotze. His spiritual metaphysics is based upon epistemology in Kantian fashion. Cohen recognizes his leadership in physiologic psychology and asserts that his philosophy stands for criticism of the procedures and the fundamental ideas of the sciences. Riley discusses this stand more fully and points out Ladd's emphasis on the empirical data for philosophy, and also on the synthesis of scientific results.\(^1\) Riley points out how Ladd achieves unity through personalism. He likens him to Royce in conceiving the world as mechanical when considered as an object by itself, but as self-like when considered as an entity known to man.\(^2\) Cohen deprediates Ladd's intellectualism by calling his idealism a branch of modern Christian apologetics. He says that Ladd's chief interest was in making better Christian citizens.

5. At Boston University.

Cohen's reference to Borden Parker Bowne of Boston University, brief but high in its praise. He calls him "one of the keenest of American metaphysicians."\(^3\) He mentions Bowne as a more direct follower of Lotze than was Ladd.

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\(^1\) Riley was a pupil of Ladd's.  
\(^2\) Riley, AT, 270.  
\(^3\) Cohen, CH, III, 240, footnote.
H. The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce (1840-1914).


Concerning the richness and variety of Peirce's thought, Cohen states, "If philosophic eminence were measured not by the number of finished treatises of dignified length but by the extent to which a man brought forth new and fruitful ideas of radical importance, then Charles S. Peirce (1840-1914) would easily be the greatest figure in American philosophy." Cohen attributes his inconsistency and his obscurity to the fact that because of unconventional morality and "inability to work in harness," he was deprived of the opportunity to hold an academic position. Yet, according to Cohen's later observation regarding academic pedantry, this very deprivation may have been an advantage.

2. Diversity of Talent.

Peirce's chief concern was with the philosophy of science. He was master of mathematics, logic, photometric astronomy, geodesy, psycho-physics, and philology. The field of mathematical logic developed by him is now used by neo-realism. R.B. Perry mentions his founding of "symbolic logic."2

3. Originator of Pragmatism.

The chief influence of Peirce has been evident in the development of pragmatism. In a little club of which Chauncey Wright was the dominating personality, Peirce became interested in the translation of general propositions into prescriptions

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1 Cohen, CH, III, 241.
2 Weber and Perry, HP, 578, note.
for obtaining new facts. He formulated the general maxim of pragmatism, viz., that the meaning of any concept is to be found in "all the conceivable experimental phenomena, which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply."¹ This maxim was developed by James, but the latter differed in many ways from Peirce, who preferred to call his philosophy pragmaticism.² Peirce emphasizes the good in general ideas rather than in individual, segregated reactions, which, as Cohen states, reminds one strongly of the central ideas in Santayana's philosophy. Contrariwise, James's emphasis is on the particular, sensible experience. Royce does not value Peirce primarily as the founder of pragmatism, but rather as a logician.³

4. His Tychism.

Cohen praises Peirce for opposing "that sacred cow of philosophy," the belief in eternal laws, and for substituting the primacy of mind and chance. Peirce considers that law is merely an accidental variation which has grown habitual with things. Cohen mentions that this tychism is used by James in releasing men from a "block universe."

5. His Influence on James.

Riley discusses the influence of Peirce on James, and points out the differences between their views, among which is Peirce's disagreement with James's assumption that the end of man is action. Riley agrees with Cohen on Peirce's interpretation of the meaning of a concept, not in individual reactions, but in the way

¹ Monist, XVI, 162. ³ Royce, PC, 114-117.
² Robinson, ILP, 240.
those reactions contribute to the development of concrete reasonableness.¹

Rogers points out the influence upon James of Peirce's metaphysical doctrine of the real presence of chance in the world. He says that Peirce's pragmatism is a doctrine of the meaning of ideas rather than of truth. Peirce would call truth "the mental state at which inquiry aims," the satisfaction derived from the ultimate pushing of inquiry far enough, the consensus of opinion among scientific minds.² What James appropriated were the "practical bearings," a matter of supererogation with Peirce. This opinion is in agreement with Cohen's. Rogers proceeds further in pointing out Peirce's belief that the will should exercise cautious doubt and weigh reasons, as opposed to James's will to believe. Peirce denies the creation of thought by its own object. Rogers also emphasizes Peirce's adherence to the truth whether it was in the interests of society or not. He was not, we note, a social pragmatist like Dewey.

6. Opinions of Other Critics.

Perry, Riley, and Rogers agree with Cohen on a high evaluation of Peirce's work. Riley says that his aim was less selfish than is usually thought and his spirit less practical than general.³ Perry refers to Peirce as "a scholar of great erudition and originality."⁴ Cohen considers that he was "endowed with the bountiful but capricious originality of genius."⁵

¹ Riley, AT, 288.
² Riley, AT, 288.
³ Weber and Perry, HP, 578, note.
⁴ Cohen, CH, III, 241.
⁵ Perry, Riley, and Rogers agree with Cohen on a high evaluation of Peirce's work. Riley says that his aim was less selfish than is usually thought and his spirit less practical than general. Perry refers to Peirce as "a scholar of great erudition and originality." Cohen considers that he was "endowed with the bountiful but capricious originality of genius."
Robinson calls him "one of the greatest American philosophers." Mumford considers Peirce as a lonely voice between the pragmatists who dominated the foreground and the thinkers who were searching for a background. Mumford pays tribute to his precise and deep thinking, what his own age sorely needed but overlooked.

We note here that the Harvard University Press is now publishing Peirce's works for the first time.

I. The Philosophy of Josiah Royce (1885-1916).

1. Metaphysical Idealism.

Cohen's discussion of Royce's idealism is comprehensive and appreciative. Royce's earliest published papers revealed a Kantian denial of the possibility of ultimate metaphysical solutions except by ethical postulates. His first book The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885) reveals the author as "a full-fledged metaphysical idealist," who contends that the possibility of error requires the presupposition of absolute truth and an absolute knower. The world must be either of the same nature as our minds or else unknowable, or as Thilly says, explaining Royce, "An existence that has no mental attribute is to me wholly opaque."

2. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy.

