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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

OSCAR PFISTER'S SYNTHESIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to investigate Oscar Pfister's synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion. His views of psychoanalysis and of religion as well as his application of psychoanalysis to his pastoral ministry will be examined. The critique of his synthesis will be from two points of view: 1) theoretical consistency of psychoanalysis and Christian doctrine, and 2) practical effectiveness of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method in the hands of the minister. Finally, we shall attempt to evaluate his contribution to psychoanalysis, psychology of religion and pastoral psychology.

Pfister is now a pastor emeritus of the Reformed Church in Zurich, Switzerland. He has served over forty years as pastor in the church, teacher in the theological seminary in Zurich, as practicing psychoanalyst, lecturer and writer in the fields of psychoanalysis and religion. Following experience in a psychiatric clinic in Berlin and extensive study in psychology, he became in 1908 an ardent student and follower of Freud. Active in the

founding of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Association, he has been interested through his pastoral work and writings in the relationship of psychoanalysis and religion. His concern has been both theoretical and practical, seeking a more adequate tool for the pastoral work of the minister of religion as well as a more thorough psychological interpretation of human behavior.

Pfister has considered psychoanalysis and Christianity as confederates in pastoral care.[1] Whereas the latter furnishes the norms of ideal personality and social experience, the former is the scientific method for removing obstacles in the way of personality growth and for keeping the forms of religion free of obsessive and neurotic elements. For those persons who consider psychoanalysis as a secular, mechanistic, deterministic and anti-religious psychology with slight regard for personal

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1. Pfister: Psychoanalytic Method, Preface, p. xii.
"Not because of the opponents but out of love for the truth, I have laid great stress on the proof that the much calumniated and more than once misused psychoanalysis, is not only compatible with the highest ethical and religious demands but absolutely presupposes them.....The analysis has strengthened me in the conviction that the human being is in no way merely a sexual being of the highest order...but that the varied mental wealth and noble characteristics which the idealistic philosophy has found in him, really belong to him."

ethics in the therapeutic process; this combination which Pfister has worked out may seem, not only strange, but one difficult to justify theoretically and practically. It is the aim of this study, then, to discover the compatibility of psychoanalysis and Christianity, to see what valid contribution psychoanalysis has made in Pfister's pastoral work and to discover a satisfactory interpretation of psychoanalysis through the eyes of the Christian minister. An important aspect of the study is the determination of the manner and limitation of psychoanalysis in the service of religion.

The work of Pfister represents a pioneering effort in bringing psychology to the service of religion. He is the first Protestant minister who has applied psychoanalysis to the pastoral ministry, and is one of the few who has applied it so extensively.[2] He has not only used psychoanalysis as a counseling technique and method of personality interpretation, but he has also critically examined or analysed various forms of religious experience and practice and the history of religions. He also

---

2. Karl R. Stolz, Pastoral Psychology. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1932, p. 15, states, "He who aspires to more technical competency in rebuilding personality is referred to the more technical and exhaustive works of a pastoral specialist like Pfister."

made extensive use of psychoanalysis as a means of preventive mental health, and in this connection has amplified the usefulness of psychoanalysis for the parent, educator and the minister.

Of course, the problem of how esoteric psychoanalysis should be was waged violently by Freud and his immediate followers.[3] The defining of the relationship of psychoanalysts to the medical profession is still unsettled. The entry of the minister into the inter-professional field of therapy has necessitated a continuation of defining roles and functions within the framework of a cooperative mental health team.[4] Pfister was well aware of the problem. Although some may think that he has stepped beyond the limits of the ministry to perform analytical work,[5] his standards and methods of cooperation with the medical and teaching professions should prove instructive.

Pioneering work in psychoanalysis is past. Divisions of opinion and improvements in theory and practice have

3. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Lay Analysis. New York: Brentano's, 1927. See also the symposium, "Discussion on Lay Analysis," International Journal of Psychoanalysis. 8(1927), pp. 174-283.
4. See below, footnotes 47, 48, 49.
5. This seems to be the implication of Stolz, Ibid., p. 15.

greatly modified the original psychoanalysis of Freud.[6] In general Pfister represents a point of view which adheres closely to orthodox Freudian psychology. One might ask if the study of his works in the light of more recent developments might be, from a psychological point of view, of less value than the study of later works. For the purposes of this investigation, however, Pfister's combination of psychoanalysis with religion is more pertinent than up-to-date psychoanalytic theory. For the ultimate aim is not so much the theoretical understanding of psychoanalysis as it is its practical relevance and applicability to Christian thought and therapeutics.

We shall be interested, further, in the influence that psychoanalysis has upon Pfister's own view of Christianity. With him, too, the value of psychoanalysis was in terms of or in reference to a Christian ministry to human needs and problems. However, it will be important to discover in what ways and to what extent the scientific discipline of psychology has modified, altered, or refined his religious thought and experience.

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6. See especially the works of Jung, Adler, Rank, Horney, Menninger, Alexander and Fromm listed in the general bibliography.

We seek, therefore, an adequate statement of Pfister's understanding of psychoanalysis and of the Christian faith and ministry and of his interrelating the two disciplines. We seek also through his work to determine the adequacy of psychoanalytic interpretations of personality and especially religious experience, and to determine the possibilities and problems of the use of psychoanalysis as a pastoral tool.

2. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

The influence of psychoanalysis is far reaching. It has spread into every field of research which is concerned with man, his relationships and culture. Fundamental concepts are no longer debated, although interpretations of details vary widely. The dynamic unconscious is taken for granted in psychology. Psychosexual development is accepted by child psychologists although there has been great resistance to the interpretation of Freud's theory as "pan-sexualism." Abreaction or catharsis is accorded proper importance both in the Catholic confessional and in the Protestant permissive counseling.

Psychoanalysis has likewise found a place in the psychology of religion. Although there is no systematic

treatment from a consistently psychoanalytic point of view, there has been increasing use of Freudian theory in the interpretation of religious phenomena.[7] Prof. R. P. Casey of Brown University, in seeking for psychological clarification of religious problems supports this view.

> Despite important leads in psychoanalytic literature, no comprehensive and detailed view of religion has been reached and the time is probably not yet ripe nor the available evidence adequate for such a theory. Nevertheless religion has supplied psychoanalysis with some of its most instructive material and a number of psychoanalytic formulae have proved incomparably useful for the description and understanding of religious phenomena.[8]

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7. Paul Bjierre, "The Way to Grace." Psychoanalytic Review, 14(1927), pp. 255-267. L.E. Hinsie, "Psychoanalysis and Heaven," Psychoanalytic Review, 13(1926), pp. 145-172, 323-338. C. Moxon, "Mental Hygiene and Religious Teaching," Psychoanalytic Review, 8(1921), pp. 95-97. Theodor Reik's works (see bibliography) and especially "Final Phases of Belief Found in Religion and Obsessional Neurosis." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 11(1930), pp. 278-386. Also Theodore Schroeder, "The Psychoanalytic Approach to Religious Experience," and "Guilt and Inferiority Feelings as Creators of Religious Experience," Psychoanalytic Review, 16(1929), pp. 361-376, 46-54. See also page 20 and bibliography for other earlier psychoanalysts who have made research in religion. More recent psychoanalytic studies of religion, especially by Jung and Fromm, (see bibliography) have been from a modified Freudian point of view.
8. R. P. Casey, "Religion and Psychoanalysis," Psychiatry, (1943), p. 291.

Christian psychologists have not followed the more extreme and exhaustive psychoanalytic interpretations of religion of such men as Theodor Reik or Theodore Schroeder. Few Christian ministers have employed psychoanalysis in pastoral work as extensively as has Pfister.[9] But in theological seminaries and parish ministries there is increasing interest in and hope for further contributions to religious thought and work. For the Christian Gospel, the healing ministry of Jesus and the needs of human beings for maintaining and restoring mental health make imperative a skilled pastoral ministry.

There is at the same time widespread resistance and hostility to psychoanalysis from religious circles. Hiltner maintains:

> It remains true at present, however, that most theologians are inclined to regard psychology more as an enemy than a friend if they consider it relevant at all, and to interpret their function in relation to it as establishing reality or objectivity in contrast to the subjectivizing tendencies they feel are inherent in psychology.[10]

Neo-orthodox theology in the Protestant Church has cast skeptical glances at the religious importance or efficacy

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9. See separate bibliography of Pfister's works.
10. Seward Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding of Religion," Crozer Quarterly, 24(1927), p. 16.

of man's ministrations to man, and at the same time has constructed a kind of religious psychology which is descriptive within the theological frame of reference, but which provides inadequate foundation for a scientific ministration to human need.[11] The Roman Catholic Church also contains outspoken representatives who have attacked psychoanalysis either as philosophical error or as secular interference with the Church's program of salvation.[12]

11. Especially illustrative of this view is Kierkegaard's Der Begriff der Angst (1844), Zur Psychologie der Sunde tr. (1890) and more available in English translations are Fear and Trembling (tr. Walter Lowrie) Princeton U. Press, 1941, and The Sickness Unto Death (tr. Walter Lowrie) Princeton U. Press, 1946. Influence of this view is also seen in D. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ, New York: Scribner's Sons, 1948, p. 44. "To a true Christian ethic the 'chief end of man' is not the cultivation of his personality, or even the formation of his character on ideal lines, or anything so self-centered and introverted as that, but faith and love towards God as He comes to us through our relationships with our fellow-creatures -- in short, 'to glorify God and to enjoy him for ever.' Concentration on the development of personality or the cultivation of character does not really produce a soundly integrated personality, and certainly does not produce the Christian character."

12. Rudolf Allers, "The Successful Error: A Critical Study of Freudian Psychoanalysis, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940, and The Psychology of Character (tr. E. B. Strauss) New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931, p. 338, 339 fn. Fulton Sheen, Peace of Soul, New York: Whittlesy House, 1949. See also for the Roman Catholic position on psychoanalysis Charles Bruehl, Psychoanalysis, New York: The Paulist Press, 1949; Roland Dalbiez, Psychoanalytic Method and the Doctrine of Freud. 2 Vol. (tr. T. F.Lindsay) (See next page for balance of footnote #12.)

It appears imperative, therefore, that there be some attempt made at a Christian view or interpretation of this significant psychology which is represented as alien to religion on the one hand, and yet is considered by some, as Pfister, as an ally of Christianity, on the other.

There is a need, not only to answer Freud's criticisms of religion, but to see what corrective purpose they may serve to religion. For psychoanalysts have been critical of religion and its expressions, not merely with the intention of dismissing it as useless or harmful in man's psychic and social life, but for the sake of understanding its motives and purposes and freeing it from unhealthy manifestations. This task, however, appears to Hiltner to fall essentially within the realm of the theologian's responsibility.

> It is clear that a Christian apologetic is needed against psychology or anything else which professes to attack one or more of the roots of Christianity. Hence there is an important theological and philosophical function to be performed against the psychologizing of religion out of existence or to a place of irrelevance...Only a small portion of our leading religious philosophers today have a sufficient acquaintance with psychology to defend

12. (Continued from p. 9.) New York: Longman, Green and Co., (1936), 1941; Thomas V. Moore, Dynamic Psychology. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1926, pp. 253-308; James H. Vander Veldt and Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952, pp. 141-159.

psychologically what needs and deserves defense in Christianity.[13]

Further importance is to be derived from the more adequate examination and evaluation of psychoanalysis as a pastoral tool in the hands of the parish minister. Pfister claimed that an understanding of and at least limited ability to apply psychoanalysis was imperative for every minister and educator. Pastoral skills are certainly a necessity for the ministry to people in this day. No prejudice should prevent the proper appropriation of psychoanalytic concepts and techniques for the pastor's work. Through Pfister's extensive and consistent application of psychoanalysis we are afforded an opportunity to examine the adequacy, possibilities and limitations, the theoretical compatibility and practical mutual service of psychoanalysis and religion.

Finally, and possibly foremost, it appears valuable and timely, at least from the historical point of view, to examine and evaluate the contribution of Pfister to religion and health. Despite the cultural differences, the normative side of mental health as represented in the Christian religion and probably the obstacles to health found in America and Continental Europe are quite

13. Hiltner, Op. Cit., p. 8.

similar. It is important, therefore, to make a historical and critical investigation into his synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion.

Summarily, we may say that the purpose of the investigation is first, historical, (a) to investigate and set forth the psychoanalytic pastoral care of Pfister, (b) to trace the influence of psychoanalysis on psychology of religion and pastoral care. The second purpose is theoretical, that of determining critically the relationship between Christian doctrine and psychoanalytic concepts in the thought of Pfister. The third purpose is practical, (a) to gain insight into personality needs that a pastoral ministry can meet, and (b) to draw critically from Pfister's analytical practice and experience the applicability of psychoanalysis to Christian pastoral care.

3. PREVIOUS STUDIES IN THE FIELD

Psychoanalytic literature is voluminous.[14] Not only have the psychoanalysts been active in defining and interpreting their field, but their forthright and independent thought has provoked many popularizers as well

14. See J. Rickman, Index Psychoanalyticus, 1893-1926. London: The Hogarth Press, 1928, for bibliography until 1926.

as antagonists. There are no systematic studies of religion although many psychoanalysts have turned their hand to religious phenomena.[15] Freud's theories are to be found in Civilization and its Discontents (1930) where he defines religion essentially as a derivative and elaboration of the childhood feeling of dependence on the father.[16] He denies the universality of the religious feeling[17] and holds that where it exists it is an infantile regression.[18] The Future of an Illusion (1928) represents Freud's concerted attack upon religion which he defines as dogma[19] which are illusory projections motivated by wish-fulfilment.[20] Religion, then, becomes a "universal obsessional neurosis of humanity...originating in the Oedipus complex."[21] In Moses and Mono-

15. Prof. Casey recognizes the lack of systematic psychoanalysis of religion and probably has done as much as any other to rectify the deficiency in his survey, "The Psychoanalytic Study of Religion," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 33(1938), pp. 437-452. Also to be noted in this connection are the works of Carl Jung and Erich Fromm especially.
16. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, London: The Hogarth Press, 1930, p. 21.
17. Ibid., p. 20.
18. Ibid., pp. 22, 23, 42.
19. Sigmund Freud, The Future of An Illusion, London: The Hogarth Press, 1928, p. 43.
20. Ibid., pp. 52-55.
21. Ibid., pp. 75, 76.

theism (1939) Freud uses the data of the Old Testament record to illustrate his primal horde theory which is an anthropological and social psychological application of the Oedipus complex. Although Freud insists that it was not his purpose in Totem and Taboo (1912) to explain the origins of religion[22] he states later,

> From then on I have never doubted that religious phenomena are to be understood only on the model of the neurotic symptoms of the individual,...as return of long-forgotten happenings in the primeval history of the human family, that they owe their obsessive character to that very origin and therefore derive their effect on mankind from the historical truth they contain.[23]

This earlier study in the psychoanalytic view of primitive tribal organization marks the beginning of his general attitude toward religion. Although his works in religion show speculative originality, we find no thorough or systematic analysis of religious faith and practice, nor an application of psychoanalysis in the clinical treatment of religious problems.

Jung's works in the field of psychology and religion are well known: Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933), Psychology and Religion (1938), Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (1928). In these works he develops a theory

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22. Ibid., p. 39.
23. Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, (Tr. K. Jones), New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939, p. 89.

of continuity in the unconscious between the present religious symbols and experience to the archetypal symbols of primitive man. Since religion is at once a spontaneous and universal phenomenon, it presents a useful form for the investigation and treatment of the whole mental life. Whereas Freud's works erred on the side of speculation, Jung's show a stronger element of mysticism.

Adler has left the problem of religion virtually untouched,[24] and Rank, a brilliant and suggestive thinker among the early psychoanalysts, ascribed to Freud's view of the primal horde theory in The Myth of the Birth of the Hero (1914) and in Beyond Psychology (1941), although his Truth and Reality, Will Therapy and Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Geisteswissenschaften (1913) show an interest in the dynamics involved in religious experience. The latter contains a suggestive study of religious fantasy. His Das Inzest Motiv in Sage und Dichtung likewise is concerned with unconscious motivations in myths and folk-tales.

Theodor Reik, in his lectures on religious ritual given 1914-1919, later published in America as The Psychological Problems of Religion: Ritual (1946) was

24. Notwithstanding, such religious psychologists as Stolz and May are influenced strongly by Adler's idealism and optimism.

projected as the first volume of researches in religious phenomena from a psychoanalytic point of view. This work was merely the application of Freud's theory to certain rituals, the Couvade, the puberty rites of savages, the Kol Nidre and the Shofar. Later works, Der Eigene und der Fremde Gott (1923) and Dogma und Zwangsidee (1927) continue this line of investigation. However, he writes in the introduction of the work on ritual:

> It is not intended to build up a system of religious psychology founded on psychoanalysis, but to show by a few examples of representative value and significance what psychoanalysis with the means at present at its disposal may accomplish towards the explanation of difficult religious problems.[25]

Reik has also replied critically to Freud's Future of an Illusion, and in the discussion on lay analysis has been very favorable to pastoral treatment and recognizes a place for the church in mental healing.[26]

Many psychoanalysts have written on scattered problems of religion. Moxon, the British analyst treats religion as a symbolic result of poor adaptation to the life task and as a safety valve for the mentally ill.[27]

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25. Theodor Reik, The Psychological Problem of Religion: Ritual, New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1946, p. vii.
26. T. Reik, "Bemerkungen zu Freud's 'Zukunft einer Illusion,'" Imago, 14(1928), pp. 185-195. Also "Discussion on Lay Analysis," International Journal of Psychoanalysis 8(1927), pp. 243-244.
27. C. Moxon, "Religion in the Light of Psychoanalysis," The Psychoanalytic Review, 8(1921), pp. 92-98.

He also presents a defense of religious training as preventive mental hygiene.[28]

In his study of Nirvana in Buddhism, Alexander has observed a form of complete regression to the comfortable irresponsibility of the mother's womb. Erich Fromm, with his sociological orientation, has applied insights of individual psychoanalysis to the social and historical phenomena of the Christian tradition in the study of the messianic concept in Jewish society and history with its consequent alterations as the Christian community became accommodated to other social and political expressions.[29]

Kunkel, deeply interested in the religious life, and in his psychology departing from the departures of Jung, has brought forth in a rather popularized form his "We-psychology," which, although firmly grounded in psychoanalytic understanding, he believes to be a higher synthesis of religion and psychology without falling into the errors of analytical or individual psychology.[30]

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28. C. Moxon, "Mental Hygiene and Religious Teaching," The Psychoanalytic Review, 8(1921), pp. 95-97.
29. Erich Fromm, Die Entwicklung des Christusdogmas, Wien: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1931. Also Psychoanalysis and Religion, (N H: Yale University Press, 1950.)
30. See especially Kunkel's In Search of Maturity, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943.

Beth, Bjierre, Kamiat, Levy-Suhl, T. Schroeder, Waelder, Coriat, E. Jones, Money-Kyrle, Müller-Braunschweig, Roheim and Hitschmann are other psychoanalysts whose interest in religion has provoked excursions into the field which have produced varying results. Of these, the rather intensive work of Schroeder in analyzing the sexual foundation of religious experience and the more extensive anthropological studies of Jones are of special value.[31]

The psychologies of religion, whose history is about as long and probably no less precarious than psychoanalysis, have also dealt with psychoanalysis from the religious point of view. As may be expected, however, the earlier works of Ames, Coe, Leuba and Starbuck contain no reference to Freud or psychoanalysis with the exception of Coe's reference to psychoanalysis as a "sort of mental housecleaning." [32]

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31. See bibliography, the articles of Schroeder, all of which are on this theme, and E. Jones, Essays on Applied Psychoanalysis. London: The International Psychoanalytic Press, 1923.

32. George A. Coe, The Psychology of Religion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916, p. 316. Hiltner speaks of Coe's understanding of Freud: "He apparently failed to see the implications of the coming dynamic psychology; yet he mentions Freud, shows that he has read him through without comprehending the revolutionary character of Freud's works." Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding of Religion," Crozer Quarterly, 24(1947), p. 10.

Perhaps it is not too surprising that William James, (Varieties of Religious Experience, 1903) the great pioneer in psychology of religion, anticipated, at least by suggestion, the contribution of a psychology of the subconscious to the understanding of religious phenomena.

> Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its farther side the more with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary theologian lacks.[33]

He believed that even so-called instantaneous conversion followed "subconscious incubation" which worked itself out in the actual conversion experience according to ordinary psychological laws.[34]

Although James was not uniformly well impressed with Freud's dream theories and symbolism which he heard Freud expound in one of the five lectures at Clark University (1909), he did comment, "I hope that Freud and his pupils will push their ideas to their utmost limits, so that we may learn what they are. They can't fail to throw light on human nature."[35] Evidently he saw a

33. William James, Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Longman's Green and Co., 1902, p.512.
34. Ibid., p. 236.
35. Cited by Ed. Hitschmann, "New Varieties of Religious Experience" in Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences. New York: International Universities Press, 1947, p. 201.

possible method for probing the subconscious depths and scientifically accounting for subconscious religious experience. Hitschmann has continued in the vein of James to interpret the religious experience of James, Kierkegaard, Schweitzer, Schopenhauer and others from the psychoanalytic point of view.[36]

The psychologies of religion of the 1920's show a much larger influence from the new psychology. Thouless (1923) considers Freud significant, but uses him chiefly to refute his sexual theory. Pratt (1924) refers extensively to Freud, but also resists strongly reduction of religion to sexual origins.[37] Hickman (1926) hints at the possible exploration of the unconscious as the source of religious stimulation, following James' suggestion. Josey (1927) shows some acquaintance with psychoanalysis, but does not embody it in his treatment. Especially pertinent in this period is Valentine's Modern Psychology and the Validity of Christian Experience (1926) which is a direct answer to psychoanalytic criticisms of religion as rationalization, projection, deterministic and subjective. He goes on to relate the Christian doctrines of man, sin, salvation, God, Christ and the Holy Spirit to

36. Ibid.
37. James B. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920, p. 111.

concepts in psychoanalysis. Barbour (Sin and the New Psychology, 1930) has done much the same thing in substantiating the Christian doctrine of sin by correlating psychoanalytic concepts with the doctrine, eg., temptation-unconscious impulse, sense of guilt-inferiority complex, forgiveness-transference, sanctification-sublimation.

The psychologies of the 1930's reflect evidently the prejudices of the writers. Ligon (1935) has no serious attitude toward psychoanalysis although he recognizes its popularity.[38] Stoltz (1937) suggests the importance of psychoanalysis for religious education and personality adjustment.[39] Hughes (1933) makes a concerted defense against psychoanalysis and behaviorism rather than a systematic treatment of the psychology of religion. The Wiemans (Normative Psychology of Religion, 1935) are quite skeptical, if not derogatory, toward psychoanalysis, fearing its adoption as a substitute religion, critical of long "transference sessions," and speaking of the "sewage system subconscious."[40]

38. E. M. Ligon, The Psychology of Christian Personality. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936, pp. 224, 228.
39. Karl R. Stolz, The Pschology of Religious Living. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1937, pp. 162, 164.
40. H. N. and R. W. Wieman, Normative Psychology of Religion. New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1935, pp. 13, 427, 322.

The later psychologies reveal, if not direct references to Freud's contributions, the assimilation of his extensive influence upon the psychology of the unconscious, instincts, symbolization, sexuality, psycho-sexual development. The dynamic point of view is generally accepted. Noteworthy is Johnson's Psychology of Religion (1945) which is not only written from the dynamic point of view with attention given to unconscious motivation in a goal-striving system, but also gives a specific critique of Freud's contribution to the psychology of religion.[41]

Along with Valentine and Barbour, Deabler sympathetically interprets Freud's critique of religion and evaluates psychoanalysis from the point of view of psychology of religion and philosophy of religion.[42] Allers (1940) criticizes psychoanalysis from the Catholic point of view.

The influence of psychoanalysis is also seen in the literature of pastoral psychology. Beginning in

41. Paul E. Johnson, Psychology of Religion. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945, pp. 196-202.

42. Herdis L. Deabler, Freud's View of Religion. Boston: unpublished manuscript, Library, College of Liberal Arts, Boston University, 1936.

1932 with the writings of Oliver,[43] Stolz,[44] and Holman,[45] we see, especially in the latter two, a cautious appreciation of psychoanalysis. Oliver, a physician, is thoroughly psychoanalytic although he does not deal with the subtle dynamics of personal and interpersonal strivings. Although Stolz believes the theory and application of psychoanalysis have been excessively overweighted and extended, he does deal sympathetically with the "talk cure" and states, "The pastor can make use of some principles of psychoanalysis...He is a worker in the area of anamolies rather than a specialist in the field of pathologies."[46] In his later work, The Church and Psychotherapy (1943), he deals broadly with the history of medical psychology and recognizes that although Freud was antagonistic to religion, his significant emphases upon childhood impulses, the unconscious, catharsis and sublimation really support Christian thought and practice.

Even though Holman writes from a sociological orientation, he lays heavy stress on psychoanalysis as theory

43. John R. Oliver, Pastoral Psychiatry and Mental Health. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932.
44. Karl R. Stolz, Pastoral Psychology. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1932.
45. Charles T. Holman, The Cure of Souls. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932.
46. Stolz, Op. Cit., p. 218.

and therapeutic technique. In agreement with all pastoral psychologists considered here he recognizes the value of catharsis. However, he is skeptical of transference and insists on the pastoral role of stimulation of the will to higher instincts, a kind of forced sublimation.

Although not dealing directly with the relevance of psychoanalysis to religion, the work of Anton T. Boisen,[47] an autobiographical study of mental illness enlarged into a compelling plea for psychologically oriented pastoral care, has increased interest in the scientific and clinical preparation of ministers.

Bonnell's work,[48] popular in nature, indicates an understanding of psychoanalysis. He uses hints from dream interpretations in counseling; his attitude is nonjudgmental and permissive, although his interpretations are cast in a religious rather than a psychological framework. In his later publication[49] he deals directly with psychoanalysis, recognizing Freud's hostility to religion, but he also states, "No spiritual counselor will be able to achieve full effectiveness who does not under-

47. Anton T. Boisen, The Exploration of the Inner World. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1936; reprinted Harper and Bros., 1952.
48. John S. Bonnell, Pastoral Psychiatry. New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1938.
49. John S. Bonnell, Psychology for Pastor and People. New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1948.

stand the significance of these concepts and psychiatric terms."[50] He recognizes the integrative, meaning-imparting power of God available to the pastor's work and not to the psychoanalyst's who seeks adjustment only.

The Englishman Murray has written An Introduction to Christian Psychotherapy (1938)[51] from a Jungian point of view; consequently it represents a consistent effort to assimilate psychoanalysis into Christian pastoral care. He is critical of Freud's mechanistic materialism and the merely negative function of psychoanalytic therapy.

May's main work in pastoral care[52] purports to utilize the theory of Freud, Jung, Rank and Kunkel and especially Adler in the understanding of people, but he departs from strict psychoanalytic technique in his emphasis on empathy, creative and appreciative understanding, rather than intellectual and formal analysis.

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50. Ibid., p. 20.

51. J. A. C. Murray, An Introduction to a Christian Psycho-therapy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938.

52. Rollo May, The Art of Counseling, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942, p. 206.

Wise[53] recognizes that psychoanalysis alone has been concerned in differentiating healthy and pathological religious expression. It has made "a large and valuable contribution at the point of discovering some basic realities in the nature of love."[54] He also recognizes the validity of the psychoanalytic interpretation of ideals as the development of the super-ego and in the capacity to identify, although he opposes psychoanalytic reduction of religion to unconscious processes.[55]

Cabot and Dicks[56] and Blanton and Peale[57] represent medico-ministerial teams whose work illustrates the possibilities for cooperative services toward more effective mental health. This movement toward the synthesizing of psychiatry and religion was furthered by the conferences of psychiatrists, ministers and social scientists such as those held in Washington in 1947-1948 and Boston in 1948[58] which sought to coordinate thinking on the various professions' mutual and complementary services to the mentally distressed.

53. Carrol A. Wise, Religion in Illness and Health. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942, p. 206.
54. Ibid., p. 213.
55. Ibid., pp. 162, 163, 127. See also his Pastoral Counseling, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951.
56. Richard C. Cabot and Russell L. Dicks, The Art of Ministering to the Sick. New York: Macmillan, 1944.
57. Smiley Blanton and Norman V. Peale, Faith is the Answer. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1940.
58. Reported in the Journal of Pastoral Care, (1947) pp. 2-15, the symposium edited by Joshua L. Liebman, and in Psychiatry and Religion. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948.

Hiltner's recent text,[59] is written from a thoroughly dynamic point of view and reflects an appreciative attitude toward the pioneer work of Freud and the contributions of contemporary psychoanalysts, particularly Horney and Fromm.

Until the present time there have been no studies of Pfister and his work in psychoanalytic pastoral care. He is mentioned in the works of Deabler, Bramble, Weatherhead, Barbour, Allers, Holman, Zilboorg, Valentine, Wittels, Casey and Hiltner, usually in recognition of his contribution to psychoanalysis and its literature. Hiltner states:

> It is something of a mystery why Pfister has been so little known in America. Had he written more stridently, doubtless he would have been translated earlier. His works which have found their way into English appeared so late that their circulation has been handicapped. While not strikingly original, they deserve more serious attention than they have yet received.[60]

Casey writes of him:

> His principle service was a prolonged study of religious persons who came to him for help and to whose problems he applied psychoanalytic insight and modified analytic treatment. His work, therefore, on religious education, and on the place of religion among the causes and cures of

59. Seward Hiltner, Pastoral Counseling. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1949.
60. Seward Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding of Religion," The Crozer Quarterly, 24(1947), p. 13.

> of religious people's difficulties, possess a pecular value. Unlike the professional psychiatrist he was in touch with many problems not brought to a doctor's office and with many persons not amenable to conventional observation and procedure.[61]

4. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The primary sources to be investigated were Pfister's own writings among which are forty-eight articles and twenty-three books available for this study. Although some of his publications were not available, Dr. Pfister has cooperated generously in furnishing from his own library those articles which cannot be found in this country and which may be pertinent to the study. His published articles represent writing done for psychoanalytic periodicals, religious and educational journals, as well as lectures originally given to meetings of educators, ministers, psychoanalysts and mental hygienists. Some of his articles and books have been translated although the major portion is in the original German. Further information, dealing specifically with problems in the thesis, was gained from personal correspondence with Dr. Pfister who has offered this further service.

61. R. P. Casey, "The Psychoanalytic Study of Religion," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 33(1938), p. 440.

Other sources of information were the writings of Freud, of other psychoanalysts, psychologists of religion and pastoral psychologists as presented in the previous section. These were re-examined in the light of the present problems of this study and will furnish the frame of reference for a more adequate and critical investigation of Pfister's work.

5. METHODS OF RESEARCH

The methods of research to be employed are first, biographical. We shall attempt to discover the facts and relationships in Pfister's life and work which may be pertinent to our aim of study. Secondly, the historical method will be used to trace the development of psychoanalysis and pastoral care during Pfister's ministry and to discover the historical setting for his work in terms of contemporary psychologies and prevailing church practices regarding pastoral care.

Thirdly, logical analysis of the data of Pfister's pastoral and psychoanalytic work will be made from a psychological and theological viewpoint. For his pastoral psychology must meet both standards of psychological and theological adequacy. The fourth method of research

will be that of systematic comparison; that is, Pfister's work is to be compared systematically with other psychoanalysts and psychologists of religion and pastoral care. Fifth, we shall attempt a critical evaluation of the data and of Pfister's combination of psychoanalysis and religion.

6. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Although definitions of specific terms in the study will follow, it may be well at the outset to define the scope of the terms, religion and psychoanalysis. Both are to be defined later from the point of view of Pfister. However, it should be noted that by religion we mean chiefly the Christian faith in its theological and therapeutic and practical behavioral aspects. Likewise, the term, psychoanalysis, is understood to refer not only to the method of therapy discovered and developed by Freud and his followers, but also to the theory of personality which has grown out of that clinical experience.

7. OUTLINE OF INVESTIGATION

The study, then, will proceed in the following way: First, we shall investigate the life and times of Pfister with special attention to the religious and psychological

thought of his day in Continental Europe. Second, we shall examine Pfister's activities in the psychoanalytic group. Third, we shall look at Pfister's work as popularizer and interpreter of psychoanalysis to discover his methods of defense of psychoanalysis against the current prejudices and to discover the scope and value of his applications of psychoanalysis. Fourth, we shall make a comparative study of Pfister's and Freud's theories of psychoanalysis. Fifth, Pfister's view of religion as a churchman and as an analyst will be contrasted with Freud's. Sixth, through the experience of Pfister we shall critically examine the opportunities and limitations of the pastoral application of psychoanalysis, and finally, we shall evaluate Pfister's contribution to the psychology of religion and pastoral psychology.

CHAPTER II

OSCAR PFISTER'S LIFE AND TIMES

1. HIS LIFE

The chief source of information concerning the life of Oscar Pfister is an autobiographical sketch entitled, Die Pädogogik der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen.[1] Although many details are missing, it is written with the educational influences in Pfister's life foremost in mind. It provides the core of our biography.

Oscar Robert Pfister was born in Zurich, Switzerland on February 23, 1873. His father, according to the son's estimate of him, was a liberal and enlightened minister in the Reformed Church. His life had been saved from diptheria during childhood by an operation, and this so impressed him that he resolved to study medicine so he could be simultaneously a body and soul doctor. Before he reached his goal, however, he died when Oscar was only three years of age. His mother, widowed with four boys, of whom he was the youngest, settled in straitened circumstances with a Moravian community.

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1. Oscar Pfister, Die Pädagogik der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellung. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, No date.

The strongest impressions of childhood which Pfister recalls most readily center about the ineptness and cruelty of his teachers. One incident indelibly marked in memory was the harsh punishment meted out to one of his small comrades who fell asleep in school and the accompanying anguish. When he was seven he remembers his teacher as an alcoholic who beat unmercifully two retarded girls. This action pleased most of the other students, but it filled the more sensitive boy with bitterness.

During his tenth and eleventh years, however, he met a young teacher who was a great benefactor to his development, and whose excellent instruction and spiritual inspiration Pfister long remembered. He gives this teacher the credit for laying the foundations for his manner of critical thought. His gymnasium days were boring to him; he found escape in musical enjoyments. In the later years he was inspired by the teachers of German and of history. A skeptical history teacher's barbed sarcasm directed at Christianity confirmed him in what had been his childhood dream, to study theology.

At the University of Basel, 1891-1892, where he intended to study theology he found philosophy more to his liking. He had been brought up in orthodox Pietism, but he revolted against the attempts made by the theological

faculty to prove miracles as scientific facts. He transferred to philosophy in the first semester, and it was Hermann Lotze who led him back to religious belief. He was a great admirer also of Paulsen. He loved the history of philosophy[2] but psychology brought him his greatest disillusionment. After eight semesters in Basel and Zurich, he passed his state's examination in theology and then turned in earnest to the serious study of philosophy.

He wrote his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of religion and psychology of religion of the Zurich theologian, A. E. Biedermann. But he was still unsettled. Having sought through philosophers and psychologists in order to find the origins of piety or religious experience, he found regularly the banal result that in religion as in every psychic act the ordinary intellect, feeling and will were manifested. Nevertheless he did not give up hope for an adequate religious psychology.

Before his philosophical examinations had been taken, he had decided upon his practical work. He felt compelled to leave his more formal scholarly study; he loved the pulpit work, the pastoral care of the sick, the

2. This love seems never to have been lost, for in his Love of Children and its Aberrations and Christianity and Fear he has spared no pains to sketch carefully the philosophical background of the problem.

oppressed, the erring, those needing help and especially religious instruction. This decision was probably confirmed by his attendance in 1896 at a "psychiatrisch-forensisches Kolleg in Berlin an der Charite, einer grossen Klinik,"[3] which was an important part of clinical pastoral training and from which experience he later wrote an article on "Zur Aetiologie und Symptomatologie der Katatonie."[4]

Consequently, he assumed in 1897 the pastorate of a church in Zurich Oberland where he remained for five years. He married his first wife, Erica Wunderli, in 1898, and became the father of one son.[5] During his first pastorate he wrote Die Willensfreiheit (1901) as a vindication of the Christian religion. It was one of his responsibilities to give religious instruction to four hundred school children, 12 to 16 years of age and from seven different grades. He found that any difficulty in holding their attention was allayed by the lively instruction of religion presented as health, a source of joy and protection.

3. Personal correspondence, letter of December 3, 1949.
4. In Allgemein Zeitschrift fur Psychiatrie. 63(1906), pp. 275-298.
5. His first wife died in 1929 after which he married again. He had only the one son.

In his ministry he was confronted with human misery, moral distresses, and also by the desire for life and moral greatness, the desire to be freed of filth and hunger on the part of some of the promising youth. His method of handling delinquency[6] proved its worth as evidenced by the fact that upon one occasion when he found a crowd of boys burning a Bible and dancing around the fire in the plaza next to the church, he kept his faith in them, and eventually developed a friendly relationship with the town's young manhood which has not been broken.

He maintained interest in psychology, writing in the Protestantische Monatshefte an article, "Die Unterlassungssünde der Theologie gegenüber der modernen Psychologie" (Theology's Sin of Omission Against Modern Psychology, 1903) of which he says, "Schon damals war mein Glaube an eine denknotwedige Metaphysik stark ins Wanken geraten."[7] He insisted that theological method

6. He agreed essentially with the method's of August Aichhorn of whom he was a great admirer. See Aichhorn's Wayward Youth, New York: Viking, 1944; also Pfister's "Therapy and Ethics in August Aichhorn's Treatment of Wayward Youth" in Searchlights on Delinquency. The method called for compensation for lack of love and gradual making of demands upon the youth.
7. Pfister, Die Pädogogik, op. cit., p. 6.

should meet the severe requirements of an exact science. He set himself the task of setting up principles for a Christian science of belief. In 1905 he published in the Schweizerischen theologischen Zeitschrift, Vol. 22, "Das Elend unserer wissenschaftlichen Glaubenslehre" which he summarized in these words:

> Die heutige Glaubenslehre ist antiquarisch, abstrakt, scholastisch, unwissenschaftlich, desorientiert; sie ist auf metaphysisch-spekulative Abwege geraten, sie befasst sich nicht mit der ganzen, lebendigen Persönlichkeit, sie knüft nicht an das Phänomen der einzelnen Glaubenstatsachen an und weiss sie nicht wissenschaftlich exakt zu bearbeiten, zie hat den Sinn für das Persönliche, Geniale, Prophetische zerstört.[8]

This, then he set as his task, to establish the empirical basis of theology which is scientifically grounded and to demonstrate its practical utility.

He found parish duties prevented him from following his course of action and study. At the same time, he was dissatisfied with the traditional religious instruction. The learning of Biblical material, songs and speeches did not seem to fulfill nor challenge the religious and moral disposition as it is necessary for life. He tried experimentations in education. He gave special homework to the ill who often times were living in morally

8. Ibid., p. 7.

vile circumstances. He observed how these students responded better than had been anticipated. His church authorities were understanding and cooperative in his work. His leadership in the church community was recognized by his serving as chairman of the Kantonalen Zurich Pfarrergesellschaff in 1906.

In 1908 he was invited to become professor in ordinary of systematic and practical theology, but after inner struggle he found it impossible to leave his congregation. He was much attracted to abstract theology, but his interest in science counseled him that if he were to teach the science of belief and practical theology, he must be connected with a congregation. More and more, he considered book learning an abomination. He was horrified to know later two professors of education and authors of pedagogical textbooks who had had no practical experience in education. He later spurned several offers to teach even though he recognized that people did not consider a scholar at full value if he did not bear a professorial title.

Shortly after his decision against teaching he heard of Sigmund Freud for the first time in June, 1908. Earlier he had practiced psychotherapy in the sense of suggestion as advocated at the time of Dr. Paul Dubois,

the Bernese neurologist. He had some good results. He avoided a stronger interest in this healing method because it did not get at the necessity of causal relationships and its stereotyped form of therapy was boring to him. It appeared to him too much of an adroit trick; and he believed that it was of little use and held small truth for the pastor, for it challenged no moral insight in the removal of neurotic symptoms.

