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# Lotze's metaphysical monism defined and evaluated.

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GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

LOTZE'S METAPHYSICAL MONISM DEFINED AND EVALUATED

by

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(A.B., Gordon College, 1949)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. . . . . 1

1. The Purpose and Organization of the Thesis. . . . . 1

2. The Chief Sources of Investigation. . . . . 2

3. Lotze's Philosophical Method. . . . . 3

    i. Early Convictions and Efforts . . . . . 3

    ii. Science Versus Faith. . . . . 4

    iii. The Task of Philosophy. . . . . 6

4. Lotze's Method and the Modern Scientific Spirit . . 10

I. THE AXIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOTZE'S MONISM . . . . . 19

1. The Three Elemental Realms of Knowledge . . . . . 19

    i. Necessarily Valid Truths. . . . . 19

    ii. Immediately Given Facts of Reality. . . . . 20

    iii. Determinations of Worth . . . . . 20

2. The Nature and Function of Feeling in Value Judgment. . . . . 21

    i. The Feelings of Pleasure and Pain . . . . . 21

    ii. Feeling in Cognitive Activity . . . . . 23

    iii. Feeling as a Basis for Art and Morality . . . . . 25

3. The Good as Living Love Unifying the Three Elemental Realms. . . . . 26

4. Natural Evil and E. S. Brightman's Doctrine of "The Given". . . . . 32

II. THE MONISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF RECIPROCAL ACTION. . . . . 43

1. The Essence of a Thing. . . . . 43

2. The Connections Between Things. . . . . 47

    i. The Concept of Commensurability . . . . . 47

    ii. The Possibility of Reciprocal Action. . . . . 48

3. The Oneness of All Things . . . . . 51

    i. The Formal Nature of the Immanent M (World-Ground) . . . . . 51

    ii. The Immanent M (World-Ground) as Idea or Thought. . . . . 54

    iii. Space and Time in the Oneness of Things . . . . . 56

4. The Doctrine of Causality in Logical Positivism . . 58

5. The Naturalistic Ontology of Sellars, Hofstadter, and Winn. . . . . 62

- III. THE PERSONAL NATURE OF THE MONISTIC M (WORLD-GROUND) . . . 74
  - 1. The Metaphysical Deduction of the Personality of the Monistic M (World-Ground) . . . . . 74
  - 2. Lotze's Criticism of Impersonal Views of M (World-Ground). . . . . 76
    - i. Infinite Substance . . . . . 76
    - ii. Impersonal Spirit. . . . . 77
    - iii. World Order. . . . . 77
    - iv. The Problem of the Ego of God. . . . . 78
  - 3. God as Perfect Personality . . . . . 81
  - 4. H. N. Wieman's Idea of God as Creative Event . . . . 83
  - 5. C. Hartshorne's Social Panpsychic Principle of Personality . . . . . 90
- IV. THE STATUS OF THE FINITE SPIRIT IN LOTZE'S MONISM. . . 96
  - 1. The Substantiality of the Finite Spirit. . . . . 96
    - i. Lotze's Transition from Panpsychism to Objective Idealism . . . . . 96
    - ii. The Unique Characteristics of the Finite Spirit . . . . . 98
    - iii. Lotze's Criticism of Kant's Treatment of the Paralogisms. . . . . 101
  - 2. The Independence of the Finite Spirit. . . . . 103
    - i. The Soul as Being-for-self . . . . . 103
    - ii. The Origin of the Soul and Lotze's Doctrine of Creation. . . . . 106
  - 3. The Mind-Body Connection . . . . . 110
  - 4. The Adequacy of Lotze's Doctrine of Independence . 113
  - 5. The Possibility of Interaction on the Part of the Soul . . . . . 120
  - 6. Concluding Definition of Lotze's Monism. . . . . 128
- V. CONCLUSIONS. . . . . 133
- BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 136
- ABSTRACT . . . . . 144

# LOTZE'S METAPHYSICAL MONISM DEFINED AND EVALUATED

## INTRODUCTION

### 1. The Purpose and Organization of the Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to present an accurate account of Lotze's argument for metaphysical monism, and to evaluate it. The special interest of the paper is the metaphysical status of the finite spirit. This important topic is taken up in the final chapter, after the general principles of Lotze's monism have been established.<sup>1</sup>

The contents of the thesis are organized into three distinct developments of thought, preceded by an introduction to Lotze's philosophical method. The first development, consisting of Chapter I, is an examination of Lotze's primary axiological convictions, which are the underlying foundations of his system as a whole. The second, including Chapters II and III, deals with Lotze's argument for an all-embracing immanent and personal ontological Ground, in whose spiritual unity all finite beings exist and interact. The third development, comprehending Chapter IV, is a consideration of Lotze's reconciliation of the uniqueness and freedom of the finite spirit with his monistic ontology of interaction.

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1. We of course do not here simply presuppose Lotze to be a hard and fast monist. The significance of his monism is made evident in our interpretation (in Chapter IV) of his doctrine of the independence of the finite spirit. Our conclusion there is that Lotze is a monist only as regards interaction. In regard to the independence of the individual, Lotze seems to us to be quite clearly a personal pluralist.

## 2. The Chief Sources of Investigation

The chief sources used are the following:

1) Lotze's Microcosmus, first published in three volumes in 1856 when Lotze was thirty-nine years old, is his earliest comprehensive work. An English translation was made in 1885 by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones. Lotze's aim in this inspired masterpiece, according to his own expression, is to show how mechanism is absolutely universal in the world, and yet how completely subordinate to a realm of ends or purposes.<sup>1</sup> We find a very full account of his axiology throughout these writings.

2) Lotze's System of Philosophy was to consist of three works: Logic, Metaphysics, and Practical Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Religion.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, however, he died before he could complete the third work, so his readers were deprived of what was expected to be a systematic treatise on the axiology which is so evident in the Microcosmus. The two-volume English translation of the Metaphysik, edited in 1887 by Bernard Bosanquet, is a most important source for this thesis, especially as regards Lotze's ontology.

3) A number of dictated portions of the lectures of Lotze, translated into English and edited by G. T. Ladd, are valuable for an insight into Lotze's most mature views. However, since they were printed posthumously, and really were

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1. MIC, I, xv-xvi; MIC, II, 724, 728. (Footnote abbreviations are explained in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.)  
2. MET, I, vii.

not intended for publication, they do not exhibit the detailed and exhaustive character of the works which Lotze himself published.

Use has also been made of a lucid article, entitled "Philosophy in the Last Forty Years," written by Lotze in English and published in The Contemporary Review in 1880, one year before he passed away.

### 3. Lotze's Philosophical Method

i. Early Convictions and Efforts. When Lotze began his studies, it was generally held that the ultimate philosophy should be able to explain all particulars from one general principle, and that Hegel had most adequately fulfilled the requirements. Lotze's first early conviction, then, was that there was a definite unity in the world, but he writes:

It seemed to me that only a Spirit who stood in the center of the universe which he himself had made, could, with the knowledge of the final aim which he had given to his creation, make all the particular parts of it pass before him in the majestic succession of an unbroken development.<sup>1</sup>

He thus accepted the unity of things, but only with a great reserve concerning the ability of thought to comprehend all of reality in its innermost connections.

His second early conviction was that "intellectual life is more than thought."<sup>2</sup> He believed that much goes on in our thinking which can be contemplated only from without, and

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1. Art.(1880), 135.

2. Art.(1880), 136.

whose contents cannot be represented exhaustively. We find the world "more wide and rich than thought which tries to follow its marvellous structure. . ."<sup>1</sup> This conviction turned Lotze completely away from the Hegelian dialectic, with whose purpose he was at first much in sympathy.

Lotze's first philosophical efforts were directed toward showing the untenability of the "vital force" theory of Schelling as an explanation of life. As a competent physiologist, he contended for the acceptance of a thoroughly mechanistic view of organic life and even of the mind-body interaction.<sup>2</sup> Because of these efforts, Lotze was considered a materialist by many thinkers; but he strenuously denied this, and in his Microcosmus made his stand unambiguously plain.

ii. Science Versus Faith. When Lotze published the Microcosmus (1856 -- ), science was rapidly clearing away old boundaries of thought, and was showing that increasingly many different kinds of phenomena were subject to unquestionable natural laws. Indeed, the advantages of the inventions of science in practical life could only be gratefully accepted and enjoyed. However, in its rush for what it called "truth for truth's sake," science was denying the obligation to return to the religious questionings of the human heart. Apparently, as Lotze suggested, scientists feared that their precise notions would be disturbed and rendered indefinite by the admission of

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1. MIC, II, 712.  
2. Moore, ELM, 5.

the incalculable elements of religion.

On the other hand, some thinkers were obstinately clinging to an immediate religious belief, verified only by its consonance with intense personal desires. Science was being completely set aside as an incoherent abstract maze, detached from the all-important religious concerns of life.

Into this situation, Lotze thrust the Microcosmus in an attempt to vindicate the reality of the spiritual needs of men and to reconcile the seeming contradiction between faith and science.<sup>1</sup> He aimed to show that science rested on assumptions which were by no means incontestable. Its fundamental elements of forces and laws were not the ultimate threads of reality, for upon the exercise of keen insight they led back to the supersensuous region of the hopes and wishes of the heart. Lotze pointed out that the anticipations of faith always preceded scientific systematization. Furthermore, what value could there possibly be in an indifferent and repetitious reflection in cognition of the world as it existed? Lotze held that there could be no significance to such a "barren rehearsal," if there came no human good, nothing by which it might be more plain "what we have to reverence as the true significance of existence, what we have to do, and what to hope."<sup>2</sup> Science needed to justify itself by affording increasing satisfaction to spiritual needs, which could no longer be contemptuously

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1. Moore, ELM, 6-7.

2. MIC, I, ix; Art.(1880), 153.

ignored.

However, Lotze maintained that neither must stubborn faith oppose the recognition of a scientific view of the world, on the fear that freedom and poetry would vanish. On the contrary, the enlarged prospects which science opened up revealed boundless realms of poetry. And even religious conviction was benefitted. Lotze writes:

These enlargements of knowledge. . . have driven us to seek for and to find with greater intellectual effort. . . that which we can no longer regard as near and directly intuitable.<sup>1</sup>

iii. The Task of Philosophy. For Lotze, the greater work of philosophy lay in a "regressive investigation," by which it might be discerned what principle could be recognized and used as "the living principle in the construction and course of the world."<sup>2</sup>

Philosophy is the endeavor of the human mind, after this wonderful world has come into existence and we in it, to work its way back in thought and bring the facts of outer and of inner experience into connection, as far as our present position in the world allows.<sup>3</sup>

However, Lotze writes that he never cherished the assurance that speculation possessed "secret means" of going back to the beginning of reality and uncovering its genesis and necessity.<sup>4</sup> He considered it a fruitless attempt to try to reach new and unique principles of certainty. Descartes, for example, had gone back to the Cogito and the criterion of clearness and

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1. MIC, I, xiv.  
2. Art.(1880), 135.  
3. MIC, II, 718.

4. MIC, II, 718.

distinctness; but these principles were of little use in judging the truth or falsity of various particular thoughts. According to Lotze, the fundamental principles of knowledge, contrary to Kant, do not belong to the mind a priori apart from experience. Rather they are innate only in the sense that "there is a tendency constraining it (i.e. the mind) at the suggestion of experience to develop these modes of conception."<sup>1</sup> He says further:

The nature of the mind is so constituted that when impressions of experience stir it, it is then unconsciously impelled to a reactive operation, which consists partly in a definite combination in thought of the manifold given in perception, partly in intuitive acts, whose inciting causes are still hidden from itself.<sup>2</sup>

The only guarantee that we can have that the nature of the mind permits a true representation of that to which it reacts is, Lotze thinks, a living faith that the unity of the world has somehow determined thought and being for one another.<sup>3</sup> In his answer to subjectivism, Lotze gives us in the following passage an important insight into his methodology:

In putting trust in one component of ostensible knowledge while we take another to be erroneous we can be justified only by a consideration of the import of the two components. We have to reject and alter all the notions, which we began by forming but which cannot be maintained without contradiction when our thoughts are systematized, while they can without contradiction be replaced with others. As regards the ultimate principles, however, which we follow in this criticism of our thoughts, it is quite true that we are left with nothing but the confidence of Reason in itself, or the certainty of belief in the general truth that there is

1. MIC, I, 227.  
2. Art.(1880), 139.

3. Art.(1880), 140-141.

a meaning in the world, and that the nature of that reality which includes us in itself, has given our spirit only such necessities of thought as harmonize with it.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze refuses to grant that a knowledge of the psychological processes whereby ideas form themselves has the slightest relevance to philosophical methodology. For him, it matters little where ideas come from; the important thing is to be able to criticize them once they arise and thus to progress toward "the complete harmony of our reason with itself and with the given facts, the only goal which is at all attainable by us."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, of prime importance are our philosophical criteria of truth, which indeed must first be established before any psychological hypotheses can be evaluated. This means that psychology should be considered one of the last products, but certainly not a starting-point, of metaphysical investigation.<sup>3</sup>

We see that for Lotze any a priori attempt to formulate a theory of knowledge is a fruitless venture. As he well puts it, "the continual sharpening of the knife is tiresome, if we have after all nothing to cut with it."<sup>4</sup> But how then can a beginning of systematic inquiry be made? What criteria shall be used? Lotze's interesting answer is as follows:

Any part of experience may serve for such a starting-point when it finds itself, in the shape in which it immediately presents itself, standing in contradiction to those innate truths which we desire to see controlling all reality, and which, even in the moment in which the observed fact conflicts with them, force themselves upon our consciousness

1. MET, I, 220-221.  
2. Art.(1880), 148.

3. MET, I, 18.  
4. Art.(1880), 155; MET, I, 16.

as indispensable postulates. This is the way in which, setting out from experience, every philosophy has in actual fact arisen.<sup>1</sup>

In this most important passage, Lotze shows clearly how the "innate truths," the religious and aesthetic tendencies of the heart are welded into his all-inclusive empirical basis.

Further progress in inquiry must, according to him, be conditioned by the peculiar nature of the thing under consideration, and the method must at every moment adapt itself to the particular thing.<sup>2</sup> The most important duty is

to pursue every fundamental thought one tries into all its possible consequences, in order to ascertain how far its validity suffers no contradiction from reality, and at what point its fruitfulness ceases.<sup>3</sup>

Lotze cautions against any rigid allegiance to a single universal speculative method. He believes that it can only lead to a violence to concrete things. Fictitious links will have to be made, forcefully to bring "the deeply-felt, but ill-understood defects of the world" into harmony with what is presupposed. Everything which does not accommodate itself to the method must be ignored. He sees in this tendency a desire to withdraw from the disconcerting features of reality and its imperfections, and, by the construction of a "logical calculus," to place oneself beyond the need of troubling to exercise personal acuteness.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Art.(1880), 150. See also  
LOG, I, 301 and MET, II,  
164-165.

2. Art.(1880), 152.

3. Art.(1880), 153.

4. Art.(1880), 150-152.

For Lotze, the world does not hang together in neat readily deducible patterns, but instead is as an infinitely complex texture so woven that all truths are at the same time in "every bit and fold of it." Any strand may be made the subject of inquiry, but at every instant the others with which it is indissolubly united must also be taken into account.<sup>1</sup> For human beings, who are completely isolated from a knowledge of the greater part of the world texture, inquiry must always be fragmentary. Therefore, philosophy can only be "modest and terrestrial" and not "vast and cosmic" in scope. Its task, according to Lotze, is only to provide a coherent basis for humble satisfaction in an optimistic faith.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4. Lotze's Method

##### and the Modern Scientific Spirit

Lotze's method is indeed terrestrial compared to Hegel's dialectical process of knowledge, which is a necessary movement of thought whereby the soul traverses the ascending series of its own forms of consciousness, "like stages appointed for it by its own nature," and arrives at that explicit unity or concrete immediacy of self-knowledge which constitutes absolute knowledge.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, his method is grounded on the same primary ideal which Hegel espoused,<sup>4</sup> and which in fact has in one form or another always been evident in the history of philosophy, namely, the cosmic primacy of rational mind. Today

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1. Art. (1880), 153.

2. MIC, II, 718.

3. Hegel, PM, 135, 805.

4. Knudson, POP, 378.

as never before, that confidence in this ideal which Lotze so admirably exemplified, is being denied by a very formidable sect of thinkers, whose distinguishing characteristic is their militant adherence to modern experimental method. Let us briefly examine the nature of this opposition.

Hans Reichenbach eloquently laments the predicament of philosophy.<sup>1</sup> He says that the scientist knows what it means to stand on the common ground of a universally accepted body of knowledge and to teach with "the proud feeling of introducing his students into a realm of well-established truth." In sad contrast, the philosopher must always qualify his teachings with the clause "according to the view of philosopher X. . .," and even that cannot be made with universal consent because of the vexing problem of interpretation. What have the scientific thinkers done to remedy this apparently unbearable situation? They have decided that it is the task of true philosophy solely to clarify the concepts of science by logical analysis and to make metaphysical generalizations only within the range of experimental method. In effect, they have sought universal respect for philosophy by subordinating it to science.<sup>2</sup>

Some of the philosophical reformers have reduced the necessary processes of thought to the physical movements of cortical cells. Thus, for example, R. B. Winn, an eminent naturalist, argues that "idealism is quite wrong in ascribing to

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1. Reichenbach, Art.(1948), 331.

2. Russell, Art.(1947), 228.

reality the qualities of thought, as if reason created nature and not the other way around. . ."<sup>1</sup> Others, like J. Dewey, the instrumentalist, regard thought as "biological adaptive behavior," whose ultimate significance lies in its "prospective control of the conditions of its environment."<sup>2</sup> T. Lafferty gives a clear statement of this idea of reason:

We state the world in such a fashion that our statement will indicate consequences that will be there in experience. The statement is hypothetical in that it is yet to be tested. . . and the distant object makes explicit the hypothetical realities in so far as it answers to the responses of the organism. It is to be noted that what answers to the hypotheses that guide us truly is not a "rational order" that mirrors the dialectic of our thinking; whatever "answers" are observable existences in nature that are denoted by the conclusions of the hypotheses.<sup>3</sup>

Another reduction of thought is made in anthropology and psychology. Thought is held to be a product of subterranean roots, of irrational biological impulses or emotional attractions and repulsions.<sup>4</sup> Belief (e.g. theistic) is seen as the result of a persistent infantile paternal need, or the result of yearning on the part of the philosopher for his own "best of all possible worlds." In our age of ear-catching slogans, such psychological terminology has great popular appeal. This is W. E. Hocking's appraisal of this tendency:

Man sees darkness as the reality of his light. Explanation is precisely inverted; the rational is understood only when it is seen as a manifestation of the irrational.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Winn, Art.(1939), 293.  
2. Dewey, Art.(1947), 467.  
3. Lafferty, Art.(1932), 207.

4. Blanshard, Art.(1945), 358.  
5. Hocking, Art.(1950), 11.

The logical positivists completely separate the necessities of thought from factual existence. For them, there are only two kinds of meaningful propositions: 1) purely logical and 2) factual (i.e. pertaining to sense data). The former are truly necessary, but refer to nothing existent. The latter are not necessary. According to A. J. Ayer, "necessary propositions simply record our determination to use words in a certain fashion."<sup>1</sup> And H. Feigl says that a sentence is factually meaningless if it contains "extra-logical terms for which no experiential or operational definition can be provided."<sup>2</sup> Thus the sound metaphysics will be wholly inductive, using the established facts of science; but even so, thinks Feigl, its generalizations will lack adequacy and precision, and it will be only "the risky, sanguine, disreputable extreme of science."<sup>3</sup> Regarding the justification of induction, the logical empiricist holds that "the procedure of induction. . . far from being irrational, defines the very essence of rationality."<sup>4</sup> E. Nagel gives very plainly the rationale for separating logic and fact:

For my own part, it is only on the assumption that the statements of logic express and help organize relations between our meanings, and do not formulate some ultimate structure of all being, that I can make intellectual ends meet. For I do not know how else to reconcile the necessary and a priori character of logical principles with the requirements of a consistent experimentalism concerning all existential matters.<sup>5</sup>

How shall we evaluate Lotze's method in view of this

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1. Ayer, LTL, 114.

2. Feigl, Art.(1947), 384.

3. Feigl, Art.(1947), 384-385.

4. Feigl, Art.(1947), 390.

5. Nagel, Art.(1949), 31-32.

upheaval, which at most assigns idealistic metaphysics to a realm of creative or imaginative art, where knowledge is not integrated, but only illuminated poetically by a kind of romantic fancy. H. W. Schneider lightly terms such "illumination" of solid scientific knowledge "metaphysical vision."<sup>1</sup> And according to A. Portmann, this "philosophical imagination" has its roots in "l'inconscient collectif," a complex group of hereditary nervous structures. Where science marks the end of useful knowledge, there imagination takes up its primordial role and speaks "à sa façon dans l'ancien langage des images qui est le sien."<sup>2</sup> Must we then agree with Reichenbach that scientific method alone is the path of a "sober study of truth," and is "the inescapable consequence of an unprejudiced study of the history of philosophy: . . . the only successful path open to the philosophy of the twentieth century?"<sup>3</sup> If so, Lotze's method certainly must be discarded. We are, however, persuaded by a number of serious reasons that such a consequence is far from necessary or advisable.

Firstly, when the skeptical views of anthropology are generalized, they hardly make sense, but rather seem to reduce to nihilism.<sup>4</sup> If thought is constrained solely by cortical changes or by irrational impulses, then all theories, including these themselves, are useless and thought can prove nothing objectively. Actually, however, these supposed influences or

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1. Schneider, Art.(1949), 409.

2. Portmann, Art.(1950), 202.

3. Reichenbach, Art.(1948), 346.

4. Hocking, Art.(1950), 7.

constraints upon thought, as well as other 'facts' about consciousness which seem so wholly acceptable to the scientific reformers, are more correctly matters of biased conjecture than of established experimental science.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding logical positivism, E. W. Hall and B. Blanshard have convincingly contended that logic truly implies ontology.<sup>2</sup> Are there no ontological implications in the fact that existence is such that some propositions entail others? If logics are entirely conventional, then why are there none in which the law of contradiction is replaced by an arbitrary alternate? Blanshard thinks that "in the end all necessary propositions must be taken to assert of existence, and no factual propositions are altogether contingent."<sup>3</sup> And Dr. E. S. Brightman reminds us of the important but often overlooked truth that "there could be no logic without a mind to think it."<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, in restricting meaningful fact to the sense data of experiment, the scientific thinkers make illegitimate appeal to an axiological criterion. Why is it not better to accept all the experience of our whole conscious life as meaningful fact? Experimental method is, to use an expression of James, too well-buttoned and clean-shaven to speak for a struggling universe of life, death, ideals, and values. It requires us to dismiss the

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1. For example, C. C. Pratt, an eminent psychologist, grants that modern psychology has uncovered little regarding man's higher intellectual activities. Pratt, LMP, 166-167.
  2. Hall, Art.(1949), 25.
  3. Blanshard, Art.(1945), 368.
  4. Brightman, NV, 45.

primary problems and convictions of the whole person for the sake of complete faith in an abstract thread of knowledge that as yet barely encompasses a pebble or two in the vast sands of existence and fact. The abstract character of experimental method is evident in its presuppositions (as enumerated by Dr. Brightman): a unified self, observed data in consciousness, the validity of purpose and reason, memory that permits recognition of past experience, an objective world, a temporal process, and a society of persons.<sup>1</sup>

The adherents of scientific method are not properly justified on their premises to classify statements of religious and axiological data as "emotive" and hence factually meaningless. Analysis can never grasp values, and experiment can never reveal a religious order of things; and by the same token, both are equally incapable of judging the non-existence of values and religion.<sup>2</sup> That is, to isolate oneself in scientific method is to preclude all judgment, pro or con, regarding anything other than sense experience. Therefore, when the experimentalist reformers claim that scientific method is best for philosophy they are palpably inconsistent. However, the scientist cannot help but presuppose some objective values; for every experiment is conducted on the assumption that it has real value as a contribution to knowledge or at least to the personal enjoyment of the experimenter. And in practical life the scientist

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1. Brightman, Art.(1938), 136-143.