Cohen describes The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892) as "an unusually eloquent" book. This opinion is borne out by Lewisohn's remark that Royce's treatises "both for structural order and textual eloquence are far above any other prose of

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1 Robinson, ILF, 35. 2 Mumford, GD, 194. 3 Thilly, HP, 560.
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Cohen points out the emphasis in this work of the will rather than knowledge. The Berkeleyan concept of the world as ideas is accepted. Royce recognizes the tragic fact of experience, viz., that there is no complete satisfaction for effort and passionate toil; yet he conceives of the "eternal frustration of our ideals or will" as enriching to life. This recognition of the facts of experience, we note, is empirical. Perry states that there is a "naturalistic and empirical flavor" to Royce's thought. Rogers also praises Royce for starting with empirical reality. This recognition of evil is contrary to the excessive optimism or indifference of Emerson. Robinson interprets Royce's acceptance of evil as metaphysically real but as conquered by the Absolute. Cohen points out the principle of social or cosmic suffering, the suffering of the Absolute because of evils resulting from ignorance and against the will. Lewisohn's comment, typical of his contempt for the Puritanic emphasis on sin and guilt, is pertinent here: "He cared little about the freedom of the will, for he was a good man not eager to assign guilt and mete out punishment."

3. The World and the Individual.

Cohen emphasizes Royce's indebtedness to Peirce, which becomes explicit in The World and the Individual (2 volumes, 1901). Here the Absolute is reconciled with the individual by the analogy of the relation of mathematical infinity to one of its finite

1 Lewisohn, EA, 298.  
2 Rogers, FAP, 283.  
3 Robinson, ILP, 133.  
4 Weber and Perry, HP, 546-552.  
5 More, CH, I, 361.  
6 Lewisohn, EA, 298.
parts. However, Royce departs from Peirce in attempting to reconcile the reality of abstract logical and mathematical universals with Berkeleian ideas. Cohen questions this reconciliation. Rogers praises Royce for going beyond many English Hegelian idealists, and grappling with the problem of the individual and the Absolute. Thilly points out how each finite individual in the Absolute contains a copy in itself of the Absolute. Such an interpretation reminds us of Emerson. Robinson mentions the development of the coherence criterion in this work. Cohen does not.


Cohen classifies Royce's subsequent work under mathematical-logical and ethical-religious. The essay on logic in The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences is chosen as an example of the former group. In this essay, logic is treated as the most general science of objective order. His argument, Cohen notes, is on a perfectly realistic basis and is in no way affected by his professed adherence to idealism. Cohen is particularly appreciative of this fact. In these writings, Royce exercised an influence on neo-realism.

The Problem of Christianity (1913), Royce's last book, is selected as representative of the second group. Here is found an interpretation of Pauline concepts by social psychology; and the personality of Christ is considered only as the embodiment of the spirit of a beloved community. We are reminded

1 Rogers, EAP, 283.
2 Thilly, HP, 561.
3 Riley, AT, 142.
4 Robinson, ILP, 106.
here of Emerson's protest against the historical emphasis upon the person of Jesus.  

Robinson, in discussing Royce, speaks of the "blessed community which transcends every finite social order and constitutes the essence of God."  

Cohen does not mention Royce's theory of interpretation as a higher function than either perception or conception. This theory and that of the signs which determine interpretation were derived from Peirce.  

5. Historical Influence.  

Cohen considers that Royce influenced historically the spread of two opposing forces to twentieth-century idealism, viz., pragmatism, by his emphasis on the ethical and the practical aspect of ideas, and neo-realism, by his teaching and writings concerning mathematical logic. The latter influence was a continuation of that of Peirce. Robinson states that neo-realism "arose as a polemic against Roycian Absolute Idealism."  

R.B. Perry considers that such absolutism contains three root-defects: formalism, equivocation, and dogmatism. Santayana criticizes Royce's incompatible combination of the Absolute and of social realism. This seems to us a valid criticism.  

We note that Cohen does not discuss Royce's theory of error or his Philosophy of Loyalty.  


Robinson characterizes Royce as "one of the ablest teachers
of philosophy this country has produced.\textsuperscript{1} Lewison calls him "perhaps the most powerful writer of the period" between the Civil and Spanish Wars.\textsuperscript{2} He also describes him as an "idealist of a rather exorbitant type,"\textsuperscript{3} which opinion would be in accord with Cohen, who, nevertheless says, "he continued to represent, against the growing tide of anti-intellectualism, the old faith in the dignity and potency of reason which is the cornerstone of humanistic liberalism."\textsuperscript{4}


1. Early Influences.

"The union of religious mysticism with biologic and psychologic empiricism is characteristic of James's work from the very beginning."\textsuperscript{5} Cohen points out the Swedenborgian atmosphere of his early home, the learning of the art of observing details from the teaching of Louis Agassiz, the tendency of the companionship of Chauncey Wright and the reading of Renouvier to lead him away from monism, and his personal inclination for Hume and Mill. Lewisohn adds another early influence, viz., that of an "auto-therapeutic effort" to free himself from the perplexities of metaphysics and so from ill health, by his determined exercise of the freedom of the will. As his metaphysical inquiries were associated with grief and despair, whereas faith in his will saved him from such trouble, James accepted the working of the will as truth.\textsuperscript{6} This interpretation seems to us plausible when we consider the despair to which many persons

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Robinson, ILF, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Lewisohn, MA, 297.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Loc. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Cohen, CH, III, 248.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 250.
\item \textsuperscript{6} Lewisohn, EA, 332.
\end{itemize}
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are driven by their early speculative thought.

2. His Principles of Psychology.

Cohen selects James's Principles of Psychology (2 volumes, 1890) as best to illustrate his chief contribution to the realm of philosophy. James accepts Spencer's view that thought is developed by an evolutionary process and is biologic in functioning. However, for James, the body is an instrument of the mind and the latter may be freed from the former at death, and express itself in some "celestial" form.¹ Cohen mentions James's belief in the "survival of consciousness beyond death."² In the Principles of Psychology, James answers the idealistic argument that relations are of non-empirical character, by attributing to the connecting relations themselves a "psychological status on a par with the things they connect."³ His conception of ideas and things both as experiences, Cohen thinks, has aptly been called neutral monism and thus likened to the philosophy of Ernst Mach. Perry, Sellars, and Russell consider that James is the founder of neo-realism.⁴ His simple elements of pure experience out of which all transient entities, including consciousness of individuals, are made, is called by W.M. Sheffer, "neutral entities."⁵ Hasan agrees

¹ Robinson, ILP, 291. ³ Ibid., 250. ⁵ Ibid., 203.
² Cohen, CH, III, 249. ⁴ Robinson, ILP, 158.
with this assumption of James's influence. Cohen does not express his opinion on this issue.

