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EXAMINING THE EVOLUTION OF RACIAL PROFILING IN INDIVIDUALIZED POLICE PRACTICE

by

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*To my uncle: Dr. Alan Gropman Ph.D., Colonel USAF (Ret.). Your constant encouragement, guidance, and input were invaluable.

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EXAMINING THE EVOLUTION OF RACIAL PROFILING

IN INDIVIDUALIZED POLICE PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this study was to examine the controversial issue of racial profiling. This study examined the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of 112 police officers from four separate police departments. The study began with the premise that racial profiling was a widespread issue in law enforcement. It looked to identify attributes, similarities, and differences of contrasting police agencies that would explain why some groups engage in racial profiling and others do not. The research was also undertaken to determine what might mitigate racial profiling practices. This study examined the issue from three different positions.

The first step was to determine whether police officers believed that racial profiling was problematic in their respective departments. The cohort overwhelmingly reported that they did not believe racial profiling was a serious problem. The second goal of the study was to determine if a department's organizational culture (attitudes, values, and behaviors) contributed to racial

profiling attitudes and practices. This study found, through an examination of organizational commitment, that organizational culture did affect racial profiling practices. Police departments with more committed officers showed lower search disparity rates between minority and majority motorists. Finally, racial profiling attitudes and practices were examined controlling for training. Police departments where a majority of officers received racial profiling training showed lower search rate disparities between majority and minority motorists. They also showed higher levels of commitment to the organization.

A statistical analysis found that training and Organizational Commitment were shown to have a statistically significant effect on racial profiling practices. Attitudes, however, appeared to be unaffected. Quantity of training appeared to be the critical factor; quality of training was not examined as a part of this research. Police departments that committed to department-wide training showed lower search rate disparities between minority and majority motorists. Further research is needed to identify the connection between training, organizational culture, and officers' individualized behavior.

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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

Targeting people because of their race or ethnicity is a widespread and highly controversial problem in law enforcement. Commonly known as 'Racial Profiling', it is a result of a number of issues that are deeply entrenched not only in law enforcement, but in the fabric of our social values. According to a recent Gallup Poll, 40% of African-Americans believe that they have been profiled. (Gallup, 1999) In fact, the problem is so apparent that the majority of White Americans surveyed in this same poll thought that the practice was widespread in law enforcement. The mere existence of this phenomenon, however, is highly disputed among law enforcement officers. This inquiry examines the antecedents of racial profiling. This examination was done through library research, field observations, and interviews with police officers. Insight into the causes, correlates, and materiality of racial profiling are developed as a result.

It is unquestionable that racial profiling exists in law enforcement. The empirical evidence, as well as my fourteen years of first-hand observation as a police officer confirms this. The extent and causes, however, are complex and also quite vexing. Racial profiling is a consequence of a selection process that recruits a homogeneous group of individuals. The only requirements to become a police officer in many states, furthermore, are that the applicant has attained the age of eighteen, is a United States citizen, and has a driver's license. Inadequate training and supervision only exacerbate this faulty selection process. (Walker, 1999)

Law enforcement supervision adheres to the "military etiquette" (Geller, 1991) style of supervision that emphasizes compliance over integrity. Many police supervisors, moreover, receive little or no training. (Thibault, 1995). In fact, effective police training at all levels is often limited and ineffective. Law enforcement training is limited in scope, duration, and methodology. Yet, training is the most important aspect of an officer's career development. Racial profiling is also a fundamental consequence of the ubiquitous influence of the police subculture.

Police officers have close interpersonal relationships that spawn this distinctive organizational culture. The internal sanctions and pressure to conform to a body of "esoteric knowledge" (Thibault, 1995, p. 25) of established and distinctive group norms greatly influences individualized behaviors. This, more than any other variable appears to be a determining factor in the proliferation of racial profiling. To compound these internal pressures, and to some extent because of these internal pressures, police officers have extreme rates of a number of afflictions and mental pathologies. The moral reasoning, decision-making, and individuality of every officer are also affected. (p. 26).

These variables not only contribute to racial profiling, they also contribute to the divergence in attitudes among sworn personnel and the citizens that they protect. This research will examine the magnitude of racial profiling, attempt to identify the antecedents that propagate this phenomenon, and propose remedies

to mitigate these vastly different perspectives. That is, how widespread of a problem is racial profiling? What factors contribute to racial profiling? What steps can be taken to mitigate racial profiling?

1.1 NATURE AND SCOPE OF PROBLEM

Members of African-American and Hispanic minority groups have long alleged racial profiling. Police administrators, however, have dismissed the issue that minorities were targeted by police officers because of their skin color rather than their actions. In the last few years, though, data has been collected that, in many cases, substantiates the minority citizenry's claims. The New Jersey State Police is currently under decree from the US Department of Justice and the State of New Jersey Attorney General's Office because of its covert and overt policy of stopping and searching minority drivers without just cause. (Scheft, 2000) In fact, the State of New Jersey entered into a consent decree to avoid costly and damaging civil litigation because of the, "pattern or practice of conduct by troopers of the New Jersey State Police that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. " (Meeks, 2000)

An examination of the practices of the New Jersey State Police found that "79.2 percent of the people being pulled over and searched were African Americans, although they made up only 17.5 percent of the motorists." (American Civil Liberties Union, 1999; Ramirez, 2000). As a part of this decree, the New

Jersey State Police agreed to a host of initiatives that would better document, monitor, and review its practices so that racial profiling would be avoided in the future. Yet, the New Jersey State Police are not the only police organization that practices tacit as well as conspicuous racial profiling. Both the Maryland and Illinois State Police Departments have reluctantly acknowledged the problem. The cause and magnitude of racial profiling, however, remains unknown and highly ambiguous.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

It is undeniable that racial profiling occurs in the United States. In fact, the occurrence is quite prevalent in an active group of racist police officers. These officers, African-American, Caucasian, Hispanic, male and female, are identifiable as the recipients of repeated complaints. An examination of the Kansas City (MO.) and Boston police departments found that "as few as 2 percent of all officers are responsible for 50 percent of all citizens' complaints." (Walker, Alpert, Kenny, 2001) These complaints range from the use of excessive force, to rude, abusive behavior, to racial profiling. Other research has also found that a predominant number of all complaints against police officers are attributable to a small amount of "rogue officers." (Swanson, 1988; Thibault, 1995; Fridell, 2001) If the problem were simply confined to this discernible cohort, however, the problem would be quite solvable. Unfortunately, this isn't the case. Although there is no figure on the number of officers who practice racial profiling, it is the opinion of

many of the experts interviewed for this study that racial profiling is practiced by an extensive segment of the police cohort. Both the Pilot Study (M. Gropman, 2001) and more recent research appear to support this argument.

1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to ascertain the extent of racial profiling and attempt to explore how this complex phenomenon evolves. In other words, how do police officers acquire the prejudice views that provoke racial profiling, and to what extent are these views sustained throughout the cohort? The examination, furthermore, hopes to identify intervening factors, e.g. leadership, supervision, and training, which might mitigate these attitudes and behaviors. The limited research on racial profiling that has occurred has been conducted from the perspective of the aggrieved minority population. I hoped that examining the roots of the issue rather than the symptoms might offer greater insight. To understand the issue of racial profiling, though, one must examine both sides of the equation.

There has been a fairly extensive examination of the victims of racial profiling. Few, however, have examined the transgressors. At the recent United Nations World Conference Against Racism held in early September, William Parham, of the American Psychological Association Committee on Ethnic Minority Affairs, called for a new course of study. "To fully understand the various 'isms' of the world-racism, sexism and related atrocities-it is important to learn about the experiences of the perpetrators as well as the victims." (Murray, 2000)

1.4 STUDY SETTING

This examination took place in and around a major northeast city. All of the police departments involved are geographically connected. The departments were given pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. The level of crime varies in each locale. This appears to be a result of location. That is, some of the police departments abut areas of this major city where crime is high; others abut this major city where crime is lower. The police departments that were compared have similar levels of crime. The Bravo Police Department was utilized in both the Pilot study and the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) study. Each police department serves a community of over 50,000 residents, and has a minimum of 125 sworn officers.

1.5 PARTICIPANTS

Twenty-six police officers were surveyed in the Pilot study. All were members of the Bravo police department. One hundred-twelve subjects were surveyed in the Modified MEOCS Study. Four separate departments were surveyed in the second study. The departments were comparable in size and Part I crime levels.

1.6 INSTRUMENTATION

The Pilot questionnaire was developed as a tool to gather information on racial attitudes. The Pilot questionnaire was comprised of two parts. Part I involved eight questions measured on a three-point Likert Scale. Part II involved a mock scenario based on Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) theoretical framework on racial stereotyping.

The MEOCS questionnaire involved the use of a statistically reliable survey used in the United States Military. This survey is utilized to measure racial climate in military units. The MEOCS was recently de-classified. According to Dr. Richard Tallarigo (2003), Director of the Department of Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, there have only been two other non-military studies utilizing the MEOCS. The MEOCS was modified only slightly for this study, and is referred to throughout the study as the Modified MEOCS.

1.7 QUALITATIVE SECTION

A qualitative component was utilized in each study. Local authorities in race and policing were surveyed in the Pilot Study; nationwide authorities were consulted in the Modified MEOCS examination.

1.8 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Pilot Study

The Pilot Study attempted to answer three questions. Did officers believe:

1) Racial Profiling existed in law enforcement?
2) Did Racial Profiling exist in their own department?
3) Did they believe they had ever unknowingly practiced Racial? Profiling?

Subjects responded to a scenario similar to the one proposed by Sommers and Ellsworth (2001). In the Sommers and Ellsworth study, participants were instructed that they would be jurors in a mock trial situation. Following the scenarios, they were asked for their findings regarding a Black defendant and a White defendant's guilt. Sommers and Ellsworth's study indicated that the jurors showed bias against the Black male in their recommendations. Jurors 'convicted' the Black male at a higher rate even though the circumstances of both scenarios were the same. The Pilot study had similar findings. The officers' responses regarding the scenarios were correlated to the Pilot questionnaires to attempt to verify the validity of the responses.

Modified MEOCS Study

The second part of the research employed a more generalizable national survey using the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) as a model. This section of the study attempted to answer the following questions.

1) Do police officers perceive racial profiling to be a serious problem in their organization?
2) Do organizational deficiencies lead to increased racial profiling through negative racial attitudes?
3) Does increased training in racial profiling lead to a commensurate increase in officers' sensitivity to the phenomenon?

The examination was administered to two distinct cohorts. Randomly selected officers from four separate police departments were chosen. The departments were comparable in size, number of residents in the jurisdiction, and the number of part I crimes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (UCR). Two police departments that were surveyed had little or no training in the area of racial profiling; two others had extensive training in racial profiling. Superior officers in each representative department distributed two hundred-fifty surveys; 112 surveys were collected. Modified MEOCS scores were compared using statistical analysis

The Modified MEOCS findings were then compared with training and traffic stop data. Specifically, training an organization offered in racial profiling, racial sensitivity, and/or multi-cultural education, and the findings of a two-year long examination on racial profiling based on motor vehicle stops. These findings, mandated by the state where the departments are located, were first reported in one of the largest newspapers (based on circulation) in the United States.

The third part of the examination involved qualitative examinations with experts in the field of law enforcement and racial profiling. Since the perspectives on the existence, extent, and the causes of racial profiling are so contradictory, social science experts from this relatively new field were consulted. These renowned social scientists and educators, were given a structured questionnaire with open-ended questions, and asked to respond in writing through electronic mail.

CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERATURE

OVERVIEW

This chapter is comprised of six sections. The first section is the framework for the subsequent categories. Police departments are unique and separate social organizations. Their values, customs, and behaviors are a result of a number of variables. Part 2.1 discusses the demographic of police officers and the specific variables that influence and affect them. Section 2.2 examines generalized law enforcement training concepts that most officers receive. Once officers graduate from a police academy, they rarely receive any other any significant, prolonged training. Section 2.3 examines police supervision, and the training these supervisors receive. Supervisors have a significant impact on line level personnel attitudes' and behaviors'.

Section 2.4 examines the culture of police organizations that has been referred to through research as the police subculture. This subculture, in fact, is a secretive and closed society made up exclusively of police officers. Although police norms and customs can be generalized, because of the parochialism of policing, each police department maintains its own unique culture. Section 2.5 examines stress and policing. Stress, danger and malady are an accepted component of the police subculture. Police officers have high rates of divorce, alcoholism, and mortality. This is attributable, in part, to the stress of policing.

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON RACIAL PROFILING

Harvard Professor Randall Kennedy wrote a passionate article in the *New Republic* in September of 1999. "Few racially discriminatory decisions are animated by only one motivation... But it cannot logically negate the *existence* of racial discrimination."(Kennedy, 1999). Many police practices may be a result of racially discriminatory biases, whether it is the result of discriminatory laws or enforcement practices. However, few are the result of outright racist individuals. That is, most of the police officers that unwittingly or even knowingly perpetrate these discriminatory practices are not racist. Nor does it mean that one racial or ethnic group of officers practices racism; or that these discriminatory practices are against one racial or ethnic group of civilians.

Police officers that practice racial profiling and racist police officers may be part of the same subset, but these categories are not mutually dependent. Renowned police educator John Scheft Esquire argued that "racism occurs in a small percentage of policing, probably under 15%. But racial profiling occurs in....probably about 99% of policing." (J.S. Scheft, personal communication, February 16, 2001) Racism invades every institution in our society and law enforcement is no exception. "To a substantial degree, police behavior simply mirrors the ethics of the larger community in which the police carry out their duties.... No police department can remain an island of integrity in a sea of corruption." (Geller, 1991)

Prejudice, bias, and bigotry are unfortunate but real parts of our society. Even the Reverend Jesse Jackson harbored what could be considered racist beliefs. "There is nothing more painful to me...than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start to think about robbery and then look around and see somebody White and feel relieved."(Kennedy, 1999, p.15) Racial profiling is an even more insidious form of bigotry because individuals who have been given the legal authority to protect our ideals perpetuate it.

The literature on racial profiling has grown exponentially. According to Meehan and Ponder, (2002) articles about racial profiling have grown from one in 1994 to 18, 425 in 2000. Because of the recent findings that the state police agencies in Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey appear to engage in widespread racial profiling practice, research will continue to expand. (Engel, Calnon, Bernard, 2002) As more empirical evidence is compiled, it is probable that racial profiling will be found to be widespread throughout the country. In my research undertaken of a mid-sized, northeastern, urban department, 84 %, (n=21) believed that racial profiling occurred in law enforcement. More specifically for this examination, though, 68% of this group believed that racial profiling occurred in their respective department. A high percentage (72%) admitted to unconsciously practicing racial profiling. (M. Gropman, 2001) This percentage is astonishing because the participant police department had received extensive training in the area of racial profiling. What is mystifying about this phenomenon though, is the divergence on the extent and causes of racial profiling across the police cohort.

Anecdotal information obtain informally through field research indicates that most officers do not believe racial profiling exists. (Fridell, 2001)

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) explained the dichotomy as a matter of nomenclature. PERF's national study of police executives found that when the terminology was redefined as "racially biased policing," (Fridell, 2001, p.15) the gap between law enforcement and civilian attitudes narrowed substantially. According to PERF, "citizens equated racial profiling with all manifestations of racially biased policing, whereas most of the police practitioners defined 'racial profiling' as stopping a motorist based solely on race. When the facilitators broadened the discussion by using the term "racially biased policing," police participants were much more likely to acknowledge that a larger problem exists." (p.15). Racially biased policing occurs when; "law enforcement inappropriately considers race or ethnicity in deciding with whom and how to intervene in an enforcement capacity." (p. 15).

The second part of the PERF research involved examining the extent of racial profiling on a larger scale. Using data from Fridell's (2001) study, the empirical evidence was weighed to determine attitudes of police officers from a more representative sample. Using a stratified random sample, PERF randomly chose 2251 agencies from 13,539 agencies listed in the National Public Safety Information Bureau's 2000 National Directory. A large number of departments

(1087) responded by filling out a six page open-ended questionnaire. PERF used other techniques to compile data as well.

Information was also gathered through focus groups. Police executives were contacted, and informal discussions with "various practitioners, subject-matter experts (e.g. law professors and social scientists)" were also held. (Fridell, 2001, p.13) Focus groups were surveyed across the US, and involved groups of citizens, police commanders, executives, and line staff. (p. 13). These focus groups were conducted in the following states: New York (1); Virginia (1); Maryland (4); California (4), and Massachusetts (5).

PERF found divergence between the attitudes of the police officers and the citizens they surveyed. Many police officers and administrators thought racial profiling was not a problem in their jurisdiction. The majority of citizens surveyed in these same jurisdictions, however, believed it was (p. 23). PERF thought that to close this divide, a clear definition of racial profiling was necessary. This was only attainable through open dialogue with the community. Once this was achieved, "activities could be implemented to reduce racial profiling and the perceptions thereof." (p. 27). These activities included better training, better supervision, better recruitment, and more effective data collection systems to identify problem officers.

Abuse of Authority

The National Institute of Justice recently examined police officers' attitudes towards abuse of authority. Missing from this examination, though, was racial profiling. Some of the findings, however, were noteworthy for this discussion. Although most of the officers surveyed did not believe that race and class are important in examining police abuse of authority, 89 percent of White officers in the study thought that Whites did not receive better treatment than Blacks, while 51 percent of Black officers believed they did (Weisburd, 2000.) The researchers summed up these divergent views. "The survey may not be generalizable beyond police officers; its findings seem to corroborate the view that there is a racial divide between Blacks and Whites in American society-a divide so pronounced that even the apparently strong culture of policing does not transcend it." (p. 9). These illustrations further reinforce the theory that attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors can vary across such a doctrinaire group as police officers.

A number of agencies were involved in this large-scale survey: the U.S. Justice Department, the Police Foundation, and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Other important findings in this survey include: although "most" police officers did not consider race to be an important factor in understanding abuse of authority, this same cohort was strongly divided along racial lines regarding "salience of race," in regard to police abuse of authority. Only 5.1 percent of White officers in the sample felt police officers were more

likely to use force against Blacks. Ten times that amount (57.1 percent) of the Black officers thought police officers were more likely to use force against Blacks. (Weisburd, 2000, p. 9)

The divergence between the views of Black and White officers was extreme. In fact, the disparity was so pronounced that Weisburd was forced to create a third category made up of "other minority officers." This cohort was somewhere between the extremes of the Black and White officer surveyed. About one-quarter (23.4 percent) agreed that Whites received better treatment; 12.4 percent felt that force was used more against minorities. John S. Scheft Esq. (2001) felt these figures were an underestimation of the divergence between Black and White officers.

Racial Profiling in Massachusetts

Scheft (2000) offered the first private training in racial profiling in the state of Massachusetts. A renowned police educator and consultant, he found that White officers were much less receptive to the training than Black officers. In fact, like much of the more recent research has found, many White officers thought profiling was more or less created by "media hype." (P. Scott, personal communication, February 16, 2001) What Scheft found to be a breakthrough in his training methodologies, though, was the input of Black officers during the training. Black officers openly spoke of being victimized by fellow officers who

appeared to target them simply because of the color of their skin. In fact, an overwhelming number of the Black officers, "at least 75 percent" felt that they had been profiled. According to Scheft, hearing this from brethren officers "enlightened many of the White officers," that the problem did exist. (Scheft, 2001)

Scheft's estimations weren't far off. A recent survey of African American officers in the Milwaukee Police Department supported Scheft's assessment. Four hundred-fourteen officers identified by the Milwaukee Police Department as African American were surveyed. One hundred sixty-seven responded. Sixty-nine percent believed that they had been stopped as a result of racial profiling." (Barlow & Barlow, 2000). Of the 167 respondents, males were overwhelmingly represented. In fact, seventy-four percent of the male respondents felt that they had been stopped as a result of racial profiling. The percentage was lower, forty-five percent, for female respondents (p. 356). These African American officers were surveyed regarding whether they used racial profiling in performance of their duties. Only ten percent answered affirmatively. However, the survey did not investigate whether these officers had witnessed other officers engage in racial profiling.

Racial Profiling in America

The National Institute of Justice survey conducted by Weisburd (2000) did acknowledge the existence of more widespread racial profiling. "More than 25% of officers surveyed in Illinois and 15 percent in Ohio stated that they had observed an officer harassing a citizen, most likely because of his or her race." (Weisburd, 2000, p. 2) Moreover, this same sample found that 20 percent of the officers surveyed in Illinois, and 13 percent of the officers surveyed in Ohio, had reported witnessing fellow officers using "excessive force when apprehending a suspect." (p. 2).

The US Department of Justice has taken the lead in examining racial profiling. The US Bureau of Justice Statistics, an arm of the Justice Department, began collecting traffic stop data in 1999. However, "only 9 of the 49 state law enforcement agencies whose primary duties include highway patrol reported requiring officers to record demographic information on the driver or passengers for all traffic stops. Hawaii does not have a formal state police agency." (BJS_1, 2000) Overall, thirty-one states collect racial and ethnic data for operators who receive motor vehicle citations. It appears that as police actions increase in severity, stricter requirements are enacted. For example, while only twelve states require race or ethnic data on written warnings, thirty-one states require racial and ethnic data on traffic citations. The number increases to thirty-seven states when an arrest is made as the result of a traffic stop. Furthermore, only fourteen states require police agencies to collect demographic data when a vehicle or its

occupants are searched. Federal legislation has been proposed to require all police agencies to record race and ethnicity during traffic stops. The International Association of Chief of Police (IACP) has vigorously fought against this, though.

The US Department of Justice recently funded research that would assist police departments with traffic stop data collection. The nucleus of the work was developed at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts. The project, entitled "A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems," (2000) is a blueprint for a police department to use in developing collection procedures. One of the biggest complaints the IACP offered in its argument against mandated collection was the time and resources it would take to develop and maintain an effective system. This research dispels many of those fears.

The resource guide offered dramatic insight as well. One of the authors, Professor Jack McDevitt, is a longtime consultant for the Boston Police Department. The hundreds of hours he has spent with police officers have given him an insight into the realities of policing. This knowledge is evident in his discussion on the idiosyncratic behaviors officers develop. "*Many police departments have not developed formal, written, standards directing officers on how to use discretion. Instead, officers often develop ad hoc methods of winnowing suspicious from innocent motorists. This intuition, often learned by young officers observing the actions of more experienced officers, can vary widely across individual officers even within the same department...These discretionary decisions are seldom documented and rarely reviewed. As a result,*

individual officers are infrequently made accountable for these decisions." (Ramirez, McDevitt, Farrell 2000, p. 9) McDevitt points towards deficiencies in training and supervisions as the cause of these idiosyncrasies and variations.

Racial Profiling and the American Psychological Association (APA)

The American Psychological Association (APA) has taken an active role in combating racial profiling. The APA sponsored the "End of Racial Profiling Act of 2001." The proposal, US House Resolution 2074, would require federal law enforcement agencies to "cease practices that encourage racial profiling and to adopt policies and procedures to eliminate racial profiling." (American Psychological Association, 2001) The APA has also passed a resolution that encourages APA members to take an active role in combating racial profiling. The resolution encourages research, data collection, and the development of relationships with law enforcement agencies. The APA utilizes a multidimensional approach in their battle against racial profiling (American Psychological Association 2, 2001).

Racial Profiling and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

The American Civil Liberties Union (2001) argues that racial profiling is a result of law enforcement's war on drugs. Yet, the war on drug reaches far beyond the racial and ethnic minorities of the inner cities of America. Even though Cleary (2000) found that criminality was associated with "Blackness," Harris (1999) argues that "five times as many Whites use drugs." The point Harris is trying to make is that there should be five times as many drug arrests of Whites. Racial profiling has become so pervasive that the ACLU has successfully filed lawsuits against entire state police agencies (e.g. Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois). These suits were based on statistically significant data that indicated these agencies routinely engaged in racially discriminatory stops. Harris further argued that even though Blacks "constitute 13 percent of drug users in the United States, 37 percent of those arrested on drug charges, are Black." Yet, in each of the aforementioned states, the search rates of African-American motorists sharply exceeded the rate of Whites.

The American Civil Liberties Union vows to end racial profiling. In fact, it promises to make, "the outrageous practice of racial profiling...one of the ACLU's highest priority issues." (ACLU, 2001) An expansive section within the ACLU web-site is dedicated to racial profiling. Entitled "Arrest the Racism: Racial Profiling in America," the authors purport that "Racial profiling is prevalent in America... despite the civil rights victories of thirty years ago. Today skin color

makes you a suspect. It makes you more likely to be stopped, more likely to be searched, and more likely to be arrested and incarcerated."(ACLU, 2001) There is ample empirical evidence to support these assertions.

Attitudes and Behaviors

A correlation was found between attitudes and behaviors of officers in Walker's meta-analysis. Walker did not find that there was a, "one-to-one relationship: that prejudicial attitudes...automatically transfer into discriminatory behavior. " (Walker, 1999) However, a correlation was apparent. In Reiss' (1971) examination of the Chicago and Boston police departments, he found that "three quarters of the officers expressed some racial prejudice in the presence of field observers." Friedrich (1979) found that these attitudes didn't necessarily "translate into observed patterns of discrimination." This was attributable to various bureaucratic checks and balances that seemingly limit "the influence of officers' attitudes on behavior." These checks and balances "limit the ability of the officer to act solely on the basis of his or her prejudice." (Friedrich, 1980; Walker, 1999) However, Black (1980) found that police officers of all races were more likely to arrest African-Americans. "White officers with positive racial attitudes," and "African-American officers were more likely to arrest African-American suspects." We may, therefore summize that accountability may regulate the

effects that prejudicial attitudes have on behavior. However, this control is by no means comprehensive; racially biased policing still proliferates.

Racial Profiling in the United Kingdom

Racism in law enforcement was examined in the United Kingdom in the 1980's. McKenzie (1986) found that training that targeted "attitude changes" was the key to egalitarian, "police performance with racial minorities." McKenzie, as part of the U.K. Police Training Council Working Party on Community and Race Relations, found that the training had to address both the attitudes and behaviors of officers. The council used Zimbardo's theoretical framework on the dimensions of attitudes as a background. Zimbardo theorized that there were three dimensions to attitudes, "emotional...which relates to feelings about an object or person; cognitive...which involves what a subject knows or believes about a person or object; behavioral...which pertains to the subject's behavior toward an object or person." (McKenzie, 1986) The council found training that created "real life situations...through role playing, experimental exercises, and videotape feedback of these exercises" was effective in modifying attitudes. As a result, the behaviors' of the participant officers were positively affected.