2. Brightman, Art.(1920), 371-373.

as much as everyone else acts on the concrete reality of social and economic values. Yet these important valuations cannot be supported by scientific methodology.

Therefore, no arbitrary limitation of reason can justify itself as the method of philosophy. An adequate method must rather allow all of conscious experience to be considered meaningful fact; it must lead to what S. C. Pepper calls "a large amount of corroboration in the handling of the totality of evidence."<sup>1</sup> Experience may truly be explained only if science, as well as other limited fields, are included in a synopsis, in which an attempt is made to judge of things as a whole. We must, as A. N. Whitehead urges, explore experience with synoptic hypotheses:

The true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme. . . The importance of philosophy lies in its sustained effort to make such schemes explicit, and thereby capable of criticism and improvement.<sup>2</sup>

What is needed is Lotze's confidence in reason, and a will to understand life as a whole. This faith may not indeed lead us quickly into the promised land, but it at least leaves open the possibility that there is such a land with an accessible path leading to it, and makes thinking a momentous adventure. To deny this confidence may seem like sober scientific modesty, but, as Lotze perceived, it is really more a kind of despair, in

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1. Pepper, Art.(1943), 262.

2. Whitehead, PR, x. See also Brightman, ITP, 22-29 for a discussion of synoptic method.

which we may, at any point in our thinking when difficulties become too unbearable, shut ourselves off from the concrete world. Much thinking today reflects such despair. The modern scientific spirit manifests an abundance of penetrating and often uncharitable expressions of aversions, but a lack of positive contributions to a philosophical understanding of life. Lotze long ago recognized this danger and urged a struggle against any doctrine which would impoverish faith without enriching knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

We conclude then that Lotze's method exemplifies the true philosophical spirit, and that, far from being invalidated by the truly marvellous advances of modern science, it is more than ever needed for a balanced interpretation of life as a whole.

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1. MIC, II, 718.

## CHAPTER I

### THE AXIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOTZE'S MONISM

Lotze's metaphysical monism springs from two main strands of thought: the axiological and the ontological. However, these strands are not at all indifferent to each other. Lotze's argument rather consists in a remarkable interweaving, in which the two strands either explicitly or implicitly supplement and strengthen one another at each point. In this chapter, we shall consider the axiological aspect of this interweaving. Lotze's theme is that values (and hence also personality) are of fundamental cosmic significance, and that this implies a monistic personal Supreme Good.

#### 1. The Three Elemental Realms of Knowledge

It seems, for Lotze, that the source of the difficulties and doubts involved in any view of the world lies in the reciprocal relations of three forms of knowledge, not logically deducible one from another, yet upon which all judgments of reality must be based. These three "elemental realms" are the necessarily valid truths of thought, immediately given facts of reality, and determinations of worth.<sup>1</sup>

i. Necessarily Valid Truths. In this class are included such universal truths as the logical laws of identity and

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1. MIC, I, 417-418; MIC, II, 575; AES, 9-11.

contradiction, and mathematical intuitions of number, succession, etc. These necessities of thought lead us to postulate one universally valid order in nature, according to which certain definite results necessarily flow from certain conditions.<sup>1</sup> Only on this basis is science possible. Even ideas of divine reality can satisfy us only if they are in harmony with the binding force of these laws.<sup>2</sup> But universal truths have binding force only in application to an already existing reality. They tell us what must follow from certain conditions, but no actual occurrence of conditions can be deduced from them.<sup>3</sup>

ii. Immediately Given Facts of Reality. While the laws of thought present themselves as necessary but without content, the given contents of perception conversely convey no evident necessity. The actual features of reality to which we are accustomed could just as well exist in different forms or not at all.<sup>4</sup> We can see no rational necessity for the realization of a particular color. The content of sensations, holds Lotze, "is, and is as it is, by immediate revelation which we can but receive."<sup>5</sup>

iii. Determinations of Worth. Finally, not only do we observe reality as active according to the eternal but indifferent truths of thought, but reality also elicits from us judgments of worth. We cannot regard carefully even the most commonplace phenomena without perceiving in them something of a

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1. MIC, II, 600.  
 2. MIC, II, 689.  
 3. MIC, II, 661.  
 4. MIC, II, 575.

5. MIC, II, 662. Dr. Brightman calls such ultimate contents "brute fact." See Brightman, POR, 168, 320.

favoring or a disturbing influence upon our souls.<sup>1</sup> We see reality working toward ends, toward the fulfillment of which various parts are brought together according to universal laws.<sup>2</sup> Such worth determinations are possible only on the basis of an original peculiarity of the mind, by which we become aware of the values in changing reality in terms of feelings of pleasure and pain.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. The Nature and Function of Feeling in Value Judgment

i. The Feelings of Pleasure and Pain. The states of pleasure and pain should, according to Lotze, be sharply distinguished from bare sensations, which are "indifferent perceptions of a certain content."<sup>4</sup> The mere relations of simultaneous impressions or ideas do not of themselves produce feelings. Rather, it is when such relations act as stimuli upon the soul as a whole that the soul reacts according to its original and unique capacity for producing feelings. Lotze says that it is

a probable hypothesis that feelings are the results and tokens of the agreement or disagreement between the excitations produced in us, and the conditions of our permanent well-being.<sup>5</sup>

The power of ideas and sensations within us is due not so much to the indifferent magnitude with which their content is made known, but to their total effect of excitation or agitation on the whole soul. Thus Lotze writes:

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1. MIC, I, 241; PSY, 73.  
2. AES, 10.  
3. MIC, I, 240.

4. PSY, 73.  
5. PSY, 74.

The strength of the sensation is of far less moment than that which, in the connection of our memories, intentions, and expectations, it means, indicates, or foretells.<sup>1</sup>

Now what are the forms of these results of agitation on the soul? Lotze classifies them into the two general designations of pleasure and pain. Pleasure is the feeling that arises upon the occasion of "an exercise of possible functions within the limits in which this exercise answers to the conditions of the well-being and continuance of the whole."<sup>2</sup> In other words, in feeling pleasure the soul reacts to stimulations which harmonize with its direction, condition, or form of "vital evolution," and which promote its conscious striving. It becomes conscious of the exercise of its resulting functions as of an "enhanced value in its existence."<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, pain is the feeling which results when a stimulus sets up changes or excitations which oppose the conditions of well-being. The soul then usually reacts in an effort to overcome the attendant strife and disturbance.<sup>4</sup>

Lotze assumes that there is in some degree a constant "economy of vital functions" or general conditions of well-being, so that the same stimulus applied repeatedly would give rise to the same feeling. However, in addition to this constant factor, there are present much more important variable factors which condition the intensity of a feeling. Of great importance are the number and kind of connections which the feeling has at

1. MET, II, 225.

2. MET, II, 225; PSY, 74.

3. MIC, I, 240.

4. MIC, I, 178-179, 240.

the time with other feelings. And most important is the total state of feeling at the instant when a particular feeling occurs. Lotze writes that the feeling has more or less value "according to the closeness or distance of its relationship to that which is moving our feeling at the moment."<sup>1</sup>

But Lotze cautions that these theoretical postulates are not to be taken as descriptions of mechanism of feeling. It is not true that the soul first perceives its excitations, then relates them to its conditions of well-being, and finally decides whether to produce a feeling of pleasure or of pain.<sup>2</sup> Rather, the feelings arise immediately from within "without revealing the internal motion of the soul whence they spring."<sup>3</sup> Feelings are exactly like colors or sensations, which, though they are certainly occasioned by complex bodily processes, in their immediate appearance tell us nothing whatever concerning those processes.<sup>4</sup>

ii. Feeling in Cognitive Activity. Besides the activities of the soul in ideating on the basis of perceptions, and in relating according to the necessary truths of the understanding, Lotze distinguishes a higher cognitive activity--that of reason appreciative of worth.<sup>5</sup> Whereas the faculty that Lotze calls "understanding" relates elements of reality indifferently and without any regard for any totality or unity, "reason" is

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1. MET, II, 226.  
2. PSY, 74.  
3. MIC, I, 241.

4. PSY, 75.  
5. MIC, I, 236, 244.

guided by the idea "that the sum of reality can exist only as a perfect unity and totality."<sup>1</sup>

As the style of architecture which we select for a building determines the way in which every part of it is to be combined with every other, but leaves wholly undefined the final form of the structure, the plan of which, on the contrary, is prescribed by the end it has to serve, so the principles of understanding exhibit to us the style of the world's construction, but not the form of the outlines of its completed whole.<sup>2</sup>

Lotze holds that reason requires the plan or end of the form of the world to be that which is a "guarantee of the value of the actual," that in which the ultimate well-being of the individual is secured.<sup>3</sup> And he thinks that

in its feeling for the value of things and their relations, our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as, in the principles of logical investigation, it has an indispensable instrument of experience.<sup>4</sup>

During all the efforts of the systematic scientific understanding (which in our day denounces Lotze's idea of reason and calls it "emotive"), Lotze declares that reason holds fast to an "unquenchable trust" in the future.<sup>5</sup>

But since the only basis for the affirmation by reason of a certain form of the world is the feeling of the value which it finds in this form, great caution is needed, for there are numberless circumstances by which reason may be deceived, through undisciplined habits of thinking, individual peculiarities, and limitations of experience. Thus, while Lotze maintains that worth-determining reason is always the "animating

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1. MIC, I, 237.  
2. MIC, I, 238.  
3. MIC, I, 244.

4. MIC, I, 245.  
5. MIC, I, 245.

and quickening breath of all human efforts," he admits that a common norm is difficult to determine. He concludes that we had better be content with demonstrating that the principles of scientific understanding are the "explicable parts" of the intellectual treasures of reason. The methods of understanding are not extraneous to reason, but proceed from it as the only methods that we mortals have of realizing, however imperfectly, the requirement of reason, namely, a harmonious world view.<sup>1</sup>

iii. Feeling as a Basis for Art and Morality. The pervading presence of feelings of the favoring or disturbing nature of the world environment is, according to Lotze, the reason for much of our higher culture. Feelings are bases for imagination, from which spring the creative impulses of art. Aesthetic appreciation and creation both lie in the

delicacy of apprehension by which the mind is able to clothe the world of values in the world of forms or to become instinctively aware of the happiness concealed under the enveloping forms.<sup>2</sup>

In regard to morality, the same worth-determinations which we make concerning external reality lead us to judge of our own worth and significance, "of the ends we may hope to attain, of the duties which are incumbent upon us."<sup>3</sup> For Lotze, moral action, if it is anything of value, must produce a feeling of pleasure in a being capable of enjoyment.<sup>4</sup> But he denies that this is an advocacy of hedonism, for there is no general

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1. MIC, I, 246.  
2. MIC, I, 244.

3. MIC, I, 684.  
4. OPP, 19.

pleasure which we may set up as a goal of action, and which can become actual as a psychological state.<sup>1</sup> Just as motion or color in general cannot be seen, but only specific things in motion or definite colors, so also feelings cannot be anticipated as general forms.

"Will and desire themselves," Lotze states, "are what they are only by their consciousness of relation to something worthy in their objects."<sup>2</sup> Such relations, being in harmony or discord with the state of the apprehending subject, result in feelings of pleasure and pain. For Lotze, the subsequent efforts to hold to pleasure and to avoid pain are "the only springs of all practical activity."<sup>3</sup> He believes that the opposing Kantian idea of an altogether unconditioned object of worth shoots beyond the mark of truth.<sup>4</sup>

For moral norms, Lotze would appeal to the rule of conscience, which he holds has in all ages provided landmarks of rights and duties. But in addition, he believes that though there is an "indestructible core of good. . . innate in men's consciences," disciplined reflection and education according to established practical rules are necessary for a clear insight into the general conditions which are to be held obligatory.<sup>5</sup>

### 3. The Good as Living Love

#### Unifying the Three Elemental Realms

We now arrive at the considerations toward which this

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1. OPP, 18-19; MIC, I, 694-695.      4. MIC, I, 690.  
 2. MIC, I, 688.                              5. OPP, 22; MIC, I, 712-713.  
 3. MIC, I, 688.

exposition has been moving, namely, the manner in which Lotze provides an objective basis for the validity of value determinations. Lotze contends that so long as we must conceive of necessary laws, immediate facts of reality, and ideas of worth as pointing to independent components of reality we have neither the unity needed for theoretical progress nor the confirmation which our hopes require. For him, such indifferent independence is thus unthinkable, and must give way to a conviction that there is one origin from which the three forms flow as aspects. This conviction cannot be verified scientifically, for its basis is essentially the "living faith" is such a hypothesis.<sup>1</sup>

The view that the world is a development of a blind force, working according to universal laws, but devoid of good or evil, fails to make intelligible the rise of the light of value and goodness, holiness and beauty, out of the darkness of the source.<sup>2</sup> And for Lotze it cannot be that the eternal and self-evident truths, which have such meaning and authority in the world, are themselves based on a meaningless source. He believes that they are rather only the first consequences which the Living Meaning of all reality set in the pursuit of its ends in the ordering of what was worthy of such order. We cannot deduce reality from this Meaning, but can only imperfectly trace reality to it,<sup>3</sup> for we stand not at the source and center of

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1. MIC, II, 576.  
2. MIC, II, 718.

3. MET, II, 319.

reality, but "at the farthest extremities of its structure, loud with the whirl of machinery."<sup>1</sup> Lotze acknowledges the inexactness of his axiological conviction, but says: "I still feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which should be the ground of that which is."<sup>2</sup>

Insight into what ought to be will alone open our eyes to discern what is; for there can be no body of facts, no arrangement of things, no course of destiny, apart from the end and meaning of the whole, from which each part has received, not only existence, but also the active nature in which it glories.<sup>3</sup>

But is it possible to form a more concrete conception of this living source of unity which faith affirms? In answer, Lotze begins with the facts through which we form notions of good things. By means of feelings we assign value or goodness to a large variety of things. This should lead us to seek for a universal character of goodness by virtue of which things occasion worth-determining feelings within us. What is this common element of goodness of which all good things partake and are reflections? Lotze's axiological faith enables him to affirm such a universal, not as a bare formal abstraction, but as a concrete existent, which "is that which it indicates as a quality in the individual real thing."<sup>4</sup>

Now good things or actions do not exist as such apart from a mind by which they are evaluated or willed. Lotze thus suggests that we look for a quality of mind as the good-in-itself, of which the goodness of things is but a reflection. He offers

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1. MIC, I, 400.  
2. MET, II, 319.

3. MIC, I, 392.  
4. MIC, II, 719.

the hypothesis that the quality of mind which may be called good-in-itself is benevolence--the sacrificing of worth for self for the sake of worth for others. He says: "The only thing that is really good is that Living Love that wills the blessedness of others."<sup>1</sup> Lotze's idea of the intrinsic goodness of a benevolent mind is as follows:

This, having reality as a movement of the whole living mind which feels, wills, and knows itself, is just on that account not merely a formal general condition the fulfillment of which by any other would entitle that other to the appellation of good, without the condition itself being good, but this it is which alone in the true sense has or is this worth, and all else--resolves, sentiments, actions, and special directions of the will--all these share with it only derivatively the one name of good.<sup>2</sup>

In the activities of human beings, benevolent love may be misdirected because of defective foresight, so heed must be given to the regulative commands of a trained conscience. However, the divine source of reality needs no such guidance, for nothing is prior to it, neither eternal truths, nor immediate reality, nor worth. Divine Living Love or the Supreme Good unfolds itself in one movement which to finite cognition appears as three realms or aspects of the Good, which is the movement's end, the constructive impulse of realization, and the universal truths that are means to the end.<sup>3</sup>

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1. MIC, II, 721.

2. MIC, II, 721. Dr. Brightman bases his "one vigorous argument for immortality" on the basic truth that "value is personality at its best." Thus if God is a good conserver of values, he must also be a good conserver of persons, without whose immortality there would be a great loss of the highest intrinsic values. See Brightman, POR, 400-404.

3. MIC, II, 722.

Lotze thus binds the three elemental realms of reality in terms of a lofty faith. His conclusion is that the Supreme Good is the only basis for the validity of value determinations, and for that matter of all metaphysical axioms. He thinks that all of reality is brought forth "in order that the . . . Highest Good may become for the (finite) spirit an object of enjoyment in all the multiplicity of forms possible to it."<sup>1</sup>

All being, all that we call mode and form, thing and event, the whole sum of Nature, can be nothing else than the condition for the realization of Good, can be as it is only because thus in it the infinite worth of the Good manifested itself.<sup>2</sup>

Hence cognition of value, however imperfect it may be, is objective and meaningful, for the universe itself has eternal value. In fact, in perceiving the import of things, their forms of destiny and their contributions to the sum of reality, we possess the essential truth of things; Lotze holds that "it is only for the realization of this truth that things exist."<sup>3</sup>

He likens human cognitive powers to the apprehension of a spectator at a theater, whose main enjoyment and edification lie in an understanding of the significance of the performance, compared to which a knowledge of the mechanics and machinery operating the stage changes is entirely unessential.<sup>4</sup> It is through cognition of value that man may, and indeed must, apply himself to that labor which constitutes his eternal calling:

As in the great fabric of the universe the creative spirit imposed on itself unchangeable laws by which it moves the

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1. OMET, 152.

2. MIC, I, 396.

3. MIC, II, 356.

4. OMET, 152, 159.

world of phenomena, diffusing the fulness of the Highest Good throughout innumerable forms and events, and distilling it again from them into the bliss of consciousness and enjoyment; so must man, acknowledging the same laws, develop given existence into a knowledge of its value, and the value of his ideals into a series of external forms proceeding from himself.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze stresses that this meaning of reality, this Highest Good, cannot be described so easily as its derivatives, which are made clear to us through their manifestation in experience. Nor can the Highest Good be regarded as a principle from which all metaphysical truths may be deduced; for our human minds, a deduction of the world of forms from the world of values is impossible.<sup>2</sup> Lotze writes:

The very name, the 'Highest Good,' designates the content, the essentia of the highest principle, but not the form of existence which we must attribute to it in order to comprehend it as a conditioning cause of the world of phenomena.<sup>3</sup>

The conclusion, then, of Lotze's axiological strand of thought is that "the substantial 'Ground' of the world is a Spirit, whose essence our cognition were [sic] able to designate only as the living and existent Good."<sup>4</sup> For him, further progress in metaphysics lies wholly in the union and elaboration of three postulates: 1) the thought of the Infinite Ground to which ontology leads, 2) the thought that all genuine reality is spiritual, and 3) the thought of the Highest Good as the reason for the formation of the world.<sup>5</sup>

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1. MIC, I, 401.

2. OMET, 153; MIC, I, 396.

3. OMET, 154.

4. OMET, 154-155.

5. OMET, 154.

#### 4. Natural Evil and

##### E. S. Brightman's Doctrine of "The Given"

Lotze makes no pretense of his axiological conviction that the three elemental realms of experience, namely, facts, laws, and values, are reflections of three realms of reality, and that these realms of reality are not merely disjointed processes, but rather are three unified aspects of a teleologically unfolding monistic Good. Such is what he calls his "living faith" in this hypothesis, that any other account of the three realms of experience is, for him, unintelligible.

What factors are evidently implicit in Lotze's axiological faith? We should not deny that quite possibly Lotze's aesthetic disposition in some measure contributes toward the formation of such a lofty hypothesis. But we should maintain that any such immediate aesthetic influence is not nearly important as two factors which demand serious philosophical consideration. The first is the assumption that human experience is in some measure a true reflection of the objective cosmic processes. Without this assumption, the outcome, as Lotze perceives in his introduction to his Metaphysics, is positivistic nihilism. The second factor is his philosophical criterion of truth. When he continually insists that it is unintelligible that reason would rise out of what is not reason, what does he mean? He does not mean that it is inconsistent to think so, but rather that it is only on the assumption that the objective processes are the activities of one purposive Spirit that we can understand or make coherent our own existence, and that the assumption of a confidence in

in reason is fully justified. Impersonal views of reality cannot appeal to such a criterion; they have in fact none. The most that they can claim is self-consistency, but not that they are better or closer to truth than the personalistic view.

Thus Lotze's postulate of an unfolding monistic Good rests mainly on a serious appeal to the criterion of intelligibility or coherence. But now is it really coherent enthusiastically and unreservedly to assume a monistic Good as the source of all existence? Should not the existence of natural evil give cause for at least some hesitation?

Lotze was always fully aware of the problem of evil. However, he was never satisfied enough with the absolutistic approach to offer a whole-hearted defense of it. In the Microcosmos, he confesses that there appears to be an irreconcilable contradiction between the omnipotence and the goodness of God, and that "we do not understand the solution which we yet believe in."<sup>1</sup> He writes further:

I might. . . appeal to the fuller dimensions of true reality in which may be reconciled supreme goodness and the existence of evil, which in our view must always conflict; but all that I should accomplish with such a juggle of words would be to veil the admission which we must frankly make, that we cannot even imagine the direction in which the unknown conciliation of the difference is to be sought.<sup>2</sup>

In the first edition of his lectures on the philosophy of religion, he goes so far as to say that "we must take seriously the statement which we often hear made: that the reason for a meth-

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1. MIC, II, 717.  
2. MIC, II, 718.

od of guidance which we do not understand lies in the inscrutable wisdom of God."<sup>1</sup> However, in the second edition, representing probably his final thought, he pronounces the problem to be an enigma, made bearable only by a practical religious faith which he calls "a deed that is to be accredited to character."<sup>2</sup>

Lotze's personalistic followers have almost without exception accounted for evil on the absolutistic basis of the ideal whole. In recent times, however, Dr. E. S. Brightman has formulated an unusual theory of a finite God, which would in large measure mitigate Lotze's theoretical hesitancy. This theory has greatly influenced contemporary personalistic idealism and has received much attention in theological discussions. Dr. Brightman ascribes evil not to the will of God, but to the hindrances imposed on God's will by certain eternal, unwilled, and uncreated elements or processes present within God's unity of consciousness.<sup>3</sup> These non-voluntary conscious processes as well as the voluntary rational and non-rational forms of activity are included in what Dr. Brightman calls "The Given." The Given consists of

the eternal uncreated laws of reason and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of non-rational conscious-

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1. OPR<sup>1</sup>, 145.

2. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 128.