3. His Varieties of Religious Experience.

James's Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) does not treat the spread and vitality of historic religions, but shows interest chiefly in psychology, particularly in the extraordinary type of human being. Cohen remarks that James reveals no "pride of the intellect." This, to be sure, is a virtue, but one which may inhere not only in empiricists.

We note here that Royce believes that James's emphasis on the particular and the individual in religion leaves it to caprice. However, inadequate and chaotic as his philosophy seems to Royce, the latter maintains that it is not to be rejected, but viewed as an aid to finding truth.¹


Cohen leaves his own treatment of James to consider various criticisms of the latter's views. He observes the consternation which has resulted from James's neglect to indicate the relative importance of results. He does not clearly differentiate between causes of belief and evidences of the truth we believe. Cohen thinks that he devoted too much energy to opposing the theory of the truth of ideas as inert copies of reality. Although pragmatism is regarded as James's view, it is merely the method leading to his radical empiricism, according to Cohen.

¹ Royce, WJOE, 22-25.
It has been proposed that James has done away with the traditional metaphysical problem, the relation of mind and body and the need for an Absolute. According to James, experience is not to be defined but to be lived. But, as Cohen asserts, "Just what experience is, James does not tell us." ¹ Yet Rogers states that "in consenting to sacrifice the autonomy and independence, and creativeness of man to the craving for a mystical and religious union with the divine, James comes so close after all to the Absolutism of Royce, that it is hard to detect differences of pragmatic importance." ² Such apparent inconsistencies lead us to see why Howison classes James as a great thinker but not as a philosopher. ³ Howison's contention is that he did not possess a mastery of logic and did his best to discredit it; but Cohen considers such criticism to be unfair, for James elaborated definite doctrines regarding the nature of the mind, truth, and reality; he showed dialectical skill in his works, Radical Empiricism and The Meaning of Truth; and he discredited not logic in general, but only the logic of "vicious intellectualism." Thilly calls James's philosophy anti-intellectualistic because, in order to be true, it must satisfy other than intellectual or logical demands. The intellect is not his only judge of truth.

Howison's criticism is significant in its differentiation between "philosophy as technique and philosophy as vision." Cohen answers that James was aware of technique, but interested

in philosophy as a religious vision of life. Thilly points out how all James's philosophy is rooted in the will to believe, and that theism is the only conception that satisfies his emotional and volitional nature. Rogers also cites the religious motive as James's philosophical preference.

Cohen disagrees with Flournoy's opinion that James derived his cardinal beliefs from the main current of Christian thought. He claims that James is not orthodox, but inclined to accept God as the Deity to whom men pray. He is more definitely opposed to Hegelian and Roycian Absolutism than to popular unbelief. Thus we see his psychological emphasis on the empirical. He opposes Absolutism because of its "insufferable pretension to finality of proof," and because of his own preference for an anthropomorphic universe.

Cohen does not treat specifically Royce's opinion of James, but we mention it here. Royce considers that James is the third in the line of the three great classic philosophers in America. Royce calls James a creative thinker and an interpreter of his age. In opposition to this view, we cite Munford's opinion that James did not create, but that he reported the thought of the "gilded age." Munford construes the whole pragmatic movement as one of acquiescence to the post-Civil War discount of the ideal.

5. Summary of Cohen's Own Appraisal.

Cohen's own constructive appraisal of James follows.

1 Thilly, HP, 570. 2 Rogers, EAP, 385-387. 3 Munford, GD, 183-195.
Although he considers that his place in the history of metaphysics is still a matter of debate, he deems him worthy to occupy a place beside Emerson as a seer or prophet. This reminds us of the opinion of Howison, observed above.¹

Cohen observes a note of obscurantism in his attitude toward logic and "over-beliefs." Rogers agrees in noting obscurity and confusion in James's logic. Rogers thinks that the right to extend belief beyond evidence in cases of momentous issues may be adventurous, but it may lead to rashness resulting in calamity, as, for example, to believe that a chasm ten feet wide is only five feet wide and to act accordingly.²

But Rogers commends James's inculcation of a sense of proportion by avoiding preoccupation with trivialities of logic outside of human interests. Nevertheless, he notes how this tendency to minimize exact logical analysis affects the value of philosophical constructions.³ In this connection, we note Riley's observation that faith and not logic decides questions for James.⁴ But, as Lewisohn remarks, we need to know whose faith in what. Although James's special faith saved him from folly, the faith of the burners of heretics also gave the believers satisfaction. Lewisohn recognizes the need for an objective standard of truth and morality.⁵ We present these opinions as a supplement to those expressed by Cohen.

¹ See page 60.
² Rogers, EAP, 379-380.
³ Ibid., 370-371.
⁴ Riley, AT, 319.
⁵ Lewisohn, EA, 334.
Conen considers that the chief effect of James's work is "to raise the standard of intellectual honesty and courage." Cohen believes that the tone and manner of philosophical writing has been transformed by "the width and depth of his sympathies and the irresistible magic of his words," and that his influence outside America is impressive and steadily increasing.

Lewisohn's evaluation is not so high. He claims that pragmatism "abandons both the search for spiritual and intellectual values as well as the critical spirit. It damns disinterestedness," and therefore is an excellent delineation of present-day American thought. In this same connection, he also writes, "The suspicion that in the best of all possible worlds we were running the best of all possible civilizations straight to a millennium of righteousness and increased profits---that gentle suspicion had now received the stamp of philosophical truth."

Riley considers that it is a shallow belief which James takes from Spencer regarding the preservation of our remote ancestors' ideas. Riley asks why these surviving commonsense principles are fit. Cohen does not discuss this point.

We conclude this discussion with Conen's observation that James's writings are "rich in the variety of factual insight but not in effective answers to the searching criticisms of men like Royce, Russell, and Bradley."