It was through his interest in the care of souls that he was led to psychoanalysis. A respectable woman came to him bearing an anonymous calumniating letter which had caused her much torment. His suspicion that she herself had written the letter was confirmed by Dr. Jung, and with his help he started his analysis of the woman. Soon, however, the difficulties and complications in the case became too much for him. He didn't know whether his first attraction to a thorough study of Freud was more theoretical or practical. But there was no endless speculation on the metaphysics of the soul, no experimenting with minutiae while the great problems of life were undisturbed, no self-satisfaction with mere denial of spiritual and mental life and experience, of myth, language, forms of society, living religions, and

the moral acts and feelings. The highest functions of life preceded the microscopy of the soul; their origin and mutual relations, the laws of development, their deeper meaning in the whole of psychic experience were of importance for psychoanalysis. The pathological had played a great part in his pastoral and educational experience. Thus the psychoanalytical investigation and the practical work went hand in hand.

He now became able to help a variety of sick people with whom heretofore he could only stand by and watch helplessly. Soon they came to him for help, the hysterical, anxiety and compulsive neurotics, even many psychopaths. He called on a number of physicians to help him out of difficulties and in diagnosis. He selected out for his treatment those patients with whom the moral and religious problem stood in the foreground, and among these, especially those who were not sick in the medical sense of the word. He saw the success of his work with people who were morally crippled, disturbed and distracted because of unconscious forces causing aberrations. Compulsive neurotics responded especially well. Now he was able to reach into the powerful depths of the soul which pedagogy considered beyond the realm of conventional respectability.

Opposition was not lacking. Several doctors criticized him for dealing with the sick. But he countered that doctors were the intruders in the care of souls since the so-called nervousness of men was not organic but spiritual and moral. He was encouraged by Freud and several analytical psychiatrists. Educators began to see unwillingly the necessity of investigating the sexual needs in the inner depths of their student's souls. Physicians avoided the work as unpleasant; others denounced it from grounds of prudery. The theologians could not approve his discovering the life of faith in its immediate actuality instead of picking it out of books. Strongest opposition came from the psychologists, who, still enamored of the experimental and statistical methods, could not understand anything of the total unity and development of the soul. The spirit of geometry ruled in psychology.

His main pedagogical work, The Psychoanalytic Method, appeared in June, 1913. Although there is only a glimmering of the differences between Freud, Adler and Jung in this book, this deficiency was made up in a later publication.[9] Pfister generally considered Freud by far the

9. Oscar Pfister, Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education. (Authorized translation) London: Henry Kimpton, 1922.

deepest observer. Adler had reduced neuroses to an unsuitable reaction to physical inferiority. Will to power was the central motive according to him; love and sexuality were relegated to mere accompanying phenomena to the development of the power of the will. This did not accord with Pfister's observations. He did not believe it correct that the instincts should be dealt with as separate departments of the soul, but the development of sexuality was entangled with that of self-esteem, feelings of worth, and the drive to power was related to love. Pfister maintained the strict unity of the soul.

When in 1914 the Zurich society for Psychoanalysis completely broke with Freud, Pfister resigned from the group. It was a difficult step for him to make because he had helped found the organization, and had derived from it much stimulation. Until 1919, when the Swiss Psychoanalytical Society was established, he stood quite alone in Zurich in his views in support of Freud.

Pfister's writings, which will be considered more fully in Chapters III and IV, and as can be seen by a cursory examination of his bibliography, were directed toward the learned during his first decade of work in psychoanalysis; but more and more in later years he wrote for a broad reading public, seeking not only to popularize

and clarify the concepts of psychoanalysis, but to help many people to have available the insights of psychoanalysis for the purpose of self-analysis.

Through Pfister's organizational affiliations and membership in professional bodies, the breadth of his associations becomes apparent. Besides his membership in the local society of ministers, he became in 1920 the founder and president of the Relief Committee for Famine Stricken People in Zurich. For thirteen years, from 1933 to 1946, he served as central president of the Allgemeiner Evangelischer-protestantischer Missionsverein. He is an honorary member of the Swiss Society of Psychoanalysis, the Swiss Society of Psychology, a member of the International Society of Psychoanalysis, and a corresponding member of the Vienna Society of Neurology and Psychiatry.

Pfister's fundamental points of view are derived from the demands of his own nature, from critical experiences and crucial experiments in his life and ministry, from psychoanalysis and from Christianity. Scientific psychology, as represented by psychoanalysis, was the meeting of his mind's demand for rational understanding and his heart's need to serve his fellow men. Psychoanalysis saved him from the cold abstractions of tra-

ditional theology and the frustrations of his father, who, as a minister, wished to study medicine that he might better meet people's needs. For him "Das Christentum ist die Erlösungsreligion, die zu einem Leben in wahrer Freiheit helfen will."[10] Through psychoanalysis he dealt with moral and religious problems which were on the borderline between medicine and theology. External symptoms medically speaking were seen by him to be the manifestations of a moral conflict. He saw that the persuasion method of Dubois might remove the external symptoms but leave the cause untouched. To be sure, suggestion and auto-suggestion might prevent a complete moral derailment, but unless the inner moral problem was solved there was no true release. This he believed conformed well to Jesus' concern with the inner motive of life's behavior. Individual psychology held great possibilities for alleviating the psychic suffering of people and restoring productive health through tracing the actual conditions of the individual in life so that diagnosis and help could be given. He held that love is the foremost means of education. Inasmuch as psychoanalysis can proceed only in a transference situation, it furthers the

10. Pfister, Die Pädagogik, p. 15.

development of love. Such is a practical expression of the Christian view of love.

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUNDS

Late nineteenth century saw the birth of scientific psychology. Although psychology was still a branch of philosophy in most universities, in its experimental forms it was reacting against the absolutistic synthesizing of Hegel whose thought dominated German philosophy in the early nineteenth century.

Herbart (1776-1841) was one of the first who turned from idealism in his attempt to imitate the natural sciences. He thought of the soul in terms of a quantity of energy, and his system presented mathematically complex formulae for its distribution. The work of Johannes Müller in general physiology (1835) introduced new interest in neurology. Influenced by Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy (1826-1842) he rejected introspectionism for behaviorism and found the seat of human actions in the reflex. This reduction of behavior to other than rational control, which figures so centrally in psychoanalytic thought, had another precursor in Schopenhauer's philosophy which gave primacy to the will. Müller developed a physiological psychology distinct from medicine

and made notable studies in vision, color and speech.

Weber (1795-1878) and Fechner (1801-1887) made extensive research into psychophysics or the exact measurements of stimuli and sensations. Weber's work in touch and temperature resulted in Weber's law (1834) which states the proportion between stimulus strength and strength of sensation. Fechner elaborated upon this law in his physiological study of sensation, and in his monumental work, Elemente der Psychophysik, (1860) contributes the theories of just noticeable differences, right and wrong cases, and average error. Helmholtz (1821-1894), although influenced by the idealistic philosophy, worked on the physiology of perception, especially vision and sound. His chief works were Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik (1859) and Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen: Physiologische Grundlage für die Theorie der Musik (1873).

Lotze was a conciliatory influence between idealistic philosophy and physiological psychology. His chief psychological work, Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (1852) was a development of the thesis that psychology must be grounded in the neural processes of the organism. At the same time he held to the spirituality and individuality of the human soul. Lotze was much misunderstood in his efforts to reconcile the ideal-

istic philosophy and scientific method, but the fact that Pfister gives him the credit for restoring his faith is at least one personal testimony of his success. Lotze's metaphysical position was that human reason distinguished the world of fact, of law and of value, which in reality are inseparable. His making fact and law instrumental in the realization of value gives ultimate primacy to personality; thus he was no materialist, and for all his interest in the physiology of the soul, he represents a distinct position from his contemporary psychologists whose experimentalism and reductionism led them away from the person as a whole to the minutae of separate sensations and stimuli.

With the work of Wundt in the founding of the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879 the age of modern psychology was officially opened. Wundt did not consider the soul as a separate agent but as a particular class of actions. Behavior as a function of the organism was to be explained in terms of physiological processes correlated with psychological events. With his founding of modern experimental psychology, the analysis of specific isolated problems under controlled circumstances became the order of the day. The thesis underlying the experimentation was that psychical states are

compounded of simple elements, the sensations of which are exactly measurable.

Pfister seems to be less directly influenced by the psychologists of France and England. British associationism was giving way to disputes over the mind-body problem and interest in the abnormal. James Ward, G. F. Stout, and the scholastic, Brentano, with his opposition to physiology and the subconscious, were British self-psychologists which are not mentioned in Pfister's writings. French psychology, on the other hand, was in the hands of medical men interested in psychopathology and in methods of treatment. He was sympathetic with their progress in therapy, but he was influenced by them through Freud. Charcot (1825-1893), with whom Freud studied, conceded the importance of suggestion and had conducted experiments in hypnotism with some success, but he never relinquished the physiological point of view. Janet continued Charcot's study of hysteria particularly in connection with somnambulism and hysterical fugues and emphasized the process of dissociation. Ribot (1839-1916) in Diseases of Memory (1881) and Diseases of Personality (1885) contributed to the literature of psychopathology. Taine's work on intelligence (1870) was followed by

Alfred Binet's (1857-1911) significant formulation of the intelligence test. During this period also Le Bon, Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim were making important studies in social psychology and primitive anthropology.

Since Pfister was not a medical man he did not share the theoretical interest of the French in psychopathology. He did, however, show interest in their empirical study of mental disease particularly of the neurotic rather than the psychotic type, and he recognized the groundwork done by the French upon which psychoanalysis was developed.

As we shall see later more clearly, Pfister's relationship to the forms in which the contemporary experimental psychology were taking was one of antagonism. The dissecting of the soul appeared to be of no advantage in therapy and this was his main criterion for psychological adequacy. The theoretical framework of his thought was strengthened by the synthesizing work of Lotze in establishing the relationship between natural science and philosophy, and he did recognize the therapeutic importance of the French psychiatrists, but for the materialism and reductionism of the German experimental psychology he held no hope.

3. ECCLESIASTICAL BACKGROUNDS

Not only are the psychological backgrounds of Pfister's life important for our consideration of his interest in psychoanalysis, but it is also helpful to note the general character of the church within which he did his work. Inasmuch as Pfister's work in psychoanalysis was done in and through his ministry in the Reformed Church in Switzerland it should be instructive to examine the church which permitted one of its ministers not only to practice psychoanalysis as a pastoral aid, but also to be its active advocate. This may appear quite surprising when, although some Roman Catholic priests are thoroughly acquainted with psychoanalysis and have written generally critical works on it although at the same time recognizing some of its merits, the Roman Catholic Church denounces it as heretical.[11]

Freedom is the historical heritage and present condition of the State Church in Switzerland. The "Formula Consensus" which was adopted by most of the cantons in 1676 as a means of confessional unity failed

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11. Rudolf Allers, The Successful Error. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940; Fulton J. Sheen, Peace of Soul." New York: Whittlesey House, 1949. See above p.9, footnote 11. The Roman Catholic position is clearly and concisely stated in Vander Weldt and Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism, pp. 141-159, 177-218.

in its purpose,[12] for as soon as 1725 most of the clergy ignored the creed and many "had practically given up faith in the divinity of Christ, the doctrine of original sin, and of predestination."[13]

In mid-nineteenth century religious conditions were unsettled in Switzerland. The advocates of orthodoxy were strongest in Berne, whereas Pfister's city, Zurich, was the home of the rationalistic school, which was another factor in warranting the freedom which Pfister exercised. A survey of religious conditions up to 1900 reports thus upon the Swiss Church:

> Throughout French and German Switzerland the changes of conditions followed each other with great rapidity. The religious life of the church failed to satisfy large masses, who, as a result, became infected with fanaticism, leading to serious consequences for the faith. Modifications in the form of government prepared the way for neglect not only of the Church, but of the private exercise of religion, and had the effect of moral degeneration upon the people, which was improved, however, until together with the general life of the Church it equals the best ecclesiastical conditions of the Continent.[14]

12. This creed to which all preachers were expected to subscribe was the "last doctrinal confession of the Reformed Church of Switzerland and closes the period of Calvinistic creeds." It was in essential agreement with the Synod of Dort, approving in particular the literal inspiration of the scripture and God's decrees of the innocense of creation, the Fall, salvation of the elect only. See Phillip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, Vol. I. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1878, pp. 477-481.
13. John F. Hurst, History of the Christian Church, Vol. 2. New York: Eaton and Mains, 1900, p. 773.
14. Ibid.

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Pfister has personally testified to the freedom of the church and the confidence of its authorities and the congregations which permitted him to practice psychoanalysis in his parish without interference and even with evident support.

> Unsere Schweizerkirchen sind die freiesten der Welt, wofür ich Gott danke. Ich habe nie die geringsten konflickte mit den Behörden gehabb und genoss das herzlichste Vertrauen der Gemeinde bis zu meinem Rücktritt 1939, ja bis heute.[15]

Among the Swiss pastors contemporary with Pfister who have given their support to psychoanalysis, at least through their writings, are A. Waldburger of Ragaz, a Calvinist; Theodore Johner, a conservative theologian; and Adolf Keller, the ecumenicalist of Zurich.[16]

Thus we are to understand that there was a minimum of institutional restraint upon Pfister's independently working out a synthesis between a scientific psychology and the Christian faith. Indeed, the necessities of his congregation and of his own mind and Christian calling made imperative for him such a synthesis.

This synthesis began with his early contacts with Freud's writings and with the psychoanalytic group in

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15. Oscar Pfister in personal letter of December 3, 1949.
16. Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, p. 13

Zurich. We will now examine his early development in the understanding of psychoanalysis, his early practice and his associations in the psychoanalytic group in order to get a clearer idea of his conception of psychoanalysis and to begin to see how he began to establish the relationship between psychoanalysis and Christianity.

CHAPTER III

OSCAR PFISTER'S PLACE IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC GROUP

1. EARLIER ASSOCIATIONS

Pfister considers 1909 the time when he became a follower of Freud. This is a significant year in the history of the psychoanalytic movement for in this year Freud was introduced to the American public through the five famous lectures at Clark University arranged by G. Stanley Hall, president of the University. Prior to his interest in psychoanalysis Pfister had read extensively in the classical and contemporary psychologists looking in vain for psychological understanding that would be of practical use in the pastoral ministry. He appreciated Bleuler's exasperation with such writings.

> Like many another psychiatrist I have lost a great deal of my precious time in searching the psychological textbooks for knowledge that should facilitate the comprehension of psychopathology...I perceived, too, how many non-medical men are longing, in social intercourse, or in educational or pastoral work, to obtain a better understanding of psychology, and how grievously they are disappointed. It is our duty to help those who are looking for knowledge and actual achievement, instead of leading them into the wilderness of speculation, offering them a science which, indeed, has discovered thousands of isolated data, but

> has usually no more to offer than a few crumbs which are of no use to the student.[1]

Pfister's enthusiasm for psychoanalysis, on the other hand, was great from the start. His early preparation consisted of studying the works of Freud and carrying on analyses under the supervision of sympathetic psychiatrists. We know of no analysis that he submitted to; perhaps didactic analysis was not a standardized requirement in the early days of the psychoanalytic movement. However, from the frequent recommendations of self-analysis we may infer that Pfister did, as most analysts do continually, practice this form of analytic understanding. He also studied ten years in the psychoanalytic seminar, which was conducted by the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society in Zurich, before which papers were read by the members who also took responsibility for giving assistance to younger members in their practice and in their theoretical grasp of psychoanalysis.

His practice began among school children and youths of the seminary in Zurich as well as among his parishioners in the church. Evidently he devoted much time to analysis for by 1913, at least, he reported 2,000 to

1. Oscar Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis. (Authorized translation) George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1923, p. 161, 162, citing Bleuler, "Die psych. Richtung in der Psychiatrie," in Schweizer Archiv. f. d. Neurologie u. Psychiatrie, ii. p. 192.

3,000 hours of analyzing.[2]

2. THE SWISS PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

Pfister's development in psychoanalysis can be clearly observed in his affiliation with the professional group of analysts in Zurich. Not only was this association the way by which he extended his own understanding of psychoanalysis, but it also profited from his membership and leadership in it.

His relationship to the psychoanalytic group in Zurich may be considered at the outset as a kind of anomaly, especially when his attitude to Freud's and Freud's attitude to Jung and Bleuler, the outstanding psychiatrists of Zurich, are considered. During Jung's presidency of the Psychoanalytic Congress from 1909 to 1913, Freud's earlier devotion to his brilliant student turned to positive antagonism. In his Psychology of the Unconscious (Eng., 1916) Jung discovered the divine as well as the animal in the unconscious and he ascribed the Oedipus complex and other sexual processes to the province of symbolization. The libido he understood to be genetic not sexual energy. Both Jung and Bleuler

2. Oscar Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method. (tr. C. R. Payne) New York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1917, p. 154.

seceded, or rather were expelled by the master, from the true psychoanalytic faith. It may seem strange that with Jung, grounded in Freudian theory and departing from it for the sake of religious interests, Pfister did not follow him. Pfister, unlike Jung and Bleuler, maintained belief in the Oedipus complex and the importance of repressed sexuality in the neurotic nucleus, and even in later writings has remained close to Freudian orthodoxy in theory even though he did practice a modified analysis. Wittels explains Jung's apostacy, in part, on the grounds of the influence of Calvin, but there seems little to substantiate this view.[3]

Pfister's activity among professional psychoanalysts in Zurich is seen in the fact that on February 10, 1919 he took the initiative with Dr. Oberholzer and his wife to send out a letter of invitation to the first meeting of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society. How the early exponents of the new psychology had separated themselves like sectarians in religion may be seen by the fact that the stated membership in the new group was to "embrace all those adherents of psychoanalysis who had not accepted the theories of Adler and Jung."[4] Fifty were

3. Fritz Wittels, Freud and His Time. (Tr. Louise Brink) New York: Horace, Liveright Inc., 1931, p. 187.
4. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1(1920), p. 365.

invited; twenty-one responded. The society was organized at the first meeting for the purpose of the "theoretical and practical exercise and encouragement of the psychoanalytic method founded by Freud."[5] Rules adopted by the society, and which we shall see governed Pfister's practice, stated that non-medical men should work in cooperation with a medical doctor to avoid diagnostic errors.

It is interesting to note that among the early constituents of the group were Hermann Rorschach, elected the first vice-president, and Jean Piaget.[6] Pfister was a member of the original executive committee.

Pfister's first paper read before the society was at the second meeting when he presented his "Biological and Psychological Foundations of Expressionism."[7] This was the report on the analysis of a young artist, whose artistic expressions were employed as means of drawing

5. Ibid., p. 366.
6. Jean Piaget is, in the estimation of Husband in General Psychology, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940, p. 476, "an eminent Swiss child psychologist." See also Piaget's, "The Language and Thought of the Child. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1927.
7. Later published and translated into English by Barbara Low and M. A. Mügge as Expressionism in Art: Its Psychological and Biological Basis. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923.

forth unconscious material and establishing associations. Two years later Rorschach read "The Use of Experiments in the Interpretation on Ink Blots for Psychoanalytic Purposes."

During 1921 Pfister read two papers, one in April on "The Analysis of Capitalist Mentality" and in December, "Small Contributions to Freud's Theory of Dreams." Hans Zullinger, a member of the group, shared Pfister's interest in education as seen in his paper read in the June meeting of the same year entitled "Psychoanalytic Lights from Experience in Primary Schools." He had adopted the term "Ped-analysis" which Pfister is supposed to have coined in his Psychoanalytic Method (1913, p. 524). The interest in educational subjects seems to have been maintained throughout. Whether Pfister contributed to this emphasis can only be surmised by his numerous publications on the subject.

We note in the reports of the society[8] during 1923 that although Pfister is not mentioned, outside lectures to educational groups were mentioned as part of member's activities. In 1925 Pfister was elected vice-president

8. These reports have appeared with some regularity in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, and they comprise the chief source of information regarding the Society's activities.

of the society. During 1928 he held the office of secretary. During the same year he is reported to have been active in the preparation of candidates and in lecturing on psychoanalysis and related subjects to various groups. In January he gave a lecture, "The Influence of the Unconscious on the Choice of a Profession," in connection with a course given in the Zurich High School which was organized by the Juvenile Advisory Organization for the Canton of Zurich and intended for workers who would be called upon to advise youth in their choice of employment. In February of 1928 he gave a series of lectures at Buer in the Ruhr district. These lectures sponsored by the University Extension Lectures for teachers were given to the Teachers Unions and others interested in Psychoanalysis and its applications to educational work. Seven hundred persons were reported to have attended the lectures. Subjects which he covered were "The Nature of 'Depth' Education," "The Old Educational Methods in the Light of Psychoanalysis" and "The Application of Psychoanalysis to the Training of Children."

In the same month Pfister delivered a lecture, "Errors in Education and Their After-effects" at Kirche Alstetten at the invitation of the Educational Authority. Before the chapter meeting of clergymen of the Zurich

district he read a paper on "The Necessity for Spiritual Care of the 'Deep' Mental Processes."

In May and June of 1928 Pfister was one of seven who gave the introductory lectures for the training of candidates at Berne. He spoke on "The Possibilities and Scope of Psychoanalysis" before an audience of 120-150 including physicians, teachers, parents and students. The society reports that press notices were favorable and showed interest in the work.

Papers read before the psychoanalytic society included Pfister's report on "The Analysis of a Twentieth Century Witch," being a number of sessions he had had with a woman popularly believed to be a witch. Dr. Harnik, a guest of the society from Berlin, read a paper on "The Problem of Religious Conflicts in Psychoanalytic Therapy" being a case of the treatment of a woman who described her religious conflicts and, in tracing them to early childhood experiences under analysis, resolved them.

Whether 1928 was a year of increased activity in promulgating psychoanalysis or just thoroughly reported, we do not know. At any rate, it suggests the enthusiasm Pfister had for psychoanalysis, the interest and response of the public and the extent to which he publicized and

supported the new movement as a practicing analyst, teacher, lecturer and minister.

A year later he gave analytical comments on an ex-service man's account of his experiences in the war entitled "Thoughts and Phantasies Induced by Shock during Dangers of Death." At another meeting discussion centered on the possible connection between the religious sentiment and mother fixation.

In November, 1930, having returned from a visit to America,[9] Pfister read a paper, "Intuitive Psychoanalysis amongst the Indians of Navaho," which comprised the account and psychoanalytic explanation of two cases of cure by the medicine men. Pfister noted the intuitive recognition on the part of the medicine man of death wishes the patient had for relatives. The other case involved incest wishes in a female patient suffering from sterility. Cures were effected through ceremonies in which the whole tribe participated and in which drawings in the sand with easily recognized symbolism were

9. Pfister had been invited to attend an International Congress on Mental Hygiene in 1914 which was cancelled because of the war. He did attend the First International Congress on Mental Hygiene held at Washington, D.C., in May, 1930. His speech on the significance of religious values for mental health appears pp. 544-546, Vol. II of the Proceedings.

involved. The paper was received as an "important addition to our knowledge of ethnology and folk psychology."[10]

A few months later Pfister appeared before the society to report on his "Analysis of a Young Man Convicted of Habitual Theft and of Murder," which was also an experience which he had had of visiting for some hours with a prison inmate in America.

The minutes of the 1931 meetings include the reference that Pfister had been among those who had spoken "at the invitation of various private societies on the use of psychoanalysis in pastoral, educational and remedial work." Four papers were read by him in the same year on sundry topics: "From the Analysis of a Buddhist," "Hamlet at the Chess Board," "The Psychoanalysis of Motor Driving," and "The Analysis of a Swindle."

Fortunately, his paper, "The Part Played by Anxiety in the Structure of Religion," read before the society in 1932 is reported in abstract. He dealt with animism and magic as the preliminary stages of religion and proposes that the purpose of all religion and religious practices is to bind or allay anxiety. He recognized that in certain circumstances anxiety is increased by religion until a reforming tendency makes its appearance. His

10. International Journal of Psychoanalysis. 12(1931), p. 259.

evaluation and comparison of religion and psychoanalysis are implied in the statement, "The ideal conception of the overcoming of anxiety by religion is (at the present time in the great religions of civilization) usually impractical without the aid of analysis."[11]

Pfister's long service to psychoanalysis was recognized by the society in a minute of the February 25, 1933 meeting.

> On February 23, 1933 Pfarrer Dr. Pfister completed his sixtieth year. At the meeting of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society on February 25, 1933, the President congratulated him on the occasion in an address expressing his own and the society's admiration and appreciation of Dr. Pfister's long loyalty and devotion to Professor Freud and to psychoanalysis and his untiring energies in working for the cause.[12]

In the next year the society had another occasion to congratulate Pfister upon his receipt of the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Theology from the University of Geneva.

Papers read before the society's meetings in 1934 and 1936 continue the trend started with the paper read in 1932 toward a more definite treatment of religious subjects. "The Cure of Souls in the New Testament and Psychoanalytic Therapy" (1934) and "The Experience of

11. Ibid., 14(1933), p. 291.
12. Ibid., 15(1934), p. 457.

Inspiration" (1936) are the last notices of his activities appearing in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis.

If there be any shifting of emphasis in his papers read before the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society from 1920 - 1936 it appears to be from the more general illustration or documentation of standard Freudian concepts and a consistent interest in education through a period of rather random excursions into various fields of psychoanalytic applications to what might be called the religious phase. One might observe a similar pattern in his major published and translated writings: The Psychoanalytic Method (1915), Some Applications of Psychoanalysis (1922), Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education (1922), and Christianity and Fear (1944).

3. PFISTER AS POPULARIZER OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

It becomes quite apparent from our examination of the nature and scope of Pfister's activities with the psychoanalytic group that he was a member of the group, not merely for his own edification and experience, but that he might spread the truth of psychoanalysis. Although he has said, "Meine Ansichten sind sehr nahe verwandt denjenigen des methodistischen Geistlichen

Leslie D. Weatherhead,"[13] his writings have not been so consistently just the psychological interpretation and validation of the Christian faith in life as have Weatherhead's, but he has written a great deal toward the substantiating of the validity of psychoanalysis - and his more popular works are in the latter group.

It is true that many of the special investigations have dealt with the psychological analysis of the religious behavior of certain types of individuals found in church history. These are apart from those studies made by him concerning the parishioners or clients who came to him with their concrete moral and spiritual problems. One of the first that he dealt with was Die Frommigkeit des Grafen Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1910). Others were "Zur Psychologie des Histerischen Madonnenkultus,"[14] "Hysteria und Mystik bei Margaretha Ebner (1291 bis 1351),"[15] "Die Entwicklung des Apostels Paulus,"[16] Die Legende Sundar Singh's. Eine Religions-psy-

13. Pfister, personal letter of October 9, 1949
14. Zeitschritt für Religionspsychologie, 5(1911), pp. 263-271.
15. Zentralblatt f. Psychoanalyse, 1(1910-1911), pp. 468-485.
16. Imago, 6(1920), pp. 243-290.

chologische Untersuchung, (1926), "Aus der Analyse eines Buddhisten."[17]

The types of religious behavior and problems which concerned him may become apparent from the following writings: "Die Psychologische Entratselung der Religiosen Glossolalie und der Automatischen Kryptographie,"[18] "Die Primaren Gefuhle als Bedingungen der Hochsten Geistesfunktionen,"[19] "Sünde und Herzenreinheit im Lichte der Tiefenseelsorge,"[20] "Neutestamentliche Seelsorge und Psychoanalytische Therapie,"[21] "Das Erlebnis der Eingebung als Psychologisches Problem,"[22] "Die Verscheiden Arten des Unglaubens in Psychoanalytischer Beleuchtung,"[23] Religiosität und Hysterie (1928), Das Christentum und die Angst (1944), and Calvin's Eingreifen in die Hexer und Hexenprozesse von Peney (1947).

His main works, however, and in the earlier period especially, appear to be intended for the general public and the educators. They propose to present the theory

17. Psychoanalytische B ewegung, 3(1931), pp. 307-328.
18. Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse und Psychopathologische Forschungen 3(1911), pp. 427-468, 730-794.
19. Imago, 8(1922), pp. 46-53.
20. Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, 1(1928), pp. 5-27.
21. Imago, 20(1934), pp. 425-443.
22. Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, 11(1938), pp. 65-111.
23. Ibid., 8(1936), pp. 20-51.

of psychoanalysis along with the possibilities for its use. He does not plead for specialists, but he believes that all people such as teachers and ministers who deal constantly and quite intimately with people should have psychoanalytic understanding of human behavior. Chief among these works are Die Psychoanalytische Methode (1913), Die Psychoanalyse im Dienste der Erziehung (1917), Zum Kampf um die Psychoanalyse (1920), more accurately titled in its English translation: Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, and Die Liebe des Kindes und Ihre Fehlentwicklungen (1922).

Wahrheit und Schönheit in der Psychoanalyse (1918) and Psychoanalyse und Weltanschauung (1928) were written for the more philosophically elite. In these he seeks to answer the critics of psychoanalysis' metapsychology by maintaining the distinctness and separation between psychoanalysis and metaphysics. Analytische Seelsorge (1927) is his work in pastoral psychology. Religionswissenschaft und Psychoanalyse (1927), Religiosität und Hysterie (1928) and Das Christentum und die Angst (1944) (translated, Christianity and Fear, by W. H. Johnston, 1948) are his more general works in the psychology of religion. These would be of more particular interest to the pastor and specialist in religion.

Besides his writings we have seen that Pfister was active in publicizing the new psychology from the lecture platform and in delivering lectures in the training course for psychoanalysts.

4. FREUD'S FRIENDSHIP AND LATER CRITICS

A man's position in the early psychoanalytic group can hardly be assessed apart from an examination of the relationship between that man and the founder of the movement. Although Freud has been understood by some to have been a man of erascible temperament, dismissing those who disagreed with him, and maintaining a closely knit group of those who recognized him as master, he appears to have been on the kindliest terms with Pfister during his lifetime. This friendship is not based on agreement of thought nor upon Pfister's subservience. One can surmise that Freud may have found some satisfaction in the fact that a minister should espouse psychoanalysis when he himself was critical of religion and had aroused such vehement opposition from the church. Perhaps he respected Pfister's sincerity and tact and his honest faith in the face of Freud's destructive critique of religion. Of the more intimate relationships between the two men we know very little, except that Pfister

mentions that he has visited with Freud often in Vienna and has carried on a lively correspondence with him.[24] Freud probably appreciated also the stand that Pfister made for him in Zurich at the time of the apostacy of Jung and Adler.

Freud gives Pfister direct recognition in his published writings on two occasions. The first appeared in the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement in which he commented:

> In his work on the "Piety of the Count of Zinzendorf" as well as in other contributions, the Rev. Dr. Pfister, of Zurich has succeeded in tracing back religious zealotism to perverse eroticism. In the recent works of the Zurich school one is more likely to find that religion becomes injected into the analysis rather than rationally explained by it.[25]

We may quite justly suspect that the latter criticism is probably leveled at Jung rather than Pfister, although it is chiefly upon this count that other psychoanalysts in reviewing his works have criticized him.

The second is Freud's introduction to Pfister's The Psychoanalytic Method, in which he recognizes the

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24. Pfister, personal letter, December 3, 1949. He further states that Prof. H. Meng of Basel has his correspondence with Freud which amounts to 126 letters which are to be given to Anna Freud.
25. S. Freud, History of the Psychoanalytic Movement. New York: The Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1917, pp. 28, 29.

possibility of valuable therapeutic assistance given by the educator and Protestant pastor trained in psychoanalysis which might obviate the necessity of a physician's services. His comments here, however, are chiefly directed toward the approval and encouragement of lay analysis in general; but, of course, this is the point of view from which Pfister was writing. The fact that Freud wrote the introduction to Pfister's book indicates his recognition and approval of the psychoanalytic work which Pfister was carrying on.[26]

Barbara Low gives Pfister credit for the "care, accuracy and sincerity"[27] which mark his works. She writes approvingly of his Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education when she says:

> Very convincingly he shows how great is the scope of psychoanalysis, and how its most precious function perhaps is not the curing of disease but the raising of the so-called 'normal' and 'healthy' individual to higher levels and finer development.[28]

In a later review Miss Low speaks less approvingly of Pfister's intention to use psychoanalysis in moral development.

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26. Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, pp. vi, vii.
27. Barbara Low, review of Pfister's Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 4(1923), pp. 205-207.
28. Ibid., p. 206.

> Psychoanalysis is treated throughout...as an ethical instrument, having an ethical purpose, rather than as an exact science investigating the phenomena of mind and personality. Pfister has, of course, his own outlook and his own beliefs, but these cannot be treated as a part of psychoanalysis. There is a very strong disposition throughout this book to classify as superior (or 'higher') and inferior (or 'lower') different human manifestations, and then to demonstrate that psychoanalysis will always lead out to the 'superior' development, with a repudiation of 'inferior' impulses. Even if it were so, this is not the function of psychoanalysis, whose work is investigation, the tracing of connections, and the history of the development of one kind of emotion and activity into new forms; not moral judgment or ethical valuation. Pfister sometimes seems to be concerned with the latter processes at the expense of the former.[29]

She further criticizes Pfister with confusing psychoanalysis with re-education.

This opinion seems to be held also by Müller-Braunschweig in his review of Die Liebe vor der Ehe und ihre Fehlentwicklungen.[30] He recognizes Pfister as the "worthy popularizer of psychoanalysis," who has done much to propagate the understanding of psychoanalysis among a wider public, but he fears that "he has not escaped the danger of sacrificing some measure of scientific strictness in the interests of popular presentation."[31] He

29. Barbara Low, review of Pfister's Love in Children and its Aberrations. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 6(1925), p. 69.
30. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 7(1926), pp. 100, 101.
31. Ibid., p. 101.

further criticizes Pfister for his "moralizing tendency" even though he insists that he is non-judgmental.

Pfister's work, on the whole, however, seems to have been well-received and those criticisms from within the body of psychoanalysts were not without their note of appreciation for his service to the cause of psychoanalysis in its earlier days. His interest in education and religion found warm response in the psychoanalytic group in Zurich, and his espousal of psychoanalysis, not only met their endorsement, but through his prolific writing, found wide reception among various classes of readers.

Pfister is little known, however, in this country. Apart from a few cursory comments in recognition of the fact that he applied psychoanalysis to pastoral work and education, the body of his works has been ignored by American writers. This is apparent also in the recent writings of American psychoanalysts, the more conservative of whom (in the sense of orthodox Freudianism) have found little in Pfister that expands or deviates from the master's work; and the more liberal of whom (the so-called "modified" Freudians) have found his applications of psychoanalysis to religion more impressive than his contributions to the more recent psychoanalytic literature.

As far as the more popular reception of Pfister's works in this country is concerned, his recent and major work to be translated, Christianity and Fear, has not even been reviewed according to the Book Review Index (1944, 1948). It is probably too technical for the lay reader, and for the psychoanalyst it is written too much within the framework of Christian experience, theology and history.

In this examination of Pfister's place in the psychoanalytic group, it has been increasingly apparent that in the earlier days of the movement, he has figured prominently in Switzerland in the development and promulgation of the new psychology. We, now, proceed to investigate the basis upon which he carried on his work and the areas in which his applications of psychoanalysis have been made.

CHAPTER IV

PFISTER'S APOLOGETIC FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS

Pfister was sensitive in his early writings to the difficulties psychoanalysis faced in being accepted as a legitimate scientific school of psychology. We have investigated his activities which furthered the popular acceptance of psychoanalysis. We now look at his theoretical defense of psychoanalysis which is chiefly in the areas of its scientific and applied adequacy.

1. PSYCHOANALYSIS AS SCIENTIFIC

For a variety of reasons the development and spread of psychoanalysis met resistance, particularly from Continental psychology. Though at first psychiatrists looked upon it askance, they at least became familiar with its major tenets. Among the medical profession psychoanalysis was more kindly received in Great Britain and America than on the Continent. The psychology of the classroom and laboratory was slow to admit psychoanalysis as an acceptable school, objecting to (1) the unconscious and the esoteric vocabulary which was employed to describe its contents and processes, (2) the emphasis on sex and sexuality, (3) the difficulty in

verification through experimental control and statistics of the intricate and complicated processes of personality unearthed by the slow methods of psychoanalysis, and (4) the divisions among those who professed and practised psychoanalysis.[1]

This opposition led early psychoanalysts to be dissatisfied merely to hammer out the differences of opinion among themselves, but they sought also to relate psychoanalysis to psychology and to establish and maintain its respectability and adequacy among the accepted schools. Pfister not only came to the service of psychoanalysis in publicizing it as we have seen earlier, but he also took up its defense against the unremitting critics within the psychological field and tried not only to justify it as a science but to affirm its necessity as filling a gap in contemporary psychology, to answer specific questions and objections, and to set forth its applicability to deal with areas of man's experience that psychology had heretofore left untouched.

Pfister defined psychoanalysis as a method and as a body of knowledge derived thereby.

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1. Gardner Murphy, An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928, p. 334.

> Psychoanalysis is a scientifically grounded method devoted to neurotic and mentally deranged persons, as well as to normal individuals, which seeks by the collection and interpretation of associations... to investigate and influence the instinctive forces and content of the mental life lying below the threshold of consciousness.[2]

Also

> Psychoanalysis can also be understood as the collective designation for all theoretical insights which have been gained with the aid of the foregoing method.[3]

This method of investigation of the human soul had to win its way in spite of opposition from the established schools of psychology, experimental and associationistic, which dealt with normal functioning of behavior and restricted the domain of the self to consciousness. Psychoanalysis not only admitted into psychology the unconscious but maintained that therein were the chief dynamic forces operating upon and motivating human conduct. Psychoanalysis, then, refers to the technique of investigating these unconscious determinants of behavior, and also to the body of theoretical postulates that the findings so derived required.

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2. Oscar Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method. (tr. C. R. Payne) New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1917, p. 20.
3. Oscar Pfister, Psychoanalyse und Weltanschauung. Leipzig: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1928, p. 9. My own translation.

Pfister was impatient with those investigations which proceeded from abstract elements of consciousness and purported to give some truth about the human person when in actuality the results were to reduce the soul to analyzed particles, and often times that which was irreducible was denied. To treat the person as a whole and to seek to find within the depths of himself the connections between contemporary activity and its causes was a departure from the current atomistic experimentalism which considered that only scientific which could be abstracted from the whole and subjected to physical measurement. The experimentalism of Pfister's early days was embarrassed before the concrete facts of the total unitive psychic life such as religious experience, artistic intuition and creativity, the emotional and intellectual and conative processes. The fundamental question of psychology, "Why does a man act as he does?" was left unanswered.

Psychoanalysis began in the observations of Freud which were made on patients whose hysterical symptoms demanded the recognition of unconscious processes. He started with no preconceived theory of the psychic life, but became aware during the clinical observation of patients in catharsis that there were connections between the

symptoms and events in the patient's life which were not remembered or easily recalled and according to the strength of the repression were difficult to relate to the onset of the disorder. Freud was thoroughly empirical in his approach to the problem.

> Freud is the first great positivist in psychology. We understand by positivism the point of view that given facts and their lawfully governed relationships comprise the only conditions of knowledge, and that the investigation of the innermost being, the final causes and purposes is to be renounced.[4]

His thoroughgoing positivism, however, led him to the postulating of instincts in order to account for and bring some kind of comprehension to the unconscious processes. Even when he admitted unconscious phenomena, he had already broadened the idea of what should properly be included in a positivistic science. But this choice was not forced on him by his methodological dogma, but by the facts and needs of the patients under observation. Freud's positivism was not philosophically grounded but rather a principle of investigation to which he sought to adhere rigorously by fidelity to the observed data. If his later results were skewed toward the theory evolved from previous investigations, that should not malign his early honest attempts to provide

4. Ibid., p. 12

a more adequate system for the interpretations of his investigations.

This accorded with Pfister's view of the philosophy of science. He maintained that in every science one proceeds from immediate experience through logical constructions and abstractions to assumptions adequate to the experience. He denied pure experience in the positivistic sense, but rather affirmed that without trans-empirical, abstract methods of thought, no reasonable thought could be possible.[5] But the crux of the problem is keeping the logical constructions accurate in terms of the empirical data. Freud was correct in maintaining that the further thought was from the empirical, the greater the intrusion of subjectivity; thus he was skeptical of much that passed for metaphysics and religion which was not grounded in the experience of the total personality.

Griffith maintains the correctness of this view when he says,

> When due allowance is made for its terminology, the mental point of reference passes beyond the observation of mind and behavior to a speculative construct.[6]

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5. Ibid., p. 55.