"Race and Place"

Meehan and Ponder's (2002) examination on race and location confirmed what many minority motorists have alleged for years. Albert Meehan and Michael

Ponder of Oakland (MI.) University recently found that "African Americans are subject to significant racial profiling, as reflected in disproportionate surveillance and stopping by police when driving through whiter areas." Meehan and Ponder took a novel approach to the examination. They examined race-based computer inquiries of police officers in an overwhelmingly White police department, (97%), and jurisdiction, (98 %). This "blue collar and predominately White [community]... has a mix of industrial and technological industries. It is among the larger cities in the state (Michigan), and shares one border with a city of predominately African-American residents (75%).

They found significant inquiries by an active group (n=12) of officers that overwhelmingly targeted African-American motorists. They also found that the further African-American motorists traveled from their community, the greater the chances were of being targeted. That is, the query rates of minorities by officers via the officers onboard computer system ranged from 325% to 383% greater than their numbers in the driver population. Based on this empirical evidence, it is impossible to refute the existence of racial profiling in the department examined.

It is likely that Meehan and Ponder's findings are generalizable to a majority of police departments throughout the country. It is a reality that biased and prejudicial attitudes affect every part of our society. Law enforcement is affected in a number of ways; one recently acknowledged manner is racial profiling. The following matters contribute to racial profiling, racially biased policing, and outright racism in policing.

2.2 POLICE OFFICERS

Individuals who enter into law enforcement may enter with racist ideals. Often, though, this is not the case. In fact, as Trojanowicz stated, "many of the men and women who seek careers in policing are inspired by idealism and altruism...many say they are drawn to police work as a career because of a desire to help others." Many social psychologists (Reiser, 1972; Baehr, 1969; Trojanowicz, 1998) found that police officers are, "above the norm in intelligence, have better than average emotional stability, like working with people in a service function, and have a desire to contribute to the betterment of community life." There are few studies that have found police officers to possess anything less than a convincing "degree of maturity, good judgment, and mental health." (Symonds, 1971). Furthermore, the number of police officers from racial and ethnic minority groups continues to grow.

There are an estimated 420,000 sworn police officers serving in more than 13,000 police organizations. According to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics (2000[2]), racial and ethnic minorities make up 21.5% of this figure. This is a dramatic increase from 1987, when minority officers accounted for just 14.6%. There is ample evidence that a predominant number of the cohort that is attracted to law enforcement come from the working class. This is an important issue because males from this cohort portray specific social characteristics that have

been labeled authoritarian, conservative, and suspicious. (Balch, 1972; Rokeach, 1971; Bayley and Mendlesohn, 1969) In fact, some social psychologists argue that these character traits are the make up of a distinct police personality archetype.

The Police Personality

There has been considerable research on whether, in fact, a 'police personality' exists. Rokeach (1971) found that "police are generally homogeneous in their attitudes' and beliefs'... [and] have attitudes and personality characteristics distinctly different from other occupational groups. (Rokeach, 1971, p.156) These researchers further found that police officers with little education placed "a relatively lower value on freedom, equality, independence, and a world of beauty and...place a relatively higher value on obedience, self-control, a comfortable life and pleasure." (p. 164). In this study researchers compared trait scores of police recruits and college students from a similar demographic. They concluded that the differences in scores could not be attributed to a police personality. However, individuals from the more conservative working-class group do tend to seek employment as police officers in higher rates.

Balch (1972) concluded after extensive examination of the literature that the police personality was more or less a fable. The literature "does not

indicate the existence of a police personality, authoritarian or otherwise." (Balch, 1972, p. 110) He found, however, that police officers showed, "a common set of ideas about themselves, the world in which they live, and their work. These attitudes are largely the result of socioeconomic background and work experience." (p. 110). This close-knit, male dominated group often emanates from a sociological background that purports working class values that have, "a pre-occupation with maintaining self-respect, proving one's masculinity, 'not taking any crap', and not being taken in." (Wilson, 1970) It appears that the difficult, threatening, and often enduring experiences that police officers face may intensify and exacerbate these traits.

Length of Police Service

Bayley and Mendlesohn (1969) found that experienced police officers scored relatively lower on, "anomie, authoritarianism, prejudice, and social distance than control groups." Neiderhoffer (1967), Regoli and Poole (1978) found, furthermore, that cynicism was related to the length of police service. That is, the longer an individual worked as a police officer, the more cynical he became. Neiderhoffer defined cynicism as, "a loss of faith in people, in

enthusiasm for higher ideals of police work, and of pride and integrity." While Delattre (1989) found that cynicism was evident when police officers "stop taking their ideals seriously." Neiderhoffer postulated, "It is the police system, not the personality of the candidate that is the more powerful determination of behavior and ideology." (Neiderhoffer, 1967, p. 160)

Research confirms that cynical attitudes and beliefs increase with the length of service. Whether it is attributable to the police system or the police candidate is an issue of much debate. Violanti (1985) found that job related stress increased from the first year of service to approximately the thirteenth. The first five years were known as the "alarm stage;" while the sixth through thirteenth year were labeled the "disenchantment phase." These findings coincide with Neiderhoffer's stages of cynicism. "Pseudo cynicism" is evident from one to five years; while "aggressive cynicism" was apparent after ten years of service. Conway (1989) found that an officer's Locus of Control measurements, the ability or inability to influence ones own future, also deteriorated during this same period. That is, as length of service increased, a commensurate loss of control over ones own destiny was perceived.

It is paradoxical that over this same period of consternation and stress, these same officers take an increasingly central role in their respective departments. That is, at the most stressful, cynical, and difficult period of their careers', these officers are promoted to detective, master patrolman, and other supervisory roles such as sergeant and lieutenant. As these more experienced

officers progress, they are required to take on auxiliary functions. One of the most apparent and most critical is training. However, the pathologies developed as a result of the police system accompany them into this critical auxiliary function.

Inoculation of Cynicism

The San Jose, California Police Department's archetype on field training is still modeled today. The San Jose Police Department found that the key to a successful field-training program was an experienced and exemplary field-training officer (FTO). (Eisenberg, 1981) In fact, Eisenberg found that inexperienced FTO's were one of the most critical hazards to the program. "FTO's with just a couple of years of field exposure are inappropriate and counterproductive." Ironically, as many of these officers grow weary, cynical, and even more "prejudiced," (Bayley and Mendlesohn, 1969) they wield more and more influence on the customs, practices, and behaviors of the policeman that surround them.

Many of these officers may have been predisposed to cynicism and prejudice. As Balch (1972) points out, "police departments recruit members from a relatively authoritarian class of people...working class men." The trait characteristics of this cohort

are already well documented. It is likely that the children of a generation that purported the 'Separate but Equal' ideology may exhibit some of the traits and

ideals embraced in their households'. Some of these malicious traits lay the foundation for racism in our society, and specifically, racial profiling in policing.

Traits of Problem Officers

There is also anecdotal evidence that a minority of problem officers have certain psychological characteristics that may make them prone to inappropriate and even immoral influences. Dr. Richard Kelly, Chief Counseling Psychologist for the US Marshall's Service, argues that some individuals aspire to become police officers to make good with their fathers'. These deep-seated psychopathologies are relative to both Erikson's Theory of Psychosocial Development and Bowlby's Attachment Theory. (Gormley, 1997) Even though studies indicate that most police officers are above the norm in "average intelligence...better than average emotional stability, and [have a] strong desire to contribute to the betterment of the community;" (Reiser, 1972) an unusually high number of law enforcement officers referred for psychological counseling exhibited, "authority problems." (R. Kelly, personal communications, February 27, 1995)

Dr. Kelly and Dr. Michael Roberts found anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon with many of the officers referred to them from the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. Kelly theorizes that these problem officers may have had relational problems with their fathers. Using Bowlby's Theory of

Attachment and Erikson's Theory of Development, we can hypothesize that these individuals enter law enforcement to improve their perceived lack of acceptance by their fathers'. Individuals with strong, positive attachments acquire the essential basis for development. Development occurs in through an initial state of disorientation, but can develop into a positive state of "identity achievement." (Gormly, 1997, p. 429)

The authority that police officers possess apparently appeals to those with "insecure and disorganized attachments." (p.140). Kelly and Roberts found corresponding characteristics among the officers who were mandated to their care. Many, for example, were the oldest or only males in their family. Although they exhibited above average intelligence, they performed below average in high school. Finally, they entered law enforcement at a relatively young age. (Kelly, 1999)

Many suffered from high degrees of frustration, anxiety, cynicism, and other disorders. If we explore Erikson's theory in relation to these authority problems, these problem officers, "are likely to acquire a mistrustful outlook to others... [They] will also lack confidence and consider themselves unworthy of attention." That is, when the aforementioned group of officers experiences frustration, it leads to a cycle of cynicism, anxiety, and other psychopathologies. (Gormley, 1997, p. 136) All the while, these officers continue to struggle with rules and regulation, as well as supervisors and administrators.

Counseling for Problem Officers

It is important to note that many of the officers who Kelly and Roberts examined were referred to psychological counseling because of problem behaviors that affected their ability to perform their jobs. This is relevant because in law enforcement there is an immense stigma attached to seeking counseling assistance; few officers will seek help voluntarily. (Kirschman, 1997) Some officers take part in Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) sessions. This, according to Kelly, enables officers to better deal with the trauma cognitively rather than affectivity. Thus the traumatic events remain "cognitive, not visceral." (Kelly, 1999) Other officers continue to suffer, though, and are required to attend counseling after difficulties with their supervisors, families, or the public persists. These psychological problems are often a result of the emotional stress of policing; improper follow-up treatment following a traumatic event (often resulting in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)); and a perceived lack of recognition by superior officers. In fact, this is by far the greatest complaint of most police officers. "Criticism comes often while praise comes rarely." (Ianonne, 1987)

Frustration in Law Enforcement

Erikson (1968) identifies formal thought as an integral part of self-esteem. Erikson and Piaget point out that formal thought makes it possible to understand and assimilate abstract ideas such as success and failure. The definition of

success to many officers is formal recognition by their peers and family. (Ianonne, 1987) When barriers exist to the attainment of this goal, whether they are real or perceived, the natural consequence is frustration. When this frustration progresses beyond the threshold level, aberrant, immoral, and sometimes illegal behaviors occur. This depends to a great extent on the individual and the psychosocial influences of each respective department. (Yeager, 1999) One of the more recurring behaviors is racial profiling.

Quantitative Policing

Traditional police theories are quantitatively based. (Swanson, Territo, Taylor, 2001) Many police officers, both Black and White, equate criminality with Blackness. (Cleary, 2000) Thus, surveilling, detaining and arresting African-American's at a disproportionate rate can be rationalized as "good police work," under the traditional model of policing. (Meehan and Ponder, 2002) Statistics indicate that nearly one in four Black males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five are involved in the criminal justice system. (Black, 1980) This led one police officer to state to me, "hey, I'll just grab the first Black guy I see if one in four is a criminal." (M.J. Gropman, 1993) Another officer in the Pilot study rationalized, "Hey, I'm just giving them [administrators] what they want." (M.J. Gropman, 2001) Many officers view the targeting of minorities as efficient policing; they're simply playing the numbers. When these quantitatively based

traditional policing ideals are embraced by police leaders, racial profiling is inevitable.

Race and Human Tendencies

Racial profiling may also be attributable to certain universal human tendencies. Social psychology examines individual attitudes, convictions, and ideals in relation to the social environment in which they are developed. Social psychologists have found that police officers-both Black and White-are more responsive to victims that are White when the perpetrator is Black. (Smith, 1984) To reinforce further the apparent endemic bias, Black (1980) found that African-American officers were more responsive to African-American victims than White officers, but were more likely to arrest Black perpetrators than White perpetrators. (Black, 1980, p. 90) Since stereotypes are "cognitive structures that represent categorical information about a social group," (Fiske, 1998) the stereotype that Blacks are more likely to be criminals than Whites inevitably influences beliefs, expectations, and behaviors. (Oschner& Lieberman, 2001). This has important implications in the area of law enforcement and race.

Labeling of Out-Groups

Isenberg (1999) and Whalen (1998) found that the amygdala area of the brain is triggered "implicitly" when potentially threatening stimuli are experienced. An examination of Person Perception research further found that when race-

labeling conditions indicated an individual was from a "race-out" group, "amygdala activation was high." (Hart, 2000) This, according to Hart, suggests that unfamiliar faces "are ambiguous and potentially threatening." (Oschner& Lieberman, 2001) We need only refer to the overwhelming majority of Caucasian police officers to realize that to many of them, African-American males are the 'race-out group' that appear ambiguous and potentially threatening. Because of this, African American males are likely to be surveilled with apprehension and with greater frequency.

We also know that most people categorize other individuals almost instantaneously. This automatic bias occurs to, "make sense of their social world." (M.B. Brewer and Brown, 1999) Fiske (1998) also found that attitudes were affected almost instantaneously when racially or ethnically distinct individuals were surveilled. Fiske further reported that these distinctions lead to "a tendency to exaggerate differences between groups and similarities within one group." (APA, 2003) The traits, distinctions, and differences become " the predominant aspect of the category, even when disconfirming information is provided and particularly when there is some motivation to confirm the stereotype." (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999; APA, 2003)

The danger is that this automatic bias is confirmed through institutional tradition; traditions that are upheld by a cohort consisting mainly of White males. In spite of efforts to mitigate these discriminatory beliefs, they persist. The damage occurs when law enforcement officers act on these beliefs.

Race and Anxieties

Randall Kennedy believes that many police actions result from this complex psychology. "Inflated anxieties about the risk posed by African-Americans...make it likely that, even when police officers are sincerely attempting to use race solely for the purpose of advancing efficient law enforcement, they will err in a disturbingly large number of instances because of exaggerated fears." (Kennedy, 1997) Indeed, our society shares these exaggerated fears. It is ignorance, however, that perpetuates racial discrimination in policing. Ignorance reinforced by "news reports, rumor and folklore." (p. 144). With documented evidence confirming that Black males disproportionately commit violent crimes, augmented by folklore that sustains misguided perceptions, racially biased policing is foreseeable.

Police officers are held accountable for their inactions as well as their actions. It is the rationale behind these actions and inactions that deserves closer examination, though. In essence, police are mandated to investigate potential threats against the communities that they serve. Kennedy argues that "before conceding that a given act of racial discrimination is "reasonable," careful attention must be paid to the accuracy of the information used in making such an assessment." (p. 144). Kennedy's asserts that many of the threats that citizens and officers experience are perceptual rather than actual. Furthermore, police attitudes reflect the bias of the community they serve. "Public expectations

insidiously instruct [the officer] to safeguard the community from minority outsiders." (Bitner, 1970; Weitzer, 1999) Thus, communities that experience racial profiling by their respective departments bear some of the responsibility as well.

Institutional Tradition

The only institutional redress to these misconceptions and biases is to better educate officers. The fact that law enforcement training programs are ill equipped to correct this learned (and expected) behavior contributes to and sustains racial profiling. These attitudes and behaviors, however, could be changed "implicitly" or through "conscious evaluation and re-evaluation." (Oschner &Lieberman, 2001; Shultz and Lepper, 1995) That is, with affective and continual training, these behaviors could be mitigated. Yet, police training eschews deeper examination into this critical deficiency. Because of this, racial profiling continues and the relationship between the police and the minority community suffers.

This has significance under Trojanowicz' Community Policing theory. According to the theory, improved police-community relations leads to increased information sharing, decreased crime rates and increased quality of life issues. (Trojanowicz, 1998) However, this theory is unlikely to be realized if the tension between the segment of the community most affected by crime (minorities) and the police continues. Part of the answer is training. The resources that most

public agencies possess, however, are rarely appropriate for the in-depth training that will prepare, and to some extent inoculate, officers against prejudice and bias.

Police Racism

Many police officers are truly brilliant individuals who have a strong grasp of human nature, policing, and the law. As studies have shown, most are above the norms in emotional and intellectual intelligence. (Reiser, 1972) There is, however, also a small minority that is mentally deficient. (Thibault, 1995) It is within this small minority that categorical racism, indiscreet racial profiling, and other police deviance proliferates. (Walker, Alpert, Kenney, 2001) It is an unfortunate reality, but many police departments fail to psychologically screen their candidates. (Thibault, 1995, p. 258) The system wide profiling that does occur, nonetheless, cannot be blamed on these few rogue officers.

It is the inherent management practices that condone quantitative law enforcement as "good police work," that directly contributes. (Weitzer, 1999; Ianonne, 1987). When racially biased officers receive accolades for the quantity of arrests they make without regard for quality, the system tacitly encourages racial profiling. We know, for example, that most of a police department's budget is dedicated to personnel costs necessary to generate arrests. (Swanson, 2001). According to Trojanowicz (1998). Other limited resources are disproportionately steered towards drug interdiction (p. 231).

Rationales for Racism

The most readily apparent method of intercepting drugs is through the enforcement of motor vehicle law. These are commonly referred to in law enforcement as 'car stops.' The US Supreme Court's ruled in *US v. Whren* (U.S. 116 S.Ct 1769, 1996) that the subjective intent of an officer doesn't matter if a motor vehicle is lawfully stopped. As a result of this decision, racial profiling flourished under the guise of the enforcement of minor motor vehicle infractions. New Jersey State Troopers often used this rationale to stop minority motorists.

Dr. Elmo Randolph was stopped by the New Jersey State Police "more than fifty times," between 1991 and 1999. (Meeks, 2000) Randolph, an African-American dentist, was never given a citation. However, he was undoubtedly profiled. On each occasion a trooper would approach his motor vehicle and ask if there were any drugs or weapons in the car. "Police are suspicious when they see a Black man driving an expensive car," Randolph contends. (p. 15). The sheer number of times that Dr. Randolph was stopped is indefensible; however, the motivation is even more troublesome.

These New Jersey State Troopers sought recognition and reward by initiating numerous and indiscriminate car stops of African American motorists. The subsequent detainment and searches were not the work of a few mentally deficient, rogue, or racist officers. The entire New Jersey State Police Department implicitly participated. Although line officers committed the actual

stops, they did so with the manifest support and guidance of their superiors. New Jersey is not the only state police agency to engage in this misconduct. Numerous other police agencies have been accused of widespread profiling as well.

2.3 POLICE TRAINING

It would be easy to indict police training, especially in New Jersey, as institutionally racist. To generalize, however, about such a complex and disparate discipline would be wrong. If we examine police training, though, we can detect a number of deficient practices that ultimately lead to racial profiling. For example, in one of the most extensive studies ever done on police training curriculums, McManus (1970) found that the Boston police had the most extensive training program, "with over 1600 hours of training...whereas the Kalamazoo, MI. police department [had] the shortest, at 120 hours." Even though the study found that the quality of training was more a determinant in preparing recruits for performance than quantity, the sheer disparity between Kalamazoo and Boston points to the lack of universal police training standards. Since this basic training is likely to be the only extended and intensive training in most officers' careers, the importance of quantity and quality of instruction cannot be over emphasized. It should be noted that both departments have increased the amount of time recruit officers are trained since this study; however, there is still disparity.

Divergence in Training

The Boston and Kalamazoo figures highlight the divergence that is evident in police training. For example: The Boston, MA. Police Department amounts to 40 weeks of intensive recruit training. The training I received from the Brookline, MA. Police Department, which was once a part of Boston and is geographically surrounded by it, was only 14 weeks. Also notable about the training of these two abutting jurisdictions: they use different instructors, different sites, and different curriculums. Even more startling, Massachusetts is one of the more progressive states in the area police training. (D.W. O'Laughlin, personal communication, November 3, 2001).

The quality of an officer's training is of paramount importance. It is especially significant when dealing with critical situations. Many departments, however, call for no more than the state's mandatory requirement. In Massachusetts this is currently 16 weeks. As Thibault (1995) points out, "these standards normally deal with what has been called the 'nuts and bolts' training...most of these either deal briefly or do not deal at all with human relations skills." (p. 282). He later notes, "With officers spending the overwhelming majority of their time in contact with citizens...the lack of human relations training spells trouble." Deficient training in human relation skills is an obvious concern in an era of increased citizen interaction. This increased communication is a requisite of Community Policing.

Progressive Training

Progressive, effective training is one of the solutions to racial profiling. It is also one of the keys to a police officer's very survival. As David O'Laughlin, president of the Massachusetts Training Officers Association states, "when you have to make a life or death decision, and there's no time to contemplate, everything refers to your training." (O'Laughlin, 2001) Delattre adds further emphasis to the importance of training, "The habit of deciding with care when circumstances require is, like other habits, acquired by practice." (Delattre, 1989) The commonality off these perspectives is that training ingrains attitude and behavior. This is why training is such an integral part of an officer's professional as well as moral development.

Police Training in Greensboro, N.C.

One of the more progressive police training programs exists in the Greensboro, N.C. police department. There is recognition in Greensboro's "Phase Approach" to training, "that quality, in-depth, sustained training is an important part of every officer's professional and personal development." (Thibault, 1995, p. 296) The Greensboro training framework was developed out of the realization that "there are multi-phases in the training and development of police officers, and a standard training program for each of these phases," is necessary. (p. 297). After lengthy and intensive academy training, probationary

officers are assigned to a field-training program for a period of approximately 18 months. These exceptional field-training programs are critical in shaping appropriate attitudes and behaviors in probationary officers. According to Detective T.R. Sizemore of the Greensboro, NC. Police Department's Training Division, racial profiling is not a serious problem in Greensboro. (T.R. Sizemore, personal communication, February 3, 2003) Captain Anita Stalls adds, though, that whether or not it's a problem is a "matter of perspective." (A. Stalls, personal communication, February 3, 2003)

Sizemore accepts that America does have a race problem. In fact, he admits, "Do I have a race problem? To some extent I do even though my best friend's Black." It is accepted within the Greensboro police training division that racism is a reality of society. It is not, however, accepted that it is a reality of the behaviors of the Greensboro, North Carolina Police Department. Greensboro officers receive extensive training in "Arbitrary Profiling" to guard against the proliferation of racial profiling.

The Greensboro Police Department clearly defines arbitrary profiling. Arbitrary Profiling involves, "Any police-initiated activity that is motivated solely by race, gender, ethnicity, religion, age, citizenship, sexual orientation or any arbitrary stereotype rather than the behavior of an individual or information that leads to a particular individual that has been shown to be engaged in a specific illegal behavior." Greensboro Police Department Policy: Section 1.8.1. 1/14/02. The progressive nature of this approach has averted any widespread allegations

that the Greensboro police department has a racial profiling problem. This position, as any experienced police administrator can attest to, is tenuous at best. This is why departments with progressive training philosophies such as Greensboro rely on Field Training Programs.

Field Training Programs

Field Training Programs require probationary officers to be assigned to an exemplary senior Field Training Officer (FTO). This senior officer acts as a mentor to the inexperienced officer. The field-training program will engender positive attitudes, behaviors and beliefs that will endure throughout the officer's career. In fact, numerous police scholars (Trojanowicz, 1998; Thibault, 1995, Ianonne, 1987) have identified field training as one of law enforcement's most influential programs. Often, however, it is poorly instituted, if at all.

The San Jose, CA. Police Department's FTO program continues to be a model for field training. Developed in 1972 as one of the first programs of its kind, San Jose takes a phase approach to training much like Greensboro, NC. After successful completion of a 26-week academy and a two-week in-house program, officers are assigned to carefully screened FTO's. For the next 12 weeks they are assigned to three different FTO's, on three different shifts, in three different districts. There are "daily observation reports by the FTO and weekly evaluation reports by the supervisor." (McCampbell, 1986) It is at the end of this period when

a determination is made whether the recruit needs remedial training, continues on to the third phase of training, or is dismissed outright.

Police Training in San Jose, CA.

The San Jose Police Department has approximately 1400 sworn officers. They serve nearly 600,000 people in the City of San Jose. The Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department also services San Jose. David Paul is the director of the South Bay Regional Public Safety Training Consortium. This consortium of academies trains many of the officers in San Jose and surrounding Santa Clara County. Mr. Paul, along with Captain Anita Stalls from Greensboro, believes that the problem of racial profiling is a matter of perspective. (D. Paul, personal communications, February 3, 2003) The state of California, however, mandates a minimum of five hours per annum in cultural diversity training. This ensures that officers understand the unique customs of the many citizens they protect and serve. It furthermore provides a more egalitarian structure of law enforcement.

The curriculum and the instructors in all training settings are certified by the State. The Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (POST) and the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles developed the curriculum. This is an evolving and dynamic program that has attempted to keep pace with the myriad changes police officers face. Most importantly, though, it is mandated to every peace officer in the state of California receive training.

The training has appeared to work in San Jose. The Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences examined all locales with published racial profiling reports. As previously discussed, empirical evidence indicated that police activities in Maryland, New Jersey, and Ohio, were "likely discriminatory" (Engel, Calnon, Bernard, 2002) Interestingly, New York City and its lauded zero tolerance policy on street disorder was also found to engage in "likely discrimination." (p. 254). However, an examination of the empirical evidence in San Jose, CA. found that though, "Latinos and Blacks [were] disproportionately stopped," the difference was a result of a "concentration of minorities in neighborhoods with high police presence." (p. 255). This is an example of the positive effects training can manifest.

Field Training Apprenticeships

The period of apprenticeship is of immense significance in a probationary officer's personal, moral and professional development. It is at this stage where critical decisions are made on their future, as well as the future direction of the sponsoring agency." (Thibault, 1995, p. 271) For progressive administrators, this is the time period where they are most reliant on the soundness of their FTO programs. Any doubts about probationary officers must always be resolved in the best interest of the department. (Ianonne, 1987) The question arises, though: Is it wise to place such emphasis in one program? The answer is ambiguous and is at

the heart of police officers digression towards such socially unacceptable behaviors as racial profiling.

FTO's and their direct supervisors are in the best position to judge the performance of probationary officers based on the norms of their respective department. In fact, in larger departments, it is possible that neither the police commissioner nor the precinct commander has even met the probationary officer under review. Administrators are even more reliant on line officers and supervisors in these instances. However, exactly what constitutes normative behavior varies widely from department to department, and even precinct to precinct.

A police agency with a tradition of corruption illustrates this point. Former Boston Metropolitan District Commission (M.D.C.) police Captain Gerald Clemente stated, "I became corrupt by going on the police force...to be a part of the police force you had to be a thief." (Delattre, 1989; CBS News, 1987) Clemente is a convicted bank robber and made this statement from jail. Unfortunately, Clemente's morally corrupt views appeared to reflect the normative behaviors and values of the now defunct M.D.C. police department. These values and attitudes, however, only endure in departments without a commitment to progressive, consistent, quality training. FTO programs are an integral part of these exceptional archetypes. Unfortunately, exceptional training programs are rare and are only as good as their FTO programs. According McCampbell (1986) only "sixty-eight percent" of police departments nationwide used FTO programs.