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1 Cohen, CH, III, 254.
2 Ibid., 248.
3 Lewisohn, EA, 332.
4 Riley, AT, 315.
5 Cohen, CH, III, 249.
K. The Philosophy of John Dewey (1859- )

1. The Center of a School of Philosophy.

Cohen introduces John Dewey as "the only American about whom has been formed a regular philosophic school."¹ In Riley's American Thought, however, the Cambridge School is considered as one formed about James; but James's theories had so much variety that he is claimed as the founder of a type of pragmatism, and also by a group of his leading students, as the founder of neo-realism. In regard to Dewey's School, Perry and Lovejoy believe that it will not maintain itself as such, but that its idealistic and realistic elements will be absorbed respectively by exponents of these two philosophic types.²

2. Relation to Hegelian Absolutism.

Cohen states that Dewey's early writings reveal a mastery of Hegelian dialectic. Idealistic elements persist in his view of remodelling the world by thought, and in his organic point of view; but in the latter, Dewey's emphasis is on the changing "situation" rather than on the Absolute, which he ignores. Concerning this issue, Rogers states that Dewey, coming to pragmatism by the way of English Hegelianism, "inherited its lack of concern for the connection of knowledge with a human knower."³ Riley claims that Dewey is not inclined to disparage a certain type of Absolutism, viz., that of an immanent

¹ Cohen, Ch. III, 254. ² Robinson, ILP, 305. ³ Rogers, EAP, 392.
A. The Improvement to Town Lighting.——

To the Mayor and Town Council of

[Signature]

The Town Council of

[Signature]

A. The Improvement to Town Lighting.——

[Signature]

To the Mayor and Town Council of

[Signature]
rational principle which performs the natural selecting.\(^1\)

3. His Naturalism.

Dewey's main work is represented by Cohen as thoroughgoing naturalism. According to his view, the supernaturalism latent in idealism is incompatible with a naturalistic account of the origin of human thought. He accepts James's view of the biologic function of thought, and applies philosophical technique to the exposition of that view. Thus it has received more attention from professional philosophers. Dewey replaces the method of mathematics and physics by that of natural history. He relies upon the Darwinian method to develop philosophical ideas from the discovery of ideas in their natural state. But, as we have noted above, James believes that the mind may be immortal; whereas Dewey rejects immortality as an outworn view. As Cohen points out, James uses pragmatism to justify the claims of supernaturalism; whereas Dewey uses it to eliminate all theological problems. Dewey is indebted to James's Principles of Psychology, but he is an independent ally rather than a disciple. James was later indebted to Dewey's doctrine of instrumentalism. Dewey's instrumentalism eliminates the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality, as having outlived their usefulness. He does not go so far even as Chauncey Wright, who acknowledges their value as a contribution to human happiness.\(^2\) Dewey has no use for the "consolation" of philosophy. He advocates the use of ideas in transforming the

\(^1\) Riley, AT, 304. \(^2\) See page 56. \(^3\) See page 44.
empirical world. In fact, he considers that the only reason we think is because we are forced to do so by some obstacle which stands in the way of our physical adjustment. We note that he ignores all speculation of a contemplative type, all mystical meditation. As Riley says in this connection, Dewey goes to extremes in cold reasoning and does not give due credit to God, freedom, and immortality, experienced as emotional. He has no use for sanctions of sentiment, and is an iconoclast of beliefs that transcend his method. Rogers says that if beliefs do not conform to Dewey's arbitrary definitions, he blames the beliefs.

4. His Realism.

Cohen asserts that Dewey is a professed realist. He holds that thought is an outgrowth of the pre-existing world upon which it reacts. Lovejoy claims that within his pragmatism are both idealistic and realistic doctrines, which are contradictory. Cohen recognizes some of these apparent adherences to idealism, but he does not explicitly condemn them as contradictory.

5. Dewey's Neglect of Values.

Cohen says nothing explicit concerning Dewey's neglect of values. Rogers, however, discusses this limitation at some length. He says that a scientist may ignore epistemology,

1 Riley, AT, 298. 2 Rogers, EAP, 400. 3 Robinson, ILP, 305.
but that a philosopher should consider total reality.
Rogers claims that he has no right to insist that ethical edification is the only legitimate problem. Rogers maintains that the status of values is presupposed by the valuing activity and not merely brought about by that activity as an instrument of physical adjustment. 1


Cohen says of Dewey that "judged by the ever increasing number and contagious zeal of his disciples, Dewey has proved to be the most influential philosopher that America has yet produced." 2 It is interesting to note the various criterions used by Cohen throughout this chapter in making his superlative judgments. Cohen accounts for Dewey's influence by his rare personal qualities as a teacher, his opportune appeal to the prevailing distrust of other-worldliness, the popularity of utilitarianism, the contempt of the practical man for the visionary and for idle play, and the optimism which sees success as the reward for intelligent effort. We are reminded of McCosh's tribute to Scottish realism as the proper philosophy for America. 3 Lewisohn recognizes this representation of Americanism in Dewey, refers to him as "the philosophical spokesman of the age," 4 and goes on to say that "this philosophy interprets good and ill almost, if not quite, in the terms of what seemed good and ill to George Babbitt of Zenith." 5

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1 Rogers, EAP, 406.
2 Cohen, CH, III, 256-257.
3 See page 48.
4 Loc. cit.
5 Lewisohn, EA, 336.
He claims that "the triumph of this philosophy consists in its failure to define the 'good' and 'ill' and 'desirable in the present' of which it speaks," but that it implies what is desirable to a hustling citizenry. After observing how the disciples of Dewey have clearly eliminated ultimate questions from philosophy, Lewisohn exclaims, "No wonder that we have an age of gin and moral confusion!... The stronger novelists of our contemporary period are more philosophical than the philosophers."¹

7. Dewey's Literary Style.

In regard to Dewey's style of expression, Cohen observes that it is "fragmentary, highly technical, and without any extraneous graces of style,"² and this statement is borne out by Lewisohn's comment, "Until the days of Professor Dewey and his disciples and the reduction of philosophy to a tool in a world of go-getters, America has always been happy in the literary quality of her philosophers."³ Lewisohn and Cohen remind us of the grace of Edwards's mystical writings, of the vigor of Fiske, of the charm of Royce and James, and of the poetic artistry of Santayana.


Cohen gives Dewey credit for eliminating the cosmic drama in which persons had such an infinitesimal significance.