6. Coleman R. Griffith, Principles of Systematic Psychology. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1943, p. 406.

At the same time he maintains that psychoanalysis is fundamentally grounded upon empirical observation.

> The basic data of psychoanalysis and the empirical starting point for the whole system of Freudian psychology are behavioral. That a person is judged as abnormal at all depends upon an observed discrepancy between his actions-in-environment and some social or other standard act by the adjustments of persons who might be called normal.[7]

As a religious man interested in, and to some extent at least responsible for, the moral and spiritual life of people, Pfister was concerned about the psychological basis of theology and ethics. He was not content with the erroneous oversimplification that the religious life of man was simply God entering human experience.

> Are we to presume, with the supernatural psychology of the uncritical ages, that the highest achievements of art, ethics, and religion which spring up in consciousness without any discoverable means, have come straight from Heaven?[8]

He required that psychology should account for religious experience scientifically and its theological and ethical expressions are likewise a part of its task of considering the totality of personality. He had been critical

7. Ibid., pp. 407, 408.

8. Oscar Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis. (Authorized Translation) New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1923, p. 49.

of his theological training on this count. He believed theology should be constructed upon empirical foundations.[9] Psychology should be the prolegomenon of theology. And psychology, if it is to be scientific, must admit religious experience into its province for investigation. Otherwise it is blinded to the unity and wholeness of life.

Freud believed that

> a great part of the mythical view of the cosmos, which permeates modern religion, is nothing else than psychology projected into the world around us. The obscure recognition of the psychic factors and circumstances of the subconscious is reflected...in the construction of a transcendental reality which has to be transformed by science into the psychology of the subconscious.[10]

This, however, does not rule out metaphysical reality or discount religious experience as being solely concerned with objects which are subjective projections; but Pfister does seek to distinguish, as many religious people are afraid to do, those elements of their own belief which derive from a superstitious conception of

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9. Oscar Pfister, "Die Unterlassungssünden der Theologie gegenüber der modernen Psychologie." Protestantischen Monatshefte, 1903, and "Das Elend unserer wissenschaftlichen Glaubenslehre." Schweizerischen theologischen Zeitschrift, 22(1905), see ch. 11 note 5, p. 29.
10. Sigmund Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life. (tr. A. A. Brill) New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930 (1917), p. 309.

reality and expressed through myths colored by subjective wishes on the one hand and normative religious faith on the other. That Freud personally is unable to affirm the objective validity of religious experience should not be taken to mean that he does not believe there is such. He awaits evidence. There may be a sneer, but certainly no braggart denial in the confession:

> I am sorry to confess that I belong to that class of unworthy individuals before whom the spirits cease their activities and the supernatural disappears, so that I have never been in a position to experience anything personally that would stimulate belief in the miraculous.[11]

The important thing for Pfister's thought was not so much the affirmation of his atheism or his agnosticism, but that he had provided a method for the investigation of the religious life which was related to all other aspects of psychic experience, and which could not be properly understood apart from them.

2. PSYCHOANALYSIS AS EXPERIMENTAL

When psychoanalysis entered the field experimentalism was the touchstone of scientific psychology. When psychoanalysis did not come forth with apparatus for minute measurement, when it sought to deal with the whole

11. Ibid., p. 312.

person rather than isolating some part of him, when it made no attempt to vary the conditions of life or analysis and recognized its difficulty to control the experiment and repeat it for verification, it was immediately placed under suspicion by the prevailing psychologists. To be sure, psychoanalysts had criticized the experimentalists for pouring out the spiritual life of man into their apparatus, running it through filter processes to find manageable (experimental) particles and coming out with a rarified distillate which had the remotest resemblance to life. But at the same time psychoanalysts, of whom Pfister was one, sought to maintain that psychoanalysis met the requirements of the experimental method rightly conceived more fully than did orthodox psychology, and its findings were of more use in the psychological understanding of behavior.

Psychoanalysis began as a method of accurate observation. In the process of gaining the facts (free association) distracting elements are sought to be removed; at the same time, there is avoidance of influencing the subject, i.e., there is a rigorous attempt to elicit undistorted facts expressing the actual state of the patient's psyche (abreaction). Following this, the data are systematically connected and interrelated

(interpretation). Finally, this "experiment" is terminated through gaining insights which are validated by the strength of the countertransference or the sensed affection of the therapist from which the patient affirms sufficient health for himself to be free of the analyst. To be sure, the steps are overlapping and the problem at hand is within the context of a complex personality, but the order of experiment is there. There is no arbitrary limitation of the variables for the sake of the procedure. The possibility for repetition of psychic experience is much more remote than that of a mechanical order; hence statistical probability has has to succeed the exactness of description and analysis of the repeated experiment. The control of conditions is not possible when there can be no prediction of unique behavior; but just so - when the control of conditions is at a minimum there is greater possibility of dealing most completely with a free personality.

3. PSYCHOANALYSIS AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN ORTHODOX PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

As we have seen the psychology of the late nineteenth century apart from psychoanalysis represented two fundamental points of view. On the one hand, there was

the experimental laboratory working with chiefly physiological processes and on the other there were those psychologists interested in the social manifestations and organizations of behavior. These two directions of thought were ably demonstrated by the work of Wundt. He not only pioneered in the psychological laboratory in his use of psychophysics to trace the physiological correlates of psychological behavior, but he also made a monumental study of three forms of primitive tribal life, language, religion and custom in his Völkerpsychologie. But the concrete individual was lost in the sands of analysis and the suns of speculation. An integration between physiological psychology and social psychology was sorely needed.

The problem that was psychology's of abstracting variables and formulating postulates on the basis of observed behavior so that which was uniquely personal could be distinguished was impossible of solution unless within the individual could be found a principle of psychic continuity. The reflex arc, to be sure, accounted for persistence in reaction, but it alone could not account for the persistence of a particular kind of reaction. And this was important, not only for physiological psychology, but also for social psychology, for unless

there be some means of taking into consideration not only the immediate experimental situation, but also the etiology of contemporary behavior and the similarity and concurrence of individuals' behavior in social patterning there could be no science of psychology worthy of the name.

This principle of continuity was supplied most impressively by psychoanalytic thought by the extension of the concept of the psyche to include the unconscious. We shall be concerned with its more detailed definition later; for the present purposes it is sufficient to recognize that it functioned as the connecting link in two respects. First, it became (in what may be called the vertical dimension) the intermediary between conscious experience and the functioning of the physical body. This is clearly illustrated by the initial great discovery of Freud and Breuer in establishing the connection between repressed memories and the symptoms of conversion hysteria. It is of interest to note that W. H. Sheldon has carried this movement to its reductionistic conclusion in identifying the unconscious with the body and thus making psychology fundamentally morphology.[12] There

12. W. H. Sheldon, Varieties of Delinquent Youth. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949, p. 4. It is

being no psyche and no soma, he has eliminated the mind-body problem by maintaining only a structure-behavior functional continuum,[13] but unfortunately the psyche as conscious experience seems to have been bowed off the stage as a mere squally of subjective coloration upon the broad sea of body structure. Freud held his ground against such reduction although recognizing the value of psychology being biologically grounded.

> I study minds and I cannot quite believe that bodily structure and mind can be so connected that an analysis of the one will lead to an understanding of the other.[14]

Freud insisted that the best connection still was to be found in the unconscious as a psychic phenomenon.

Secondly, the psychoanalytic view of the unconscious formed the horizontal connecting link (historical dimension) between contemporary behavior and its temporal antecedents. Unconscious processes were not merely present determiners of behavior but they were themselves the products of earlier activity. Through the understanding of

12. (Con't.)
recognized that Sheldon's anthropology is only a segment of his more comprehensive four-panel, biographical psychology, but somatic, even genetic determinism is basic to his thought.
13. Ibid., pp. 3-6.
14. Ibid., p. 50. Sheldon's citation of personal conversation with Freud.

the dynamics of repression, we were given not only a greater grasp of the earlier causative factors behind present action but also important motivations toward memory and forgetting. The unconscious, as supplying temporal continuity, also provides the uniquely psychological substructure for a psychology of culture, race, religion, art, and society. Whether or not psychoanalytic conclusions are valid in this area is not here the question; the fact is that with the recognition of unconscious motives and processes the door was opened to research - and speculation - that had heretofore been left to rational analysis. Now the emotional basis of social behavior and organization became more accessible.

A further function which psychoanalysis filled for psychology as a whole was therapy. Psychology was academic. Therapy was left in the hands of the physician who had some training in psychiatry, but whose lack of psychological training was readily excusable because of its therapeutic irrelevance. For the German academician that psychology was not applied to the personality disorders was no handicap at all. But for the Christian minister whose psychology was useless unless it could be therapeutically oriented, it made a difference. If the psychology could only analyze the mind without offering

a methodology for the treatment of the mental disorders and for the restoration of mental health, then it was sterile. To be sure, no psychology needs to be therapeutically applicable in order to be theoretically sound, but it is seriously limited if it cannot account for the deviations of personality functions. And it was a serious fault from the frame of reference of pastoral requirements that psychology did not offer itself in the service of the soul. The fundamental groundwork of psychoanalysis was won in the therapist's treatment room. Its first insights were discovered in the actual process of dealing with the neurotic patient's illness. Whatever may be the truth of the psychoanalytic description of the structure and function of personality, it was first and foremost a method of treating neurosis. And as such it made psychology aware of the forgotten areas of personality functioning and malfunctioning; and in focusing upon the concrete personality as a dynamic whole functioning amid the dynamics of emotionally charged interpersonal relations, it escaped the aridity of the rationalistic folk or social psychology and of the orthodox physiological psychology.

4. ANSWERS TO CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM

1). The concept of the unconscious is not new with Freudian psychoanalysis. Leibnitz, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Fechner, Nietzsche, Butler and others have, either on philosophical or psychological grounds, propounded theories of a mental life underlying conscious awareness but figuring either motivationally in behavior or cognitively in memory and forgetting. All recognized its inaccessibility, however, and it was not until Freud discovered a methodology of probing into the unconscious that it really came into its own. The psychology of the late nineteenth century equated the psyche or soul with consciousness and therefore resisted psychoanalysis and insisted that any concern with a hypothetical unconscious had no place in psychology. The criticism was not so much that there need to be no concept of unconsciousness to cover the facts of the mental life as that there was no place in the framework of "conscious" psychology for any notion of the unconscious. Relegate it to physiology or neurology, but the science of the unconscious was not psychology.

It is true that some psychologists before Freud affirmed the strength of unconscious motivation, but fail-

ing to have at hand the means of scientific observation, they could only helplessly look on conscious experience as a kind of epiphenomenon. Lipps, for example, believed that consciousness was the disinterested by-product of the unconscious. Schopenhauer thought of consciousness as a single beam of light playing over the unconscious area which served as a receptacle for ideas.[15] But his more important interpretation of the unconscious assigned it the task of being the seat of the will which was primary in life. For him, then, the primary drive was unconscious. Hartmann saw both the cognitive and conative functions within the unconscious, but he also advanced the theory, substantiated by psychoanalysis, that poetic inspirations, artistic productions, sudden transitions and alterations of thoughts are products of unconscious mentation.[16] He also held to the positive, creative and unitive functions of the unconscious which he considered a kind of "internal providence."[17]

Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, affirms as one of its central hypotheses the unconscious, and endeavors

15. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea. Vol. II. (Tr. R. B. Haldane) London: 1891 (1859), p. 335.
16. Eduard von Hartmann, The Philosophy of the Unconscious. Vol. I. Berlin: O. Duncker, 1878 (1869), p. 279.
17. Ibid., p. 168.

to bring to light its fundamental laws and to produce a method for its investigation. And it is a hypothesis. It is to psychology what the atom is to physics. It is not a psychological entity, but a schematic construct to account rationally for the mental phenomena which go on in our minds without conscious direction. We shall observe later in comparing Freud's and Pfister's views of psychoanalytic theories the various meanings of the unconscious; it is enough for our present purpose to indicate the manner in which Pfister justified the necessity and accuracy of the unconscious as a psychological hypothesis.

Pfister recognized that the unconscious was not a Freudian innovation, but he held that Freud's use of hypnotism and free association provided the first experimental proof of its existence.[18] He recognized also the work of Ach and others in the Gestalt school in connection with their theories of "determining tendencies" and "memory traces" as marshalling experimental data to the support of the unconscious theory.

There were, however, those (Jodl and Külpe) who insisted on interpreting the unconscious in its motiva-

18. Oscar Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method. (Authorized Translation) New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1917, p. 26.

tional function, not as a form of mental life, but as a physiological process. This view is currently held by Knight Dunlap who denies the unconscious in the Freudian sense. Wundt was agnostic about the unconscious, believing that if there be such psychic predispositions of an unknown kind, they are likely, as far as psychology is concerned to remain unknown.[19] Others, such as Höffding, are uncertain about the acceptance of a theory of the unconscious. If there be such, he can think of it in no other terms than some kind of process analogous or parallel to the conscious, and that its investigation should produce nothing other than what is in the conscious mind.[20]

Thus, even the most conservative psychologists suspected the necessity of the unconscious but appeared methodologically helpless in the face of it. Why then should there have been such resistance from them when psychoanalysis opened doors and turned on lights? 1) Psychoanalysis requires the patient to make a slow, but ruthlessly honest disclosure of the intimate and person-

19. Wilhelm Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology. Vol. II. (Tr. Ed. B. Titchener) London: Sonnenschein & Company, 1904, p. 204.
20. Harold Höffding, Outlines of Psychology. (Tr. M. E. Lowndes) London: Macmillan & Co., 1892, pp. 103-110.

al aspects of life which, according to its theory, have been zealously guarded by the strength of repression. The same resistance to pain which lies behind repression also was asserted when the discomforting necessity of breaking down the repression for the purpose of analyzing the pain's protection was called for. 2) Psychoanalysis entered the domain of the unconscious through such simple, fragmentary and apparently insignificant data, that its processes appear unscientific. Picking up what other psychologists reject as a kind of residue, psychoanalysis uses these as the instruments of gaining access to the unconscious; namely, dreams, associations of words, forgetting, slips and mistakes and abnormal physical symptoms. 3) Further resistance was aroused by what appeared to be arbitrary interpretations of unconscious events by the process of inference and symbolic meanings. Apart from the analytic situation, or out of the context of the individual's total experience, such symbolization does often appear unwarranted and certainly unscientific. But again, symbolization is the process observed by which a repression makes itself presentable to consciousness. At first it is only a clue which indicates an interpretation; but when the interpretation has been accepted emotionally by the patient, the validity of the symbol's

meaning must be accepted.

Pfister's chief answer to those skeptical of the unconscious in the field of psychology appeared in his clinical practice and the finding therein forms of symptomatic behavior, both psychical and physical, which could neither be explained causally or scientifically understood apart from recourse to subliminal processes. He denies that psychoanalysis is the only means whereby the citadel can be stormed, but he does insist that no psychology which repudiates unconscious motives can be theoretically adequate or therapeutically useful.

2) The importance of sexuality in psychoanalytic theory also provoked criticism. Although Pfister treated patients of neurosis of traumatic onset without dealing with sexual material, he concedes that although the treatment was successful it required only superficial exploration and suspects that, like most psychoneuroses, its nucleus is to be found in the sexual sphere. Pfister holds that the psychoanalytic method stands in its own right apart from any and every particular sexual theory. He denies that Freud derives the energy of the psychic life from sexuality alone but that he had merely devoted his major attention to this neglected but powerful instinct.

Let the critics renounce sexuality as the fundamental life force, and psychoanalysis still remains.

The chief criticism of psychoanalysis was not that the psychoneuroses had their focus in sexuality, but that the meaning of sexuality became extended and elaborated and consequently misunderstood. Sexuality was not limited to the psychophysical union of male and female, around which already clustered much cultural and emotional repression, but it became the central instinctive force in the Freudian theory. It is the chief characteristic of the pleasure principle (that is, sexual gratification is the criterion for pleasure) which is operative in early life; hence infantile sexuality.

Pfister defended Freud's position regarding sexuality because he understood thereby all the tender emotions of love which is the inner impulse to seek a harmonious unity with an objective goal. Freud thought of sexuality more correctly as psycho-sexuality in order to balance the more primitive physical impulses with the mental factor of the sexual life. He finds no disparity between sexuality and the comprehensive meaning of the German word, "liebe." [21] This seemed to Pfister to

21. Sigmund Freud, "Uber Wilde Psychoanalyse." Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 1, p. 92.

dissolve opposition to sexuality, for it was what he meant by love, or at least it was the emotional relationship of the self toward a desired object, which object through the process of sublimation need not be sexual in the specifically physical sense, but which could be the "idealized" sympathy, friendship, faith and love in the Christian sense for all persons and for ethically and spiritually exalted goals. That the purest ethical love was based upon sensual experiences, only indicates its unconscious and physical roots, but does not necessarily thereby distort its value.

We observe that in Pfister's adherence to Freud as opposed to Adler, he recognizes that not only is the source of neurotic disorders within the sphere of blocked love relationships rather than in distorted evaluations of the self, but that the chief source of therapy lies not merely in a re-orientation of self-appraisal, but in the establishment of relationships of love (transference) beyond the self.

3) Criticisms from the side of ethics also were leveled at psychoanalysis. The lack of scruples of some practitioners gave fuel to the fire of those who opposed psychoanalysis; but the misuse of a psychological method

should not prejudice us against the method unless inherent within it are the obvious seeds for its malpractice. The ethics of the analyst is one problem; the non-moral system of treatment is another. At first it was assumed that inasmuch as psychoanalysis was a disinterested science the moral life of the analyst was as irrelevant to his investigations as is the moral life of the chemist or physicist. However, it soon became apparent that because of the depth of the attachment of the patient to the analyst during transference, it was necessary that the latter's morality be freed from elements which would permit the endangering of the patient's development or lead to the exploitation of the analytic situation for the analyst's own interest.

The further objection to psychoanalysis as non-ethical was leveled at the mode of treatment. Moral suggestion was replaced by acceptance and interpretation of all material regardless of whether it was believed to be good or evil either by the analyst, patient, or society. Indeed, it became apparent that much conflict was created through the disparity between instinctive forces and unassimilated objective or external ethical standards. Psychoanalysis, as a method of liberating and redirecting these instinctive forces, freed the patient of constrict-

ing and tormenting "ethical ideals." This "de-ethicizing" of the patient or the reducing of the crippling force of the super-ego could certainly lead to danger. On the one hand judgment and ethical explanation leads only to a strengthening of the symptoms; on the other, complete freedom from repression might conceivably lead to harmful libertinism.

The facts of the matter, however, are that the analyst cannot refrain from some moral guidance even though his conscious intention is complete permissiveness and abstinence from judgment and advice. Even while the analyst seeks a logical patterning of the unconscious life, there is an unconscious relationship between him and the patient which in itself has a moral character. No matter what extraneous motives may be present, the analyst seeks the health of the other, and mental health is not without its ethical considerations.

Pfister goes further in the inclusion of moral instruction in the course of analysis in the case of the young and the adults who, after analysis, find themselves freed from their symptoms, but without any positive and constructive apprehension of self-direction and appropriate goal for life.[22] He believes that it is necessary

22. Oscar Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis. (Authorized Translation) London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923, p. 196

in such cases to provide re-educative instruction and that this can be done for the prevention of harm to the patient without re-erecting resistances.

We shall see below that, far from believing psychoanalysis to be non-ethical, it has, in the view of Pfister, contributed to a sounder, higher, and more healthy ethical life.

4) Another objection is the derivation of theory about personality from pathological data. That psychoanalysis made its most important discoveries concerning the structure of personality from observations upon pathological cases raised the question as to the validity of assuming that the dynamics of disease formation apply equally well to the normal functioning and behavior of the person. In other words, can a method of treatment be the means of building a systematic psychology of personality? It is doubtful that Freud intended to erect a system of psychology rather than to seek explanation for the facts and processes of the psychic life. This explanation, however, has become in Freudian thought so extensive in terms of hypotheses and theories, that in actuality what must have been a search for therapeutic competence has produced the theoretical structure for

the interpretation of personality.

Persistently Pfister admits the lack of definition between the normal and the pathological. Because deviant or neurotic behavior is not clearly distinguished in many of its manifestations from a more optimum form of personality functioning, it is quite impossible to believe that the structure and function of the personality is different in health from what it is or becomes in mental ill health. The underlying dynamics must be similar in both cases even though the forms of expression (the symptom selection) may vary. Pfister maintains that pathological elements and spiritual phenomena, functional madness and supreme works of art, spring from similar sources and follow similar dynamic processes, and that the difference between them lies in their contrary attitudes toward Reality.[23] He recognizes, too, that the "abnormal" personality is a loosely defined characterization determined as much by social and cultural standards and mores as by psychic structure and constitution. The formation of "abnormal" behavior patterns results from dynamic processes within and among persons and their environment.

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23. Oscar Pfister, Expressionism in Art: Its Psychological and Biologocal Basis. (Tr. Barbara Low and M. A. Muggel) New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923, p. 259.

Therefore the concept "abnormal" may not be so strictly used to characterize individual modes of behavior.

Admitting of course that there are distinguishable symptoms of neurotic disorder, although not always so clearly distinguishable, Pfister maintains further that psychoanalysis has an important function in the understanding of normal behavior. The educator as well as the physician is to be served by psychoanalysis. The force of instinctual drives and of repression does not suddenly assert itself with the neurotic person. It is a constant force exerting itself, regardless of how it may be descriptively specified, in every individual. Consequently, psychoanalysis has an important function in understanding and interpreting the unconscious determinants and processes of what is considered socially normal and matter of course.

5. PFISTER'S APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Pfister's most extensive apologetic for psychoanalysis has been through his showing the possibility for and actual effectiveness of applying psychoanalytic understanding in the fields of art, education, ethics, philosophy and religion. He has applied psychoanalysis broadly and suggestively to such diverse areas as cultural anthro-

pology and church history, social ethics, literature, delinquency and criminology. But his more constructive contributions in indicating the utility of psychoanalysis are seen in the following categories:

1. Art.

Art in its more expressionistic, i.e., its subjective or surrealistic forms has as its source the unconscious. "The unconscious is the proper mother-womb of all great art."[24] To be sure, there is and must be a trans-subjective value to great art. It is a social performance having within it a kind of ethical and metaphysical confession, but it arises as a most personal matter within the individual experience of the artist. Art represents the tension between the subjective forces of the artist and the objective reality toward which it strives. The psychoanalytic contribution is, of course, not at the objective end of the scale, which is the problem of aesthetics, but rather in describing the subjective elements in artistic creation.

Pfister identifies five processes or laws of artistic creation.[25] 1) The first prerequisite of art is life-inhibition. There is no expression without re-

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24. Ibid., p. 215.
25. Ibid., pp. 165ff.

pression and suffering. Repressive forces must make it impossible, on the one hand, to find more sociable and economically more fundamental outlets for the life-force, and on the other, to make it necessary to develop sufficient tension to demand expression. If the basic needs and drives would be easily satisfied there would be no creativity. 2) Regression furthers the retreat from present tension and allows the artist to find the material and freedom for its expression. Pfister noted in the artistic works of his patients during analysis earlier phases of development reproduced in a form in accordance with their present psychic condition. 3) Identification was observed in which the artist sees in the figure of his painting characteristics which he can only unconsciously attribute to himself. 4) Introversion and autism are apparent through the artist's desire to express what is truly himself. 5) Polarization between the subjective psychic condition and the effort toward objective representation occurs as the artist seeks not merely self-expression but the communication of meaning.

Pfister claims that graphic art particularly is highly significant for life development. 1) It satisfies certain instinctual pressures; 2) Wish-fulfilment is expressed within the area of circumscribed reality

which need not interfere with reality as a whole; 3) The subjective finds objectification; 4) The artist's affairs are socialized; and 5) There is some contact, at least, with a more universal experience.

In the course of analytic treatment artistic creations were used as apperceptive instruments to probe the unconscious. They were used very much as dreams might be. Pfister sought associations with whole paintings and parts, figures or items within a painting in order to detect unconscious representations. Interpretations followed the pattern of dream-interpretation with extensive use of symbolization. He also recognized that there were both latent content and manifest contents in pictures just as in dreams.

The cathartic usefulness of artistic productions Pfister regarded highly. The artist often finds that his art is his freest means of expression and also the means by which he can reveal his innermost thoughts most accurately. It is also of value as a means of sublimation or at least of providing the material through which sublimation is made possible. Pfister observed that in the course of treatment, as improvement was observed, the subjective element which distorted nature or suppressed external reality was diminished. He also dis-

covered in the analysis of a man who was estranged from his wife that when a cure was accomplished to the extent of reconciliation with his wife, the man's interest in the psychological details of his paintings gave way to a metaphysical perspective.[26]

There are recognized limitations in the use of art as a psychoanalytic tool, apart, of course, from the obvious fact that not all are artists. 1) It provides by itself alone an autistic solution to the conflict. 2) It is also an imaginative solution lacking contact with reality; and 3) it provides limited socialization. Nevertheless, art becomes not only a tool for eliciting and interpreting unconscious material, but it is the effort of the artist to win his own deliverance, to make possible his arising out of the chaos, distortions and limitations of his own subjectivity to a realm in which there can be a more communicable relationship with objective reality.

2. Education.

Pfister's most extensive application of psychoanalysis, apart from religion, is in education. In his relationship to the public as popularizer of psychoanalysis,

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26. Ibid., p. 138.

he identified himself with the role of the educator. He conceived of the pastor and the teacher as in similar positions regarding the use of psychoanalysis and the degree to which psychoanalysis fitted into their roles traditionally defined. Both professions called for lay analysis. Both worked at the level of preventive psychotherapy. He seconded Freud's belief that education and therapy had a complementary relationship.[27] Therapy began when symptoms were well formed or a character perversion was expressed while education had a prophylactic function as well as a post-treatment task of reorienting and redirecting the patient toward worthy life goals. Pfister was so insistent on the necessity of close cooperation between psychoanalysis as a psychiatric method and education that he won the criticism of those analysts who did not want psychoanalysis to be confused or adulterated with anything of a moral or re-educative nature and considered treatment merely in terms of the negative aspect of freeing from symptoms and from crippling repressions. Pfister, on the other hand, believed so strongly in the educative use of psychoanalysis that he termed such,

27. Sigmund Freud, Introduction to Pfister's The Psychoanalytic Method, p. vi.

"pedanalysis" to distinguish it from therapeutic analysis and to suggest its equal significance.

In three areas psychoanalysis is considered indispensable for education. a) Psychoanalytic training should be a prerequisite for all teachers. It probably would be to no advantage and be impractical for teachers to become analysts, but they should have sufficient psychoanalytic understanding and experience to recognize their own unconscious motives and drives and to be able to comprehend the unconscious meanings of the role in which they are cast by their pupils. The intimate and persistent contacts which teachers have with students make it imperative that they not make them subject, for example, to uncontrolled displaced aggressions, as in the form of brittle, rigid discipline or excessive punishment, or require from the teaching situation certain compensations for the effects of crippling inhibitions and frustrations. It is likewise of importance that no inner resistances be allowed continually to work against the teacher's achievement of professional competence. It would be unfortunate if the psychoanalytic training of teachers would make them fadists for the new psychology, but within the frame of reference of the teacher's task and for the purposes of self-insight, freeing of the instincts for the

sublimating activity of teaching would be of great value.

b) Psychoanalysis is also of importance for what light it can throw upon the educational aspects of child development and upon the usual and ordinary personality problems that can be expected in the course of that development. The educator, by his observation of children over an extended period should be able to detect signs, such as excessive withdrawal and isolation, day-dreaming, or a nervous tic, which would indicate emotional disturbances of some kind which should be treated. The model pupil, who gives the teacher such delight, may be seen, upon analytical investigation to be suffering from a painful unconscious compulsion to be perfect. The slow and lazy student may not be mentally retarded or physically ill, but rather be suffering from anxiety which draws off much of his attention and energy, preventing him from tackling the tasks of school without inner restraint.

A knowledge of the psychoanalytic stages of infantile development could be helpful in the recognition of regressive forms of behavior in the older child. The discovery of forms of an Oedipal situation within the student's home could be helpful in the removal of resistances from which schoolwork suffers. To understand the importance of the sexual development of the child and to

appreciate his anxiety connected with it could prevent serious aberrations in its development as well as in his wholesome socialization.

The possibilities for the application of psychoanalysis to the understanding of child development and personality problems are almost as varied and as numerous as children in the classrooms. The degree to which help can be given to the child and directly or indirectly to the home will vary in large part according to the analytic understanding and experience of the teacher and the extent to which the significance of the emotional development of the child was appreciated.

c) Psychoanalysis has also come to the aid of education in suggesting a pedagogical method and in extending the scope of "conscious" education. Psychoanalysis cannot take the place of education. It is only a guide or a corrective. It proposes that the establishment of a relationship of love is prior to and possibly more important in terms of the total life development of the pupil than the more purely intellectual process of assimilating content. Psychoanalysis draws onto the stage the affective elements in the teacher-pupil situation and affirms that unless the relationship is free and permissive and the emotional condition is one of warmth and

acceptance, there will not only be serious handicaps to the learning process, but also to the life process.[28] Psychoanalysis, in the first place emphasizes the emotional relationship over the factual material.[29] It further affirms the value of work as providing contact with reality. Any form of withdrawal, whether it be from work, or toward it, represents an avoidance of a task, the achievement of which is required for proper development. The educational situation provides opportunity for work within a social group that is beneficial in maintaining reality reference.

Psychoanalysis, as Pfister sees it, is to be applied educatively also in play.[30] He has proposed theories very similar to modern methods of play therapy.[31] He recognizes the freedom in play which is similar to

28. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, Op. Cit., pp. 264-290.
29. If we compare this with the fundamental course of psychoanalytic therapy, we discover there, too, not so much attention on the content of the repressed material as upon its emotional evaluation by the patient and the dynamic relationship of transference and its resolution between patient and analyst.
30. Ibid., pp. 290-315. Reprint of an article, "A Contribution to the Psychology of Science," delivered in 1916 at the Educational Holiday Course of the Swiss Pedagogic Society.
31. Cf. Virginia Mae Axline, Play Therapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947.

the freedom of the analysand in which unconscious material can find expression. It is also the permissive arena in which an individual's patterns of social behavior can be accurately observed. It also provides a preview of a child's anticipated future life-task as well as a diagnostic glimpse of his emotional expressiveness.

The importance which psychoanalysis has ascribed to sexuality and its role in character formation as well as in neurotic symptom formation has imposed the imperative of sex education upon teachers and school administrators. Historically, the lines of influence between psychoanalysis and sex education in the schools may be rather tenuous, but Pfister is a strong advocate of sound sex training by the educator.[32] He sees factual and temperate sex education in the hands of a healthy teacher as one of the most significant contributions of education in reducing emotional disturbances that create harmful repressions.

A final implication of psychoanalysis for education is the important stress placed upon the family relations and the necessity of cooperation between the educator, psychoanalytically trained, and the parents in treating

32. Oscar Pfister, Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education. (Authorized Translation) London: Henry Kimpton, 1922, pp. 148-150.

problems of the child.[33] The educative process, which psychoanalytically is considered essentially an emotional one, goes on preeminently in the family. If society is to perform its educational task, then the education of the young in the institutional system must be complemented by the psychological training of the adults in the home. Psychoanalytically this is imperative, for indulgent parents exuding excessive love, or rigid rejecting parents incapable of love, are not only securing the mental and emotional ill-health of the next generation, but are undoing the constructive work of "pedanalysis."

3. Ethics.

At first glance there appears to be no ethical issue involved in therapy, if by that we mean merely the making conscious of that which is unconscious. But we see that the neurotic conflict is itself between the libidinous drive and the aesthetic or ethical counterstriving. The conflict cannot be moralized away, but it is to be resolved by conscious insight. It is not enough, however, to make conscious the libidinous urges and their object; the ethical counter-striving or the super-ego which is itself both conscious and unconscious must be investigated

33. Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, pp. 545-551.

analytically to free it as well of repressed conflicts. If we assume with Pfister that freedom from all repressions and complete consciousness of the psyche is consistent with an ideal life, then the goal of psychoanalytic treatment is certainly a moral one.[34]

It deserves attention that the analyst does not interfere with the free self-determination of the patient with regard to moral and religious matters. Continually Pfister assures us from his analytical experience that moral instruction only produces resistance and delays the arrival at the more basic conflict which thwarts a sounder moral development. Pfister goes further in stating that the more a person imposes his moral postulates on another the greater will be the drive to evil and incapability of good in the other person. The more the evil is condemned the more intensely does the inner demon force himself upon one.[35] Although he does believe in respecting the free self-determination of the individual Pfister does not believe that moral instruction repudiates that respect, but on the contrary is sometimes needed. He recognizes, however, the danger of harm, and also the

34. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 252.
35. Oscar Pfister, Analytische Seelsorge. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1927, p. 54.

uncertainty of instruction's saving the moral integrity of the patient. He maintains that the extent of psychoanalytic work with any individual is directly proportional to the "maturity of the moral habitus."[36]

After all has been said concerning the freedom of the patient, it is still important to recognize the strong suggestive influence the analyst's personality exercises on the patient in the transference relationship which makes the moral knowledge and certitude of the analyst crucial.

Ethogenesis. Pfister has applied psychoanalysis in indicating the empirical basis of ethics.[37] Accordingly, ethics has its roots in the study of the basic human drives, to see how they are interrelated in the total psychic economy, and by critical thought to discover their proper place in a comprehensive pattern of life's experiences and thus arrive at newer and higher ethical ideas. The norms of external authority are rationally determined by the critical examination of the primitive impulses which exert their imperative force. Through progressive enlargements and circumscriptions the ideals

36. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 198.
37. Pfister, Psychoanalyse und Weltanschauung, pp. 60ff.

which are subjective pretensions become the norms which correspond to the social and universal development of the indwelling spirit.

The development of ethics is analagous to the psychoanalytic process of sublimation. The mastery of the primitive instinct is overcome through sublimation or exchange of instinct-goal for a more socially sublime purpose. Rules are judged morally convincing or are corrected through the evolution of a broader imperative. Right action is established, however, not merely by rational thought but by the judgment of the developing moral consciousness. There is a process of heirarchical values beginning with simple rules regulating primitive impulses through more comprehensive ideals to the highest, most general norms which we attribute to absolute character or perfection. How this development takes place Pfister explains through recourse to Wundt's principle of heterogony of ends which purports to account for the resultants arising from psychical processes which include contents not present in earlier partial components. These changes which arise in the relations between simple parts of psychical compounds are considered the "results of successive creative syntheses." 38

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38. Wundt, Op. Cit., p. 326

Ethics is seen to be a dynamic development toward perfection and not a static code of morality. It proceeds from experience to hypothetical contructs just like every science. Ethics follows in its development hypothetical postulates which in further observations are either acknowledged or corrected. This norm-seeking action Pfister calls ethogenesis.

Ethogenesis insists that values and norms must be the results of human development. Ethics must be both empirical and rational. It starts with instincts which come from an experienced deficiency which seeks to be fulfilled, but its fulfilment depends upon conditions in the external world. In the conflict between the individual's needs, desires, or instinctive drives and the external realities reluctant to bend to them arises the necessity of ethics to determine the legitimacy of those desires and the possibilities of their fulfilment in terms of reality and the needs of other men. Thus laws and norms develop as we have seen. The individual has only relative independence in this absolute process of working out a valid ethic.[39]

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39. Pfister, Psychoanalyse und Weltanschauung, p. 66.

Pfister is not so naive as to assume that ethics can be developed through analytic experience alone. Psychoanalysis has a purgative, critical task of removing contradictions and freeing dammed up drives for the establishment of a stable character. He calls attention to three specific contributions of a more positive nature of psychoanalysis to ethics.

1) Psychoanalysis has brought the ethicist's attention to the subjective facts of moral experience. Conscience is both conscious and unconscious, subject to both conscious control and unconscious urges and conflicts. It is not the rational ethics which are developing according to ethogenesis, but the super-ego striving or restraint upon libidinal impulses. That this is so illustrates the truth of the apostle Paul's complaint, "The good that I would I do not, and that which I would not, that I do." It further indicates how moral problems can produce the unconscious roots of anxiety and guilt. There is also the suggestion of the possibility of the psychological grounding of a concept of 'Original Sin' in morality's unconscious aspect and which is given racial continuity through a hypothesis similar to Jung's collective unconscious.

2) Psychoanalysis applies the biologic-hygienic

principle to ethics. Some acts, traditionally appraised as immoral have been shown, from the medical point of view, to be the result of illness. A person can be a victim of unconscious restraints. Compulsive characters are mentally ill as well as morally responsible for guilt. Pfister does not believe that any naturalistic ethic will suffice, but that it is necessary to recognize the natural, i.e., physical contraints upon the free and responsible will of man. He suggests that it might be possible to think of ethics as a hygiene of a higher order for personality and society since both ethics and hygiene follow from postulates of a perfect life development. It should be further recognized that mental and social health have their moral implications.

3) Psychoanalysis insists that a valid ethic must rest on the individual's capacity to utilize or realize the ethical order. The striving to live up to an externally imposed norm can cause suffering, whereas true morality is the achievement of an increasingly higher morality within the individual's experience. No person could rightly be called highly moral because he carried a heavy guilt feeling caused by his inability to achieve an unassimilated but nevertheless high ideal. The ethical system of any individual can itself become the

rationalization of threatening unconscious forces which are held repressed. A repressed sense of guilt can seek compensation by an attachment to a projected wish-ideal which has no real moral strength. The validity of ethics rests not merely upon its excellence, but upon the eligibility of the individual to achieve its claims and his possibility of establishing a connection in life's experience with what he is and what he progressively should become.

4. Philosophy.

Psychoanalysis as an experimental science endeavors to discover the unconscious motives of personal experience and to set forth the ways in which these subjective elements in experience become inhibited in such a way as to cause distortions in behavior and in one's apprehension of reality. Nor does it withhold its critical scrutiny from the field of philosophy and metaphysics which deals with the rational comprehension of reality broadly conceived. Psychoanalysts were critical of the absolutizing of the metaphysicians. A philosophy, regardless of the caution in its conception, can manifest neurotic indications as surely as can a man's interpersonal relationships. Freud succeeded in undermining the philosopher's pretensions of complete objectivity by his persistent

rejection of the possibility of a respectable metaphysics which is free of subjective projections. Otto Rank and Hans Sachs,[41] on the other hand, avoid the final renunciation of philosophy as subjective projection, but rather indicate that although these elements do creep in, philosophy is not to be reduced or limited to them.

The original meaning of the term metaphysics derived from the placing of the book of Aristotle's highest principles on the shelf after his book on nature suggests the empirical foundation of metaphysical knowledge. Pfister insists on experience as the starting point of metaphysics just as it is for every science. And its true end, just as is the true aim of science, is to remove the unreal and contradictory elements in naive empiricism, and to seek for more comprehensive formulae which account for logical causes and which set forth the true function and purpose of the empirical object or event. Psychoanalysis extends the empirical base upon which the rational systems of philosophy are built. It also indicates the necessity of purging all thought, both philosophic and scientific, of anthropomorphism. Pfister de-

41. Otto Rank and Hans Sach, Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse für die Geisteswissenschaften. Wiesbaden: Bergman, 1913.

fends philosophy by insisting that it is no more vulnerable to subjective adulterations than any other form of rational investigation for they all depend upon transempirical constructions, abstractions or hypotheses.

5. Religion.

It is the conviction of Pfister that religion has less to fear from psychoanalysis than it does from the ponderance of its own ecclesiasticism and ritualism and the ease with which religious experience takes perverted forms. Psychoanalysis not only provides a means of restoring mental health to those people who have adopted religious causes or practices as the expressions of their neurotic symptoms, but it also helps to clarify the use of symbols in religion and through them to trace the continuity between contemporary forms of religion and primitive myths. We are to be reminded (and it is often forgotten by those who feel that psychoanalysis destroys their religion) that psychoanalysis cannot stand in judgment over the truth or falsehood of religious belief. This is the task of the philosophy of religion. It rather seeks to discover the psychic roots of religious experience and relate their meaning to the symbols used for their expression and to recognize the function and purpose of the experience within the context of the whole personality.

Pfister defines religion as "the relation of mankind to centers of spiritual power which are supernatural, but felt to be real."[42] Religious experience is derived from inhibitions which restrain life, just as in the case of art. However, it does not deny forces which do exist, but rather, as in the case of metaphysics, it seeks to find the true Being which underlies the appearances of external phenomena. Religion is essentially the personal experience of relationship to or inner grasp of the ideal-real power-center which is called God.