Common Training Issues

There are many other common dilemmas that currently exist in police training. Three of the most urgent issues involve program content, instructor quality, and instruction methodology. The first tour of duty for a recruit officer is usually filled with utter anxiety and excitement. Before the inaugural cup of coffee gets cold, however, this highly motivated and trained recruit has often been told, 'forget all that crap you learned in the academy, kid, this is the real world.' Even with the 'new breed' of educated field training officers now mentoring these recruits, there is little confidence in most training programs. As Thibault (1995) states, "This is an area where rank should not have privileges...The major question that must be asked of each instructor is: Can this instructor communicate effectively and serve as a role model for the recruits?" (p. 283).

Program Content

An example of my police academy training highlights the program content quandary. Searches are an area of law enforcement that are critical to understand. If a search is improperly done, any evidence discovered is inadmissible during court proceedings. A search incident to arrest is of importance because a significant amount of evidence is discovered contemporaneously with an arrest. The limits of my training regarding a search incident to arrest were obvious during my experience as a police officer, and later

as a police supervisor. My academy notes on this critical area are inadequate to understand this critical subject.

The notes were taken on May 15, 1989. They include, "Search incident to arrest. An officer may search- Who- any person, any time, or every person every time a person is placed under arrest. When- when you develop probable cause to make an arrest. Where- arms control- you may search within "lunging distance"- A reasonable search where you may search for fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of a crime." It wasn't until years after this training that I learned that a search incident to arrest can precede an arrest, and, in fact, may take place even if an arrest doesn't occur. This incomplete coverage is only a part of the program content dilemma.

Police training experts, for example, have lamented the lack of coverage of human relations and communication skills for years. Experienced police officers, on the other hand, have lamented the lack of realism that academy training provides. (O'Laughlin, 2001) Although a recruit officer may be ready for the most hardened of criminals, individuals whom they'll encounter only on the rarest of occasions, they are infrequently prepared to arbitrate the most simple of disputes; arguments that they'll encounter on a daily basis. Rarely are officers properly educated to comprehend the varied customs, beliefs, and lifestyles they'll encounter. These deficiencies may lead to racial profiling because the training is often ineffective in translating cross-cultural norms.

The human relations training often earmarked for a number of multi-cultural issues is often dismissed as 'diversity training' or 'sensitivity training'. It is often a mockery because it is usually conducted by fellow police officers with an eye towards appeasing aggrieved minority groups. In one diversity training session that this author attended, the veteran, Caucasian officer who conducted the training began the program with, "we all know why we're here". This leads, of course to the second issue: instructor quality.

Instructor Quality

Police administrators have often filled academy teaching posts with members of their command staff and the academic community. Being a member of either, however, does not automatically qualify an individual as an effective educator. Thibault (1995) appropriately qualifies the standard all instructors must attain. These instructors must be able to communicate effectively with these recruit officers, while, at the same time, they must act as role models.

Implicit in this prerequisite is that instructors know their subject matter well and possess the appropriate credentials, experience, and background knowledge to be properly received by these impressionable students. Many instructors with academic backgrounds have problems "relating [their] research to practical skills," and few recruits aspire to emulate these academics. Other instructors furthermore, are simply, "command and supervisory officers who relate stories about policing to impress young recruits." (p. 283). Thus, recruit officers may be

receiving insensitive, prejudicial, unrealistic and substandard training from the very onset of their police preparation. Many police training systems are fraught with a host of other problems as well.

The most obvious of these problems is that the curriculum isn't related to the broader context of the police mission. That is, the service part of the 'protect and serve' motto is all but missing. Jerome Bruner (1977) considered a continual broadening of knowledge as the nucleus of education. However, Bruner also believed that this knowledge was of little use unless it was clarified, translated and explicitly linked to a discipline and its broader scope. In other words, Bruner asserted that affective learning does not occur in a vacuum. An integrated, common curriculum, however, is rare in police training and often has little regard for the broader context of policing.

Instruction Methodology

Nearly all police training that I have experienced over my fifteen-year career has been presented using the direct instruction model. The direct instruction model is closely related to the basic lecture format. The purpose of the direct instruction model so overused in police training includes, "training people to perform complex behaviors that involve a high degree of precision...for example, being a crew member in a submarine." (Joyce, 1992) This model is an effective way to impart knowledge in "reading and math, especially for students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds." However, it is not the appropriate method to utilize

with individuals who will soon be responsible for examining, understanding and solving a host of complex human problems. This didactic approach simply encourages blind adherence to process and procedure, and ultimately lays the groundwork for utter adherence to established norms. It teaches these future officers that conformity is of greater importance than individualized character, and contributes both directly and indirectly to corruption, mediocrity, and racial profiling in policing. We need to look no further than the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles to see this phenomenon's perpetuation.

Eleven police officers stood by and witnessed two fellow officers brutally beat Rodney King on the evening of March 3, 1991. The confrontation occurred after a high-speed chase ended in Los Angeles, CA. and King exited his vehicle and confronted the officers. King resisted the officer's attempts to bring him into custody, and was actually the aggressor from the onset. After a brief struggle, however, these officers brought King under control. Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers Lawrence Powell and Sergeant Stacey Koontz then beat King so severely that he had dozens of broken bones. Koontz was the supervising officer as the sergeant on scene. Many of these officers sat idly by were while their immediate supervisor brutally beat King. These inactions are partially attributable to their police training.

The academic indoctrination these officers had received as a part of their LAPD training, and the blind adherence it actualized, contributed to their gross negligence. There is little doubt that these officers would have intervened to stop

the criminal acts perpetuated by their brother officers if they were properly trained. Ethics training, multicultural training, and problem solving training are now a standard of many police academies. These disciplines give officers a universal picture of what is acceptable and not acceptable behavior. The beating of King now falls under the unacceptable category.

Direct Instruction does have its place in police training. There are many subjects that must be mastered before new knowledge is imparted. For example: weapon efficiency, self-defense, First Aid/C.P.R., and defensive driving. The highly structured learning environment that is implicit in the direct instruction model carries with it an emphasis on "academic focus, teacher direction and control, high expectations for pupil progress, time, and neutral affect." (Joyce, 1992, p. 309) The appropriateness of this model to the aforementioned subject matters is obvious. However, this ubiquitous training method promotes blind conformity amongst recruits. This conformity remains with most officers for their entire career and is primary in the perpetuation of the police subculture.

Teacher direction and control occurs when, "the teacher selects and directs learning tasks, determines group patterns, maintains a central role during instruction, [and] keeps student choice and freedom at low levels." (p. 309). The importance of structure, direction, and control in a learning environment of younger school-aged children is of obvious importance. It is also of importance when imparting some of the aforementioned skills. However, this over reliance on an inappropriate instructional methodology creates a "loss of autonomy in the

areas of values and attitudes," and is a testament to the lack of importance police training holds within law enforcement. (Reiser, 1972)

Using a more appropriate instructional methodology may be more effective. For example: Role-Playing, the Group Investigation Model, or the Problem Solving Model of Instruction. It would also be more difficult, more expensive, and more time consuming. Money and time are often a major consideration in public education; in police education, these resources are even scarcer. The tangible gains made by utilizing more effective teaching models, however, would be tremendous. These models are all part of what Joyce categorizes as "The Social Family." (p. V). These models are grouped together because they effectively utilize the social nature of learning to emphatically influence, " academic learning, social development, and the self-esteem of the learner." (p. V). These models enable the learner to think independently while, at the same time, flourish within the social milieu of their environment.

The Role Playing Model

The Role Playing model of instruction offers great hope in the examination of racial profiling. The model derives its basis from Fannie and George Shaftel (1967), and Mark Chesler and Robert Fox's (1966) work. "On its simplest level, role playing is dealing with problems through action... role play, if done well, becomes a part of life." (Joyce, 1992, p. 56) This methodology is affective during a recruit officer's academy training, but can also be influential as an in-service

technique. During the in-service training I received on racial profiling, I was surprised at the unconscious biases that I held. These biases showed during well-designed role playing scenarios. Joyce (p. 56) notes, "the enactment elicits genuine, typical emotional response and behaviors from students." This is what police educators should hope for. While recruits are in the controlled environment of the academy setting, genuine, typical responses and behaviors may bring to light attitudes and biases that must be changed.

The syntax of role-playing takes considerable time and effort on the part of instructors. The model is not as simple as introducing a problem and allowing students to act it out. Once a problem is introduced, "the second part of the warm-up [is] to express the problem vividly through examples." (p. 60). The importance of a vivid learning environment cannot be overstated. In fact, it was during such a phase in my own training on racial profiling that I made the decision to examine the problem more closely.

I have already mentioned the mockery that most sensitivity and diversity training sessions are prepared under. The introduction for my in-service training on racial profiling (2000) began with the forewords 'we all know why we're here'. As I sat there and skeptically watched a training film, though, I was moved. The tape showed a Black, deputy-chief being stopped by a White police officer. The deputy-chief became enraged when the officer could not identify the reason for the motor vehicle stop. As the video camera from the deputy-chief's own unmarked police car rolled, the officer requested back up. The deputy chief was

arrested for disturbing the peace and subsequently suspended. My inclination was to immediately side with the police officer; he was, in fact, just doing his job. However, when the instructor, John Scheft Esq., inquired about the rage this deputy chief must have felt, so much so that he was willing to subject himself to arrest, I became confused.

Members of this police department had previously stopped the deputy-chief on numerous occasions. Interestingly, every officer who had stopped the deputy-chief was White. He had never been issued a citation, either. He had been stopped multiple times by officers from the town in which he lived. In each instance, he was returning home in an unmarked police car. The reasons for each stop were so blatant, that I inquired out loud whether these officers were "KKK members." I was so enlightened that I began this inquiry.

The role-playing model continues through a number of subsequent phases. Phase two involves the selection of participants (on a voluntary basis); Phase three involves querying role players regarding what they expect to occur. Joyce points out that "role players outline the scene but do not prepare any dialogue." (p. 62). Phase four involves the preparation of the participants while in phase five the actual enactment occurs. This phase offers a beneficial learning experience because, "the role players assume the roles and "live" the situation spontaneously, responding realistically to one another." (p.62). The phases that follow entail discussion and re-enactment. "The new enactments should explore possibilities for causes and effects. For example, one role may be changed so

that everyone can observe how that change causes another role player to behave. Or at the critical point in the enactment, the participants my try to behave in a different way and see what the consequences are." (p. 64). Imagine the effect this model could have had if it were properly utilized at the Los Angeles Police Academy. Would the thirteen officers at the Rodney King incident behaved in a different way?

The Group Investigation Model

The Group Investigation Model is another methodology that is appropriate for police training. This Model requires students to work together to solve problems. This may, at first glance, appear to be the antithesis of teaching students to develop their independent thinking skills. However, as Joyce points out, the key to the Group Investigation Model is, " students must add an awareness of self and a desire for personal meaning. In addition, they must assume the dual roles of participant and observer, simultaneously inquiring into the problem and observing themselves as inquirers." (Thelen, 1960; Joyce, 1992) A real problem is introduced, and the character, traits, and biases of individuals within the group setting provide the direction and control to find a solution.

It is through the fundamental dualism that learners develop the ability to think independently. Within this setting students are likely to develop the capacity to perform interdependently as well. This is possible because "Life in the classrooms takes the form of a series of inquiries." (Joyce, 1992, p. 43) Joyce

reports that participants "can react and discover basic conflicts among their attitudes, ideas, and modes of perception." (p. 43). This discovery is critical because with it comes the requisite that these conflicts must be solved to achieve group and personal goals. Returning briefly to the Rodney King incident, it is doubtful that the officers who became involved in the incident believed from the onset that their goals were anything other than apprehending and arresting King. These officers, however, appeared to lack the ability to solve the obvious conflict that unfolded. The basic concepts of knowledge and inquiry are key to discovery and growth according to Thelen and Joyce.

Recruit officers gain much knowledge in the academy setting. Inquiry, on the other hand, is often a matter of clarification rather than a challenge of police doctrine. "Inquiry calls for the first-hand activity in a real situation and ongoing experience that continually generates new ideas. The students are asked to give conscious attention to the experience... In this way thoughts are reorganized into new and more powerful patterns." (p. 44). Even in the best academy settings it is difficult to present students with a real and ongoing experience. This deficiency is at the core of the problem with police training. This wasn't always the case, though.

Police Training in Boston

The Boston Police Academy assigned recruits to senior patrol officers as a part of the Academy curriculum. This occurred up until 1980. This real life,

ongoing experience was phased out, though. This was, according to Dr. Thomas Nolan Ed.D, because recruits returned from these short-term assignments, "too salty to take instruction." (T. Nolan, personal communication, December 21, 2002). Nolan, a Boston Police Lieutenant is also a professor of Ethics at Springfield College. Nolan is amply aware of the training experience because when he became a police officer in 1978, this procedure was used.

The Boston Police assigned recruit officers to short term assignments at intervals of three months. After their first three months in the academy, recruits were assigned to veteran officers for two weeks. They returned to the academy setting and three months later were assigned for four weeks. They ended their academy training with a twelve-week assignment after nine months. Nolan felt the experience was outstanding because as the recruit officers returned from their field experience, they had put into practice the many months of classroom study they had received. This method was phased out, though. Following the recruits' four-week field assignments, the conditions of the learning environment decreased precipitously. After a mere four weeks of exposure to actual police work, these officers had begun to develop, "skepticism and cynicism." (Nolan, 2002)

The experience Nolan and other Boston police officers had up until 1980 closely resembles the intermediate phases of the Group Instruction Model. Joyce describes these phases as "Organizing for study (problem definition, role, assignment, etc.)... [Followed by] Independent and group study." (Joyce, 1992, p.

48) Upon the recruit officer's return, they were debriefed and "recycled" their experiences for maximum affect.

This method of instruction offered a real, affective and effective learning experience. Unfortunately, though, it required a tremendous amount of effort and resources. With both in short supply, it was inevitably abandoned for a more economical method. Interestingly, Nolan found that without this experience, "by the three to five year mark, your police training becomes useless." (Nolan, 2002). Is it any wonder why police deviance like racial profiling flourish in such an organizational culture?

The Problem Solving Model

The Problem Solving Model is currently utilized to great effect. The model, one of the tenets of Trojanowicz' Community Policing, requires officers to take a more global perspective when examining problems. In policing, for example, there is a widespread emphasis on rapid response. The introduction of the 9-1-1 emergency phone systems in 1968 has made it simple to contact police. Abuse of 911 systems has become problematic, though. Walker (1999) criticizes the system as "dial a cop." Because of the emergency nature of the 9-1-1 driven system, some police academics maintain, "the 911 system runs the police department, preventing any rational planning and proactive police response to problems." (p. 77). The simplicity of the problem-solving model aims at correcting the system wide abuse.

The Problem Solving model was introduced in policing by Herman Goldstein in 1979. Goldstein called on police administrators to take a more comprehensive and "strategic response to deal with crime and non-crime police responses." (Geller, 1991) The model has been further simplified and is often referred to as 'SARA'." This stands for Scanning...Patrol officers look for recurring problems; Analysis... an officer or team of officers who collect information about the problem; Response...develop and implement solutions; Assessment...officers and supervisors evaluate the effectiveness of their response." (p. 80).

An effective illustration of this approach is referenced in studies done in Newport News, Virginia. The New Briarfield Housing Complex had experienced a number of residential break-ins. Officers assigned to the case quickly noted a pattern. The breaks occurred overwhelmingly during the weekdays, and most took place in the mid to late afternoon hours. After a lengthy investigation, they found that many of the culprits were school-aged adolescents that were unsupervised. Resources were unavailable for recreation or employment; thus many of the teens appeared to participate out of boredom. Rather than move in and arrest the culprits, of whom there were many, the officers mobilized a number of city resources that resulted in a 35% decrease in burglaries within one year. (p. 82).

Utilizing the Problem Solving Model

Problem Solving has also proven effective in identifying police officers with repeated problems. A meta-analysis of Early Warning System (EWS) literature by Walker, Alpert, and Kenney (2001) found that "as few as 2 percent of all officers are responsible for 50 percent of all citizen complaints." Using the problem solving methodologies, the EWS was able to identify problem officers based on citizen complaints and use-of-force incidents. Once these problem officers were identified, various intervention strategies were utilized. The results were dramatic. In Minneapolis, "the average number of citizen complaints received by officers subject to early intervention dropped by 67 percent 1 year after intervention." (Walker, 1999, p. 7)

These cognitive approaches are a divergence from past police practice. Most police officers are assigned to randomly patrol a given jurisdiction with little purpose other than interrupt crimes in progress. The chances of this are very slight, though. In fact, extensive examinations in San Diego, Boston, and Syracuse found that "patrol officers could expect to intercept less fewer than 1 percent of street crimes." (Geller, 1991, p. 63) The practice of random patrol minimizes an officer's ability to investigate and solve reoccurring problems. As a result, patrol officers are bounced from call to call, responding to the same address and the same problems over and over. The officers have little purpose other than to quickly service the call so that they can be available for the next

call. In this style of policing, officers come to accept this form of human triage as a permanent reality of police work. With this acceptance, cynicism and deviance are certain to follow.

Officers who are trained in the Problem Solving methodologies may examine issues from a different perspective. The emphasis is on learning as much about the problem, taking time to understand the underlying causes, and then seeking out solutions so this issue will not reoccur. George Posner (1992) refers to this as "meaningful learning... tasks that require understanding and sense making." (p. 102). From this meaningful learning, Posner postulates, "innate structures develop as the individual develops. Furthermore, knowledge and beliefs the individual acquire affect the way they perceive and think about subsequent ideas, objects, and emotions." (p. 109). In this light, the interminable problems officers face may be perceived as solvable mishaps rather than permanent realities. With this shift to problem solving, there is increased hope amongst officers that they can actually make a difference. (Trojanowicz, 1998) When this occurs, the possibility of ending racial profiling becomes more realistic.

Additional Issues

Danger

Another important quandary in police training is that police trainers often perpetuate the mythology of omnipotent danger. As Skolnick (1966) noted "danger is one of the most important facets in the development of a police

working personality. The relationship between the real dangers...and the police perception... is complex." Although policing is, in fact, one of the more dangerous professions in our society, the rate of injury and death is lower than many other occupations. Police are assaulted at a much higher rate than any other vocational sub group, (BJS, 1998); however, the myth of the police officer under siege is, with some respects, a self fulfilling prophecy, To compound this, there is a tendency for officers to isolate themselves from non-police personnel. Officers become increasingly weary of anyone unlike themselves. Nearly seventy-nine percent of police officers, furthermore, are White males. (BJS 1, 2002)

Insignificant Duration

The current state of academy training has a number of other deficiencies. For example: there's an over reliance on rigid military etiquette, resources are quite limited, and there is an emphasis on efficient training rather than effective training. However, one of the most profound shortcomings is the training's finite orientation. The most obvious analogous educational example is the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) training in our Nation's middle schools.

Numerous examinations of the DARE curriculum have found that this law enforcement-based, drug abuse education program is ineffective in changing attitudes and behaviors of adolescents. (Rosenbaum, 1994) Among the many criticisms leveled against this curriculum, the most pertinent was the lack of reinforcing educational experiences offered to DARE students as follow up. In

fact, there was no recapitulation of the curriculum; the children were exposed to this framework for four-plus months and expected to forever retain the core messages. Post curricula studies indicated that the affects wore off within a maximum of two years. Associate this to police training, and the comparisons become apparent.

We can return to the model recruit training programs to further highlight the importance of sustained, effective training. In Greensboro, it is only after nearly two years of rigorous training, apprenticeship, and evaluation, and the successful completion of all requisites, that an officer becomes eligible for more advanced training and assignment. In San Jose, this period spans over nearly eighteen months. In most other departments, though, it is well before even the one-year mark that rigorous and meaningful training is abandoned. Departments then come to rely on in-service training that has, at best, a negligible affect on officers. (Thibault, 1995; Swanson, 2001; Walker, 1999)

This lack of sustained, progressive training and evaluation beyond an officer's probationary period is one of the greatest weaknesses in law enforcement. In fact, this lack of emphasis on training, and the constant re-evaluation that it creates, contributes directly to the problem of racial profiling. The age-old adage in policing states, 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it.' Framingham, MA. Police Chief Bruce Larabee takes a more progressive approach, "if you don't fix it, it will break." (B. Larabee, personal communication, April 5, 1995)

2.4 POLICE SUPERVISION AND TRAINING

Supervisory training is arguably the greatest of all failures in law enforcement. Recommendations for first line supervisory training (sergeants) normally range from two to four weeks; however, many departments offer none. That is, it is possible to be a line officer one day, and a line supervisor the next. I, in fact, experienced this situation when I was promoted from patrolman to sergeant.

The screening process is often limited to a written test and a review of an officer's personnel file. Under the civil service rule of three, if an officer seeking promotion has stayed out of trouble, the appointing authority must find just cause to disregard this officer and appoint another individual. Only in the larger, more progressive departments are other qualifiers added to the supervisory screening process. It is at this first line supervisory level, more than any other in law enforcement, that the seeds of cynicism, corruption, and deviance are developed or nullified.

Sergeants

Ianonne (1987) maintained in *Supervision of Police Personnel* that sergeants were the 'backbone' of a police department. Not only is this an accurate assessment, but first line supervisors (i.e. sergeants) have the greatest affect on all aspects of their subordinates performance because of their "close

relationship...but also because the superior exercises such a strong influence upon the subordinate's physical and social environment. (p.1). Police sergeants directly control much of what occurs in police officers daily duties. This influence can be either positive or negative. The Rodney King beating is probably one of the most historic and vivid examples of defective police supervision.

Los Angeles Police Department Sgt. Stacey Koontz had the authority to bring the incident to a speedy and appropriate conclusion. Although there is much dispute as to when exactly King no longer posed a danger to the officers, the arrest turned into a brutal beating. Eleven officers and one supervisor sat idly by as Lawrence Powell struck King multiple times with a baton. This incident ultimately led to race riots around the country that left billions of dollars in damage and scores dead. Probably no other incident in this generation better exemplifies the importance of properly selecting and training police supervisors.

Training Outcomes

Goldstein found that corruption thrives "in poorly run organizations...where supervision is minimal." (Goldstein, 1977). Police departments are still modeled after the London Military Police structure of the early 1800's. This organizational structure adheres to Max Weber's organizational principles which include a hierarchy, specialization, a division of labor, official policies and procedures, etc. (Trojanowicz, 2002; Swanson, 2001; Thibault, 1995). Through these structures

and principles, police administrators are able to maintain a "high degree of structure" in an otherwise complex world of interactions and behaviors. (Trojanowicz, 2002, p. 93)

The failure to properly supervise, and the failure to properly train supervisors, has contributed to nearly every major police scandal in our nations' history. The relationship between deficient supervision and police deviance is a linear one; it underscores the need for better training at all levels of law enforcement. Only the most structured and professional departments, however, offer appropriate supervision to control and avoid police corruption and deviance. Appropriate supervision and appropriate supervisory training are indistinguishable.

Supervisory training is of such great importance because of the discretionary nature of policing. That is, absolute enforcement of every law and ordinance is not only impossible, but it is also impractical. (Walker, 1999) Many officers and scholar alike realize that non-enforcement is often a more appropriate response than initiating the perplexing criminal justice system. Few would argue that police discretion is a necessary tool. However, it is the unguided use of these discretionary powers that leads to such police deviance as racial profiling. (Kelling, 2001, Walker, 1999) Unfortunately, James Q Wilson found that discretion "increases as one moves down the organizational hierarchy." (Wilson, 1970) Line level personnel often exercise the most discretion in law enforcement. Without appropriate supervision, this can be a dangerous proposition.

community contact and citizen input. In its ideal state, community policing would provide for greater accountability to the community because police officers are permanently assigned to an area. As a result, the community better understands the abilities and limitations of the officer, and gets to know the officer on a more personal level. The theory also postulates that citizens must accept their share of responsibility, and "handle more of their [own] minor concerns." (p. 312). Officers also become more accountable for quality of life and crime related issues under the 'Total Quality Management' theory implicit in the Community Policing archetype. (Trojanowicz, 1998; Thibault, 1995; Swanson, 2001) Trojanowicz simplifies the framework by using the analogy that officers become mini-chiefs and "community ombudsman" in their assigned areas. (p. 311).

There is little evidence to counter the grand claims that Community Policing asserts. Few police administrators or police academe have dared to examine the disadvantages or losses that Community Policing may have actuated. Trojanowicz, however, qualified his theory with the caveat that "Community Policing is not a panacea." (p. 27). However, many police practitioners privately question the effectiveness of this new wave of policing, and liken it to the many fads that have come and gone in law enforcement.

The Community Policing movement has brought an increased emphasis on individual accountability while concurrently granting line officers greater autonomy. Officers are encouraged to experiment, while supervisors are encouraged to tolerate mistakes. Officers enjoy a tremendous amount of latitude

and discretion enforcing the multitude of laws. However, there is a parallel increase in accountability for topographical criminality under the Community Policing archetype. It is thus conceivable that police deviance and corruption actually increases due to this increased accountability. Bratton (2001) spoke of the "sharp pencils precinct commanders" maintained during the New York Police Department's (NYPD) zero tolerance crackdowns. However, others maintain that these 'sharp pencils' may have been used to misrepresent increasing crime statistics. Furthermore, Green (1999) found a significant increase in complaints against officers during the 'zero tolerance' initiative.

The actual number of police departments who have instituted Community Policing programs is quite significant. In fact, McEwen (1994) found in a national survey that eighty-percent of the respondent departments had instituted community-policing programs. Part of the community policing philosophy requires a "change in organizational structure," (Trojanowicz, 2002, p. 32) to accommodate increased autonomy for line officers, and increased accountability to the community. There are serious questions, however, as to whether police organizations have provided the appropriate types of supervision in the past to effectively "control police deviance." (Kappler, Sluder & Alpert, 1998)

Police educators purport that police accountability will be increased under the Community Policing philosophy due to the increase in the number of police-citizen contacts. (Trojanowicz, Bucqueroux, Kappler, 1998) Concurrent with increased interaction, there is a parallel emphasis on quantitative policing. That

is, under the theory, officers are held accountable for criminality that occurs within their specific area. (Trojanowicz, 2002, p. 10) These officers are often required to demonstrate that they have taken steps to alleviate area-specific problems. This has led to, "cops taking names off gravestones," to legitimize their workloads. (O'Laughlin, 2001) It also increases the likelihood of contact with citizenry who "don't belong in the area." (Meehan and Ponder, 2002) Therefore, Community Policing may actually increase the chances of racial profiling.