¹ Lewisohn, EA, 337.
² Lewisohn, EA, 297.
³ Lewisohn, EA, 297.
⁴ Cohen, CH, III, 256.
Cohen considers that the most significant feature historically of Dewey's influence is the rallying of those "who still believe in the cause of liberalism based on faith in the value of intellectual enlightenment." We are reminded of Cohen's tributes to the intellects of Wright, Peirce, Royce, and James.

L. The Philosophy of James Mark Baldwin.

Cohen devotes one paragraph only to the philosophy of Baldwin, who followed Darwin's evolutionary philosophy even more closely than did James and Dewey. *Thoughts and Things* (1911) Cohen characterizes as "one of the most obscure books written in America," containing a "system of evolutionary social psychology with a very elaborate technical terminology and analytic scaffolding." It was, however, appreciated in France and Germany where translations have been made. A more intelligible view of this system appears in the *Genetic Theory of Reality* (1915) in which the theory of panaclism is developed. This theory holds that the esthetic consciousness is primary. Robinson interprets Baldwin's panaclism as implying that the esthetic conserves both truth and utility, and is more profound than either. Riley devotes a section of *American Thought* to a discussion of Baldwin's use of Darwinism. Cohen states that Baldwin's emphasis on the play element is unique in American philosophy. He neglects to mention the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

1 Cohen, CH, III, 257.  
3 Robinson, ILP, 350.  
2 Loc. cit.
M. The Philosophy of George Santayana.

1. Reasons for Including Santayana in This Survey.

Cohen opens this discussion of Santayana by the observation, "The philosophic temper of an age can be judged by the kind of merit it neglects as well as by what it worships."¹ He states that the name of Santayana has not been included in surveys of philosophy. Therefore Cohen takes particular care to devote several pages to Santayana. He believes it to be especially appropriate to include Santayana, though a living author, for he believed when he wrote this chapter in 1919 that Santayana's future career would not belong to America. His prophecy has been fulfilled; for shortly afterward Santayana went to England to assume his residence.

2. His Artistic View of Philosophy.

Santayana's conception of philosophical thought is artistic. He aims to present a picture of the whole of human experience; and in this "genial" observation of totality, he is not disturbed by unsolved problems, the "Babel of society," and Dewey's anathemas against the purely contemplative. He conceives of the proper achievement of happiness through the "inner landscape," not through outer comforts. With Santayana, philosophy is not only a means to improve life, but it is itself a "more intense life."

He views art as inconsequential and abstract, not concerned with influencing the world, but as providing us with the best hint of ultimate good, and therefore an incentive to continue

¹ Cohen, CH, III, 258.
human toil. His view of esthetics reminds us of Baldwin, who evaluates beauty above utility and truth. Of course this view is sharply opposed to Dewey's instrumentalism. Santayana believes that poetic suggestion is more richly liberating to the human soul than the useful but fragmentary liberation offered by science. We note here a similarity to Chauncey Wright's evaluation of religion and metaphysics as higher than science in producing human happiness.


Cohen considers that the distinguishing mark of Santayana is his combination of naturalism with an appreciation of other-worldliness. His metaphysics contains no supernaturalism. His naturalism is even more pronounced than Dewey's in its belief that mind is an effect of biologic evolution. As Rogers points out, he considers that matter is the only causal agent, that consciousness is a natural product, and that it reports what goes on in the organism. However, it is significant, as Cohen points out, that Santayana differentiates between the origin and the validity of ideals. This is certainly an important distinction. Santayana realizes that the best is not always the latest in development. He rejects the identification of the ideal with the real, as in Hegel. Yet Robinson asserts that although Santayana ridicules Absolutism, he incorporates its essential ideas into his own so-called

1 See page 69.  
2 See page 44.  
3 Rogers, EAP, 351.
critical realism.¹

Cohen observes that Santayana is saved from the melancholy of most naturalists by accepting the Greek distinction between the brute existence and the form of things.

We add here the comment of Rogers that Santayana considers consciousness useless, but not worthless. In fact, he thinks that it is the only seat and source of worth.²

4. His Respect for Traditional Wisdom.

Another distinguishing trait of Santayana is his respect for traditional wisdom. It seems to us that in this age of cutting loose from bonds of restraint, such a respect provides good balance. Santayana, instead of rebelling, seeks a congenial type of restraint. Such characteristics are believed by Cohen to reveal Santayana’s Latin and Catholic inheritance.

Lewisohn refers to his disdain for the Germanic “World of Streben” as heathen and turbulent. Lewisohn considers that he worships his picture of the Latin civilization with “poetic passion.”³

Santayana emphasizes how reflection can distinguish the ideal from the physical embodiment in which traditional wisdom is transmitted. We see here a leaning toward idealism.

Cohen points out Santayana’s contempt for a philosophy of striving without any worthy end in sight and with no ideals by which to measure progress. We note here Lewisohn’s criticism of Dewey cited above.⁴

¹ Robinson, ILP, 227-228.
² Rogers, EAP, 351-352.
³ Lewisohn, EA, 338-339.
⁴ See page 63.
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5. His Social Philosophy.

Santayana's social philosophy is essentially aristocratic, but he recognizes that the "emancipated, atheistic, international democracy" is replacing the old order with a morality of its own. 1

6. His Attitude toward Religion.

Santayana construes religion as a method of emancipating man from personal limitations and worldliness. He considers that dogmas of religion are helpful to our inner peace by furnishing truth, not about existence, but about ideals. He considers it superstitious to regard God as an existence rather than as an ideal. He respects Catholic dogma because it calls for a reasonable deference to authority, but it leaves the mind essentially free. Cohen expresses this opinion.


Cohen attributes the relative absence of explicit recognition of Santayana, partly to the modern view of philosophy as a narrowed field of speculation and partly to Santayana's own poetic style of writing. Cohen considers that "the great tragedy of modern philosophy" lies in the difficulty of formulating a world-view which does justice to the discoveries of all the special sciences, when universal knowledge is farther than ever removed from human possibility. He notes a marked tendency to

1 Cohen, CH, III, 260.
limit philosophy to the problem of epistemology. He cites Santayana as an example of one who has abandoned scientific accuracy as hopeless, in his attempt to picture the universe. His "essential loneliness" results from his failure to elaborate any solution of the nature of knowledge. Cohen made this observation in 1919, eight years before the appearance of Santayana's Realm of Essence, in which he developed an epistemological theory.

