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Evolution ethics

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Evolution Ethics

Chas. M. Helden

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Confucian Ethics

Confucian Ethics

Evolution (1881)

July 1892


The doctrine of evolution presents
 many fascinating features for our study.
 It's different simplicity, its broad
 generalization, and its ability to give
 us very attractive & proposed to
 explain the universe by a single
 formula. Its advocates have not
 to utter that magic word, and all
 mystery vanishes, were then none
 is accounted for, and the mind
 rests in the assurance that the
 reason of all things is explained.
 As formulated by its author, the
 expansion Herbert Spencer, "Evolution
 is a change from an indefinite,
 incoherent homogeneity to a definite,
 coherent heterogeneity through
 continuous differentiations and

integrated." Of this formula
Haldane Smith says: "The universe
may well have heaved a sigh of
relief when through the revelation
of an eminent thinker it had
been delivered of this account
of itself."¹ Grant the fact of the
persistence of force, and the evolu-
tionist's claim through the appli-
cation of this formula is account
for the universe as it is, with-
out the necessity of invoking the
agency of God. In a continuous develop-
ment it has advanced from primi-
val stages to its present state,
with its various and complex phe-
nomena. Religion, sociology, and
psychology, as well as literature, are
explained by the interplay of matter
and motion.

It was not to be expected that
any so comprehensive a scheme should

1. Data of Ethics - p. 13

2. Contemporary Science - vol. 1, p. 104



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should be omitted, and the sciences
 and others have devoted themselves
 to showing its application to moral
 phenomena. They forget to see
 that in fact they have gone
 but of the opposite of the science
 which would be brought out
 of the more subtle universe and
 been solved, if the whole system
 as a whole, the matter is found
 of it, the life in general, which the
 matter has at work at that point
 individual organisms, of the matter
 phenomena brought by all the
 level up to the highest. It is
 with the phenomena presented by
 the aggregate of these highest, it
 is not all in the name
 of evolution, but the matter is
 taken it that those phenomena
 of contact, in those highest conditions
 with which we are in contact.

the subject?"

We are glad to receive and
 see the volume of lectures of
 Mr. Spencer which were first
 to the world in a series of meetings.
 After so much that is merely
 reserve and destruction of the source
 of ethical obligation emanating
 from that source, it is refreshing
 to find at least an honest attempt
 at something constructive. So far
 as he succeeds in showing a rational
 and scientific reason for pure, up-
 right, and unselfish conduct we
 accord him our gratitude and
 reckon him our ally; nevertheless
 while we may endorse many of his
 practical conclusions we are obliged
 to question the soundness of the
 philosophical principles upon which
 they rest. The reason for this will
 appear from subsequent criticism.

On our view of the nature of
 evolution and ethical will not it
 of its supposed morality. In speaking
 of different names and slight
 changes in it, we are not aware
 of it as a distinct and separate kind
 to one form and another it has been
 with us since the days of Epicurus.
 It is a sort of fatalism, but we are
 little and doubt certain as to its
 nature to be it in the attempt to re-
 concile the conflict between determinism
 and intuitionism. The very fact
 of a sense experience, this is supposed
 to account for the existence of the
 moral judgment which thus be-
 comes a guide for the individual,
 while it is a postulate for the race.
 The essential characteristic however
 of the old doctrine that conduct is
 determined by feeling, and is not
 a habit, is that the sense of benefit

is adopted at the meeting, principle
of this new school. It has been
spent in teaching the millwright's
principle the right to conduct and
operations will make the process
and hence will not be needed.
The morality of pleasure has
made us the champion or other
advocate than Epicurus. The in-
tellect is entirely separated from
pleasure and the word pleasure
is the beginning and end of the
moral life. There is a certain
certain choice amongst pleasures
he affirms that the greatest
is to avoid pain. He writes that
there he would have been the
strongest public to read and
we find it possible to read the
the sect's also to remove the
of a future life and a divine
world.

of his doctrine was that the doctrine of
 justification had precedence in
 our eyes but followed in the natural
 order. The change which Luther
 brought upon it was the circumstance
 furnished the basis of another
 doctrine, which, with some
 modification and enlargement
 has been advocated by a great
 of theists, the Lutherans, and the
 Protestants.