Community Policing has produced many success stories. For example, one of the most cited illustrations occurred in the New Briarfield Housing Complex in Newport News, Virginia. This complex experienced an inordinate amount of home burglaries in the mid-afternoon hours. After an extensive investigation into the incidents, it was determined that idle teenagers with little to do once school let out were committing many of these burglaries. Interventions were offered so that many of these teens were provided with better opportunities for more constructive behaviors. In other instances, repeat offenders were arrested and prosecuted. The goal of decreased burglary was promptly realized in this case.

How these objectives were achieved is critical to the discussion of racial profiling. If, for example, officers engaged in questionable tactics to reach the goals set forth by administrators, then ultimately the price was too high. In the Briarfield Housing illustration, this was not the case. However, the specter of such inappropriate police tactics has certainly been raised in other Community Policing

initiates such as NYPD's zero tolerance policy on street disorder. (Engel, Calnon, Bernard, 2002)

There is increased risk of racial profiling when there is increased accountability for criminality in specific areas. This is compounded when commensurate increases in appropriate support and supervision are lacking. Kelling and Bratton argue that permanently assigned neighborhood route officers can make an appreciable difference in a community's quality of life. (Kelling, 2001) This is only under virtually ideal conditions, however.

NYPD's Zero Tolerance

Bratton attributes the increased quality of life issues that accompanied his arrival as the commissioner of the New York City Police Department to COMSTAT. COMPSTAT was literally taken from "computer statistics." (Bratton, 2001) However, this computer generated breakdown of a dizzying array of statistics is arguably nothing more than increased accountability and supervision in a department infamous for a lack of both. Under Bratton's tenure, numerous incidents of what Amnesty International called, "human rights abuses," (ACLU, 2001) also occurred; including the rape of a Haitian immigrant by officers in a precinct stationhouse.

Police officers are often awarded permanent assignments because of work ethic, professionalism and initiative. "A patrol officer's sector assignment is not simply a geographical designation, it is a territory over which officers exert

jurisdictional claims." (VanMaanen, 1974; Manning, 1997; Meehan and Ponder, 2002) There is a genuine sense of ownership. When individuals enter this area that appear to deviate from the perceived norms, they become the subjects of the officer's attention. The archetype, criterion, or profile that many officers utilize is often arbitrary, misconceived, and subjective. The organizational culture often dictates these parameters. Race and ethnicity are the most apparent dimensions subject to abuse. Meehan and Ponder call them "atypifications." (p. 4).

Atypifications

The rationale behind these 'atypifications' has a dual purpose. First, officers utilize these atypifications to investigate possible criminality. However, they may also be perpetuated for the purpose of the aforementioned quantitative, topographical criminality, "To generate numbers," according to O'Laughlin. (2001) As the Pilot study and several other studies indicate, many police officers associate African-Americans with criminality. (Cleary, 2000; Weitzer, 1999) However, being a young Black male dressed in urban garb does not, by itself, constitute criminal activity. In many wealthy, predominantly White suburbs, though, it comes close enough to constitute citizen and police apprehension. Racial profiling is more apparent in these settings.

Meehan and Ponder attribute racial profiling to "race and place." However, the abuses many minority citizens suffer at the hands of law enforcement are more likely attributable to a lack of training and supervision than race and place.

Scrupulous and judicious training and supervision are critical. (Meehan and Ponder, 2002; Scheft, 2001; Trojanowicz, 2002)

Racial Profiling and the Law

Racial profiling occurs when the racial characteristics of an individual are the primary consideration for the initiation of police action. This is appropriate in some situations. However, as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in the case of Commonwealth versus Grinkley, (1997) even when a crime is reported, "merely descriptive [information] of race, ethnic identity, and location in a public place," does not amount to adequate justification for police detention. (Massachusetts v. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 62 (1997))

This decision affirmed a 1992 ruling in the case of Commonwealth versus Cheek. The Cheek's decision stated that vague descriptions could not serve as the basis for stopping "young Black males wearing Black parkas," even if they were in a "high crime area" and near the scene of a recent stabbing. (Massachusetts v. Cheek, 413 Mass. 492 (1992)) These generic, ethnic based descriptions fit many individuals in the predominantly African-American section of Boston where both crimes occurred.

The officers involved in these cases relied on their training and experience to initiate police action. In both instances, their training and experience resulted in arrests. However, the court found that these officers engaged in an implicit form of racial profiling. Many police practitioners were taken aback by these rulings.

Officers are taught from the onset of their training that they should be particularly sensitive to individuals that engage in "suspicious activity". (Scheft, 2001) Massachusetts General Law has clearly delineated what constitutes suspicious activity. To summarize the wealth of criminal cases, it is activity that is atypical for the normative behavior of a given place, at a given time, given the totality of the circumstances.

Meehan and Ponder have found race and place are critical in determining police behavior. Police officers are more likely to surveille and stop minority citizens the further they are aware from minority neighborhoods; whether a crime has been committed or not. In other words, the farther African Americans venture into White neighborhoods, the more likely they are to be stopped. This is the archetype of racial profiling.

Many citizens, however, expect police officers to "protect them from the minority outsiders" (Weitzer 1999; Meehan and Ponder, 2002) Yet, these same citizens overwhelmingly disapprove of racial profiling. (Fridell, 2001) Thus, there is a tremendous chasm between the theoretical and practical applications of law enforcement practices and the varied parameters within which they occur. Officers are barraged by inconsistent and constantly changing demands. Because of this, they often turn towards fellow officers.

2.5 POLICE SUBCULTURE

A police officer's behavior is influenced more by the value systems of fellow police officers than any other variable. It is what Arnold (1970) referred to as "the police subculture...a body of esoteric knowledge and appropriate behavior patterns...novices [must exhibit] before they are accepted by the initiated." Police officers not only have a specialized "argot or jargon, " (Thibault, 1995) they also have specialized behavior patterns. "Police work is divisive and reflects the prejudices of the community and individual officers." (Bittner, 1970; Meehan and Ponder, 2002) However, the most influential 'community' is fellow officers. This psychosocial aspect of policing is often overlooked. Yet, this organizational culture, referred to in law enforcement as the police subculture or the thin blue line, dictates the moral reasoning, values, and behaviors of nearly every officer. Thus, it is a fusion of the community and the subculture that prescribe what is 'normative' or an 'atypification'.

Police departments enjoy one of the strongest vocational group structures in our society. The unity shared by officers who work side-by-side is immense. In their duties as public servants, they come to rely on each other for their very survival. Ultimately, this closeness and co-dependency evolves off the job as well. Studies indicate that this leads to the isolation of police officers, "from the rest of American society." (Skolnick, 1966; Westley, 1970; Thibault, 1995) There is much positive about this bond. As Albert Reiser found in the Los Angeles

Police Department, (LAPD) "it bolsters and supports the individual officer's esteem and confidence, which then allows him to tolerate higher levels of anger, hostility, and abuse from external sources. " (Reiser, 1974)

The police subculture is a vocation wide set of standards and behaviors that are unique to policing. However, this subculture is also quite parochial. Standards, values, and behaviors found in one police organization might be significantly different than an abutting police organization. The APA (2003) defines culture as, "the belief systems and value orientations that influence customs, norms, practices, and social institutions, including psychological processes...and organizations." (APA, 2003; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998) This culture, actually a way of living, has unique affects on police officers.

Reiser (1972) found that police officers become more socially distant to non-police personnel as their careers' develop. This separation leads to isolation, and ultimately to greater attachment to the subculture. In many cases, the bonds between police officers become as close as family. Police officers often refer to each other as 'brother'. Reiser (1974), a former L.A.P.D. psychologist, found that these attachments led to, "a loss of autonomy in the areas of values and attitudes." It is in this loss of autonomy where police deviance and corruption fester.

Attachment to the Subculture

Attachment Theory offers an ideal theoretical framework to illustrate how far-reaching the police subculture extends. Attachment has been associated almost exclusively with parent-child relationships even though Bowlby proposed that "attachment occurred across the lifespan within the context of adult close relationships." (Pietromonaco, 2000; Bowlby, 1979) The members of this subculture become a "secure base," (Bowlby, 1979) from which individual officers identify with, assimilate from, and accommodate to. Attachment is an important factor in establishing the normative behavior patterns in law enforcement. Westley, (1970) for example, found in his examination of the Gary, IN. police department that officers were willing to "perjure themselves to protect a brother officer."

Ainsworth (1971) proposed a three-dimensional framework for attachment relationships. Relationships can be described on a continuum from secure to anxiety and avoidance filled. An individual has two choices when faced with an anxiety- inducing situation. "People can orient their behavior toward the attachment figure (seeking contact or support) or withdraw and attempt to handle the threat alone." (Brenner, Clark, and Shaver, 1998) In nearly all dilemmas that police officers face, though, they cannot withdraw or face it alone. In the first instance, withdrawal has been found to be an ineffective policing strategy. (Ianonne, 1987; Swanson, 2003, et al.) Secondly, if officers could face a situation

alone, the situation would likely be routine and wouldn't produce anxiety. Thus, police officers involved in anxiety producing situations, of which there are many, have no choice but to orient their behavior towards the attachment figure. That is, officers are gradually indoctrinated into the police subculture as a matter of custom and necessity. This cultural indoctrination begins at the very onset of a candidate's academy training. The phenomenon then evolves over the first few years of an officer's career, and coincides with Neiderhoffer's framework on police cynicism.

Cynicism

Arthur Neiderhoffer (1967) established the theoretical framework for cynicism in policing. Neiderhoffer argued that a police officer's attitudes, behaviors, and values evolved in stages. These attitudes range from euphoria and excitement, denoted by "pseudo-cynicism," to disillusionment and despair, denoted by "aggressive cynicism." Neiderhoffer's theory posited that aggressive cynicism occurred at "the ten year mark where resentment and hostility became obvious," (p.103). The reality, though, is that this may occur much earlier. (Reiser, 1974; Stratton, 1984; Violanti, 1985) The bothersome rates of police divorce, malady, and suicide gives credence to the development of this callous, alienated, and disillusioned state.

Police officers develop strong partiality towards their secure base of fellow officers with whom they share much in common. Ultimately, they accommodate

(adopt) many of their characteristics. This secure base is referred to as the "primary groups in a police bureaucracy." (Thibault, 1995, p. 31) These primary groups determine the attitudes, behaviors, and customs of a police organization. It is the gradual display of these characteristics that indicates to the informal leaders of an organization that a novice officer has adopted the appropriate group traits. This "esoteric knowledge," (p. 25) which includes cynicism and a loss of autonomy, is a rite of passage into the police subculture. One of the more apparent consequences is racial profiling.

Other idiosyncratic behaviors and beliefs are also developed. The severity of these vocational idiosyncrasies are dependent upon a number of variables that include the psychosocial milieu (subculture) within the department; the attitudes and prejudices of the community; and the leadership ability of the police chief. (Reiss, 1971; Brown, 1981; Thibault, 1995) A 1986 citizen survey in Philadelphia, for example, found that "residents view the police favorably, even though most believe that police engage in wide-spread misbehavior." (Geller, 1991, p. 240) Eighty-eight percent of the respondents in this survey reported that they believed police officers took bribes; yet, they still thought officers did a "good job." (p. 240).

New York's COMPSTAT

The police subculture and its blue wall of silence provides neglectful officers an opportunity for obscurity. (Delattre, 1989) As Community Policing continues to expand, there is a continued emphasis on quantitative as well as qualitative policing. A prime example is NYPD's COMSTAT System. However, without the appropriate training, supervision, and leadership, quantitative policing inevitably leads to corruption, deviance, and racial profiling. In a neglectful environment as such, the general behavior patterns of officers become highly individualized and subject to corruptive influences.

Leadership within the Subculture

The police chief and the community also contribute. In Philadelphia, they came to tacitly accept police corruption as an occupational truism by their inaction and capitulation. These corruptive influences readily expand to other officers. The acceptable and normative behavior of the organization, the organizational culture, was such in Philadelphia that corruption was the conventional manner of behavior. In this environment, where training and supervision are minimal, and discretion often goes unchecked, corruption, deviance, and racial profiling thrive. (Walker, 1999; Bayley, 2001)

Racial Profiling is considered by some (P. Scott, February 16, 2001) to be a new form of corruption. However, the problem is anything but new. Racism was

a normative part of our society just a generation ago. These effects have undoubtedly carried over into current law enforcement practices. In fact, the respondents in the Pilot study were in agreement that there have been dramatic changes over the last generation in policing. Brookline Police Captain Peter Scott asserted, "We could get away with a lot more when I came on the job twenty-seven years ago." (Scott, 2001) However, Scott added that twenty-seven years ago, there were no computers, poor public record keeping, little oversight of police departments, and a "very homogeneous" group of police officers. It becomes quite apparent how individual values are quickly lost in this secretive and unwavering subculture.

Leadership and Supervision Failure

The River Cops of the Miami Police Department illustrated how psychosocial factors within a police organization contributed to corruption and deviance. The officers in these incidents didn't engage in deviant acts, they partook in violent, explicit criminal behavior. These officers became known as the "River Cops, or the Enterprise," (Geller, 1991, p. 243) because of their penchant for robbing drug smugglers along various rivers in the greater Miami area. These robberies were often official police acts since they were on duty when these crimes were committed. The psychosocial milieu within the department, the geographic and sociological make up of this area, and the lack of conscientious leadership allowed for these disturbing circumstances to occur.

The massive demographic and social changes in the Miami area that occurred at this time also contributed to these problems. There was little community cohesion due to the massive influx of immigrants into the area. These recent Émigrés, many from Haiti and Cuba, also had great reservation and outright distrust for government officials. The police department was not accountable to the community because, in reality, a community, with all of its cohesive characteristics, did not exist. This lack of accountability, coupled with poor training, poor supervision and poor screening ultimately led to police officers committing murder. What was even more disturbing, other officers who were aware of these problems did nothing to stop them.

This is the dominion the police subculture maintains. In Miami, the self-interest of the police subculture was more important than the rights, liberties, and lives of the community members. An appropriate descriptive of this sad irony is provided by Delattre in his examination of Durkheim's account of anomie, "a pathological condition of alienation from society and its constraining influence of law and morality. It means loss of any sense of solidarity with the collective sentiments and positive norms of society." (Delattre, 1989, p. 75) Miami is not the only department to experience serious and violent corruption by its members. New Orleans, New York City and Los Angeles are just a few of the departments who have had murders perpetuated by police officers while they were on duty.

Corruption and Policing

Corruption has long been viewed by police academia as the results of a small group of defective officers. Recently, though, the "bad apple theory," has been discounted and researchers have been forced to re-examine the effects of the "organizational/occupational approach." (Klockars, 2000) A recent study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice attempted to measure the levels of integrity in 30 separate police departments. A standardized survey was presented to identify collective trends. What the survey found, though, was a dramatic difference in what constituted acceptable behavior in each department. In fact, Klockars reported that the research "found substantial differences in the environments of integrity among the agencies studied." This was attributable to a number of issues all related to the organizational culture of each respective department. Integrity measures differed vastly based on the accepted norms of each department. These were important findings because they attributed attitudes, behaviors, and customs to the parochial subculture.

Organizational Culture

Organizational culture greatly affects the customs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of a police organization. Organizational deficiencies include poor training, a faulty selection process, lack of supervision, and poor leadership. (Walker, 1999; Ianonne, 1987) Organizations that are deficient in training,

leadership, and supervision usually offer deficient, and even corrupt police services. (Geller, 1991, pp. 248-250) Leadership, training and supervision are central to this research. However, an examination of the hiring practices of these departments is beyond the scope of this research

Excessive force by police officers can also be attributed the organizational culture of a department. Although Scrivner (1994) found certain individual officers with personality disorders were more likely to be involved in excessive force complaints, the predominant archetypes identified in the research were all attributable to the organizational culture. Scrivner found that "excessive force is not just a problem of individuals but may also reflect organizational deficiencies." (p. 5). These deficiencies ranged from improper screening, to "officers whose previous job-related experience places them at risk." According to Scrivner, these officers were negatively affected as a result of trauma encountered in the line of duty; however they didn't receive subsequent support and assistance to deal with the after effects. As a result, they're involved in "an excessive force situation in which the officer has lost control." (Scrivner: 6)

The Miami 'River Cops' received tacit support for their acts simply by the inaction of their police brethren. Their fellows officers, from police chief to first line supervisor, should have been aware of prior, less serious police deviance because the "corrupting of a cop is a gradual process." (Geller, 1991, p. 250) Yet, it was often dealt with in an ineffective manner, if it was dealt with it at all. (p. 247). The lack of appropriate community input, supervisory controls, and poor

training only compounded the outcome. This equation, then, is the antecedent to police corruption, police deviance, and racial profiling.

Police officers believe that they maintain the 'thin-blue-line' between anarchy and democracy. However, this partition can breed and insulate corrupt police practices through an "excessive tolerance for the misconduct of fellow officers." (p. 250). The organizational culture of a department is a principal reason why corruption perpetuates. It is not the only reason, though.

The community and the police chief often contribute indirectly to police scandal. The community contributes by not demanding quality and accountability from their respective department. Police officers and citizens alike often forget that policing is a public service. That is, it is a government body set up specifically to serve and benefit community members. Yet, citizens and officers rarely interact with one another on positive terms to foster this relationship. This is compounded by the fact that there is an invariable drop in support for police when an individual is victimized. (p. 35). Community Policing reiterates that close ties to the community are critical to effective law enforcement. This is not just the responsibility of the police department's community service division, though.

The Community and the Police

The community is dependent on the police for safety. The police, in turn, are dependent on the community for information. Goodwill between these co-dependent entities should create enhanced police services, according to

Trojanowicz' Community Policing philosophy. However, this is rarely the case. Police officers develop an 'us-versus-them' mentality that creates hostility toward the public. When the public is victimized by crime, there is a uniform drop in support for police officers. (Geller, 1991). Police officers in many urban areas throughout the country, though, experience more than an invariable lack of support.

They often endure hostility, hatred, and violence. The Kerner Commission (1968) found a sudden increase in violence against law enforcement in the late 1960's. The Kerner Commission reviewed the actions of the Chicago Police Department's 1968 "police riot" at the Democratic National Convention. "The policeman in the ghetto is a symbol of increasingly bitter social debate over law enforcement. One side...exerts extreme pressure on police for tougher law enforcement. Another group inflamed against police as agents of repression, tend towards {outright} defiance." (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, 1968; Saxe & Fabricatore, 1982) Although the quote is dated, the theme is repeated today. Entire sections of communities, often wealthy and White, feel that, "if the police just cracked heads and the court locked up everyone" crime would abate. (Trojanowicz, 2002, p.23) While many residents of besieged minority neighborhoods still see the police as agents of oppression. Thus, the community categorically and directly affects the quality of police service.

Absence of Leadership

The police chief also contributes to the quality of policing a community receives. A police chief, first and foremost, must provided leadership. Leadership is a multi-faceted concept. Poor leadership is most evident when a department is rife with corruption and scandal. Other indications include low morale and espirit de corp, excessive turnover rates, abuse of sick time, and inordinate excessive force complaints. (Geller, 1991; Ianonne, 1987) These variables are compounded when supervisors exhibit these attitudes and behaviors. The need for examining attitudes towards an organization is critical because these attitudes dictate actions and behaviors.

Chiefs contribute to police scandals by manifesting leadership in a vacuum and thus being removed from the daily operations of the department. The only internal interactions most police chiefs have is with other administrators. It is rare to find chief administrators with an intimate knowledge of first line supervisory and line level practices except in the smallest agencies. Yet, Ianonne (1987) calls this group the "backbone" of a police department, and Kelling (2001) calls them "critical," to the success of any police organization. An examination of highly publicized police precipitated events illustrates this point.

Prominent examples of Leadership Failure

Three prominent incidents illustrate. These are Ruby Ridge, ID, Waco, TX, and the MOVE Disaster in Philadelphia. Nagels (1991) review of the Philadelphia MOVE disaster of 1985 found that the decision makers resorted to a phase in their planning which he referred to as "defensive avoidance." This stage followed a specific pattern of, "procrastination and delay, followed by passing the buck and denying other personal responsibility, followed by bolstering and gaining superficial support from others." (Swanson, 2001, p. 537) Nagel's hypothesis on defensive avoidance provided the framework for Taylor and Pritchard's (1996) paper, "Decision-Making in Crisis: Police Responses to Protracted Critical Incidents."

Taylor and Pritchard identified these protracted critical incidents as having uniquely similar evolutions. "Each incident grew from police advancing on the homes of well armed openly defiant groups. In all the incidents, police intelligence... was in gross error. To complicate the issue, the primary decision-maker was not at the scene. Finally, the decision maker lost all hope for a peaceful solution." They concluded that leadership in each incident was lacking and faulty. The message this incident extends is that leadership not grounded in critical, salient, and situational specificity is likely to fail.

This detached leadership is the cause of many police failures. Although the three critical incidents are obvious examples, pervasive deviance and

corruption are more subtle indicators. Racial profiling proliferates in settings where leadership is lacking, as do other forms of police deviance and corruption. To guard against the inevitable failures that lead to racial profiling, clear policy must be established.

Policy must state what is and is not acceptable behavior. Policy must have contingencies built in because rarely do even the best plans fully succeed. (Swanson, 2001) Unless there is forethought into future plans, and input from those who will be responsible for carrying out these plans, failure is inevitable. Failure exhibits itself through racial profiling, excessive force, and inferior policing. The key to the control and eradication then, is excellence in leadership, supervision, and training. In an environment that lacks these foundations, officers become proficient in putting their best interests' above and beyond all else.

2.6 STRESS IN POLICING

Racial Profiling and police deviance eventuates as a result of the aforementioned variables. However, one issue that is rarely attributed to corruption and deviance is the physical, emotional, and psychological pathologies police officers suffer as a result of their vocation. The results of cumulative stresses on police officers and police families are disturbing: "as many as 25% of officers in their respective departments have serious alcohol abuse problems."

(Roberts, 1975) "Police officers have the second highest rate [of suicide] of thirty-six occupations, at 47.6 per 100,000 per year."(Labovitz, 1971) "Police officers as an occupational group have one of the highest divorce rates in the country." (Swanson, 1988) "Police work poses about the same risk as diabetes or high levels of cholesterol...and is even a greater risk than high blood pressure or smoking." (Franke, 1998) "The average rate of death for police officers in our forty year study was sixty-six." (Violanti, 1995) Profiling, corruption and deviance appear to relate to stress in law enforcement. Without commensurate support and assistance, which appears to be a nearly universal dilemma in policing, these transgressions are predestined.

Much has been written about police stress. The National Criminal Justice Reference Service of the US Department of Justice cites over five thousand references. However, little has been done to correlate police deviance and corruption to stress. Stratton (1978), in fact, came to the observable conclusion that "People under stress make mistakes. In policing... [mistakes] result in potentially irreparable, even fatal, consequences." It is the finality of these mistakes that can have devastating affects.

Several of the experts interviewed (Scheft, Scott, and O'Laughlin) have little doubt that stress contributes to deviant, immoral, and corrupt behaviors. Scrivner (1994) found that many excessive force complaints were not attributable to "bad apples," (rogue officers) but were the result of "organizational deficiencies." (p.5). One of the most glaring and universal organizational

deficiencies in law enforcement is a lack of suitable employee support and assistance. How does this translate to police officers engaging in racial profiling?

Primary Stressors

The Police Organization

The answer to this question lies in the predominate source of stress in policing. It is not the danger of the job. Nor is it the frequency at which officers observe human beings at their very worst. The most stressful aspect of police work is the police organization. (Finn & Tomz, 1996) Finn and Tomz meta-analysis found that these stresses included "police culture (e.g. machoism, code of silence regarding corruption);...unproductive management styles...inconsistent discipline, lack of input into policy and decision making...and a lack of administrative support."

An antagonistic relationship between administrators and line level personnel is commonplace in police organizations. This tension leads to a number of organizational pathologies. Included in these are, "excessive aggressiveness...emotional detachment...reduced morale...cynicism and suspiciousness...suicide." (p. 55). In such a divisive and fractured environment "subcultures within the organization," even develop. (p. 56). This is the antecedent to the 'subculture of cynicism' that Neiderhoffer spoke of.

Untreated stress leads to disturbing behaviors. Suicide, drug abuse, and alcoholism are just three examples. (Swanson, 2001) Not coincidentally, police

officers have elevated rates of all three. The increased disease rates can, to a modest extent, be tied to the nature of police work. These rates, however, are more affected by the nature of the police organization. Arthur Neiderhoffer's much cited work on cynicism in policing illustrates.

Neiderhoffer's Cynicism

Neiderhoffer (1967) wrote extensively about cynicism in police. His study is still one of the most referenced in policing today. He purported that police officers went through a series of developmental milestones that resulted in apparent changes in the officers' belief systems. The experimental design of Neiderhoffer's examination was later proven faulty. As a result, much of his work was discredited. His examination of police attitudes, however, still resonates today, and is of critical importance to the discussion of racial profiling.

Neiderhoffer found that officers' attitudes were shaped by the how long they had served as a police officer. Although Neiderhoffer's examination was methodologically flawed, Regoli and Poole (1978) later confirmed his theory on attitudes and length of service. Neiderhoffer found that cynicism developed in four stages. He noted that the most vulnerable were the "most idealistic" young officers. During Neiderhoffer's third stage of cynicism, "aggressive cynicism...resentment and hostility," were apparent. This was most evident at the ten-year mark of an officer's career. This stage was dependent upon "a conjunction of individual cynicism and the subculture of cynicism." (p. 105).

This subculture of cynicism is a driving force in the evolution and perpetuation of racial profiling. In an environment where officers are forced to depend on one another for their very survival, this closed society of officers yields a tremendous ability to demand conformity to group norms. We know that this 'group' is predominately working class, White males with conservative attitudes. Thus, it can be presumed that others will assimilate prejudicial attitudes this predominant group may hold. In such an intimate vocational cohort, these closed, conservative, and secretive ideals can shape behavior, attitude, and bias.

It has been found that cynicism proliferates in a workplace with low decision making latitude and high demand. (Quick & Terrick, 2003) There is also evidence that this combination, "is particularly dangerous in relation to illness risk." (Karasek, 1979) Quick and Terrick indicate that job strain that involves low decision latitude is associated with, "excess risk [of illness] between forty and fifty percent in most of the studies." (Quick & Terrick, 2003, p. 210) Job strain is defined as work, "which involves a high level of psychological demand." Karasek's construct further found that these increased risks led to mental pathologies and cynicism especially in high demand, low decision latitude work environments. Law enforcement manifests all of these characteristics.