Another quality which Cohen considers prevents Santayana from gaining widespread acceptance is his speculative detachment, which appeals to neither conservatives nor radicals. On the one hand, he repels religious rationalization by his atheistic, non-democratic, and esthetic morality; on the other, he has escaped the notice of scientific philosophers. Rogers, we add, calls attention to the tone of condescension which Santayana employs in place of argument in his attitude toward conflicting views.

Cohen agrees with Rogers on a high evaluation of Santayana's literary style, and also in recognition of its lack of appeal to the popular and to the philosophic taste. Rogers attributes such a condition to "academic distrust of literary gifts." Despite his beauty of diction, which Cohen compares to the cadences of Walter Pater, his thought is difficult to discover in his "pithy and oracular epigrams." His arguments are not clearly elucidated. We are reminded of Emerson's epigrammatic style.

1 Rogers, EAP, 351. 2 Loc. cit. 3 Cohen, CH, III, 261.
report. The reports are then analyzed to determine the accuracy of the observations. The findings are then presented at a conference to share the results with other researchers in the field.

The conference provides an opportunity for researchers to discuss their findings and collaborate on future studies. The conference also includes workshops and seminars to share best practices and new methods in the field.

In summary, the process of observing and compiling data is crucial in the field of research. It requires careful planning, attention to detail, and collaboration with other researchers. The findings can then be used to advance the field and improve our understanding of the world around us.
Lewisohn allies Santayana with the great French writers of maxims. He attributes the obscurity of his style to the "defects of its hieratic and remote significance."¹ Lewisohn's tribute to Santayana is high: "Of American prose writers of his own generation or the next there is none who is comparable to Mr. Santayana, ... a suave, muffled, exquisite, but always alien voice."² He seems to blame the reader if he fails to understand Santayana; just as a commentator blamed the audience for not comprehending Emerson's occult sayings.³

Cohen compares Santayana's cultivation of calm detachment to Emerson. We recall Emerson's quiet withdrawal to his home in Concord.

A tribute to Santayana's comprehensiveness is given when Cohen suggests Santayana's Life of Reason as the most appropriate American work in philosophy to recommend to a European critic like Taine should he ask for "a distinct and comprehensive view of human life, its aims and diverse manifestations."⁴ Such comprehensiveness reminds us of the German encyclopedist Hegel.

N. The New Realism.

1. Its Origin.

Cohen treats the new realism very briefly. He states that it came about in opposition to certain types of pragmatism and to the older forms of idealism. This new system opposes

¹ Lewisohn, EA, 338-341. ³ Long, AL, 324.
² Loc. cit. ⁴ Cohen, CH, III, 258.
the Lockian theory that our ideas contain the objects of knowledge. It does not treat the mind as does Scottish realism, but rather as do Santayana, Dewey, and Aristotle, i.e., as a function of the organic body responding to environment. He includes as pioneers in this field: Woodbridge, Montague, Holt, and Perry.

2. Frederick J.E. Woodbridge, the Prophet of New Realism.

Cohen gives special consideration to Woodbridge's contribution. Woodbridge emphasizes metaphysics and a philosophy of nature rather than psychology or epistemology. His chief sources are Aristotle, Hobbes, and Spinoza. He opposes the Lockian tradition of the necessity of examining the mind before undertaking the study of nature. He points out that when the earth was a fiery mist, there was no consciousness, and that the epistemological argument presupposes a certain degree of knowledge. He claims that how we know is irrelevant to the consideration of specific issues of nature. He looks upon mind, not as the bare subject of knowledge, but as a natural manifestation of nature, the relation between things, viz., the relation of meaning. Consciousness, for Woodbridge, is the phenomenon of things coming into relation with each other through the organic body. Therefore, for him, logic becomes a study of the laws of being rather than of thinking.

Cohen considers that the new movement received strength through Woodbridge's personal influence, and through his
To be continued...
editorship of The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method. His own views are sketched but not elaborated. Riley refers to him as the prophet of the new movement. This opinion is in accord with Cohen's.

3. The Six American Neo-Realists.

The six American neo-realists Cohen treats together as the authors of The New Realism (1912). They are Walter Taylor Marvin, Ralph Barton Perry, Edward Gleason Spaulding, W.P. Montague, Edwin Holt, and Walter B. Pitkin. They appeal to the naïve consciousness of reality, but their doctrine is mechanical and complicated in its reliance upon modern physics, physiology, and experimental biology. The neo-realism has been called a new scholasticism. Cohen considers that the ethically neutral symbols of mathematics are a great aid in avoiding the tendency of philosophy to become a branch of apologetics.

O. Cohen's General Remarks on the Philosophy of the Period Covered in This Chapter.

1. The Dominant Interests.

Cohen believes that the philosophy of the period since about 1850 has been dominated by two interests: the theologic and the psychologic. The former has weakened; whereas the latter has been strengthened. He considers that until very recently the American economic, political, and legal thought had been dominated by eighteenth-century individualism or

1 Riley, AT, 341-342.
natural-law philosophy.

2. Influence in Education, Law, and History.

Cohen recognizes the influence of W. T. Harris and of Dewey in the field of education; and he expects that Roscoe Pound will exert an influence upon legal thought with his pragmatism and the use of Ward's theories. Nevertheless, Cohen believes that very few noteworthy achievements stand to the credit of American philosophy. He notes that a large part of American philosophic writing has been in the field of the history of philosophy.

3. European Forces.

Cohen considers that James and, to a lesser degree, Baldwin, Royce, and Dewey are European forces; and C.S. Peirce's contribution to logic is recognized in Germany, Italy, and Great Britain.
Conclusion

Thus we see in review the main trend of American philosophy, beginning late in history and not revealing until recent years any particular originality. It has followed chiefly in the Scottish-British tradition.

The colonial period was covered with the dark shadow of Calvinism for which Edwards's keen mind served to provide the last stronghold.

In the eighteenth century, Calvinistic logic was dissipated by the growing belief in human morality based on a certain freedom of the will, and in the benevolence of the Deity.

The early nineteenth century brought Emerson's individualism and the transcendentalist emphasis upon that which goes beyond, or is independent of, sense-experience.