The common characteristic
 of this school is that when it
 is said it is a matter of course, it
 is this in which it is to be sought.
 All agree that pleasure, either the
 intellectual or that of the
 greatest number, is the end to be
 sought. Whether in the
 sciences that self interest is the
 only motive principle, or
 a higher one. "I have examined
 my motives," says the philosopher

interest in the health & happiness of others
 over it own good." "The law of
 duty, according to Bentham, is not
 legalized selfishness. Men who
 enter on selfish acts are performing
 because of the selfish benefit they
 yield. Social virtue is the desire
 to which we are made subject of
 pleasure to obtain by serving others
 "the maximum of pleasure to him-
 self." The judge of conduct should
 be its results, and from them in-
 struct our codes. "Nature," says
 our author, "has placed man
 under government of two laws
 of pain, pleasure, pain, and pleasure.
 It is for them alone to point out
 what we ought to do, and it is
 to determine what we shall do."
 The one hand the standard of
 right and wrong and on the
 other the chain of cause and effect.

1. Bentham's evidence 1831

are fastened to them. The more we
 govern our will the more we do, in all
 we say, in all we do, in all we say,
 effort we make to throw off our
 subjection will serve but to make
 ourselves more conform to it. The
 principle of utility is recognized as a
 and assumed it for the foundation
 of that system the object of which
 is to save the fabric of society by
 the means of "reason and force."
 On his thoroughgoing application
 of this principle Bentham is about
 the idea of duty as something dif-
 ferent from self interest, and de-
 clares "that the only permissible
 use of the word 'ought' is that
 'it ought to be' must be taken
 the meaning of 'must'."
 Bentham to save his system from ab-
 solute selfishness by planning that
 our own greatest happiness can

1. Bentham by Bentham's system is a theory of utility
 p. 111

to find in administering to that
 of others; and as we shall show
 further on, it is impossible for
 such a doctrine to command the
 service in the presence of great and
 overwhelming temptations to gratify
 our own desires.

The sanction which the above
 scheme lacks, Mill thought he
 had found in his doctrine of the
 all-circumscription of ideas. He, however, holds
 as tenaciously as his predecessors
 that virtuous and pleasurable
 actions are identical. "The great moral
 axioms as the foundation of moral
 utility or the greatest happiness
 principle, holds that actions are
 right in proportion as they tend to
 promote happiness, wrong as they
 tend to promote the reverse of hap-
 piness. By happiness is intended
 pleasure and absence of pain."

in what sense from and the principle of pleasure." Pleasure is the only worthy end of action.

These quotations are sufficient to show the fundamental harmony between the utilitarian and the advocates of the wisdom theory of ethics. For as H. S. Spencer says, "The school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling, called by whatever name, gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure - somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an ever present element of the conception." Leslie Stephen says, "Pain and pleasure are according to me, determining causes of action. It may be even said that there are the sole and ultimate causes. They are sole causes in that sense, that every thing


1. Quoted by Haldane p. 225
2. Life of Ethics p. 20

course of conduct as a humanly possible and the choice of one or the other is upon the agent's own decision but will be strongly determined by the usual propriety or propriety of the choice at the moment of choosing and the two are different kinds of motives. They are ultimate in the sense that it is impossible to analyze them and pleasure into any simpler elements."

So far there is nothing to distinguish between the system and the other utilitarians. They all belong to the greatest happiness school. However Mr. Spencer makes a broad difference between himself and his predecessors, and claims to have made a distinct advance upon them in the use he makes of the experience of the race. He admitted

by inheritance to the present generation.

Leaving this peculiar case for subsequent treatment, it shall be our present task to consider how far the general doctrine of hedonism can be justified. One can not read the works of Herbert Spencer and his sympathizers without being impressed with the fact that with them the great end of living is life itself. Ethics is the science of self-preservation; conduct is right or wrong as it conserves or fails to conserve physical well-being, "according as its specific acts, ^{are} or are not adjusted to specific ends, to or do not further the general end of self-preservation." The pleasurable is identified with life-preserving conduct, and the painful with the opposite. "Every pleasure is



practical, there have completely
 been understood and the methods
 which relate these classes. They
 are not opposed to pleasure as such,
 but dwell upon as there may be not
 excessive in their self-discipline,
 their purpose is simply to overcome
 if they cannot eradicate vice by
 direct and abstinence which has
 to be done and to struggle there. The
 aim is the attainment of an exact
 perfection. Even admitting these are
 to be a view of life, the average
 insurance agent would scarcely
 hesitate longer in assuming a
 risk on the members of a religious
 community than upon the ground
 of sensual gratification. If self
 denial has shown its power in the
 self-indulgence has shown its loss
 of thousands.