Neiderhoffer wrote extensively of cynicism nearly forty years ago. Quick and Terrick, however, note that work by Anderson & Bateman (1997), and Dean, Brandes, & Dharwadkar (1998), indicates that cynicism is still, "an emerging concept in psychology and organizational behavior, [now] used to refer to

negative attitudes involving frustration from, disillusionment and distrust of organizations, persons and groups." (Quick & Terrick, 2003, p. 247). Anderson and Bateman found that cynicism is closely associated with burnout. This syndrome, they argue, includes "distinct attitudes, including distancing, hostility, rejection, and unconcern." (p. 247). Cynicism and burnout appear to be somewhat interchangeable. Of importance for this examination: burnout (or cynicism) has been correlated to "the self reported use of violence by police officers against civilians." (Kop, Euwema, & Schaufeli, 1999)

Organizational Culture

It is likely that the organizational culture in law enforcement also contributes to many of the physical and psychological difficulties that the cohort experiences. It is the cumulative affect of job stress, cynicism, burnout, omnipotent danger, and the intense subcultural demands that leads to high rates of malady in police officers. Kroes, et al. (1974) found that, "peer acceptance is one of the greatest pressures operating within a police organization. The desire to be identified as a "good officer" is a strong motivating factor and a failure to achieve that goal... can have a devastating and demoralizing effect." We need to look no further than the suicide epidemic amongst police officers to accentuate this issue.

Police Suicide

Suicide by police officers has long been treated with great secrecy. Many officers consider it a private matter best kept within the police family. For instance, an examination of suicides in the Chicago police department indicated that, "Sixty-seven percent of police suicides had been misclassified as accidental or natural deaths." (Wagner & Brzeczek, 1983) The rationale for these misclassifications is numerous; however, the primary reason is to protect the fallen officers' families. That is, line-of-duty deaths that occur while officers are cleaning their service weapons qualify the officers' family for full death benefits. Suicide, on the other hand, does not. This suicide epidemic is an avoidable and manageable perplexity if it is given proper attention.

The nature of policing and the police organization underlie the police suicide epidemic. "Frustration," (Swanson, 2001, p.363) has been found to be central to this problem. Frustration with both "police work," (Heiman, 1977) and the feeling of powerlessness that poorly administered bureaucratic organizations produce. (Weber, 1947) Frustration can be overwhelming in law enforcement. It is well established that police officers cite the police organization and police administrators as the most frustrating aspects of their already stressful and dangerous occupation. (Kroes, 1974; Reiser, 1974; Eisenberg, 1975) Efforts to counter these nearly universal conditions that lead to frustration in law enforcement have been minimal, though.

Violanti examined the issue of cynicism and psychological stress. He found that stress ensued in the same stage-like fashion as cynicism. Interestingly, Violanti found that psychological stressed increased from the initial "alarm stage...through five years," to the "disenchantment stage... [From] years six through thirteen." (Violanti, 1985) During this second stage, the individual officer's perceptions of affiliation, allegiance, and recognition "were the most important factors affecting stress levels." Violanti argued that stress management intervention was most critical in this second stage to address the host of pathologies, cynicism included, found in the police cohort. Other noted individuals also examined the psychosocial dynamics of police deviance.

Locus of Control

Conway's (1989) doctoral dissertation tied cynicism to job satisfaction through an examination of the Locus of Control construct. Conway found in his study that the group with the lowest level of job satisfaction consisted of officers with anywhere from three to nine years of experience. Conway further expected to find a specific demographic archetype that would identify inordinate levels of cynicism and dissatisfaction that led to these subsequent pathologies. However, he found that race, education, military service, and even locus of control scores were not predictive of high levels of job satisfaction. What he did find, though, was widespread cynicism, especially in the cohort of officers with 3-9 years of service.

The importance of Conway's locus of control examination cannot be overlooked. The construct ranges from an internal locus, where individuals "believe reinforcements are contingent upon their behaviors," to an external locus of control, where individuals believe they are, "under the control of powerful others." (p. 32). Individuals with lower scores on the construct are thought to have an external locus of control and are said to have more dependent behaviors. An individual with an internal locus, however, would exhibit more independent behavior. Conway theorized that officers with an external locus of control would have higher levels of cynicism, affliction, job stress, and dissatisfaction. Not only did he not find this, he found that job dissatisfaction was nearly universal across the cohort. It is important to take note that job dissatisfaction was found to be a predictive occupational variable for length of life. (Kornhauser, 1965; Burke, 1970) Perhaps this is why the average age of death for police officers is sixty-six?

The psychosocial influences that emerge from the subculture of policing are consequential. One would expect that an individual with an internal locus of control, with personality traits such as high esteem and resiliency, would rise above these environmental factors that those with an external locus would not. However, the pessimistic and loathsome nature of police work, and the unquestionable subculture of cynicism are apparently so potent that even the optimistic, idealistic, independent candidates turn pessimistic and cynical. The assimilation of these negative characteristics was nearly universal in Neiderhoffer, Violanti and Conway's examinations'. These theorists illustrate the

negative affects the police subculture produces amongst its members. The following is an excerpt from a personal journal I was required to maintain for a course I took with Dr. John Yeager of Boston University in 1997. The last names of the officers involved in the incident have been changed.

Stressful Encounters

9/25/97- I was never sure what would be the first entry in this journal. I've been so lazy about writing. Today, though, has been a pretty lousy day for a father who loves his daughter so much. At 8 o'clock this morning the sector nine car received a call that a young child had collapsed on the tennis courts of a local school. Officer Kenny Bird, a 30-year veteran, quickly arrived. A young child was down; in fact, the little girl was in cardiac arrest. It was horrifying to hear Kenny's voice yelling for help. All his training, the yearly first aid and CPR, were of little help to this lifeless and gray child. Kenny screamed for assistance, "get me some help up here." Fire and ambulance personnel arrived, but Kenny would not yield care. Yet there was very little they could do to get a pulse. As the little girl was rushed off to Children's Hospital, Kenny radioed for assistance to clear the morning rush hour traffic. The little girl, who lived less than a quarter of a mile from the school, never regained consciousness. The police department cried.

Kenny stayed at Children's for a while; his duties as a police officer now took precedence over his emotions. When he arrived back at headquarters, I asked how he was doing? "All right," he said. When I asked for information to

notify the district attorney's office, he took out his notebook, put on his glasses, and began to shake. He rushed out of the room and down the hall, his eyes swelling with tears. I figured he'd gone to the bathroom to be alone so I waited outside. When he came out his eyes were red. I stopped him and asked if he wanted to talk. "No, I'm all right," he said. Then he paused for a few uncomfortable moments, "I'd hate to be that little girls father, though" and then he began to cry again. Is there anyone close to you that you want to speak to? I asked. He couldn't answer me. He grabbed his handkerchief and fled out the front door to his cruiser; he didn't want to let his co-workers see him cry.

Jimmy Kidd, another 30-year veteran, responded to assist by closing off an intersection in hope that doctors at Children's could perform another miracle. As he crossed the intersection with his lights and siren blaring from his police motorcycle, he was struck by a car, dragged, and seriously injured. Not a great way to start of the day.

I use this example of the omnipresent dysfunction that is a part of so many officers' careers. In the aftermath of this incident, Officer Jimmy Kidd was permanently disabled and never returned to work. Officer Kenny Bird had a heart attack while working just five months later. He, too, was permanently disabled. I bumped into Kenny at a local coffee shop a few months after his heart attack. When Kenny saw me he firmly grabbed my hand, spoke a few words, and began to sob. It was one of the most saddening experiences of my life.

Lack of Support

What was striking about this incident was that there was no support in place to assist these officers through such a traumatic incident. Officer Burke was still affected by this incident nearly a year later. He had learned that cops weren't supposed to cry so he fled to the isolation of his police car and refused to speak with anyone. No one sought him out, either; the culture of the police organization didn't allow it. Both of these officers were in the twilight of their careers'. They had entered Neiderhoffer's final stage of cynicism. They may, in fact, have begun to "accept and come to terms with the flaws of the system." (Neiderhoffer, 1967, p. 104)

Work Acumen

It is important to note the final stage of Neiderhoffer's framework, "resigned cynicism." Neiderhoffer argued that this evolved near the twenty-year mark of an officer's career. This is noteworthy because if we examine alleged instances of racial profiling, rarely are these allegations made against officers with such seniority. Samuel Walker found that "in departments with little or no corruption... veteran [line] officers teach new recruits that certain things aren't done here... and this informal pressure helps maintains standards of integrity." (Walker, 1999, p. 253) Furthermore, Violanti and Aron's research (1995) found that for "Officers over forty-six years of age, the mean value of all stressors dropped." These

honorable veteran officers can offer restraint on the perpetuation of deviance, corruption and racial profiling. Because these veteran line officers don't possess rank, though, rarely are their resources utilized. This is of relevance to racial profiling for a multitude of reasons.

It appears that absolute change in values and attitudes are associated with seniority. According to the Violanti, Conway, Neiderhoffer, and others, this is evident somewhere between three to ten years of time in service. These adaptations are subsequently mirrored by changes in behavior to accommodate transformed ideals. The changes can often be dramatic and, unfortunately, not always in line with the principles of public service. Scandals abound of entire precincts, Rampart in the LAPD, and the 30th and 77th Precincts in the NYPD, which were involved in corruption. Ideally then, only the most hearty, resilient and psychologically balanced candidates should be accepted as police candidates. (Yeager, 2000) However, with current screening methodologies that are rudimentary at best, it is highly unlikely that any candidate except the truly deranged and psychotic would be rejected. (Thibault, 1995, p. 258) This is assuming that psychological testing is even used by a department as part of the screening process.

Screening

Baehr (1969) found in his examination of the Chicago Police Department that police administrators desired candidates who could follow direction, and whose, "response is one of cooperation and active endeavor...rather than withdrawal. In the area of temperament, and personality functioning, the desirable traits are those which make for control of purely impulsive and emotional responses and for a "work" rather than a "social" orientation." Although stability and a 'work orientation' are obvious needs of any candidate who aspires to be an officer, flexibility, wisdom, and prudence are similarly important traits. Though these qualities are critical to policing, compliance is often more valued than jurisprudence.

It would appear that candidates who possess heartiness and resiliency would be better insulated against any exposure to the harmful and negative conditions of policing. (Yeager, 2000) However, most testing is designed to give administrators, "some idea as to whether that particular recruit is apt to "break" in a stress situation." (Thibault, 1995, p. 259) Thus, administrators often seek, "guys who are stable, can take an order, and don't have any skeletons in their closet." (O'Laughlin, 2001) These traits were apparent in the cast of LAPD officers previously mentioned in the Rodney King incident.

Loss of Individualism

The loss of individualism that members of the police fraternity suffer is profound. Many individuals lose their ability to make independent moral judgments that are outside the cohort's normative behavior patterns. Did these officers possess the traits of hardiness and resiliency? Would it have made a difference? These are pertinent questions, but are nearly impossible to answer. What these cases illustrate is that the psychosocial aspects of the police subculture are powerful. The widespread problem of racial profiling is further evidence of this.

Racial profiling in its most severe form of indiscreet racism is a criminal act. It is also a unique form of corruption. The widely held definition of corruption, "using police authority for personal gain," (Geller, 1991, p. 239) is fulfilled because personal gains are realized through the targeting of poor minorities. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some officers target minorities in older model cars because of the increased likelihood of discovering a motor vehicle violation. Immeasurable achievement and advancement within the cohort is realized as arrests mount.

Career Advancement

Achievement and recognition in law enforcement can lead to better assignments. A study by Walker, Alpert and Kenney (2001) found that officers

who were referred to early intervention programs were "promoted at a higher rate than control officers." It appears ironic that, "some departments tend to reward through promotion the kind of active and aggressive behavior that is likely to cause officers to be identified by an early warning system." (p. 6). Officers who have been identified through an excessive number of use-of- force reports, citizen complaints, and other early warning system (E.W.S.) standards are glorified rather than censured. The message to other officers is obvious. This is overt racial profiling, but it does not occur in a vacuum.

For this to occur on an ongoing basis there has to be tacit support or unequivocal advocacy by fellow officers. The more benign kind of profiling, where officers unknowingly practice racial profiling, is more widespread and damaging, though. Unknowingly does not denote ignorance or a lack of knowledge. It indicates that those who undertake these actions do so because they believe it is normative. The aforementioned example regarding insurance and minorities illustrates through the practice of "selective enforcement." (Geller, 1991, p. 169)

Selective Enforcement Practices

US vs. Whren (1996) has had a far-reaching effect on selective enforcement. Under Whren, the subjective intent an officer may have for initiating a traffic stop is irrelevant if the officer possess any legal authority for the stop. This highly subjective practice has led to a disproportionate number of minority

motorists being stopped for even the minutest violations. In fact, in one Massachusetts case, officers stopped four minority motorists for an *anticipated* motor vehicle infraction that they believed to be "imminent." (*Comm. v. Whitehead*, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 905 (2000)) As McDevitt reports, "Consequently, some officers routinely use traffic stops as a means of tracking down drug or gun couriers."(Reamers, 2001) For most police officers, Black, White, Asian, or Hispanic, the profile of a 'drug and gun courier' is a poor, young, Black male dressed in urban garb, driving a motor vehicle. This is often reinforced and rewarded institutionally.

This confidential criminal intelligence report of the Maryland State Police was discovered as a part of an investigation into widespread racial profiling allegations. (Meeks, 2000)

"DATE: 4/27/92 Hour: 1700; Agency/Assignment:

18-D.E.D/Allegany County Narcotic Task Force:

Subject: Armed Drug Traffickers in Allegany County, Maryland.

OFFICER SAFETY.

Allegany County is currently experiencing a serious problem with the incoming flow of crack cocaine. The majority of the crack cocaine is going directly into Cumberland [MD.}... The dealers and the couriers (traffickers) are predominately Black males and Black females...The drug traffickers will utilize a variety of vehicles, usually standard size automobiles. Please pay particular

attention to rental vehicles and especially vehicles displaying Virginia registration. The traffickers will usually travel with two or more people in the car, several are known to travel alone. ...The drug traffickers feel that police

Officers are less apt to search females as thoroughly as males, therefore be aware that any females riding in the traffickers' vehicles are probably concealing drugs on them, usually in their panties. Also for the same reason, the females have been known to carry guns for the traffickers...CAUTION! Several of these people coming into Cumberland have been involved in shootings and several have commented that they will not hesitate to shoot a police officer if necessary. The weapons of choice are .380 and .45 automatic handguns. ...If you conduct a motor vehicle stop and it appear that the occupants are potential drug traffickers, use extreme caution and wait for a backup unit before taking additional enforcement action. DO NOT let the occupants know you have called for a K-9 drug dog...Make it appear that you are simply conducting a routine traffic stop." (Meeks, 2000, p. 26-8).

Danger

Segments of this report brought serious alarm to many civil libertarians. In fact, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) inaugurated the ACLU Freedom Network (2001) to battle racial profiling in law enforcement. However, this same report undoubtedly brought tremendous apprehension from the group of police

officers that it was prepared for. This intelligence report is cited as "highly reliable." What is important to note is the report cites that the couriers are "predominately Black males and Black females." That they are possibly driving "rental vehicles," or "vehicles displaying Virginia registration." Most importantly, though, is the caution that these drug couriers are armed and, "will not hesitate to shoot a police officer if necessary. The weapons of choice are .380 and .45 semiautomatic handguns." (p. 28). Every time Maryland State Troopers approach a rental vehicle with Virginia plates operated by any African American, the troopers have a potentially lethal situation; at least perceptually.

These troopers will undoubtedly engage in racial and situational stereotyping. In fact, if the report is accurate, it may save their lives. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that occupants of motor vehicles that fit this profile pose any danger to the troopers. However, in the middle of the night, on an isolated area of an interstate, where a back up unit may be fifteen to twenty minutes away, only the most foolhardy of officers would risk treating this stop as anything but high risk. This scenario plays itself out every time an officer reports to work. The cumulative effects of such constant stress can be devastating, and is likely why police officers suffer such high rates of affliction.

Literature Review Summary

The literature on policing is extensive. The literature that was reviewed found that police officers work in a unique environment. According to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics (1998), police officers are assaulted at a higher rate than any other vocational group. Studies on longevity (Franke, 1998) have found that police officers have exceptionally high mortality rates. Reiser (1972) found that the police subculture provides a buffer between the citizenry and officers. However, it also leads to a decrease in individualism, and to the adoption of "esoteric knowledge." (Thibault, 1995)

Police officers have been found to possess the traits of, "conservatism" (Skolnick, 1975); "cynicism" (Neiderhoffer, 1967); and "authoritarianism." (Adorno, 1950). The training officers receive, academy, in-service, and supervisory, is limited in scope, depth, and effectiveness. Training resources are limited; as a result, police training becomes a liability shield rather than a vehicle for personal and professional development.

Poor supervision, poor training, and the considerable influence of the police subculture have contributed to nearly every police scandal. This studies attempts to examine whether these specific variables cumulatively evolve into racial profiling. In order to determine this, racial profiling was examined from several aspects. From a local perspective in the Pilot study, where the research setting was open and intimate. From a more global perspective in the Modified

MEOCS study, where the research setting was more comprehensive. Racial profiling was also examined from a qualitative perspective that allowed for a more comprehensive examination.

SECTION III-METHODOLOGY

PILOT STUDY

OVERVIEW

The Pilot study was undertaken to explore the attitudes officers possessed regarding racial profiling. The officers who participated in the Pilot study had recently undergone thorough, department-wide training. Yet, many appeared to remain skeptical of the extent or even existence of racial profiling. Section 3.1 discusses the experimental design of the Pilot study. Section 3.2 reviews the Pilot study questionnaire. The Pilot study questionnaire was divided into three parts. Part one included a mock criminal sentencing scenario similar to Sommers and Ellsworth's (2000) design. Part two included eight closed end questions. Part three included two open-ended questions that were inserted to elicit feedback. The results of this questionnaire were presented to area experts (two) in Part C of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire was adjusted for reporting so that the actual location was not readily identifiable. Only the first reader knows the identities of all locations. These changes are indicated by the use of Italics. Anonymity was ensured to the officers who participated in the Pilot study.

3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The experimental design involved a three-part questionnaire. These questionnaires were administered to 26 randomly selected police officers from a police department that I had been given access to. The department is a medium-sized urban department that abuts a major northeast city. The questionnaires were randomly distributed to police officers who had been summoned to a local court to testify in various criminal matters. I was assigned as the police prosecutor at this location and distributed the surveys to the officers when they arrived at my office. The police department where the research occurred was given the pseudonym "Bravo Police Department." This was to ensure anonymity and provide consistency throughout the research.

3.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The questionnaires involved three sections. The first section involved two scenarios concerning individuals arrested and convicted of a crime. The participants were asked for sentencing recommendations. The second part of the survey included eight closed-ended questions graded on a three-point Likert scale. The third part of the survey included two open-ended qualitative questions that were utilized to elicit feedback and insight. Finally, two local law enforcement authorities were consulted in part IV to obtain a diversified, qualitative perspective on racial profiling.

The first questionnaire was developed after examining a multitude of sources and questionnaires as a part of the literature review. These include O'Mara and Tierney's (1978) "Racial Attitudes and Perceptions Survey" (RAPS); Motei and Eggers (1996) "Attitudes Towards Diversity Scale" (ATDS): McConahey's (1986) "Modern Racism Scale"; Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamilton, Williams, and Bryant's, "Police Attitudes toward Abuse of Police Authority Survey." And Conway's (1989) Dissertation, "Measuring Job Satisfaction and Locus of Control of Municipal Police Officers." Scheft's 2000 "Racial Profiling" training was also considered as a source. However, each of these questionnaires was quite extensive, and it was unrealistic to expect officers to contribute 30-40 minutes filling them out. The Alpha Reliability coefficient of the Pilot Survey was .22.

Section one of the survey presented two scenarios using Sommers and Ellsworth's (2001) research framework. The sample population was informed that the author needed sentencing recommendations to offer to the Trial Court. The officers were not informed that this was part of any exercise. All of the participant officers' identifications were codified to ensure anonymity.

The scenarios refer to the exact same fact pattern. That is, an assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (to wit a shod foot), committed by young adult male. The participant officers were informed that upon seeing the police, the defendant in each case fled. There was no indication of the race or gender of the victim in either case. Indicating the victim's race might trigger civil rights laws.

Gender is not indicated because of the gravity of domestic violence. Domestic violence and civil rights incidents are treated with greater severity in the reporting department.

The two scenarios are quite similar. One defendant is described as a young Black male dressed in urban garb (Black hooded sweatshirt, baggy jeans, and sneakers). The area of the incident is a high crime area that abuts a large city housing project. The other scenario is developed to portray a young White male who is well dressed and is attending a local frat party. This is no indication as to whether or not the suspect is a college student, and similar to the previous scenario, race and gender of the victim are left out. The rationale behind the scenarios is similar to Sommers and Ellsworth: to determine if race is a mitigating factor in crime, especially to the predominantly White cohort of police officers.

The race, age, dress, and class are inferred in each incident to mimic the New Jersey State Police training acronym C.A.R.D.: Class, Age, Race, and Dress. (Meeks, 2000) In the scenarios, both young men flee once they observe police, and both are convicted of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. In the reporting state, this crime carries a maximum of 10 years in state prison with no minimum mandatory sentence. (See Appendix A for Pilot questionnaire parts A and B)

PILOT STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE- PART IV

The fourth part of the questionnaire included open-ended discussions with participant officers. Two police experts, John Scheft Esq., and Captain Peter Scott, MA were also consulted. These distinguished law enforcement authorities were instrumental in shaping the Pilot study. The interviews took place on February 16, 2001. Scheft and Scott were asked a separate line of questions then the survey participants. These included:

1) What are the most significant changes in law enforcement you've encountered over your career?
2) Does Racial Profiling exist in law enforcement? If so, to what extent?
3) What changes can be made in Law Enforcement practices so that racial profiling (real or perceived) can be addressed?
4) Is racial profiling different than police corruption?
5) How do you address the unique pressures in policing that tacitly accept racial profiling?
6) What changes in law enforcement would have the greatest impact on racial profiling issues?

These interviews were recorded in writing during the interviews. Since I am familiar with both individuals, the interviews took place with the initial purpose of recording qualitative data. Each interview, though, turned into an in-depth conversation that went well beyond the scope of the initial research. As a result, only the most salient sections of the discussion are reported.

Two qualitative queries were posed to survey participants. These included, "What are your feelings about the racial profiling issue?" "What suggestions would you make to eradicate racial profiling?" The questionnaires were intended to act not only as a research tool, but also as a learning medium for participants who still held undetected biases. The closed-end questions were graded on a three-point Likert Scale. Only two of the twenty-six respondents offered feedback in the qualitative section. Both were veteran officers with over twenty-five year's experience. Both were White males; one officer was a police supervisor. Their responses were enlightening but painted a distinct picture of the bias that some law enforcement officers maintain. Few police officers, though, are willing to openly express these biases.

SECTION III- METHODOLGY

THE MODIFIED MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLIMATE SURVEY (MEOCS)

OVERVIEW

This section provides a description of the setting, selection process and instrumentation used in the data collection phase in the second segment of the study. This section is comprised of five sections. Part 3.3 discusses the instrumentation utilized in the larger and more generalizable research study. This study utilized a valid and reliable questionnaire used by the United States Military, and then modified it slightly. Part 3.4 discusses participants and confidentiality that was obtained through their informed consent. Part 3.5 examines the experimental design of the Modified MEOCS study. Part 3.6 describes the variables that were examined with the Modified MEOCS. In the final section, part 3.7, the questionnaire presented to recognized experts is examined.

3.4 INSTRUMENTATION

The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) was chosen after a review of numerous surveys. This second segment of the research involved a comparative study of officers from four different jurisdictions. The MEOCS was used to gauge attitudes regarding the racial climate of and attitudes

towards their respective police departments. The MEOCS has been used in the US Military since 1990. It is a reliable and valid instrument that has been used to survey over 800,000 personnel in 6,000 different military units.

The MEOCS assesses a military unit's organizational and racial climate. These criterions are controlled for by ethnicity, gender rank, and unit. Since police departments are quasi-military organizations, this instrument was pragmatic. The MEOCS was declassified in 2001. Prior to this, use by civilian personnel was severely restricted. The MEOCS was modified only slightly.

The MEOCS was not used in its entirety. Only sections Two (II) and Five (V) of the MEOCS 2.3 Version were chosen. The other ten sections of the MEOCS 2.3 Version were military-specific. The MEOCS was hence referred to as the Modified MEOCS. It is attached in the appendix below. The Modified MEOCS contained thirty-nine (39) Questions and four (4) Qualifiers. The US Military MEOCS Version 2.3 (See Appendix) contained 101 questions, and 23 qualifiers. It would have been unrealistic to expect the participating officers to complete the 124-item MEOCS Version 2.3.

The Modified MEOCS is an accumulation of twelve factors. Theses factors are, in fact, twelve scales contained within the MEOCS. Four of these scales were used to research this study. They are the Organizational Commitment Scale (8 items); the Discrimination scale (8 items); the Reverse Discrimination scale (4 items); the Separatism Scale (5 items), and a Composite of these scales (25 items). Nine questions were control questions not included in the four

aforementioned scales. One question was added to probe racial profiling-specific behaviors.

The Modified MEOCS scales measure different organizational attributes. For example, the Organizational Commitment scale measured the level of commitment officers reported towards their organization. The Discrimination and Reverse Discrimination scales measured perceived levels of discriminatory and reverse discriminatory actions within their respective organizations. Finally, the Separatism scale measured the officers' perception of separation based on race and gender. The

The Modified MEOCS closely parallels the MEOCS 2.3 version. It was 'modified' by replacing the words "military" with "police," and "unit" with "department". No other substantive modifications were done. The Alpha Reliability for the Modified MEOCS is a modest .68.

3.5 PARTICIPANTS and CONFIDENTIALITY

The MEOCS examination reviewed police officers' attitudes regarding racial climate and organizational commitment. The hypotheses in this segment were tested using data obtained from one hundred-twelve (112) police officers from four (4) participating police departments. Confidentiality was assured each participant, and informed consent was approved by Boston University. The disclosure statement (See Appendix) was affixed to each Modified MEOCS.

Police managers from each representative department were briefed regarding the Modified MEOCS and the purpose of the research study.

I had a working relationship with each of these police managers. It was the familiarity with each of the participant departments that led me to these police managers. This area of the U.S. maintains strict parochialism amongst law enforcement agencies. Each police department in this study was, in fact, a closed society. Influential police managers were, therefore, necessary; not only to distribute these questionnaires, but to actually sell them.

These four police managers were instructed to survey police officers at random. Police managers were advised that the distribution process should reflect the diversity of their respective department's. The surveys were completed in private settings, and the police managers and supervisors collected and debriefed each participant. This debriefing did not effect the Modified MEOCS results, and was meant to elicit important and/or unique feedback from the wide spectrum of police officers. Only the Alpha Police Department offered substantive feedback.