3. This view may be regarded as a special case of Whitehead's general suggestion that "the temporal world is to be construed in terms of additional formative elements which are not definable in the terms which are applicable to God." Dr. Brightman would alter this to read: ". . . not definable in the terms which are applicable to God's rational and good will." See Whitehead, RIM, 99.

ness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (qualia), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil.<sup>1</sup>

God, according to Dr. Brightman, controls The Given in the sense that he uses the rational aspects (like Plato's Pattern) as instruments of experience in fashioning the non-rational aspects (like Plato's Receptacle) in so far as possible for ideal values.<sup>2</sup> "God's will is limited both by eternal necessities of reason and by eternal experiences of brute fact."<sup>3</sup> Dr. Brightman stresses that it is only in this respect that God is finite; in goodness and love (as well as in duration) he is infinite. Thus all natural evils--global disturbances, mental illnesses, and numerous terrible bodily diseases--are the outcome of God's struggle with The Given.<sup>4</sup> This struggle is one of eternal and inexhaustible "perfectibility" (i.e. never reaching static perfection).<sup>5</sup>

In reply to numerous objections which have been raised regarding The Given, Dr. Brightman has given what seems to us to be a most convincing defense.<sup>6</sup> Since then, however, Dr. L. H. DeWolf has advanced a fresh challenge. Dr. DeWolf's arguments, found in his short but excellent critique of neo-orthodox irrationalism, consist in 1) the common absolutistic appeal to human limitations of knowledge, and 2) the objection that the doctrine of The

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1. Brightman, POR, 337.  
2. Brightman, POR, 338.  
3. Brightman, POR, 300.

4. Brightman, Art.(1932)<sup>2</sup>, 135  
5. Brightman, POR, 340.  
6. Brightman, Art.(1932)<sup>2</sup>.

Given does not explain evil.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Brightman has adequately answered the first.<sup>2</sup> Hence we need briefly notice only the second.

Dr. DeWolf writes:

Actually the meaning of an event is not one whit further explained when it has been attributed to The Given, but then the very possibility of any explanation ever being found has been denied. For all explanation implies intelligibility. What is inherently non-rational can neither be intelligible within itself nor can any inference be made from its existence regarding the causation of such and such further events.<sup>3</sup>

In this passage, Dr. DeWolf manifests a speculative rationalistic approach to a philosophical definition of explanation and intelligibility. His criticism of The Given is thus wholly external, for Dr. Brightman's idea of explanation rests, like that of Lotze, on more empirical grounds. Certainly, if "the real is the rational," then evil is either unreal and irrational or it is explainable entirely in terms of rational purposes. However, empirically there are non-rational factors such as values and sensations in experience, and we may hence infer the presence of such factors in God's experience. Therefore, if the empirical philosophical approach to evil is true, The Given most certainly is an explanation, and, in so far as is empirically possible, makes evil intelligible.<sup>4</sup> It seems then that Dr. DeWolf, by reason of his rationalistic restriction of explanation, falls short of refuting the Given. His second objection presupposes the truth which the first seeks to establish, namely, that evil is

1. DeWolf, RRR, 183.

2. See Brightman, Art.(1932)<sup>2</sup>, 141, where he answers Knudson's fourth argument.

3. DeWolf, RRR, 183.

4. For Dr. Brightman, to explain means to include in coherent context, not to explain away!

part of an ideal rational whole.

We should also mention F. H. Ross's main thesis against The Given. He thinks that Dr. Brightman's doctrine implies a metaphysical dualism, for the reason that The Given is presented as a definite force in addition to the force of God's will. Since Dr. Brightman holds that God's will and his nature are inseparable, The Given cannot be included in God's nature without also being included in his will.<sup>1</sup> The force of Ross's reasoning comes from the assumption that God's will expresses his whole nature. Empirically, the grievous character of evil contradicts this assumption, so it must give way to the possibility that God's nature contains non-voluntary processes. It is just this possibility that Dr. Brightman exploits to avoid metaphysical dualism, while at the same time accounting for evil.

Is the finitistic hypothesis an answer then to Lotze's hesitancy? It would certainly seem so. In fact, it is quite surprising that although Lotze held a serious regard for the absolutistic possibility, his many-sided probing did not lead him to entertain the finitistic view as an equally serious possibility. It seems to us that one cannot be considered without bringing to mind the other. Evil is surely real and terrible beyond all reason--this is an empirical fact sufficient enough to lead one immediately to a finitistic view of God. On the other hand, we cannot lightly put aside the remembrance of our limitations, and also that strong axiological hope within, that would like to see

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1. Ross, PPE, 41-51.

all existence without exception traced back to one Good. This, with somewhat less force, keeps us mindful of the absolutistic hope. These are the two choices before us ignorant mortals. As Dr. Brightman says:

The choice is not between divine impotence and human ignorance, but rather between two faiths for us ignorant mortals. We must choose between the faith that God's will does not produce the evil in question, yet can make all things work together for an increasing good, and the faith that God produces both the evil and also a perfectly ideal outcome from it.<sup>1</sup>

What choice shall we make? Empirically, there is little reason to doubt the adequacy of the finitistic hypothesis. It is, as we see it, the task of philosophy to adjust itself to the facts as we know them now, and not to "adjust" the facts to a speculative rationalism or to a revelational dogmatism or to a materialistic reduction based on a fanatical faith in experiment. Philosophy ought to be a down-to-earth regressive investigation and not an inflexible legislative interpretation of the facts. As Lotze suggests, we must alter all starting notions which cannot be held without contradiction when our thoughts are systematized, but which can without contradiction be replaced by others. Now since natural evil contradicts our idea of love, we must alter the general starting notion of a monistic all-begetting Good. We can without contradiction assume that evil is due to non-voluntary processes within the monistic personality of the Good. This, therefore, must be our choice.

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1. Brightman, Art.(1932), 141.

Why did not Lotze, especially in view of his admirable empirical methodology, make this choice? Could it possibly have been that he was so engrossed in the poetry of his beautiful metaphysical monism that he was too insensitive to the brutal prose of evil to carry his reasoning in this matter to a definite empirical hypothesis? His consistent fineness of thought and his exhaustive handling of problems make this possibility practically unthinkable. The reason appears to be simply that he felt that the application of a thorough empirical methodology to the problem of evil would lead to a compromise regarding his optimistic axiological ideals which would be even more unbearable than the admitted uncertainty of an absolutistic view. In support of this conjecture, we should quote B. P. Bowne, who we think was one with Lotze on theodicy, and who gives a very explicit statement of his own unwillingness to adjust to the facts of evil:

If any one had an interest in maintaining the opposite hypothesis of unwisdom and evil in the world-ground, much might be said for it. . . Of course, a purely objective procedure would demand that we take all the facts into account and strike the average. Such a study of the facts would leave us in great uncertainty. . . The outcome would probably be the affirmation of a being either morally indifferent, or morally imperfect, or morally good, but limited by some insuperable necessity which forbids anything better than our rather shabby universe. But the mind is not satisfied to take this road. It will not allow its ideals to collapse without some effort to save them. It prefers rather to maintain its faith in the ideal, and to set aside the conflicting facts as something not yet understood, but which to perfect insight would fall into harmony.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Bowne, THE, 257-258. This passage harmonizes well with Lotze's thoughts in Art.(1880), 150, which we have quoted on page 8 of this thesis.

Regarding Dr. Brightman's definition of The Given, we should be more satisfied if the factor "disorderly impulses and desires"<sup>1</sup> were omitted. This factor is doubtless assumed to account for global disturbances. But why not charge all such disturbances to an unknown non-voluntary "whatever in God is the source of natural evil"? Then there would be less cause for an objection like Dr. DeWolf's, that The Given (i.e. the sources of evil in The Given) is "a projection of confusion and frustration within our experience to the being of God himself."<sup>2</sup> It would seem best not to press the finitistic view for concrete analogies, especially since we obviously do not possess creative wills (except perhaps in a very remote sense, as manifest in artistic creation). Thus any analogy which might seem appropriate would give little insight into the rise of evil, and would give needless cause for charges of anthropomorphic "projection." We should be content to ascribe all natural evil to a unique inscrutable process in God's being, and to rest the hypothesis on the absence of disverificatory evidence<sup>3</sup> regarding

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1. It is of interest to note that the factor "disorderly impulses" is closely related to Plato's "Receptacle," the primordial chaos of space, and discordant and disorderly motion. See Brightman, POR, 339.
  2. DeWolf, RRR, 172.
  3. E. W. Hall emphasizes the significance of disverification in metaphysics. He writes: "We must remember that disverificatory instances are far more significant in deciding between the claims of rival metaphysical hypotheses than are verifiatory; thus we should construct our hypotheses with this in mind, and constantly be alert in weighing them and in advocating them for disverification." Hall, Art.(1947), 191. See also his discussion of the relative importance of disverification in science and in metaphysics (189-191).

the mutual compatibility of this hypothesis with the personalistic metaphysical which, as we shall see, seems to be such an inevitable outcome of a consideration of the phenomenon of reciprocal action.

Before concluding this section, we should notice Dr. P. A. Bertocci's interesting criticism of *The Given*. Dr. Bertocci has suggested that it might be more desirable to call only "the chaotic retarding factor in God's experience" *The Given*, for the reason that we cannot know that the rational laws are immutable necessities or a logical prius to God's activity.<sup>1</sup> This proposed alteration would be in accord with Lotze's argument against the doctrine of pre-mundane truth.<sup>2</sup> That is, we have no a priori right to subsume this particular world under the easily conceivable general category 'all possible worlds,' and from this to infer an immutable prius to God's rational activity. For who can tell what would be if the world were otherwise realized? This seems to us to be quite true; we must at least leave open the possibility that there are other possible modes of rational realization by God, and hence that there may be no logical prius.

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1. Bertocci, EAG, 279.

2. We are here, of course, not concerned with what Lotze was primarily interested in refuting; namely, the view that rational truth is an authoritative realm apart from the being of God. Dr. Brightman's doctrine of *The Given* poses only the question of logical prius. It is well to note also that Dr. Brightman does not include reason as a phase of *The Given* in *The Problem of God* (1930). This synthesis first appears in *The Finding of God* (1931).

On the other hand, we see no reason why the absolute necessity and validity of the forms of reason as we know them now should not be an acceptable empirical basis for the hypothesis that God truly has a rational given. On such a basis, we should judge that Dr. Brightman's idea of The Given is amply substantiated. In any case, however, the doctrine of a non-voluntary given as the source of natural evil is unaffected.

The above discussions bring us to the conclusion of our examination of the finitistic view as a possible answer to Lotze's hesitancy regarding the problem of evil. It seems to us, indeed, that the finitistic view is the only possible consistent outcome of the empirical methodology whose principles Lotze himself so admirably formulated. Strangely enough, however, he did not even entertain the idea of such a solution. The assumption of a finite God is a reasonable outcome of a serious attempt to account for the facts here and now, and, contrary to Bowne's fears that religious ideals would be undermined, it can (as Dr. Brightman's philosophy demonstrates) be stated in such a way as to be fully compatible with a rich and wholesome religious faith. Lotze's over-optimistic doctrine of an unfolding monistic Good diffusing itself throughout reality is certainly what we would like to be true, what we certainly must wish for; but the facts as we know them now (not as we might know them) seem inexorably to point us away from our likes and wishes and toward a far less poetical actuality.

## CHAPTER II

### THE MONISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF RECIPROCAL ACTION

In the preceding chapter we followed Lotze's axiological strand of thought to the postulate of a monistic Good--the source of all reality. We shall now turn to the ontological strand, through which Lotze, employing a sensitive and penetrating dialectic that subjects every idea to a most comprehensive criticism, arrives at the concept of an immaterial monistic M as mediator and sustainer of all interaction.

#### 1. The Essence of a Thing

According to Lotze, the primary fact that concerns metaphysical inquiry is change, which dominates the whole range of existence.<sup>1</sup> Now how does Lotze's doctrine of change begin? At the outset, he, in agreement with the ordinary view of things, accepts what sensuous experience presents, namely, a multiplicity of changing and interacting things. This changing reality is ordinarily taken to have a persistent existence entirely independent of any observer, and it is this very independence that establishes reality as objective. If we now ask what it is that constitutes the true essence of actual things as distinguished from those merely imagined, the most convincing answer would seem to be that it is just the objective reality of those

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1. MET, I, 2.

connections which actually bind things.<sup>1</sup> This answer very naturally presupposes independent centers of relations to which the changing states of an individual and also its changing relations with other things attach.<sup>2</sup> From the standpoint of this common view, Lotze raises two of the most important questions of ontology: 1) What is the peculiar nature of the objective relations connecting things? 2) How must we conceive the being of these centers of relations about which the changing states of a thing adhere?<sup>3</sup>

In answer to the latter, Lotze opposes himself to the notions of "pure being" and creative "putting." He regards them as mere verbal indications of the somehow common character of all existence, but certainly not ontological explanations of this character. Here, as very frequently in his discussions, he detects in such notions that curious and vain attempt to show how reality came to be as it is, whereas the proper study of metaphysics is only reality as given, assuming of course that there was an incomprehensible original "creative breath" that gave things the common character of existence which we seek to make theoretically explicit.<sup>4</sup> Lotze argues that it is much more plausible to assume that reality with all its relations came into being in a single act, and not according to those successive strata which our abstractions all too easily suggest.<sup>5</sup> Certainly, holds Lotze, we must give up all ideas of homoge-

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1. MET, I, 36-37.  
2. MET, I, 38.  
3. MET, I, 53.

4. MET, I, 195-196.  
5. MET, I, 40-46;  
MIC, II, 580-587.

neous centers of "pure being." Lotze objects to Herbart's idea of a simple supra-sensible determinate quality posited in creation as the essence of a thing, for the reason that it does not explain the form of a changing thing at any given instant. That is, the simple quality  $C$ , which supposedly is the essence of the thing in all its successive forms  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n$ , cannot unreservedly be identified with any single  $a_p$ , which excludes all other forms.<sup>1</sup> Rejecting all such attempts to arrive at a simple "core" of things, to explain the changeable by what is unchangeable, Lotze turns to the view advocated in ancient times by Heraclitus, that all existence is flux, that reality is process, and tentatively suggests that the unchangeable essence of a thing lies in a certain pattern of change.

Thus, it may be stated as a general truth, that our idea of that which makes a thing what it is consists only in the thought of a certain regularity with which it changes to and fro within a limited circle of states whether spontaneously or under visible external conditions, without passing out of this circle, and without ever having an existence on its own account and apart from any one of the forms which within this circle it can assume.<sup>2</sup>

He cautions against grounding the possibility of this regularity in any authoritative realm of general laws, like the Fate of early Greek speculation; or in any realm of Platonic Ideas. And in accordance with Hume, we must not think that our knowledge of the regularity affords us an exhaustive representation of that actual connection of reason and consequent in virtue of which things change.<sup>3</sup> But if this is so, how can we consider

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1. MET, I, 69.  
2. MET, I, 77.

3. MET, I, 110.

regularity or law as the real living active essence of a changing thing? By what concrete form may we represent this true essence?

Upon closer examination of the notion of change, Lotze finds that the term is not wholly satisfactory in describing a thing as it assumes successive forms; for when the thing in state  $p$  proceeds to a new state  $q$ , no residuum of  $p$  is carried over to which the attribute 'change' may properly be predicated. The state  $p$  really becomes a new and different  $q$ , which rises out of the complete extinction of  $p$ . However, Lotze emphasizes that he does not mean to assert an absolute becoming. The forms  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n$  cannot be regarded as self-contained motionless beings such that there is some instantaneous interval of time between them during which the thing ceases to exist. These symbols are merely our way of conveniently representing what is really a continuous becoming, "a continuity according to which every later phase in the becoming, instead of merely coming into being after the earlier, issues out of it."<sup>1</sup> Lotze cites Aristotle's concepts of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as clear expressions of this kind of becoming.<sup>2</sup> For Aristotle, a thing as potential is not a mere possibility of thought, but an existent reality whenever conditions for its rise to actuality are

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1. MET, I, 114.

2. Prof. J. Wild, in his article entitled "The Structure of Change" concludes that "at the present time, and in the present state of philosophy, Aristotle's account of the structure of change and becoming have for us an importance exceeding that of merely academic. . . study." See Wild, Art.(1941), 59. Lotze clearly realized this.

actually contained beforehand in something else already existing ἐνεργῶς.<sup>1</sup> Lotze thus comes to the fullest formulation of the problem under consideration: What must this essence of a thing be in order while existing at any given instant in a state  $a_p$  to contain as potential all future states  $a_{p+1}$ ,  $a_{p+2}$ , ...,  $a_{p+n}$ , and yet again to hold all states  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$ , ...,  $a_{p+n}$ , as Lotze says, "as its own, and thus to maintain itself as against them."<sup>2</sup> The possibility of this kind of an identity in change we find, according to him, in the special nature of only one being: the spiritual subject.

It is only through the fact that our attention, bringing events into relation, comprehends past and present in memory, while at the same time there arises the idea of the persistent ego to which both past and present belong, that we become aware what is meant by unity of being throughout a change of manifold states, and that such a unity is possible. . . . Thus the proximate conclusion to which we are forced would be this: If there are to be things with the properties we demand of things, they must be more than things. Only by sharing this character of the spiritual nature can they fulfil the general requirements which must be fulfilled in order to constitute a thing.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. The Connections Between Things

i. The Concept of Commensurability. Regarding the problem of the peculiar nature of the objective relations between things, Lotze distinguishes two kinds of relatedness: 1) the commensurability of all things, which renders them members of a system having one universal truth, and 2) the connection of cause and effect.<sup>4</sup> Commensurability provides especially for the prediction of future events. Lotze writes:

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1. MET, I, 107.  
2. MET, I, 118.

3. MET, I, 223-224.  
4. MIC, II, 587 ff.

If once we drop this primary conviction, nothing any longer requires explanation and nothing admits of it; for that mutual dependence would no longer exist which the explanation consists in pointing out. . . . And just because of this the mere fact of a constantly repeated coincidence would be no proof of the presence of a universal law, by the help of which a further forecast might become possible as to the yet unobserved cases that lie in the future. It is not until the connection of manifold facts according to law is established as a universal principle that any standard can exist for distinguishing a possible from an impossible, a probability from an improbability.<sup>1</sup>

Nothing then could be more basic to experimental research than this concept.<sup>2</sup>

ii. The Possibility of Reciprocal Action. The fact that the events that form the course of the world can be predicted as consequents from known antecedents points to a primary unity of all things. However, Lotze finds more positive grounds for such unity in the second kind of relatedness: reciprocal causal action. The primary question here is, what condition must be fulfilled if in any relation C, whatever its form, things are to affect each other causally?<sup>3</sup>

One possibility that easily and naturally suggests itself is that there is some kind of transeunt action. Lotze shows in some detail how this idea is hopelessly involved in endless difficulties (e.g. the nature of the entity transferred, what determines its direction of travel, how the entity can act on the object and be absorbed into it), and ends by presupposing

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1. MET, I, 6-7.

2. MET, I, 7. E. E. Thomas finds three directions in Lotze's quest for unity: 1) the logical unity of commensurability, 2) the all-inclusive unity making interaction possible, and 3) the unity of a changing thing. See Thomas, LTR, 55.

3. MET, I, 134.

what it set out to explain. But now if the passage of influences is incredible, the only alternative is to attempt an explanation without such fruitless presuppositions.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze gives special attention to one such attempt, namely, Leibniz's notable system, in which the individuals of the universe are simple super-spatial immaterial monads or force-substances, "without windows" and acting in completely determined harmony pre-established by God, the all-inclusive monad.<sup>2</sup> Lotze finds two main difficulties in this unusual attempt. Firstly, why did God choose to give objective reality to the "best of all possible worlds," instead of simply allowing it to remain as a thought? He says:

To give reality to an idea of a world was only worth doing if the sum of the Good was increased by the sum of those who might become independent centres of its enjoyment; if, . . . the beings, of whom the image and conception were included in the approved plan of a world, were enabled themselves to think it and have experience of it in their lives.<sup>3</sup>

This could hardly be consistently provided in a system where the inner development of each monad takes place in a parallel independent course in which the successive states are completely indifferent to each other. Lotze's second objection is that Leibniz does not explain the necessity of general laws as a condition of that perfection of the world which renders it worthy of existence. It is not self-contradictory to suppose that general laws are entirely alien to the realization of perfection, and that each moment of reality may well be unique, con-

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1. MET, I, 146.

2. Windelband, HOP, 425.

3. MET, I, 154.

forming only to the import of the whole, whatever aesthetic or poetic basis that might have.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze grants that some such pre-established sympathetic connection between independent inner developments of things affords a possible solution to the problem of reciprocal action. However, he shrinks away from the thoroughly consistent determinism involved, and clings to the insuppressible hope (justified by those all-important axiological principles which we discussed in the previous chapter) "that the course of things in which we live admits of events being initiated, which are not the necessary consequences of previous development."<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, he believes that all ideas of independent centers connected either by external or by occasionalistic ties must be given up.

Lotze instead offers the postulate that the state of a thing can be changed only by some passion or living feeling arising within itself. Only in so far as things can produce passions in each other can they interact. Lotze adds that "the change which we assume in one must be a direct passion in the other. . ."<sup>3</sup> "The reality of one state is the direct and immediate condition of the realization of another."<sup>4</sup> We must, he holds, assume as the ground of this possibility the substantial oneness of all things, and must take interaction to be one of "those simple facts that compose reality."<sup>5</sup> In the following

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1. MET, I, 160-162.  
2. MET, I, 163; MIC, II, 597.  
3. MIC, II, 596, 636.

4. MET, I, 164.  
5. MIC, II, 599.

passages we have a clear summary of this crux of Lotze's metaphysical monism:

There cannot be a multiplicity of independent things, but all elements, if reciprocal action is to be possible between them, must be regarded as parts of a single and real Being. The pluralism with which our view of the world began has to give place to a monism, through which the 'transeunt' operation, always unintelligible, passes into an 'immanent' operation.<sup>1</sup>

[sic]

It is only if individual things do not float independent<sup>^</sup> or left to themselves in a vacuum across which no connection can reach--only if all of them, being finite individuals, are at the same time only parts of one single Infinite Substance, which embraces them all and cherishes them all within itself, that their reciprocal action, or what we call such, is possible. For only then can the change which any one of them experiences be at the same time a state of the Infinite, so that it is not necessary for its influence to extend across a gulf which can never be filled up, in order to produce this state; only then can the result which this state produces in the Infinite, in accordance with the truth of its own nature, appear at the same time as a change of other individual things without there being any need of some fresh process by which it may be produced in them.<sup>2</sup>

### 3. The Oneness of All Things

Two general problems now present themselves: 1) How can the Infinite One contain the plurality of finite things in its unity; that is, is the notion formally self-consistent? 2) Under what concrete form may we in thought represent this all-embracing Being?<sup>3</sup>

i. The Formal Nature of the Immanent M. The substantial unity which Lotze finds to be a necessary presupposition of reciprocal action he designates by the symbol M. This M somehow resolves itself, relative to our faculties of observation, into

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1. MET, I, 165.  
2. MIC, II, 598.