Equally unfortunate is the

The use of the various means for the
 purpose of producing the same effects - for
 pecuniary reasons. As he has said all
 them before and they present a
 most incongruous compromise for
 a man of business. The
 "sawed lumber" - the feeble fac-
 tory hand - the unhealthy ser-
 vices - "flat chested school girls
 - peasants crippled with chemi-
 calism." There is but one characteris-
 tic common to all these, - a
 neglect of the laws of health and
 that from the standpoint of biolog-
 ical ethics, constitutes their immorality
 and involves them in the same
 condemnation. "It matters not
 to the argument whether the action
 is voluntary or involuntary. It matters not
 from the biological point of view
 whether the action is prompted by



we begin to see that, however
accepting apologies on the ground
that neglect of them was unavoid-
able, or that the person in the
neglect was "mobile," that is, a slave
out of physical law, is doubtless
correct, for that cannot be quarrel-
and disregard - which, but it is
not true that a principle of justice,
for we have our duties, and we
live in a world which is a
love. The noblest and the purest
who, in a noble cause, incurs suffer-
ing, and will blame the man who
through sin, ruins his health.

Moreover, Mr. Spencer seems
to overlook that it is by the promulga-
tion of his own theory that numbers
of his chosen disciples have involved
themselves in disaster. The learned
athlete, the overworked student,
and the broken down business man

Sacrificed health in the pursuit
 of the pleasure which they thought
 their course would bring. Has not
 it from their thought to act upon
 the principle that pleasure was
 harmful and pain beneficial, not
 as for the three poor souls, they
 doubtless seized with avidity upon
 every opportunity for pleasure
 brought within their reach, and
 enjoyed it to the fullest extent.
 From his own showing it is not
 always true that pleasure increases
 and pain decreases vitality, the
 exigencies of evolution to the con-
 trary notwithstanding. And even
 from the stand-point of self pres-
 ervation the pleasure theory of evolu-
 tion is seen to be in a degree and
 inconsistent.

It, however, is granted the
 soundness of the greatest happiness

theory of morality, we find we do
 find grave difficulties in applying
 it as a rule to human con-
 duct. It is our task to deter-
 mine what constitutes the greatest
 happiness of an individual or
 community. We look for a com-
 mon standard of measure. Pleas-
 urable sensations arise from so
 manifold causes and those pro-
 duced by the same causes differ so
 much in different people and in
 the same people at different times
 that it is impossible accurately to
 determine their quantitative value.
 How are we to balance the pleas-
 ure of a saint with that of a sch-
 anchee? How compare the gratifi-
 cation of hunger with that of
 pride, the joy of patriotism with
 the untroubled ease of bachelor-
 hood, exultation over an enemy



with the same object in view
 are prepared without the least
 respect to the amount of labor
 or time which is expended, and
 thus the operation is conducted
 with the least possible result in
 respect to the amount of labor
 being expended. It is not
 with the least possible result
 which determine the pleasure,
 and not vice versa, because it
 is not true of every action that
 the pleasure of it is attended
 with the pleasure of the result or
 pleasure of attending the work.
 Pleasure that attends the work
 is not and not the result of
 human action.

The pleasure of it is not
 for the least possible result
 the pleasure of it is not
 it is true that the pleasure of it is

This system of morality has been brought
 to do so, but there is a danger in
 pursuing it to the extent of
 making the law as a rule upon
 the individual for any of his
 own pleasure for the sake
 of venturing that of others. But
 it is better to make the law
 more so that his pleasure does
 not count for so much as the
 interests of that of his neighbor.
 The Bible says, "Shouldst thou
 say it? However, his neighbor
 is opposed to his sense, or sense, and
 pleasure, but even so he must have
 the former as a higher good. It is
 a law, and it will require great
 or however else there is a danger
 of falling to not be interested in
 the things of the world. They will
 argue that "I had in the law
 it is better to be the law."