The arid academic period was given a renewed spirit in the mid-century by the controversy concerning evolution, which Fiske popularized in this country. The Hegelian type of philosophy was best upheld here by Royce. But pragmatism, instigated by the fertile minds of Wright and Peirce, continued to gain strength. James used it as the way to his radical empiricism, and Dewey developed its instrumental emphasis. Dewey leads the philosophic thought of our country today.

Santayana, an alien voice, combines naturalism with an appreciation of other-worldliness. His poetic style and artistic emphasis are outstanding.
Conclusion

The use of computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) technology has become increasingly prevalent in the automotive industry. This approach allows for the creation of detailed, accurate models that can be used for various purposes, from product design to quality control. The integration of CAD/CAM systems into the manufacturing process has improved efficiency and reduced costs. However, the implementation of such technology requires a thorough understanding of the industry's specific needs and challenges. Further research and development are essential to ensure that these systems continue to meet the evolving demands of the automotive sector.
The new realism opposes the Lockian theory, appeals to the naive consciousness of reality, and uses a technique which involves mathematical symbols and modern physics and biology.

The tendency seems to be away from idealistic systems toward the empirical and the positivistic.

The account of this progress of American philosophic thought is given very concise and clear treatment by More, Riley, Goddard, and Cohen in the chapters contributed by them to the Cambridge History of American Literature. Cohen's treatment is particularly scholarly and critical.
Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758)

Jonathan Edwards, the great American exponent of Calvinistic philosophy, was essentially a mystic. His native mysticism found early expression in spontaneous rapture, but it was all too soon stifled by the conscientious attempt to uphold Calvinistic dogma through preaching and through treatises in deductive logic. His monumental logical work "The Freedom of the Will" concluded that there was no freedom of will, that even in God inclination and will were one function, and that man's inclinations, the strongest of which determined his will at any time, were given by God.

More criticizes Edwards's hatred of evil as disastrous to his respect for God. It may lead him to hate God for the cosmic evils.

Edwards's mystical strain was revealed late in his career when he became identified with the Whitefield Awakening through his insistence upon the emotional element in conversion. This emphasis led in part to the estrangement from his Northampton congregation.

The usual judgment of Edwards is that he possessed a mighty power for deductive reasoning, but that his conclusions were rendered invalid by his assumption of false premises; and that his warm mystical nature was chilled by the doctrines of Calvin. More holds this opinion.
Chapter II
Philosophers and Divines (1720-1789)

The general movements which undermined Calvinism were the intellectual revolt which took the form of deism, the emotional revolt which found expression in the Awakening, and the volitional emphasis which was upheld by the Arminians.

Charles Chauncy, noted for The Benevolence of the Deity, argued against the doctrine of determinism and supported the view of human morality. He considered that the capacities for happiness in human beings led to a happier view of the Creator than that entertained by the Calvinists.

Jonathan Mayhew in The Divine Goodness argued for the necessity of wisdom as well as goodness in the nature of God. He also heralded the founding of Unitarianism.

Samuel Johnson early displayed radical views in his reading of Bacon and in his affiliation with the Church of England. He opposed determinism and was attracted to Berkeley whose disciple he became. He interpreted metaphysical idealism in his Elementa Philosophica, which was received here with indifference.

John Woolman's Journal revealed mild, mystical Quakerism and a love for all mankind. His emphasis was not on controversy but on duty. His treatise "Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes" showed a broad sympathy and a socialistic emphasis.
Chapter II

(Continued from page 7975-17977)

The University's main emphasis was the training of young men and women in the various fields of study. The faculty was composed of dedicated scholars who were committed to the advancement of knowledge. The students were encouraged to engage in critical thinking and to develop a deep understanding of their chosen disciplines.

As the years went by, the University grew in size and reputation. New buildings were constructed, and the curriculum was expanded to meet the changing needs of society. The University continued to be a leader in higher education, producing graduates who were well-prepared for success in a variety of fields.

In recent years, the University has faced new challenges. The rise of technology has necessitated changes in the way that courses are taught and evaluated. The University has responded by investing in new technologies and by adapting its teaching methods to meet the needs of today's students.

The University remains committed to its original mission of providing a high-quality education to its students. With its rich history and strong traditions, it continues to be a beacon of academic excellence.
Chapter III

Transcendentalism

Transcendentalism was the New England manifestation of man's practical and imaginative faculties as opposed to skepticism. Emerson's *Nature*, *The American Scholar*, and *The Divinity School Address* constitute the chief philosophic contributions.

The term transcendentalism was derived from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, but was generalized and used loosely to indicate anything which goes beyond experience of sense or is independently given by intuition.

The chief metaphysical ideas held were the existence of the Over-Soul which includes all being, and the microcosm of each individual. The movement placed more emphasis upon the cultivation of an attitude of self-reliance, individualism, and optimism, than upon the establishment of a metaphysical system.

Oriental mystical elements were introduced. Emerson and Thoreau became students of oriental literature. Amos Alcott was the chief propagandist.

Transcendentalism was misunderstood because of excesses and confusion with contemporary movements. Goddard considers that its strength lay in the fact that it was rooted in Puritan character.
Chapter III

TRANSPORTATION

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Chapter IV

The Philosophy of Emerson (1803-1882)

Emerson's outstanding position is due not alone to personal genius but also to his representation of the "transient experiment" of New England transcendentalism. His fundamental theory is faith in the Over-Soul and in each individual's intuition; but he formulated no coherent system, nor did he often seek to defend his views by argumentation. He expressed his intuitions as he received them from time to time.

Emerson represented Puritan character influenced by oriental, Greek, and seventeenth-century English philosophy.

His ability for expressing great ideas in simple form is revealed in his quatrains.

More criticizes Emerson chiefly for his neglect of the problem of evil. Carlyle agrees. Lewisohn, however, rejoices in his lack of emphasis upon sin. Parrington, on the other hand, cites references to evil in Emerson's Journal. Riley and Firkins show how he triumphed over pain by his concentration on stronger interests. Emerson is commended by Riley for retaining a brilliant optimism through all his diverse sufferings.

More calls Emerson the outstanding figure in American letters. He writes, "Thwa world had never before seen anything quite of its kind, and may not see its like again."  