3. MIC, II, 598.

a plurality of individuals. According to him, if we take any two particular things, A and B, and call the remaining multiplicity R, then M can be considered the function  $g(A,B,R)$ . Any change in A will immediately affect M, and since B and R are included in M, they will be immediately subject to change. This is what Lotze calls "only an immanent operation of M upon M."<sup>1</sup> He points out however that the intensity of relations in g may vary greatly. For example, a change in R may result in the production of a P, leaving A and B unaffected; or a change in R may affect only B; or a reciprocal action between A and B may leave R unaffected. In all cases the kind and degree of relation realized is due solely to the import or plan of M, whose unity may be likened to a piece of polyphonic music in which the voices are not externally related, but are simultaneously present as blended yet distinct in one complex sound wave.<sup>2</sup> A thing is what it is and acts as it acts only through the commission given it by the monistic M as its part in the fulfillment of the equation  $M=M$ .<sup>3</sup>

Lotze shows that the law of identity does not by any means preclude predicating both unity and multiplicity of M. However, M is not g in the same neutral sense that  $M=M$ ;  $M=g$  rather "in the active sense of bringing it forth and being present in it."<sup>4</sup> In short, reality is much deeper than the bare copula 'is' of logic. Lotze writes:

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1. MET, I, 168.  
2. MET, I, 171, 193.

3. MET, I, 198.  
4. MET, I, 177.

S is P and S is not P are irreconcilable with each other; but the propositions S is P and S is non-P are reconcilable until it is established as a matter of fact that there is no non-P=Q. . .<sup>1</sup>

Lotze defends his doctrine of M as immanent in all finite things against a Leibnizian separation of things and God. He thinks that Leibniz, in thus separating the world from the mind of God, deprives the world of that very inner connectedness and richness, which, encompassed by the living presence of God, is the ultimate reason for its realization.<sup>2</sup> He grants that the desire to prevent distinctionless blending of God and the world is surely justified. However, the way to do this, he holds, is simply to recognize that

what in this theory is presented as a mere possibility and preliminary suggestion (to the mind of God) is in fact the full reality, but that nevertheless the one remains different from all the manifold, which only exists in and through the one.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, Lotze warns against taking the truly existing M, the complex of all things, as a motionless object of contemplation. It is entirely unlike the unmoved Mover of Aristotle. Rather, since experience testifies to the reality of continual becoming, we ought to assume that M is in a process of eternal development:

It is not therefore as a stationary identity with itself, but only as an eternally self-sustained motion that we have to recognize the given being of that which truly is. And as given with it we have also to recognize the direction which its motion takes.<sup>4</sup>

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1. MET, I, 175.  
2. MET, I, 186.

3. MET, I, 186.  
4. MET, I, 197.

ii. The Immanent M as Idea or Thought. In regard to the concrete form of M, Lotze immediately turns to a comparison of the doctrines of idealism and realism. He represents his own teleological idealism by the equation  $M=g(A,B,R)$ , and realism, the opposing view, by the converse:  $g(A,B,R)=M$ .<sup>1</sup> These equations very effectively bring out the basic contrast of the two views, for the former means that M is the independent variable,<sup>2</sup> the developing living Idea whose import is the "form-giving prius" of the world. The latter, on the other hand, presents M as the dependent variable, the resulting form which the material world assumes. Realism explains the many marvellous organic and inorganic activities of adaptation to ends with the rather arbitrary assumption of a given harmonious arrangement of all elements. This arrangement might have been otherwise or not at all, but, once given, it leads to the resulting ends in accordance with general laws. Lotze's chief criticism, therefore, is that realism appeals to two independent principles which it has no way of uniting: 1) the authoritative general laws, and 2) the given arrangement of their points of application.<sup>3</sup>

For idealism, the idea M is a concrete reality, not conditioned by any pre-mundane truth, but maintaining teleologically the order of development of its forms as well as forming the

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1. MET, I, 208.

2. This is of course the exact opposite of ordinary mathematical convention. In the equation  $y=f(x)$ , y is ordinarily called the dependent variable, and x the independent variable. Nevertheless, Lotze's illustration is quite clear and useful.

3. MET, I, 218. These objections would, however, not apply to a theistic realism.

multiplicity of elements. By its unconditioned act of determination, M makes each preceding phase of its development the condition of the realization of the following phase, as its nature constantly progresses to new forms. Lotze emphasizes that we must never think of the Idea as an unformed being apart from all the possible forms of realization. It does not figuratively dip into a repertory of possible forms, clothing itself with those forms required for a possible series. The Idea is real only in some definite form.<sup>1</sup> Lotze's notion here is like that which we find continually stressed by Hegel--the self-identical Universal in which God maintains his "absolute, permanent foundation" is only an abstract moment, and nothing apart from the rich fullness of concrete Spirit, which alone really is.<sup>2</sup> Lotze points out further that due to our habit of thinking of all things as instances of kinds, we are easily liable to imagine M and some non-M as instances of the general category 'All possible worlds.' This, according to him, is the root of those abstract doctrines of pre-mundane truth.<sup>3</sup>

Now how does Lotze reconcile this teleological process of the realization of M with the universal validity of natural law? He does so by the postulate that the change in M from phase to phase comes through a combination or resultant of many uniform effects, which, considered in themselves, are unchangeable and independent of the phase in which they happen to be contempo-

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1. MET, I, 212-213.  
2. Hegel, POR, I, 91.

3. MET, I, 210.

rary. Thus there is a universal mechanism of realization which necessarily impels M from form to form, and yet each mechanistic realization conforms exactly to the import of M. The following passage enables us to connect this outcome of Lotze's ontological strand of thought with the axiological considerations of the first chapter:

Such is the fact: such is the nature of the concrete Idea, and such the manner of its realization at every moment, that everything which it ordains in virtue of its own import must issue as a necessary result in ordered succession from the blind co-operation of all the several movements into which it distributes itself, and according to the general laws which it has imposed upon itself.<sup>1</sup>

iii. Space and Time in the Oneness of Things. For the sake of rounding out this presentation, it would be well to add a very brief statement of Lotze's views of space and time in the monistic M. As regards space, there are two main questions:

1) How can space have a reality of its own such that it exists prior to its possible content? 2) How can the existence of real things in space be conceived?<sup>2</sup> According to Lotze's doctrine of internal relations, the answer to the first is that space is purely phenomenal; relations exist only as ideas of reflective thought, or as inner states of the interacting elements of existence. However, this does not mean that space is a mere semblance referring to nothing in the real world. For Lotze, spatial determinations are secondary qualities which real relations present to our minds.<sup>3</sup> That is, it is the total presence in con-

1. MET, I, 215-216.

2. MET, I, 246.

3. MET, I, 258.

consciousness of the effects of things changing states according to real relations that is the direct cause of our spatial idea.<sup>1</sup>

Time is a much more difficult concept, for, unlike space, the presentation of change in consciousness presupposes a real succession of events. Lotze shows conclusively the contradictions involved in the notion of a timeless changeless reality which produces only an appearance of temporal change in finite minds. His view is rather that the ordinary belief in an empty time in which events are said to take place is an illusory abstraction of the real process of becoming which is the development of the monistic M. Actually, time is sui generis; becoming brings forth time, and not vice versa.<sup>2</sup> Lotze holds that the ontological realization of M takes place as an eternally changing 'present.'<sup>3</sup> Regarding the relation between the actual succession of the phases of M and our consciousness of the succession, this, thinks Lotze, is a difficult matter, for our consciousness of the passage of events depends on the peculiar nature of memory, which enables us to make a timeless comparison of 'present' and 'past.'<sup>4</sup>

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1. MET, I, 260.

2. MET, I, 334.

3. MIC, II, 713.

4. MET, I, 335 ff. This difficulty is expressed in the Scriptural saying: "A thousand years in thy sight are as yesterday." Ps. 90:4. See also 2 Pet. 3:8.

#### 4. The Doctrine of

#### Causality in Logical Positivism

In opposition to Lotze's monistic ontology of interaction, the scientific spirit of our time has raised a strong protest. The positivists, standing on Hume's well-known position,<sup>1</sup> deny that causality implies anything more than a regular succession of events, conveniently symbolized in functional relations. And the naturalists have taken up anew that "common sense" realism which James so energetically championed at the beginning of the century. In this short thesis we cannot give a very full account of these aggressive tendencies. We shall discuss several representative thinkers and shall try only to bring out decisive issues bearing on Lotze's assumption of a monistic M.

M. Schlick, one of the leaders of positivism,<sup>2</sup> does not deny that there may be a peculiar "intimacy" between cause and effect. However, for him verification is made only by sensuous observation, and he adds: "Where there is no definite verification, there can be no definite meaning."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, succession is the only possible meaning of causality. To think of any mediating "tie" (e.g. Lotze's M) is to exceed the logical limits

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1. See Hume, ENQ, 75, where he says: "After a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion."

2. That is, until he was tragically assassinated in 1936.

3. Schlick, Art.(1932), 101, 103.

of linguistic usage and to enter the realm of nonsense. Schlick says:

After the scientist has successfully filled up all the gaps in his causal chains by continually interpolating new events, the philosopher wants to go on with this pleasant game after all the gaps have been filled. So he invents a kind of glue and assures us that in reality it is only his glue that holds the events together at all. But we can never find the glue; there is no room for it, as the world is already completely filled by events which leave no chinks between them.<sup>1</sup>

B. Waters in the same spirit declares that the productive theory of causation is nothing but the imaginary endowment of nature with the exchanges of poetical or artistic feelings.<sup>2</sup>

Before asking how the positivists establish regularity of succession, we would again point out that the arbitrary limitation of verification and meaning to sense data is not at all justifiable. It is said that we must abstain from all non-sensuous inferences regarding causality. But, as J. Loewenberg reasons, such abstention is an imperative inference which must be justified; and yet, on positivistic grounds, nothing can justify it but the plainly self-contradictory inference that the causal relation allows of no non-sensuous inference.<sup>3</sup>

Now regarding the problems of induction and probability the familiar question is this: How is induction possible without the assumption of a real uniformity in nature, or, as Lotze asked, a commensurability of all things? V. F. Lenzen, an eminent philosopher of science, frankly admits that acceptance of causality as a methodological principle of science involves the

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1. Schlick, Art.(1932), 109.

2. Waters, Art.(1938), 91.

3. Loewenberg, Art.(1932), 36.

presupposition of a uniformity of nature, "whose justification lies beyond science."<sup>1</sup> However, Schlick and Waters both insist that causal law does not indicate a necessary determination in nature. Laws are only "abbreviated expressions of the order in which events do follow each other."<sup>2</sup> As H. Feigl insists, we do not have to ground induction in any higher principle, for it itself is the rock-bottom ground of inquiry. We try, try, and try again to generalize from past experience, and if there is a regular order of events in nature we shall discover it.<sup>3</sup> But we can never be sure of the future--knowledge, as Reichenbach puts it, can be interpreted only as "a system of posits or wagers."<sup>4</sup> How many times must observation of succession be made to establish causal law? There is no rule. According to the positivists, a function is constructed on the basis of observed data and then tested on new data. If the function succeeds, the scientist gains greater confidence in his wager. Schlick writes:

If observation shows that the function fits the new data . . . he will believe that it expresses the real law. . . He will believe it; he will never be absolutely sure, because new data may come up in the future which will not fit into the formula. But, of course, his faith will grow with the number of verifications.<sup>5</sup>

But we would here interrupt with a grave objection: Is not this faith that seems so important for the establishment of causal law mere nonsense? Why should any number of successes in formulating the events of nature give us believing confidence

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1. Lenzen, Art.(1932), 96.  
2. Schlick, Art.(1932), 114;  
Waters, Art.(1938), 93.

3. Feigl, Art.(1947), 389.  
4. Reichenbach, EP, 404.  
5. Schlick, Art.(1932), 119.

in the future if we really left it an open question whether there is a uniform continuity in nature? As Lotze recognized, the idea of probability would then be meaningless, and it would be no more improbable that nature should always change uniformly, yet wholly accidentally, than that there should be a completely disorderly succession of events.<sup>1</sup> Causal law would be a meaningless term, and faith in our formulations would at best be hardly anything more than an irrational "stab in the dark." We would thus be brought to the last stage of a denial of explanation. Fortunately, this positivistic procedure of wagering, in virtue of its irrationality, cannot justify itself objectively as the best hypothesis either for experimental science or for wider fields of inquiry. Rather we should assume that a judgment that event Y succeeds X according to causal law implies an inward ontological process in X by which Y is actively determined. Only when this uniform process is presupposed can causal law be formulated, and only when this same inward process is adequately inferred can the causal relation be considered philosophically explained.

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1. MET, I, 7. This is the stumbling block to Russell's correlation theory of prediction. Regardless what grouping or correlation of events has been formulated mathematically from the data of past experience, every prediction will be a leap into total darkness, unless there is assumed some ontological basis for an invariable causative action. See Russell, AM, Ch. 20, and Loewenberg, Art. (1932), 31-32.

5. The Naturalistic Ontology  
of Sellars, Hofstadter, and Winn

But now what is adequate inference regarding the causal relation? This question brings us to a sharp cleavage of thought in recent philosophy. On the one side are the naturalists, who ascribe productive causality to a given material complex of processes called "nature;" and on the other are the idealists, who, like Lotze, see mediating spirit as the ontological condition of the possibility of causality.

The naturalists would cut Lotze off, as James might say, "without a shilling." They see no reason for leaving concrete "common sense" realism and solid experimental method in order to speculate on the διὰ τί of things. Let us, they say, be content with ὡς ἔστιν and perhaps τί ἔστιν; but to ask διὰ τί is, according to W. R. Dennes, only to "waste the light of day, and to miss what we might have seen of the landscape."<sup>1</sup> What is this landscape or "nature"? Naturalists are far from united on a consistent and precise definition of the term.<sup>2</sup> However, the characteristic notion seems to be that expressed by Y. H. Krikorian:

"Nature" means what empirical science finds it to be and what a completed empirical science would find it to be. Empirically nature includes physical objects and living beings, inclusive of human beings and their ideals.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Dennes, Art.(1932), 176.
  2. See Brightman, NV, 31-34 for some outstanding examples of this surprising deficiency.
  3. Krikorian, Art.(1944), 243. In comment, we should remark that it takes much faith to believe that experimental method will someday encompass the self and its ideals.

R. Sellars holds that the world, including mind, is basically a substantial "texture" which we may penetrate thoroughly by induction.<sup>1</sup> All things are more or less complex substances, composed of units of matter which are extended, structural, and massive.<sup>2</sup> Mind, according to him, emerges as a complex "non-atomic kind."<sup>3</sup> For Hofstadter, "existence" is "denotative of the conditions of structure, behavior, and society."<sup>4</sup> "Structure is the actuality of process and is potentiality for activity."<sup>5</sup> There is no need of an extra agency to make possible structure; all that is needed, argues Hofstadter, is "that conditions be ripe for it." For him, the terms Force, God, Mind, and Nature are all symbols representing the fact that whatever happens does so only according to "natural conditions and circumstances."<sup>6</sup>

But is it not really astounding that matter should in itself provide those "natural conditions" which integrate nature into a harmonious "structure"? We should judge even before going further into naturalistic ontology that naturalists do not take Lotze's objections against realism seriously enough. They are content, like William James, to take conjunctive and disjunctive relations as given "primordial elements of fact," and to consider the world as a collection of elements simply "hanging together."<sup>7</sup> The conditions for "hanging together" are naïvely explained simply by reference to "nature" or to such phrases as

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| 1. Sellars, PPR, 373, 396-397. | 5. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 14. |
| 2. Sellars, PPR, 286.          | 6. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 14. |
| 3. Sellars, PPR, 295, 401.     | 7. James, PU, 349, 358.        |
| 4. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 14. |                                |

"the executive properties of matter."<sup>1</sup> This seems like much too easy a way to make ontological explanations.

On their "ontological prejudices," the naturalists make short work of the problem of unity in change. For Sellars, a thing is a complex secondary endurant composed of units of matter called "primary endurants."<sup>2</sup> The thing is one and the same in so far as there is "persistence of organization through change."<sup>3</sup> He writes: "A thing may change in this respect or that, the limit being that of breaking down or dissolution."<sup>4</sup> Identification of a thing is possible because through memory we get "a valid categorial scheme of self-endurance or identity through time, which we apply to other things."<sup>5</sup> Thus the mind is able to translate ontological similarity into "conceptual identity."<sup>6</sup>

A. Hofstadter declares that the problem of the unity of a thing "solves itself."<sup>7</sup> The following passage best summarizes his reasoning:

The individual and the unitary are identical; an individual is a substance and substantiality is individuality. . . . The puzzle of inherence is avoided. The substance is not a group of qualities taken together and subsisting in something else, but is the group of qualities constituted in a determined manner. Constitution is essential to the being of qualities, or, substance is the support, the unifier, the source of quality. . . . The fact that substance is structural behavior in concreto; i.e. the constitution of an active entity implies the fact that a substance is a complex event. . . . It is not suggested here that a substantial event is made up of

1. Sellars, PPR, 378, 405.  
2. Sellars, PPR, 303-304.  
3. Sellars, PPR, 307.  
4. Sellars, PPR, 303.

5. Sellars, PPR, 305.  
6. Sellars, PPR, 382.  
7. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 14.

diverse other events; the so-called qualitative events are all the same event, the substance, taken in different respects.<sup>1</sup>

R. B. Winn also finds the problem relatively easy. The key to his solution lies in his concept of space and time relations. For him, these relations are as real as the relata of matter; however, they are inactive and non-substantial. Winn says:

"Relations alone are responsible for the continuity (i.e. spatial and temporal) of both objects and the intervals among them."<sup>2</sup> Thus he thinks it is wrong to speak of internal and external relations; these adjectives are applicable only to relata. The function of relations is "to constitute the continuity of the world, not to be in it."<sup>3</sup> Now the relata or things are, according to Winn, composed of ultimate particles or "primary relata" (like Sellars' "primary endurants") which may be either sizeless "punctual atoms" or indivisible units, like Whitehead's "primates."<sup>4</sup> An organization consisting of two or more relata bound together by a relationship is called a "structum."<sup>5</sup> All structa are "psychologically segregated situations" or "isolates."<sup>6</sup> These concepts, Winn thinks, solve the paradox of the one and the many, and show that the problem is only an illusory product of the mind. He concludes that the passage in the mind from the one to the many is possible only because "relations unify and bind, while relata invariably separate."<sup>7</sup>

1. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 15.

2. Winn, Art.(1941), 28.

3. Winn, Art.(1941), 29.

4. Winn, Art.(1941), 26.

5. Winn, Art.(1941), 32.

6. Winn, Art.(1941), 33.

7. Winn, Art.(1941), 32.

Relata are doubtless many. But relations are always whole; they tend to fuse together, no matter how many relata you are willing to include in an isolate. Consequently, when you stress relata in your experience, you have many; when, on the other hand, you succeed in isolating a bit of reality and stress relations, you have one. Thus depending on what you emphasize, separateness or structure, you have one or many in what is essentially the same (i.e. the structum).<sup>1</sup>

We are very much impressed by the technical and involved terminology of Sellars, Hofstadter, and Winn. However, as much as we struggle to realize that they have given us the reasonable solution to the problem of unity in change, we rather feel that the real issue has been quietly avoided. What we mean when we ask how can a thing be one, is not how can it be one at each given instant. Certainly, what is at an instant is one related group of elements.<sup>2</sup> What we mean is how can it be one in a temporal succession of changes? Sellars alone comes to grips with this issue in his doctrine of the translatability of ontological similarity into conceptual identity. But he remains with only an ontological similarity, not unity. Equations like Hofstadter's substance=unity and Winn's relations=spatio-temporal continuity=one are wholly tautologous. We honestly cannot see what real insight they convey regarding any of the terms involved.

It seems to us that naturalism can be consistent only by denying a real unity to the things of nature--identity in change

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1. Winn, Art.(1941), 33.

2. William James would go no further with the problem. He says of the thing: "Its unity is aboriginal, just as the multiplicity of my successive takings is aboriginal." But we might remark that everything under the sun is aboriginal in a sense. The question is, in what sense? See James, PU, 357.

can only be a strange product of the mind. The terms "relations," "continuity," "conceptual identity," and "substance as unifier" are but restatements of the problem. The most that naturalists can say is that things are merely ontologically similar (why, who knows?), but that in some unimaginable way, the same "executive capacities" that miraculously permit matter to emerge into an example of true unity in change, namely, the self, also enable the self to bind together the different phases of a mysterious ontological similarity into the concept of one thing. We thus see the fruitful significance of Lotze's hypothesis: If a thing (or nature as a whole) is to be a real unity and not merely a succession of mysteriously similar becomings unified only in our thought, then we can conceive of it empirically only as in some sense a spiritual subject. Naturalists cannot deny that this is at least a valid possibility.

Let us now look into the problem of causality. According to Sellars, the category of causality is to be accepted as ontologically springing up with the notion of thinghood. He says: "There is no place for the subjectivism of Hume here, for causality is a process of nature, and perception of it is a whole experience which is unitary and synthetic."<sup>1</sup> We cannot intuit the energy or productive power passing from cause to effect, but we do intuit clues or sensory cues regarding the causal relation. These cues are obtained in the unique elements of causality:

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1. Sellars, PPR, 285.

continuity, contiguity, and necessity.<sup>1</sup> For him, force is a "dynamic capacity" integral with the dynamic conception of thinghood. Thus he writes: "I would accept the fact of impressed force or causal effective."<sup>2</sup>

For Hofstadter, causality is simply another name for change (i.e. either of substance or quality).<sup>3</sup> "The word 'causality' singles out that character of nature which constitutes its ever-present interweaving of societies and individuals."<sup>4</sup> He thinks it useless to seek a final cause which is unconditioned and non-interconnection:

The true meaning of "ultimate cause" is just that structural interconnection, unspecified for any particular case of it, everywhere to be seen in nature. Causality is an ultimate character of nature; it postulates no extra individuals, entities, ingredients beside those discoverable in nature by the ordinary processes of science.<sup>5</sup>

He adds that it is only when structure is considered ideal, static, or devoid of effectiveness that there is temptation "to appeal to a new ingredient in structural situations, called Force, Mind, God."<sup>6</sup> Rather effectiveness or power is for him simply a general name for what things are as "contributory elements in the interconnectedness of nature."<sup>7</sup> Things are causes in virtue of their power or capacity for "entering into natural occurrences."<sup>8</sup> Hofstadter emphasizes that the natural causal situation is the concrete active structural interconnectedness.

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1. Sellars, PPR, 376,  
384-385, 481.

2. Sellars, PPR, 330.

3. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 17.

4. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 16.

5. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 18.

6. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 17.

7. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 18.

8. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 18.

However, in a description of this concrete situation, the causal aspect is "mirrored" in the relational terms of the statement, and the concrete powers or qualities are "mirrored" in the terms of the verbal relations. Thus, thinks Hofstadter, when it is forgotten that abstract linguistic differentiation breaks up what is unitary, then "the connections of structure and actual behavior becomes a mystery the key to which is offered in the form of some supra or infra-natural agency."<sup>1</sup>

Winn supplements Hofstadter's view of causality as structural change with a rich doctrine of the ontological mechanics involved in causal change. His main theme is that causation always involves a passage of energy from place to place.<sup>2</sup> With this assumption he thinks he is able to solve the traditional paradoxes of causality; namely, action at a distance and action across an interval of time. The former is logically inconceivable without some medium of interaction; and the latter contradicts the indubitable truth that nothing can act while it is not. Thus it seems necessary to acknowledge the simultaneity of cause and effect, and also a medium of interaction. But one of the prime methodological assumptions of experiment is that there is a functional dependence of later events on earlier ones, and needless to say experimental method can reveal no medium. Winn's contention is that both paradoxes can be resolved if it is recognized that causality involves two entirely different aspects:

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1. Hofstadter, Art.(1935), 19.
  2. Winn, Art.(1940), 202.