3.6 EXPERIMNTAL DESIGN

Two separate populations were examined. Police departments with little or no racial profiling training were used as comparison groups. Police departments with extensive racial profiling training were used as experimental groups. The four separate police departments were chosen to participate based on training and

comparative demographic information. This included the number of sworn officers, population served, and number-of-part I crimes. The cohort was further qualified based on exposure to part I crimes per police officer. This was to maintain the integrity of the experimental design. It has been found that attitudes remain quite consistent across the police cohort on a number of issues. However, fourteen years of police experience, research, and education have led to the conclusion that urban police departments with serious and multiple crime issues maintain differing perspectives than suburban and rural police departments. (Thibault, 1995, p. 69) Similar police departments were compared using the level of training as the dependent variable. Table A illustrates the comparative data.

Table 1- *A Comparison of the Surveyed Police Departments*

	Bravo P.D.	Charlie P.D	Nora P .D.	Sierra P.D.
Police Officers (Department Size)	145	270	161	130
Citizens (Population)	58,000	130,000	85,000	80,000
Part I Crimes/ Crime Rate	1390 /2.39 %	4500/ 3.46%	937/1.10%	2200/ 2.75%
Part I Crimes/ Officer	9.58/PO	16.6/PO	5.82/PO	16.9/PO
Trained/Untrained Officers	20/10	15/15	9/15	23/3

The comparison groups are apparent. The Charlie Police Department and the Sierra Police Department were paired due to the similarities in the number of part I crimes per police officer. Likewise, the Bravo and Nora police departments were paired because of their similar amount of Part I crimes per police officer. The majority of Sierra police officers in the study (88%, N=23) received racial profiling training. Contrast this with the Charlie Police department, where just 50% (n= 15) received racial profiling training. A majority of Bravo police officers, 66% (n=20), received racial profiling training. Contrast this with the Nora police department where just 37% (n=9) received racial profiling training.

These qualifiers were examined in relation to the Modified MEOCS scores. The two samples were contrasted and compared to determine attitudes regarding racial climate, racial profiling, and attitudes towards their respective organizations. This was done from an organizational setting since the MEOCS measures the racial attitudes of an organization or unit.

Further analysis was completed based on findings of the region's largest circulated periodical. This periodical examined motor vehicle stops of police departments throughout the state where the departments are located. The periodical then compared disparities between search and arrest rates of White versus Black motorists. Disparate search rates were reported in ratios. Ratios were compared with Modified MEOCS Scores as well as the perception of Racial Profiling.

3.7 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

The police departments were not randomly chosen. All of the departments abut the same major Northeast City where the Pilot study took place. The study utilized scales within the MEOCS, the Disparity indices found in the area's major circulation, and training criterion.

The criterion for training was straightforward. A department with a majority of officers who had received a minimum of eight hours of racial profiling training within the last eighteen months was considered trained. A department with a majority of its members who had not received at least eight hours of racial profiling training in the last eighteen months was considered untrained. The following variables were calculated:

Dependent Variables

Modified MEOCS Scores, Disparity Indices, and Racial Profiling Attitudes

Independent Variables

Ethnicity, Gender, Police Department, Rank, and Training,

The Bravo Police Department was utilized in the Pilot and Modified MEOCS study. Each department was codified based on the US Marine Corp alphabet to ensure anonymity. They included the Bravo Police Department, the Charlie Police Department, the Nora Police Department, and the Sierra Police Department. In actuality, five police departments were surveyed. The largest department, the Alpha Police Department, initially agreed to participate in the

study. When officers reviewed the Modified MEOCS, however, they protested its phraseology and refused to complete the survey. (See the "Fifth Comparison Group", p. 215) The three major research questions examined the perceived extent of racial profiling; the correlates of racial profiling through an examination of organizational commitment, and how training influenced racial profiling.

3.8 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS WITH RECOGNIZED EXPERTS

The final part of the examination involved qualitative interviews with various law enforcement scholars, police academe, and other recognized authorities in the area of race and policing. Each individual was administered an open-ended questionnaire and provided with the results of the first two parts of the examination. The purpose of this qualitative section was to gain better understanding of the varied perspectives with respect to racial profiling. As Dr Bayley's informal study found, there are diverse and even contrary positions on racial profiling. By seeking the input of police officers, police scholars, and recognized authorities from the effected minority community, greater understanding of the complexities of racial profiling was realized. (See Questionnaire in Appendix)

CHAPTER IV RESULTS AND FINDINGS

OVERVIEW

This chapter is composed of seven sections. Section I consists of statistics on the variables and correlations in the Pilot study. Section II consists of the three major questions in the Pilot study. Section III consists of descriptive statistics of variables and correlations in the Modified MEOCS study. Section IV presents the findings of the second part of the Modified MEOCS examination. Specifically, the first major research question, "Do police officers perceive racial profiling to be a serious problem in their respective departments'?" Section V presents the findings of the second major research question; "Do organizational deficiencies lead to increased occurrences of racial profiling?" Section VI presents the research findings of the third major research question; "Does training affect an officer's attitudes regarding racial profiling?" Section VII is composed of additional data analysis of the three separate scales contained within the MEOCS. This section also contains an analysis of group variance based on race, rank, gender, exposure to part I crimes, and department.

SECTION I

PILOT STUDY

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the Pilot study. Pearson Correlation coefficients are presented in part II. Statistically significant correlations at the .05 and the .01 level are indicated by the presence of an asterisk at the .05 level, and by two asterisks at the .01 level. A t-test was performed and reported below.

Table 2- *Pilot Study Results*

QUESTION	POPULATION (N)	MEAN	S.D.
Scenario 1	26	2.80	.49
Scenario 2	26	2.50	.70
I have received racial sensitivity training	26	1.15	.54
I am sensitive to racial profiling	26	1.30	.73
Racial bias is a factor in some police actions	26	1.38	.80
I socialize with people of a different race	26	1.84	1.00
I believe racial profiling may exist in law enforcement	26	1.73	.96
I believe racial profiling may exist in my department	26	1.73	.96
I may have unknowingly practiced racial Profiling	26	1.69	.97
I treated the defendants in the scenarios equally	26	1.53	.90

4.1 FREQUENCIES

Table 2.1- *Black Male Scenario*	Frequency	Percent
Dismissed	1	3.8
Unsupervised	3	11.5
Supervised	22	84.6
Total	26	100

Table 2.2- *White Male Scenario*	Frequency	Percent
Dismissed	3	11.5
Unsupervised	7	26.9
Supervised	16	61.5
Total	26	100

Table 2.3- *I have received racial sensitivity training*	Frequency	Percent
Agree	24	92.3
Disagree	2	7.7
Total	26	100

Table 2.4- *I socialize with people of a different race*	Frequency	Percent
Agree	15	57.7
Disagree	11	42.3
Total	26	100

Table 2.5- *Racial bias is a factor in some police actions*	Frequency	Percent
Agree	21	80.8
Disagree	5	19.2
Total	26	100

Table 2.6- *I believe racial profiling may exist in law enforcement*	Frequency	Percent
Agree	23	88.5
Disagree	3	11.5
Total	26	100

Table 2.7- *I believe racial profiling may exist in my department*	Frequency	Percent
Agree	16	61.5
Neither	1	3.8
Disagree	9	34.6
Total	26	100

Table 2.8- *I may have unknowingly practiced racial profiling*	Frequency	Percent
Agree	17	65.4
Disagree	9	34.6
Total	26	100

Table 2.9- *I treated the defendants equally in the scenarios*	Frequency	Percent
Agree	19	73.1
Disagree	7	26.9
Total	26	100

A predominant amount of officers surveyed (88.5%, n=23) believed that racial profiling occurred in law enforcement. Many also believed it happened in their respective department (61.5%, n=16). Of note, the percentage of officers who believed they may have unknowingly practiced racial profiling is notable (65.4%, n=17). This cohort was also widely trained: 92.3% of the survey population (n=24), received racial sensitivity training by highly regarded experts. Only two officers did not receive training, and these were probationary officers who had been on the job for approximately six months.

Discrepancies are apparent in the amount of officers who recommended supervised probation to the different defendants. For example, in the instance of

the African-American defendant, 88% (n=22) recommended supervised probation; only 56% (n=14) recommended supervised probation for the White defendant. On the other hand, 36% (n=9) of the officers recommended a lesser probation sentence to the White defendant; only 8% (n=2) felt this same sentence was appropriate for the African-American defendant. Also of relevance to the survey, though, is that the African-American officers surveyed were consistent with their recommendations of the stricter form of supervised probation for both defendants.

4.2 SIMILARITIES

There are nine statistically significant correlations that the Pilot study identified. A positive correlation was found between the sentencing recommendations of the Black male in scenario 1 and the White male in scenario 2; $r = .748$, $p < .01$. When the Black male in scenario 1 was sentenced harshly, there was commensurate sentencing for the White male in scenario 2. A significant positive correlation also existed between the recommendations of the White male in scenario 2 and the belief that they had been sentenced equally; $r = .688$, $p < .05$. Those who believed they had offered equal sentencing recommendations related significantly to the sentencing recommendations of the White-male scenario only. Officers believed their treatment of the males in the two scenarios were equal; however, this was actually an inaccurate assessment.

There was a contrary correlation between the sentencing recommendations of the Black male in scenario 1 and sensitivity to the issue of racial profiling; $r = -.493$, $p < .05$. Those not particularly sensitive to racial profiling had a strong negative relationship with the sentencing recommendations in the Black-male scenario. Thus, officers generally recommended more harsh sentences for the Black male when they reported they were not sensitive to racial profiling issues. Those who reported they were sensitive or cognizant of racial profiling appeared to have more correspondent treatment of the two defendants.

A positive correlation was found among officers who believed racial profiling existed in law enforcement, and the belief that racial bias was a factor in some police actions; $r = .435$, $p < .05$. These beliefs also correlated to the perception that racial profiling occurred in the officer's respective department; $r = .486$, $p < .05$. Apparently officers who were cognizant of racial profiling practices perceived race to be an issue in policing both locally and beyond.

A positive correlation existed between officers who had received racial profiling training and those who believed racial profiling existed in their respective department; $r = .389$, $p < .05$. A positive correlation also existed among officers who received racial profiling training and officers who believed they may have unknowingly practiced racial profiling and, $r = .397$, $p < .05$. This would appear to indicate that the training these officers received was effective in defining and communicating the parameters of racial profiling; thus leading to a heightened awareness of conduct that would fall within these parameters.

Those who stated they might have unknowingly practiced racial profiling also believed that racial bias was a factor in some police actions; $r = .465$, $p < .05$. These beliefs were also strongly related to the perception that racial profiling existed in law enforcement; $r = .496$, $p < .05$; and the perception that racial profiling existed in the officers respective department; $r = .551$, $p < .01$. Thus, officer who admitted unknowingly practicing racial profiling acknowledged the existence of the phenomenon vocation-wide.

4.3 DIFFERENCES

An analysis of the difference between the means of the two scenarios was performed. Using a t-test, a difference in the mean scores for the mock scenario was found. The mean score for the Black male is 2.80; the mean score for the White male is 2.50. A score of 2.0 indicates that unsupervised probation is recommended. A score of 3.0 indicates that supervised probation, a more restrictive type of probation, is warranted. The Alpha Reliability for the two scenarios was .82. A t-test was performed on scenario 1 versus scenario 2. ($t = 3.33$; $df = 25$; significance = .003) Based on these findings, a statistically significant difference existed between sentencing recommendations. These findings are similar to the results of Sommers and Ellsworth's (2001) study.

SECTION II

4.4 RACIAL PROFILING TRAINING

A predominant amount of the cohort received racial profiling training. Over ninety-two percent (n= 24) of the cohort had received a minimum of twelve hours of training within the eighteen months prior to the distribution of the test. The training was provided through the Bravo Police Department as well as a private outside source. Because this percentage was so high, it was neither feasible nor significant to contrast and compare trained and untrained officers. Untrained officers made up only 7.7% (n= 2) of the cohort. Further examination of the variables found that a predominant percentage, 88.5% (n= 23), believed that racial profiling existed in law enforcement. Table 2.7 also indicates that 61.5 % (n= 16) believed that racial profiling occurred in their respective department. Over sixty-five percent (n= 17) also believed that they might have unknowingly practiced racial profiling. This is noteworthy because without extensive training, it is likely that officers would not have been aware of what racial profiling encompassed. The PERF study and Bayley's (2001) examination further validates this reasoning.

SECTION III

4.5 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

The qualitative section of the Pilot study gave respondent officers the opportunity to share feedback via face-to-face discussion. When asked to elaborate on his admitted profiling practices, the analogy one veteran officer used was unique. "The best analogy I can give is that of a mailman and a Doberman Pincher. If he's bitten by the dog, every time he sees another one, he's going to be leery. Twenty-eight years of experience causes me to be leery when I see a Black guy; just like the mailman is leery when he sees the dog."

The veteran supervisor was less direct. "Have I practiced racial profiling? Of course I have, but so has everyone else. When you see a White guy in a Black project [predominantly African American housing complex], what's the first thing you think of? Drugs. Is that profiling? Absolutely, you'd be naive to think anything else... [Profiling] is an occupational tool we use; Black and White cops. It's not going to change anytime soon, either. How many cops did you say are White?"

4.5 I- A POLICE EDUCATOR'S POINT OF VIEW

Scheft and Scott offered perspectives from a different point of view. Scheft estimated that racial profiling was prevalent in "99 percent " of law enforcement. However, it was "unintentional," or unknowing. "Police officers

associate color with crime. They do it because of bias, because they've been told [this], and because, statistically, it makes sense. Police officers arrest minorities at a higher rate because Blacks are scarier, more violent, and appear more disrespectful. No question prejudice creeps into the decision. There's no sociological excuse for it...Is this marginal efficiency worth pissing off an entire segment of the population?" (Scheft, 2001)

Scheft referred to Randall Kennedy and his persuasive argument on racial profiling. There are three ways to look at racial profiling. It's only racial profiling if you pick Blacks just because they're Black. Even Mark Furman didn't do that. It's not racial profiling if you use race as a factor and do so not to harass. Yet, if race is one factor in many, it can degenerate into racial profiling. You need strict scrutiny; race cannot be a factor unless there is some compelling reason to use it." (Scheft, 2001)

Scheft reports that racial profiling and corruption are not the same. Racial profiling is mostly unintentional because of prejudice, and they're doing things with good intentions. The cop reasons, 'I didn't make the world the way it is'. Cops can rationalize this. On the other hand, corruption is obviously morally wrong, cops can't rationalize it.

Scheft indicates that the key to dealing with racial profiling is training. "If training contributes to cops being defensive then it sucks. It's the number one problem I have with police training. Here's another person telling me how I should act. Training must be presented in a tactful manner." This is why Scheft considers

minority police officers to be the best educators of racial profiling. "They have powerful credibility with their brother officers." (Scheft, 2001) Scott, on the other hand, offers a different view.

4.5 II- A POLICE OFFICER'S POINT OF VIEW

Scott accepts that racial profiling does exist in law enforcement. However, he does not believe it is "as prevalent as the media makes it out to be. Police officers make 100 stops and maybe 2 complain about racial profiling. But you don't hear about the other 98." (P. Scott, personal communication, February 16, 2001) However, Scott indicates that racial profiling and corruption are inseparable.

"You can't break the law to enforce it...Compare racial profiling with the late 60's and Miranda. Cops said it would hurt enforcement of the law, and this wasn't true. The clear message must be that quality arrests are important, not quantity." To eradicate racial profiling, Scott offered a clear caveat, "Get the message out: if you do the right thing we'll back you, but racial profiling will not be tolerated." He offers four areas that can address the problem. (Scott, 2001)

Changes in law enforcement practices can be made so that racial profiling can be eradicated. "The selection process can weed out kids with racial bias through role playing, interviews, and better background checks... Academies must teach about it and monitor it more closely... FTO programs have to be

objective and highly trained... In-service training is the key, especially for veteran officers. They can change the system and make it different." Scott concludes that administrators, "can't stick their heads in the sand and hope it will blow over. Like Miranda, instead of fighting or denying it, it has to be addressed head on." (Scott, 2001)

SECTION II

THE MODIFIED MEOCS STUDY

MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION I: Is Racial Profiling A Serious Issue in This Police Department?

4.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Section 4.6 examines the descriptive statistics of the second, Modified MEOCS, study. It identifies the participating officer's race, rank, gender, department and training. It also addresses the first major research question; "Is Racial Profiling is a serious problem in this department."

Table 3.1-Department Participants

Department	N
Bravo	30
Charlie	31
Nora	24
Sierra	27
Total	112

Table 3.2-Participants' Gender

Gender	N	Percent
Male	96	85.7
Female	13	11.6
Didn't Answer	2	1.8
Total	111	99.1

Table 3.3-Participants' Race

Race	N	Percent
Black	4	3.6
White	99	88.4
Hispanic	1	.9
Asian	3	2.7
Other	3	2.7
Didn't Answer	1	.9
Total	111	99.1

Table 3.4-Rank

Rank	N	Percent
Patrol Officer	80	71.4
Sergeant	20	17.9
Lieutenant	6	5.4
Captain	3	2.7
Didn't Answer	2	1.8
Total	111	99.1

Table 3.5-Trained In Racial Profiling

Trained	N	Percent
Yes	67	59.8
No	43	38.4
Didn't Answer	1	.90
Total	111	99.1

The group consists of predominately White males who are line level personnel. This follows the national trend reported earlier. Seventy-seven percent of all police officers are White males, and a majority of police officers, regardless of race, are line level personnel. The gender of the cohort is also fairly representative: 12% of the population is female. The population of each

department is fairly equalized as well, and nearly sixty percent of the population (59.8 %) has been trained in racial profiling.

The assemblage reported the following attitudes regarding the extent of racial profiling practices in their respective departments'.

Modified MEOCS Queries

Table 4.0- *Racial Profiling Is A Serious Problem in This Department.*

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	2	2.7
SOMEWHAT AGREE	9	8.0
NEITHER AGREE/DISAGREE	20	17.9
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	28	25
STRONGLY DISAGREE	42	37.5
DIDN'T ANSWER	8	7.1
MISSING	2	1.8
TOTAL	112	100

Table 4.0 indicates that a majority of the respondents did not perceive racial profiling as a serious problem in their department. Over 63% (n= 70) disagreed that racial profiling was a serious problem. Conversely, only 10.9 % (n= 12) agreed that racial profiling was a serious problem in their respective department. Of note, though, 17.9 percent (n= 20) neither agreed nor disagreed; 7.1 percent (N= 8) did not answer, and 1.8 percent (N= 2) was missing from the

system. Officer appeared evasive regarding this inquiry. No other item in the Modified MEOCS was eluded by such a large percentage of the sample.

These attitudes regarding the extent of racial profiling are presented based demographic information. These statistics are reported through a comparison of means. Attitudes are examined based on race and ethnicity, gender, rank, and department.

Attitudes Based on Race/Ethnicity

Table 4.1-*Racial Profiling is a Serious Issue in this Department*

Race	Population (N)	Mean
Black	4	2.75
White	98	4.16
Hispanic	1	3.00
Asian	3	3.33
Other	3	3.00
Did not answer	1	4.00
Total	110	4.10

Attitudes Based on Department

Table 4.2- *Racial Profiling is a serious problem in this department*

Department	Population (N)	Mean
Charlie	31	3.96
Bravo	29	4.00
Sierra	26	4.19
Nora	24	4.29

Attitudes Based on Rank

Table 4.3- *Racial Profiling is a serious problem in this department*

Rank	Population (N)	Mean
Patrol Officer	79	4.12
Sergeant	20	3.80
Lieutenant	6	4.16
Captain	3	5.00
Did not answer	2	4.50

Attitudes based on Gender

Table 4.4-*Racial Profiling is a serious issue in this department*

Gender	Population (N)	Mean
Female	13	3.62
Male	95	4.13
Did not answer	2	5.00

4.7 SIMILARITIES

There are several significant correlations identified from the Modified MEOCS. The correlations of the scales were considered via the demographic information above. Only the statistically significant correlations of the demographic categories are discussed.

Nearly 11 percent (N = 11) of the cohort agreed with the inquiry that racial profiling was a serious problem in their department. Officers who reported that racial profiling was a serious problem exhibited a strong relationship with several individual items in the Modified MEOCS. Six were statistically significant at the .01 level.

Officers who reported that racial profiling was a serious problem in their department showed a positive relationship with the inquiry, "More severe punishments are given out to minorities as compared to majority offenders for the same types of offenses," (r = .27). A relationship was shown between the inquiry,

"Majority members get away with breaking rules that result in punishment for minorities," (r= .31). There was also a positive relationship with the inquiry, "Majority males do not show proper respect for minorities or women with higher ranks," (r= .24). A positive relationship also existed with the inquiry, "Majority males are not willing to accept criticism from minorities and women," (r= .27).

These items are discussed simultaneously because they appear to derive from a similar source. That is, the correlation appears to emanate from an underrepresented cohort that includes minority and female officers. Although the sum totals are not identical, thirteen women were included in the study and seven non-White respondents; the responses appear to originate from these underrepresented groups. The Modified MEOCS measures the racial climate of an organization. It appears, based on the derivation of these attitudes, that these underrepresented groups affiliate inequality with racial profiling.

There was one other significant correlation (.01 Level). "Minority and majority members would be better off if they lived and worked only with people of their own races," (r= .25). The underlying premise of this response appears tinged with racism. However, because the population was small (N=11), and represents only 10% of the population, generalizations can't be made. There does, however, appear to be an obvious difference between the officers who reported a serious racial profiling problem and those who did not.

There was a negative correlation with the inquiry, "This organization provides a good career chance for advancement for minorities and women," (r = -

. 28) This would appear to indicate the segment of the cohort that acknowledged the existence of a racial profiling problem possessed ambiguous attitudes. That is, a percentage of the cohort that reported a serious racial profiling problem also reported a poor chance for advancement. Conversely, the more predominant segment of the cohort that reported racial profiling to be non-problematic also reported that minorities and women possessed a good chance for advancement. These findings appear consistent with divisions found earlier along racial, ethnic, and gender lines

There appeared to be an apparent disparity amongst the officers surveyed. The segment of the cohort that reported the existence of racial profiling indicated that majority members received better treatment. They also indicated that majority members showed a lack of respect towards their minority co-workers. Although this segment of the population was small (10.7 %), it appeared that these attitudes did not emanate the predominant respondents: White males.

Only one of the composite scales showed a significant correlation (.01 level) to the racial profiling inquiry. Officers who reported that racial profiling was a serious problem had an apparent relationship with the Discrimination Scale. This would indicate that officers who reported racial profiling to be a serious problem in their respective departments did not find discrimination towards women and minorities to be problematic. The portion of the cohort that acknowledged a serious racial profiling problem, was, however, quite small (N=11).

4.8 DIFFERENCES

The first major research question sought answers regarding the perceived extent of racial profiling among the cohort. Specifically, whether the respondents believed "Racial profiling is a serious problem in this department". The cohort, as a whole, appeared unified in its disagreement with the statement. However, there were trends that indicated dissimilarities among subgroups of the cohort.

ATTITUDES BASED ON RACE

An examination of attitudes based on the racial makeup of the respondents followed universal trends. Table five highlights the difference between the attitudes of White and Black officers. Due to the small number in the Black group (n= 4), though, it was not feasible to make comparisons to the larger White group (n= 98), even though there was a notable difference. $F(5, 104) = 2.562$ $p < .05$

Table five also examined the attitudes of non-White respondents. These respondents, Hispanic, Asian, and 'Other' nationalities enumerate more than Black respondents do. Their numbers, (n= 7) are still not significant enough to make comparisons between the much larger White sub-set. However, the scores of all non-White groups are lower than the White subset. While White officers

had the highest mean, Hispanics and Other nationalities (3.00, S.D. 2.00), and Asians (3.33 SD 1.15) followed. African Americans had the lowest mean scores.

Table 5.0-*Racial Profiling Attitudes based on Ethnicity*

Racial profiling is a serious problem in this department.

Ethnicity	Mean Score	Standard Deviation
White	4.16	1.13
Black	2.75	1.25
Hispanic	3.00	N/A
Asian	3.33	1.00
Other	3.00	2.00

DIFFERENCES AMONG RANK & FILE

There were also consistent trends based on rank regarding the extent of racial profiling. For example, the mean scores in Table 5.1 found that sergeants (n= 20) had the highest reported perception of racial profiling. Captains, on the other hand, (n= 3) strongly and unanimously agreed that racial profiling was not a serious problem in their respective departments. These differences were not statistically significant, though.

Table 5.1-*Racial Profiling Attitudes based on Rank*

Racial profiling is a serious issue in this department.

Rank	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Patrol Officer	79	4.13	1.22
Sergeant	20	3.80	1.20
Lieutenant	6	4.16	1.17
Did not answer	2	4.50	.50
Captain	3	5.00	0
Total	110		

M=3.80, SD= F (4, 109) = .804 p= .525

Attitudes based on gender showed only minor differences. Table 5.2 indicates that males appeared to perceive racial profiling as less of a problem than their female counterparts. Again, the differences were not statistically significant.

Table 5.2-*Racial Profiling Attitudes based on Gender*

Racial Profiling is a serious problem in this department.

Gender	Population	Mean	Standard Deviation
M	95	4.13	1.13
F	13	3.69	1.54
Didn't Answer	2	5.00	1.41
Total	110	4.1	1.19

F (3, 106) = .44 p=. 72

Attitudes based on department indicated consistent findings. As table 5.3 indicates, each department was in strong disagreement that racial profiling was a serious problem. The average mean score for the four surveyed departments was 4.10. The only average mean score less than 4.00 was the Charlie Police Department (mean 3.96).

Table 5.3 *Racial Profiling Attitudes by Department*

Racial profiling is a serious problem in this department.

Department	Population	Mean	Standard Deviation
Bravo	29	4.00	1.69
Charlie	31	3.96	1.13
Nora	24	4.29	. 85
Sierra	26	4.19	. 84
Total	110	4.10	1.19

MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION II: Do Organizational Deficiencies Contribute to Racial Profiling?

OVERVIEW

The body of the text has discussed the influence and affects the police subculture has on an organization. This subculture sets the organizational culture and climate. The Organizational Commitment Scale is foremost in the MEOCS because it is accepted that the psychosocial conditions of an organization influence both the values and behaviors of its membership. This section examines the second major research question, "Do organizational deficiencies contribute to racial profiling?"