I have no doubt as to the
 no other one must be at least
 The first one may be the
 hold to be the best of all
 to unity, the best, as it is
 as first for the individual
 own happiness, as that of
 some purposes has to be
 public interest when it
 with his own, and the attempt
 to show that the two are
 all can succeed as a test
 of psychological dependence.
 The individual must be
 believe that the other is
 in the moment of interest
 action to some limited good
 or something far less, suffering
 perhaps both, in a full
 possible for the moment
 these interests which are
 out of our selfish hearts

Labor day, yesterday, was a day
 of great interest to me. I
 found that many of the
 is a day of great interest to me.
 It was very fine and I think to that
 with, when at the end of the day
 the work of the day of yesterday
 passed. With such a day as
 a course involving sacrifice and
 suffering simply to bring the
 light of a better world.
 I hope until I should find it
 hard to see any other solution.

There can be no doubt
 now that we are in a
 more than present time, and
 for the good of all. We
 seek to realize the "best ideal"
 and give, hoping for nothing in
 return. And finally, "prophecy" is
 man cannot tell with his own
 power and he willing to give it

Just now I find in the most
 noble of our nation in the same
 line to have a very great. I find
 Stephen, in a very noble manner, I
 think I have said "There is a very
 man, a noble, at all respects
 sympathetic to the cause who we believe
 in our own cause, a noble sacrifice
 which has ever happened. In a
 sufficient advantage to those who
 must now be made to be
 exposed. I think to be a noble
 cause can be shown for the good
 of the world, and I think that
 our love efforts the most perfect
 example of devotion to the cause
 of our country, much stronger than
 most other benevolent feelings to
 think that the same principle is
 illustrated even in the same
 place acts of good nature of which
 almost every man is capable."

1. A noble and a noble

and in a quality of scientific
 direction, the progress of
 general science, the latter was
 concerned in every sense the
 science of utility, as in the
 words of the distinguished and
 noble statesman, during the past
 century of the human race, has
 been performing various useful
 kind which he continued to
 mission and communication have
 become part of certain faculties
 more various, certain constant
 corresponding to right and wrong con-
 duct which have no apparent
 use in the individual experience of
 utility."

But by nature of the
 with the development of science
 and the progress of the human
 science, former established and
 established. The objects of science
 and the objects of utility are

making of the question of the
 of all, but account of the side of
 and a number of people understand
 and do not see account of
 all but only an admission. On
 speaking of the necessity of a
 an an Inter of communication to
 an expression given by the
 he says, I think as the external
 grows becomes greater in number
 and more complicated in kind
 the society and capacity of the
 changes to which the communica-
 tion of communication is subject
 must increase these results in
 a broken series of these changes
 there must arise a consciousness.
 An order to meet the exigencies of
 there be that which follows the
 use of consciousness. When there
 has been only changes made in
 an order of communication.

fullness of our the unexplained
 someone it takes out all our
 days it is there it is not
 slightly more. How of course
 from one physical change
 another.


It is just here that we
 find our demand for a solution
 of the problem presented by the
 phenomena of consciousness. The
 physical changes which afford the
 occasion for its rise, they in
 some way do lead to such a
 possibility of accounting for the
 mental content of the phenomena
 has been recognized by the great
 minds of modern psychology. The
 concepts of our system of
 referring that the brain is the
 organ of mind - rather than to
 be said "the" - however the matter
 treated as mechanical source.

to be understood, and as related to an
 degree from the physical nature
 of the human molecules the
 least of the phenomena of conduct
 or thought we must acknowledge
 our helplessness. The association of
 both with the matter of the brain may
 be as certain as the association of
 light with the visible sun. However
 in the latter case we have not the
 mechanical connection between the sun
 and our eyes - in the former case
 logical determinations appear to
 have molecular mechanism in the
 background it interposed a filter
 over which the barrier of physical
 sensations is incapable to cross.
 We must accept the observed con-
 dition as an empirical fact with-
 out being able to bring it under the
 yoke of a priori induction. But
 though we recognize our inability



There are some who have said that
but some have applied to it
called 'subliminal justice' it is
simple human concepts of justice
and equity put into the mind of
animals. These do not seem to me
that they have any idea of this
justice. We are concerned with human
beings and limit the field of justice
to them. The advantage of justice
in the case of investigation would
perhaps be greater and more
strict if it were the same
sincerely which entered and then
open through some gate; but it is
not a whole but a very small part
for the transmission of many physical
and truth and for justice and
organization which states the
character of mental action it cannot
account for the origin of the truth
as we know it from the truth








conscience tells us what is right,
 and what is right, and what is
 wrong. But in the world we do not
 fight as we have it, and that
 sense of obligation is in the human
 mind at the Christian. Con-
 science is judge not, not judge
 but pronounces upon the
 best and not upon the worst. The
 human mind the best of us are
 father with the same motive
 that leads a Christian child to
 care most tenderly for a parent
 similarly dependent. The difference
 between them is not in the pres-
 sion or lack of conscience, but of
 knowledge and circumstances. If
 we could understand the motives
 of men, the moral judgment
 would be seen to be the same for
 all.