1) a change in a certain event, which requires no time, and  
 2) the time-consuming space-consuming transmission of energy, during which an effect of one event becomes the cause (or one of the causes) of another event.<sup>1</sup> As an example Winn chooses the phenomenon of a moving photon of energy. While it is moving, it is an "inactive cause;" but upon striking a particle of matter it becomes active and causes a simultaneous change in the particle. This change results in outgoing effects or transmissions of energy, which are in their turn the causes of other events, one of which is our apprehension, in the sensation of color, of the original simultaneous change.<sup>2</sup> Thus, according to him, all interaction can be explained by two symbolic triads: 1) cause-change-effect, and 2) effect-motion-cause. In regard to the first, Winn states that a cause is not change--"it is an expression of energy stopped on its way by matter."<sup>3</sup> Change is rather a simultaneous process of matter, determined by both the cause and the composition of matter. Nor is effect the change--"effect is inseparable from energy. Like cause, effect involves energy in motion, the outgoing motion."<sup>4</sup> Regarding the second triad, the cause is not motion--Winn says that it is "opposite to motion, for it signifies that a certain specific motion (i.e. of energy) has come through an impact to an end."<sup>5</sup>

Now do these views satisfy us that Lotze's postulate of an M mediating interaction is superfluous and unwarranted? On the

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1. Winn, Art.(1940), 201, 204.  
 2. Winn, Art.(1940), 202.  
 3. Winn, Art.(1940), 203.

4. Winn, Art.(1940), 203.  
 5. Winn, Art.(1940), 202.

contrary, as in the problem of unity in change we again feel that our representatives of naturalism have skirmished much with the formidable terms of physics and ontology, but have given us scant understanding of the causal process. Hofstadter asserts that "causality is an ultimate character of nature," as if that were the unquestionable end of the matter. But what increase of knowledge does this proposition actually yield? No one denies that causality is ultimate in a sense. The important question is, in what sense is causality ultimate? Hofstadter is at least consistent in giving what seems to us to be the only possible naturalistic answer. In effect, he says that causality is ultimate simply in the sense that it implies causalitiness; interconnection is ultimate because it implies no monistic M as medium of connection but simply "structural interconnectedness." In other words, so far as experimental method is concerned, it might be said more plainly and without burdensome etymological compounding that causality is inscrutable--it simply is.

Sellars and Winn attempt to increase knowledge by their doctrines of the transeunt action of energies. But what is the substantial status of energy? The photons that Winn mentions are in the present formulation of physics not well-established facts. They are speculative postulates made to account for the apparently corpuscular behavior of light. Unfortunately, light also has an equally positive wave-like behavior. And in classical mechanics, energy is no observable entity--it is a useful term enabling us to imagine the remarkably conservative inter-

action of the elements of nature. But let us, however, grant that energy has some substantial status--perhaps a "neutral entity." Even then, naturalism asks us to believe that things have some way of receiving energies, storing them, and sending them forth. And not only this, but things must also have the capacities for directing energies in conformity with the marvellous uniformity of nature. Further, energies themselves must have equally remarkable capacities for "following directions" accurately and uniformly.<sup>1</sup> What, may we ask, are these divine all-knowing capacities on the part of things and energies if not pure magic?

As Lotze long ago discerned, the telling inadequacy of naturalism is its appeal to two independent principles which we are asked to accept without question as given: 1) the general laws of nature, and 2) the capacities of things that enable them to act in harmony with the laws. Naturalism is consistent with the facts (so far as we know them) only in virtue of a foundation of credulity which seems to us to require much more faith than does the acceptance of Lotze's hypothesis of a monistic M. Thus truly if we cannot believe that the world is held together by a monistic M, we can only put our trust in empty words like "structure" or "interconnectedness." We see then the convincing force of Lotze's monistic view. Dr. P. A. Bertocci well puts this postulate:

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1. See Bowne, MET, 77 ff.

That the order which constitutes "Nature" resembles an order characteristic of mind at its best is an hypothesis which is closer to the facts as we know them than any other hypothetical explanation of order.<sup>1</sup>

We conclude then that naturalism does not preclude Lotze's M, but rather it itself most certainly though tacitly presupposes a mediating agency (evident in its assumption of the validity of general laws). However, being averse to any supernatural transcendentalism, the naturalists, by a great leap of faith, merge the concrete form and function of M into a mysterious "Nature." This procedure is entirely consistent with an experimental methodology, but it adds little to metaphysical knowledge, and when elaborated tends toward obscurity and verbal pseudo-simplicity. In view of the many metaphysical incredulities which the naturalistic leap of faith heaps upon us, Lotze's metaphysical monism seems in our estimation to be a much more acceptable explanation of the facts of reciprocal action.

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1. Bertocci, Art.(1947), 85.

## CHAPTER III

### THE PERSONAL NATURE OF THE MONISTIC M

We shall now consider the capstone of Lotze's ontological strand of thought: the metaphysical principle of personality as it applies to the monistic M. His theme here is that the idea of divine personality, far from being merely an emotionally enthusiastic anthropomorphism, is in truth the result of a very reasonable application of the fundamental assumption that personality is the key to metaphysics.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, this fundamental assumption is Lotze's guiding light in all of his inquiries. In this respect, personality is not only the cap stone but also the all-important corner stone of Lotze's metaphysical monism.<sup>2</sup>

#### 1. The Metaphysical Deduction

##### of the Personality of the Monistic M

In the Microcosmus, Lotze unexpectedly breaks off his metaphysical discussions and passes directly to the concept of a personal God found fully developed in religion.<sup>3</sup> He states in passing that the metaphysical middle terms of his reasoning can readily be supplied by the reader. And indeed they can, for we

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1. See Dr. E. S. Brightman's lucid article on the metaphysical principle of personality in Brightman (ed.), PIT.
  2. A. C. Knudson shows high regard for Lotze's masterly use of the principle of personality, and considers him still to be the chief protagonist of personalistic idealism. He writes: "It is largely to his influence that the revival of theism during the past thirty or forty years is due. . ." See Knudson, POP, 62.
  3. MIC, II, 659, 672.

have only to recall the conclusion that Lotze reaches regarding the essence of a thing. His decision is that a changing thing can truly be one only if it is a spiritual subject, holding its successively realized states in its unity of consciousness. Now in the development of the ontology of reciprocal action, we arrived at the postulate of an immanent M as idea or thought, realizing itself in successive becomings. We must remember that this one idea, which we believe to be the very essence of M, may be only our subjective apprehension of a harmonious order.<sup>1</sup> However, if the idea M is actually able to unite the phases  $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_n$  which we unify in our temporal forms, it can do so only if it is in some sense a self-conscious person. Thus, holds Lotze, the condition of M's being absolutely unconditioned is that it have personal existence.<sup>2</sup>

Lotze stresses the importance of two points concerning personality. First of all, personality always involves, however imperfectly, a cognitive image of the subject itself. Secondly, there must be present the feeling that this image is the ego or self, which by this self-feeling is "placed in a fundamental and incomparable opposition to all else."<sup>3</sup> He points out that it is this self-feeling that widely separates a living personality from a mere personification of an eternally unchangeable self-cognizant Idea or Truth. Any such personification would lack the essential condition of true personality: "capacity of suffering."

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1. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 53.  
2. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 55.

3. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 56

Lotze says: "Personality can never belong to any unchangeably valid truth, but only to something which changes, suffers, and reacts."<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Lotze's Criticism of Impersonal Views of M

i. Infinite Substance. Lotze declares emphatically that his argument for the substantial oneness of all things in a monistic world ground connects him only apparently with pantheism, and that actually his views are far from those of Spinoza and Schelling.<sup>2</sup> The former ascribes to the universal Substance innumerable attributes, of which only two, thought and extension, are known to us through their manifestations in existence. The world process is not due to an act of will on the part of the infinite Substance, but solely to a necessary, eternal, and timeless causality. The two attributes, which are not reducible to each other, are related in a pantheistic parallelism in which exactly the same content of Substance is present in each of any two corresponding modes of thought and extension.<sup>3</sup> For Schelling, the infinite Substance is the common root of thought and extension, but both rise out of it as mere consequences and are in no way constituents of the root. This for Lotze is a concept that surpasses all human powers of comprehension.<sup>4</sup> He cannot believe that spirit can rise out of what is not spirit, as an isolated blossom growing from a stem of substantial realness that

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1. MIC, II, 682.

2. MIC, II, 677.

3. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 38;

Ueberweg, HOP, 74-75.

4. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 38.

works unconsciously. He thus comes to this significant conclusion:

From a metaphysical point of view, we could only agree with pantheism as a possible conception of the world if it renounced all inclination to apprehend the Infinite Real under any other than spiritual form.<sup>1</sup>

ii. Impersonal Spirit. Lotze also opposes himself to any doctrine of impersonal spirit. For him, the idea of an unconscious Reason, which becomes conscious only in individual spiritual beings, is an unintelligible abstraction from the concrete life of reason.<sup>2</sup> It is incomprehensible how conscious reason could originate from such a source.<sup>3</sup> Further, Lotze thinks that to hold that at first there exist in the Absolute "common spiritual capacities" through which it, as well as finite beings, develops its personality, is a mere speculative curiosity. And if it said that the Absolute remains impersonal, and finite beings alone develop their "spiritual capacities," then it is incredible that the Absolute should produce in blind movement those conditions which favor the development of finite capacities while denying realization to its own.<sup>4</sup>

iii. World Order. Regarding world order, Lotze holds that

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1. MIC, II, 677.

2. Dr. E. S. Brightman agrees: "The impersonal God is inconceivable when thought through. If he did exist, there is no reason to suppose that an impersonal power for good would be better able to explain the existence of human consciousness than would an entirely atheistic world order. Impersonal values and impersonal spirit are mere phrases invented to express aversion to the word 'personality.'" Brightman, IGP, 54.

3. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 40.

4. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 43-44.

the term 'order' can never be applied to the being that orders. The sufficient reason against world order is that "the order must ever be a relation of something which exists, after or during its existence."<sup>1</sup> Thus order can never precede the ordered material as a conditioning or creative cause. But, Lotze writes, it might be said that to seek in order an ordering being is to fail to understand true reality, which without any residuum is through and through a living activity, determining itself. He here anticipates what is a militant theme of modern naturalism. His answer is that this enthusiastic notion, when clearly analyzed, leads back to what it seeks to avoid. For how can we conceive of universal laws which command and things which obey except in terms of a spiritual unity of reality?<sup>2</sup>

And, for Lotze, the idea of a moral order leads even more inevitably back to a personal deity. For how should we reasonably imagine a blind activity establishing a dominion of good, an activity unable consciously to order things or to distinguish between the bad and the good, yet acting as though it could?<sup>3</sup>

iv. The Problem of the Ego of God. A far more subtle difficulty presents itself in the objection that God cannot be a person, for ego necessarily implies an alien non-ego. Lotze distinguishes three possible meanings in this objection: 1) The ego is thinkable only in reference to a non-ego. 2) The ego

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1. MIC, II, 674.

2. MIC, II, 674-675.

3. MIC, II, 676.

cannot be experienced without the presence of the non-ego.

3) The existence and active influence of the non-ego is a necessary condition for the development of the ego.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze agrees with the first, but only with the qualification that the ego, which is the independent member of the contrast, presupposes a being having a nature such that the determination of the ego is grounded in that nature before the contrast with non-ego arises. In other words, he means this: the bare symbolic contrast of the notions 'ego' and 'non-ego' cannot alone account for conscious experience. If neither of the notions had any fixed meaning apart from the contrast, then the question which of the contrasting contents, of which the notions are symbols, should be ego and which non-ego would be meaningless. One could be called ego just as well as the other.<sup>2</sup> Thus Lotze argues that personality is not found exclusively in the act of ideation by which the self cognizes itself as ego apart from non-ego, but more primarily in a special nature without which it is impossible for a being to be an ego. The following passage indicates Lotze's conception of this special nature:

It may be that only the being who in thought contrasts with himself a non-ego from which he also distinguishes himself, can say I to himself, but yet in order that in thus distinguishing he should not mistake and confound himself with the non-ego, this discriminating thought of his must be guided by a certainty of self which is immediately experienced, by a self-existence which is earlier than the discriminative relation by which it becomes ego as opposed to the non-ego.  
 . . . All self-consciousness rests upon the foundation of

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1. MIC, II, 678.  
 2. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 62-63.

direct sense of self which can by no means arise from becoming aware of a contrast with the external world, but is itself the reason that this contrast can be felt as unique, as not comparable to any other distinction between two objects. Self-consciousness is only the subsequent endeavour to analyze with the resources of cognition this experienced fact.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze is thus directly opposed to the second meaning of the objection.

The third possible meaning represents, according to Lotze, the most serious form of the objection. The implication is that no personality can develop without receiving those impressions of an external world which supply the contents of ideas and the occasions for the immediate experience of self, for "the feelings in which the ego, existing for self, can enjoy self without as yet being conscious of. . . contrast to the non-ego."<sup>2</sup> But Lotze cautions against transferring these finite conditions to divine personality. It must first be remembered that the external world, which the non-ego reflects, as such never enters consciousness; it merely provides, through the senses, the influences or excitations which occasion the forms of activity or inner conscious states that flow from the inner nature of the spiritual being itself. It is only in opposition to its own states that the subject apprehends itself as I.<sup>3</sup> And once inner states have been occasioned, much that is new is developed without fresh stimulation. Lotze points out that in reflection, imagination, and conflicts of passions the finite being achieves a great amount of living development, though this of course is

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1. MIC, II, 679-680.  
2. MIC, II, 681.

3. MIC, II, 683;  
OPR<sup>2</sup>, 64-65.

limited by the necessity of continually renewed orientation, "by action and reaction with the whole in which it is comprehended."<sup>1</sup>

### 3. God as Perfect Personality

The conditioning of inner life by itself which takes place only imperfectly in the finite personality, is wholly unlimited in God, for he needs no stimulus from an external world. His train of thought is, according to Lotze, an eternal inner movement, having never been quiescent.<sup>2</sup>

Lotze asserts in a manner that is very pertinent in our age of impersonal materialisms in which any thought of divine personality is explained away as fanciful and wishful dreaming, that, on the contrary, the natural steps of an adequate metaphysics lead us to the idea of a perfect Personality, of which the finite mind is seen to be but a "feeble reflection."<sup>3</sup> Personality, for him, is not a mere human phenomena, but the very opposite--it is the majestic and unfettered essence of the divine Being. The finite spirit, in reflecting upon itself, finds the power of the Absolute only as an obscure germ in its own inner being. Lotze says:

This power it is which works through and through them (i.e. finite spirits), and, without their own assistance, prescribes for them the universal forms of their spiritual activity, their sensation, imagination, judgment, etc.; and which permits them only within narrow limits to dispose further of this dowry, and to pursue their special ends.<sup>4</sup>

1. MIC, II, 684.  
2. MIC, II, 685.

3. MIC, II, 685.  
4. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 67-68.

Lotze maintains that the finite psychic forms are actually obstacles to a perfect inner development. The laws of psychic mechanism are such that ideas inhibit one another and only a very small number can be present at one time in consciousness. Thus we can never bring together in cognition our whole nature at any one moment, much less the unity of its whole temporal development. We appear to ourselves from a one-sided point of view, and our action much of the time is carried on under the influence of fragmentary feelings or groups of ideas which happen to be present in consciousness, and which afterward, when we have collected our thoughts more coherently, we can hardly recognize as our own. Also individual moods seem permanently to escape memory; youthful enthusiasms, which once seemed to part of our very being, seem later to be unintelligible aberrations.<sup>1</sup> The divine personality contains none of these obstacles. Lotze thus concludes:

In point of fact we have little ground for speaking of the personality of finite beings; it is an ideal, which, like all that is ideal, belongs unconditionally only to the Infinite. . .<sup>2</sup>

Perfect Personality is in God only; to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof; the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this Personality, but a limit and a hindrance of its development.<sup>3</sup>

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1. OPR<sup>2</sup>, 68.

2. MIC, II, 687. See also Brightman, IGP, 54, where Dr. Brightman writes: "Instead of taking personality to be too human a category to apply to God, it would really be more logical to take it as too divine a category to apply to man. . . It is this ideal of a perfect person which we use in thinking about God, not the actual human person with all his limitations."

3. MIC, II, 688.

#### 4. H. N. Wieman's Idea of God as Creative Event

For the purpose of evaluating Lotze's application of the principle of personality to the monistic M, we have chosen for consideration two interesting modern doctrines regarding divine personality. The one, that of H. N. Wieman, is representative of religious naturalism, according to which personality as a cosmic metaphysical principle is unacceptable. In this view, the traditional Hebrew-Christian conception of a spiritual God is reinterpreted as a symbolic or pictorial religious reference to an unconscious axiological tendency in "Nature." The other doctrine, C. Hartshorne's social panentheistic realism, represents, as we shall see, a metaphysical attitude toward personality which is in sharp contrast with that of Lotze.

Wieman's ontological assumptions are the same as those of the naturalists whom we considered in the previous chapter. For him, reality or Nature is made up entirely of substantial events composed of qualities and relations (Wieman says that "relations" is another term for "structure").<sup>1</sup> All values, of which the highest are to be found in religion, are, according to Wieman, to be interpreted in terms of "structural events and their possibilities."<sup>2</sup>

He defines God as "creative event." What does he mean by this term? Firstly, the creative event is an event; that is, any one of the continuously changing "structures" of nature.

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1. Wieman, SHG, 6.  
2. Wieman, SHG, 7.

Now all events are material, but by "material" Wieman means not merely "pellets of inanimate matter," but also biological, social, and historical forms of existence.<sup>1</sup> Further, an event is not only material, unique, and changing, but it is also multiple, for it can be analyzed into sub-events or included in some more inclusive event.<sup>2</sup> Ordinary naturalism, or "contextualism" as Wieman calls it, considers everything to be in a process of transformation--the unities of structure come and go continually. Wieman, however, finds that there is in this process of events an exceptional and abiding agency. This is "creativity," which is a character, or structure, or form of certain events which "bring a new structure whereby the human mind distinguishes and relates events in such a way that there is more richness of quality in happenings as they occur. . ."<sup>3</sup> The creative event is one that possesses "creativity."

Now the creative event can be analyzed into four sub-events, all of which must be present to make possible creativity: 1) emerging awareness of qualitative meaning derived from other persons through communication, 2) integrating these new meanings with others previously acquired, 3) expanding the richness of quality in the appreciable world by enlarging its meaning, and 4) deepening the community among those who participate in this total creative event of intercommunication.<sup>4</sup> Wieman emphasizes that the "-ings" mean that the creative event or the

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1. Wieman, SHG, 8.  
2. Wieman, SHG, 299.

3. Wieman, SHG, 68.  
4. Wieman, SHG, 58 ff.

creative good is an event in process--it is "the source of human good." Its finished products are "created intrinsic good," which is culture, and "created instrumental good," which is technology.<sup>1</sup> The creative good is always and absolutely good in the sense that it always creates values.<sup>2</sup>

One of the most important conditions under which the creative event occurs is "the self-giving of the individual himself to such transformation."<sup>3</sup> The following passage shows well Wieman's idea of the function of the creative event:

The creative event. . . weaves a web of meaning between individuals and groups and between the organism and its environment. . . In weaving the web of meaning, the creative event transforms the individual person so that he is more of a person. In the beginning it creates the human person out of the living organism of the infant. Likewise, it creates and progressively transforms human community and the course of history.<sup>4</sup>

Like R. B. Perry,<sup>5</sup> Wieman declares that his God is much more than a person. For him, to say either that God is like man or that God is a perfect person and man only an imperfect image is really to admit the sad truth that both are very different from each other.<sup>6</sup> Thus personality cannot be an actual attribute of God. He considers the Christian idea of a loving Person to be merely a mythical symbol representing what alone is real--the creative event. Here is how he explains the rise of this common symbolism:

Since creative good at the level where it saves and transforms human personality always works in the form of inter-

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1. Wieman, SHG, 68-69.  
2. Wieman, SHG, 299.  
3. Wieman, SHG, 20.

4. Wieman, SHG, 20.  
5. See Perry, GTV, 685-686.  
6. Wieman, SHG, 266.

action between persons, we must deal with persons to deal with it. Furthermore, the persons are much more easily apprehended than the deep and subtle and mighty working of this creative event. Therefore, what is more natural than to represent the reality humanly. . . . As previously noted, the persons with whom we deal when creative transformation is most profound and regenerative are, for the most part, not visible and not even known, having died long since. . . . The conclusion is obvious. The religious man who commits himself in worship to the source of human good will most naturally think of this reality as an invisible, transcendental person, who somehow pervades the universe. . . .<sup>1</sup>

Wieman thus grants the principle of personality only a practical usefulness in the religious worship of the creative event.

We are pleased to see that Wieman's creative event, like Perry's "personal and social integration,"<sup>2</sup> is so inseparably related to personality, and also that he considers religious values to be the highest. Admirable also is his emphatic aim to provide a truly objective answer to the all-important question, what is value? We are, however, not convinced that the doctrine of the creative event is an adequate solution. It is practically incredible that there should be an impersonal being which cannot consciously provide for the generation of values, yet, so far as we can judge empirically, acts in every way as though it could. Even if experimental science had reached such fantastic heights that it could show how personality might actually be ex-

1. Wieman, SHG, 267.

2. For Perry, as for Lotze, value objectivity presupposes a divine benevolent will. However, he thinks of this will as a "personal and social integration," which is not a mere community of interest, but rather a unique union accomplished through the harmonious fulfillment of all interests. This real integration constitutes Perry's idea of God. God is a union of persons; to conceive of him as a person is only to confuse the meaning of the term. His God as living love, he tells us, means "something more than that God is a loving person." It means a moral control "of all persons, by all persons, for all persons." Perry, GTV, 685-686.

perimentally produced from a specific mixture of inanimate ingredients fashioned under specific conditions, it would still be more reasonable and credible to assume in impersonal Nature a conscious "creative event" as guarantee of value objectivity. In other words, why assume that an impersonal Nature can produce human personalities and not such a cosmic personality also?

As it stands, we cannot consider Wieman's creative event to be anything more than a hypostatization of the abstract universal "creativity" which has been abstracted from the data of value experience. Indeed, we doubt that the idea of an impersonal God can be expressed otherwise. Actually, the question should not be whether there is a personal or an impersonal God, but rather this: What do we actually believe when we acknowledge that values are truly objectively grounded? If this be the correct way to put the question, then we should hold that many so-called "atheists" who are sincerely committed to noble social and moral ideals believe in a personal God,<sup>1</sup> in the sense that they cannot show concretely and meaningfully that they do not tacitly presuppose a cosmic personal Ground. Attempts to avoid this presupposition cannot progress very far beyond a bare statement of dislike, an empty negation,

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1. That is, logically or, better still, coherently speaking, such men believe in God. Psychologically, they of course do not, or at least give little evidence of it. Nevertheless, in virtue of their sincere commitments to high ideals, we may just as fully and validly impute belief to them, as we may logically and coherently impute disbelief to those who psychologically believe in a personal God, but who deny him by committing themselves to uncharitable, intolerant, and uncircumspect ways of life.

denoted by the terms "atheism" and "impersonal God."<sup>1</sup> These terms symbolize the vague speculative guess that value norms somehow need not be grounded in a personal Ground. How an impersonal Ground (i.e. if it were possible to show that the term has positive meaning) could be more desirable and richer than a loving Personality we cannot begin to conceive.