4.9 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Selected Modified MEOCS Queries

Queries from the Modified MEOCS are presented below. These queries examine internal attitudes and behaviors of an organization's membership. Only queries that are germane to organizational culture are presented.

Table 6.0- *Modified MEOCS Question Nine- I Could Just As Well Be Working In Another Organization As Long As The Type Of Work Was Similar.*

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	12	10.7
SOMEWHAT AGREE	48	42.9
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	34	30.4
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	11	9.8
STRONGLY DISAGREE	7	6.3
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

Table 6.1- *Modified MEOCS Question Ten- I Am Proud To tell others that I Am A Part of This Organization.*

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	30	26.8
SOMEWHAT AGREE	42	37.5
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	32	28.6
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	7	6.3
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	. 9
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

Table 6.2- *Modified MEOCS Question Eleven- There should be More Close Friendships Between Minority And Majority Members.*

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	10	8.9
SOMEWHAT AGREE	27	24.1
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	64	57.1
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	7	6.3
STRONGLY DISAGREE	3	2.7
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	1	.9
TOTAL	112	100

Table 6.3- *Modified MEOCS Question Twelve- I Dislike the Idea of Having A Supervisor of A Different Race than Mine.*

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	2	1.8
SOMEWHAT AGREE	3	2.7
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	13	11.6
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	12	10.7
STRONGLY DISAGREE	82	73.2
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

These findings offer corresponding results. Only 4.5 percent of the cohort (N= 5) agreed with question twelve: I dislike the idea of having a supervisor of a different race than mine. Similarly, only 9 percent of the cohort (N= 10) disagreed with question eleven: There should be more close friendships between minority and majority members. This would appear to indicate that separatism amongst the group is an unacceptable practice.

Over sixty-four percent of the cohort (N= 62) agreed with question ten: I am proud to tell others that I am a part of this organization. However, only 16.1 percent (N=18) disagreed with question nine: I could just as well be working in another organization as long as the type of work was similar. It would appear that the group is proud to be a member of the law enforcement community, just not the specific department they work for.

4.10 SIMILARITIES

MODIFIED MEOCS QUERIES

There were several closely related, statistically significant correlations (.01 level) identified through demographic information. These statistically significant correlations are reported in the table below. Gender correlated to the three items within the Modified MEOCS. There was a positive correlation with question number 10, "Often I find it difficult to agree with the policies of this organization on

important matters relating to its people, " (r=. 24). " A positive correlation existed between question number 23A, " There should be more close relationships between minorities and majority members in this organization," (r= .36). A positive correlation also existed with question number 25A, "Minorities don't take advantage of the educational opportunities available to them," (r= .30). This would indicate that predominantly male respondents felt minorities were given opportunities they didn't take advantage of, but further indicated a desire for increased friendships with the same individuals they portrayed as underachievers.

Race correlated to the two items in the Modified MEOCS. Race showed a positive correlation to question number 21A, "This organization provides a good career chance for advancement for minorities and women," (r = .36). Race also showed a significant relationship to question 23A, " There should be more close relationships between minorities and majority members in this organization," (r= .24). This would appear to indicate that the predominantly White, male cohort felt the chance for advancement amongst minorities and women was good. Furthermore, this police assemblage accepts that relationships amongst them don't extend across racial lines often enough.

Rank correlated to two items in the Modified MEOCS. Question number 10, "Often I find it difficult to agree with the policies of this organization on important matters relating to its people, " (r= .26). Question number 6A, "The police department is fully committed to the principle of fair treatment for all of its

members," (r= .24). This appears in line with earlier findings. Many supervisors are discontent with aspects of their respective organization, but feel the chance for advancement for minorities and women is better.

Department did not correlate significantly with any items within the Modified MEOCS. Training correlates are examined below. Correlations at the .01 level are underlined.

Table 7.0- *Correlation Matrix- Statistically Significant Modified MEOCS Queries*

Question number with brief summary	Gender	Race	Rank
Question # 10 I don't agree with policies regarding personnel	.24	.23	.26
Question # 23A More close friendships between races	.36	.24	.14
Question # 25A Minorities don't take advantage of education	.30	.05	.20
Question #21A Good career chances for minorities and women	.11	.36	.05
Question #6A Department committed to fairness for all	-.02	-.04	.24

4.11 MODIFIED MEOCS SCALES

ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT SCALE

A comparison of Organizational Commitment scores between comparative departments indicated that the Sierra Police Department had a higher Organizational Commitment score than the Charlie Police Department (3.27 vs. 3.05). Likewise, the Bravo Police Department had a higher Organizational Commitment score than the Nora Police Department (3.57 vs. 3.28).

Organizational Commitment was found to have a significant relationship with two other scales. Organizational Commitment was positively correlated to the Reverse Discrimination Scale ($r = .32$, $p < .01$). Organizational Commitment was also positively related to the Separatism Scale (r= .33, p, .01). Officers with high Organizational Commitment scores reported higher Reverse Discrimination and Separatism scores. This would appear to indicate that officers who were more committed to their respective organizations reported low instances of reverse discrimination and separatism.

There was a statistically significant relationship between commitment to the organization and the perception of reverse discrimination in these organizations. Officers who were found to be more committed to the organization reported that reverse discrimination was low. Conversely, officers who were less committed to the organization were found to report higher levels of reverse discrimination.

There was also a correlation between the Separatism Scale and the Organizational Commitment Scale. Officers who had high Organizational Commitment scores reported that separatism was low in their respective organization. Conversely, officers who had low Organizational Commitment scores reported higher levels of separatism. It is likely that officers with minimal commitment towards their organization are more likely to report negative attributes. Officers who are more committed to an organization are more likely to report positive attributes.

Organizational Commitment was found to have no significant relationship to opinions about racial profiling. The cohort did not, in general, perceive racial profiling to be a problem. Even though this same population reported relatively low Organizational Commitment scores, the extent to which officers perceived racial profiling as a problem did not relate to their commitment towards their organization. However, there was a relationship between Organizational Commitment and Search Rate Disparity. Organizations with higher Organizational Commitment scores had lower incident rates of disparate searches. Conversely, organizations with lower Organizational Commitment scores had higher incident rates of disparate searches. This would appear to indicate that an organizational culture affects behaviors. This is further examined in the Organizational Commitment section.

DISCRIMINATION SCALE

Discrimination was found to correlate to Racial Profiling attitudes. Officers with high Discrimination scores also were found to perceive racial profiling as a problem ($r = .34$, $p < .01$). This would indicate that officers who reported low Discrimination also reported low Racial Profiling practices. Conversely, officers who reported the existence of Discrimination within their organization also reported Racial Profiling was more prevalent.

Discrimination was also found to have a positive relationship with Separatism. That is, when Discrimination was reported to be low, Separatism was also reported to be low ($r = .37$, $p < .01$). The converse of these findings indicates that when Discrimination is reported to be high, Separatism is also reported to be high.

REVERSE DISCRIMINATION SCALE

Reverse Discrimination was positively correlated to both Organizational Commitment and Separatism. In line with the previous findings, high Reverse Discrimination scores correlated to high Separatism scores ($r = .36$, $p < .01$). This deserves re-statement: officers who report higher commitment levels are likely to, in most instances, report lower instances of reverse discrimination and separatism.

4.12 DIFFERENCES

There are noteworthy differences among the cohort. Department, rank, gender, and race contrast these differences. There were also several noteworthy distinctions noted by statistically significant differences in the Modified MEOCS scales.

ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT

Organizational Commitment by Rank and Department

Analysis of the Organizational Commitment scores by rank emphasized the leadership quandary. The mean scores highlight the negative attitudes a majority of the cohort maintained towards their respective organizations'.

Table 8.0-*Organizational Commitment scores by Rank*

RANK	MEAN	S.D.	POPULATION (n)
Patrolman	3.23	.65	79
Sergeant	3.25	.40	20
Lieutenant	3.44	.57	6
Captain	3.88	. 70	3
Total			108

A review of table eight found an expected trend. The Organizational Commitment scores based on rank show stepwise increments. That is, as an officer advances in rank, there is a commensurate increase in commitment to the

organization. However, as stated earlier, there is widespread discontent amongst supervisors with their respective organizations; even though these supervisors are proud to be members of the overall law enforcement community.

Table 8.1 indicates the Organizational Commitment scores of the participant departments. These scores highlight the attitudes officers maintain towards their respective departments'.

Table 8.1- *Organizational Commitment scores by Department*

DEPARTMENT	Org. Commitment Score	Standard Deviation
Charlie	3.05a	.44
Sierra	3.27ab	.61
Nora	3.28ab	.69
Bravo	3.57b	.67

All scores sharing the same letters, (a, b) have no statistical difference.

F (3, 107) =3.79 p=. 01

Table 8.1 indicates that there was a significant difference between the Organizational Commitment scores of the Charlie and Bravo Police Departments. The Organizational Commitment scores of the Bravo and Charlie Police Departments are statistically different at the .01 level. This was believed to be a product of exposure to part I crimes and skewed distribution.

Organizational Commitment and Reverse Discrimination

Organizational Commitment was contrasted with Reverse Discrimination. Table 8.2 indicates the perception of Reverse Discrimination in the Sierra and Charlie Police Departments to be significantly higher than the Nora Police Departments. The Bravo Police Department is statistically similar to all departments. Similarly, the Organizational Commitment scores of the Sierra and Nora Police Department are statistically the same. Table 8.2 reports these findings as a part of the MEOCS Composite Analysis of Variance.

The Organizational Commitment scores of the Charlie and Nora Police Departments are also significantly different. The Charlie Police Department, therefore, has statistically significant differences with the Nora Police Department and the Bravo Police Department. This could be due to the different policing environment that Charlie police officers work in: urban, inner city, with a relatively high crime rate.

Table 8.2- *Organizational Commitment and Reverse Discrimination*

Department	Reverse Discrimination	Organizational Commitment
Charlie	3.08a	3.05a
Sierra	3.07a	3.26ab
Nora	3.72b	3.28ab
Bravo	3.55ab	3.57b

All scores sharing the same letters, (a, b) have no statistical difference.

Reverse Discrimination F (3, 107) =. 4.0, p=. 01

Organizational Commitment F (3, 107) = 3.79, p=. 01

4.13 COMPOSITE MEOCS SCORES

Modified MEOCS Comparisons

An examination of composite scores found the Bravo Police department to have the highest Modified MEOCS composites. These results were based on the self-reporting of department members. The Charlie Police department, on the other hand, had the lowest overall Modified MEOCS composite. These findings did not indicate that the racial climate of the Charlie Police Department was inadequate or the Bravo Police Department satisfactory. They did indicate, though, that the racial climate was below/above the departments surveyed.

The Charlie Police Department is significantly lower than the Bravo Police Department (14.09 vs. 15.53). Table fifteen indicates that there was a statistically significant difference at (.01 level). Average MEOCS scores showed similar trends to Organizational Commitment and Reverse Discrimination scores. The Charlie Police Department was significantly different than the Bravo and Nora Police Department in separate Modified MEOCS scales, but only the Bravo police department in the Modified MEOCS scale.

Table 9.0- *Total Composite MEOCS Results*

Department	Composite Score
Charlie	14.11a
Sierra	14.31ab
Nora	15.22ab
Bravo	15.53b

F (3, 108) = 3.53 p = .01. All scores sharing the same letters, (a, b) have no statistical difference.

These findings are significant because an organization's values and attitudes dictate actions and behaviors. An assessment of overall Modified MEOCS scores in conjunction with the Disparity Index illustrates the influence the racial climate of an organization has on individual behaviors.

Table 9.1- *Composite of Modified MEOCS scales*

Department	Charlie	Sierra	Nora	Bravo
Disparity Index	2.9 times	1.0 times	2.9 times	2.3 times
Org. Commit.	3.05	3.27	3.28	3.57
Separate	4.30	4.25	4.39	4.58
Reverse Disc.	3.08	3.07	3.72	3.56
Discrimination	3.66	3.95	3.82	3.82
Total	14.09	14.54	15.21	15.53

Table 9.1 is a composite of the Modified MEOCS Scales. A comparison of composite Modified MEOCS scores indicates that the Charlie Police Department had higher incident rates of racial profiling and lower Modified MEOCS scores compared to the Sierra Police Department. Likewise, the Nora Police Department had higher incident rates of racial profiling and lower Modified MEOCS scores compared to the Bravo Police Department. The converse interpretation of table 9.1 indicates that comparative police departments with better racial climates engage in lower incidence rates of racial profiling.

4.14 RACE AND SEARCH RATE DISPARITIES

Search Rate Comparisons

Each department engaged in widespread racial profiling over a period of two years. This is according to statistics compiled the regions largest circulated periodical. This occurred in spite of the recent implementation of policies prohibiting racial profiling by each organization. All of these organizations had elevated search rates of minority motorists; only the Sierra Police Departments search rate was not grossly disproportionate. Minority motorists stopped by these organizations were searched at disproportionate rates to White motorists. According to this comprehensive examination of motor vehicle citations, the Nora and Charlie Police Departments had some of the highest search disparities based on race (racial profiling) in the entire state.

Table 10.0-*Search Rate Disparities*

Department	Disparity (Search Rate)	Statewide Rank
Nora Police Dept.	2.9 times	4th
Charlie Police Dept.	2.3 times	6th
Bravo Police Dept.	2.3 times	15th
Sierra Police Dept.	1.0 times	42nd

Search Rate Disparities

The Nora Police Department ranked fourth and the Charlie Police Department ranked sixth in disparate searches of minority versus White motorists. Minority motorists were searched at a rate 2.9 times that of White motorists in both the Nora and Charlie Police Department jurisdictions. Minority motorists were searched at a rate 2.3 times that of White motorists in the Bravo Police Departments jurisdiction, and just 1.0 time in the Sierra Police Department's jurisdiction.

Lack of organizational commitment did not influence racial profiling in this examination on the basis of the cohorts' perception. However, there was a relationship between Organizational Commitment and Search Rate Disparity. Organizations with higher Organizational Commitment scores had lower incident rates of disparate searches. Conversely, organizations with lower Organizational Commitment scores had higher incident rates of disparate searches. This may be due to an organizational culture that is more supportive of a police department's mission, objectives and values. Committed officers are more likely to support these customs than less committed officers.

4.15 TOTAL COMPOSITE SCORES

Table ten emphasizes the differences among comparative police department. Training appears to have had an affect on the attitudes and

behaviors on officers. The Sierra and Bravo Police Departments had lower search rates than the Charlie and Nora Police Departments respectively.

Table 11.0- *Composite of Modified MEOCS scales*

Department	Charlie	Sierra	Nora	Bravo
Disparity Index	2.9 times	1.0 times	2.9 times	2.3 times
Org. Commit.	3.05a	3.27ab	3.28ab	3.57b
Separate	4.30	4.25	4.39	4.58
Reverse Disc.	3.08a	3.07a	3.72b	3.56ab
Discrimination	3.66	3.95	3.82	3.82
Total	14.09a	14.54ab	15.21ab	15.53b

F (3, 108) = 3.53, $p < .01$ All scores sharing the same letters, (a, b) have no statistical difference

Table eleven indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the total composite scores of the Charlie and Bravo Police Departments. This could be a result of a more diverse work force in the Charlie Police Department. The Bravo Police Department is predominately White, and thus the opportunity for reverse discrimination is relatively lower. Furthermore, the Charlie Police Department reported the lowest Organizational Commitment scores. The Charlie Police Department sample was also skewed; eighty-eight percent were White males. Furthermore, the chief of the Charlie Police Department is an African-American male. The Bravo Police Department, conversely, was less

skewed than the Charlie Police Department, and the chief is a Caucasian male. It is an actuality that leadership is often related to commitment. It is conceivable that the Charlie Police Department considered race in the leadership formula.

MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION III: Does training mitigate racial profiling practices?

4.16 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 12.0-*Trained in Racial Profiling*

Trained	Frequency	Percent
Yes	67	59.8
No	43	38.4
Didn't Answer	1	. 9
Total	111	99.1

Training appeared to affect the perception of the racial profiling problem. Those trained (N=67) showed a tendency to perceive racial profiling as more of a problem than untrained officers (N=42). Table twelve reports the contrast. Although there is an apparent difference between trained and untrained officers, this difference was not statistically significant.

Table 12.1- *Racial Profiling and Training*

Racial profiling is a serious problem in this department.

Trained	N	Mean	Standard deviation
Yes	67	4.07	1.25
No	42	4.14	1.11
Total	109		

Table 12.1 indicates the number of officers trained in racial profiling disagreed with the statement that racial profiling was a serious problem in their respective departments. (N= 67; Mean= 4.07; S.D. = 1.25) Officers with little or no training in racial profiling more fervently disagreed with the statement, but there was not a statistically significantly difference. (N= 42; Mean 4.14, S.D. = 1.11)

There are similarities based on the breakdown of departments in table 12.2. Although the amount of training differed considerably, from zero up to sixteen hours, the mean scores between departments were quite similar. The Charlie Police Department, with minimal or no training, reported a mean score of 3.9677. The Nora Police Department, also with little or no training, had the highest mean score (4.2917). These departments had greater differences in their mean scores. The Bravo Police Department's mean score (4.00), and the Sierra Police Department's mean score (4.19), have a lesser disparity than the two untrained departments (Charlie and Nora). This is true even though the Sierra and Bravo police departments did not receive the same training, or the same amount of training. Conversely, the departments with little or no recent training (Charlie and Nora) show a wider disparity in their attitudes regarding racial profiling. This would appear to indicate training influenced the perception of racial profiling.

4.17 SIMILARITIES

MODIFIED MEOCS QUERIES

Training proved to be an important variable in this research. Several queries were closely related to training at the .01 level. Individuals trained in racial profiling showed a correlation with three Modified MEOCS items. Question 29, "Some minorities get promoted just because they are minorities," r = .195; Question 33, "This organization provides a good career chance for minorities and women," r = .23; Question 35, "There should be more close friendships between minorities and majority members in this organization," r =. 21. This would appear to indicate that trained police officers, though more cognizant of racial issues in law enforcement, appear to still harbor discriminatory beliefs.

Training and gender were closely correlated (r = .53, p< .01). Training was also correlated at the .01 level to rank (r = .31), and race (r = .50). There were other Modified MEOCS queries that were significantly related at the .05 level. These are worthy of discussion because of the apparent affect training showed on individualized police practices.

Training was related to three Modified MEOCS inquiries. Significant correlations included: "Some minorities get promoted just because they are minorities" (r = .19). "This organization provides good career advancement for minorities and women" (r = .23). "There should be more close friendships between minority and majority members in this organization" (r = .21). This would indicate that training was closely related to race, gender, and rank at the .01

level. At the .05 level, this would indicate that the officers surveyed believed minorities and women possessed an advantage for promotion because of their race and gender. It would indicate, furthermore, that racial separatism still exists.

The average composite scores for the cohort were quite high. The Mean for trained police officers was higher than the Mean for untrained officers (Trained = 4.45 S.D. = .74 vs. Untrained = 4.29 S.D.= .68), although this difference was not significant. Furthermore, a comparison of Separatism scores was worth noting. Even though mean scores for trained and untrained officers were low, the group, as a whole, indicated that friendships did not satisfactorily extend across racial lines. This, in essence, is racial separatism.

4.18 DIFFERENCES

Table 12.2 examines response rates to the first major research question through an ANOVA. A mean score of 5.00 would indicate that the officers strongly disagree; a mean score of 1.00 would indicate that the officers strongly agree. The comparison found all departments to be statistically similar; however, the disparity between the two untrained departments (Charlie and Nora) is greater than the two trained departments (Bravo and Sierra).

Table 12.2-*Racial Profiling Mean Scores*

Department	Population (N)	Mean Score
Charlie	31	3.96
Bravo	29	4.00
Sierra	26	4.19
Nora	24	4.29

This appears to indicate that training had affect, however small, on unifying attitudes among participants. Minimal or no training, however, resulted in more disparate, less consistent attitudes.

Training did not to appear to have a significant affect on the other Modified MEOCS scales. Table twenty-one indicates that the difference in attitudes between trained and untrained police officers was minimal for Discrimination against minorities and women, Reverse Discrimination, Separatism, and Organizational Commitment.

Table 12.3- *Training and the MEOCS sub-scales*

Sub-scale	Trained/Untrained	Population (N)	Mean	Standard Deviation
Racial	Yes	67	4.07	1.25
Profiling	No	42	4.14	1.11
Discrimination	Yes	67	3.86	.67
Minority/Women	No	43	3.72	.60
Reverse	Yes	67	3.27	.91
Discrimination	No	43	3.45	.87
Separatism	Yes	67	4.45	.74
	No	43	4.29	.68
Organizational	Yes	67	4.07	1.25
Commitment	No	43	4.14	1.11

4.19 TRAINING & COMPOSITE MODIFIED MEOCS FINDINGS

A composite examination was beneficial delineating the affects of training. A comparison of the four departments emphasized the impact of training. Since the Discrimination scale and the Separatism scale of the cohort were statistically

the same, further analysis via the Part I Crime index and Search Rate Disparity index assisted in articulating the affects of training. Table 12.3 illustrates.

The Charlie and Sierra Police Departments have similar Part I crime indices. The number of part I crimes per police officer further emphasizes the similarities. These two departments have similar attitudes towards their respective organizations, as well as similar attitudes regarding reverse discrimination. However, the Sierra Police Department instituted department-wide training; the Charlie Police Departments did not. This appeared to effect the incident rates of racial profiling; rates that are reported in the disparity indices below.

The Bravo and Nora Police Departments have similar Part I crime indices. The number of part I crimes per police officer also emphasizes the similarities. These two departments have similar attitudes towards their respective organizations, as well as similar attitudes regarding reverse discrimination. However, the Bravo Police Department instituted extensive, department-wide racial profiling training; the Nora Police Department did not. This, too, appeared to effect the search rate disparity index.

Table 12.4-*MEOCS Composite (ANOVA)*

Department	Crime Index	Crime/Officer	Organization Commitment	Reverse Discrimination	Disparity Index
CHARLIE	3.46	16.6	3.05a	3.08a	2.9
SIERRA	2.75	16.9	3.26ab	3.07a	1.0
NORA	1.10	5.82	3.28ab	3.72b	2.9
BRAVO	2.39	9.58	3.57b	3.55ab	2.3

All scores sharing the same letters, (a, b) have no statistical difference.

The Bravo and Sierra Police Departments had higher levels of racial profiling training. They also had lower disparity rates than the Charlie and Nora Police Departments. The composite analysis of the crime rate index, the search disparity index, crimes per police officer rates (Crime/Officer), Organizational Commitment scores, and Reverse Discrimination scores indicated that training had an affect on the racial profiling practices of comparable police departments.

Table 12.5- *Composite Score Examination;* Trained vs. Untrained Officers

Trained in Racial Profiling	Racial Profiling is a serious problem in this department	Total Composite	Average Composite
Yes	4.07	14.89	3.72
Mean N	67	67	67
Std. Deviation	1.25	2.01	.50
No	4.14	14.64	3.68
Mean N	42	43	43
Std. Deviation	1.11	2.11	.50
Did Not Answer	4.00	15.77	3.94
Mean N	1	1	1
Std. Deviation	-	-	-
Total	4.10	14.80	3.70
Mean	110	111	111
Std. Deviation	1.19	2.04	.49
ANOVA	F(1, 107)= .08, p=.77	F(1, 108)= .40, p= .52	F(1, 108)= .19, p= .65

The final examination was to determine if there was a significant difference between the composite scores of trained and untrained officers. It was previously noted that training appeared to affect behaviors. This was evident through the Search Rate Disparity index. However, as noted in table 12.5, training did not appear to significantly affect the attitudes of the general cohort regarding racial profiling.

SECTION III

QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

AUTHORITIES

Two esteemed authorities were chosen to participate in the qualitative section. They were chosen based on their work in race and policing. Dr David Bayley has over thirty-five years of experience in law enforcement research. Dr Bayley distinguished himself as early as 1969 when he and Harold Mendlesohn were recognized for their work, *Minorities and the Police: Confrontation in America*. Dr. Bayley has studied race and law enforcement for nearly forty years. I met Dr Bayley at a police leadership seminar. Actually, I came to his defense as a group of officers aggressively challenged his hypothesis on racial profiling.

John Scheft Esquire has nearly twenty-five years of experience in law enforcement. He started his law enforcement career as an Assistant District Attorney; later rising to the level of Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts. Mr. Scheft founded a private sector law enforcement educational institute. This company, Law Enforcement Dimensions, has become the preeminent source of police training in Massachusetts. It was a lecture that Mr. Scheft gave on race and policing in the spring of 2000 that played a role in undertaking this research.

4.20 METHODOLOGY

Both experts were contacted and agreed to assist in this research. They were fully advised of the results of both major sections of the study. The proposed questions were, furthermore, briefly reviewed and discussed. It was agreed that the most efficient method of discussion would be through electronic mail (e-mail). This was done so that a permanent written record of the electronic conversation could be maintained and readily available.

4.21 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

SECTION I

John Sofis Scheft, Esquire Correspondence

1) My study found that training affected racial profiling (RP) practices b/w comparative P.D.'s. P.D.'s w/ more training had lower search rate disparities b/w minority and majority members. Is training the solution to racial profiling?

Training is not a solution to RP, but it is a vital component of an overall approach to address the issue. I see a complete department approach to RP as involving (1) Culture; (2) Supervision; and (3) Training.

Training is important for any issue – like profiling, use of force, ethics, etc. -- where a person's natural reaction may not be the most effective under the circumstances.[1] The mark of a professional is someone who reacts in a helpful manner in spite of the difficult circumstances (e.g., a civilian might scream in horror at a traffic accident with severe injury; the police professional calls for an ambulance and stops the bleeding – even though that officer may be very troubled by the scene; here, the professional officer allows competence, commitment and service to triumph over emotion and inaction).

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[1] Radelet and Carter apparently use this understanding in an approach to police ethics called "applied ethics." I haven't read their stuff but you can find it in Louis Radelet and David Carter, Police and the Community, 5th Ed. (MacMillan Press, 1994), pp. 91-92

The same is true for training in RP. Good training allows officers to see – non-righteously --the possibility that their own bias may influence their decisions on the street – who to stop; how to speak to them; whether to fear them, etc. It then talks about police situations where these unconscious and conscious biases may assert themselves – often in a detrimental way for the citizen and the officer. Officers also need to learn the citizen's perspective because, right or wrong, that perception is a reality and colors whether that citizen will comply or complain.

Great training adds two important steps.