Psychoanalysis has many services to perform for religion according to the view of Pfister. The general aim in applying it to religion is to seek out the subliminal motives of the religious consciousness and its effects and to find their psychic cause and biological basis. He emphasizes the following contributions of psychoanalysis to religion:

1) It throws light on the extensive use of symbolism in religion. Symbols have value in being easily comprehended, in their flexibility and inexhaustability in incorporating new meanings, and in their emotional values, but psychoanalysis insists on seeing the symbol as symbol and not as an entity in religious experience.

42. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, Op.Cit., p. 249.

It furnishes practical preachment against idolatry.

2) Psychoanalysis shows the connection and similarity between some present forms of religious experience and some ancient myths. It affirms in reality the universal character of the religious consciousness.

3) Psychoanalysis discriminates between religion as personal experience and its effects or artefacts. About the Objective Referent of religious experience, psychoanalysis can say nothing, but it does distinguish between that experience and the means, the creeds, rituals, etc., by which the experience is communicated.

4) Psychoanalysis throws light on spurious forms of religious experience, such as myths, hallucinations, inspirations, prohibitions, bizarre behavior, ceremonials and the like, and traces the unconscious connections between the act and the subjective complexes. Accordingly, many forms of rituals appear to function as magical acts committed for the purpose of allaying anxiety. This form of religious practice, therefore, perpetuates a basically intolerable situation rather than seeks to resolve through analytical and moral means the cause of the anxiety.

5) Psychoanalysis, while being critical of formal and ecclesiastical expressions of religion has indicated the preventive character of religious faith. Even Freud

himself, although speaking of religion as a universal obsessional neurosis, admitted that it protected against the danger of certain neurotic afflictions.[43] Pfister affirms the importance of faith and love as operative characteristics of personality in maintaining mental health.

6) Psychoanalysis holds before the psychology of religion the necessity of research into the causal and biological comprehension of religious phenomena.

7) Psychoanalysis has confirmed the psychological validity of the Christian faith. Both appear as methods of release from crippling inhibitions for freer, more creative life functioning. Both require the capacity for establishing deep affectional bonds along with the more severe demand for sacrifice. According to Pfister, the pattern of psychoanalytic treatment through which connections are established between present conflict situations or symptoms to early childhood experiences accords well with Jesus' prescription to become as little children. Regression is indicated as a pre-condition of reconciliation.

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43. Sigmund Freud, The Future of An Illusion, (Tr. W.D. Robson-Scott) London: The Hogarth Press, 1934 (1928), p. 77.

We shall see later the more extensive and specific uses to which psychoanalysis was put in the service of the Christian faith and life through Pfister's ministry. For the present it suffices to see that he recognized both the theoretical and practical applicability of psychoanalysis to religion and this was in part the validation and justification of psychoanalysis.

CHAPTER V

COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS WITH THE THOUGHT OF FREUD IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY AND PRACTICE

We have examined Pfister's defense and advocacy of psychoanalysis. We shall now make a detailed and systematic review of his psychoanalytic theory so that we may see more clearly his relation to the thought of Freud and also have before us the interpretation of psychoanalysis which could be coordinated with or applied to Christian thought and pastoral care. This seems to be important, for the possibility of synthesizing psychoanalysis and religion may have begun in the process of accomodating psychoanalytic thought on the part of Pfister to his religious position. Although he followed Freud closely in agreeing with his major psychological tenets, we may be able to detect deviations toward a less naturalistic, materialistic, deterministic system of thought. We desire, therefore, not only to investigate the main aspects of psychoanalytic thought according to Pfister in a systematic way, but, in comparing and contrasting them with Freud, to discover, if possible, the intrusion of more idealistic and spiritual interpretations which made possible Pfister's synthesis of the two disciplines.

A. THE UNCONSCIOUS[1]

The differentiation of the mental life into conscious and unconscious dimensions is a fundamental premise of psychoanalysis. Although it has various definitions the unconscious denotes the mental activity which is distinguished from consciousness by the characteristic of not being known. It is a dynamic differentiation. That is, the unconscious is not weaker, lacking power to become conscious; for it can dominate the whole of life. The unconscious mental life is dynamic; impulses are continually pressing toward expression instead of being passive, static and inert.

The unconscious is not a mysterious, unapproachable unreal force, but is rather that aspect of the mental life which is operationally inaccessible and unknown. Freud spoke of the consciousness and unconsciousness of a psychic process as being its attributes.[2] The transformations and activity of the unconscious take place systematically, according to its own laws, which must be analogous at least to the laws of conscious mental life, for it is through a mentalistic process that they are

1. See also pp. 92-97.
2. Sigmund Freud, General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. (Authorized Translation) New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920, p. 255.

investigated. The unconscious, subconscious, or subliminal (and Pfister uses the terms interchangeably) refers to intellectual processes which being unknown at the moment must be inferred according to the principle of causal connectedness. There has been a tendency on the part of analysts to carry these causal connections back to physiological processes and thus advocate a type of psychophysical determinism and materialism. Freud has suggested this[3] but Pfister staunchly resists such reduction. To be sure, the instincts which are largely unconscious are biologically rooted, but their concrete functioning, their modifications and transformations which account for particular behavior are not to be understood through physiological investigations alone.

The unconscious is to be differentiated according to whether its contents are the result of repressions or not. If it is caused by repression it is a kind of by-product of the collision of forces of the id, ego and super-ego. If it is not, it appears to be the primitive manifestation of instinctual energy prior to the accommodations to external social reality.

There are several aspects in which the unconscious is understood. We have noted that it is dynamic. It

3. Sigmund Freud, Kleine Schriften, 1, p. 52.

also appears to function as a kind of recording process in which events and ideas are filed away; as an intellectual process it is memory; as an emotional process, it is repression. The unconscious performs the retentive function of holding items in readiness for recall or for abreaction.

Because of the ominous nature of an unknown unconscious, and because it contains primitive instinctual urges, it readily becomes stigmatized as a dangerous force. That popular interest in the unconscious had been aroused through the part it plays in neurotic formations, has further cast a blight upon its character. The intrapersonal struggle is not just between a conscious, rational will and the unconscious, irrational impulses, but the unconscious is as well the source of creative inspirations, sublimating objects and logical organizations. Pfister sees more of the positive nature of the unconscious than does Freud even to the extent of agreeing with James that it must be the seat of man's most sublime experience of religious objects.[4]

B. INSTINCTS

Instincts are simple tendencies of a definite aim,

4. Oscar Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, p. 9.

the pressure of activity to be directed by a more or less specific goal tension. It is often represented as a certain sum or quantity of energy forcing its way in a certain direction. The number of instincts to be abstracted will depend upon the specificity or generality of the aim, direction or goal idea. For example, one may speak of the instinct as the process of satisfying a fundamental felt need. Freud reduces these needs to two, self-preservation and race-preservation or the ego instinct and the sex instinct. Pfister, on the other hand, believes that it is arbitrary to separate the ego and sex instincts, that if by ego instinct we mean self-preservation, and by sex instinct we mean race-preservation, a person can be so identified with the race that individual and racial continuation become the same thing or exercise the same force and fulfill the same function within the individual.[5] Pfister speaks rather of a life-impulse or will to live which is a more generalized libidinal energy denoting both ego and sexual gratifications but not being limited to either. This is not to be confused with Freud's meaning of libido, for he identifies it with the sexual instinct as a purely empirical

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5. Ibid., pp. 53, 54.

fact. Jung gives it a metaphysical and a sexual meaning and then ascribes empirical qualities to it. Jung includes in it volition, striving, desire and hunger as well as the energy of growth and speaks of it thus:

> This libido is nothing concrete or familiar, but rather an absolute X, a pure hypothesis, a picture or marker, as little concretely conceivable as the energy of the physical world.[6]

It should be observed that any theory of instincts makes use of a single level of abstraction. According to Pfister an instinct is merely a specification of the fundamental life force, or the type of activity in which the life force exerts or invests itself. A repression, then, does not properly transpose the instinct but rather redirects the life force. Freud also intimated in his suggestion of partial instincts that they were not elementary forces but were reducible on the one side to a non-sexual instinct and further to reactions to organic stimuli.

An instinct is characterized in three ways: 1) by having a source of excitation within the body which does not depend upon external stimulation for its arousal, 2) by having an aim which is to remove the excitation

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6. Carl Jung, Jahrbuch, Vol. V, p. 342, cited by Pfister in The Psychoanalytic Method, p. 166.

or to meet the demands of a felt deficiency, and 3) by having an object which is the external means or the type of action which will achieve the aim and thus restore the psychic equilibrium of the satisfied instinct.

It becomes clear that the theory of instincts, much opposed among present day psychologists seeks to recognize given psychic energy, drive or needs which require activity for their resolution. When the instinct becomes a psychic entity and not a frame of reference and when the psychologist seeks to specify with dogmatic absoluteness the exact nature of the instinct, the theory has run into difficulty.

Pfister uses the concept of instincts to define particular kinds of felt needs and urges, but he insists on the interrelationship of any particular instinctual activity with the total life force. None can be studied truly in abstraction. No behavior can be explained as the result of a single instinct. He recognizes that even the sexual instinct and the ego instinct, as Freud views them, are not concretely separable.

Although instinctual energies or the life force cannot be accurately measured, there are intimations in Pfister's thought that what are usually referred to as religious resources of power are directly related to psychic

energy. Free libidinal expressiveness toward sublimated objects is taken as an ideal characteristic of religious life. Repressions which prevent sublimation divert psychic energy toward the handling of neurotic complexes. Freedom from the latter releases energy to be expended in satisfying noble ends. We shall see below that Pfister believes in the varying capacities for sublimation; likewise it is to be observed that even among relatively healthy people, psychic energy may be expended before religious goals have been ventured; and hence arises agnosticism regarding religious empowering; -- since the energy to achieve sublimated objects is no longer available, there arises uncertainty about the possibility of their existence. For example, when a person finds himself unable to love, and incidentally unable to love God, he may quite readily deny the latter's existence.

C. SEXUALITY[7]

We have observed the difficulties encountered in the definition of sexuality in Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud extended its meaning beyond the physical reproductive process to include what Pfister meant by love.

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7. See also pp. 77-77

Pfister, on the other hand, limited sexuality to its specific biological meaning and used the term 'eroticism' to cover what Freud had included in his extended definition.

> Under sexuality, we understand the sum total of those physical and psychical phenomena which are related to reproduction or the activity of the reproductive instincts and organs. From this concept, we distinguish eroticism which we compare with 'love' and can consider as characterized either as sexual or non-sexual.[8]

This clarifies Freud's observations concerning infantile sexuality; for we see it as eroticism of a non-sexual nature according to the terminology of Pfister.

Whereas Freud distinguishes the sexual instinct from the ego instinct and believes that all higher emotions of sympathy, aesthetic enjoyment and religion are derived from the former, Pfister held that love toward other people is dependent on the instinct of race preservation which is not identical with sexuality, but which also has elements of egoism about it. Thus Christian love has its roots in sexuality only as it is distinguished as eroticism which develops progressively toward a non-sexual nature. Altruism is thus seen to grow out of eroticism which by the process of sublimation finds

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8. Pfister, Psychoanalytic Method, p. 168

for its object, not the self, but an external cause, purpose or person. Love alone is primary in the psychic life; hate is always a foreign invader.

Pfister has made an exhaustive study of problems in satisfying erotic needs and in establishing constructive relationships of love. Narcissism is the failure to find a love object other than the self and the consequent inability of the libido to be detached from the self. Although sadism, the inflicting of cruelty upon others, and masochism, the abnormal sexual passion characterized by pleasure in being abused and in accepting pain, appear to be opposing tendencies of the inhibited libido, Pfister sees them constantly occurring together. Although in his practise they have manifested themselves separately, he believes that both forms of impulses are brought about by the thwarting of the normal erotic development which results from the denial of affection or the irritation caused by the cruelty of punishment.

He further distinguishes four types of malformations of the erotic development. 1) Don Juanism is the attempt to find a mother substitute and establish an infantile but transient and irresponsible attachment. 2) Erotic impulses polarize in forming attachments simultaneously to both vulgar and ideal objects. We discover this in

the case of a married man with his mistress or of a religious person whose religious devotion is contrasted with an equally intense but disreputable form of behavior. 3) Incapacity for love which has often been considered a primary disposition or style of life is understood to depend upon repression. It is often connected with a regressive identification and projection which transforms the present erstwhile love object into someone else of a previous stage of development. 4) The emotional flood is a form of erotic malformation in which excessive love is offered to one object to reinforce or compensate for lack of love for another. Thus exaggerated love for one's wife may rightly be suspected of being transformed love for the mother. And extreme mysticism which loses the self in union with God needs the balancing love to other men to save it from the sham success of diverting the libido from hated persons.

In his analysis of hate and reconciliation Pfister has distinguished clearly and pointedly the harmful effects of hostility and the beneficial effects of love. 1) Hate impoverishes the personality by a one-sided direction and fixation of its interests. 2) The individual is depersonalized by increasing dependence on unconscious desires; his freedom is endangered through persistent

irritability and through outbursts of uncontrolled rage. 3) The will is paralysed. 4) Constructive energy is wasted in unproductive fantasies. 5) The individual becomes progressively more isolated with introversion and egoism resulting. Love, on the other hand, requires the person to acquire new concepts and he is stimulated to overcompensate defenses against hate. When hate is turned to love, sadistic desires give place to masochistic mechanisms, which when sublimated resolve the revengeful spirit and lead to penance.[9]

D. MENTAL MECHANISMS AND FUNCTIONS

1. Sublimation occupies an important place in Pfister's thought. It is the principle by which a rational and valid ethic is realized. It is the means whereby all progress is made, for by sublimation is meant the transposing of psychic energy from lower to higher ends. True sublimation arises out of the primary eroticism plus a non-sexual disposition. It is not an automatic process of an inhibited instinct; the married woman who finds her husband sexually incompatible does not always adopt the most pious practices of religious devotion. Nor does psychoanalysis say what activities are to be better or more valuable objects of the instinctual

9. Oscar Pfister, "Analytische Untersuchungen über die

energy. Dürr defines sublimation as

> the utilization of sensual dispositions in the service of ideas and thoughts more valuable to the organic resonances and in particular also ideas and thoughts motivating valuable acts.[10]

It requires reality thinking to define what the criteria of value are, as well as freedom from the initial repression in order that the libido may form an attachment to the more valuable goal. If there is an attempt to make a sublimation without first removing the inhibiting repression, the person finds himself straddling between excessive demands upon his psychic energy.

We have observed that sublimation is not so much the transformation of an inhibited instinct as it is the freeing and redirecting of the libidinal energy. Sublimation cannot take place so long as primary impulses remain under repression. To release these gives the interest in higher things freedom and power.

Pfister has made a most significant observation from his practice that the mobility and capacity for sublimation varies greatly in different individuals.

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9. (Con't.)
Psychologie des Hasses und der Versöhnung." Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische Forschungen. 2(1910), pp. 134-178

10. Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, pp. 313, 314.

In other words, some people biologically require a greater extent of direct gratification of libidinal impulses, whereas others can more readily and more safely circumvent the primary pleasure and transform the instinctual energy to intellectual, aesthetic, ethical and religious ends. The potentiality of the individual for sublimation appears to inhere largely in the given biological and chemical makeup or composition of the person. Freud believes that a certain amount of the repressed libidinal impulses have a just claim to direct gratification[11] whereas Pfister believes that a certain amount of primary application of the instinct is a prerequisite for proper sublimation. With Freud, direct gratification is justified because the instinct demands it; with Pfister it is necessary, not just for its own sake, but because it is instrumental in making a sound sublimation. There may be found a certain portion of the sexual present in the sublimation, perhaps ethically directed, as a complete eroticism gone over into religion.[12] Sheer elevation of instinct without regard for its basic function, and which

11. Sigmund Freud, Über Psychoanalyse, p. 61, cited in Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, p. 315.
12. Oscar Pfister, "Die Primären Gefühle als Bedingungen Der Höchsten Geistesfunktionen." Imago. 8(1922), pp. 46-53.

goes beyond the power of the individual often results in fanaticism and narrow-mindedness. It is observed that the danger of immorality is much more likely in the case of a strained or forced sublimation; the ascetic who has renounced worldly pleasures and has grafted on a monastery's rigid super-ego finds temptations all the more tormenting.

2. Repression is the inhibition of the instinct. It is not to be confused with the suppression of an idea which is the conscious attempt to assign the idea to the unconscious. Repression restricts the instinct at a certain stage which prevents certain ideas from becoming conscious. Repression is brought about by several means, a) by reality's depriving the instinct's gratification or by forcing abstinence upon the person, b) by the conscience overruling an instinct's fulfilment, c) Infantile impressions often determine what is or is not compatible with the instinct goal. d) Failure of sexual gratification. e) Painful experience in connection with the erotic development, and f) traumatic events which thwart the instinctual energy.

In Freudian thought repression is the foundation upon which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests.

He emphasizes its function of rejecting and keeping an idea out of consciousness. It is an unconscious process, however, not to be confused with suppression as we have seen above.

3. Regression occurs when internal or external obstacles impede the development of the libido and it flows backwards. When an impulse encounters difficulties in the exercise of its function and cannot reach a satisfactory end to its strivings it seeks for more infantile or primitive expressions. Closely allied with this process is fixation which is the powerful attachment of the instinct upon a pleasing object. This accomplishes the arrest of the partial instinct at an early stage of development. The stronger the fixation the more readily is regression resorted to and the less likely is the fully developed functioning of the instinct accomplished.

4. Identification, substitution, projection.

Identification is a process closely allied to the ethical idea of sympathy. By it is meant the treating of another's emotional states, intellectual, ethical and aesthetic judgments as highly significant to one's self. It is an intense form of imitation through which the subject seeks to take into himself or embody the conditions of another.

There is another form of identification through which, by unconscious substitution, another person is taken as similar in behavior or characteristics or who fulfills the same psychic needs in the subject as another person. This occurs most frequently under psychoanalytic investigation in the case of a young man who forms an attachment to a much older woman in whom are seen, probably unconsciously, the characteristics of his mother. This form of identification we call substitution in which the subject transposes the characteristics of one person into a third. A similar form of mental mechanism which occurs chiefly in dreams is displacement. It is done by the omission of elements, modification and rearrangement of the dream by its censor. This distortion within the dream for purposes of acceptance is analogous to the dream itself in relation to the total psychic life as the effort to make suppressed material respectable by displacement. By this is meant essentially the removal of a feared object or person by putting another in its place. The substitute is at least admissable to conscious or manifest expression, but because it is a cloak for a feared object it often assumes phobic significance.

Projection is the transposition of wishfulfillments

from one's self to another person. Instead of rejecting an improper or denied desire altogether, one disowns it and ascribes it to the will of another. Hence there is a kind of vicarious indulgence in a disapproved act without incurring the danger of heightened guilt. It is the mechanism which operates frequently in paranoia.

An important distinction between projection and identification in terms of the ethical life should be observed. With identification one seeks to incorporate into himself what is another's, sometimes for his own development, at others, for the strengthening of the other. In projection, however, there is the attempt to repudiate responsibility for entertaining forbidden desires, so that the guilt-producing activity is seen in another and not in one's self; hence guilt is avoided.

5. Symbolization is the process of veiling or masking an idea or expression, often in a fantastic form bearing an analogy to the original idea, which is too painful to be accepted by itself. The symbol is useful for many reasons; since it is a more pictorial or sensual representation it is more easily grasped than the bare idea; there is an emotional stimulation derived from the symbol that the abstract idea lacks. One is reminded that the story of the good Samaritan is a much more com-

pelling inducement to service and unselfish sharing than a theoretical discussion of altruism. The symbol is flexible in that its meaning can be expanded or detracted; it both reveals and conceals. Its content is determined not alone by the rational interpretation of that which it represents, but also by the concurrence of wishes, or the subjective intent of the idea.

Pfister maintains that in the psychology of dreams not every symbol can be interpreted and every symbol has varying depths of interpretation. He warns against the all-too facile readiness of people to assume a typical interpretation of symbols. The typical interpretations only have high probability of exactness, and are of use only in the hands of a trained analyst. Freud, on the other hand, assumes much more regularity with the typical symbols:

> Since symbols are permanent and constant translations....they permit us in certain cases to interpret a dream without questioning the dreamer.[13]

Symbols are also to be understood in their importance in the religious life. Much of what are taken for reality concepts are in reality only symbolic means of achieving some kind of comprehension or condensation or expansion

13. Sigmund Freud, General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920, pp. 123, 124.

of a significant event or worshipped person or object. The meaning of the symbol depends in part upon the subjective needs or wishes it is required to satisfy. Hence, it is difficult to assume an easy conformity of all to a single liturgy, theology, or form of religious experience.

7. Pleasure and Reality Principles.

The basic principle governing psychological activity is known as the pleasure principle. Freud assumed that the entire psychological processes were directed or regulated autonomically toward gaining pleasurable stimulation and toward the avoidance of painful ones. Pleasure is the result of reduction of stimulation, either internally or externally. Hence, the fulfillment of need, the satisfying of a drive is pleasurable. Allow the hunger, the desire for association, or the need for rest to go unfulfilled and pain results. Freud believed that once a need had been satisfied by outside means and it occurred again, it would be met again by hallucinated means if its real fulfillment were not available. From this he concluded that the psychic mechanism would guarantee pleasure even if it had to arrive at it by unreal presentations.

However, through experience the ego learns that its direct gratification is often and unavoidably withheld, its momentary pleasurable experience is postponed; and indeed, greater satisfaction may be achieved in the long view by the endurance of immediate displeasure through conformity to reality. Thus Freud saw that the pleasure principle was expanded to take into consideration the reality principle by which the individual admits certain deprivations in order to attain a more comprehensive good. At bottom, however, the desire for pleasure rules.

Pfister gives much more place to the reality principle than does Freud. He believes that both are present and fundamental in the beginning of the psychic life. They represent two kinds of thinking. When one is restricted the other assumes predominance. Allow the conception of reality to be limited and it is filled out with autistic or fantastic thought. Allow the desire for pleasure to be unfilfilled and the pain resulting counsels the ego to make a more serious and appropriate conformity to reality. Neither form is more fundamental than the other in the thought of Pfister. They comprise the true polarity of the psychic life to which Freud ascribed them.

E. NEUROSES AND THE MENTAL DISORDERS

Both Freud and Pfister base their fundamental theory of neurosis around the functioning of the sexual instinct. Whereas Freud describes its inception in terms of the internal dynamics of the ego's helplessness before the excessive tension created by unsatisfied need, Pfister maintains more concretely that the neurosis originates from an incapacity to love. In the latter case, also, the neurotic conflict between the forces of the id and the ego and the super-ego are not seen merely as mechanical operations but as a moral struggle between the super-ego or conscience as interiorized sense of duty and the given instinctual drives which strive for expression. With both men the neurotic symptoms become necessary with the converting of the disturbance of the libido into anxiety.

A symptom is formed as a kind of substitution for an unachieved instinctual gratification; it is the attempt to restore the psychic equilibrium which has been distorted by the excessive inhibition of the instinct. The neurotic individual, therefore, carries with him an abnormally strong sexual repression along with an excessive elaboration of the sexual instinct. For when the instinct is blocked without a sublimated object to

attach itself to it aggrandizes itself. When the ego is incapable of directing the instinct, it is driven back on itself with excessive energy which is utilized in the neurotic conflict and which the neurotic feels as anxiety. The symptoms are the psychic attempt to prevent the tension or the void caused by the inability to love. They drain off the excessive energy and thus reduce the anxiety. Compulsive forms of behavior are methods of allaying anxiety which results from an inability to love (Pfister) or response to situations of danger (Freud).[14] The symptom is the psychological method of defense against the overpowering force of the id and for the beleaguered ego which can hold the id in check only by restricting itself. Freud speaks of three types of anxiety which is the admission of weakness on the part of the ego: 1) reality anxiety or the inability of the ego to cope with reality, 2) moral anxiety, or the ego's insufficiency in dealing with the super-ego, and 3) neurotic anxiety, or the ego's weakness before the strength of the id's passions.[15]

14. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety. (Tr. Henry A. Bunker) New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1936, p. 85.
15. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. (Tr. J. H. Sprott) New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1933, p. 104.

Unfortunately, Pfister does not delineate his theory of neurosis with the same terminology as does Freud. With the latter, it is in terms of the ego's situation of danger with reference to the id (chiefly the sexual instinct) and secondarily with external reality. That is, because the sexual instinct cannot be gratified, the ego is forced to reevaluate itself in terms of its new limitations; at the same time greater demands are made upon it by the ungratified sexual energy. With Pfister the cause of anxiety is chiefly the damming of love caused by a conflict between conscience and impulse. It thus has a moral character; and the anxiety is a signal of the danger of guilt inasmuch as the conscience in meeting the demands of the impulse either must limit itself or reappraise its content. Essentially, the two processes are identical. Freud's view of sexuality in the cause of neurosis is more narrowly biological than is Pfister's.

To apply this distinction to the neurotic element in religion, it appears that Pfister believes that the inability to love God could be the origin of anxiety whereas Freud believes that a man's love for God would be the manifestation of a neurotic symptom. God, for Pfister, is a real person to whom love may be legitimately

and healthily directed. Failure to do so is symptomatic of the inner conflict between conscience and impulse and is productive of anxiety just as is the blocked love toward any human person. With Freud, however, the anxiety caused by ungratified sexual instinct which causes the revaluation of the ego in terms of its new limitations causes the ego to make the projection of the God-image to compensate for the shrunken ego.

F. THE OEDIPAL SITUATION

The Oedipus complex as represented by Freud is the nucleus of every neurosis in males. Accordingly, it is the repressed incestuous longing for the mother accompanied by the corresponding hatred for the father who is the son's competitor for the mother's love. In every case it takes the form of a fixation upon the parents, sometimes expressing itself positively toward one and then negatively toward the other. It may become the source of a crippling general ambivalence as the result of love for mother and hate for father being present simultaneously in the person's life.

Pfister does not accord the Oedipus complex such importance as does Freud. He proposes the following strictures upon its universal use: 1) Not every one who

has an Oedipus complex is neurotic. It is not unusual to find a normal person whose Oedipal feelings are well developed. It is not the characteristic sign of a neurotic person. 2) Nor is the Oedipus complex the result of a conscious wish which has been repressed because of the restrictions against incest. 3) The erotic attachment of children to their parents is not necessarily incestuous, but it may be due to other causes such as reactions to a threatening external situation or in the case of hate the result of improper education. 4) It is possible that in the formation of neurosis, the sexual desires directed toward the mother may be the result of a displacement from a present, but unattainable sexual object. As the process of regression takes place, the mother becomes the <u>new</u> but trusted object for the otherwise thwarted impulses.[16]

Pfister admits that in many neurotic persons the Oedipus complex is present, but he does not believe that its being the universal nucleus of the neurosis is conclusively established. It is true that many neurotics display an unusually strong attachment to or repulsion from their parents, but this is not always true nor does

16. Pfister, <u>The Psychoanalytic Method</u>, pp. 164, 165.

it always follow the pattern of the Oedipus complex as defined by Freud.

6. TOPOGRAPHY OF THE PSYCHE

It is not uncommon to attempt a graphic representation of the fundamental aspects or forces in the psychic life. Indeed, Freud speaks of his topography of the psyche as a kind of "anatomy of mental personality." [17] He distinguishes three dynamic forces, the ego, id and super-ego, and also three levels of consciousness: the conscious, pre- or fore-conscious, and the unconscious. These divisions, although basic to Freudian theory, are not to be taken as the kind of sharply defined boundary lines which are drawn in political geography. They represent concrete psychic energies manifesting themselves in particular ways. The id is the most primitive, irrational and unmoral aspect of personality. It represents the "instinctual cathexis seeking discharge." [18] It is the most completely unconscious. It is the seat of the basic drive, energy or passion of life. It is the uncultured source of activity and thought. The ego is a part of the id which has become modified by its contact with the

17. Freud, New Introductory Lectures., p. 78
18. Ibid., p. 100.

external world and which exercises a selective influence over the external world and the id for purposes of self-protection. The ego is organized and organizing. It seeks to order the otherwise untamed passions of the id and to achieve their satisfaction from the external world. The ego also seeks the manipulation or appropriation of the external world to its own benefit. The super-ego represents the demands of morality upon one's self. It accounts for the activities of self-observation, conscience, and the holding up of ideals. It is a later development in the psychic economy being the interiorizing of the standards of conduct from other loved and respected persons or institutions. The ego, super-ego, and the id are largely unconscious, the ego and the super-ego having greater possibility for consciousness than the id.

Freud distinguished also consciousness as the very limited area of perceptual awareness, the pre-conscious or fore-conscious as the intermediary between the conscious and the unconscious in which ideas could very easily bubble up into consciousness, and the unconscious as the vast domain of psychic energies containing repressed material and the unknown springs of creative action. Pfister does not distinguish a fore-conscious, but maintains that inasmuch as it is not conscious it is uncon-

scious. He recognizes that there are degrees or depths of unconsciousness, that some material is much more readily accessible than others.

Pfister uses the terminology of Freud and recognizes the distinction in functions among the several aspects of the psychic life, but he continually warns against false abstractions and hypostasizing of any one element. The psychic life is an organic dynamism and not a mechanism. Its structure is only schematic, not real. There is no id apart from an id functioning in relation to the ego and super-ego. The psyche functions as an indivisible whole; and no matter how it is to be broken up for purposes of understanding that function, it still operates as a unit. Pfister avoids unnecessary pictorializing or graphic schematization of the psyche because it produces a false impression of concrete mental life.

H. THE BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW AND PSYCHIC DEVELOPMENT

The psychoanalytic view of child development is closely allied with the appearances of emerging biological sources of erotic pleasure. Originating in the most basic physiological processes the gratification of the libido is first achieved through oral expression.

i.e., in the earliest months by the intake of food. Next, the libidinal energy finds satisfaction in anal gratification or through elimination. As the child develops, his own sex-differentiation specifies the genitals as sources of pleasure. With the distinctions between the sexes, the Oedipus complex has an opportunity to be established. Before puberty, the sexual development appears to be arrested momentarily in what is known as the latency stage. Pubescence, then is the flowering of full genitalia, in which, through the capacity for orgasm, mature sexual development is achieved. These steps provide the biological base of the psychosexual plan of growth.

Pfister has not written a systematic psycho-biology of childhood. He is more concerned with the interpersonal dynamics of the growing child in its early group and especially family relationships. He has seen the emotional disturbances in youth whose early experiences of love have been thwarted either by excessive, over-demanding affection from the parents or by their incapacity or rigidity in loving the child. He recognizes anal-eroticism and onanism particularly as forms of regression in which the libido, instead of finding concrete expression in the contemporary social situation is driven

back to a fantasied fixation upon an earlier mode of gaining gratification.

This developmental point of view is not merely a recognition of the order of the awakening biological functions, but it is the attempt to discover the meaning or the purpose which these functions serve in the individual's psychic organization. That is, the harmonious functioning of the physical organism leads not alone to the elimination of the pressures from the instinctual urges, but it enhances the ego as well. This is seen in all stages of development; for example, the intake of food not merely satisfies hunger, but it gives the infant a sense of security and power in a providing environment. Likewise, in the anal period, when control over elimination becomes increasingly conscious the child has at hand a means of expressing his love or hostility by incurring the pleasure or displeasure of his parents. The extent to which there has been successful satisfaction connected with these more primitive aspects of the erotic life, and the extent to which there is difficulty in gaining equal satisfaction in more mature means of libidinal expression determines the regressive tendencies of the individual.

I. PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPY

The aim of psychoanalytic therapy can be described in a variety of ways. Freud intends it

> to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of vision, and so to extend its organization that it can take over new portions of the id.[19]

Pfister speaks of the general aim of psychoanalysis as the "emancipation from inner inhibitions for the autonomous, loving faithful personality."[20] How closely agreed are Pfister's and Freud's aims of therapy may be more readily seen by Freud's statement:

> Every psychoanalytic treatment is an attempt to set free repressed love which had found a miserable compromise outlet in the symptom.[21]

This task of emancipation proceeds in a two-fold manner.[22] 1) The neurotic symptoms must be interpreted by the analyst who seeks the meaning of the symptoms as well as the wishes or desires which underly it. 2) The motives for the repression, along with their emotional concomitants are brought into consciousness. This making conscious of the disturbing conflict along with its affective overtones achieves the resolution or dissolution of the

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20. Pfister, Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education. London: Henry Kimpton, 1922, p. 4.
21. Freud: Delusion and Dream. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1919, p. 78.
22. Pfister, Psychoanalysis in the Service of Education, p. 124.

neurosis. Pfister emphasizes the fact that it is essentially a negative process. It frees the patient from constricting forms of behavior, but there is nothing inherent in the process which produces the mechanisms of constructive activity. Pfister uses on several occasions the analogy of plowing and sowing to indicate the preparatory work of analysis. It makes the psychic life capable of growth, it removes obstacles, but the educational processes by which new content and behavior is incorporated must take place, just as planting must follow the plowing and preparation of the soil for the procurement of the crop.

The method of psychoanalysis or the means of making the unconscious conscious is essentially free association and analytical interpretation. Word association, dream interpretation and hypnosis are subsidiary methods employed. Pfister made extensive use of word associations and for a time employed the standard word-association test devised by Jung. As we have seen, he also used artistic associations freely. The impression is readily gained from Pfister's numerous case studies that the course of treatment he followed was usually much shorter than standard analysis; and that moral instruction, suggestion and persuasion were utilized in some cases in which a

shortened number of analytical sessions was indicated.

But psychoanalytic treatment cannot be reduced to the process of making conscious the unconscious material and the consequent freeing of the patient from his symptoms. Of utmost importance is the dynamic course of treatment which is the interpersonal situation existing between the patient and the analyst. Initially, there is the relationship of dependence upon the analyst as the patient sees in him the means of deliverance from his neurosis. Resistance, however, soon develops, as the patient not only is disinclined to admit unconscious material which has been repressed, but also resents his inferiority before the analyst. Resistance, however, is overcome, and the attachment of the patient to the analyst (transference) becomes more intense in the process of analysing the depths of the unconscious. This attachment may be either of love or of hate, positive or negative; but it is nevertheless a strong emotional relationship to the analyst. Gradually, however, as the analyst is successful in re-directing the interest and energies of the patient to reality correctly conceived, the process of counter-transference, the felt concern of the therapist for the patient, makes less imperative the patient's own attachment to the analyst and he becomes able at last to

proceed freely in achieving satisfactory adjustments with his environing persons and conditions.

J. FREUD'S METAPSYCHOLOGY

It was difficult for Freud to prevent the elaboration of his system of mental mechanisms into a view of reality as a whole. Although he persistently eschews any advances into metaphysics as being beyond the province of psychology and as giving rise to subjectivism as opposed to analytical objectivity, he finds himself defending the position of correspondence between our minds and external reality. At first this is the basic tenet of his philosophy of science; but it becomes expanded when applied to man's philosophy, art, religion and cultural products to include the process of man's projection of his own wishes into the 'real' world. This treatment of the various aspects of culture as subjective projections upon the outer world is termed "metapsychology." It comes close to being a psychologizing of metaphysics and is such when it is used to the total discredit of metaphysical thought.

Freud's own thought is based on the belief that there is an intimate connection between our minds and the external world. These are the assumptions of his

science: 1) Our minds have developed as means of investigating the outer world, hence they must have attained a degree of appropriateness in their structure to the structure of the world. 2) Our minds are parts of this world. 3) The task of science is to show how the world appears to us with respect to the particular organization of our minds. 4) Scientific results are conditioned, not only by our mental organization, but also by that which has produced that organization; and 5) To try to attain a world view which seeks to be free of any consideration of the perceiving mental apparatus is an empty abstraction.[23] There is no correct metaphysics which is not based on a sound epistemology.

But, of course, Freud saw in art, religion and philosophy man's efforts to populate the world with friendly spirits or to apprehend the world in such a way as would be pleasing to the self. Wish-fulfillment, then, is for him the true motivation of man's spiritual interests. We want to be loved, protected, and assured of security, so in our terrifying helplessness we create our gods who can give us what we want. These external

23. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion. (Tr. W. D. Robson-Scott) London: The Hogarth Press, 1949 (1928), p. 97.

sources of our wishfulfillment are not real; they are the imagined constructions of our real wishes.

Pfister parts company sharply with Freud in his metapsychology. It is true that Pfister does not believe it possible to arrive at completely objective knowledge. It is impossible to purge our perception of truth of all subjectivity. But truth itself is not a subjective illusion. The order of the universe to which our philosophy and religion seeks explanation is real. God, who is the designer of the world and of men's mental apparatus, is no projection, but the objective loving reality toward which normally healthy persons are striving. As we have seen above, a belief in God is for Freud the symptom of mental ill-health; but for Pfister it is, as the emotionalized belief of "faith through love and love through faith," the most profound source of mental health as well as being the most appropriate apprehension of Reality.

This difference between Freud and Pfister is reflected in their contrary views of culture. For Freud culture is at once man's mental means of making human existence more tolerable, of creating institutional circumscriptions against the more animal or primitive expressions of instinctual urges and also man's means of

making life problematical, of forcing upon him the necessity of repressing and suppressing anti-cultural activity. But for Pfister culture cannot be regarded apart from its ethical task. Freud interprets justice as meaning the universal validity of a law, but insists that it has nothing to do with the ethical value of the law.[24] Also civilization is not to be misconstrued with any notion of becoming perfect.[25] Pfister, on the contrary, insists that, although culture does both guarantee certain freedom as well as impose restrictions on man, it is not just the subjective projections of his mind, but a real process of humanity's seeking (and this is not an intellectual process merely, but a vital living response to persons, physical conditions and moral and spiritual forces and principles) for an optimum form of a total life organization, which is, in religious terminology, the Kingdom of God.

We have investigated the relationship of Pfister with the psychoanalytic group and his understanding of psychoanalysis in reference to Freud's view. It has become apparent that the chief area of difference with Freud

24. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents. (Tr. Joan Riviere) London: The Hogarth Press, 1939 (1930), p. 59.
25. Ibid., p. 61.

is essentially religion. And since our major problem is not only to understand these differences, but to get before us Pfister's general synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion, we turn now to the other aspect of the problem and consider his interpretation of religion and the psychoanalytic insights which he brought to bear upon it.

CHAPTER VI

PFISTER'S VIEW OF RELIGION

A. AS A CHURCHMAN

We have observed that Pfister defines religion in terms of man's relation to centers of spiritual power which are supernatural, but felt to be real.[1] The character of both the relationship and the spiritual power is essentially love. His theological point of view is consequently not a typical church's dogma, but it is the treatment of the source, necessity and effects of that love, both human and divine. He is not anti-theological, but he recognizes dogmatics as a form of rationalism. The avowed elimination of the subjective factor on the part of the theologians is no more warranted than the psychologist's claim that when they have demonstrated the subliminal origins of faith, they have also shown the objective element to be unwarranted.[2]

1. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 249.
2. Cf. Paul Tillich's careful insistence that theology must embrace the subjective-objective categories of philosophy and concern itself with man's involvement in the object. See Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 22ff.

A Christian theology which deprecates the love of God, manifested in Jesus, which seeks corresponding response in the believer in favor of metaphysical, sacramental or ecclesiastical interests succeeds only in distorting the truth of Christianity. Christian dogmatics is preeminently a doctrine of love derived from the fundamental commandment of Jesus. Systematic theologies should subordinate their conventional subjects and their subtle rationalizations to the doctrine of love.

> Theory was made for life and this includes the theory of dogmatics. Now life is love; indeed it is its essence.[3]

When the emotional emphasis is given to dogma rather than love, whether it be among orthodox or liberal theologians, it is indicative of a misrepresentation. When particular elements of the creed, or the creed itself, are afforded preeminence, it is symptomatic of repressions due to the inability to love.

"God is love" is the keynote of Pfister's theology. His chief attributes are goodness, justice, mercy, wisdom, and also "an intense moral gravity." His judgment is never punitive, but is motivated by his love. Nor is

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3. Oscar Pfister, Christianity and Fear. (Tr. W. H. Johnston) New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948, (1944), p. 544.