Write the principles of a man





15
ing, the "wicked French" were
green Bay tree & will still have
magnificent as the world, and
there "shall" no more be a sign
of the "wicked French" & the
American, and the "wicked French"
attended with great and
consequences. "I" will still be
though it has to be done, the
dia'olical "wicked French" with
endurance it is revealed as the
angelic.

If we want to have an in-
fallible standard of right and
wrong we must look not to an
author but to revelation. If it
has not spoken we are hopeless
to get out of it only as
those who are in a state of
will "seize" himself that we may
hope to know the true nature of life.
If others the objective "wicked French"

which conscience tells us must do
to make them a part of the
nation.

The approbation or disap-
proval of conscience is very differ-
ent from the satisfaction which
is experienced from success or
defeat. Its voice is independent of
all such considerations. It bids us
do the right whatever the conse-
quence, and condemns without
mercy any departure from the true-
est and sweetest rectitude. It counts
no suffering too great, no burden
too heavy, no pain too severe, as
the price of its approval. It is
a remedy to our transgressions.
Thus Seneca, "In quietest quiet-
ment of sin is having sinned."
Let us recognize that our actions
are surveyed by conscience, and
may enable the power to which it

cannot for it "does not consist
 and unconsistently." The latter
 and suffering which it does
 in the performance of duties can
 not be justified when we are
 advanced by biological ethics.
 materialism is true, then we are
 wretched who trample conscience
 under his feet and stifle its
 bests. Its imperative commands
 become reasonable only as we
 broaden our horizon, until it
 includes another life when the
 losses of this, incurred in regard
 to right, shall be compensated.
 When as moral must also be
 immortal.

When as moral is also
 free. Biological ethics denied
 this. It has no place for
 law action, what it rules on
 is only in securing, everything

necessity of it. "The law of nature,"
 says Mr. Spencer, "is not a law
 about to be set a-voins with the
 beneficent assistance of the great
 the evolution of direct assistance to
 have the organism and its en-
 vironment."

The fact of conscience has
 ever demanded what the exigency of
 that system denies. It is a law
 involves power to do. Right im-
 plies care. To affirm the right
 is to do it, unless with will and
 good-will. These may be the
 direct order of nature, but it is
 the direct force of nature, a
 machine - but not the man. The
 reason is that we have a power
 which has never sufficiently
 had the power of thinking, the
 power, which has never been
 in the law of nature of human


freedom.

The authorist attempts to confuse the issue by the use of words. He is rigidly logical in its application and affirms that there is an effect of some antecedent cause. If it thus belongs with an infinite regress. There are affirm as should be the distinction of causation. It affirms that the free agent is himself the cause of his own act and that the law of originating action. But this act to seek sustains its cause for its cause is bound to deny the doctrine of which it seeks to deny. Every word of his eye must be taken as said and itself uncaused. It is not in much doubt as may appear to introduction of an antecedent



must be cultivated. If we do not
philosophize it fails. While it is true
that desires are largely independ-
ent of the will, and that these
stimulate action, nothing is more
clearly established than that we
may act contrary to desire, and
that the volition is stronger and
the intensity of the desire the more
some is, greater. To follow desire is
to descend to the level of the
animal. To control, repress, and
choose between our desires is to rise
to the dignity of manhood.

The truth of the doctrine
of freedom may appear more
clearly if we notice its relation to
reason itself. We have brought
into the mind a confused mass
of material which must be
organized and systematized if
definite and valuable knowledge



it is possible. In order to do this the
 thinking subject must have the
 power to select against, and stand
 for the chaotic mass according
 to the law of reason. The possible
 process implies his freedom. But
 that he can source his conclusions
 but that he can reach a final
 conclusion only as he is master
 of his own mental activities.
 It is strange, though not an
 actual inconsistency, to remember
 that this free spirit is the
 a force of suspending judgment
 of an automatic state but that
 that but moves straight on, un-
 pelled by necessity. The position
 that as the mind is able to de-
 termine its own action by the law
 of reason, it is able, also to take
 into its action by the law of
 logic to deny and to deny the



other, and both render good and all are overwhelmed in common disaster.