Of course, it is entirely possible that personality is only the foam of the breakers of a great impersonal sea, and is confined solely to human beings. Against this possibility, we can only offer our "ontological prejudice"; we, with Lotze, see something wonderfully unique in human personality, and have the ineradicable faith that would have, as Hocking puts it, "Mind in charge of fate."<sup>2</sup> The naturalists, on the other hand, ascribe ruling power to "natural events," of which personality is mere-

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1. This seems to be Dr. E. S. Brightman's approach in his criticism of Bertrand Russell's philosophy of religion. Russell ostensibly denies the knowability of value-norms, the eternal worth of personality, and the existence of God. But these theoretical denials are flatly contradicted by his obviously sincere and whole-hearted devotion to spiritual and social ideals. Russell's main efforts are so spent in righteously indignant but rather emotional outbursts against the trappings of religion, i.e. specific distorted sectarian dogmas, the clergy, formal church organizations, etc., that he unfortunately never gets to a serious and systematic consideration of the truly positive arguments for theism. In Dr. Brightman's words, Russell's quest for theoretical certainty has crowded out all considerations of empirical adequacy. See Brightman, Art.(1946), and also (in the same volume) Russell's acknowledgment of Dr. Brightman's very charitable style of criticism. Russell, Art.(1946), 725-727.
  2. Hocking, Art.(1950), 7. Dr. P. A. Bertocci once remarked in a directed study discussion that the issue between naturalism and idealism boils down to a simple alternative: Either we believe that personality is too good to be true (i.e. of the cosmos), or we believe that it is too good not to be true. This certainly seems to be the issue in a nutshell.

ly an incidental result. They have the apparently ineradicable faith that experimental method is universally applicable, and can and will someday completely explain in impersonal terms its presuppositions, namely, personality and the uniformity of nature.<sup>1</sup> However, we should point out that the fact of the matter is that experimental method has a long way to go in laying bare the inner workings of nature. Indeed, until much further progress is made in accounting for personality, we cannot but regard naturalism as a highly speculative venture, whose militant claims to truth rest on the dubious unempirical grounds of what has yet to be achieved.<sup>2</sup> Thus, on their faith, the natural-

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1. See, for example, Y. H. Krikorian's plain statements to this effect in Art. (1944), 242. He writes: "For naturalism as a philosophy, the universal applicability of the experimental method is a basic belief."
  2. It may sound odd to call naturalists highly speculative. Do they not claim to be but simple and modest adherents of experimental method, intensely opposed to metaphysical cosmological speculation? But if this were so they would make no normative philosophical legislations; they would simply and modestly be content to give a step by step account of the progress of experimental science as it relates to philosophical problems. They would never deny that there is a personal God--they would simply record the truth that science has not yet found one. They would never hold that personality is nothing but the behavior of an organism--they would state that behavioral studies have resulted in an experimental body of knowledge about personality. But no one, much less a philosopher, could limit himself to such an uninteresting role. With their postulate of the universal applicability of experimental method the naturalists enter upon speculation just as surely as the most speculative idealist. They dogmatically proclaim that experiment is not simply an abstract descriptive method, but the true philosophical criterion. This proclamation goes hand in hand with a definite cosmological speculation: the material structure of reality. In thus speculating on the ultimate significance of experimental method, the naturalists, it is important to see, rest on nothing more than a faith in such ultimate significance.

ists are able to wield their concept of Nature almost like a magician's hat: To explain causality it is said that Nature has "structural interconnectedness." Unity in change is accounted for on the basis of the "structural unities" of Nature. In regard to mind, it is a "non-atomic" product of an emergent Nature. Finally, the divine function of axiogenesis is assigned to a "creative event" in Nature. Nothing seems too difficult to explain; all that is needed it seems is an ample store of appropriate terminology.<sup>1</sup> And for all we know Nature may be such an all-producing impersonal womb. We who trust in a more empirical explanation of reality can only wait in hope that the modern enthusiasm for an impersonal order of things will, as experimental method itself gradually makes plain its great limitations, eventually subside and make ample room for Lotze's personalistic postulate.

#### 5. C. Hartshorne's Social

##### Panpsychic Principle of Personality

Hartshorne opposes the Thomistic idea of an absolutely independent God, as well as any doctrine of external relations which precludes a transcendent deity. His starting-point is the conviction that benevolent social participation is the very metaphysical essence of reality.<sup>2</sup> He maintains that self-enjoy-

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1. Do not Wieman's facile reinterpretation of faith in a personal God, and his rich, freely flowing language relating to the sub-events and functions of the creative event provide some grounds for such an impression regarding naturalistic explanation?
  2. Hartshorne, DR, 27.

ment and development are realized only when one goes beyond oneself and takes a sympathetic, altruistic, and benevolent interest in other persons. This participation in the vicissitudes of others, called by Hartshorne "the bond of social rapport," extends to all forms of existence.<sup>1</sup> Thus when we have feelings of well-being, we may, according to him, assume that the cells of our bodies consciously participate in their own fashion in our pleasure.<sup>2</sup>

The bond of social rapport is the social panpsychic principle upon which Hartshorne bases his idea of God. He reasons that if the social panpsychic principle is to have objective axiological validity, it can only be on the assumption that there is in nature a reliable immanent tendency guaranteeing the fruitful functioning of the principle.<sup>3</sup> For Hartshorne, the possibility of theology depends on our conceiving this tendency as the supreme instance of social benevolence; as the purposive Personality indicated by the Scriptural phrase "God is love."<sup>4</sup> This is the core of his doctrine of God. He asserts that metaphysics either leads to a "socio-sympathetic" deity or "evaporates into thin air." "If the cosmos is not held together by love, it is held together by empty words, like causality. . ."<sup>5</sup> Lotze would unreservedly assent to this statement.

Hartshorne's reconciliation of his view with traditional absolutism is this: He considers God to be absolute and inde-

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1. Hartshorne, *MVG*, 155.  
 2. Hartshorne, *MVG*, 152.  
 3. Hartshorne, *MVG*, 157.

4. Hartshorne, *MVG*, ix, 144.  
 5. Hartshorne, *MVG*, 346-347.

pendent in his unchanging, perfect love (this is God's "primordial nature"); but, in order to be so absolute in love, God must be aware of and must include in his being the joys and sufferings of his whole universe. Hartshorne holds that God is perfect in love only because he is perfect in appreciation of and participation in the interests of his creatures (God's consequent or panentheistic or supremely relative--"surrelative"--nature).<sup>1</sup>

What now is Hartshorne's ontological conception of this divine social Personality? He tells us that this can be conceived only by analogy from human experience. Accordingly, he fastens his attention on the assumed fact that the human body is like a world of individuals and that the mind is "something like an indwelling God."<sup>2</sup> The world then can be considered to be literally God's body. However, God exercises immediate and direct control over it, much in the same way as our minds immediately influence and are influenced by the brain cells. Hartshorne strongly denies that this doctrine of divine personality is in any way anthropomorphic, for God's direct control of his entire body is metaphysically unique.<sup>3</sup> In the sense that God has an eternal and unchanging immediacy of awareness (omniscience) and control (omnipotence), he is absolute. But in the sense that his all-inclusive awareness and control connect him with all existence, he is wholly relative and dependent. Furthermore,

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1. Hartshorne, *MVG*, 159.  
2. Hartshorne, *MVG*, 177.

3. Hartshorne, *DR*, 31-32.

holds Hartshorne, the supreme relativity of God is his concrete living character, which alone makes possible and is superior to his abstract absolute aspect.<sup>1</sup>

In connection with Hartshorne's idea of God's control of his body, we might also add that in place of creation ex nihilo, he accepts the doctrine of the eternal development of the world.<sup>2</sup> Creation, for him, is "supreme influence upon growth," according to the supreme adequacy (not sovereignty) of God's omnipotence.<sup>3</sup>

Hartshorne agrees very closely with Lotze regarding the doctrine of divine benevolence. As we saw in the first chapter, Living Love is, for Lotze, the very essentia of God's personality. However, regarding the form of existence of God, they differ radically. Both to be sure ascribe personality to God, but Hartshorne feels that Lotze's doctrine of an ontologically monistic God implies the abolition of all distinction between included and including.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, he has applied his social principle of divine personality not to an immaterial monistic M, but rather to a divine being whose nature is analogous to the human mind-brain cell structure. He thus arrives at a panpsychic theistic realism.

This view lends itself easily to concrete imagination, and would seem to be a quite proper doctrine of divine personality.

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1. Hartshorne, DR, vii.  
 2. Hartshorne, MVG, 230.  
 3. Hartshorne, MVG, 193.

4. Hartshorne, DR, 92-93. In the next chapter, we shall give detailed attention to this objection.

However, we unfortunately cannot avoid a grave metaphysical defect which accompanies any such plausible imagery of a living divine Organism. How is it that any interaction at all is possible between God's mind and his body? Is there not required some additional mediating agency? It seems that if we are to carry through completely Hartshorne's mind-brain cell analogy, we must carry over to the being of God that agency M which makes possible human cerebral interaction. This objection seems to us to be sufficient reason for rendering wholly untenable Hartshorne's analogical dualism. The only way out of the difficulty would be to say that there is an inscrutable given external connection, and that there is neither any need to analyze this connection further nor any need for a connecting agency--such is the structure of God's being. This kind of answer, implicit in Hartshorne's doctrine, is exactly the same as that found in the naturalistic doctrine of a given interconnected structure of Nature. For a more empirical philosophy, like Lotze's, such a way out is a speculative unempirical way. Empirically, we can in some degree truly explain the possibility of connection<sup>only</sup> by taking up apparent external connection into real internal connection within one divine consciousness.

We thus see in Hartshorne's application of the principle of personality very clearly and concretely why Lotze more than once cautions against construing his immaterial M to be a web or net of intellectual relations connecting things.<sup>1</sup> For if M be a web,

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1. See, for instance, MIC, II, 624-625; MET, I, 193; MET, II, 184.

we must ask what makes possible the action of the web on the things enmeshed in it. This, however, plainly leads us into a baffling and fruitless infinite regress.<sup>1</sup>

We have now presented the general structure of Lotze's metaphysical monism. Let us go ahead to inquire into a question which has been persistently pressing forward in our thoughts. In this chapter, we have seen that instead of thinking that God is like man, it rather behooves us to realize that man is like God, like him only roughly and imperfectly. The light of personality which shines brilliantly in God flickers very weakly in the finite spirit. But now, what is the exact metaphysical status of this weakly flickering light? Is it actually possible for the finite spirit to have any real light of its own? In the next chapter, we shall attempt critically to discuss this interesting problem in the light of our previous evaluations.

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1. In Beyond Humanism (Ch. 12), Hartshorne argues that the only intelligible explanation of causality is in terms of panpsychic "sympathetic rapport" or "societism" or "organic sympathy." He writes that this involves a "pre-established harmony," which, however, is not absolute, but "very rough and flexible" (210). One thing acts on another by contributing to the feeling of it (208). Regarding God, he says: "We shall never understand a God of love unless we conceive of him as the all-sensitive mind of the world body." (208) This is certainly consistent doctrine. Is it, however, not more empirical, with Lotze, to conceive of the transmission of feelings according to law in terms of the activity of an immanent spiritual Substance? Then we do not have to wonder how it is that one object can know what action is required of it by a certain occasioning impulse, how it can be in rapport with another. It is easier to understand that in so far as objects interact, they are not merely God's body, but his very self. This is our difficulty with Hartshorne's idea of divine personality. It seems to us that in order to be more empirical, Hartshorne's pluralistic panpsychism must give way, in so far as interaction is concerned, to monism; God's body must be absorbed into identity with his mind. Rapport is best conceived as the immanent activity of one being.

CHAPTER IV  
THE STATUS OF THE  
FINITE SPIRIT IN LOTZE'S MONISM

The central issue in Lotze's philosophy is the problem of individuality. As we have seen, Lotze considers interaction to be possible only if all things are phases or modes of one spiritual Substance. Now does this mean that the finite spirit is wholly absorbed into a spiritual pantheism? Can Lotze provide for a real independence on the part of the finite spirit? The answers to these questions will enable us correctly to determine the extent and significance of Lotze's monism.

1. The Substantiality of the Finite Spirit

i. Lotze's Transition from Panpsychism to Objective Idealism. In his ontology, Lotze, we recall, concludes that a thing can be a real unity in change only if it is in some sense a spiritual subject.<sup>1</sup> Does this imply that all things, even the most minute specks of dust, consciously participate in the development of the monistic M? Such is indeed Lotze's conviction in the Microcosmus. He grants the possibility that there may be self-less things as mere states of the One, but he holds that this is most likely improbable and that really all things pos-

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1. See pages 43-47 of this thesis.

ess selfhood in varying degrees of perfection.<sup>1</sup> His inability to think of any part of the cosmos as a lifeless instrument for the ends of another, and his desire that the universe should have the "joy of animation" diffused throughout are the main motives that underlie his conviction.<sup>2</sup> In answer to the charge that it is ridiculous to consider dust as having inner life, Lotze offers a statement that is difficult to gainsay:

The dust is dust to him alone whom it incommodes; the indifferent form of the utensil no more lessens the value of the several elements of which it consists, than a confined social position that represses the outflow of intellectual life, destroys the high destiny to which even such oppressed fragments of humanity are called. When we speak of the divine origin and the celestial goal of the human soul, we have more cause to cast a sorrowful look on this dust of the spiritual world, whose life often seems to us so fruitless, whose work so purely a failure. We have far less reason to deny an inner life to such insignificant constituents of the outer world, for--uncomely as they may seem to us in their accumulations--they at least everywhere and without shortcoming perform the actions permitted to them by the universal order as modes of expressing their internal states.<sup>3</sup>

In his later reflections in the Metaphysics, Lotze leans toward a less poetical outlook. And in his lectures on the philosophy of religion we find no traces of panpsychism. He everywhere makes a sharp distinction between the world of created spirits and the world of inanimate things, which are mere thoughts of the monistic M and possess no substantiality of their own. After all, he asks, is it necessary to maintain the real spiritual existence of things whose activities do not in the least give clear evidence of a supposedly hidden life?

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1. MIC, II, 647.  
2. MIC, I, 362.

3. MIC, I, 361.

Could not the creative spirit dispense with this roundabout way and give rise directly in spirits to the phenomena which it was intended to present to them? Could it not present that form of a world which was to be seen without the intervention of an unseen world which could never be seen as it would be if unseen? And this power being in all spirits one and the same, why should there not in fact be a correspondence between the several activities which it exerts in those spirits of such a kind that while it would not be the same world-image that was presented to all spirits but different images to different spirits, the different presentations should yet fit into each other, so that all spirits should believe themselves planted at different positions of the same world and should be able to adjust themselves in it, each to each, in the way of harmonious action?<sup>1</sup>

The above passage is interesting not only as an indication of Lotze's objective idealism, but also as an introduction to his doctrine of the status of the finite spirit. He reasons further that the assumption of real (inanimate) things would have no advantage over the view that things have no independent metaphysical reality, being only "elementary actions of the one Being which forms the ground of the world."<sup>2</sup> This then would seem to be Lotze's final view. Instead of holding, as he did earlier in life, that all that is real is spirit, he would affirm that only spirits are real. Let us now inquire into Lotze's idea of the reality of the spirit, and its relation to the reality of the immanent One.

ii. The Unique Characteristics of the Finite Spirit. It would be well to begin this section with a brief explanation of Lotze's psychological terminology. For him, 'self,' 'soul,' 'spirit,' 'person' are synonymous terms, and applicable to man and

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1. MET, I, 225.  
2. MET, I, 226.

brute alike. However, the human spirit has certain definite features which distinguish it from the animal soul, and which justify our calling it a 'mind.' These main features are two in number: 1) the reflective idea of valid and binding truth, and 2) the moral sense of universal right or binding duty.<sup>1</sup> Animals are able to ideate, but only man can discern in cognition "the presence of laws that reach out indefinitely beyond the particular cases."<sup>2</sup> Lotze says that "the capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite is the distinguishing endowment of the human mind."<sup>3</sup> By this he means the capacity of the mind to strive for ends, not simply instinctively, but by reflecting on and methodically gathering together the most complex and heterogeneous means.<sup>4</sup>

What are the reasons for applying the above terms to a definite subject of mental life? Lotze thinks there are three: 1) the freedom of mental life, 2) the incomparability of inner processes with observed states of inanimate matter, and 3) the unity of consciousness.<sup>5</sup> The first two are important, thinks Lotze, but not sufficient to establish the uniqueness of a spiritual subject; for, firstly, the freedom of inner life is difficult to define precisely, and, secondly, the mere fact of incomparability does not rule out the materialistic possibility that mental life is somehow the resultant of an interaction of physical forces.<sup>6</sup>

1. MIC, I, 713-714.  
2. MIC, I, 674.  
3. MIC, I, 714.

4. MIC, I, 645-646.  
5. MET, II, 167-169.  
6. MET, II, 168-169.

Lotze would rest the fact of the unique substantial existence of the soul on the third reason: the unity of consciousness. He emphasizes, however, that this fact of unity does not depend on our conscious of any unity. The important point, according to him, is that if anything can appear to us, even the cognitive image that the soul is an unconnected plurality, we may from this infer the active presence of a truly unified subject.<sup>1</sup> For the real meaning of unity of consciousness lies in the act of relating and comparing in a timeless synthesis by which the contents of consciousness are not simple fused together, like physical compositions, but rather are so combined that all retain their peculiar characteristics, while the subject, the ego, so to speak stands apart and focuses its awareness upon them.<sup>2</sup> Such a wonderful relating activity presupposes the indivisible unity of the soul. Lotze says:

It must be one and the same thing which forms the idea of a, then that of b, and which at the same time is conscious of the nature and extent of the difference between them.<sup>3</sup>

His conclusion, then, is that the unity of consciousness implies that the soul is a simple substance. But by this soul substance he of course does not mean any sort of hard atom. The term 'substance' is, for him, simply a designation of any independent center or subject of conscious action or reaction.<sup>4</sup> We must not think of this substance as any kind of substratum

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1. MIC, I, 157.  
2. MIC, I, 164.

3. MET, II, 170.  
4. MET, II, 175, 181, 316.

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 which might be the ground, means, or cause of the soul's activity.<sup>1</sup> Just as when we ask what any inanimate thing is, our answer must lie in a description of its activity, so also the substantiality of the soul is, according to Lotze, "what it shows itself to be, unity whose life is in definite ideas, feelings, and efforts."<sup>2</sup>

The fact of the unity of consciousness is eo ipso at once the fact of the existence of a substance: we do not need by a process of reasoning to conclude from the former to the latter as the condition of its existence,--a fallacious process of reasoning which seeks in an extraneous and superior substance supposed to be known beforehand, the source from which the soul and each particular thing would acquire the capacity of figuring as the unity and centre of manifold actions and affections.<sup>3</sup>

iii. Lotze's Criticism of Kant's Treatment of the Paralogisms. In order to illustrate and make clear his idea of substantiality, Lotze examines Kant's famous arguments. According to Kant, "the conception of substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be other than sensuous."<sup>4</sup> For him, the presentation of a manifold of intuitions in consciousness presupposes the synthetical unity of the manifold. This unity, called by Kant the "transcendental unity of apperception," is the basis of the "I think," the identity of apperception, which accompanies all representations in consciousness.<sup>5</sup> His main theme against the paralogisms is that this identity of apperception, the I, is never present as an intuition of the internal sense, as an object of experience, but only as what

1. MET, II, 174.  
 2. MET, II, 181.  
 3. MET, II, 175.

4. Kant, CPR, 242.  
 5. Kant, CPR, 82.

he calls a "perfectly contentless representation."<sup>1</sup>

We can lay at the foundation of this science (i.e. of the paralogisms) nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation I, which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this I or He or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought=X, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence we are obliged to go round this representation in a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ it, in order to frame any judgment respecting it.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, according to Kant, when one takes the transcendental unity of consciousness to be an intuition of the transcendent subject (i.e. the thing-in-itself), one falls into error, for the categories of the understanding can be applied only to objects of possible experience. This is the plain fallacy of the paralogisms. Actually, we can know nothing regarding the thing-in-itself which lies at the foundation of the empirical ego--for all we know, there may be a permanent plurality of such real noumenal substrata, or even a continually changing sequence of things-in-themselves (as Kant's interesting illustration of the colliding spheres suggests).<sup>3</sup>

In comment upon Kant's reasoning, Lotze expresses doubt regarding the significance of the idea that some thing-in-itself lies beneath the concrete empirical contents of anything, and that this substratum is in any way useful to or consolidates the reality of the object, and, further, that it is important to ask whether this substratum is one or many. For him, all that is

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1. Kant, CPR, 239.  
2. Kant, CPR, 239-240.

3. MET, II, 177-178.

required for substantiality is the identity of the subject:

So far and so long as, the soul knows itself as this identical subject, it is, and is named, simply for that reason, substance. But the attempt to find its capacity of thus knowing itself in the numerical unity of another underlying substance is not a process of reasoning which merely fails to reach an admissible aim; it has no aim at all. That which is not only conceived by others as unity in multiplicity, but knows and makes itself good as such, is, simply on that account, the truest and most indivisible unity there can be. But in Kant's mind, so at least it seems to me, the prejudice is constantly recurring, that a thing may in a certain peculiar sense be unity, and that this is metaphysically a much prouder achievement than merely to make itself good as unity, since this last capacity may perhaps also belong to that which is not really or numerically one.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze holds, then, that Kant was right in opposing traditional soul substance theories, which made the substance a medius terminus, from which, for instance, immortality was inferred; but he was wrong in thinking that no meaningful idea of soul substantiality could be inferred from inner experience.