God a tremendum evoking awe and fear before his infinite greatness and holiness, but rather does he arouse reverence and love. God's love for men includes his hate of evil, although evil is recognized as a necessity in the maintenance of the moral struggle. Nor is man to believe that God's love should free him from discomfort or the necessity to suffer, for God himself has suffered and does so continually in the face of sin and imperfection in men. Faith in God should save men from egocentricity and self-pity and free them for courageous moral endeavor.

Pfister has noted that Jesus Christ is all things to all men in Christian thought and experience. The historical person of the Synoptists who is the God-become-man of the Pauline and Johannine writings, is considered to bring salvation by his incarnation, atoning death, by sacramental incorporation, or by a form of identification, sometimes as sensuous as it is spiritual, with Jesus. Pfister observes that Christology has accomodated itself to the individual requirements for the allaying of anxiety. He warns against identifying Christ with God and allowing attachment to Jesus to degenerate into emotional indulgence lacking moral character and clear thought. Jesus is the embodiment of the self-sacrificing

and pardoning love of God and elicits the love of man. There are some who find Christ, not an object of love, but as the person whose love should be imitated. This introjection of Christ has produced significant character and valuable life contributions, but its unsuccessful attempt has likewise caused harmful slavish restrictions upon the free wholesome participation in contemporary life.

Man is not to be viewed as a depraved creature, totally other than God. He is the child of God, worthy of divine love, and in need of it, and created with the potentiality to love, the fulfillment of which becomes his chief destiny. Indeed, Pfister believes that man's love is both human and divine. To view man as an animal and limit his essential nature to egoistic impulses is to fail in obtaining a proper perspective. This does not mean that the realization of love is without its difficulties, arising from man's physical disposition and external realities. But the view that man is helpless, bound in his own sinfulness and in the animalistic functions of his own body, and can only await the infusion of God's grace not only falsely indicates man's free, responsible character, but results in the unnecessary fettering of moral endeavor.

Salvation is not to be achieved by any gloomy form of asceticism, penitence or masochistic self-torture which only causes increased feeling of torment or leads to compensation formation without the uprooting of the basic cause of the compulsive necessity for that form of self-punishment. Salvation is essentially the work of divine love or mercy which requires as its pre-condition a "change of heart emerging out of the yearning for God's love."[4]

The Scriptures cannot be considered infallible because of the necessity of interpretation, and this is never free of the interpreter's subjectivity. Pfister maintains that the Bible has not been used as the infallible authority in the history of theology. Where this has been claimed, it was rather to support those predetermined dogmas which could be substantiated in the Bible. So much of contradictions and ambiguity lie in what we choose to believe out of the Bible, that it very closely reveals the subjective needs of the reader or can be used very easily for his own purposes.

Pfister denounces any eschatological doctrine which is not ethically oriented. He warns against the idea of happiness to come producing obsessive cravings for per-

4. Ibid., p. 551.

sonal well-being devoid of moral inspiration and also against the fears of hell becoming so tormenting as to paralyse moral effort.

> It is true that there are many unfortunates who draw strength to endure their troubles on earth, and to ward off fear through moral endeavor, by looking towards the future to give them rewards and compensations for their present sufferings; nevertheless hygienic expediency is no justification for pious deception or for second-rate ethical motives.[5]

Whatever may be the hope or fear directed toward that which is to come, it must not gain such proportions as to restrict moral effort now. The Kingdom of God which is the end toward which we strive is not to be confused with any political kingdom or geographical domain, nor is it to be found along with its opposite merely as a condition of the unconscious life. It is essentially the state in which the divine love is perfectly realized among persons and which can be participated in at least fragmentarily through experiences of Christian love.

In the light of his theological thought, the historical and contemporary church failed in many respects in furthering the love of God in Jesus Christ. Rigid orthodoxy as well as forms of fanaticism represent the collective neuroticization of Christianity which have resulted from fear and the failure to love and which have

5. Ibid., p. 553

only perpetuated the condition instead of resolving it. The church, which should be a Christian community fostering love and recognizing the vital leadership of Christ, has too often assumed the characteristics of the mob, in which ecclesiastical practices have been used as a blind defense of orthodoxy against the arousal of the repressed and suppressed needs of the communicants. Following the first World War, Pfister was particularly critical of the Continental churches.

> We have no right to imagine that our European Christianity is pure and authentic! We have made such a hateful pact between our Christianity and Mars and mammon, between the spirit of caste and national self-esteem, between lying politics and expansion, that a pure evangelical mission is a bitter necessity for our churches and our hearts. In return the Christian religion has been overlaid with obsessive neurotic dogmas, metaphysical enormities and intellectual servitude, without any power of promoting love; and all these have been made the very core of belief -- and even in mission work the rubbing in of this dogmatic ointment has been looked upon as the only way to salvation. And as this system of dogma is biologically under the dominion of repression...and therefore contains much that is repressive and infantile, it always implies an agreement with primitive religions, e.g., the belief in demons and the anxiety features.[6]

Religious development and education are to be understood as quite distinct from doctrinal or creedal indoctrination. Pfister learned early in his catechetical

6. Oscar Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1923, p. 342.

classes how much more appropriate to the needs of his students and truer to the aims of Christianity was the presentation of the study of religion in terms of the practical effects of the doctrines taken in dynamic terms. Hence, relevance to the profound needs of the student and his capacity to incorporate, not just intellectually, but emotionally and experientially, the Christian faith became the touchstone of his teaching.[7] Religious training proceeded to the loosening of the bonds of repression and of freeing the child for establishing bonds of love. It did more harm than good to impose doctrinal rationalizations no matter how sublime they might be. By so doing the youth either became uncritically enthusiastic about an idea which had little real meaning for him, or more likely, it became merely an intellectual exercise devoid of practical application to life.

Religion is to be presented not as dry theory but as an experience which should "embrace the whole inner man so that he may become fresher, fuller of life, more joyful, and morally strengthened by the religious im-

7. Oscar Pfister, Die Pädagogik der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, No Date, p. 7.

struction."[8] It should inspire heroic action, the desire for a free investigation of a personal view of life in which God appears as trusted and loving father, friend and protector, the giver of moral imperatives and of forgiveness.

B. PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION

The psychoanalytic investigation of religious phenomena has as its chief aim the research into the subliminal motives of the religious consciousness and its effects along with its causal derivation and its biological grounding. Pfister had examined the psychology of religion of Kant who emphasized the will, of Schleiermacher who derived the religious consciousness from feeling, and Hegel, for whom reason was the fundamental process. He had also studied Starbuck's use of the questionnaire in studying conversion, Coe's work and James' biographical method; but from all these was lacking a deeper causal comprehension. The psychology of religion required more than descriptive data.

> It is certainly necessary to know according to what laws this or that pious occurence took place, from what sources religious creation is fed, under

8. Oscar Pfister, Religionspädagogisches Neuland, Eine Untersuchung über das Erlebnis - und Arbeitsprinzip im Religionsunterricht. Zurich: Schulthess, 1909, p. 6.

> what conditions this or that elimination of ritual or doctrine has become necessary, in what psychic constellation any particular religious phenomenon is bound to appear or disappear.[9]

It must be an empiric study. Pfister made his observations predominantly upon the great number of persons who came to him for analytical pastoral care. To be sure, not all presented material valuable to a general notion of a psychoanalytic view of religion. He also made studies upon religious personalities or those persons in whose life religious activities and interests bulked large. He also approached church history psychoanalytically to detect the subliminal forces behind the larger institutional movements of religion as well as to interpret the cult experiences.

No systematic comprehension of religious phenomena from a psychoanalytic point of view is here presented. Such is lacking from the whole of psychoanalytic literature.[10] Suggestive interpretations of particular forms of religious behavior are all that are available. They have a credibility within the framework of psychoanalytic theory, but within the larger perspective of religious experience and thought there is much left to be filled

9. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 317.
10. R. P. Casey, "Religion and Psychoanalysis." Psychiatry, 6(1943), p. 291.

out. We are also to be warned that the accessibility to or attractiveness of pathogenic expressions of religion gives them the greatest bulk in the whole literature; and they cannot be taken as true representations of all religious experience or of religion generically. It is true that much data was selected to illustrate and substantiate a particular theory. This is particularly true of the works of Schroeder which as we shall see below illustrate just such dangers and limitations to psychoanalytic interpretations of religion up to the present.

The investigations of Pfister, however, although focused predominantly upon extreme expressions of piety, seek dispassionately to establish the connections between the phenomena and their unconscious motives.

In the case of Margaretha Ebner, we discover a collection of symptoms connected with her necessity and inability to sublimate her desire for marital love. Her piety is an attempt to sublimate her erotic enthusiasm, but the forms it takes clearly indicate its source. In her ascetic attempt to mortify the flesh she fell into autistic sexualizations. She made the man Jesus her husband and hallucinated intimacies with him. The child Jesus became her own child whom she conceived and bore and also nursed according to a heavenly commandment. How

disoriented from reality was her emotion is illustrated by the fact that when a pregnant woman had her child cut out of her body before her execution for selling a consecrated wafer to a Jew, Margaretha Ebner pleaded no sympathy for the woman.[11]

With the Count of Zinzendorf, Pfister also found that when the normal eroticism was prohibited for religious reasons, it broke out into the religious sphere in but a thin disguise. With the desexualization of marriage came the hyper-sexualization of religion.[12]

In an investigation of ten inspired persons and of the conscious and unconscious motivations of the inspirations and their genesis, Pfister found that as far as the psychical conditions of its origin, inspiration is not very dissimilar to hallucination and other neurotic symptoms, though one must not for this reason regard it in all cases as a pathological event, nor condemn it from a moral and religious point of view. He identifies four steps in the progress of inspiration: 1) Genetical relations or predisposing tensions, 2) Inducing exper-

11. Pfister, "Hysterie und Mystik bei Margaretha Ebner (1291-1351)" Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 1(1910-1911), pp. 468-485.
12. Pfister, "Hat Zinzendorf die Frömmigkeit Sexualisiert?" Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, 5(1911), pp. 56-60

iences, 3) Regression, 4) Interaction of the conscience and the instincts in determining the content of the inspiration.[13]

An eighteen year old youth developed hysterical symptoms involving severe pain, twitching and sometimes paralysis of the right arm together with melancholia and a suicidal tendency. In the course of his neurotic illness he, although from a Protestant family, became a passionate worshiper of the Madonna. His other symptoms disappeared. Pfister showed that the symptoms and the fanatical adoration of the Madonna which superceded them were attempts to sublimate a dammed up primary eroticism which had become fixated in the unconscious upon the youth's mother.[14]

The Apostle Paul appears to have suffered neurotic afflictions and tensions, for example, his thorn in the flesh, the buffetings of Satan which debilitated him, his disease which may have been hysterical epilepsy. He experienced ecstacies and spoke in tongues. He became a zealot at the feet of the mild Gamaliel. His religious

13. Pfister, "Das Erlebnis der Eingebung als Psychologisches Problem." Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie." 11(1938), pp. 65-111.
14. Pfister, "Zur Psychologie des Hysterischen Madonnenkultus." Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse. 1(1910-1911), pp. 30-37.

and moral hypersensitivity buttressed by passionate adherence to the law of Judaism broke through on the Damascus road when the conflict between his attraction to Christ and guilt over his persecution of the envied emancipated Christians reached a climax.[15]

Pfister has cited a number of religious manifestations which have been presented to him by his patients which were transpositions of thwarted erotic expression and development.[16] The fanaticism with which the religious object is held, or the tenacity or obsessiveness of the ritual appears to be directly related to the strength of the repressed impulse.

The psychoanalytic study of the history of religions has been preeminently successful in ferreting out those instances in which neurotic elements are present. This does not invalidate the generally positive valuation of religion as a means of restoring and maintaining proper reality perspective and ethically productive conditions of life. On the other hand, innumerable ascetics and holy men and women are seen to suffer from hysteria and obsessional neuroses. Countless religious people fall

15. Pfister, "Die Entwicklung des Apostels Paulus. Eine Religionsgeschichtliche und psychologische Skizze." Imago, 6(1920), pp. 243-290.
16. Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, p. 408.

into sadistic and masochistic forms of behavior as evidenced by witch-burnings, inquisitions, persecutions of heretics, holy wars, self-torture and voluntary martyrdoms. Rigid orthodoxies, obsessive rituals and fanatic ceremonialism indicate compulsive neurotic symptoms.

Pfister has made a psychoanalytic study of the history of the Christian Church with reference to its success at various stages and in its various institutional forms in alleviating anxiety and releasing the capacity to love.[17] He finds in Jesus the norm for the Christian faith as well as the perfect illustration of implicit psychoanalysis applied. All other forms of the Christian faith have not only allayed fear, but they have induced it as well. Paul's view of God as a God of love and power reduces fear, but by limiting God's love to his experience with Christ upon the cross and to a predestinated love or hate, he also invites the increase of fear. Paul centered his system upon Christ and by intensifying it into mysticism was able to overcome the compulsion neurosis that was the presupposition of the Jewish legalistic religion. Paul's formulation of the Christian faith relieves fear in its theory of atonement which makes Christ's death satisfy

17. Pfister, Christianity and Fear, pp. 177-497.

God's justice and also in its identification with or introjection of Christ. Paul's use of baptism and communion as sacraments symbolizing the condition of salvation and the community of the saved respectively have produced reduction of fear. On the other hand, his contemptuous attitude toward marriage and his advocacy of ascetic practices prevented the freedom of love which overcomes fear at its roots instead of merely reducing the pain of fear after it has taken hold.

With the Catholic Church fear is a dominant theme. The contrary processes of arousal of fear and its combatting have been intensified and organized so that the results become a compulsive form of a collective neurotic character. From early childhood dread is evoked by ideas of purgatory and the order of devils. These become a threat to God's love; so also does the irrational basis of the doctrine of God which in its trinitarian form depersonalizes the loving father. Christ also becomes the second person in the trinity instead of a loving human person. As a consequence of this process of depersonalizing God and Jesus, the intermediaries are multiplied in Mary, the angels and the hosts of saints. Priests, who are surrounded by much taboo fear carry on ecclesiastical practices which by their unknown symbolism take

on the appearance of magic. Although salvation is theoretically the result of free grace, restitution must be made and penalties must be paid, all through a stereotyped ritual.

Fear is also increased by inhibiting life in the restrictions upon sexuality which are imposed by the celibate requirements of the monastic orders as well as by the regulations of the sex life within the family which have the power of an ecclesiastical command regardless of any considerations of physical and economic conditions. Further inhibitions are placed upon the freedom of intellectual inquiry by the imposition of a dogmatic theology. Likewise freedom of expression is limited in that the church assumes the psychology of the crowd, the individual's uniqueness is minimized within the stereotyped pattern of ritual and creed.

The Catholic Church seeks also to prevent fear by its irrational dogma, its ritual which assumes a compulsive stereotyped and magical character, by its submerging the individual within the crowd, and by its appeal to superior leaders before whom by identification the individual may resolve his fear. It is observed that the degree to which fear is aroused determines the amount of pleasurable satisfaction to be obtained through its allev-

iation by compulsive rituals and ceremonies. Thus the Catholic Church insures a pleasant effect to the individual as well as the perpetuity of its ecclesiastical forms and organization.

In Protestantism generally there grew up a detachment from the church's authority, greater freedom from repressions, freedom for the developing of religious movements and of individual's expressiveness through a variety of forms and orders.

With Luther, his early fears found temporary palliative in monastic life. But only as he sensed the unconditioned grace of God as the author of salvation was there a release from fear caused by guilt. Many of the institutions of the new church, however, were motivated as much by hatred toward the opposition as by the desire to mediate God's love. Nevertheless, permitting the clergy to marry removed inhibitions in this area. There was also a renunciation of the papist ceremonialism of a compulsive and magical character which instantaneous forgiveness made no longer necessary.

Pfister is impressed by the contributions of Zwingli in the alleviation of fear. This reformer's personal life was relatively free from anxiety and we find in his church also a great freedom in form and absence of ritual

of a compulsive character. Zwingli most nearly approximates Jesus in his treatment of fear although he was not altogether successful in removing it as seen in his doctrine of predestination; however, in his placing love in the center of his faith, he has provided an excellent interpretation of Jesus as well as prophylaxis of fear.

Calvin, reared in a legalistic and anti-clerical family and entertaining the strictest pessimism, has made only slight contributions to the alleviation of fear. Emphasizing faith in God is a positive element, but the absolute sovereignity of God evokes fear rather than stimulates love. Likewise, his doctrines of the elect, of man's depravity have only heightened anxiety; his well formulated dogmatic orthodoxy has provided the compulsive symptom for fear's neurotic release. Herein Pfister observes that the compulsive neurosis of the Catholic Church has only been replaced by another in which the absence of love was evidenced by rigid orthodoxy and cruelty toward heretics.

Some smaller sects in Switzerland, such as the Quakers, the followers of Sebastian Castellio, and the Swiss Baptists were successful in achieving the release of love in the sense of Jesus. Modern Protestantism in its emphasis upon rationalism has failed to arouse sufficient

subliminal stimulation to cope with fear; it has been content with its own rationalizations without dealing with the concrete problems of the individual's psychic life. Pfister, however, sees greater hope in more recent Protestant thought which is beginning to take into consideration the irrational elements in man's nature and in his religion. He is far from pleased with the reduction of religion to those irrational elements, however, but rather sees in such movements a further vindication of the necessity of analytical study into its subliminal roots.

A recurring theme in psychoanalytic researches in religious experience is the importance of the unconscious as the ground or source of the experience. William James suggested that religion is most impressive in its subliminal formations and he expressed the theory that the unconscious is probably the meeting ground of the human and divine or the point at which divine influence is preeminently exerted.[18] Before the claims of psychoanalytic investigations this might well have been just the throwing of the problem back to a confirmed agnosticism, or an appeal to ignorance, but with the psychoanalytic method

18. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Longman's Green & Co., 1902. pp. 228, 473, 501-505.

of understanding subliminal processes, we should expect to have at hand the means of testing the theory. Pfister's researches into the analytic deciphering of ecstatic language and cryptic writing performed under the influence of religious excitation has revealed the source of these types of behavior not to be in the beyond, but in the unconscious. Behind all spontaneous speech were discovered painful thoughts, which revived analogous experiences - for the most part infantile - repressed by consciousness but now brought forth in disguised form. The motives for glossolaly were found to be, above all, erotic emotions; secondarily, pride and longing for a more remunerative position. The biological interpretation of glossolaly lies, as in dreams and neurotic symptoms, in the fact that wishes, unfulfilled in reality, are realized in the realm of fantasy.[19]

Pfister warns against the identification of God with the subconscious, as is so often the case with religious sectarians who claim that God's revelation to them is final and infallible. The realm of the subconscious is

19. Oscar Pfister, "Die Psychologische Enträtselung der Religiösen Glossalalie und der Automatschen Kryptographie." Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische Forschungen, 3(1911), pp. 427-468, 730-794.

in most cases at the same time heaven and hell, and the experiences which arise therefrom with compelling immediacy are not to be taken uncritically as the product of either the one or the other. It is the intent of psychoanalysis, according to Pfister to release the positive and constructive subconscious forces and thus prepare the way for valid religious experience.

> If the priest descends into this Avernus, it is for the purpose of fettering the demons and setting the angels free.[20]

The relations that religion has with the sexual instinct, its inhibition and the guilt connected with forbidden acts have occupied the attention of several psychoanalysts. The most impressive statements of the unconscious source of religious experience in the malformations of the sexual sphere are to be found in the researches of Theodore Schroeder.[21] According to his view, as

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20. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 267.
21. Theodore Schroeder, "Der Sexuelle Anteil an der Theologie der Mormonen." Imago, 3(1914), pp. 197-204. "Revival Sex and Holy Ghost." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 14(1919), pp. 34-47; "Religious 'Love in Action.'" Psychoanalytic Review, 12(1925), pp. 414-419; "A Contribution to the Psychology of Theism: the French Prophets and John Lacy." Ibid., pp. 16-29; "Manufacturing the 'Experience of God.'" Ibid., 14(1927), pp. 71-84; "Guilt and Inferiority as Creators of Religious Experience." Ibid., 16(1929), pp. 46-54; "The Psychoanalytic Approach to Religious Experience." Ibid., pp. 361-376; "A 'Living God' Incarnate." Ibid., 19(1932), 36-45.

the erotic factor becomes more compelling the compensating and inhibiting motives also become more active. Hence, there arises incompatibility between the desire for 'moral' approval and for a completed love. Continence or the craving for it implies the organic preparedness for a psychosexual explosion and release of tension (religious experience).[22] The sense of guilt over this conflict brings on feelings of inferiority and humility before the supernatural. The thought of God usually does not eliminate the source of the guilty and shameful desires or feeling, but it does prevent its precise character from dominating the conscious life so painfully. It thus becomes associated with the idea of God, given a credible 'spiritual' label and soon it becomes the work of an infinite being. Thus the erotic ecstasy which is intensified by attempted sexual suppression is transformed into the elevation of the soul to God and spiritual joy. There also develops the need for muscular discharge of the sexual tension and this is accomplished by overt forms of ecstasy, posturing, rolling, speaking in tongues, etc. Schroeder sees an intense relation with God to be an effort to neutralize excessive shame. He

22. Schroeder, "The Psychoanalytic Approach to Religious Experience," p. 374.

holds that the degree of spiritual exaltation is in exact proportion to the shameful feelings of depression that required and created it.[23] This achievement of the contact with the divine wins the approval of the religious community and there is compensation for the previous inferiority and guilt feelings. Also the creation of the ideal figure compensates for one's own inadequacy. He further maintains that "all moral values are merely symptomatic of unwholesome emotional disturbance,"[24] and that religious experience is a "delusional relief for a sick conscience."[25]

Pfister recognizes unquestionably the sexual forces invested in religion. In Christianity, he believes it is sublimated sexuality, but it would be a gross error to assume that the Christian religion were nothing other than sublimated sexuality. It is significant, however, that the Christian religion specifies three distinct objects for the libido: God, others and self. And in encouraging this balanced outlet for the libidinal energy, Christianity performs an invaluable service to mental

23. Schroeder, "Contribution to the Psychology of Theism," p. 25.
24. Schroeder, "The Psychoanalytic Approach to Religious Experience," p. 365.
25. Ibid., p. 371.

health.[26] Other sources of religious experience, other than sublimated sexuality are derived from reality thinking, e.g., Kant based his faith in God upon the requirements of the ethical demand. That the unconscious content likewise furnishes the material, content and symbolic respresentation for the religious idea and event should not lead us, at the present stage of research, into the premature conclusion that the manifestations of God in my experience comprise the nature and being of God.

It is not to be gainsaid that many forms of religion have been derived from psychopathological processes. To establish this fact has been a conclusive achievement of psychoanalytic research. Neurotic individuals have neuroticized their religion. Neurotic religions have contributed to individual neurosis. But religion has also been a resource for mental health. It should also be noted that when psychoanalysts have been ready to criticize neurotic religion, or to discount religion altogether as a neurosis, they have been reluctant to take into consideration how readily psychoanalysis has lent itself to the process of religious formations. Let us examine each of these connections between religion and psychopathology in turn.

26. Pfister, Christianity and Fear, pp. 511ff.

a) Neurotic religion produced by individual neurosis.

Many religious convictions, articles of personal belief, the existence of certain loves and hates are readily recognized as rationalizations or the conscious attempt to make subconscious wishes and motives appear reasonable and respectable. Among the Christian sects, the Bible provides oftentimes an ample source for their rationalizations of particular forms of behavior or belief. Particularly illustrative of this rationalizing process are the high and holy causes and purposes attributed to war. We see it also in the subject's substantiating his activity which results from post-hypnotic suggestion. It works similarly in religion. Pfister cites the example of the Protestant who is thinking seriously of becoming a Catholic because he believes their confession to be superior. The young man, however, reveals that it is particularly one woman's faith which has won his admiration, that he loves the woman who is older than himself, and that he is in conflict with his own mother.[27] When the connections between his emotional situation and his new religious interest were made clear to him the latter disappeared. In fact, it has not been uncommon for the critics of psychoanalysis to complain that those who have

27. Ibid., p. 326.

been analysed lose their religion. This is to be expected insofar as their religion has been attached to the neurotic symptoms. Remove the symptoms and the unhealthy formations of religion disappear as well. Religious faith which is free of neurotic elements has nothing to fear from analytic investigations.

We have observed Pfister's studies of the neuroticizing of religion in the cases of the Count of Zinzendorf, Margaretha Ebner and the young man who assumed new ardour in worshiping the Madonna. He discovered, too, the painful erotic element behind ecstatic speech. He has also brought to our attention cases in which the hallucinated figure of God was none other than a human figure in the patient's life toward whom there was an extraordinarily strong emotional relationship, usually of hate.[28]

Neurotic religion takes two forms. The first, the obsessional, is characterized by its strong attachment to the letter of the law or book and to misunderstood ritual, by its constant anxiety and remoteness from the world. The second, the hysterical, overflows with turgid expressions of emotions, but which exhausts itself before the requirements of life are fulfilled. It leads to an

28. Ibid., pp. 247-248.

introverted form of piety and withdrawal from reality which lacks ethical strength.[29]

Natural religion arises among primitive people from anxiety which is dealt with by magical and symbolic acts. This form of behavior, which is identical to that of the anxiety neurotic resorting to compulsive symptomatic acts, however, is not to be taken as the norm of religious experience, according to Pfister's view. The truth and the utility of religion are not exhausted merely by the alleviation of the psychic tension, nor even by the more optimum and progressive emancipation of love for the performance of sublimated tasks.

b) Some forms of religious experience must also be recognized as productive of mental conflict. We have seen that the holding up of an ideal may cause pain and the distressing sense of guilt, inadequacy and depression.

> How often has religion deprived life of energy by its repressive ethic, and driven the intellect, by its orthodoxy, and the emotions and the will by its ritual into the path of harmful and obsessive neuroticism.[30]

Where religion has been conducive to mental ill health it has resulted from the religious community, institution or rite becoming fixated at the level which has met

29. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 155.
30. Ibid., p. 248.

the need of some tormented soul, and this level has become the standard for subsequent religious experience. Inasmuch as communicants or believers conform to the level of the church or sect so fixated, they assume for themselves an abnormal or unhealthy norm of religious experience. In Pfister's investigation of the history of the Christian Church, he has shown wherein the various acts have not only succeeded in alleviating fear, but also in creating it. Any rigidity, whether of doctrine or practice, with the strong sanction of the ecclesiastical body, is very likely to create problems with individual adherents.

c) Religion, correctly conceived, is pre-eminently a resource and method for mental hygiene in the thought of Pfister. Religion has the task of achieving and maintaining the health of the whole man. Certainly this was the intent of Jesus. He broke the bonds of the letter and of dogma, avoided association with sentimental cults and set up love, and particularly the love of one's neighbor, as the most significant application of the life energy. Love is the meliorating influence against an obsessive sense of duty relative to a given command. It substitutes for a severe 'must' a joyful 'will.' Love as the voluntary devotion to others with the intention of

furthering their good releases energy for constructive effort. This conduces to high religion and to sound mental health.

Pfister sees in man's love for God a resource for stability and balance amid the injustices and disappointments of life.

> The believer flees to the domain of the ideal, to the heart of the eternal love, when life disappoints him and fellowmen treat him contemptuously and unjustly. In the divine father-love, he, whose longing for help, for ethical salvation is not satisfied by the surrounding reality, finds no comprehension and no return love in his fellowmen, is refreshed. The titanic drama of the work of salvation with its immense contrasts, sin-grace, human-depravity-Jesus' conquering love, death-life, affords guilt laden souls a source of consolation, the sustaining force of which, the irreligious individual can scarcely appreciate. Further, the educated person with deeper thinking and feeling, who bears a mighty desire for the reality of the ideal, will again and again long for God as the substance and real basis of the ideal and submerge himself in Him when men and nature (in the broadest sense) leave him in want.[31]

However, although this love for God is not morbid nor grounded in sexuality, it is the developing love for man that saves it from pathological excesses and which keeps it a sustaining source of health.

It should be observed that in the history of religions there have been two methods by which anxiety has been alleviated or removed. Pfister distinguishes these as the

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31. Pfister, Psychoanalytic Method, pp. 574-575.

synthetic and the analytic. By the synthetic method, the compulsion symptoms, which in neurotic religious behavior are obsessive rituals, are the substitute-satisfactions of a more pleasurable kind than those of the neurotic symptom. The synthetic treatment does not attempt the removal of the basic cause of the anxiety, but rather it admits the validity of the punishing authority which in the religious sphere is atoned through the religious practice. The analytic method, on the other hand, goes back to the original anxiety which produced the compulsive act and clarifies the demand of the super-ego or the religious authority before which the ego or the individual failed and began making substitute formations. The objective demand is validated in terms of external reality and internal needs which frees the individual from the necessity of making payments to an austere authority; but which introduces a reasonable, loving authority whose will, to which the individual by repentance and change of heart is subjected to, is to love. Analytic treatment in the psychological sense is achieved by the redefinition of the religious sphere, it is the introduction of God whose requirements are not for a satisfied justice, but for a freely loving spirit.[32]

32. Erich Fromm states the same problem similarly, within

We shall examine in the next chapter the specific techniques whereby religious resources are brought to the aid of the mentally ill.

d) It is difficult to fail to notice that the persistent concern of psychoanalysts with the pathological derivations of religious experience has placed them in the position of making their psychoanalysis a religion. As a matter of fact Pfister has been accused of doing as much. Karl Beth, in criticizing Freud's attack upon religion, has maintained that Freud himself comes close to religion in The Ego and the Id.[33] Kristol, in criticizing the acquiescence of religion to psychoanalysis, speaks of psychoanalysis as the symptom of a diseased mind, just as the psychoanalyst thinks of religion.

> Psychoanalysis in the eyes of religion, is a historical passion of men obsessed with the death of God.[34]

W.H. Sheldon, himself a psychoanalyst, speaks of the manner in which psychoanalytic practitioners have made

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32. (Con't.)
a metaphysically non-theistic frame of reference, in his distinguishing between the rational and irrational bases of ethics or that based on competence on the one hand and on power on the other, in Man for Himself. New York: Rinehard, 1947.

33. Karl Beth, "Die Religion im Urteil der Psychoanalyse Sigmund Freud's Kampf gegen die Religion." Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, 2(1929), pp. 78-80.

34. Irving Kristol, "God and the Psychoanalysts." Commentary, 8(1949), pp. 434-444.

of their scientific theory a religious dogma and have used it in the same way as a theology.[35] Seward Hiltner suggests the mechanisms of theologizing on the part of analysts:

> One suspects there may be in some psychoanalysts a defense-of-the-faith motive not unlike (Msgr. Fulton J.) Sheen's view of religion.[36]

He further points out similarities between religion and psychoanalysis: 1) the tendency to be indiscriminate in their devotion to their founders, 2) the emphasis on 'you must have experience to know,' and 3) the defensive attitude toward aspects of culture.[37]

Barbour[38] and Selbie[39] have made impressive comparisons between psychoanalysis and Christian doctrine to indicate the way in which psychoanalysis can be conceived as containing in its theoretical structure and in its therapeutic process the articles of Christian doctrine dynamically interpreted. In like manner, Fulton J. Sheen

35. W. H. Sheldon, Varieties of Delinquent Youth. New York: Harper and Bros., 1949, pp. 850, fn. p. 42.
36. Seward Hiltner, "Religion and Psychoanalysis." The Psychoanalytic Review, 37(1950), p. 151.
37. Ibid., pp. 133-136.
38. G. E. Barbour, Sin and the New Psychology. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930.
39. W. B. Selbie, Christianity and the New Psychology. London: Centenary Press, 1939.

has noted how psychoanalysis has interiorized the church's dogma with regard to the theology of man, God and Satan into its doctrine of the ego, super-ego and the id.[40] Such comparisons and similarities are on the whole not difficult to find or make, however artificial the results may be. It cannot be denied that there can be established a correspondence between selected features of each system; and the naturalistic psychoanalysts have denied those within the framework of a religion in favor of the psychoanalytic view.

If it can be assumed that a part of the aim of religion is therapeutic, then psychoanalysis has assumed the role of religious ministrations[41] and has relegated to itself a unique and absolute place in the deliverance of people. From a sociological point of view also, the similarities between psychoanalysis as a movement (and certainly the early leaders considered it such)[42] and the religious cult are most striking.

Pfister's study of varied types of religious disbelief throws light upon the psychological processes and

40. Fulton J. Sheen, Peace of Soul. New York: Wittlesey House, 1949, pp. 2-4.
41. Theodore Reik, "Discussion on Lay Analysis." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 8(1927), pp. 243-244.
40. Sigmund Freud, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement. New York: The Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Co., 1917.

characteristics involved.[43] As might be suspected, his chief thesis is that the denial of individual faith content and the incapacity to experience certain convictions of faith are often shown to be the effect of repressions and unconscious processes and their plausible arguments are shown to be rationalizations. Also conscious disbelief does appear as unconscious faith and conscious faith can be found to be a flight from the revelation of subliminal disbelief. Among the typical unconscious determinants of disbelief, Pfister found especially a) hatred for the parents arising out of the Oedipus situation, b) injured narcissism, c) repressed sense of guilt and conviction of sin which disbelief sustains, d) moral relativism and its consequent immorality assuming a normative position in the individual, e) traumatically created dogmatic denial of the deep, spiritual powers for good in nature and in history, and f) the evaluation of love as disgusting. Disbelief which is thus dependent upon repression develops usually according to one of four ways: a) extreme introversion which leads to the denial of all reality outside the ego, including God (solipsism), b) increased theoretical and perceptive extraversion which denies all spiritual

43. Oscar Pfister, "Die Verschiedenen Arten des Unglaubens in Psychoanalytischer Beleuchtung." Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, 8(1935), pp. 20-31.

reality (materialism), c) "The Hamlet tie" in which the ambivalence of love and hate paralyse one another (skepticism), and d) the tendency to self-destruction in which the devaluation of the ego by the judgment of the super-ego results in the depreciation of all ideal values and consequently the undervaluation of all reality (nihilism). The emotional drives or instinctual impulses corresponding to these forms of disbelief are respectively, masochism, self-aggrandizement or exaltation, self-reassurance, and escapism or freedom from self.

Just as the greater number have applied psychoanalysis critically to religious faith, so must it also be applied to disbelief for unconscious motives are operative in either case.[44]

In addition to the general considerations of the psychoanalytic interpretation of religion, the chief researches, apart from the study of individuals in order to investigate the psychological basis of religious behavior, have been in the area of religious ritual. The thesis of these investigations has been that ritual,

44. See particularly Johnson's analysis of the athiest as reported in his Psychology of Religion. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945, pp. 169-173. He finds that the motives behind athoism are jealous revolt, egotism, projection and rationalisation.

insofar as it has any binding force at all, is the symptomatic act of a compulsive character. It is a substitute formation for a basic anxiety. It is established and maintained within the religious community according to the laws of individual anxiety-compulsion neuroses.

Through his investigations into primitive cultural anthropology and mythology, Freud saw in the totem feast the precursor of the Christian rite of Communion.[45] In the former the event celebrated the killing of the primeval father by the rebellious sons whose ambivalence toward the father created the guilt over the killing which was appeased by the ceremony. The feast both honored the revered protector of the clan and affirmed the victory of the contemporary clansmen over their envied leader. Similarly in the Christian communion, through the incorporation of the flesh and blood of Christ, the Father is revered as well as the recognition of Christ's work and person is affirmed. The peculiarly obsessive hold that the sacrament has over Christians is grounded in anxiety over the killing of Christ as it is the projection of one's own guilt.

45. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, in Basic Writings (Tr. A. A. Brill) New York: Modern Library, 1938. Moses and Monotheism. (Tr. K. Jones) New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939, pp. 132, 133, 138, 139.

Likewise, baptism has been interpreted as the social symbol of the washing compulsion arising from a feeling of guilt.[46] It represents the wish that the guilt be removed. Associated with intense fear, it becomes a kind of magical act. Or when the guilt receives institutional sanction and support as in the doctrine of original sin, the rite becomes all the more compulsive as seen in the Catholic insistence upon infant baptism.

Sacrifice, which plays such an important role in religious practices also is not without its psychoanalytic interpretation on the basis of the application of the anxiety compulsion neurosis theory. It, too, represents a form of expiation for guilt. This is seen not merely in the primitive practices of human sacrifices, and in the ransom theory of the atoning death of Christ, but also in the church's emphasis on self-sacrifice and sacrificial giving. It might be noted that the financial strength of the revival sects which emphasize salvation from sin and from highly emotionally charged guilt is far out of proportion to its number of adherents relative to the more established denominations.

The element of rebirth or second birth is understood to be a form of sublimated longing for return to the

46. Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, p. 282.

mother's womb; the accomplishment of the second birth, then, in psychic reality is the removal of unconscious guilt over incestuous longing.[47]

More extensive psychoanalytic research has been done by Reik in his investigation of several Jewish rituals.[48] He has found evidence in these rituals to substantiate the validity of the thesis that ritual is a compulsive symptom of neurosis.

Any number of religious acts, as varied as genuflecting, praying, pilgrimages, attendance upon church and confessional can be seen to alleviate anxiety. That they become habitual, however, cannot be assumed to make them compulsive. Nor does the fact that some forms of religious ritual follow the mechanisms of neurosis necessarily mitigate against the value of the ritual. That there are primitive antecedents of some rituals does not thereby invalidate their spiritual value and ethical intent. The media of religious experience cannot be expected to be other than the given mechanisms of the psychic life.

47. Ibid., pp. 299-301.
48. Theodore Reik, The Psychological Problems of Religion: Ritual. New York: Farrar, Strans and Company, Inc., 1946.

6. CONTRASTS IN PFISTER'S AND FREUD'S VIEWS OF RELIGION

The contrasts in Freud's and Pfister's views of religion are so patent that they hardly need emphasis. Pfister's religious faith is as profound as Freud's skepticism is intense. Freud denies metaphysical reality; Pfister affirms it. Pfister brings the psychoanalytic method to the aid of religious therapy; Freud would have us believe that psychoanalysis obviates the necessity of religion. Both men are certainly critical of specific forms of religious manifestations; but whereas Freud sees them as indicative of a pathogenic situation, Pfister sees the particular religious practice as an expression, even though in an aberrated form, of a fundamental, genuine and universal religious need of the individual. Treat the symptom, yes, but there is a wholesome, optimum form of personality functioning (which is mature religious behavior) which must not be lost sight of in the course of symptomatic treatment. The fundamental process of growth within the tree cannot be denied simply because the horticulturalist spends most of his time pruning the outer branches. Nor is it scientific wisdom to doubt the objective and universal process of the entelechy of plant growth. Just so, in the growth of

persons, although within limited frames of reference the mechanistic assumptions of scientific method can and must be applied with effect, we cannot deny the entelechy of personal development and the objective and universal validity of the ideals and goals toward which persons strive. To cast these out as illusions is to condemn the psychological interpretation as fragmentary and abstract.

Freud used the model of the neurotic symptoms of the individual as the sole means of understanding religious phenomena.[49] Pfister would not restrict the scope of religious experience to the pathological formations to which it appeared analogous. He was always cautious to show that the religious practices that conformed to the neurotic pattern were themselves neurotic, but religion generically is not to be judged on the basis of its pathological appearances despite the fact that these seem to be the more attractive and available to psychological investigations.

Freud's criticisms of religion have been attempts to describe psychologically the origins of religious experience and to distinguish the psychic mechanisms by which it is realized. His excursions into social anthro-

49. Freud, Moses and Monotheism. (tr. K. Jones), New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939, p. 89.

pology (Totem and Taboo, 1912) produced an imaginative and highly speculative theory of the primal horde as having the type of experience which, though dimly remembered, and only through imagination recalled, accounts for man's belief in God, morality and social customs.[50] According to this view, in primitive times one strong male jealously dominated his sons who finally banded together to kill the father, and in the ceremony of their triumph partook of his flesh. But the sons who both feared the father and envied his superiority began to quarrel among themselves until they were forced to form a union among them which was sealed by their common guilt over their hatred and ambivalence toward their murdered father and which was kept in memory by periodic rituals symbolizing the incorporation of the dead father's body. As historic memory aggrandized the past, Freud believes men have filled in the gaps in the story with their religious faith-fear of God who has taken the place of the tribal father.