1 More, CH, I, 361.
Chapter V
Later Philosophy

The chief tradition in American philosophy has been English and Scottish; the German influence was not felt directly until 1876. Absorption in material conquest and the narrow orthodoxy of church and college combined to serve as obstacles to the acceptance of German speculation.

Cohen names Bowen, Mahan, Bledsoe, and Tappan as "acute" minds, and Shedd and Hickock as "powerful" minds, during the arid period of pedantry preceding the evolutionary controversy which followed Darwin, Lyell, and Spencer. The pioneers in modern American philosophy were John Fiske, Chauncey Wright, and William T. Harris.

Fiske interpreted Spencer's agnosticism and developed a teleological evolution. His Cosmic Philosophy, written in vigorous and popular style, was influential in spreading the evolutionary theory.

Chauncey Wright rejected the Spencerian philosophy as inadequate. He was cut off by an untimely death from developing Mill's logic. He considered metaphysics to be a religious problem, and he evaluated religion as an instrumental value in producing human happiness. Cohen places Wright high in his adherence to the truth. His influence was exerted upon Peirce, James, and Dewey.

William T. Harris was influential as the interpreter of Kant and Hegel to America through the St. Louis School. He
rejected Spencer. He is noted as the organizer of the Concord School of Philosophy, and as the editor from 1867-1893 of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, the first philosophical journal in the English language. Harris was not particularly original, but was important in the fields of education and journalism.

The academic institutions were very tardy in their recognition of German thought or of any ideas contrary to religious orthodoxy. At Harvard, Bowen's opposition to Hegelianism was followed by Palmer's acceptance of this system. At Princeton, McCosh defended Scottish realism as the proper American philosophy. He attempted to harmonize religion with evolution. Ormond, his successor, added Berkeleian and Kantian elements. At Yale, Noah Porter, though cognizant of German thought, upheld Scottish intuitive philosophy. George Trumbull Ladd, a professed eclectic, was a follower of Lotze. His metaphysics was based upon epistemology in Kantian fashion. Cohen considers that his thought was a branch of Christian apologetics. Cohen mentions Borden Parker Bowne as "one of the keenest of American metaphysicians."1

Charles S. Peirce's fertility of thought was outstanding. His development of symbolic logic is used by neo-realism. He formulated the general maxim of pragmatism which was used later by James. However, James departed from Peirce in his

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1 Cohen, CH, III, 240, footnote.
The conclusions derived from these analyses are very much in their infancy, and it is entirely too early to generalize from the data presented. However, it is clear that the information gathered is of considerable importance to the understanding of the problem at hand.

The analysis of the data seems to indicate that the factors most closely associated with the phenomena under study are those which can be measured objectively. It is hoped that further research will enable us to develop a more comprehensive understanding of these factors and their interrelations.
emphasis upon the individual rather than upon the general. Peirce's tychism was adopted by James.

Josiah Royce's first book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, contained his metaphysical idealism. He contended that if the world was knowable, there must be an Absolute Knower, and the world must be ultimately ideal. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, an unusually eloquent book, emphasized the volitional element, and accepted Berkeleian metaphysics. He recognized evil but considered that it was conquered by the Absolute. The World and the Individual reconciled the individual with the Absolute by an analogy of the relation of mathematical infinity to its finite parts. His subsequent work was mathematical-logical and ethical-religious. Royce exerted an influence historically upon two forces which have opposed idealism, viz., pragmatism, by his empirical method and by his ethical emphasis, and neo-realism, by his contribution to mathematics and logic.

William James's chief contribution was in the field of psychology. His Principles of Psychology emphasized the evolutionary, biologic function of thought, but upheld the belief in immortality. His pragmatism was only a method leading to his radical empiricism. Although aware of technique, James did not emphasize a system of thought. He was definitely empirical. His philosophy was a vision of life.

John Dewey is the only American about whom a school of philosophy has been centered. Dewey came to instrumentalism by the way of English Hegelianism. He emphasizes the
changing situation rather than the Absolute. He is a thoroughgoing naturalist. He eliminates the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality as outworn. He views the thinking process as a necessity for removing obstacles to physical adjustment. Dewey has no criterion for intrinsic value. Dewey's influence has been felt strongly in the field of education.

James Mark Baldwin's *Thoughts and Things*, a very obscure book, was elucidated further by his *Genetic Theory of Reality*, which developed pancealism with its emphasis upon the primacy of the esthetic consciousness.

George Santayana's view of philosophy is artistic and synoptic. He combines naturalism with an appreciation of other-worldliness. He distinguishes, in Greek fashion, between the brute existence and the "form" of things. He scorns the activity of striving without any worthy end in view, or any standards by which to measure progress. Santayana shows the influence of Latin civilization and Catholicism. Cohen attributes the lack of recognition of Santayana to his style of writing, the poetry of which is distrusted by academic philosophers, and the obscurity of which is not attractive to the ordinary reader.

The new realism arose in opposition to the Lockian theory that our ideas contain the objects of knowledge. Frederick J. E. Woodbridge was the prophet of the movement. He emphasized metaphysics and a philosophy of nature rather than epistemology. He exerted a great influence through *The Journal of*
It is a well-known and widely accepted theorem that the sum of the squares of the sides of a right triangle equals the square of the hypotenuse. This theorem, known as the Pythagorean theorem, is a fundamental result in Euclidean geometry. It has numerous applications in various fields, including physics and engineering.

The theorem can be expressed algebraically as:

$$a^2 + b^2 = c^2$$

where $a$ and $b$ are the lengths of the legs of the right triangle, and $c$ is the length of the hypotenuse.

The proof of the Pythagorean theorem is quite simple and can be demonstrated through various methods, such as geometric dissection or algebraic manipulation. One common proof involves constructing a square on each side of the right triangle and demonstrating that the area of the square on the hypotenuse equals the sum of the areas of the squares on the legs.
Bhilosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method.

The six American neo-realists, Marvin, Perry, Spaulding, Montague, Holt, and Pitkin, collaborated in publishing The New Realism. They appeal to the naive consciousness of reality, but their doctrine is technical in its reliance upon physics, physiology, and biology, and in its use of neutral mathematical symbols.

Cohen considers that since 1850, the theologic emphasis has lessened while the psychologic has been strengthened. He names James, Peirce, Royce, Baldwin, and Dewey as European forces.
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