## 2. The Independence of the Finite Spirit

Let us now proceed to relate Lotze's concept of the substantiality of the finite spirit to the idea of that one real Substance, the monistic M. If the latter is immanent in all and embraces all, is there any significance in the notion of a finite substance?

i. The Soul as Being-for-self. In the Microcosmus (Bk. IX, Ch. 3), Lotze makes an important distinction between 'reality' (Wirklichkeit) and 'realness' (Realität). This distinction is an indispensable key to an understanding of his doctrine of

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1. MET, II, 179. For Lotze, substantiality does not depend on the permanence of the subject. The soul is existing substance only when and in so far as it asserts itself as identical subject.

the independence of the finite spirit. Wirklichkeit is a general category designating all action and existence, while Realität is a special kind of Wirklichkeit which is attributed to beings that are spiritual, that experience and recognize this experience as their own.<sup>1</sup> The Realität of the finite spirit is synonymous with its self-existence, its being-for-self, and it is just in virtue of this Realität that the finite spirit can be considered to be truly independent of or detached from the monistic M. The detachment of the finite spirit is proportional to the intensity of its Realität, that is, to the richness and complexity of its self-existence. Thus there is a graded scale of detachment according to which the whole world of spirits could be arranged. The lower primitive forms of animal life would be but slightly detached from the One, while man would, of course, possess the greatest independence. Lotze writes:

Whatever is in condition to feel and assert itself as a self, that is entitled to be described as detached from the universal all-comprehensive basis of being, as outside it: whatever has not this capability will always be included as 'immanent' within it, however much and for whatever reasons we may wish to make a separation and opposition between the two.<sup>2</sup>

He therefore who, constrained by necessity, regards minds as well as things, as being states, thoughts, or modifications of God or of the Infinite, yet as not serving merely to propagate the logical results of the nature of the Infinite from point to point, being connected amongst themselves as links of a chain, but as also feeling that which they do and suffer as their states, in some form of relation to self, as events experienced by their self--he who assumes this,

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1. MIC, II, 646.  
2. MET, I, 229.

and yet believes in addition that for these living minds immanent in God, he needs to prove an existence external to God, in order that they may be real in the full meaning of the word, does not, it seems to us, know what he is about--he does not know that he already possesses the kernel whole and complete, and that what he painfully seeks is but the shell.<sup>1</sup>

For Lotze, the assertion of relative independence on the part of the finite spirit is the essence of their substantiality. Spirits are substances like the one absolute Substance, but they are imperfect and incomplete in their substantiality. Nevertheless, they are true substances, because, unlike things, which are mere phenomenal states of the One and without any unique status of their own, spirits "possess the faculty of being-for-themselves, because they think themselves, and are not merely thoughts in the mind of another."<sup>2</sup> Spirits alone have

a reality which through the operation of God constitutes them not merely thoughts in His mind, but true and independent subjects on their own account.<sup>3</sup>

Is the spirit as a whole, then, really to be considered as transcendent instead of being immanent in the monistic M? Lotze replies that the relations which we try to imagine with the help of the terms 'immanence' and 'transcendence' do not allow of such distinctions as these symbolic spatial expressions suggest.

We cannot logically distinguish from God the humblest thing, for independent upon <sup>(s)A</sup> God there is nothing. A thing has a real, albeit relative, independence, only when and in so far

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1. MIC, II, 646.  
2. OPR<sup>1</sup>, 94.

3. OPR<sup>1</sup>, 95.

as it asserts the same. Only a spirit can so assert its independence. It alone feels and represents itself as the common centre of its own states, and so brings itself into that opposition to God, who created it, which can only be conceived of as existing between creator and created.<sup>1</sup>

The important point here is that the finite spirit has only a "relative independence." By this, Lotze means that besides its Realität or self-awareness, the spirit has additional Wirklichkeit, which can in no sense be considered independent of the one activity of the monistic M.

ii. The Origin of the Soul and Lotze's Doctrine of Creation. Now how is it possible for such relative independence, such being-for-self to arise? And how is the soul brought into interaction with the world of things? How does it happen that a particular soul substance is associated with a particular body, and at what stage of the body's development does it enter into its place? These questions are, for Lotze, unanswerable explicitly and in detail, and this for the simple reason that the 'how' and 'whence' of souls and things alike is not properly within the limits of metaphysics. As he often stresses, it is not the task of metaphysics to construct the world.

How it can be brought about, or how the creative power of the absolute begins to bring it about, that an existence is produced which not only in accordance with universal laws produces and experiences effects and alterations in its connexion with others, but also in its ideas, emotions, and efforts, separates itself from the common foundation of all things, and becomes to a certain extent an independent center,--this question we shall no more attempt to answer than we have others like it.<sup>2</sup>

1. OPR<sup>1</sup>, 93.

2. MET, II, 183.

The problem of the origin of the soul can, according to Lotze, be answered only in so far as we appeal to the same general idea by which we try to make intelligible to ourselves the most insignificant interaction of inanimate elements. This basis of explanation is simply the fact that the monistic M is wholly present and active at the place in question. Lotze says:

We may regard the process by which things that possess a life and soul are formed as something unusual and superior; but the presence of the absolute which makes this process possible is no less the basis necessarily implied in the most insignificant interaction of any two atoms. Nor again do we think of its presence as a mere uniform breath which penetrates all places and this particular spot among them, like that subtle, formless, and homogeneous ether from which many strange theories expect the vivification of matter into the most various forms: but the absolute is indivisibly present with the whole inner wealth of its nature in this particular spot, and, in obedience to those laws of its action which it has itself laid down, necessarily makes additions to the simple conjunctions of those elements which are themselves only its own continuous actions, simple additions where the conjunctions are simple, additions of greater magnitude and value where they are more complicated. . . It is thus that it gives to every organism its fitting soul.<sup>1</sup>

In harmony with Lotze's idea of substantiality, there is no need for the absolute to make a "correct choice" out of a store of souls. This would be the case only if the soul were erroneously regarded as a substratum which should enter the body at some point in the body's history. Since the absolute is present continuously during the whole course of the development of the body germ, we may, holds Lotze, regard the formation of the soul as an extended process in time. At the very physical conception of the germ, the soul itself would be

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1. MET, II, 184.

present in its most rudimentary form, asserting itself as substance and unity in gradually increasing intensity and significance.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze admits that if we could observe the physical development of the germ from its beginning, psychic life would appear just as the materialist thinks. There would never be any evidence of a sudden mental activity, as might be expected to result from the addition of a living soul to the germ. Signs of psychic life would gradually increase exactly as if they were merely side effects of the physical processes.<sup>2</sup> Actually, however, the mental activities would be the manifestations of a distinct soul substance. Lotze considers it impossible that a mere configuration of elements could of itself give rise to such a unique element as the thinking subject. And, for him, even Fechner's suggestive theory of a psycho-physical process, according to which consciousness and unconsciousness are only relative quantitative functions of psycho-physical motion, is wholly unintelligible--it is attractive only because of its indistinctness.<sup>3</sup> By this concept, consciousness and unconsciousness seem to be neatly reduced to something neutral, namely, the mathematical function; but plainly, holds Lotze, we have here only another way of putting the very old and often expressed conviction that reason can emerge out of what is devoid of reason. For it is not the abstract function that can determine

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1. MET, II, 185.  
2. MET, II, 185.

3. MET, II, 195.

consciousness or unconsciousness, but rather the psycho-physical motion of forces which in themselves are completely unconscious.<sup>1</sup> Lotze opposes himself to any such views and asserts that the soul does not arise above, between, or by the side of physical elements; nor does it arise out of nothing. It is a new creation which the monistic M alone produces from its own nature as a supplement to its activity in the physical germ.<sup>2</sup>

To satisfy the imagination we may say it is from itself, from its own real nature that the absolute projects the soul, and so adds to its one activity, the course of nature, that other which, in the ruling plan of the absolute, is its natural completion.<sup>3</sup>

For Lotze, the term 'creation' is meaningful only in application to this rise of spiritual life. So far as the inanimate world of nature is concerned, we gain little by trying to conceive of its realization (e.g. as did Leibniz) as other and fairer than that which it already has in God's living consciousness. Finite spirits alone are in any proper sense actually created. Lotze's definition of creation is given in the following passage:

Creation may be defined as follows: God permitted the thought which at first was only His own to become the thought of other spirits; or He caused this world of spirits to arise in which His continual influence and operation causes His own cosmic thoughts to arise and figure as the appearance of an outer world surrounding them and capable of being perceived by them.<sup>4</sup>

The world of things, then, is to be regarded only as a system of appearances, by which the living monistic M stimulates

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1. MET, II, 198.  
2. MET, II, 195.

3. MET, II, 186.  
4. OPR<sup>1</sup>, 92.

finite spirits to action and reflection. Further, Lotze holds that the particular system of appearances with which we find ourselves associated is by no means to be taken as exhaustive of God's activity. We may very well believe that there are many other ordered worlds which appear to other realms of finite spirits. These pluralities of worlds do not really exist external to each other; all are bound together in the same monistic One, and serve their purposes according to the same general import of the One. Lotze says: "God is bound up with creation by a perpetual sympathy, that he feels and lives in it."<sup>1</sup> These convictions are the foundations of Lotze's philosophy of history.

As regards the destiny of any particular finite spirit in this complex monistic activity, this, for Lotze, is not a matter for human judgment, much less a proper problem of metaphysics. We can permit ourselves to trust only in a general proposition which in our hands is entirely inapplicable to concrete instances:

Every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world. . .  
Everything will pass away which had its authorized place only in a transitory phase of the world's course.<sup>2</sup>

This is Lotze's doctrine of conditional immortality.

### 3. The Mind-Body Connection

Let us, in conclusion, briefly outline Lotze's most important ideas regarding the mind's interaction with the

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1. OPR<sup>1</sup>, 99. Compare with page 91 of this thesis.      2. MET, II, 182; MIC, I, 389.

phenomenal system in which the monistic M has created it.

Firstly, the fact of interaction is not precluded by the incomparability of the psychic and the material processes. Lotze's doctrine of reciprocal action, as we have seen, shows that homogeneity of appearances does not in the least help us to account for interaction.<sup>1</sup> Lotze argues that though the soul is separated from the supersensuous realities of the external world, "it is not parted from them by the gulf of that inseparability which is supposed to be a bar to all interaction."<sup>2</sup>

As to the seat of the soul, Lotze rejects the views that the soul is diffused throughout the entire body, or that from a point or limited area, the soul's influence extends infinitely far with gradually diminishing intensity, or finally that the soul is at one point and acts only by direct contact.<sup>3</sup> He rather believes that the soul acts directly upon a certain finite number of points within the brain.<sup>4</sup> Thus we may say that there are literally many seats of the soul, and at each one the soul is indivisibly present, expressing, as Lotze puts it, "one of those diverse activities which ought never to have been compressed into the formless idea of merely a single outgoing force."<sup>5</sup> This does not contradict the fact of the unity of consciousness, for the soul's spatial and seemingly separate locations are purely phenomenal expressions of its single supersensuous being. According to Lotze's metaphysics of space,

1. MIC, I, 270-278.  
2. MET, II, 190.  
3. MET, II, 283-288.

4. MIC, I, 302-303.  
5. MET, II, 290.

spatial location is not a condition of a thing's activity, but only a phenomenal consequence. Rather, a thing is where it acts.

According to Lotze, it is the purpose of the central nervous organs "to bring about the commerce of the soul with the external world."<sup>1</sup> As to the incoming "commerce," Lotze considers the brain to be most essential in the generation of the spatial image. All bodily impressions acquire at their points of influence on the body certain supplementary qualitative marks or "local signs," through which the soul, upon generating a specific sensation, is able to place its representation in correct spatial relation to other representations.<sup>2</sup> He thinks that the bulk of the brain is developed exclusively for the purpose of preparing "localized" impressions for direct action on the soul.<sup>3</sup>

As regards the outgoing influence of the soul, the starting-point is without exception some feeling (either new or recalled), on the occasion of which the associated movement is brought forth with strict necessity according to the universal mechanism ordained by the monistic M.<sup>4</sup> Here alone, for Lotze, lies the true meaning of free beginnings. Not only voluntary resolutions, but also involuntary feelings and passions give rise to a corresponding blind movement, which takes place without our co-operation or knowledge.<sup>5</sup> Freedom of action, then, consists simply in an infinitely varied choice and utilization of

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1. MET, II, 294.  
2. MIC, I, 309-311.  
3. MIC, I, 320-321.

4. MET, II, 304.  
5. MIC, I, 285.

elementary movements.

Finally, the fact that consciousness is often interrupted in sleep, illness, and injury leads to an interesting question: What is the status of the soul in such situations? Does it somehow still exist as an unconscious being? Lotze's answer is that souls, as well as material things, have no indestructible existence; they are, according to him,

simply actions of the one genuine being or existence, only that they are gifted with the strange capacity, which no knowledge can further explain, of feeling and knowing themselves as active centres of a life which goes out from them. Only because they do this, only in so far as they do this, did we give them the name of existences or substances.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, regarding a soul which thinks, feels, and wills nothing, Lotze teaches that we ought to have the courage to say that "as often as this happens, the soul is not."<sup>2</sup> Of course, this alternation of existence and non-existence is intelligible only on the basis of the continual activity of the monistic M:

Why should not its life be a melody with pauses, while the primal eternal source still acts, of which the existence and activity of the soul are a single deed, and from which that existence and activity arose? From it again the soul would once more arise, and its new existence would be the consistent continuation of the old, so soon as those pauses are gone by, during which the conditions of its reappearance were being produced by other deeds of the same primal being.<sup>3</sup>

#### 4. The Adequacy of

##### Lotze's Doctrine of Independence

Conflicts in philosophy often rise out of a misunderstanding of definitions and of the metaphysical background that

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1. MET, II, 316.  
2. MET, II, 317.

3. MET, II, 317.

conditions their particular formulations. Lotze's philosophy is especially liable to such misunderstanding. Therefore, it is of prime importance that we keep in mind the whole development of Lotze's monism when we undertake an examination of his doctrine of independence. Otherwise, we might easily be inclined to dismiss his psychology as a fruitless attempt to reconcile what is irreconcilable; namely, his continual emphasis on an extreme monism of interaction and the notion of real finite independence. We then might, for example, readily agree with H. Höffding when he writes:

Lotze's theory therefore culminates in a spiritualistic monism. He likewise places increasing emphasis on the immanence of the elements in a primary Substance. On this latter point he stands much closer to the Spinozistic view than he is aware.<sup>1</sup>

C. D. Burns expresses the same opinion: "Thus the conclusion of his (Lotze's) metaphysics is in an Absolutism almost like that of Spinoza. . ."<sup>2</sup> And some of Lotze's German critics have been much more positive regarding his relation to Spinoza and pantheism. Wartenberg, whom Kronheim discusses in detail, writes:

Lotzes Monismus hebt jede Selbständigkeit der Dinge auf und verwandelt dieselben in blosse Besonderungen der absoluten Welteinheit.--Dasselbe gilt vom Monismus Spinozas.<sup>3</sup>

1. Höffding, SHMP, 275. This is a modification of Höffding's earlier conclusions in his larger work on the history of philosophy. There, although he says that "Lotze's religious-philosophical standpoint may be described as ethical pantheism" (519), he concludes: "We shall hardly be inclined to agree with some of his more recent critics that in later life he modified his doctrine of the substantiality of the soul in essential points, bringing it nearer to Spinozism." (524) See Höffding, HMP.

2. Burns, GMP, 238.

3. Quoted in Kronheim, LLED, 53.

However, such conclusions as these have not been the outcome of our study of Lotze's monism. On the contrary, our connected consideration of the whole of his argument gives us the very opposite conviction: Lotze can be associated with Spinozism only superficially, only when some of his ideas are shorn from their context in his philosophy. It would be more correct to say that Lotze's theory begins with a strict spiritual monism, but culminates, without ceasing to be monistic in a sense, in a real spiritual pluralism. But even this would not be wholly fair to Lotze, for we should judge that he never really began with an extreme monism. All of his references to monism must be taken in a certain restricted sense which is not incompatible with real finite independence.

In order correctly to evaluate Lotze's doctrine of independence, it is important that his definition of soul substance be clearly seen in the wider perspectives of his metaphysics. As we recall, he does not mean by substance some inert super-sensuous substratum. His only definition is that 'substance' "signifies everything which possesses the power of producing and experiencing effects, in so far as it possesses this power."<sup>1</sup> He states in comment upon certain misunderstandings of his application of the term to the soul, that he uses this term as a mere name "in all innocence," that is, with the natural understanding that his readers will judge his usage only in accordance with the total metaphysical context. Therefore, he

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1. MET, II, 174.

writes:

It would have been too absurd to suppose this power of producing and experiencing effects in general to have its ground in one universal substance, and then to expect that a grain of this substance, buried in each individual thing, would quicken this general capacity into the particular ways of producing and experiencing effects which distinguish that thing from all other things.<sup>1</sup>

This is a significant passage, for it points us more directly toward a clear view of the soul's independence. Lotze's doctrine of reciprocal action, leading to the assumption of one Substance as the ground of the possibility of all being and interaction, is continually presupposed in his psychology. The soul as interacting being cannot be exempt from this general condition of existence and activity. Now when Lotze reasons that the unity of the soul presupposes a simple substance, he does not mean that the one Substance somehow has imparted some of its own substantiality to the soul. The One has not literally detached a "piece" of itself from itself. Rather, by the very fact that the soul is capable of producing and experiencing effects, it is a substance, moreover, a substance on its own account and truly separate as such from the substantiality of the absolute. However, in so far as the soul is in interaction with the world (and this is an undeniable fact), it is as such, that is, in distinction from its experiencing of interaction as its own, nothing more than a state of the one Substance, which makes possible all interaction. For this reason, Lotze holds that the soul has only "relative independence."

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1. MET, II, 174.

We must guard against the tendency to associate substance with a hard spatial form if we are rightly to evaluate Lotze's view. It is, of course, self-contradictory to suppose a simple indivisible being as such independent of and yet one with the Absolute. But it is not inconsistent to assume, as does Lotze, that a being can be simple, indivisible, and independent in one sense or aspect or activity (self-awareness), and yet one with the Absolute in another activity (interaction). Lotze's view of the soul is activistic--a soul, like anything else, is what it does, what it appears to be.<sup>1</sup> If a thing simply interacts in the world system without being capable of self-experience, the thing has no substance on its own account; it is to be considered a mere phase of the one Substance. But if a thing shows itself to be an experiencing subject, by virtue of that activity does it merit the title of simple substance. How the Absolute can bring forth in creation such a soul substance is, of course, beyond human insight. This view, notwithstanding its appeal to mystery, seems to us to be compatible with Lotze's doctrine of creation.

The fundamental assumption of Lotze's philosophy is that only a spiritual subject can be said to be a substance, to possess Realität. Now it would be strange indeed if he should actually have intended to absorb the very reality of the spiritual subject, which he had used as an empirical criterion for

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1. See Dr. Brightman's discussion of four types of views of the soul: organic, monadic, mentalistic, and activistic. Barrett (ed.), CIA, 172-175.

determining the personal nature of that one fullest substance, the monistic M, wholly into the spiritual oneness of the M. Rather, when we follow Lotze's arguments about the ground of the possibility of reciprocal action we must with him tacitly hold fast to the independent concrete reality of the finite subject, even while asserting an absolute oneness of all things; for this monism is reckoned necessary only in so far as interaction is to be explained. Thus the independent Realität of the finite spirit does not somehow have to be laboriously strained out of Lotze's monism as a strange accommodation; it is always presupposed as one of the essential necessities of the view. Otherwise, to be sure, Lotze's doctrine of interaction taken by itself can easily lead to Spinozism. For if the realness of the finite spirit, which we employ in inferring a spiritual monism of interaction, thereby becomes a mere illusion, what empirical grounds can there be for saying that the Absolute is in some sense a spiritual subject, a being-for-self? Then there can be no way of deciding whether the Absolute is a spiritual subject or a blank One, a substance entirely unlike the finite spirit, one which Spinoza, for example, defines as "that which exists in itself and is conceived by itself, i.e. the conception of which can be formed without the aid of the conception of anything else."<sup>1</sup> Such a conclusion on the part of Lotze would contradict his empirical approach.

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1. Ueberweg, HOP, II, 63.

The great point of difference between Lotze and Spinoza is that Lotze's fundamental assumption is that a true idea of the One can be formed only with the conception of something else; namely, the idea of the independent reality of the finite subject. The empirical validity of the hypothesis that the One is a spiritual substance depends upon the real substantiality of the finite spirit. Therefore, all that Lotze has in common with Spinozism is the mere terminology, 'substance,' 'One,' and 'monism.' Really there is hardly a point of contact metaphysically; each represents an entirely different way of approaching reality. Lotze's way is empirical, based on the concrete reality of the finite spirit; Spinoza's way is wholly rationalistic and unempirical. We do not see how Lotze can seriously be called a Spinozist, unless it is through a failure to keep in mind his empirical method and his whole direction of thought. His insistence on the immanence of all elements in so far as interaction is concerned is entirely compatible with his insistence on the independence of the finite spirit. We do not have to wait until Lotze explicitly (although not too clearly) brings this out in his psychology. This compatibility is implicitly assumed in his axiological and ontological strands of thought.

In answer to the question, how can the soul have such a double activity, Lotze can only reply that we must assume that the monistic M is as a matter of fact capable of producing a being which has such a nature. The ontological mechanics of this "strange capacity" of the soul as being-for-self is, of course,

a mystery, but it is no more mysterious than the fact of interaction. All we can say is, as Lotze puts it, that the soul is not created out of nothing, but that the Absolute brings the soul into being from its own real nature and as an addition to its own real activity as ground of interaction. This may seem like an easy way out of the difficulty of conceiving the soul as independent and yet immanent in the Absolute, but what more can be done on Lotze's premises? As he rightly emphasizes, it is not the task of philosophy to construct the world, but only to understand its construction consistently in so far as the facts permit. Kronheim sums up well Lotze's synthesis of immanence and independence:

A relative independence comes to things in spite of their immanence in God. They do not completely lose their independence as part of the Absolute. For this reason he has zealously taken pains to separate his philosophy from Spinoza's pantheism. . . He is therefore not a pantheist in the ordinary sense, but a panentheist. Even as parts of God, things enjoy a certain measure of independence. . . Lotze teaches their immanence in the Absolute only to make interaction comprehensible. The independence of things therefore becomes, even through immanence, only so far abrogated (aufgehoben), as precisely the actual fact of interaction requires, but no further.<sup>1</sup>

##### 5. The Possibility of Interaction on the Part of the Soul

But would it not perhaps be more adequate and less confusing to define the soul or self as conscious unity of experience and to say with Dr. E. S. Brightman that "the soul is

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1. Kronheim, LLED, 40. (Translated by the writer.)

indeed confined to conscious experience; it is no unconscious entity or mere capacity"?<sup>1</sup> A more mentalistic definition would have the advantage of clearly and unambiguously marking out the self and of separating it from what is not its own conscious process. However, the fact is that the self so clearly defined must still interact with the world. But how can interaction be explained if, as Dr. Brightman writes;

when a personalist speaks of a self or person, he means a conscious unity; he does not mean to include in the self its interaction with what is not its consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

In another essay we find this statement:

At no time is God absent or inactive; but at no time can the presence of God be construed pantheistically. That is, although God always acts on man and interacts with him, no part of man's personality can be regarded as any part of God.<sup>3</sup>

We take the term "at no time" to mean "in no sense." Dr. Brightman further holds that "God creates and continually sustains the being of all other persons and selves in the universe."<sup>4</sup> Is it, however, possible for God to interact with what is no part of him? And can we conceive of God sustaining what is not in any sense a part of him?

If Lotze's ontology of interaction is empirically adequate, there can be no interaction between entirely independent beings; all must be included in one medium of interaction. In Dr. Brightman's philosophy, <sup>interaction</sup> is not such a fundamental and pervasive theme or foundational reference point. In regard to

1. Brightman, ITP, 192.  
2. Brightman, Art.(1943), 44.

3. Brightman, Art.(1950), 4.  
4. Brightman, Art.(1950), 4.

the mind-body problem, however, he writes that "experience speaks in favor of interactionism," and that "interactionism, then, would appear to be the true theory."<sup>1</sup> As to physical things, Dr. Brightman reasons from the fact that

all the work done by "matter" is energy; the particle makes no difference. Its presence adds nothing; its absence would not be noticed. Such an entity cannot be said to belong in the system of nature.<sup>2</sup>

Thus he accepts Leibniz's idea that the energizing activity of matter is an activity of the nature of mind--"the system of things is active like a mind."<sup>3</sup>

In Lotze's philosophy, interaction is basic and its explanation is the same whether the objects in question are souls or things. For him, the independence of the soul must be harmoniously synthesized with the doctrine of immanence. That is, for him, souls can interact with each other and the world, and God can sustain them only if they are in some sense included in his being. Dr. Brightman avoids this compromise with monism by defining the self so as to separate it metaphysically from God. The relation between God and the self, for him, must in every sense be external. Thus for Dr. Brightman the mystery would be: How can the self be so separate metaphysically and yet interact with God and the world? For Lotze, the mystery is interestingly enough the converse: How can the self as interacting being, and hence according to the doctrine of interaction, one with God, possess any real independence?