Freud admits that this is a "reasonable surmise" but he has fitted the surmise so cleverly into the pattern of the individual neurosis that it easily catches the credulous unawares. He has sought to explain "inexplic-

50. Ibid., pp. 127ff.

able manifestations" in individual neurotic behavior by appealing to an earlier, and subsequently forgotten social experience, which is understood or recreated only according to the neurotic pattern which it is supposed to explain.[51] Such circuitous reasoning can hardly satisfy any scientific requirements for psychological explanation. Further, if it be conceded that the primitive horde experience did take place as Freud suggests, although it would be acquiescing to imaginative speculation with no possibility for scientific verification, there still remains the question whether it is accurate to assume that what occurs within an individual's experience is the most valid means of interpreting the social past. The primitive society was made up of its own interacting persons; the individual is interacting within a contemporary social situation. It seems incredible that the two could correspond in such a manner as to permit interpretation or understanding of the primitive society in terms of the individual. And of course they do not. The past which Freud recalls, the race has forgotten; and present society is not reliving it, nor can individual experience provide such a complete pattern to unravel it.

51. Ibid., p. 113.

Again, Freud has overlooked the problem of transposing a forgotten tribal chief into the God who is conceived as creator, law-giver and redeemer. All this occurs, in Freud's view, not according to any psychological process but in that realm of the forgotten. He seems to make a fatuous appeal to ignorance - or to that period when we do not remember.

A second interpretation of religion that Freud held and expounded widely is that the oedipal situation is the prototype of faith in God.[52] Freud sees in the parental complex the root of the religious need; the almighty and just God and the kindly mother nature appear as the sublimations for the real mother and father.[53] Biologically, then, religion is the process by which the individual regresses to an infantile attitude of dependence upon his parents; but, although destitute and helpless before the demands of life, he is unable to restore his original dependent relationship upon his finite and perhaps unworthy parents and so creates symbolically the father image, God, which gives him security.

To which Pfister replies:

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52. Cf. also Cavendish Moxon, "Religion in the Light of Psychoanalysis." Psychoanalytic Review. 8(1921), pp. 92-98.

53. Freud, Leonardo da Vinci, a Study in Psychosexuality. (Tr. A.A. Brill) New York: Random House, 1947. p. 71.

> No cautious psychoanalyst will believe that he has established the falsity of the religious symbol of a fatherly God by laying bare the father-complex inherent in this image. Spiritual life is not a product of the unspiritual course of things.[54]

Nor can the truth of religion be dismissed nor limited by the biological origins of experience which is similar to the religious faith in God. The Christian conception of God is preeminently that of father, but his justice and love are of such a pure and exalted nature that he could never be a substitute for a capricious human father who elicits oedipal ambivalence. On the other hand, to love God without fear and to be assured of God's love would require and could accomplish the resolution of the oedipus complex and be the most worthy sublimation of it.

Religion, according to Freud, is also spoken of as wish-fulfillment and the product of projection. This is the psychological mechanism at the bottom of substituting God for the human father. This is the theme of Freud's Future of an Illusion, that religious ideas and beliefs are illusions or the fancies which are created out of man's wish to alleviate some of the hard realities of life.

54. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 249.

Desiring protection, we imagine a Protector; wishing comforts, we create a Comforter; wanting love, we manufacture a dependable divine Lover and project his reality into the universe. In other words, Freud sees religion as an illusory attempt to make external reality conform to our wishes. The illusion does not admit of proof; it is irrefutable. Individuals create solipsistic paradises and people them with devoted friends and faithful guardians. Such is the manner in which Freud views religious thought and life. Pfister recognizes much in religious thinking that is colored by subjective desire. It is true that the objects of religious faith do satisfy what Freud admits to be the oldest, strongest and most insistent wishes of mankind.[55] Wishing does not make them true. But an illusion can be true. Columbus had the illusion of a round earth. That God can be conceived as the product of men's desires does not deprecate his nature or restrict his existence; it only indicates that the demands of human nature for faith are more firmly rooted than passing intellectual curiosity. But Freud is in error in thinking that religious ideas are products solely of desire governed by the pleasure principle. They also arise from reality

55. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 52.

thinking which seeks objectivity. Indeed, true religious ideas should be found at the point of deepest integration of desire with reality thinking, both of which being purged of subjective discoloration.[56] Freud himself would scorn the attempt to eliminate desire from life as in the case of Buddhism or pathogenic introversion. It is the egoism of desire that must be overcome.[57] The life of Jesus indicates the supreme manner in which egoism has disappeared in favor of universal ethical ideals. Toward these are the desires of the mature religious person directed.

Projection, from the religious point of view, is the inverse side of faith. Here, too, egoism which can lead to pathogenic religion operates. The view that what I believe about external reality is the truth about reality is the kind of projection in which dogmatic religion indulges. However, the desire to rethink and refashion one's own belief in accord with enlarging experience has always been the mood of the humble man of faith who seeks the universal will, not his own. Healthy faith is rather introjection. Projection, or making reality

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56. Pfister, "Die Illusion einer Zukunft." Imago, 14(1928), pp. 149-184.

57. Ibid.

according to my own will, is not only a dangerous psychological mechanism, it is infantile religion. And Freud is unfair in limiting his investigations and criticisms of religion to its immature and undeveloped forms. Even if projection is accepted as a legitimate mechanism operating in religious experience, it does not alter or affect the objective reality of religion to which we believe our projection is at least closely analogous. The agreement of the projection with reality is the problem of the philosophy of religion; psychology is concerned with the process and its adequacy in accounting for the facts of experience of all types.

Freud also views religion as a "generalized neurosis."[58] It seems true that what we know as natural religions which arise from anxiety and are dealt with by magical and symbolic acts conform to the neurotic pattern. "Obsessional neurosis is private magic; the magic of primitive peoples is a collective obsessional neurosis."[59] This is merely reiterating his original thesis that religion is a pathological formation which is similar to the individual neurosis. In religion as a universal neurosis,

58. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 77.
59. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, pp. 331, 332.

however, Freud sees some salutary function -- that of prevention of other more acute individual neuroses. Religion becomes a form of psychic immunization, a poisonous spray that protects the growth of plants. If it is true that religion is instrumental in maintaining psychic health certainly it is of the greatest value. Even on pragmatic grounds, civilized men might well indulge an illusion (which might be true) if there was the possibility of better mental health thereby. But, as we have already seen, Freud is again guilty of criticizing an immature form of religion; but even in this he sees some value, unless, of course, he considers it a disservice to his profession that religion has reduced the numbers who might otherwise find costly consolation in analysis.

A word should be said regarding freedom and determinism in the thought of Pfister and Freud, because the degree to which freedom is allowed in a psychological system is indicative of the extent to which man is viewed as a mechanism or as a personality. It is at this point where Freud and Pfister are sharply contrasted. It is true that both seek in therapy for the freedom and release of the psyche from crippling and inhibiting symptom formations. But this negative freedom <u>from</u> the neurosis is all that Freud offers. Otherwise man is a creature

of unconscious instincts working within a mechanical order in which personal determination is minimized to the restricted regulations of the ego. Man is free only to allow the instincts to be gratified.

Freedom has a real and positive meaning according to Pfister. He agrees with Freud that man has to work with and through a psychic mechanism, but man is not merely a mechanism pushed by unconscious forces. Man also feels, pulls from around and above. His behavior is not determined solely by the requirements of his biological nature, but he is motivated by the ideals and purposes of his own personality, of others and of God. Freedom, then is not just the absence of restraint; it is the possibility and potentiality for creative participation in an objective order of existence.

Inasmuch as Freud has made surmises in order when it comes to religion, we can also surmise on the motivations of his criticisms of religion. Freud was a Jew, who felt very keenly the social restrictions and intolerances that constricted his people and circumscribed his personal ambition and made opposition to him socially approved. His culture, of which the religion was its very essence, handicapped and impeded him and seemed contrary to the processes of free scientific thought. His

antagonism toward religion in general may easily have been displaced hostility toward his own. For his main criticism of religion as a form of obsessive compulsion applies with greatest appropriateness to a legalistic, ritualized and dogmatic religion, of which type primitive Judaism was representative. His Moses and Monotheism, further, is an attempt to undermine the historical validity of the Mosaic tradition and explain early Judaism as a kind of natural religion.

On the other hand, Freud's service to religion should not be overlooked. True, he was her critic. But the conservative elements in society need criticism in order to prevent stagnation and promote growth, to eliminate errors, and to prevent the uprising of authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies. Unhealthy forms of religious experience ought to be distinguished. Freud has done this, or given the courage and technique to his followers to do so. He has also given to religion an understanding of man and a method for psychic therapy which should not only complement our theological anthropology, but should make more relevant to man's psychic needs the resources for health which are at the disposal of religion. To the utility of psychoanalysis in the service of religion, we now turn our attention.

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE SERVICE OF THE PARISH MINISTER

We now turn our attention to the consideration of the practical utility of the disciplines of psychoanalysis in the hands of the parish minister. We shall attempt, largely through the examination and evaluation of Pfister's experience, to ascertain how valuable or effective or practicable the didactic analysis would be, or to what extent knowledge of theoretical psychoanalysis or a working knowledge of the psychoanalytic therapeutic technique might be of value in the pastor's fulfilling his task.

We have not forgotten that Freud and many of his followers have denied the existence of God and have thus been considered by some, especially Roman Catholic thinkers such as Rudolf Allers, as being antithetical to and totally irreconcilable with Christianity. Such wholesale rejection of the problem of tension between the two is a much too ready dismissal of psychoanalysis, as though it were an actual threat to deeply entrenched ecclesiastical dogma and practice or could really be a substitute for theology and catechism. Freud was avowedly no philosopher or theologian. His psychology should not, there-

fore, be discredited because of metaphysical differences.

It may be observed that in a larger sense psychoanalysis has been of service, not merely to the parish minister, but to the Christian movement as a whole, inasmuch as it seriously disturbed the complacent accretion of rationalism and positivism in Christian thought of the last century. Although one might join the chorus of protest against the atheism and naturalistic determinism of Freud and Marx which is rampant in our day, it may be a saner and more helpful view to recognize that both these movements are serious reminders of the fact that man is not the captain of his own soul, that there are other factors and forces working upon him in addition to his own will. And if one does not accept either of these man-made hypotheses as the final and complete answer to the problems of human existence and progress, one may honestly be grateful to their making it possible for us to be more realistic in our dealing with man's psychic and economic life -- as well as to the fact that the door is always open for further search for that which is ultimately determinative.

We proceed on the fact that Pfister did practice psychoanalysis and was a Christian pastor concurrently and thus provides concrete data for a possible practical

cooperation if not theoretical concurrence.

A. THERAPEUTIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER

What is the minister's task? Are the requirements of the minister's duties at all correlative to the methods and aims of psychoanalysis? Certainly, if the minister's main function is to maintain a dogmatic tradition, psychoanalysis may well be considered a competing heretical dogma. If his task is to carry out ecclesiastical ordinances, then, too, psychoanalysis has little to offer. But what if the minister believes his chief task is to save souls? Could psychoanalysis, itself, be conceived as a means of salvation? Or is it the devil's means of helping man to seek his escape from God in finding adjustment to his own nature within himself? Or can selected elements of psychoanalysis be understood as aids in the minister's task of saving souls?

Traditionally, the call to preach of the Protestant minister resulted in the restless urgency to save men's souls, generally from the throes of hell. Man was lost, or at least living in such a manner as to make his entrance into hell impending. To circumvent such an outcome, the religious experience of conversion was necessary. To convert sinners was the major, if not the sole, obligation of the preacher of a few generations ago.

If we have not actually changed our vocabulary, the connotation of the term, "salvation," has certainly been broadened to include not merely the avoidance of the ultimate dire consequences of man's resistance to God, but more essentially, the restoration of the wholeness of the total man in his total environment, and more particularly in his ultimate relationship with God.

To be sure, not all segments of the church are agreed that mental health and the church's salvation are related. For some salvation is part of the cosmic process of circumventing the possibility of being assigned to eternal damnation. This is to be accomplished either through the performance of prescribed ecclesiastical practices or through achieving the emotional assurance that by conversion one has been accepted as one of the elect. Either of these processes may be considered to have no connection whatever with mental health. Or, mental ill-health may be interpreted as a symptom of sin which can be dealt with only through accepting the church's diagnosis and giving up the sin. Or, another attitude is that it is possible to be saved in a religious sense although medically remaining mentally incurable.

Citing Horney's and Fromm's contention that psychoanalysis deals with moral problems, Roberts affirms that

every neurosis is a moral problem in the larger sense, that is, not just caused by immorality, in that it prevents individual happiness and the contributions to society that a healthy person can be expected to make.

> Therapy has a moral purpose because it rests on the assumption that internal harmony and a capacity for personal growth and responsibility are better than emotional conflict, anxiety and self-enslavement. In serving this purpose it is fostering a humanitarian end which is analogous to religious salvation.[1]

It is the testimony of the younger clergy, strengthened by experiences of pastoral work in the military chaplaincy, and attested by the curricular emphases on pastoral psychology courses in theological schools, that religion must have an effect upon the mental health of people. From the time of the eighth century Hebrew prophets there has been a growing sense of the imperative nature of the task of relating religion to life. The healing ministry of Jesus stands as an unquestionable precedent to a ministry of healing — or to the task of making the resources of religion relevant to personal life. The call to preach, which in the earlier days of American Protestantism was the only prerequisite to the ministry and to training in theological dogmatics, now

1. David E. Roberts, Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man. New York: Scribner's sons, 1950, p. 40.

is to be interpreted not merely in terms of homiletical gifts or special assurances of being a selected messenger, but in broader terms of capacity and readiness to deal creatively with concrete human needs and problems.

As we have seen in looking at Pfister's biography, his introduction to the ministry was through the study of dogmatics. However, after only a short period of pastoral work in the church, he was convinced that the minister's chief task was not so much a matter of indoctrination as it was of facing up to the human cries for help which came as the symptoms of the moral and spiritual confusion and breakdown of individuals. He would not leave his church to take a teaching position, thinking that his chief ministerial obligation could be fulfilled -- not through theoretical seminary education -- but in practical pastoral work. He was convinced further that as Jesus' ministry dealt with the whole person in all his relationships and not with any one aspect or segment no matter how "spiritual" or immaterial it might be, so must the ministry of the Christian Church direct itself to the resolving of the personal and interpersonal distortions of life and to the freeing of the individual from the constricting repressions which prevent his creative participation in life.

Pfister's motivation for accepting therapy as an obligation of the Christian minister derived from his theological presuppositions as well as from his concerned observation of the human cries for help. His rationale for the use of psychoanalysis also can be discovered directly within his theology. We have noted that Pfister holds the love of God as the essential element of the Christian faith and the touchstone of the Christian life. The Church's task, then, is to further the expression of the love of God, awaken people's interest in and desire for God's love through activities which are motivated by and expressive of that love in human beings. He early found that the chief problem in this process was the inner obstacles within the individual that blocked the free expression of love. These obstacles were found to be erected, in more severe instances especially, in the subconscious process of repression by the individual's reaction to withheld love.[2] Being deprived of the love of others, the distorted appraisal of the interpersonal situation erects the inner

2. In the light of Pfister's analysis, I John 4:11, "Beloved, if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another," is not just a religious demand; it suggests the conditions and possibilities of the actual achievement psychically and socially of love.

barrier which dams up the expression of love. The minister's pastoral task, then, is more specifically, to dissolve those barriers and free the individual for relationships of love, and preeminently of love to God.[3]

Such an analysis of the situation accorded well with Pfister's understanding of psychoanalysis. He further saw as a churchman the necessity of finding concrete tools for attacking the religious problem of the distortions, withholdings and blockings of love. Psychoanalysis appeared as the tool which was designed for just this purpose. To be sure, its nomenclature was non-theological, but it concerned itself with the soul or psyche of man; and from Pfister's point of view the religious and psychological problems were the same -- the inability to

3. Further precedent, if not evidence, substantiating the minister's task as mental healer Pfister drew from his analysis of the primitive mind and tribal organization. "On the level of primitive culture mental hygiene was entirely a religious affair." (Proceedings of the International Congress on Mental Hygiene, Vol. II, Held at Washington, D. C., May 5-10, 1930), F. E. Williams, Ed., New York: The International Committee for Mental Hygiene, Inc., 1932, p. 544.) And no matter how highly differentiated and specialized human services became in modern society, Pfister would not abandon this ancient prerogative or function of the religious man to concern himself with psychic health. When Pfister began psychoanalytic practice, several doctors criticized him for dealing with the sick, to which he countered, that doctors were the intruders in the care of souls, since the so-called nervousness of men was not organic but spiritual and moral. (Pfister, Die Pädagogik der Gegenwort, p. 11.)

love. The church had been very careful to maintain a tradition, both ecclesiastical and dogmatic, but it had failed to be as successful in maintaining a workable grasp on the principles and practices of the healing of the sick soul. In doing this psychoanalysis provided for the Christian minister the scientific tools for achieving mental health and so fulfilling the minister's obligation to restore conditions of optimum functioning of the human personality.

Some criticism may be leveled at the demand for scientific methodology in pastoral ministrations. In Jesus' report after healing the man with the withered hand, he suggested, "Thy faith has made thee whole." Some may consider this instilling or arousing the expulsive faith or the communication of the "healing spirit" beyond the scope of and not reducible to scientific procedures. In a certain measure this respect for the sense of mystery before the dynamic resources of spirit counsels a sober evaluation of the means by which men assume to appropriate or release curative powers. It may well be that spiritual gifts and disciplines are more crucial for the mental healer than the mechanistic practitioner would dare assume. However, as we have already noted the devious courses which religious inspiration itself takes,

the pathological accretions to life in the name of religion remind us that in the spirit's "blowing where it listeth" there is need of disciplined understanding and of discriminating technical means for the maintenance of mental health. Further, if the methods of pastoral ministration have some good effect there is certainly an obligation to communicate the patterns of these methods for the improved ministry of others. If this cannot or will not be done, then the effective pastoral ministry of the church awaits only those rare spirits who with apparent magical powers mystify the multitude as they heal the few.

Pfister's demand for a scientifically sound methodology in pastoral care is not born of an intellectual capitulation of the Christian faith as faith to scientism. Even early in his academic life his major interest shifted from theology to philosophy because of his theological teacher's attempts to prove miracles as scientific facts. Far from seeking to maintain a religious obscurantism, he had a healthy appreciation for the limitations of each respective field. At the same time, he set as his task to establish the empirical basis of theology which would be scientifically grounded and to demonstrate its practical utility. Part of his insistence on scientific

method in pastoral procedures was based on his belief that all theoretical interpretations as well as therapeutic procedure must be derived from concrete experience of persons in living relationships. He was critical with the non-empirical theology of his day as he was with the prevailing psychological preoccupation with experimental and statistical methods applied to very restricted aspects of personality. For him, psychoanalysis as a scientific psychology met his mind's demand for rational understanding and his heart's need to serve his fellowmen. In almost the tone of a confession he affirms that psychoanalysis saved him from the cold abstractions of traditional theology and from the frustrations of his father who, as a minister, was prevented from studying medicine, which he wished to do in order that he might better meet people's needs.

It might be noted that in Pfister's search for a methodology to make his Christian motivation of service relevant to the psychic ills of persons, he met with disappointment in two fields of psychology. In his study of psychological theory in order to find the origins of piety or religious experience, he found regularly the "banal result" that in religion as in every other psychic act, the ordinary intellect, feeling and will were mani-

fested.[4] During his early ministry he practiced psychotherapy in the form of suggestion as advocated at that time by Paul Dubois, the Bernese neurologist, and not without some good results. But he avoided a stronger interest in this healing method because it did not get at the necessity of causal relationships and its stereotyped form he found boring in practice. It appeared to him more of an adroit trick which held small truth for the pastor, for it challenged no moral insight in the removal of neurotic symptoms.[5]

Pfister's actual adoption of the psychoanalytic method came not so much through a study of its theory and finding it applicable, as finding a problem in his pastoral care which responded to nothing else. He tells in his autobiographical sketch that his interest in psychoanalysis came as a necessary result of his concern for the pastoral care of his people.[6] Heartened by the lack of metaphysical speculation and of experimental minutiae,

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4. The sometimes adolescent excursions of psychology in its beginning as a science which led to categorizing instead of explanation reminds one of the answer on an examination paper to the question, "What were the causes of the failure of Solomon's kingdom?" which was, "social, economic, political, and religious."
5. Oscar Pfister, "Die Pädogogik der Gegenwart im Selbstdarstellungen. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, no date, p. 9.
6. Ibid., p. 32.

and attracted by psychoanalysis' concern for the mental life, its acts and feelings, and responding to its attempts to ferret out the deeper causal connections and meanings of the psychic experience, and recognizing a concern for pathological formations akin to his own compassion for the mentally and morally ill, he adopted rigorously, in study and practice, the psychoanalytic method.

B. PSYCHOANALYSIS AS AN AID TO PASTORAL WORK

We may see, too, that psychoanalytic understanding may be of help to the Christian minister in his maintaining balance in his religious thinking and service, and in his detecting in himself and in his parishioners that symptomatic behavior which indicates underlying difficulties. Pfister illustrates how psychoanalytic understanding can uncover the distorted character and sources of religious thought.

> The history of orthodoxy in all its manifestations teaches us what distortions threaten Christianity when the emotional emphasis is transferred from Christian love to dogma and dogmatics. It should be added that a similar transference occasionally occurs in so-called liberal theology; here again love is diminished and there is a movement in the direction of compulsion neuroses. There is a kind of anti-orthodoxy which makes itself the fanatical champion of liberal dogmatics, which drains love and which consequently manifests itself in an intolerant, arrogant and disputatious form. We must

> not forget that no kind of notion can be imagined which could not be overemphasized in consequence of repressions. Conversely an adherent of orthodoxy may be endowed with great kindness and love. But if he is so endowed he will not also be afraid of the letter of the law, nor will he be rigid in maintaining his beliefs. He will find it easy to base his views upon God, upon man's love of God, of his neighbors and of himself and to practice these principles. And he will be more ready to surrender the external forms of dogma.[7]

It becomes increasingly apparent that behind the reluctance of the church to appropriate psychoanalytic interpretations to its own use, beyond its fear of having its defensive dogma undermined, lies some difference in the basic definition of the person that we are dealing with. Apart from the rather crude distinctions between the "materialism" or "naturalism" of psychiatry and the "spirituality" of religion, there is a difference in the understanding of the "psyche" or "soul" of man. In the psychoanalytic nomenclature when the latter has been used, it is synonymous with the former as the non-material center of power or energy, judgment, organization, thought, memory and control of the total person. It is the actual functional system of thought and behavior which deals with, lives in, and has as environment the physical world and human culture. Now, the view of "soul" which is the

7. Oscar Pfister, Christianity and Fear. (tr. W. H. Johnston) New York: The Macmillan Co., (1944) 1948, p. 544.

theological term and which is considered to be the peculiarly religious concern of the church often has been defined as a something abstracted from the present world and only lightly affiliating itself with a particular psychosomatic system. It is a religious category not amenable to scientific analysis. The point of view, although most clearly stated and most consistently held by scholastic thought, has influenced the thinking of the whole Christian Church insofar as it takes seriously its distinction between religion and morality and fosters or allows double standards of behavior in religious ceremonial as apart from moral living.

However, to think of the soul in dynamic terms rather than in the metaphysical category of substance is becoming the rule with more religious thinkers. This is quite apparent in liberal theology, and is quite clearly seen in the neo-orthodox insistence on the crucial character of man's freedom which is the focal point of man's problem whether it be in response to the divine initiative or in the determination of moral behavior.

If, then, psychoanalysis and Christianity can have at least a tentative agreement that they are dealing with basically the same concept when they speak of psyche or soul or person, then perhaps we may proceed to specify

more definitely what each means, and more particularly, the possible contributions to Christian thought the psychoanalytic interpretation of personality can make.

Psychoanalysis, further, can be seen as a possible contribution to the minister's program for pastoral help if it is understood that in the analysis of the functional dynamics of mental disorder there is not merely an arbitrary division of the subject, but that in reality the functional "sins" of the religious frame of reference are the neurotic symptoms as defined by psychiatry.[8] Pfister recognized that modern psychopathology and neurology relate neuroses and the functional psychoses to spiritual conflicts. "Since the pathogenic conflicts are mostly of a moral nature, religion assumes an important task in mental hygiene."[9] If sin is considered as rebellion against God rather than man's immoralities,

8. This does not necessarily mean that sins and symptoms are the same thing. Sins are a "sinning against" the divine order, or more seriously, the repudiation of God's right to order. Symptoms are the behavioral manifestation of a causing disorder. Symptoms are the psycho-mechanical consequences of the precipitating cause. Sins are the actual, willed events of contrariness to or contradiction of the Other's will. Insofar as it is believed that God wills man's good and health, sin can always be expected to produce some kind of pathological symptoms. We are speaking, in this connection, not of the effects of sin on God or on the God-man relationship only, but essentially on what it does to man.
9. Proceedings, loc. cit., fn. 2.

as it is considered more basically in Christian theology, it must find some of its root causes, processes and effects in man's psychic life or else it is in reality only man's theoretical abstraction.

It is as arbitrary to define a problem as "religious" and send the patient to the priest as it is to look at it through the spectacles of organic analysis and refer the sufferer to the neurologist. At bottom, the distressing mental condition must be examined from the functional point of view within the frame of reference of the patient's whole life. In doing this both religion and psychology have a common task before they bifurcate the person for the application of their particular form of therapy. As the dynamics of personality become the focus, both the narrow and dogmatic religious approach and the equally limited and dogmatic psychoanalytic approach will be overcome in the light of the person's problems. Insofar as the psychologist's criticism has been justified that religion has been abstract and theoretical, defensive of its ecclesiastical forms, rather than seeking to redefine its understanding of man so that real help could be given him, then it should remember its instrumental and implementative function and place the salvation of men before the perpetuation of its own particular rational or ecclesiastical

formulations. At any rate, the closer both religion and psychoanalysis get to the actual living person and his problems the less their peculiarities impede cooperative service. It is quite significant that when this is done psychiatrists become increasingly interested in the "religious aspect" of their patients, and ministers begin to be concerned with the "psychological ramifications" of their parishioner's disharmonious behavior.

C. CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS APPLICABLE TO PASTORAL WORK

When we inquire into the possible contributions of psychoanalysis to the understanding and work of the parish minister, it may be well to consider psychoanalysis at three levels, 1) in its description of the structure of the psyche, 2) in its more functional analysis of the dynamic mechanisms of personality and behavior and 3) in its therapeutic procedure. However, before we turn to an examination of each of these areas in turn, it may be well to inquire concerning the necessity of the minister's demand for a theoretical interpretation of the structure of personality. After all, isn't this a bit abstract both from the point of view of his dealing with people where they are and from his concrete interpersonal

functions within the ecclesiastical framework? And yet it must be remembered, that although much of personality theory is necessarily in the area of hypothetical constructs, still they are derived from the dynamisms of actual experience. And in a certain sense it is arbitrary to separate them. Indeed, the prophet will be worse off than one shouting in the wilderness if his moral injunctions, his interpretations of man's life with God are not rooted in a mature conception of man's psychic possibilities. Although the means of the connection are not always clear, the Christian minister with concern for pastoral relevance, must insist that the Gospel impinge upon the real life of man and not merely on a hypothetical or isolated soul substance.

1. The description of psychic structure.

What, then, is the psychoanalytic description of the structure of the psyche that may contribute to a Christian view of man? Although we should continually remind ourselves of the non-spatial and hypothetical character of the Freudian structural concepts, they fall into two dimensions. The first suggests the various levels of consciousness which have been identified as the unconscious, the conscious and the preconscious. Although this conceptualization is not original with Freud,

it became the basic presupposition of his system. As psychologically valid assumptions, the distinctions between the conscious and the unconscious cannot be gainsaid. It is not to the point in our present connection to justify their psychic status. The question before us is, is this a structural description which is clarifying to a Christian view of man, or is it merely a necessary presupposition within the framework of psychoanalysis, but without any necessary reference to what man is from the Christian standpoint?

The traditional categories of Christian theology in their treatment of man are concerned with man's origin, his moral condition at the point or time of origin, his moral condition and potentiality since, his freedom, his original and potential relationship to his Creator. The dualities of man's nature in terms of his creatureliness and his independence on the one hand and his sinfulness and goodness on the other are recurring problems for the Christian understanding of man. Man is observed as containing within his being a dichotomy of mind and body or spirit and matter. Theologians as far apart as Ritschl and Niebuhr recognize this duality as a part of the predicamentative character of man. The former states, "He (man) stands at the juncture of nature and spirit; and is

involved in both freedom and necessity,[10] while the latter, in similar vein suggests, "Man finds himself as both a part of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature."[11]

The psychoanalytic distinction between the conscious and unconscious may well be taken both as a statement of this prevailing interpretation of man's being, and also as an attempted solution of the underlying dichotomy by dealing with the two poles of his character within the psychic sphere, where it appears from both points of view resolution must be made. It is, then, the interiorization of the larger problem of man's duality and the arena in which (although not without anxiety) the realization of unity or the resolution of his contradictions must take place. Tillich suggests that the unconscious represents man's potentiality which has not been actualized and insofar as he looks upon man as microcosm in which all levels of reality are present, the unconscious then represents man's participation in nature and human nature.[12]

10. Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. (2 ed., tr. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macauley), Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, (1870-1874), 1902, p. 199.
11. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. New York: Charles Schribners, (1941), 1946, p. 181.
12. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol. I, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 179, 260, 261.

At least, we must say that the Christian view of man usually presents him as an amphibious character participating or seeking to participate in two (or more) realms of being. Although the Old Testament view of man does not make this explicit, it is certainly manifest in the New Testament, in Jesus' teaching of inwardness and in his distinction between the inner motive and the external act. Paul's writing of the law of and flesh and the law of the spirit struggling within him, and "the good that I would I do not, and that which I would not, that I do," indicate very graphically the characteristic dualism we find in Christian thought. In other words, it appears clear that Christian thought recognizes that although man is essentially a free, active agent, there is also as a part of his nature that over which he has little or no control, but which acts upon him. Thus it appears, that although the conscious-unconscious dichotomy of the psyche is not referred to as such in the theological analysis of man's nature, it is at least of the same pattern as the dualism we find there; but it rather represents the drawing together of the soul-body problem into the psychic frame where it is more readily accessible. If one questions the implied association of the unconscious with the body, we might observe that this was not foreign

to Freud's view that the unconscious forces were largely if not wholly physiologocal in origin. Pfister recognizes that Freud was close to psycho-physical materialism when he considered an instinct as "the psychic representative of organic forces."[13] But this need not bother us here; the problem of the conflict within man is the same for psychoanalysis and Christianity. It is not the theoretical resolution of the traditional mind-body problem; it is rather the unification of man's spirit in which the body is not one of the agents in the struggle so much as it is the locus or the place in which some of the struggle takes place.

The concept of the unconscious, then, serves Christian thought by attacking an old problem in a new way. It helps us to understand, not merely the bi-polar conflicts and tensions within men, regardless of the qualitative variety of their forms (for it is certainly possible to have tensions which are predominantly conscious), but also how these conflicts andtensions are so tenacious in the psyche and what a real triumph their overcoming or resolution really is. The religious quest for truth or the faithful acceptance of God's grace becomes at one with the process of the unification of the psyche. Man's honesty

13. Pfister, Psychoanalytic Method, p. 54.

about himself, his destiny and his legitimate place in his world or in his transtemporal orientation, the confessions of his "kept" or unconscious experiences which are so significant for his growth in wholeness are for him the making conscious his unconscious.

The more distinct structural analysis at the psyche by Freud is rather to be found in his concepts of the Id, the Super-ego and the Ego. Although these are more clearly to be understood as dynamic forces of the psychic life, they are in psychoanalytic theory the hypothetical structures of the psyche which are understood to have a constant place in the psychic organization regardless of the particular function they assume in the concrete interpersonal activity of the individual.

This vocabulary in relation to Christian thought is even more distinctly unique to psychoanalysis than are the ideas of consciousness and unconsciousness. The id as the source of irrational forces of a more bestial nature has hovered over Christian thinking about man's nature in the form of the doctrine of original sin insofar as this has been a dynamic part of man's nature producing actual sin and not just the biological transmission of the scars of the first sin. Or one might see in this negative conception of the id the dynamic putting of the

doctrine of man's depravity. To the extent that the id is understood to be the amoral energy of the psyche, one can only say that Christian thought usually assumes it. Some forms of mysticism which attribute to God man's total energizing, that is, which conceive man as a kind of empty conduit through which God's power flows, actually make the id the manward side of God's immanence. However, it would be more accurate to view the id as the energizing of man's own will. And inasmuch as Christian Doctrine holds to the evil character of that will it is confirming the more demonic character of the id.

The libido, which is a broader concept implying life impulse with less connotation of destructiveness and more of the idea of sexuality, or the dynamics of affiliation and production and creativity, or in the narrower sense of Freud, of reproduction, is seen to bear a marked resemblance in its extended and non-specific sense to love, or at least to its psychic source. It is at this point where Freud's concept of instinct as rationalistic and materialistic does not allow for the free responsiveness of psychic energy to goals and persons that Christian love demands. Pfister, on the other hand, insisting that the impulsive life is not materialistic but volitional with aims which can be "traced back to the pur-

poseful efforts of the volitional subject"[14] accounts for the libidinal energizing of life with due respect for the Christian understanding of man as free and responsible which is fundamental to its conception of his realtionship to God and of his moral life.

The customary counterpart of the psychoanalytic super-ego is the concept of conscience. The functional aspect of each is the same, although the very distinct difference in their origin and development should not blind us to basic differences. The psychoanalytic super-ego is clearly a product of the moralizing pressures which the personal environment of the individual impresses upon him. There is not such agreement in the views of the conscience. It is looked upon at times as that given capacity within man which functions as the discriminator between right and wrong. It also appears to be a body of energized moral concepts which is capable of alteration, not only as is the super-ego, but also by rational reconstructions or through its transformation by the ego. Both the super-ego and the conscience are not understood as the source of right, but rather the force of that which the individual feels he ought to do. Probably the major distinctions between the two are that the

14. Ibid., pp. 53, 54.

super-ego is less amenable to rational control than is the conscience and the super-ego appears as more of a mechanical product of the preferential systems of others whereas the conscience is open to the influences of super-human good. As far as their psychic function is concerned, however, they play the same role, though the source of the contents of the conscience is conceived more broadly than is that of the super-ego.

With respect to the ego, Christian thought has either taken it for granted or not distinguished its unique functions within the psychic system. The more conservative church, which at the same time emphasized the doctrine of original sin and the principle of moral continuity, concerned itself, although generally uncritically, with libidinal forces rather than with ego functions. The more liberal stress, following the Pelagian pattern upon actual sin and inherent and immediate moral responsibility has given a more serious consideration to the ego factor in personality. Although the perceptive functions of the ego were recognized, the self-denial aspects of Christianity have traditionally hindered a more objective view of the ego's more positive and aggressive functions of integration and execution. A more careful examination of the ego's functions and its deterrents

may actually be helpful in uniting the truth in both positions within the Christian Church since the problem of the crippled or cramped ego which commits actual sin is partially related to and caused by the predisposing original sin which operates through subliminal id forces. The ego is crucial, too, for Christian thought insofar as the latter is concerned with concrete moral activity and the optimum functioning of the self in the present environing circumstances rather than the self's becoming disembodied from the actual present in favor of a fatuous future.

Having considered the components of the psychic structure, it may be well to consider one general issue upon which there is little agreement. Although psychoanalysis conceives of the psyche as a dynamic interplay of the forces we have been examining, it still emphasizes their mechanistic and deterministic character. Certainly Freud, with his rooting the psychic organism in the physiological organism, was more adamant in this direction than was Pfister; however, since the latter accepted Freud's structural analysis, we must be careful to see wherein the Christian insistence on individual freedom has its place.

It may well be noted here that the Calvinistic idea of man's depravity and utter helplessness before

the mercy and judgment of God as well as the extreme neo-orthodoxy which appears to make man totally incapable even of response to God are in reality forms of deterministic thought which are theocratic rather than biological. Such a position, insofar as it is strictly psychological and not metaphysical, should have no quarrel with the determinism of Freud because the latter in reality only gives content to this religious view of man's helplessness and gives the controller a different status and name. The only, and of course, crucial difference is what or who is determining man; but this is ultimately the question of metaphysics and not of psychology.

The crucial question for psychology is whether or not man's structure is so rigorously mechanistic and run by external forces, or is it to a certain degree, at least, self-determining. It appears that even Freud's determinism finds a loophole in the therapeutic process in which the individual's conscious ego becomes freed of repressions in order to make new associations and establish new transference relationships. This could certainly not be possible if the psychic life were only the rigidly mechanical interiorization of external pressures through the super-ego and biological pressures through the id upon the ego. In Pfister's emphasis upon the therapeutic relevance of

Freud's structural analysis rather than upon its mere explanatory function of the way the psyche (and usually the mal-functioning psyche) operates, he finds ample areas of freedom both within its own integral operations as well as in its environmental selectivity.

2. The functional analysis of the mental mechanisms.

Let us now turn to the consideration of the relevance of the more functional aspects of psychoanalytic theory to Christian thought.

The keystone of Freud's thought was the concept of sexuality which he understood basically as an instinct. The main purpose of man was to give expression to this instinct according to the pleasure principle. Any thwarting in this process led to the arousal of the mechanisms of defense which either guaranteed sexual satisfaction or made its postponement tolerable to the ego. Pfister, on the other hand, made love, not an abstract instinct requiring physiological release, but a life force seeking concrete productive work and affiliative community relationships, as the fundamental human experience. Likewise, when man is unable to express his love for man and God, his search for the love affiliation is distorted or transmuted by the mechanism of defense. For Pfister, the basic functional aim of man from the psychological viewpoint is

identical with the functional aim of man from the Christian point of view. Not only did he consider love in more concrete interpersonal terms than did Freud, but he also included, not only love according to the pleasure principle, but also love according to the reality principle, in a much more accurate proportion than did Freud.

> It is moreover important to remember that love should be on the one hand a passive rest and receptiveness and on the other an active giving and effectiveness; the two are complementary.[15]

As the expression of love is the chief act of the psyche, so the main mechanisms of the psyche are those which either effect, direct, or thwart this expression. It would simplify matters if it would be possible to distinguish those mechanisms which hinder or help the optimum expression of love. Such, however, cannot be done. Even repression, which psychoanalysis has accorded a place of prominence among the mechanisms of defense, not only constitutes the means by which thwarting experiences are subjugated in the unconscious, but also the source from which creative activity derives content and motive. "Despite their attendant dangers repressions are among

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15. Oscar Pfister, Christianity and Fear, pp. 508, 509. Pfister indicates further (pp. 515-518) how inseparable and complementary eros and agape are in the full psychic experience of Christian love.

the essential protection and stimulants of the human spirit."[16]

It appears in Pfister's thought that given man's predisposition to love, he is free to express it or to block it. Consequent to the blocking he erects defenses in order to counteract or counterbalance this retained force. These defenses, then, may function as blocks to subsequent attempts to love. Although Freud suggested the Oedipal complex as the universal starting point for the thwarted or distorted love and the consequent defense tactics, Pfister sharply criticized Freud's interpretation of the Oedipal complex[17] and makes any excessive or withheld or distorted love the cause of the arousal of a defense mechanism.

To determine the relevance of these dynamic mechanisms to the Christian understanding of the functional aspect of human nature it will be necessary to distinguish between those which serve in the development of a mature ego and those which operate as psychopathological processes. It has already been noted how repression may serve in both capacities. Identification, too, may not only be the means by which the child's super-ego is

16. Ibid., p. 526.
17. Pfister, The Psychoanalytic Method, p. 165.

interiorized and becomes a part of the ego; but it may also be the means by which traumatic experience is introjected by the individual fearfully finding shelter within the skirts of the disturbing person and adopting (without assimilation) his pattern as his own. Identification may be a salutary experience if the person with whom one identifies himself is an ideal person. However, even in this, there may be a too rapid, uncritical and wholesale incorporation of the ideal personality which can produce unwarranted self-regard (pride) or anxious ambivalence toward one whom he admires but like whom he cannot or will not become through moral effort.