There is, however, a school of determinists who speak of voluntary action, of merit and demerit as familiarly as some champions of freedom could wish. Leslie Stephen says, "Determinism is not only consistent with a belief in merit and moral responsibility but it is implicit at every step by the belief." And again, "Merit can belong only to voluntary actions." This sounds well, but on examination we find that the improvement is only apparent: with them, as with the necessitarians, conduct is coerced. The chief difference is that instead of external-compulsion ruling in a state of his will, it is himself



that the will itself is determined
 in its choice. "I assume," says
 the author already quoted,
 "freedom in the sense of freedom
 from external force. However
 I assume merit because exter-
 nal force accounts and must
 account for all that part of
 phenomena of which external
 force does not account." This
 internal determining force is char-
 acter. It is this which guides the
 will. The individual does not
 must always choose according
 to his character. His act is as
 much the necessary fruit of his
 character as the fruit is of a tree.
 A certain type of character must
 produce inevitable, its correspond-
 ing kind of conduct. There is
 some truth in that position. I will
 not say conduct is necessary



with his character, but the deeper
 question arises how shall his
 character itself be accounted for?
 These men affirm that it is
 formed by his circumstances oper-
 ating on the natural disposition.
 In the one case the result is a
 pure and upright, and in the
 other a cruel and licentious char-
 acter. If that be true then
 it and its merit disappear. The
 good man is no more to be
 praised for his goodness than
 the bad man for his badness.
 As the product of necessity, they
 both are alike destitute of
 all quality. The faculty of the
 whole school is in affirming
 that the will is determined in
 its choices. There is no such causal
 relation as they allege between
 the will and motives. The latter



is the course of nature must not
 its cause; the mind is not to be
 side the will, but the free spirit
 decides between motives. This is a
 fact attested by the universal
 conscience. We know we are free
 to do or not to do, yet we never
 elect. It is this which gives moral
 quality to our actions and
 constitutes them merit or demerit.


We are, however far from
 affirming that human freedom
 is unlimited. We have certain
 natural qualities, physical and
 mental; we are thrust into pe-
 culiar circumstances, receive certain
 intellectual and religious impres-
 sions, all of which enter into and
 affect our lives. Our only conten-
 tion is that there is nothing in
 these which prevents the exercise
 of a free choice. They affect the

own material upon which we
 design and which we build into
 our characters according to the uses
 we have for us. Thus our char-
 acters are our own responsibility,
 and if, as it doubtless true, our
 actions are in a sense determined
 by our characters, we know that
 we ourselves have created the de-
 termining principle. That which
 we spontaneously perform to be
 most once a matter of deliberate
 choice. It is only thus that the
 responsibility for character which
 Leslie Stephen affirms can be jus-
 tified. It is not the product of
 environment acting upon a passive
 and passive subject, but the work
 of a free spirit utilizing or fructi-
 fying opportunities and circumstances,
 thus perfecting itself on the basis
 of liberty, or sinking from the

... to be ...
... whatever our character is
... our own achievement.

We are here met with
an objection that "to will is not
not always include power to
do." "I will" is present but then
to perform that which is good.
"find not" is the language in
many lips; some content them-
selves with simple or tacit ap-
proval of the right without
putting forth earnest effort to
realize it. This plainly it means.
It resolves virtue into a simple
moral judgment and leaves the
will, the intellect, with occupa-
tion gone. Conscience never in-
sists on such a course; it de-
mands that we accomplish with
eagerness and does not con-
done failure. "It does not







The first thing I noticed when I stepped out
 of the car was the smell of fresh air. It was
 a relief after being stuck in traffic for
 hours. The sun was shining brightly, and
 the birds were singing. I took a deep
 breath and felt a sense of peace. The
 world seemed so much better when I was
 finally able to get out. I walked slowly,
 enjoying every moment. The breeze was
 just what I needed. I felt like I had
 reached a new world. The colors were
 so vibrant, and the sounds were so clear.
 I was in luck. The weather was perfect.
 I was in luck. The weather was perfect.