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1. Brightman, ITP, 205-207.

2. Brightman, ITP, 121.

3. Brightman, ITP, 121-122.

Lotze and Dr. Brightman thus approach the problem of the independence of the soul from two different directions. In both views, however, the main concern is that the individual must not be "swallowed up" in a pantheistic absolutism. Lotze prefers to attempt to superimpose independence on pantheistic immanence, while Dr. Brightman prefers to attempt to reconcile interaction with external connection. Dr. Brightman's approach is perhaps safer theoretically, for there is no ambiguity involved in his doctrine of independence. Man is no part of God in any sense. On the other hand, Lotze's "relative independence" can easily, and surely has been, construed as really no independence.<sup>1</sup> We think, however, that taking Lotze's philosophy as a whole this danger is not very great. The advantage of Lotze's approach is that the doctrine of interaction as he formulates it is a most rigorous argument for theism, and is capable, as we have attempted to show, of holding its own against impersonal views of causality and cosmic structure.

The problem of deciding between these two ways of regarding the independence of the finite spirit is not an easy one. We are, however, inclined to favor Lotze's explanation of interaction on the basis of internal relations. Thus, although it is not difficult to postulate a special inscrutable external

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1. Thus J. Wahn thinks that Lotze's monistic doctrine of interaction takes away man's freedom: "Lotzes pantheistische Erklärung der Wechselwirkung spricht dem Menschen die Freiheit ab und macht ihn zum blossen Zuschauer der Gottestaten in ihm." (Quoted in Kronheim, LLED, 54.) It is true that on Lotze's basis, man is largely a "spectator" of his states; but to stress this alone is to depreciate unjustly the wider metaphysical significance of Lotze's doctrine of volition.

connection between God and the finite spirit, and thus to establish finite independence, we wonder whether this is really necessary to insure independence. If Lotze's doctrine of independence is consistent, and we think that it is so, then it would seem to be more adequate, for it accounts for the interaction of the soul more simply, without appealing to special external connections which are different from those connections between inanimate things.

Then again, Dr. Brightman's explanation of the subconscious processes and psychic mechanism becomes involved in a complexity of external relations. Dr. Brightman says:

These other experiences, to which the name subconscious is given, since they are not integrated with the normal self-experience, are not a part of the normal self (for only its experience belongs to it), but rather a part of its environment, like the physiological organism, the social order, the world of nature.<sup>1</sup>

In another work, he speaks of the subconscious process as actually a conscious self associated with the human person.<sup>2</sup> Thus in subconscious influence there would have to be an external interaction by at least three distinct and mutually independent selves. As regards psychic mechanism, the difficulty of conceiving the action of God is equally great, for how can God, who must always remain without metaphysically, control the psychic mechanism within individual consciousness, and how is he related to memory?

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1. Brightman, ITP, 200.

2. Brightman, Art.(1943), 44-45.

In himself man finds signs of God and of God's nearness and activity. Yet man is always himself and God is God. They are mutually transcendent in a sense in which God and nature are not. Most of the states of my mind are, it is true, caused not by my self-determining will, but by God. This is true of my sensations and of all in me that is due to physiological and psychological mechanisms. Nevertheless, all conscious processes in me, whether caused by God's purpose or my own, are parts of my complex, unitary personality, which, though dependent on God for its being, is self-experiencing and, within limits, self-determining.<sup>1</sup>

Can such mutual transcendence be conceived tangibly except in terms of a Leibnizian pre-determined sympathy?

On Lotze's view the subconscious and psychic mechanism do not have to be gathered together by God and brought to act on the soul in an external fashion. For him, the only activity of the soul not immanent in God is the individual subject's unique self-awareness and consciousness of the processes which God, working in and through the soul, presents to it, and which the subject to a limited extent can call up through the capacity of volition.

Manifesting itself in the individual mind, and being in it and all its like the efficient source of their life, the Infinite develops a series of activities, as to which how they take place remains incomprehensible to finite consciousness, which intuits their product. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Is it really less mysterious and more comprehensible to define the self as metaphysically no part of God, and yet somehow able to receive external influences from God? Would putting the doctrine of independence in this manner bestow on the self a more genuine independence, and also separate God more from any

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1. Brightman, ITP, 339.

2. MIC, II, 641.

stain of finite error and sin? We cannot convince ourselves that this would be so. Lotze's doctrine of internal relations as regards interaction seems to us to be very firm ontological ground, upon which an adequate account of the interaction of the soul may be based.

For this reason we should hesitate to accept Dr. Bertocci's suggestions regarding interaction presented in his illuminating article on Dr. Brightman's theory of the self.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Bertocci's main point is this: Why consider the body as merely the energizing of God's mind (as would Lotze also), and yet at the same time grant selfhood to certain zoological creatures whose activities are certainly not more purposively intelligent than those of the body. The human body functions as a highly purposive unit even when personal consciousness is absent. Thus he says: "Why grant the cells or cell-societies of animals independent self-experience and deny it to the cells or cell-societies of the human body?"<sup>2</sup>

Up to this point the argument is very convincing. But then Dr. Bertocci inquires into the relations between God and the self. He sums up Dr. Brightman's view: The self is no part of God metaphysically, but has a monadic "window" open to him. Thus the mind-body interaction consists of two steps: 1) interaction with God through its "window" and 2) the alteration by

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1. Entitled "Brightman's View of the Self, the Person, and the Body" and published in The Philosophical Forum (1950).
  2. Bertocci, Art.(1950), 27.

God of his energizing, which appears as bodily movement. Now this seems to Dr. Bertocci to be too roundabout a manner of conceiving interaction! He suggests making it more direct, as follows:

But why, granting the constant sustenance of all finite selves (and persons) by God, is it not simpler theoretically to open up another window of the finite self to other selves constituting its body? Rather than postulating the divine Mind as a specific intermediary for every definite mind-body action, the individual self or person could then interact, subject to the laws of their created natures, directly on the selves constituting their bodies.<sup>1</sup>

Now there is certainly nothing inconceivable about this way of regarding the possibility of interaction on the part of the soul, that is, when the point of departure is Dr. Brightman's view of the self as externally related to God and the world. But we should maintain that its plausibility rests either on a fundamental obscurity regarding the coherent ontological significance of the pictorial term "window," the phrase "constant sustenance by God," and the phrase "the laws of their created natures;" or on a simple appeal to a special power of God as a matter of fact to make such external connections, which these somewhat vague terms (i.e. in themselves and out of an explicit metaphysical context) symbolize, possible. Does Dr. Bertocci mean a Leibnizian "window"? We are quite sure that such pre-determined sympathy is far from his intention. But we are not quite certain that this manner of separating the self from God metaphysically, and finally of

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1. Bertocci, Art.(1950), 27.

separating the interaction of the self ("according to the laws of its created nature") with other selves from the mediating activity of God can be elaborated in a complete metaphysics in another way.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze's doctrine of interaction seems to us to be adequate enough to make unnecessary such assumptions of external connections. Interaction is more intelligible if the elements in question are metaphysically one Substance. Thus the finite selves will never be wholly separate metaphysically from the medium of interaction; their independence must be so construed as to leave them in some sense within the medium. It is this necessity that Lotze struggles to express tangibly. Only on this basis can we, with Lotze, make clear to ourselves the meaning of the notion of law. This is why we have considered Hartshorne's mind-brain cell analogy leading to his idea of a divine Social Personality externally related to its organic "body" of selves to be untenable metaphysically. We should maintain with Lotze that the mind-brain cell connection does not merely involve two terms, but rather three, the third being the medium of interaction. Not only the mind-body interaction, but also the God-mind relation seems to us to be better explained by Lotze's doctrine of immanence.

#### 6. Concluding Definition of Lotze's Monism

If then, for Lotze, the independence of the finite spirit

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1. In this respect we await with great anticipation Dr. Brightman's treatise on metaphysics. A systematic presentation of the personalistic view of interaction is needed.

is a genuine Realität, what must we conclude regarding Lotze's philosophy as a whole? It is, we should repeat, a monism only as regards interaction and as regards the fact that there is only one eternal and abiding Substance, the monistic M. But so long as finite spirits are created and assert themselves as distinct beings-for-selves, there is no strict monism, but more generally and properly a spiritual pluralism. This, we should maintain, is what Lotze always intends to convey in all his discussions, although unfortunately he does give good cause for confusion and misunderstanding. Our main criticism of Lotze is that he lays too much stress on the monism of interaction throughout his writings. He would have done better if he had at every point balanced his one-sided absolutistic interactionism with his culminating view of the finite spirit as not merely an interacting being but a genuinely independent being-for-self, and as such wholly distinct from God. Then he would have been less liable to misinterpretation.

As his reflections stand, it is easy to get the impression that he is an absolutist in essence. Thus, for example, G. T. Ladd concludes:

The method of Hegel was, indeed, always opposed by Lotze; and he endeavored to make good what he considered the deficiencies of Hegel by substituting for a movement of Absolute Thought, a movement of Absolute Life, as the centre and sum of all reality. But, with all the differences in both method and conclusions of the two thinkers, Lotze teaches something like the same spiritual Monism as that into which many who have learned in the school of Hegel are leading the way.<sup>1</sup>

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1. OMET, xii.

And J. B. Pratt includes Lotze with such absolutists as Green and Royce.<sup>1</sup> We should acknowledge that these conclusions are plausible, especially when based on the many passages in which Lotze stresses extreme monism. These passages must be balanced by statements which are more characteristic of his philosophy as a whole, as, for example, the following:

True reality that is and ought to be. . . is the living personal spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which he has created.<sup>2</sup>

The real point of difference between Lotze's view and Hegel's absolutism is that Lotze's main aim is to save the real freedom and independence of the finite spirit, whereas in Hegel, the finite spirit is explicitly and without apology absorbed into the dialectical sweep of the Absolute Spirit. Thus we find in Hegel such statements as these: "It is equally true that God exists as finite and the Ego as Infinite."<sup>3</sup> "What seems to be my act is then God's."<sup>4</sup> This ruling power of the Absolute is "the cunning of Reason"--"God lets men do as they please. . . but the result is the accomplishment of--not their plans, but His. . ."<sup>5</sup> According to Hegel, Absolute Spirit sets up the "illusion" of finite independence or separation by differentiating itself into an "other." Then "its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created."<sup>6</sup> This action of the Absolute in the mind is, for Hegel, the "illusion under which we live."<sup>7</sup>

1. Pratt, PR, 216.

2. MIC, II, 728.

3. Hegel, POR, I, 167.

4. Hegel, POR, I, 227.

5. Wallace, LOH, 350.

6. Wallace, LOH, 352.

7. Wallace, LOH, 352.

Such depreciation of the finite individual, and, further, an extreme emphasis on deductive method is utterly foreign to Lotze's view when it is seen as a whole. Consequently, there is a wide gap between the Absolute of Lotze and that of Hegel, the gap that separates extreme rationalism from empirical idealism. Lotze's Absolute should perhaps really not be called an absolute, but as W. P. Warren suggests, "the Supreme Being," to avoid the pantheistic implications of absolutism.<sup>1</sup>

What, then, would be our final definition of Lotze's monism? We should, as our discussions have indicated, conclude that although Lotze, even in the midst of his psychological development of thought, frequently refers to his "monistic view," this should always be understood as limited to the phenomenon of interaction. His philosophy as a whole, we should, elaborating Kronheim's suggestion, define as pluralistic spiritual panentheism. Lotze's metaphysical monism is that important aspect of his pluralistic spiritual panentheism which constitutes the basis of explanation of interaction in general, including interaction between spirits.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Warren, PNT, 27.

2. For the sake of preciseness, the term 'between' should perhaps be replaced by 'of.' That is, there is really no metaphysical gap 'between' interacting spirits; as interacting they are simply the one unified activity of God. This leads to a further distinction, which is implicit in our above discussions: We must be careful not to abstract the substantiality of the finite spirit (i.e. its active self-awareness), consider it in itself apart from the total Wirklichkeit of the spirit, and then to ask how God can interact with this substantiality (which, according to Lotze, is relatively independent; that is, relative to the total Wirklichkeit), as

if God does or should so interact. Since, on Lotze's premises, the proposition that God interacts with something or mediates interaction 'between' things means simply that God is that something or those interacting things as interacting, such a question would inquire into the possibility of what is impossible, for by definition the substantiality of the finite spirit is not the substantiality of God. To ask how God can interact with finite substantiality as such, then, is to ask how God's substantiality can be finite substantiality, and Lotze's answer is that by definition it is not. The question, therefore, can only resolve itself into the unanswerable query: How can God bring forth out of his one substantiality, his one activity, a finite spirit which is one with himself as regards interaction, and which yet has a unique substantiality of its own, by virtue of which it is able actively to assert itself as relatively independent of the common Wirklichkeit of all interacting things? This, Lotze emphasizes, brings us to an impenetrable mystery. According to him, no human knowledge can further explain the possibility of this "strange capacity," this double activity, with which the soul is gifted.

CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS

We shall now bring together the main conclusions which we have reached in our examination of Lotze's metaphysical monism:

1. Lotze has laid solid foundations for a thoroughgoing empirical philosophy. We are in full accord with his confidence in reason. It seems to us that faith that nature and reason are harmoniously and objectively related is necessary if we are to avoid positivistic solipsism and nihilism. We are also in agreement with Lotze's emphatic teaching that philosophical progress must always be conditioned by the particular facts in question, and not by a deductive a priori "logical calculus." This is an admirable approach to metaphysics. However, whether Lotze throughout his philosophy follows his professed methodology is another question.

2. We have found that Lotze does not attain empirical adequacy in his doctrine of an unfolding monistic ontological Good as the source of all existence. If the Good is diffused throughout all things, as Lotze tells us, then the inference that natural evil is illusory is quite obviously valid. But is this what the particular facts of evil indicate empirically? Our conclusion, therefore, has been that only a finitistic view of God would in some measure permit a retention of Lotze's

valuable axiological idea of a teleological oneness of the three realms of reality, and at the same time most adequately account for the empirical concreteness of natural evil.

3. Lotze's ontological strand of thought based on a consideration of interaction is, in contrast to his axiological strand of thought, a thoroughly consistent and adequate application of his empirical methodology. His idea of a monistic M mediating interaction is, as we have attempted to show, a far more credible hypothesis than either positivistic "succession" theory or naturalistic "structure" theory. Further, the assumption of personality as a metaphysical principle, which underlies this rigorous development of monistic interactionism, is empirically justified in that it not only makes possible a concrete understanding of how the successive changes of things and the world processes can be unified, how interaction according to law can take place, but it also makes the rise of consciousness and reason in the cosmos truly intelligible. Impersonal views of nature are not intelligible; they are valid possibilities but there is no way of elaborating them positively--they can be expressed only as mere negations of the personalistic hypothesis.

4. The conclusion which we have reached regarding Lotze's doctrine of individuality is not quite so clear cut, for it is in regard to this problem that Lotze falls short of his usual clearness and fine analysis. Lotze does not devote sufficient discussion to this important topic as such, and, as a result,

a variety of different interpretations becomes quite possible. And some of his statements--for example, when he says that he would agree with pantheism if it were spiritually conceived<sup>1</sup>--quite definitely seem to contradict our interpretation. Still we should judge that the implications of such passages are extraneous to the essential structure of Lotze's philosophy and to what he really intends to convey. These passages are the unfortunate results of his misleading emphasis at times on extreme monism. If we keep in mind his whole metaphysical context, it will be plain that Lotze gives more than sufficient evidence that his prime aim is to provide for the real independence of the finite spirit. The real difficulty lies in his unwillingness to make the finite spirit an exception to what he considers to be necessary conditions of interaction; namely, immanence in the One. We have, however, concluded that his activist theory of the self and his distinction between Realität and Wirklichkeit make possible a consistent and adequate synthesis of immanence and transcendence. Therefore, Lotze's philosophy as a whole must not be called a monism or a pantheism, but rather a pluralistic spiritual panentheism.

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1. MIC, II, 677.

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In the case of all works by Lotze, the footnotes contain only the standard abbreviation followed by the page references.

The abbreviation "tr." means either "translation," "translator," or "translated by." Likewise, "ed." means either "editor," "edition," or "edited by." Undesignated Roman numerals refer to volumes, and Arabic numerals refer to pages.

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## LOTZE'S METAPHYSICAL MONISM DEFINED AND EVALUATED

### ABSTRACT

For Lotze, metaphysics must be a "regressive investigation" based on the confidence that nature in some measure reflects objectively the processes and necessities of reason. Since we find ourselves not in the ontological source and center of things, but at a rather remote periphery, our emphasis, he teaches, must be on induction rather than on deduction, on an empirical approach in which the most important factor is the particular fact in question rather than on any speculative "logical calculus." The goal of metaphysics can only be a very modest one; namely, to harmonize reason with itself and with the given facts in so far as our limited position allows, to provide a coherent basis for humble satisfaction in an optimistic faith.

There are, according to Lotze, three distinct realms of experience, not logically deducible one from the other:

1) necessarily valid truths, 2) immediately given facts of reality, and 3) determinations of worth. Now, for him, it is unintelligible that these realms of experience should reflect a reality which is in itself absolutely without some bond of unity. Such is his axiological faith in the cosmic primacy of purposive intelligence that he cannot consider the realms of reality,

which our experience reflects, to be anything other than phases of the activity of a monistic spiritual Being, an unfolding teleological Good, which diffuses itself throughout all creation. Living benevolent Love is the source of creation and the continual sustainer of everything. Lotze emphasizes, however, that although this axiological faith in a monistic Good is an intelligible necessity, we can never use the principle of such a Good unifying the three realms of reality in a speculative manner to deduce particular goods in the world. Rather, it is within our power only imperfectly to trace fragments of reality to it.

But now is this optimistic absolutistic faith adequate as regards an account of the facts of natural evil? Lotze acknowledges this to be a very thorny problem, and his discussions of it amount to a plain and frank confession that he is unable even to begin a reconciliation of the fact of evil with his idea of a monistic Good. At this point, it is evident that he is unwilling consistently to apply his admirable methodological principle that if a given fact contradicts a hypothesis, the hypothesis must be altered to account for the fact harmoniously. A consistent empirical approach, as we have attempted to indicate, would have led Lotze to a finitistic view of God similar to that of E. S. Brightman. Such a finitistic view is quite compatible empirically with firm faith in a wholly benevolent divine will.

Metaphysical monism is, for Lotze, not only an axiological implication of a consideration of the three realms of experience,

but it is also the conclusion of a rigorous analysis of the phenomenon of reciprocal action. How can mutually independent entities interact? This is Lotze's starting-point, and from this he proceeds to criticize various possibilities. Firstly, he shows that when interaction is conceived in terms of the passage of influences a hopeless number of incredulities become apparent. For him, there are only two consistent possibilities. We may, on the one hand, take interactions in terms of a Leibnizian pre-determined monadism. But such determined activity would negate the freedom of the individual, and therefore, since Lotze's prime concern is to maintain the concrete freedom of the individual, no such pre-established sympathy can ever be acceptable as an explanation of interaction. But we may, on the other hand, conceive of the interacting entities not as metaphysically separate, but as states or modifications of a substantial oneness, in what Lotze calls a "monistic M." Interaction does not take place across any metaphysical gap, but is rather to be conceived as an activity of and within one divine consciousness. The relations of interaction are thus, according to Lotze, wholly internal. The feeling of one finite spirit does not have to be transmitted over any spatial distance in order to influence another spirit. Rather, its feeling takes place immediately within the monistic M, and the M gives immediate rise, according to the import of its activity and its universal mechanism of realization, to a corresponding feeling within the finite spirit which is to be influenced.

Lotze's monistic hypothesis is, in our estimation, better than positivistic "succession" theory of interaction, because this latter, although it explicitly disavows ontological assumptions, must plainly presuppose an objective uniform activity in nature to make meaningful the probability characteristics of mathematical functions in the prediction of future events. His monism is also more adequate than naturalistic "structural" accounts of interaction, because naturalism must either appeal to the given inscrutable continuity of a material "Nature," and explain causality by wholly tautologous terms, or it must postulate the passage of influences, and thereby fall into those incredulities which Lotze clearly perceived.

In regard to the personality of the monistic M, Lotze stresses the fact that divine personality is not to be considered a mere anthropomorphic reflection or projection of man's personality. The truth is exactly the converse: human personality is but a feeble reflection of the perfect divine Personality. When we postulate the cosmic primacy of personality we do not create a God after our image, but rather, by laying down this basic metaphysical principle, we affirm faith that we and the world reflect, however imperfectly, the rational processes of the divine Mind. Only on this assumption can we empirically conceive the unity of a thing in change, and, further, the unity of the successive changes of the cosmos. Impersonal views of nature lack concrete empirical foundations, and, consequently, can be expressed only as negations of or aversions to the

personalistic view, as speculative guesses that the cosmos is somehow held together by what is devoid of reason, and as such is somehow able to give rise to intelligent beings. Lotze rejects such impersonal views as incredible; they are unintelligible abstractions from the concrete life of reason.

Finally, and most important of all, as to the status of the individual in his monism of interaction, Lotze is far from unambiguously clear. Our interpretation of his doctrine is based on the two principles which seem to be most prominent in his doctrine: 1) The monistic ontology of interaction is universally valid, and 2) yet the individual must have real freedom and independence; he must not be absorbed as a mere interacting state of the One, as is an inanimate thing. The key to Lotze's view is his idea of substantiality. For him, 'substance' means "everything which possesses the power of producing and experiencing effects, in so far as it possesses this power."

(MET, II, 174) Thus only spirits are substances and as such are not mere interacting states of the One. As substances, they are wholly distinct from the substantiality of the One. Their Realität is uniquely their own. But this is only a "relative independence," for as an interacting being, the soul cannot be wholly independent of God. The Wirklichkeit of the soul must always include both Realität, that is, independent substantiality, and immanence in the One. This is an activist view of the soul--it is what it does. In so far as it empirically asserts itself as a unique center of thoughts and feelings, as

self-consciousness, so is it being-for-self and not being-for-the-One. But in so far as it shows itself to be an interacting being, so is it one with the monistic M. How can these two antithetical activities be combined in one being? How can the monistic M give rise to such a being which is within itself and yet capable of detaching itself in a relative independence? These problems are, for Lotze, ultimate riddles; he does not pretend to have an answer to them.

We have concluded that this doctrine is consistent and most satisfactory. Lotze quite definitely does not cause the individual to be absorbed and dissolved in the internal relations of interaction. It is, then, not proper to call his philosophy as a whole a spiritual monism or a pantheism, for the real uniqueness and independence of finite spirits, which Lotze teaches, implies, albeit in a relative sense, a true spiritual pluralism. Therefore, Lotze's system as a whole ought rather to be called a pluralistic spiritual panentheism. His metaphysical monism may be defined as that basic aspect of his pluralistic view which constitutes an explanation of interaction.