Anxiety, as a mechanism of defense serves both a destructive and a palliative function. It serves as a warning that a more disturbing repression is forcing itself into the more active behavioral arena of the person. It further serves in that it postpones or holds in check the more destructive impulse. However, it drains off energy in non-productive and non-creative activity which prevents the more complete giving of one's self in service and in love. Anxiety has been observed as the chief reaction to man's sinfulness. Although it should not be confused with man's sense of inferiority derived from his creatureliness, his anxiety produced by his sense of

guilt has, along with his creatureliness, led him to acts of faith and repentance which have restored the capacity to love. Unless one postulates an inherent guiltiness as a part of man's primordial nature and a necessary prerequisite to faith, anxiety cannot be said to be as contributive to as it is destructive of, or at least inhibitive of, love.

Substitution and displacement are important psychic mechanisms. When it becomes impossible or difficult to love one object or person, the object or person is changed. It is readily seen that the transference relationship, itself, is dependent upon this capacity. It may be seen to operate, too, in man's capacity to love both man and God. The fact that it is possible makes possible continuity and stability in man's attitudinal and affectional life. It prevents fixations and permits the extension of man's range of interest and affection. When the initial attitude is destructive, however, the danger of its changing its object is allayed only by the fact that such change of object may allow the gradual expenditure of the energy without the more complete or intense destruction of a single object. When the prevailing attitude is love, not only is its extension made possible through substitution and displacement, but insofar as

these processes are sub-conscious, there is the possible danger of failing to love a worthy object while dispensing generous affection on less worthy, but more accepting objects.

Closely associated with substitution and displacement is sublimation or the redirection of unacceptable impulses to a socially acceptable act. By definition, and therefore uniformly, sublimation is a value-producing activity. It is the application of psychic energy where it may achieve personal and social betterment. Artistic and altruistic achievements may often be the result of the sublimation of socially less valuable impulses. Sublimation usually involves the realization of a social good as opposed to a more narrowly selfish one. We have already noted the limitations of sublimation;[18] it may be noted further here that this process is the description of the ethical task of man, but the problem of religion is not only to stimulate it, but to make available avenues for sublimating activity. If the Genesis story of the origin of work has any psychological validity it may well be that all work is the sublimating activity of a thwarted and consequently uneasy eroticism.

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18. Supra., pp. 113-115.

Projection, or the placing of rejected ideas upon another, has also important religious and ethical implications. Although the escapist quality of this mechanism is readily apparent, it should be remembered that, although not "fair" in the strictest sense to the person upon whom the projection is made, it is a helpful safety valve for a person who cannot otherwise be freed from destructive impulses. Although questionable theology, "Jesus bore my sins upon the tree," may be psychotherapeutically a valuable supportive process. The danger is that in the fixation of the projection the individual frees himself from moral responsibility for his own disposal of the idea or impulse, and confirms his own virtue by the increased vice that he has projected upon the other rather than repented of.

Symbolization is a psychic mechanism apparent both in psychoanalysis and in religion. It performs the helpful service of holding ready and available a mystery or complex concept which is either difficult to understand or express or is partially rejected. It makes possible richness and suggestion in communication. Idolatry is its danger. For in religious faith as well as in psychoanalytic therapy, the symbol may become a fetish, and what, with some careful analysis, can be a fruitful instru-

ment for the conveyance of meaning can also be, with thoughtless and fearful obeisance, a mechanical device usurping the significant interpersonal relationship which is the ground of meaning. The utility of symbolization is as readily seen in Jesus' use of the parable as in Freud's interpretation of dreams.

Rationalization is a helpful but dangerous mechanism. Without its capacity we could not discover the motive of any act. Its danger lies in the individual's inclination to select the motive most favorable to himself as the motive. Any rigid rationalization is harmful whether it be in the realm of personal behavior or in religious belief. If the rationalizing process can remain fluid and as freed from subjective influences as possible, it can be the source of real understanding both of one's self and of others. The freedom and capacity to find "other reasons" as well as the honesty to accept those which may not be so flattering but which are explanatory will not only save one from premature pride, but encourage creative thought and action.

The mechanism of regression, inasmuch as it is unconscious can result in unbearable infantilism and milder forms of unfortunate immaturity. However, conscious regression may be what the interpretive aspect of psychoanalytic therapy really is, since health is restored only

upon the unfolding and understanding of the symptomatic activity from the present back to the earlier traumatic experience, usually in childhood. Perhaps, if the psychic paths could be definitely charted, the process of "being born again" (John 3:1-8) or Jesus' reference to becoming as little children would be similar to the psychoanalytic reconstruction of life free from crippling repressions. To become childlike without becoming childish may be a condition and characteristic of psychic good health as well as of membership in the Kingdom of God.

Perhaps there has been sufficient suggestion, at least, of the relationship between several psychic mechanisms with processes of the moral and religious life which are dealt with differently in the categories of Christian thought. What is their importance for the Christian understanding of man and of his best functioning? It should be remembered that psychoanalysis deals with the psychic life descriptively and consequently describes these mechanisms as amoral, while Christianity asks why these mahanisms should be employed and what are the values and dangers inherent in and consequent to their use. However, summarily, it appears that the following are suggested as considerations of fruitfulness in the area of psycho-dynamics:

1. The mechanisms of defense seem more valuable the

more conscious one is of their employment; conversely, they appear the most dangerous when one is least aware of their particular function. This suggests the real value for mental health that may be derived from helping individuals to become conscious of the defensive measures they use.

2. A psychic defense mechanism, although potentially dangerous does function as a kind of safety valve measure. At times helping the individual to more appropriate social adjustment, at others, and more significantly, making an unacceptable idea and impulse at least temporarily tolerable until such a time when psychic energy may be marshalled for its assimilation or elimination.

3. The use of objects, persons and projects to which substitution and sublimation can be made suggests their psychic importance. Perhaps one of the most important functions of a dynamic democratic religious leader is to provide new ideas and causes worthy of increased devotion to which people may apply their energies.

4. Closely allied with this is the significance of ideal images which may function in identification whereby more mature patterns of behavior may be incorporated more readily through dynamic relationship with more avail-

able ideal figures. Although availability of such figures would in part assuage the guilt feelings produced by partial identification, there is still much opportunity for confession, repentance and reconciliation in which processes the pastoral minister has a crucial function to perform.

5. The importance of stimulation or associative attraction or reinforcement is to be noted in the psychic mechanisms observed. If creative behavior is to be forthcoming from repressed unconscious content it will not be entirely from repressions caused by trauma but it will be from that which is essentially capable of being assimilated, which has inherent value, and which is accompanied by an emotional charge which will help implant it in character.

6. If mentally healthy persons are to develop it will be as they are provided with reality reference activity which will obviate the necessity of fantasy formations and fixations in particular symbolizations and projections.

7. Evident in all our consideration of all the psychic mechanisms is the importance of flexibility in the utilization of any one. It may well be that freedom from fixations and the compulsive unconscious use of any

one mechanism is to be produced by the resilience of any accepting group fellowship in which the availability of love relationships negates the necessity of rigid defensive measures. For it seems apparent that the more completely the person is achieving his most significant psychic aim, the less obvious are the functioning of the more mechanical means of defense.

If the psychoanalytic presupposition, according to Pfister, and the Christian affirmation of man's first duty to love, is true, then both the disciplines of psychology and religion have at least three tasks in common which are derived from this assumption.

1. Man always (except in extreme cases of psychotic or psychopathic illness) has the capacity of response to other things and persons on the basis of either love or hate. To be sure, the mechanisms which he has habitually used severely limit his freedom, but in the last analysis the individual can choose to love, and insofar as he is able he is fulfilling his chief goal. Both psychology and religion can remind persons of this capacity, help them to use it, and help them to understand its use, abuse or disuse.

2. We have observed that none of the mechanisms of defense were categorically good or bad. There is always

the qualitative aspect and goal of the mechanism. Psychology and religion can help define, the latter in terms of ideal ends, the former in terms of optimum consequences, what constitutes an appropriate utilization of the psychic mechanisms.

3. Each may help the individual become aware of the mechanisms he uses and may help him to understand the real ends they serve in his psychic economy, encourage flexibility in their use, and elimination of destructive patterns through surrounding individuals with opportunities for creative fellowship.

It is difficult in dealing with the dynamic mechanisms of the psyche which have been elaborated by psychoanalysts not to suggest their possible healthy functions or the therapeutic implications of their operation. It is difficult except as one focuses on concrete persons to avoid the fallacy of abstractism in dealing with the normative functioning of personality. As we have indicated Christianity involves an ideal goal for human persons; psychoanalysis implies the possibility of a psychic integration to be attained. The examination of the mechanisms of personality leads us directly into the consideration of the means of achieving or restoring their optimum functioning. We shall, therefore, examine psycho-

analysis as a therapeutic and educative instrument in order to discover what resources may be available for Christian pastoral services.

3. Therapeutic procedures.

Before we examine specific techniques we should be sure we understand the difference in goals of psychoanalytic therapy and Christian pastoral care. The former is analysis; the discovery and interpretation and understanding of the conflicting forces within the individual. The latter is a synthesis; a restoration of a relationship. The former is a freeing from a crippling repression which impeded the life function. The latter is a freeing for a creative self-giving life. While the one leads away from that which binds within, the other leads toward that above which releases that which is within. Although the aims are distinct, they are not contradictory. Upon a closer examination the essential situation (the transference relationship) within which psychoanalysis achieves its rather negative task (freeing from symptoms) is suggestive of the reconciling interpersonal relations of pastoral work.

Zilboorg has called our attention to the underlying unity in the following statement:

> Both religion and psychoanalysis -- the former by way of inspiration and revelation, the latter by way of psychological investigation -- seek to solve the difficult problems which impose themselves upon man in his constant state of anxiety and sense of guilt. Each uses terminology of its own, but both seem to solve the problem on the basis of the same principle. Both give the principle the same name -- love. One sees in love the means for ultimate salvation, the other, the means of ultimate health. This, it would seem, is a point of contact between religion and scientific psychology which no other science has ever had.[19]

Insofar as psychoanalytic therapy is merely a releasing from constricting symptoms, it is complementary, and fulfills a necessary function of enabling the individual to assume the new demands or enlarged opportunities that a Christian perspective lays before him. Pfister firmly believed the two to be complementary. One should not exclude the other. Just as the sowing depends upon the plowing, so the Christian faith depends upon analytic preparation. That psychoanalysis is the only means of this preparation, Pfister does not assert, but he does affirm that it can effectively prepare individuals for the Christian life in cases where other methods merely scratch the surface of the basic problems.

Perhaps it may summarily be suggested that the means of psychoanalytic therapy are consistent with the ends of

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19. Gregory Zilboorg, Mind, Medicine and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943, pp. 308, 309.

Christian faith although the end of psychoanalytic therapy may not necessarily be consistent with the means of Christian life. Pfister, thus, conceived of the similarity between psychoanalysis and the Gospel only on points of method: "Analytical pastoral care is scientific application of Jesus' basic ideas which he originated, but for the technical means we are thankful to Freud."[20]

What can be said, then, of the specific methods of psychoanalysis in the hands of the Protestant minister? The basic method of free association, to which the more specific methods of word association and dream analysis are contributory as they have been employed, especially in the earlier period of psychoanalysis, is consistent with, if not analogous to the permissive, non-judgmental counseling which increasingly is employed by ministers as the most effective means for effecting confession, insight, understanding and the reorientation and readjustment of attitudes and behavior. Free association provides the opportunity for the individual to see relationships and meaningful connections within his own experience. Since it is done in the presence, and with the help, of one who is intent on the restoration of psychic health,

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20. Oscar Pfister, Analytische Seelsorge. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1927, pp. 24, 25.

and since it is done in a situation in which environmental pressures are at least momentarily reduced, the patient has better opportunity freely and uncoerced to be honest about himself to himself. Thereby self-acceptance is facilitated, and awareness of experiences which bear significantly upon that self is broadened. And in the affirmation of the self new energies are released for the accomplishment of the life task in the midst of reasserted, though better understood, environmental pressures and responsibilities.

One might ask at the outset if this is not precisely what the Christian pastor is trying to do? He is certainly endeavoring to encourage self-acceptance; however, the framework against which that self-acceptance takes place, or the standards or qualifications determining the acceptance of self are more clearly defined within the Christian interpretation of God and the individual's ego ideal as he accepts it in Jesus Christ. Traditionally there has been more effort expended in the clarification and proclamation of these concepts than there has been in seeking to help the individual find his whole self in relation to them.

The framework in which this process takes place psychoanalytically is the transference relationship. Al-

though on the surface, but quite properly, this appears to be synonymous with what we mean by Christian love, it delineates more clearly the meaning and experience that is so often and too facilly associated with it. Essentially, transference takes place when the patient directs toward the analyst repressed material, ideas and emotions which are closely associated with the neurotic behavior and which have been the repressed source of its expression. The patient relives his neurosis and the unacceptable feelings and attitudes which have been repressed begin to be expressed to the analyst. The patient has achieved implicit trust in the concern-for-him of the analyst and the confidence that no ordinary socially repudiated behavior will break it. The analyst accepts the otherwise or hitherto unacceptable emotions without letting them change the relationship between him and the patient. Here we have an inherent pattern of Christian love. An individual, in his consistent and accepting search for the best development of the other, allows the other to discover in himself these things which have proved incompatible with love, absorbs these himself as they are expressed to him and frees the other for the creation of non-defensive, trusting associations -- (or frees him) which enlarges his capacity for love.

The person is now ready for sublimating activity since he does not have to coerce his environing persons and events to maintain his repression and dishonest facade (at least dishonest in terms of his own free productive self). Now his energies may be applied to those activities which produce the extension of love or the protection of others since the compulsive protection of self is no longer needed. Cure may be said to be accomplished if the courage to be one's own self, apart from reliance upon the protective defenses maintained by repression, which begins to be expressed with the analyst, in his ordinary social environment. Not only is the pattern by which the restoration of health takes place indicative of what is meant by Christian love, but the personal environmental situation in which consistently free and productive living takes place is what the Christian means by God and his kingdom. Perhaps the flippant charge that psychoanalysts "play God" is not without some foundation. As we understand the course of therapy, they can be at least suggestive of what God in a much more comprehensive, reliable and ultimate fashion is to man. Prayer, then, becomes analegous to the free association process and abreaction. Insofar as the person who prays is putting content into the Psalmist's cry, "Search

me, O God, and know my heart; try me and know my thoughts; and see if there be any wicked way in me," he is seeking in this trustful relationship with God to reveal his true depths,[21] and in being "led in the way everlasting" to live out this creative love-conditioned and love-provoking relationship.

Pfister suggests that for him theology is tracing the implications of the revelational insight that "God is love."[22] For him, too, man's greatest human problem, anxiety, and its manifold manifestations, is produced by his repudiation of love and ultimately the love of God. The redemption of mankind in Christ is at once the expression of God's concern for man, both on the cross and in his sacrificial service to mankind, his suffering as he "takes" man's sins upon himself (or as man in faith abreacts, God accepts) and tragic revelation of man to himself in the light of the accepting patient love of Christ which is expected to move man to the renunciation of his rejection of God's love and his acceptance of it and the pattern by which it was portrayed to him in Christ.

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21. A suggestive development of this theme in the light of the psychoanalytic experience will be found in Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, New York: Scribners, 1948.
22. Pfister, Christianity and Fear, pp. 541-575.

D. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING PSYCHOANALYSIS TO PASTORAL CARE

We have considered some of the theoretical affinities of psychoanalysis and Christian pastoral thought and work. Is it possible, then, to go another step and suggest that "analytical pastoral care" is an appropriate if not essential part of the minister's equipment in the discharge of his pastoral obligations? It is hoped that the previous considerations make apparent that the close study of psychoanalytic theory and therapy can be fruitful in the enrichment of the minister's own grasp of the Gospel and of the ways in which he will make it relevant to the concrete problems of human life which he confronts. Is the kind of balance Pfister worked out between the two one which might well be the norm? Is any less involvement in psychoanalytic training than that which leads to competence in therapeutic practice only dabbling? Is any more involvement allowing the distinctive religious framework in which the minister works to be abandoned? It should be clear to the Christian minister that his psychological insights should not usurp the more fundamental character of the faith on the one hand and that any interest in psychology which he has should lead to fruitfulness

in his actual clinical or pastoral experience with his parishioners on the other.

Since the question of how this training may be acquired is being answered in part and to an increasingly effective degree by the more prevalent courses in pastoral theology and clinical pastoral training in Protestant schools of theology, it may be more fruitful to examine certain principles by which individual judgment may be guided.

First, we may be reminded of the division of labor in professional services between the minister and the psychoanalyst and the necessity for respect of their distinctive roles. The former functions within the framework of the church. His is a group ministry as well as a ministry to individuals. He is essentially non-selective in his clientele. He is more than a therapist; in his preaching and educating office he is seeking to clarify the normative functioning of human personality and to relate his people to the ultimate ground of their existence. The psychoanalyst's duty is to remove symptoms and to restore mental health. The latter's role is certainly within the total concern of the minister, but the degree of specialization of the analyst should caution against the identification of functions. The severity of cases,

the rejection of the church's role, practical considerations of availability and economy of treatment should counsel the minister's referal of the sick soul. As has been repeatedly urged, the close cooperation of the two in rendering the specific service which each can -- and must -- if the best interests of the individual are to be served, is an outgrowth of professional competence, mutual confidence and reciprocated understanding of the other's point of view, vocational involvement and particular capacity and preparation for dealing with specific situations.

Secondly, the minister must respect the integrity of the patient-parishioner. The latter must not be exploited for the sake of experimentation in the use of therapeutic techniques which may involve the minister in transference situations from which he can be extricated only with harm to his parishioner. Also, the person is one person. The coordinate services of the pastor and the analyst must always relate their particular points of view to the unity of the person.

Thirdly, the freedom of the individual patient must always be checked against the authority of both the mental healer and the minister in order that the individual's freedom and growth-in-freedom may be preserved and encouraged. The authority of the minister is often asked for

when a person comes for help, but it should be exerted with extreme caution lest the flattering position into which the request for help places him may make it impossible for him to render any real service in releasing the individual's resources for self-direction.

Training in psychoanalysis has involved three specific areas, (a) reading in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, (b) the didactic analysis, and (c) supervised analytic work. The first is amply available to ministers on every hand. His study is unique in that he is not just interested in satisfying his curiosity about the mechanisms of the unconscious life, but he is searching for means of making his pastoral work more fruitful. It can hardly be suggested that the didactic analysis, which is the keystone of the analytic preparation, is within the range of possibility of the average pastor. Although Pfister urged the inadequacy of self-analysis, it may well be that self-analysis within the background of a searching personal prayer life can help in large measure to clarify motives, to reveal repressed attachments and aversions, to illuminate underlying life patterns which will give the minister the kind of detached compassion and inner psychic resilience that will increase his effective dealing with other persons.

Unfortunately, the therapeutic group fellowships which may be so enlightening in self-analysis are infrequently available to the minister. Opportunities for supervised pastoral work are appallingly lacking apart from our theological seminaries and hospitals where clinical pastoral education may be had. Administrative officials in the churches might well consider seriously their educative responsibility to the parish ministers in providing means of evaluating the latter's actual ministry to the people. If psychoanalytic training is not available to ministers -- and this is not necessarily encouraged in its entirety -- it still may suggest certain avenues for the improvement of that training which they are actually receiving.

From the point of view of training in the actual methods of psychotherapy, the training that has been and is being given in seminaries in the non-directive or responsive counseling techniques represents perhaps the safest measure by which trainees can get actual experience with people's problems without running much danger of doing real harm. Its permissive character allows for the growth of insight on the part of the patient as well as for the understanding by the counselor of the emotional forces which are being revealed to him. Its

concern for the immediately relevant or the emotionally most urgent feeling of the counselee leads to the revelation of the dynamic patterns of behavior without, oftentimes, the laborious process of free association in psychoanalysis. If it does not take us to the cavernous depths of the soul, as has been the more arrogant claim of some psychoanalysts, it has opened the door, not only to let some light in, but also that others might see.

The same might be said, in summary, of the contribution of psychoanalysis to the parish minister. It has not only come up with clarifying interpretations about the nature and functioning of the psychic life, but by so doing it has enriched the Christian thought of man and has placed in the minister's hands, if not as Freud and his faithful followers conceived it, at least in modified forms, suggestively helpful methods for rendering more adequate pastoral service.

CHAPTER VIII

EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ON PFISTER'S SYNTHESIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION

A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION

Several years ago a Jewish writer, Irving Kristol, decried what he called the "love affair" between religion and psychoanalysis.[1] He noted that all had not been swept off their feet, however; the Catholics were frigid, the Protestants acquiescent, but the Jewish leaders were embracing the suitor with what he considered unbecoming ardor. He stated that "psychoanalysis, in the eyes of religion, is a historical passion of men obsessed with the death of God."[2] As though the rigidly home-bound daughter was free to marry the mysterious suitor now that father was gone.

Such oversimplification of the reaction of the religious world has complicated a sober evaluation of psychoanalysis and its relation to religion by overstatement and faulty generalization. Therefore it may be well, as we seek to evaluate Pfister's synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion, to cast the problem in the larger frame

1. Irving Kristol, "God and Psychoanalysts." Commentary, 8(1949), pp. 434-444.
2. Ibid., p. 441.

to see what has been a more accurate historical estimate of Catholicism and Protestantism of psychoanalysis, in order as well to get a broader perspective on Pfister's position.

1. CHRISTIAN EVALUATIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

The Roman Catholic view has been the more resistant to an appreciation and appropriation of psychoanalytic theory and technique. This has not been altogether because of a wholesale rejection of it; there have been instances of approval of psychoanalytic therapy within the framework of the "non-ethical" neuroses, but the Catholic rejection of Freud's religious views has been so vociferous, any words of approval have been hard to hear.

Rudolf Allers, whose extended criticism of psychoanalysis is entitled, The Successful Error,[3] has long waged a relentless opposition to the new psychology. Although he concedes that the psychoanalysts are right in such matters as their insistence on the importance of the experience of childhood for the later development of character,[4] and other interpretations of psychic facts, he emphasizes the gross incompatibility of Roman Catholic

3. Rudolf Allers, The Successful Error. A Critical Study of Freudian Psychoanalysis. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940.
4. Rudolf Allers, The Psychology of Character. (tr. E. D. Strauss), New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931, p. 582.

and psychoanalytic theories of human nature, and the positivistic metaphysics of psychoanalysts as compared to the theism of Catholicism; and he points out the insidiously dangerous tendency of people who accept some of the psychological interpretations of psychoanalysis and then go on easily to embrace the naturalistic philosophical implications that Freud and others have drawn from them.

> We are unable to associate ourselves with the psychoanalytic conception...We must remember that the fundamental hypotheses that form the starting point of psychoanalysis are unacceptable when regarded from the standpoint of a positive metaphysic and from a Catholic conception of the universe. It seems to me to be out of the question to seek to reconcile Catholic philosophy, and the fundamental truths it incorporates with psychoanalytical theories. Anyone who attempts this synthesis must have lost sight either of the axioms upon which the whole psychoanalytic theory is based or the ultimate meaning of Catholic philosophy.
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> As the essential hypotheses of psychoanalysis are entirely naturalistic, and their rejection would lead to a collapse of the whole system, any attempt at a compromise between the psychoanalytic approach and Catholic philosophy is mistaken from the outset. The pronounced anti-religious tendencies of most psychoanalysts, not excluding Freud himself, Reik and others, follows logically from its theoretical foundations. This cannot be 'got over' by the efforts of Pfister, a Protestant theologian and psychoanalyst....It is, of course, to be willingly admitted that psychoanalysis has taken the right view of many facts; but its exponents are in the habit, almost without exception, of assuming the whole theory. It is therefore necessary to detach the body of facts from its theoretical framework, in order to get them in proper perspective. In my opinion,

> there is an unbridgeable gulf dividing the psychoanalytic and the Catholic theories of human nature.[5]

There is lurking behind this rejection of psychoanalysis some appreciation of its facts; and although its rejection stems quite apparently from the disparity in psychoanalytic metaphysics and Catholic metaphysics rather than from differences in psychological insights, Allers maintains that since the essential hypotheses of psychoanalysis are entirely naturalistic, the whole system must be repudiated from the Catholic point of view.

This same criticism of psychoanalysis and the general Catholic attitude is also arrived at from the examination of the processes of therapy.

> Perhaps the reason why psychiatry asks no aid of religion and ethics, but on the contrary is often anti-religious and immoral, is to be sought in the fact that whatever psychology may be involved, in the philosophy of mind implied in the handling of the patient's problems by various psychiatrists, it makes no allowance for the existence in the mind of general principles of any kind, let alone the concept of moral standards and religious truths.[6]

The same rejection of Freud's philosophical assumptions is seen in the thought of Vanderveldt and Odenwald; however they do not rule out the strictly psychological insights which have psychological validity and do not depend on the naturalistic assumptions. They also

5. Ibid., fn. 4, pp. 338, 339, fn.
6. Thomas V. Moore, "Religion, Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene." Psychiatry, 7(1944), p. 322.

appreciate the fact that Freudian psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method has proved its validity in terms of its results, and that if it be utilized in scrupulous isolation from Freud's naturalism (as they believe it can be) or preferably by therapists grounded in Christian philosophy, it is a valuable tool in therapy.[7]

A less defensive position is held by Dr. Otis F. Kelly who gives psychoanalysis meager credit for "discovering" or popularizing truths which had long been common goods in the Scholastic store; but he lays the major responsibility for the popularity of psychoanalysis at the door of inept or uninterested clergymen who have not answered their people's deeper questions and problems. The latter have, then, gone to the medical practitioner to get answers which ultimately are the property of the church.[8]

Although many psychoanalysts would undoubtedly be aroused to answer charges of immorality which Moore makes, we find here again Catholic resistance to a psychoanalytic therapy that deals objectively and analytically with

7. James H. Vanderveldt and Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952, pp. 142-158.
8. Otis F. Kelly, "Is There Danger of Substituting Psychiatry for Religion?" in Liebman's Psychiatry and Religion. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, pp. 18-25.

all religious truths and moral standards the patient has, and subjects the entire contents of the patient's psychic life to a critical examination which seeks to alleviate the pressure from destructive unconscious repressions.

In his clear, facile and persuasive way, Msgr. Sheen has indicated the Catholic position relative to psychoanalysis. He has suggested that the tripartite theology of God, man and Satan has been interiorized and imprisoned within man himself in the psychoanalyst's concepts of the Super-ego, the Ego and the Id, respectively; and their objective status in reality has been denied.

> According to such a modern conception of the subjective life, man appears as a captive within his own mind and as a victim of forces which he cannot recognize. To free himself, if that be possible, he must know more about his own prison: this is one reason for the great popularity of psychiatry today.[9]

He goes on to suggest that all anxiety is metaphysical as well as psychological, being rooted in man's finiteness.[10] Therefore, no "good psychiatrist will start with the assumption that all conflicts are rooted in those

9. Fulton J. Sheen, Peace of Soul. New York: Whittlesey House, 1949, p. 4.
10. Ibid., pp. 17, 20.

instincts which man shares with animals."[11] As a result, "since the fall, goodness has not 'come naturally' but with difficulty, and is overcome thoroughly only thanks to the supernatural."[12]

In the face of these assertions which indicate that not only the cure, but the cause of man's mental disorders is bound up with his relationship to God, Sheen goes on to allow psychoanalysis some right in the healing of men's minds despite its faulty metaphysics.

> Man may be disturbed by a complex which has no ethical or moral cause; in treating such cases, medical science has a vast area in which it can legitimately operate.[13]

> To some extent, it (psychoanalysis) could be viewed as an application of the Christian doctrine of examination of the conscience to the examination of the subconscious. Christian faith and morals cannot possibly have any objections to a mental treatment whose aim is the restoration of the sick mind to its human end. But psychoanalysis becomes very wrong indeed when it ceases to be a method of treatment and pretends to be a philosophy.[14]

Thus, although there is either an ambiguity in what is the basis of a neurosis or an artificial distinction between some mental disorders which have an ethical basis and those which have not, there is a recognition of some

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11. Ibid., p. 46.
12. Ibid., p. 48.
13. Ibid., p. 70.
14. Ibid., p. 89.

little helpfulness though cautiously circumscribed that may be forthcoming from psychoanalytic therapy, on the one hand, and the same pattern of staunch rejection of the underlying philosophy and metaphysical implications of the system on the other.

It is probably even more difficult to point out a general attitude toward psychoanalysis held by Protestant leaders. Seeking to find truth where it can, and not being required to shape that truth into a preconceived system of thought has given rise to a great variety of appropriations and rejections of psychoanalysis within Protestantism. The insights of psychoanalysis have richly fertilized the thought of the psychologists of religion and the pastoral psychologies of this century. Paul E. Johnson has given an excellent illustration of the appreciative, yet critical, way in which the vast contributions of Freudian psychoanalysis are recognized, and at the same time the difficulties in Freud's theories are pointed out. Johnson gives a concise description of the systematic theory of psychic processes, of the dynamic interplay of the mental forces, and of the course of therapy according to Freud. His evaluation of the Freudian psychology gives credit for its emphasis on and description or utilization of unconscious motivation,

psychic causation, childhood experiences, the emotional source of motivation, neurotic anxiety and its therapeutic method. He recognizes, too, the value of the positive results of psychoanalytic therapy. However, he criticizes Freud's artificial and rigid dichotomizing of the psychic life into unconscious and conscious aspects, his mechanistic determinism, his lack of attention to creative behavior in later life, his reduction of motives to sex and death instincts, his tendency to universalize neurotic behavior and to generalize in theory upon it, the negative and narrow aspects of the goal of psychoanalytic therapy and the danger of dependence of the patient upon the analyst. Johnson indicates particularly the valuable contributions studies in unconscious motivation have made toward the psychological understanding of religion.[15]

Reinhold Niebuhr gives Freud credit for bringing the onesided rationalism of the nineteenth century back into better balance with the irrationalities of man's unconscious life, but beyond that psychoanalysis is considered chiefly as a protest against the moralistic rigidities of the upper middle class which has discovered the uneasy chaos within and finds it fashionable and safe to allow

15. Paul E. Johnson, Psychology of Religion. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945, pp. 196-202.

them to seep out in analysis leaving a kind of romantic pessimism.[16] Paul Tillich, as much impressed with Freud's emphasis on the unconscious vitalities of life has dealt more rigorously and more fruitfully with the therapeutic aspect of psychoanalysis. He has suggested that the emphasis of Freud on the importance of the erotic sphere for all aspects of the psychic life has been important ethically and religiously, but it has not been contradictory to a prevailing insight of religion. Further, the pattern of psychoanalytic therapy is valid within the Christian principle of the confessional so long as the analyst is a priestly man who is capable of lifting the patient out of the "realm of the subjectivity of the finite into the inclusive life of the eternal.[17]

In his most recent book, The Courage to Be, we see Tillich's view of psychoanalysis in clearer perspective. In general, he places psychology in the larger frame of reference of ontology, but he clearly indicates the close relationship. He suggests that the problem of anxiety is more basic to personality or to man's existence than the

16. Reinhold Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man. New York: Scribners, 1941, pp. 30-43.
17. Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, (tr. H. Richard Niebuhr), New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932, pp. 32, 103-107.

analytical views of pathological anxiety would indicate. Speaking specifically of the death wish, he recognizes this in the form of "anxiety of death" as being ontological and not just pathological (p. 41). He suggests the historic affinities of psychoanalytic and Christian insights in "that monastic and mystical self-scrutiny (which) brought to light an immense amount of the material of depth psychology, which entered theology in its chapters on man's creatureliness, sin and sanctification." (p. 128) He not only emphasizes the importance of theological and medical collaboration in dealing with anxiety, the latter's aim being to remove the neurotic anxiety while the former seeks to elicit the courage to accept the basic anxiety which is inherent in existence, (pp. 73, 74); but he even suggests that the psychoanalytic situation which facilitates self-affirmation, in reality, is the representation of God's affirmation of man (pp. 165-167.).[18]

Leslie Weatherhead, although drawing heavily upon the insights of psychoanalysis, has made explicit what he considers the relationship between psychology and pastoral ministrations should be. He suggests that man

18. Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.

is both a machine and a driver; that psychotherapy deals on the "garage-level" with the machine but that the pastor is concerned with the immortal spirit which is the driver.[19] He recognizes, however, that in actuality psychoanalysis is available only to the few because of the excessive time and expense involved in therapy. Further, he pleads for the church to be restored in its heritage of healing, since complete integration of the personality and complete health are made possible by the "therapist with a spiritual insight and faith which help in synthesis as well as investigation."[20] His plea for the uniqueness of the pastoral role is not unlike Tillich's assertion of the importance of the pastor lifting the patient beyond the subjective level to that of the eternal, or as Cabot simply stated it, that the "two must face the third."[21]

R. S. Lee advocates unhesitatingly the reconcilability of psychoanalysis and Christianity. With the limitation that psychoanalysis is a science and therefore not a judge of ultimate values, he has aimed to demonstrate

19. Leslie D. Weatherhead, Psychology, Religion and Healing. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1951, p. 470.
20. Ibid., pp. 484, 485.
21. Richard C. Cabot and Russell L. Dicks, The Art of Ministering to the Sick. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936, pp. 172-177.

"how psychoanalysis can cleanse Christianity of non-christian elements and can give it deeper insights into the true qualities of human life."[22]

B. G. Sanders has made a much more critical assessment of the relationship between psychoanalysis and Christianity from a more orthodox Christian view. He recognizes Freud's view of religion which depends upon the presupposition that God does not exist. He deals honestly with the problem of picking and choosing elements of psychoanalytic theory out of context to fit into another context. "As a scientific system of which each part depends upon each preceding part, it does not seem to me to be legitimate to accept the parts which we like, and to reject those we do not like."[23]

He recognizes psychoanalysis as a 'menace' to the Christian faith. And then he distinguishes psychoanalysis as science which deals with the laws of succession, rather than the absolute ends of the series or the process as a whole, disposes of Freud's critique of the origin of religion; and goes on to examine religious beliefs and practices "by the psychoanalytic method" to find that

22. R. S. Lee, Freud and Christianity, New York: A. A. Wyn, 1949, preface, p. 18.
23. B. G. Sanders, Christianity After Freud. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1949, pp. 9, 10.

they are "not incompatible with belief in the existence of God, but are patient of a theistic interpretation."[24] The examination of religious beliefs and practices from a psychoanalytic point of view was largely by the process of analogic reconstruction. For example, the doctrine of original sin "examined" by the psychoanalytic method leads to the following conclusion:

> If we allow for the difference of the terminology employed, we shall observe that a similarity, so great that it amounts almost to an identity, exists between the Christian doctrine of original sin, as the cause of evil in the world, and the psychoanalytic theory of inherited tendencies transmitted in a repressed form through the unconscious.[25]

He finds confirmation for the Christian belief in the divinity of Jesus through the psychoanalytic necessity that Jesus be divine and sinless (therefore free from negative and constricting unconscious repressions) in order to function therapeutically or redemptively for mankind. Sanders makes the complete circuit of refuting Freud's denials of religious belief in God to testing or interpreting his own beliefs by the insights and formulations of psychoanalysis and finds that the latter confirms the orthodox tenets of Christianity.

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24. Ibid., p. 155.
25. Ibid., p. 52.

Although, as we have already noted, Pfister was a "thorough-going Freudian" he made no such circuitous attempts to vindicate the truths of the Christian religion by psychoanalysing them. He has rather unfolded the psychic bed in which the seeds of religious truth are planted and watched the development of these ideas as they emerged from and through the concrete and particular psychic contents of individuals. He has traced their function in human life, evaluating their psychological service to human life as well as their psychic roots; but he has recognized the same limitations of psychological theory with reference to judgments concerning ultimate truth and value that we have noted in the Catholic and some Protestant views above.

> What depth psychology has since proved to be true of religious life now began to be dimly suspected, namely that religious truths are not accepted or rejected solely in accordance with their epistemological and logical content, and that the individual's attitude is determined by needs resulting from his experience, repressions and desires -- requirements whose roots lie deep in profane life; a truth not affected by the fact that psychology has no means for establishing the value of religious relations by examining their content.[25]

Further, Pfister did not cross-examine Christian doctrine from the psychoanalytic point of view. He rather used

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25. Pfister, Christianity and Fear. (Tr. W. H. Johnstone), New York: Macmillan, 1946, p. 491.

the psychoanalytic method and the theory it implied in the treatment of individuals, and then he showed how what was done was compatible with what he believed was of the essence of Christianity. We may note that once Pfister granted himself religiously the basic presupposition of belief in God and His revelation in Christ, he defined Christianity essentially in dynamic and functional terms. Theology was not the elaboration of the attributes of God; it was the development logically of the implications of the fact that "God is love." And the cruciality of those implications does not lie so much in their theoretical logic as in their interpersonal, relational adequacy. Hence, the synthesis for Pfister was not so much one of dovetailing two theories, as it was pointing both theories, psychoanalysis and Christianity, in the direction of the ultimately, as well as immediately, significant facts of human life -- man's actual and affectional relationships with himself, others and God. Thus, he dealt not with conflicting theories. After making the conventional distinction between science and religion, he focussed both on what he took from the Christian faith to be man's most imperative task -- his own wholeness and relatedness -- and discovered that the emphases of both psychoanalysis and Christianity on truth and love were mutually confirming and supportive.

The difficulty of distinguishing any general reaction toward psychoanalysis within the institutional framework of either Catholicism or Protestantism is evident. Although there appears more consistent rejection by Catholic spokesmen than by Protestant, there appears with both a discriminating attitude toward psychoanalysis, especially in the recognition of its contributions in therapy. We may go further, too, in observing that religious leaders have been drawn toward increasing interest in, study of, and involvement in psychoanalytic theory and therapy. This would appear to be due to the general increase in the educational qualifications and broadened training of the religious leaders, to the rise of psychology as an academic and scientific field and its being incorporated into other areas such as child development, education and industrial relations, and to the heightened concern over the psychic tensions and inner conflicts which have arisen in an accelerated, routinized and mechanized culture. In the midst of these trends the Christian minister has been forced to reconsider the ancient prerogative of mental healing of the church and has at least been encouraged to become more adequately trained in psychological insight and therapy.[27] Since psychoanalysis pioneered in modern

27. It is interesting to note here that the high incidence of healing services among the sects which were previously

times in dealing with the soul or inner life of men, its insights, although often taken with provisional circumspection, have been beacon lights into the inner life of men.

2. PSYCHOANALYSTS' VIEWS OF RELIGION

Nor has the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion been as one-sided as our viewing it from the point of view of the Christian minister might indicate. Although the psychoanalysts have never been accused of having a "love affair" with religion, it should be noted that they have shown a persistent concern with religious problems. Freud's philosophical positivism and moral neutrality set the stage for the analysis of religious experience within the framework of the neurotic pattern. This has been carried on most extensively by T. Reik in his studies of religious ritual and most intensively by T. Schroeder in his reduction of religious motives to malfunctioning sexuality.[28]

Some psychoanalysts, although following Freud's view of religious belief in God as a projected father-image,

27. (Con't.)
more generally revival services aiming at conversions is evidence of the same trend toward the church's increased concern with health.

28. See also, Supra, pp. 10-16 for a presentation of other psychoanalytic studies of religion.

recognizes its value. Although Moxon speaks of religion, in general, as a "retrograde phenomenon" he does recognize the value of religious devotion as a "safety valve," and even suggests that, "it is a satisfaction for the deep emotional needs that life often leaves unsatisfied."[29]

More positive evaluation has been offered by Kinkel who recognizes the value of Christianity in introducing the ethical postulates of brotherly love, forgiveness and individual self-sacrifice into the monotheistic principles of faith.[30] Reiser recognizes the universality of the religious consciousness and affirms G. Stanley Hall's contention, in Jesus Christ in the Light of Psychology, that despite the problem of historical evidences the spiritual vitality of Jesus' message would persist because he has revealed the best in human nature, and the real Christ lives in the best in all human nature.[31] Müller-Braunschweig, although believing the idea of God to be only an

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29. Cavendish Moxon, "Religion in the Light of Psychoanalysis." The Psychoanalytic Review, 8(1921), p. 97.
30. Johann Kinkel, "The Problem of the Psychological Foundations and of the Origin of Religion." Imago, 8(1922).
31. Oliver L. Reiser, "The Biological Origins of Religion." The Psychoanalytic Review, 19(1932), pp. 1-22.

idea and a symbol, affirms that it has value apart from its correspondence to reality, and that it is a part of normal life. He opposes Freud in denying that all religion is rooted in infantalism. Not only does the idea of God fulfill the desire for protection, but it also makes demands upon the person.[32]

In distinguishing psychoanalysis and psychosynthesis, Paul Bjierre sees the latter as that which establishes "psychic coherence" in terms of a philosophical, ethical and religious affirmation of the "healing power in nature."[33] He speaks of spontaneous recoveries as works of grace, the fact of their occurrence giving evidence of the fact that we are all parts of a universal process to which our subjective interests must accord. Further, he speaks of prayer as man's tension toward and response in communion with the goal of life, "the vital principle at the center of things."[34]

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32. Carl Muller-Braunschweig, "The Normal Groundwork of the Religious Attitudes." The Psychoanalytic Review, 19(1932), pp. 121-128.
33. Paul Bjierre, "From Psychoanalysis to Psychosynthesis." Psychoanalytic Review, 10(1923), p. 365.
34. Paul Bjierre, "The Way to Grace," Psychoanalytic Review, 14(1927), pp. 256, 265. Also, "The Way to and from Freud," Psychoanalytic Review, 12(1925), pp. 42ff.

Otto Rank who affirms the unconscious as a purely spiritualistic concept criticizes Freud's materialistic viewpoint in general, and emphasizes the importance of analytic psychology in the development of love and of ethics.[35] Kunkel's "We" psychology is also a suggestive point of view for the growth of religious personality which is sympathetic to the Christian faith.[36]

Jung's researches in religious phenomenon have certainly been sympathetic toward Christianity, although his view of God as identical with the psychic energy of the collective unconscious can hardly be theistic in the Christian sense. However, although he says of his own view of psychic health, "the place of deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man," he places prime importance on the religious point of view; "Religion is the fruit and the culmination of the completeness of life."[37] Fromm's research in religion from the point of view of and emphasizing humanistic ethics also takes into account the God-idea. He considers religious experience as sig-

35. Otto Rank, "Beyond Psycho-Analysis." The Psychoanalytic Review, 16(1929), pp. 1-11.
36. Fritz Kunkel, In Search of Maturity. New York: Charles Scribners, 1943.
37. Carl Jung, Psychology and Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. See also Hans Schaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology. (tr. R. F. C. Hull), New York: Bollingen Foundation, Inc., 1950.

nificant in the development of man's wholeness, but he is more impressed by the less productive pattern of life that follows from the more authoritarian view that has usually characterized theistic religion than he is impressed by the health-producing qualities of faith in God which he believes are possible.[38]

Not only has there been concern with the pervasive religious problems clinically, since man's religious orientation is so central to his totally adjusted life, but psychoanalytic excursions into primitive religions practices as well as into the mystical qualities of the transference relationship itself, suggest the scope of the theoretical studies in the area of religion carried on by psychoanalysts.

As we have noted in the preceding chapter, especially, and this is the foundational fact underlying the present study, Pfister's life work involved a working relationship between psychoanalysis and the Chrsitian religion. Proceeding upon the basis, not merely of sympathetic appreciation of one from the point of view of the other, but of active adherence to both, he developed a kind of

38. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself. New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1947, and Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

synthesis of the two disciplines which we may well evaluate both theoretically and practically.

B. PFISTER'S THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION

We find that Pfister's theoretical synthesis is to be seen chiefly in the areas of the nature of man, the source and goal of good, and God. In his view of man, Pfister follows the basic Christian conviction that he is a sinner. This is not in the sense of his being capable only of sin and being headed through crushing pessimism toward eternal damnation; but rather in the sense that "man as he is does not realize his true essence."[39]

> Man is not improved by being perpetually reminded of his fundamental sinfulness and by being told that his salvation depends on an act of grace on the part of God, possibly pre-cosmic and certainly beyond human influence. The belief in a breakthrough of grace results from human experience; the experience of the super-ego breaking through suddenly and without our individual participation; an act of grace arising out of the unconscious which the religiously disposed rightly attribute to God.[40]

According to the Christian view, man as a child of God has as his true essence or destiny the capacity for and activity of love. According to the psychoanalytic view of man, he likewise does not achieve his true essense

39. Pfister, Christianity and Fear, p. 549
40. Ibid., p. 550.

which is again that of being a trustful, confident person capable of giving and receiving love. For Christianity and psychoanalysis the chief deterrents in man's realization of his true selfhood are his inabilities to love. Although the Christian finds revelational evidence for his true nature in Christ's love and in such scriptural affirmations as "Inasmuch as God first loved us, we ought to love one another," whereas the psychoanalyst assumes its necessity from the facts of interpersonal human relations. The basic fact about man is the same from both points of view -- he is essentially capable of love and to develop this capacity is his chief aim.

Likewise, love is the keystone of Pfister's view of the ethical ideal. Just as Christ cleared away the rigid formalism, externality and abstract coldness of the Law as the definition and goal of human good, so psychoanalysis proceeds on the assumption that it is the dynamic interaction, the real life relationships of persons that are crucial rather than the systematic code of description of the good. Further, psychoanalysis warns against the compulsive character of legalism which attempts to coerce the anxious person to "do good" even if he does not want to. Psychoanalysis emphasizes the necessity for the libidinal wishes to correspond

with the requirements of the ethical situation, although it makes no effort to define the situation as ethical. Christianity, like psychoanalysis, and following Jesus' emphasis on inwardness and the importance of the character of motivation, is concerned with the individual's freedom to choose and desire the good. At the same time, it goes beyond psychoanalysis in the definition of the good which is characteristically in terms of the personality, teaching and works of Jesus. This however, is not a new legalism, but essentially the emphatic and complete personalization of man's goal of love. Although Christianity is distinct in its ethical ideal, its emphasis on purity of motive and freedom to love are certainly consistent with the psychoanalytic emphasis on the importance of the fulfilment of libidinal desire. Unfortunately the latter has too often been associated with conduct which is contrary to the Christian ethic and therefore frowned upon, when in reality it is amoral, and capable of ethical development.

We have already noted Pfister's resistance to Freud's 'metapsychology.'[41] Pfister affirmed religious experience as a primordial capacity of the individual and not merely the product of symptom formation of the neurotic personality. Even after the complexes behind neurotic religion

41. See above pp. 163-167, 207-218.

have been exposed, Pfister believed that there was then a real opportunity for establishing a sound and healthy faith in God on a firm basis. He held that there should be no fear that just because the neurotic forms had been brought to light loss of this basic faith should necessarily follow. Whereas Freud dismissed God as the subjective creation of man's desire, Pfister saw in such a process the fact that the religious interest, far from being merely an intellectual notion, is rooted in the deepest emotional life. Pfister, further, denied the psychological right that Freud assumed in making value judgments about ontological existence which Pfister believed lay beyond the province of psychology. Belief in God was just as consistent with psychological fact as the denial of God. The manner by which he is known, which is described by psychology, does not determine what his true character is.

Pfister, following Christian belief, drew the line in his synthesizing endeavors at the point of Freud's attitude toward God. For Pfister, God is not only the Creator and Ground of our existence, but He is more essentially the personal Being who is the source of love and with whom to have a trustful, loving relationship is man's ultimately greatest glory. We have noted above Aller's

insistence that if you adhered to part of Freud's system you would have to take it all; failing to agree with Freud's metaphysics, he felt the necessity of rejecting the whole psychology. Pfister, on the other hand, maintains the right to exercise discrimination in his appropriation of psychoanalysis and lays the burden on Freud for having made a speculative assertion which the psychological facts have no way of either supporting or contradicting.

It would be futile, from Pfister's point of view, to try to cross-reference Christian theology with psychoanalytic theory, although such attempts may have some possibility of fruitfulness and suggestibility within a limited sphere.[42] Pfister's theology was not based upon the systematic analysis of a tradition, or the classification of the history of Christian thought about the Christian revelation. His theology was the systematization of experiential religion, and, as noted, the explication and development essentially, of the thesis that God

42. See especially R. S. Lee, op. cit., B. G. Sanders, op.cit., W. B. Selbie, Christianity and the New Psychology. London: Centenary Press, 1939; and T. H. Hughes, The New Psychology and Religious Experience. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1933; and G. E. Barbour, Sin and the New Psychology. New York: Abingdon, 1930.

is love as evidenced by Christ. The crucial area for Christianity to relate itself to the scientific thought forms of the day is not in the realm of doctrine in the traditional sense, but rather in the realm of those experiential processes which furnish the prolegomenon of the theoretical interpretation. This is not to say that Christian doctrine per se and psychoanalytic theory are incompatible. It rather means that, insofar as the doctrine and the theory fulfill their real function of adequately reporting and interpreting concrete interpersonal experience, they will be found to be confirming and complementing each other. To the extent that they are remote from experience, they are difficult to coordinate.

Therefore, although Pfister did not avoid the doctrinal problem, the more productive fields of cooperation appear in the practical sphere.

6. THE PRACTICAL SYNTHESIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION

One of Pfister's earliest and persistent concerns was in the application of psychoanalytic insight and methods to education. He observed that correct psychoanalysis and good education were in harmony in their aim of developing the independence of the pupil who is capable

of exercising his right to love, to achieve, to be recognized and to be free. Although Pfister clearly recognized that psychoanalytic education must be subordinated to general education,[43] it had an important, if negative, task to perform.

> We understand by psychoanalytic education that pedagogy which on the one hand traces back to their meaning and origin the harmful inhibitions brought about by unconscious mental forces, undertaking to overcome the discovered unconscious forces by rendering them accessible to the will of the moral personality, and which on the other hand, in its positive work takes cognizance of the insight gained by psychoanalysis.[44]

Ethics and the religious orientation of the pupil must decide what the life direction shall be upon the coming to power of the will of the moral personality by its gaining control over its unconscious life.

The positive instruction which psychoanalysis affords is not in moral and religious doctrines, nor in the factual content of man's historical and intellectual experience, but rather in that teaching which bears on the personal self, which indicates new possibilities of life and which creates "the aptitude of realizing what has been recognized as good and desirable."[45] Pfister recognizes, there-

43. Pfister, Psychoanalisys in the Service of Education. (Authorized Translation) London: Henry Kimpton, 1922, p. 143.
44. Ibid., p. 14.
45. Ibid., p. 170.

fore, that psychoanalysis and education have in common the goal of liberation, that in this the role of psychoanalysis is essentially in helping the individual become freed of unconscious repressions; but in the person's consequent assumption of responsible control and self-direction, although psychoanalysis gives way to ethical considerations, it fulfills also a positive function in the increase of moral strength that is released as a result of its reducing the inhibiting unconscious forces.

In the more specific field of religious education, Pfister has clearly outlined the marks of good religious education from the point of view of mental hygiene by observing dangerous and/or harmful processes and effects from the psychoanalytic point of view.[46] These may be summarized as follows: 1) Religious education must avoid too drastic denial of the instinctual impulses without a corresponding effort to present compensatory values. Since the capacity for sublimation varies with different people, the restrictive instruction which helps one in gaining moral insight and perspective may cause another to react in immorality. 2) Those elements of fear and

46. See especially Proceedings of the First International Congress on Mental Hygiene. (F. E. Williams, ed.) Vol. II New York: The International Committee of Mental Hygiene, 1932; Pfister's report, p. 545.

threat also are to be avoided in order to prevent neurotically predisposed people from outbreaks of anxiety and compulsive behavior. For the sake of mental hygiene religious fears, if not readily removed, must be balanced by the moral gain of productive effort which is not rigidly and compulsively produced as a result of fear, but which allows for the draining off of psychic energy which is trapped by the fear. 3) That religious devotion which enforces as obligatory the belief in irrational dogmas and practices and which counters disbelief and doubts with threats of supernatural punishment is to be rejected. 4) Any form of dogmatism that shackles freedom of thought and attempts at honesty is injurious to optimum mental health. 5) Any severity which hinders the developing of love within the boundaries of moral definitions is to be avoided not only for its dangers to mental health but also the sternness in the interpersonal world which makes it more difficult for the individual to experience his relationship with God on the basis of trust and love rather than fear and hatred. 6) That form of religious education which directs the attention excessively to the "next world" or the "world beyond" at the expense of withdrawal of moral energy from the concrete tasks of the present, which restricts the interest in man-to-man rela-

lationships and discredits social activities and duties and which consequently produces the strengthening of autistic thinking is to be avoided. Summarily, Pfister states the basic principles of healthy education:

> To avoid the dangers which arise from the side of religion, there is needed a healthy education -- both general and religious -- which will make the elementary instincts ready to be used or left unused, which will strengthen the capacity for sublimation by developing the enjoyment of ideal pursuits, which prevents the formation of fear and compulsive neuroses by animating the power of love on the moral and religious level, and which makes the other-world notions inseparable from religion fruitful by applying them to the fulfillment of present-world tasks.[47]

In this program Pfister sees psychoanalysis as an important and urgently needed instrument for the cooperative fulfillment of the educational task of religious and secular education insofar as they are concerned with the whole development of persons.

Pfister's application of psychoanalysis to ethics has led to fruitful results in two areas. In the first, his theory of ethogenesis, which finds the source and ground of ethical development in human experience, is valuable in its movement toward the rational and experiential unity of the subjective and objective aspects of morality. Further, he sees in the goal of psychoanalytic

47. Ibid., p. 546.

therapy as the freeing of the will for decisive, independent and responsible activity, a real contribution to the ethical sphere. Without the freedom which psychoanalysis aims toward not only is moral activity impossible, but the individual can hardly assess with any accuracy and honesty the values and disvalues of his participation in life. Pfister recognizes that psychoanalysis does not function at the point of the definition of the content of the ethical ideal. This is the realm more particularly of ethical theory and religion. However, insofar as psychoanalysis has implied, if not explicity formulated, goals of therapy or standards of optimum personality functioning, it suggests certain clarifications of the ethical ideal to take into account the principles or patterns of healthy living.

Although Pfister could not agree with Freud that the education of a person to be truthful to himself would be a permanent protection against immorality, he did agree that this capacity to be honest was an important element in the moral life and did prevent much immorality. Further, Pfister considered Freud's promulgation of the theory of sublimation to be one of the greatest discoveries made for ethics.[48]

48. Pfister, Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, p. 198

In the application of psychoanalysis to the program of the Christian Church in evangelism and missionary enterprise, Pfister has observed that psychoanalysis and Christianity are confederates.

> Analysis dispels false values as the sun does the mist, while it establishes true values on a firm basis. And Christianity and psychoanalysis cultivate nothing else than truth and love; hence both are faithful confederates.[49]

Having observed the superficiality of methods which led merely to conscious acquiescence, he insisted on the whole man, both conscious and unconscious, being involved in the assumption of the new life. A person who is "talked into" a profession of faith may very easily be withholding or containing by powerful repressions subliminal impulses which will prevent him from the fullest realization of the Christian life and his own best personal development. Although Pfister recognizes the value of suggestion and positive example in upholding Christian behavior, particularly in cases in which life adjustment is not seriously distorted, too often these do not suffice in reaching the subliminal roots of the difficulty.

> Attempts at conversion by instruction, warnings, etc., invariably fail in the case of people who are drawn back into the mire of the invisible chains of subconscious compulsion. If a room is damp because it is over an open conduit, no amount of heat-

49. Ibid., p. 327.

> ing or of chemical absorbents will make it dry until the water supply has been discovered and removed. Our pedagogic and missionary practice is wasting its energy as long as it does not perceive that treatment of the conscious can never suffice while the demons of the deeps are exercising their tyrannical domination.[50]

Here, as with psychoanalysis and education, the role of psychoanalysis is essentially the negative task of liberating the will from unconscious repressions. The missionary and evangelistic endeavors of the church, on the other hand, desire "to fill the soul with the love and life-force of Jesus."[51] "The missionary should complete the negative work of analysis by the positive promulgation of salvation by the Gospel."[52]

More specifically, Pfister has noted that the application of psychoanalysis to missionary work falls into three phases. 1) In preparation, psychoanalysis may help the non-Christian in his desire for the Christian ideal by eliciting his desire for truth and love -- and by finding these desires actualized in Jesus. 2) In the elimination of obsessive neurotic and hysterical elements in natural or magical religions phenomena which run counter to healthy ethics, psychoanalysis frees the individual for a healthy faith. 3) In the presentation of the Gospel itself we see the activity of a) regression --

50. Ibid., p. 320, 321.
51. Ibid., p. 327.
52. Ibid., p. 329.

"Except ye become as a little child ye shall in no wise enter the Kingdom of Heaven," and b) transference -- "Have I been so long with you and you have not seen the Father?" and c) in the reconciliation of the new contents of Christian faith with the old. In connection with the employment of transference, Pfister has observed that the missionary is the way to the Way, and the capacity he has for attracting love to himself -- not for its indulgence but for redirection to Christ, is more important in the work of conversion than is the most skillful and persuasive application of Christian doctrine. Finally, in the reconciliation of the new contents of Christian faith with the old, Pfister has applied psychoanalysis to fulfilling the psychic task which is necessitated by the principle that "spiritual continuity demands that every new content which is to become the empirical possession and vital motive for a psyche, should previously be brought into harmony with the former phase."[53] Thus we see that Pfister's application of psychoanalysis to the practical work of evangelization stems consistently from his principles of psychoanalytic application to education in general, but that he has suggested how psychoanalysis can help

53. Ibid., p. 341.

to understand the pattern of, and facilitate the wholesome acceptance of the religion of Jesus which he recognizes as representing, dynamically considered, the ideal direction of life.

At this point we may note that Pfister's synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion is restricted narrowly to Christianity, and specifically to the religion of Jesus and not to its institutional expressions which Pfister observes are often still steeped in paganism. Further, he excludes those natural and magical religions which he considers arise from anxiety which is assuaged by magical and symbolic acts. Magic and obsessional neurotic rituals are treated as psychically identical; and the magic of primitive peoples is, for him, a collective obsessional neurosis.[54] The Judaic religion of law and ceremony are similarly excluded as forms of obsessional neuroses; and the Buddhist, whose faith he mentions specifically among the living religions of the world, would be incapable of applying psychoanalysis for "it would lay bare the pathological nature of his own religion."[55]

We have considered above the problem of the discriminative selection of parts of psychoanalytic theory from

54. Ibid., pp. 331-332.
55. Ibid, pp. 327, 328.

the whole system. It appears that the synthesis which Pfister arrived at, not only deals with psychoanalysis selectively, but even more, relates it to a narrow, although liberal, field of Christian doctrine. That is, Pfister has not psychoanalysed confessional Christianity or subjected the creeds of Christendom to psychological scrutiny. He has rather taken Christianity in experiential terms as beginning with and essentially being the relationship between the individual and God as revealed in Christ, and then the living out of the implications of that relationship in the actual life of love toward one's self, others and God.

Pfister's practical synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion within the psychoanalytic milieu is not so apparent as it is within that of the church. So closely did he follow the fundamental Freudian position, with the exception of Freud's attitude toward God, that he made no radical departure or creative contributions to psychoanalytic theory as relating to and drawing into its scope religious experience. This is not to deny the fact that, although basically loyal to Freud, he did question the universality of the Oedipal complex; he expanded Freud's narrower interpretation of sexuality so that it could be the psychic base for Christian love; he made greater room

for the ethical implications of neuroses and their treatment; his view of the unconscious made it the psychic seat of constructive inspiration as well as of demonic deterrents to psychic freedom; he was interested in the preventive aspects of applied psychoanalysis in education as well as in its remedial program for the restoration of mental health.

Nor is this to deny the fact that Pfister's psychoanalytic research into religious phenomena was recognized as significant by other psychoanalysts. For example, Reik, in commenting upon Pfister's studies such as "Zur Psychologie des Hysterischen Madonnenkultus," "Hysterie und Mystik bei Margaretha Ebner," and "Die Frommigkeit des Grafen Ludwig von Zinzendorf," has said, "Pfister's first analytic researches in the religious emotional life of selected personalities laid special stress on the pathology of the cases and rendered it more intelligible in the light of sexual impulses and the mechanisms of the unconscious psychic life."[56] However, here, as far as his recognized work in the field of psychoanalysis is concerned, we find him presenting valuable data, but it is within the hypothetical framework of the pathological

56. Theodor Reik, "The Science of Religion." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2(1921), p. 85. This is also affirmed by Robert P. Casey in "The

sources of religious phenomena, which is not a unique application of psychoanalysis.

The general silence of psychoanalysts toward Pfister's work appears also to be a recognition of the fact that they considered his major work to be in terms of psychoanalytic contributions to religion rather than to the development of the psychoanalytic theory itself. The few reviews of his earlier works by psychoanalysts indicate their assessment in this vein, that Pfister was concerned with the ethical implications and applications of the theory rather than with the theory and method per se.[57]

Schaer, in his evaluation of Pfister's work, although calling attention to the latter's "valuable pioneer work which merits the greatest respect," especially in the area of the pathological phenomena of religious life,

56. (Con't.)
Psychoanalytic Study of Religion." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 33(1938), p. 440, "Oscar Pfister was a contemporary of Jung's who was attracted to Freud's views and combined their enthusiastic popularization with the work of a busy pastor in Zurich....His principle service, however, was a prolonged study of religious persons who came to him for help and to whose problems he applied psychoanalytic insight and modified analytic treatment. His works, therefore on religious education, and on the place of religion among the causes and cures of religious people's difficulties, possess a peculiar value."

57. See above, pp. 71-73.

detects Pfister's failure to see psychoanalysis as a "new, scientific and broadly human form of questioning" and therefore Pfister does not "tackle the question whether the motive principle of all scientific psychology -- the urge to deeper self-knowledge -- may not itself have a religious significance." This criticism appears justified in that Pfister relied on the assumption of the importance of increasing self-awareness for religious growth, but did not elaborate upon it or incorporate it into his theological point of view.[58]

Pfister did not limit himself merely to the tracing of the psychic roots of pathological religious behavior. He insisted on the utility of psychoanalysis in the hands of the educator, as well as the clinical pathologist, in maintaining those environing conditions or institutional safeguards for the deepest and fullest realization of personal wholeness. This, however, came in the area of his work as a pastor, and his contribution is recognized as to the pastoral ministry of the church rather than to the field of psychoanalysis. Reik, again, observes in this connection,

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58. Hans Schaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology. (tr. R. F. C. Hull), New York: Bollingen Foundation, Inc., 1950, pp. 11-13.

> Pfister has devoted himself to the application of psychoanalysis to ministerial work and has thereby achieved very considerable results...No doubt such an application represents a compromise between ministerial and analytic endeavors in which it remains undecided what part is being played by the priest and what by the analyst.[59]

Pfister's utilization of psychoanalysis in this area was done without compromising the essential features of his doctrinal system. It was not a question of Christian doctrine vs. psychoanalytic theory. Within the framework of Christian thought, the psychoanalytic interpretation of the predicament and possibilities of man provided valuable evidence. Similarly, in the Christian task of retaining and restoring personal integrity and freedom for participation in the search for truth and the expression of love, psychoanalysis gave valuable aid.

D. SUMMARY

We have endeavored to examine this interrelationship of psychoanalysis and religion in the thought and practice of Pfister in order to discover the theoretical

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59. Ibid., p. 92. Reik goes on to say, "Activity of this kind is undeniably productive and commendable, but in my opinion the religious element so far as it is apart from analysis tends to mingle with the therapeutic interest of the analysis which refuses now and always to put itself at the service of a definite moral or religious point of view. According to my personal opinion...psychoanalysis is destined at some future date to take the place to a considerable extent of ministerial activity."

adequacy and practical relevance of psychoanalysis in the hands of the Christian minister. The psychoanalytic studies of religion, the psychologies of religion and pastoral psychologies have been investigated in order to form a frame of reference within which Pfister's contribution to each could be assessed and his synthesis of psychoanalysis and Christianity be evaluated. His biographical data has been set forth in order to bring to light any significant events which occurred or situations that existed which influenced the particular course which his life and professional interest took in religion and psychology. His relationship to the psychoanalytic movement was examined in order to discover his means of acquiring psychoanalytic training and also to see his contributions to the movement. His writings, consisting of twenty-seven books and fifty-nine articles were investigated in order to get a clearer perspective of his view of psychoanalysis, its theory and applications, his understanding of religion, to compare his psychoanalytic interpretations with those of Freud's, and to determine the character and extent of his application of psychoanalysis to religion. Having set forth his view of religion and having considered the difficulties that beset the sympathetic psychoanalytic study of religion because of the naturalistic views of Freud, we considered the extent

to which psychoanalysis as a theory of personality, as a description of the dynamic interplay of psychic forces and as a method of therapy could possess value to the Christian pastoral ministry. Finally, Pfister's applications of psychoanalysis to Christianity have been evaluated in terms of its adequacy as a psychology of religion and as a pastoral psychology.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions represent an evaluation of Pfister's contribution to the problem of the synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion:

1. Pfister has distinguished the scope and aims of psychology and theology in their study of religious experience. The former deals descriptively with the psychic source of the experience while the latter deals normatively with the Object of the experience - God. Psychology and theology are correlative sciences. Each has its legitimate scope for free inquiry, but both come together in mutuality in depicting the man-ward and the God-ward aspects of religious experience. As the ideas of God condition the kind of religious experience individuals have, so also does the psychic pre-condition of the believer influence the nature of his experience as well as his idea of the divine.

2. The continuum between the psychic source and the Object is love. In the maintenance of this bond is the basic health and strength of the religious personality. Pfister did not consider anxiety ontologically. It was a neurotic symptom. The primordial relationship of God and man is, as far as he has analysed it, reciprocal love. Any distortion of this fundamental relationship jeopardizes the image of the Creator in his creature.

3. To accomplish the task of maintaining this health-producing relationship psychoanalysis and Christianity have the complementary task of freeing and enabling psyche to love and of indicating the ideal character of lovableness of the Object. Therefore psychoanalytic therapy and Christian pastoral work have essentially correlative roles. Although the process is growth in freedom, freedom which Pfister affirmed was not just a negative absence of restraint, but the positive possibility and potentiality of the individual to participate significantly in existence.

4. Pfister justified psychoanalytically the importance of the development of Christian love as a prevention of neurotic symptoms on the one hand, and as a means to the optimum fulfilment of selfhood on the other. He affirms that Christian love provides man with the three significant objects for love, namely, self, others and

God, and that the life and teachings of Jesus indicate fully the qualitative character of that love.

5. Pfister has indicated how abnormal religious experience is produced by blocked eroticism or libidinal fixation. His studies of historical religious figures as well as of his own parishioners brought to light that in cases of excessive piety, compulsive ritualism, and such forms as glossalalia, there was repressed eroticism which had been inadequately or improperly sublimated.

6. Within the framework of Freudian psychoanalysis Pfister has modified the concepts of instinct, sexuality, the unconscious, and neurosis to take into larger consideration the concrete individual in his actual interpersonal relationships, and thus permit more scope for religious experience.

7. Pfister rejected Freud's scientific positivism and religious atheism, thus making possible the application of psychoanalysis to religious experience without prematurely condemning it as pathological.

8. Because Pfister drew the line so sharply and emphatically to exclude Freud's denial of the ontological reality of God (as well he should in order to preserve the basic structure of Christianity), he failed to deal

with the psychological dynamism which function in man's affirmation of God. His (Pfister's) treatment of love presupposes the underlying trust which has eluded Pfister's psychological treatment. For example, he makes no distinction between neurotic anxiety and ontological anxiety, nor does he elaborate on the psychological character of the relationship of God and man, which he affirms is love, and which is fundamental to religious faith.

9. Pfister has made valuable applications of psychoanalysis to the psychology of art, education, ethics and philosophy. His studies of expressionism in art prefaced Rorschach's theory of the apperceptive use of the ink-blot tests. His theory of "pedanalysis" as the educative use of psychoanalysis brought the new psychology into the sphere of preventive mental hygiene. Both ethics and philosophy were brought to the bar of empiricism and made to render up their judgments cleansed of neurotic subjectivities.

10. The demand for scientific adequacy and Christian compassion for human need were the motives in Pfister's synthesis of psychoanalysis and Christianity. He was not content that man's most powerful affirmations should fail to find realistic expressions in patterns of understanding and of helpfulness to human beings in their misery,

deprivations and loneliness. Romantic and sentimental views of the pastoral office were intolerable in the face of the stark human realities to a mind demanding scientific precision and Christian relevance.

11. The compatibility of Christianity and psychoanalysis in the hands of the Protestant pastor is seen in 1) the mutual enrichment of the view of the nature of man, 2) in the utilization of appropriate mental dynamisms to promote the development of optimum personal growth, and 3) the incorporation of psychoanalytic insights in the understanding of personality disorders and in the improvement of pastoral counseling.

12. The religious point of view which Pfister found compatible with psychoanalysis was a non-dogmatic and non-creedal liberal Chrsitianity, the main emphasis in which is upon the development and application of love for God and love for human beings as most significantly exemplified in the historic life of Jesus. Pfister has dealt discriminatively and additively with both psychoanalysis and Christianity.

13. Pfister's experience and writing give ample evidence of the productivity and applicability (from the pastoral point of view) of psychoanalysis as an instrument for the understanding and interpretation of psychic

phenomena as well as for therapeutic work with individuals. The two theories were reconcilable within the framework of his Christian faith; the cooperating therapies were demanded by his understanding of Christian love.

14. In Pfister's critique of religious rituals and institutions, his criterion appears to be that of individual mental health rather than a larger conception of the function of religion in human life.

15. Pfister's work is recognized historically significant in that he pioneered in the applications of psychoanalysis to pastoral care; however, inasmuch as he followed Freud closely his contribution to the creative development of psychoanalytic theory is limited; and his major psychological insights relevant to pastoral psychology have become, by this time, a part of the common store of alert and informed pastoral counselors.

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OSCAR PFISTER'S SYNTHESIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION

Abstract of a Dissertation

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The purpose of this investigation has been to explore the range of the theoretical and practical compatibility of psychoanalysis and religion in the light of the experience and writings of Oscar Pfister, a Swiss scholar, minister of the Reformed Church and psychoanalyst. Although having published twenty-seven books and fifty-nine articles in the field, (these being the primary data for this study), he has been little known in America. The major psychoanalytic writings, the psychoanalytic studies in religion, the writings in the psychology of religion and in pastoral psychology have been examined in order to provide a frame of reference against which Pfister's contribution to each can be more adequately assessed. From these areas of inquiry also arise the norms by which Pfister's synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion is evaluated.

While training for the ministry and during his early pastorate, Pfister was challenged by the sterility of ecclesiastical conventions in dealing with concrete human problems to search in psychology for a means of rendering therapeutic service which would be theoretically sound in its interpretation of personality and also consonant with the Christian faith. Finding the current Continental schools of psychology

either too abstract and speculative or their experimentalism too far removed from the total person, he turned to psychoanalysis in 1909, accepted the basic Freudian theory and became one of its earliest and most active advocates in Switzerland.

In the examination of Pfister's writings, we find that although some of the earlier works dealt with the problems of the relationship between theology and psychology and with accounts of the utilization of psychoanalysis in pastoral care, the bulk of it represented the results of his research in the psychoanalytic interpretation of abnormal religious phenomena, and the most significant of it is represented in his Psychoanalytic Method, (1913), being a general introduction to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis with suggestions for its application. The middle period of his writing is characterized by a rigorous development of his application of psychoanalysis to education as seen especially in Some Applications of Psychoanalysis, (1923). His writing in the psychoanalytic understanding of the behavior of religious personalities continued in later years with more emphasis on the therapeutic relevance of psychoanalysis for Christian pastoral care. His most significant recent work, Christianity and Fear, (1944; English translation, 1948) represents the

culmination of his psychoanalytic studies of religion in which the historical movements in Christianity are analysed in the light of their alleviating or increasing the problem of anxiety and in which proposals for a hygiene of religion are given emphasizing the development of "love through faith."

In Pfister's espousal of psychoanalysis, he accepted the therapeutic method as productive of results in terms of mental health and also in terms of being an experimental and scientific basis for the theory of personality built upon it. He observed that psychoanalysis provided a connecting link between physiological psychology and social psychology, and thus facilitated an understanding of the whole person. Pfister's answers to the contemporary criticisms of psychoanalysis affirmed the importance of unconscious motivation, the strength of libidinal energies (although Pfister rooted these in the psychic structure, not in physiology), the validity of the non-judgmental, free-association method of therapy as leading to the development of free moral persons, and the value of the theoretical interpretations of personality even though derived from pathological cases. His major defence of psychoanalysis, however, was in its positive application to art, education,

ethics, philosophy and religion. He emphasized the therapeutic value of expressionism in art (reading his paper on the subject before the Swiss Psychoanalytic Association two years before Rorschach presented his paper on the apperceptive use of ink-blots), developed the theory and practice of "pedanalysis" as a preventive psychoanalysis applicable to educational aims, set forth the theory of "ethogenesis" depicting the empirical-rational coneinuum in ethics, indicated the psychoanalytic contribution to philosophy in making sharper the subjective-objective distinctions in thought, established sympathetically psychoanalytic interpretations of religious abnormalities based upon malfunctioning eroticism, and applied psychoanalytic therapy for the development of free, productive religious personalities.

Although Pfister followed Freud, in general, in psychoanalytic theory and practice, several differences are noted. Pfister's view of the unconscious emphasizes its constructive creativity as well as its immoral dynamic functions. Pfister's theory of instincts is less abstract than Freud's and evolves in a basic psychic energy which is particularized in concrete interpersonal relationships. Likewise, sexuality is not as much a psycho-biological concept as it is

psycho-social with Pfister. Pfister's theory of neurosis is in terms of the blocking of the love function causing failure in affectional relationships, whereas Freud's view centers around the interior conflict of the id, ego and super-ego. Pfister does not maintain the universality of the Oedipus complex, although he recognizes it as basic in many neuroses. Pfister's major difference with Freud is the former's staunch rejection of scientific positivism as a necessary implication of psychoanalysis. Pfister holds that the metaphysical judgment goes beyond the scope of psychological theory, and that what is fundamental to a psychoanalytic view of personality, as he conceives it, is not necessarily incompatible with religious faith.

In his view of religious experience, Pfister holds the door of the unconscious open as the meeting "place" of the human and the divine, (cf. William James). He recognizes that the unconscious furnishes many of the forms that the expression of religious experience takes as well as being the ground upon which the religious struggle can take place. He identifies and distinguishes neurotic religion, religion which is productive of mental conflict, and religion as a resource and method of mental

hygiene. In general, Pfister analyses and criticises Freud's view of religion as abstract, based on pathological data, as a fallacious generalization from his theory of individual neurosis, as a tenuous appeal to vague "racial memories" of the patterns of conduct of primitive man, and as a failure to deal with the free, creative, healthy aspects of normal religious experience.

The motivation for Pfister's synthesis of psychoanalysis and religion on the practical level is derived from the therapeutic obligation of the Christian minister. Pfister found that the aims of psychoanalytic therapy and Christian salvation were compatible in the sense that both emphasize the importance of freedom and capacity to love. Whereas psychoanalysis has the negative task of removing obstacles that inhibit the establishing of love relationships, Christianity performs the positive task of presenting the ethically valuable objects of that love. From the point of view of the nature of man, the psychoanalytic use of the consciousness-unconsciousness concept enforces the Christian view of man as an amphibious creature involved in bi-polar situations. Further, the libido, super-ego and ego have counterparts in Christian thought in faith-love, conscience

and will respectively. The functional aspects of the mental mechanisms: repression, identification, anxiety formations, substitution, sublimation, symbolization, rationalization and regression, are evaluated with reference to their function or dysfunction in the development of mature religious personalities. Thus, the area of fruitful cooperation between the disciplines of psychoanalysis and religion, from the point of view of the Christian pastor, is chiefly through 1) the evidences of psychoanalysis confirming the Christian view of the nature of man, 2) the understanding and appropriate use of the mental mechanisms in the growth of persons, and 3) the incorporation of psychoanalytic insights in facilitating pastoral counseling.

The conclusions reached in this study, representing an evaluation of Pfister's contribution to the problem of synthesizing psychoanalysis and religion are:

1. Pfister has distinguished the scope and aims of psychology and theology in their study of religious experience. The former deals descriptively with the psychic source of the experience while the latter deals normatively with the Object of the experience - God.

2. The continuum between the psychic source and

the Object is love. In the maintenance of this bond is the basic health and strength of the religious personality.

3. To accomplish the task of maintaining this health-producing relationship psychoanalysis and Christianity have the complementary tasks of freeing and enabling the psyche to love and of indicating the ideal character or lovableness of the Object. Therefore psychoanalytic therapy and Christian pastoral work have essentially correlative roles.

4. Pfister justifies psychoanalytically the importance of the development of Christian love as a prevention of neurotic symptoms on the one hand, and as a means to the optimum fulfilment of selfhood, on the other.

5. Pfister has indicated how abnormal religious experience is produced by blocked eroticism or libidinal fixation.

6. Within the framework of Freudian psychoanalysis, Pfister has modified the concepts of instinct, sexuality, the unconscious, and neurosis to take into larger consideration the concrete individual in his actual interpersonal relationships, and thus permit more scope for religious experience.

7. Pfister rejected Freud's scientific positivism

and religious atheism, thus making possible the application of psychoanalysis to religious experience without prematurely condemning it as pathological.

8. Because Pfister drew the line sharply and firmly to exclude Freud's denial of the ontological reality of God (as well he should in order to preserve the basic structure of Christianity) he failed to deal with psychological dynamisms which function in man's affirmation of God.

9. Pfister has made valuable applications of psychoanalysis to art, education, ethics and philosophy, which have indicated means of therapy through expressionism, the prevention of neuroses through education, the relevance of ideal conceptions in ethics, and the means of increasing honest clarity in philosophy.

10. The demand for scientific adequacy and Christian compassion for human need were the motives in Pfister's synthesis of psychoanalysis and Christianity.

11. The compatibility of Christianity and psychoanalysis in the hands of the Protestant pastor is seen in 1) the mutual enrichment of the view of the nature of man, 2) in the utilization of appropriate mental dynamisms to promote the development of optimum personal growth, and 3) the incorporation of psycho-

analytic insights in the understanding of personality disorders and in the improvement of pastoral counseling.

12. The religious point of view which Pfister found compatible with psychoanalysis was a non-dogmatic and non-creedal liberal Christianity, the main emphasis of which is upon the development and application of love for God and love for human beings as most significantly exemplified in the historic life of Jesus.

13. Pfister's experience and writing give ample evidence of the productivity and applicability (from the pastoral point of view) of psychoanalysis as an instrument for the understanding and interpretation of psychic phenomena as well as for therapeutic work with individuals. The two theories were reconcilable within the framework of his Christian faith; the cooperating therapies were demanded by his Christian love.

14. In Pfister's critique of religious rituals and institutions, his criterion appears to be that of individual mental health rather than a larger conception of the function of religion in human life.

15. Pfister's work is recognized historically as significant in that he pioneered in the applications of psychoa nalysis to pastoral care; ho wever, inasmuch as he followed F reud closely his contributions to the creative development of psychoanalytic theory are limited; and his major psychological insights relevant to pastoral psychology have become, by this time, a a part of the common store of alert and informed pastoral counselors.

VITA

John Willis Johannaber was born in Rockford, Iowa on March 17,1923 to William F. and Etha Clem Johannaber. His elementary education, begun in Iowa, continued in Casper, Wyoming; Trenton, Missouri; and Omaha, Nebraska. After graduating from North High School in Omaha in 1940, he attended Harvard College (1940-1942) and received the A.B. degree from Omaha University,1943. The S.T.B. degree, magna cum laude, was received from Boston University School of Theology in 1947. Awarded the Roswell R. Robinson Fellowship, he continued graduate study in Boston University, 1947-1950.

Having joined the Nebraska Conference of the Methodist Church, he served the Lyons-Rosalie churches in Nebraska, 1945-1946, the Westport Point Methodist Church and Central Village Friends' Meeting in Massachusetts, 1947-1950. From 1950-1952 he was Associate Professor of Religion and Director of Religious Life at Morningside College, Sioux City, Iowa. He is now Professor of Bible at National College for Christian Workers in Kansas City. He is a member of the North Iowa Conference of the Methodist Church.

In 1947 he married Miss R. Elizabeth McCaw of Des-Moines, Iowa. The family, also including Nancy Elizabeth, born in 1948, and Earl Arthur, born in 1951, resides at 1535 Denver St. Kansas City, Missouri.