First, it puts officers in scenarios under controlled circumstances with skilled actors[2], so that they can experience firsthand the kinds of emotions and responses that they are prone to. Then, they can investigate different techniques that are more positive. This type of scenario training must be holistic – combining law, tactics, discretion, communication skills, and even report-writing/testimony skills. Police training that only focuses on one skill is counterproductive – e.g., every scenario pits the racist officer against the misunderstood minority or, an example from recruit training, every vehicle stop involves a psycho with a rifle. Police officers need to be trained for maximum mental flexibility, since they go from giving a happy citizen directions to hearing people scream at a domestic to drinking coffee to getting into a beef with a disgruntled motorist facing an insurance surcharge.

Second, it provides opportunities for officers to understand and interact with people from the various cultures that inhabit the municipality that they police. It might be Russians in Brookline and Cambodians in Lowell, for example. I always like the statement of Chris Braiden, former chief of police in Canada, "I always told my cops – you can have as much coffee as you want on the job, so long as you don't just drink it with other cops . . ." In other words, officers need to be encouraged and valued for reaching out to and interacting with all elements of their community.

But the real bottom line of training, and frankly why I think you saw the impact of training that you did, is that, whether bad or good, training shows officers that the department cares about this issue and, at its most cynical, that officers can end up with their ass in the ringer if they don't change their behavior. And that's better than total indifference by a long shot.

2) The Pilot study (which led to the dissertation) found that perceptions of trained officers varied considerably regarding the extent and magnitude of RP. There was either outright acceptance of the phenomenon, or outright rejection. What could explain this disparity**?**

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[2] I once worked on a program with the Waltham PD using this approach, which was effective. There were aspects that could have been better but, all in all, it made clear the superior nature of this type of active training.

A fascinating result, Mike. One follow-up question I would have is: Was the split in perceptions also consistent with department membership? In other words, if you tell me that basically all the officers in Department A felt that RP really existed, and all the officers in Department B felt that RP was media hyped piece of crap, then my response would be that the training Department A offered was superior than the training given by Department B.

However, if you tell me that officers in Department A were fairly split – with some having a new found consciousness about RP and others stiffening their resistance to the concept – then I would attribute that to what I call the "community policing" phenomenon. This to me is a natural psychological reaction – certainly of officers and probably other people as well – to either be grateful or defensive when given new information. It is the typical split that you see with community policing attitudes. Grateful officers like training, value new information, are willing to reconsider past practices and perspectives, and will try new things. They do not see a new point of view as personal, as a challenge to their self-esteem.

Defensive officers, on the other hand, take new perspectives personally. They see discussions about issues like RP as an attack on them and on their career. They say, "I'm not a racist." They rarely view issues as developing from their own perspective. They don't say things like, "Hey, maybe I could handle that call differently." They have reactions like, "Well, it's the media . . . If only people treated me with respect, then I would too . . . Oh, here we go again, you're playing the race card." The trouble is they have it half right. People do judge officers, people are prone to exaggerate RP, people don't understand the police perspective, and people are less deferential to law enforcement authority than they use to be. But, there is the other side of the coin: Officers are equally prone to dismiss the fact that their tone of voice and presence may escalate a situation, or that they bring bias to their interactions which is hurtful to the minority communities they police. The irony is that officers are often disgusted by minorities who voice the very same complaint that officers voice -- that is, that they are misunderstood by the majority.

Finally, the polarization of the opinions of officers – i.e., that RP exists or that RP is a fraud – may reflect (and again, I am speculating) the prevalence of Black/White (no pun intended) thinking in criminal justice. The nature of American policing, and those who are attracted to this profession, may encourage a type of simplistic evaluation of the human condition – You are either a good citizen or a maggot; you either get arrested or you get released; the law either addresses it or it doesn't. If officers are prone to this good/bad view, then they typically dismiss RP because truly understanding RP requires a more nuanced, "gray" understanding of people and the world.

Ultimately, the phenomenon of RP is no different than any issue involving human beings. There is a certain framework and understanding that helps us analyze the situation, but ultimately it is people doing the best they can. The best officer in the world may not be able to calm a distraught minority motorist; and the worst officer in the world has moments of understanding that produce good outcomes.

3) Numerous studies have found that there is a large disparity b/w Black and White Americans regarding the extent, or even existence of racial profiling. A similar disparity exists b/w police officers (Black vs. White). The police cohort often maintains consistent and even dogmatic views; why is there such a disparity?

That there is a disparity I do not doubt. But what interests me is the following question: Does the disparity decrease when each group receives a balanced presentation about the issue? In other words, can the disparity be bridged by effective training and dialogue? As a law enforcement instructor, I believe the answer is "yes" – otherwise, what the hell am I doing this for?

People have a unique capacity to understand each other's perspectives given the right opportunity and guidance. That is why I think the national conversation about RP and many other issues must go beyond simply documenting the divide.

I also think, and this is a training issue as well, that the conversation about RP has to be conducted in a way where people are allowed to speak their mind without fear of retribution while, at the same time, getting people to consider the fact that their views on the subject may reflect their own background and biases.

4) A police officer's commitment to the organization appeared to affect racial profiling attitudes. That is, departments with officers who were more committed to the organization showed lower rates of RP. Is the organizational culture of a police department critical in influencing the attitudes and behaviors of its officers?

Two points on this issue. First, it is a valuable finding that officers' commitment to their organization affects RP. I attribute this to the, in my opinion, iron clad relationship between organizational commitment and service to community commitment. Those officers who value their organization want to serve something bigger than themselves and their next pay check. They realize – often unconsciously – that their organization thrives when it serves the community – everyone in the community. And they have the understanding that a dissatisfied group in the community, not to mention the stigma of being biased and oppressive, hurts them and the department.

The more cynical officer blames the organization for his or her unhappiness. The organization has let them down, so they have an excuse to let the community down.

Second, it works both ways. My statement above looks at it from the internal commitment of the officer. But we also have to look at it from the skill and commitment of management. Officers, who function in an environment where they are supported by management, tend to treat the community with more support and respect. The chief who tells his officers to be courteous and fair by day, but then screams, plays politics and tells racist jokes in the guard room at night, sends a message loud and clear. Often, the internal culture of a police department reflects the way that officers treat the culture in the community.

Finally, officers, like anyone else who works for an organization, are influenced by what the organization values, support and punishes. This is often true regardless of how they may feel internally. The officer who lives in a police department that has a policy on RP, trains on RP, and supervises based on its commitment to fair policing, may not even believe that RP exists or, even deeper, may actually have ingrained racist feelings. But he will probably behave in a radically different way than if he lived in a department that expressed indifference or, worse, tacitly endorsed biased policing practices. In short, culture can truly change hearts and minds but, failing that, it can certainly change actions.

5) Are there any programs, tactics, or techniques that could be applied universally to decrease RP, or is it a more parochial, localized issue that needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis?

The assessment and existence of profiling needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Some situations look bad, but are innocent in my experience. Other situations seem innocent, but on reflection and investigation, indicate trouble or potential trouble on the part of an officer.

That is the misleading nature of statistical gathering that is currently being done on traffic stops. This kind of broad-based stat collecting has some value, but its danger is that it allows policy makers and police commanders to believe that they have addressed the problem. The problem is better understood and addressed at the supervisory level following training.

While I believe that the assessment of whether profiling exists needs to be done on a case-by-case basis, I also believe that there are universal approaches to decrease RP that can be implemented (with some flexibility) in any department. These approaches address the big three I mentioned in the first question: Culture, supervision, and training.

Hope this helps, Mike.

Applicability to Study

Much was taken away from this detailed communication. Training is a critical component if racial profiling is to be diminished. However, to be effective, it must be presented in the context of a comprehensive approach. According to Scheft this includes, " (1) Culture; (2) Supervision; [and] (3) Training." One component that Scheft failed to mention was leadership. Without leadership, training is likely to be mediocre, supervision insignificant, and organizational culture unsettled or even corrupt. The prongs Scheft mentions are interdependent. Police departments cannot expect effective policing if there is not commensurate training and supervision. Deficiencies within an organization can be corrected through training and supervision; and can be avoided, to some extent, through exceptional leadership and screening.

Excellent training leads to superior police service. Superior police service, in turn, can not be maintained without superior supervision. However, many police departments don't use training resources to develop officers; these training resources are utilized as protection against civil liabilities. A culture of excellence, if you will, is a sum total of training, supervision, leadership, and screening. Even if screening methodologies are flawed, though, superior police service can be attained through what Scheft refers to as "applied ethics. Training is important for any issue...where a person's natural reaction may not be the most effective under the circumstances." Mr. Scheft, in essence, prescribes to the theory that training

can mitigate systemic flaws. Appropriate preparation through training can moderate many ethical problems.

Training can also remedy the disparate views that officers maintain regarding racial profiling. Mr. Scheft contends, "People have a unique capacity to understand each other's perspectives given the right opportunity and guidance. That is why the national conversation about RP and many other issues must go beyond simply documenting the divide." Scheft adds a qualification, though regarding police training. " "I also think, and this is a training issue as well, that the conversation about RP has to be conducted in a way where people are allowed to speak their mind without fear of retribution while, at the same time, getting people to consider the fact that their views on the subject may reflect their own background and biases."

The issue of effective training has been thoroughly explored. Race is a divisive and controversial issue in law enforcement. Racial profiling training is worthless if it is provided in a setting where officers do not feel comfortable voicing their genuine convictions. This deficient environment is often present when ranks are commingled; when superior officers are trained with line level personnel. It even exists when rookie officers are trained together with veteran officers. As Conway, Thibault, Neiderhoffer, and Violanti found, officers with anywhere from 3-9 years of service possess a number of negative attributes. When addressing a topic such as racial profiling, it may be helpful to segregate officers based on rank and time of service. Superior officers could be segregated

from line personnel during in-service training. There are distinctly different views of the world that each segment, rookie, veteran, and superior, possesses.

A police department's organizational culture is also critical. As Scheft points out, "it is a valuable finding that officers' commitment to their organization affects RP." However, the association Scheft made between organizational and community commitment was distinct. This was not an approach I took in the study. This makes sense, though. A police department can furnish leadership, training and resources; however, unless these are provided in a context where community approval and support are present, they aren't likely to have any sustained value. In other words, as Trojanowicz purported, the community and police are, in fact, interdependent. This must be accurately conveyed to all police personnel.

A critical component of organizational commitment that Scheft mentions is management. Police service can not occur in a vacuum. As Scheft points out, "officers who function in an environment where they are supported by management tend to treat the community with more support and respect...often, the internal culture of a police department reflects the way the that officers treat the culture in the community." In other words, if racist ideals are tacitly supported in the police department, officers will almost certainly carry out these ideals in their service to the citizenry.

Officers are undoubtedly influenced by organizational attributes. Scheft contrasts a department with policies, training, and " a commitment to fair policing,"

to " a police department that is indifferent, or worse, tacitly endorsed biased policing." What this refers to is standards; standards of behavior, decorum, and professionalism. Scheft points out that an officer who harbors racist ideals is likely to behave "radically different," in the former than in the latter department. He concludes, "In short, culture can truly change hearts and minds but, failing that, it can certainly change actions."

The distinct affect training has on officers is as important as the knowledge it provides. Scheft argues, "The real bottom line of training, and frankly why I think you saw the impact of training that you did, is that, whether good or bad, training shows officers that the department cares about this issue and, at its most cynical, that officers can end up with their ass in the ringer if they don't change their behavior." In essence, training may or may not be able to change the internal attitudes of officers. However, if it is provided in the proper context, it will likely change their overt behaviors.

SECTION II

Dr. David Bayley's Correspondence

Michael:

Now that I have dug out from the accumulated stuff, here are my responses to your questions.

(1) The conclusions of your study are very interested, and tell the rest of us something important. Training clearly is the "solution," provided it is

about (1) using profiling in a smart way, and (2) how the reaction to profiling among minorities can be reduced through care in the interactions.

(2) Police officers are defensive in some cases because they are simply blind, but more generally, and more importantly, because they confuse profiling with being prejudiced. Police officers, like the rest of us don't think themselves as prejudiced. If they single out minorities somehow, they think it is because law enforcement circumstances justify doing so. They might be right. Critics also confused profiling with prejudice. What both overlook is that unfairness may arise from being dumb about racial cues, i.e. not using it in ways that are justified by law enforcement results, even with unprejudiced officers.

(3) The disparity reflects life experiences, as well as the stories told in different ethnic groups. The plain fact is that young Black men are stopped more often for no reason than young White men, and these stories are told and retold in the Black community.

(4) This too is an interesting finding. Is organizational culture important- ABSOLUTELY!

(5) RP may be more intense locally, but it is a general problem in the US, indeed worldwide. The key, as you've shown in your study, is training about what really helps law enforcement from what doesn't.

In response to your email of Sept 10th: I have given that session on RP several times and the dynamic is clear- when there is a minority officer present, and he/she speaks up to tell their experience, the conversation changes 180 degrees. People who previously denied RP in their experience, begin to admit they have seen instances. This reflects what you saw: those with training, like you, to know the problem is real, are ready to admit unjustified RP occurs; those who haven't and aren't minority, are unwilling to admit a practice that seems insulting to their character, namely, that they are prejudiced. But prejudice, have said, isn't the problem- lack of information about what is really necessary in policing is the problem.

David

Applicability to Study

Dr. Bayley's responses to the qualitative questionnaire were interesting. Dr. Bayley, a law enforcement scholar for over thirty years, accepts the reality of profiling; even condones it to some extent. However, this is only if profiling is used, "in a smart way." How can profiling be used in a smart way? Scheft, Dr. Bayley, myself, and many others who educate police officers have used a rudimentary example. To wit: if you see a White guy in a ghetto, what is the first think you, as a police officer, suspect? The answer, of course, is that this individual is there to buy drugs. Is this profiling? Of course, and it is also common

sense, at least to most officers. Dr. Bayley condones this type of profiling as good police work. I concur.

I had not thought of prejudice and profiling to be different. That is, I have witnessed and researched prejudice in law enforcement and accepted that profiling is rooted in prejudice. This, however, isn't always the case. Prejudice isn't what essentially drives profiling, according to Dr. Bayley, ignorance is. Of course there are biased and prejudiced police officers; however, in the region I studied, truly racist officers were a rarity.

Dr. Bayley attributes the difference in the attitudes of Black and White police officers as a matter of "life experience." What was interesting beyond this diagnosis, though, is that Dr. Bayley points to a cross-generational phenomenon. "The plain fact is that young Black men are stopped more often for no reason than young White men, and these stories are told and retold in the Black community." The Black community is socialized with the expectation that law enforcement will be a biased and adversarial institution.

This institutional prejudice, I stop short of using racism, isn't likely to abate soon. For example, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, every Middle Eastern male appeared to be 'suspicious' in the jurisdiction where I work. This was a natural reaction. Black males in predominately White neighborhoods are perceived similarly. Urban areas, where minorities are often over-represented, are repeatedly besieged by crime. Black males commit a disproportionate amount of crime. The media generally portrays Black male as dangerous and hardened

gangsters. Thus, the American public, majority and minority members, fears Black males. When these Black males are in places they appear not to belong, they become 'suspicious'. They are profiled, stopped, harassed, and violated. It's a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The answer, for law enforcement at least, is effective and consistent training. Dr. Bayley points out, as does Scheft, that the key to training is the participation of minority officers. My own experience with racial profiling training was powerful only because a Black officer spoke up during the training. As the room of mostly White officers attacked the speaker on his supposition of 'widespread racial profiling', this veteran Black officer mentioned his experiences. He was not eloquent, but his veracity was unquestioned. He went on to tell his fellow officers of the instances, numerous in fact, that he had been profiled, illegally stopped, and harassed simply because of the color of his skin. His message was powerful, and remains with me some five years later.

DISCUSSION

SUMMARY

The focus of this study was to examine the controversial issue of racial profiling. This study examined the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of 112 police officers from four separate police departments. It began with the premise that racial profiling was a widespread problem in law enforcement. The study looked to identify attributes, similarities and differences of contrasting groups that would explain why some officers engage in racial profiling and others do not. The study also found that certain interventions mitigated racial profiling practices.

A closer analysis found that the study group was in stark disagreement with the premise of the study. That is, this group reported that racial profiling was not a serious problem in law enforcement. Furthermore, this perception grew more consistent, excluding sergeants, as officers ascended the rank structure.

5.1 PILOT RESULTS

The cohort overwhelming reported that they did not believe racial profiling was a serious problem. This was unexpected since the Pilot study indicated that officers who received specialized training were more likely to report racial profiling as problematic. The informal research done by Dr. David Bayley (2001) further supported the findings of the Pilot study.

Further examination of the variables found that predominant percentage, 88.5% (n= 23), believed that racial profiling existed in law enforcement. This is a stark contrast to the PERF study and the informal survey conducted by Bayley (2001). Table 2.9 also indicates that 61.5 % (n= 16) believed that racial profiling occurred in their respective department. Over sixty-five percent (n= 17) of this group also reported they believed they may have unknowingly practiced racial profiling. This is noteworthy because without extensive training, it is likely that officers would not have been aware of what racial profiling encompassed. The PERF study and Dr. Bayley's examination further illustrated this point.

The Pilot Study also explored the reliability and consistency between training and the perception of racial profiling. There was consistency between training and the perception of racial profiling that occurred within the participants' respective department (r= .389, p= < .001). An even higher correlation existed between training and the practice of unknowingly engaging in racial profiling (r= .397, p= < .001). Of the participants who perceived racial profiling to be a system-wide phenomenon, a significant number perceived the practice to be evident in the respective department (r= .486, p= < .001). The most consist relationship reported of Bravo police officers was the relationship between system-wide profiling and self-reported profiling (r= .496, p= < .001). These are all very significant (statistical) relationships.

A statistically significant difference between the sentencing recommendations of the two defendants in scenario 1 versus 2 was also found.

Similar to the study by Sommers and Ellsworth, the study found that sentencing was more severe for a young Black male rather than a young White male. This appeared to be a result of the stereotypes officers hold regarding class age, race, and dress, and was the purpose of the differing descriptions in the scenarios.

It appears that there is either outright acceptance that the phenomenon exists, or outright denial. With these contrasting perspectives, commensurate perceptions followed. That is, the Bravo police officers that acknowledged the existence of racial profiling system-wide confirmed it locally and personally. Those who rejected the existence of the phenomenon systemically rejected it locally and personally. This would point to the need for more training to bring all attitudes into correspondence.

The recommendations offered in the mock trial scenario are also of consequence. Although Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon is a felony in Massachusetts, with a maximum sentence of ten years in state's prison, not one officer recommended that either defendant be sentenced to jail time. In fact, two officers recommended that the case be dismissed against the White defendant, and one of the officers felt that the case should be dropped against the Black defendant. This officer had over 25 years of police experience and felt any sanctions were useless in rehabilitating the aforementioned defendants.

These findings are of relevance because it is widely held Caucasian officers are the most frequent and worst offenders of racial profiling. Meahan and Ponder's (2001) recent findings on 'race and place' confirm this. However, the

African-American police officers that acknowledged the practice did so without apology. Even though the officers readily admitted to unknowingly practicing racially profiling in the past, they were consistent with the severity of the punishment that they recommended to defendants regardless of race. In other words, even though these African-American officers may have unknowingly practiced racial profiling in the past, once the African-American defendant was convicted, they treated him the same way they treated the White defendant. This lends doubt to the argument that racially profiling is an exaggerated and "overstated problem fed by media hype." (Scott, 2001).

It appears that the prejudices that lead to racial profiling existed within a predominate percentage of the Pilot study group. Even more germane to this examination, though, was that this same cohort not only harbored these prejudices, but they acted on them in their official capacities as police officers. Even though 72% of the officers surveyed admitted to racial profiling, the actual number is likely higher. Several of the respondents were tentative about the questionnaire even though they were assured that their responses were confidential. The research did not, however, sustain Scheft's supposition that "approximately 15% of officers are racist," though. (Scheft, 2001).

The purpose of the scenario section was to determine if police officers would treat defendants differently based on racial stereotypes. Sommers and Ellsworth found in their examination that White jurors were "more prone to harsh judgment of a Black defendant," (O'Connor, 2001) in a mock trial situation.

Comparable to Sommers and Ellsworth 2001, Bodenhausen (1988) discovered that Hispanic defendants were found guilty at a higher rate than White defendants were, "only when the ethnicity of the defendant was known before the evidence was evaluated. When participants learned the ethnicity of the defendant after the evidence was evaluated, no difference was found." (Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003)

The Pilot Study and results from Sommers and Ellsworth's study were similar. White jurors "demonstrated racial bias;" however, when race was a key issue in the mock trial situation, "societal expectations are elicited, and jurors heed egalitarian ideals." Yet when the "race card" is not played, Whites are more susceptible to making prejudiced decisions." (O'Connor, 2001) The Pilot survey attempted to duplicate this archetype. That is, given the same set of circumstances, would minorities receive harsher consideration as a result of bias and prejudice maintained by the respondent officers? The answer appeared to be yes.

The relationship between the Pilot questionnaire and scenario 1 versus 2 is worthy of discussion. Although 73.1 % (n= 19) believed they treated the subjects equally in the mock scenarios, 84.6 % (n=22) recommended supervised probation for the Black male. Conversely, only 61.5 % (n= 16) recommended supervised probation for the White male in the scenario. Each individual had committed the same crime with the same fact pattern. The sample t test reported

above indicated that there was a statistically significant difference at the .003 level.

The review of the PERF survey offered some important results. Data collected in the study was extrapolated to determine if the respondent departments reported similar problems as those found in the Pilot study. The Pilot Study interviewed officers of every rank. However, the number of police executives interviewed was so small (n=1) that no generalizations could be made. Yet, of the sample population in the Pilot study, 68% (n=17) felt racial profiling was a problem in their department. Conversely, nearly 60% (n=651) of the police administrators in the PERF study reported that racial profiling was not a serious problem in their respective departments.

These administrators denied racial profiling was a problem even though many of these executives took steps to address racial profiling. Nearly one-in-five (18.9 %; n=205) set new policies, 12.3 % (n=133) modified existing policies, and 17.5% (n=190) instituted training on racial profiling. There seems to be a contradiction in these findings. If, in fact, racial profiling was not a serious problem in the sample population, why did approximately 49% (n=528) establish criterion that restricted racial profiling? I do not believe the answer is progressive police leadership; police leaders have been historically reactive.

This contradiction can be attributed to police management's propensity to avoid any discussion of corruption. Most police officials treat police deviance (e.g. racial profiling) as, "a subject to be avoided. The prevailing view is that the less

said the better." (Geller, 1991, p. 239) Furthermore, when corruption scandals become public, "the tendency is to blame the messenger-the chief of police who not only failed to prevent the misconduct but also made it known to the public...[this] may tarnish his or her reputation and that of the department." (p. 240). Most police executives solve impending police corruption and deviance problem by writing more policies. It is what Ianonne refers to as "management by memorandum." (Ianonne, 1987, p. 126) Chris Braiden, Deputy Chief of the Edmonton, Alberta Police Department pronounces in even clearer terms, "Any fool can write a bunch rules, that's why there's so many rules in policing." (Braiden, 2001)

It is virtually impossible to write policies and procedures for the countless problems that officer's face. Police administrators have long been regarded as a reactive body, "few departments [even] collect the data needed to identify effective ways to handle tough disorder and service calls, much less reward officers for implementing these ways." (Geller, 1991, p. 60) However, there is some evidence to indicate that "administrative rule making has produced significant improvements in policing." (Fyfe, 1979; Walker, 1999) In Fyfe's examination of the New York City police department, he found that firearm discharges decreased nearly 30% once a restrictive deadly force policy was instituted. Unless, however, a policy is necessary to address a specific situation or problem, it can do more harm than good. In fact, "the development of rules only adds to the restrictions on police productivity." (Walker, 1999, p. 204) These

administrative rules, as previously indicated, were instituted in reaction to, rather than in an anticipation of a problem.

Dr. David Bayley found comparative statistics in his discussion with police administrators and command staff. (Bayley, 2001) During a seminar on police integrity, Bayley made numerous inquiries of the participants regarding racial profiling. Of the twenty-nine police administrators and command staff queried, 89% (n=26) felt racial profiling was not a serious problem in law enforcement. When further questioned regarding the seriousness of racial profiling within their respective departments, the response rate was even more overwhelming. 96 % (n=28) reported that racial profiling was not a problem "whatsoever" in their departments. Interestingly, though, of the respondents who felt that racial profiling was a problem in law enforcement, (11%, n=3) all received recent training on racial profiling. None of the respondents who answered in the negative in the first query received training.

Discrepancies were also reported in PERF's extensive examination. The differences between the perceptions of police officers and citizens were quite real. In fact, the citizens' responses regarding the pervasiveness of racial profiling in law enforcement was very "consistent with national polls." (Fridell, 2001, p. 14) While citizens overwhelmingly felt that profiling was a problem, the PERF study found that police officers overwhelmingly felt it was not. PERF attributed this divergence to a matter of nomenclature. According to PERF, "differing perceptions among citizens and police regarding racial profiling's

pervasiveness were very much related to the respective definitions." (p.15). While citizens "equated racial profiling with *all* manifestations of racially biased policing...most police practitioners defined racial profiling as stopping a motorist based solely on race." PERF reported that when facilitators broadened the definition of racial profiling to one of, "racially biased policing, police participants were more likely to agree that a larger problem existed." (p.15). There is more to these significant discrepancies, though, than a simple matter of nomenclature.

The Pilot Study was undertaken with the PERF premise in mind. That is, if, in fact the acceptance of, or at least realization of, racial profiling was a matter of nomenclature, wouldn't effective training mitigate this? The answer appeared to be "yes"; at least in the Pilot study. This led to the MEOCS study.

5.2 MEOCS RESULTS

The MEOCS study found that a department's organizational culture (attitudes, values, and behaviors) affected racial profiling perspectives and practices. By examining Organizational Commitment scores from the Modified MEOCS, I was able to determine that organizational culture did affect racial profiling practices. Police departments with officers more committed to an organization showed lower search rate disparities between minority and majority motorists.

These correlations were anticipated. Police officers who are more committed to an organization are not likely to indicate that socially unacceptable

practices are present unless they are overtly prejudiced and intolerant. Similarly, these same police officers are not likely to report high levels of Racial Profiling, Separatism or Reverse Discrimination.

Racial profiling attitudes and practices were also examined by comparing training criterion. The police departments where the research took place compared closely in a number of variables. The differentiation was found to be the amount of training officers received. Police departments where a majority of members received racial profiling training showed lower search rate disparities between majority and minority motorists. They also showed higher levels of commitment to an organization (See table 15.0). Simply put, more training meant less racial profiling and higher commitment.

Comparative police departments with better racial climates, as indicated by the sum of the Modified MEOCS scores, engaged in lower incidents of racial profiling. It appears that better trained departments had better racial climates. I can not state this conclusively; however, a commitment to better training in an organization is likely to have many ancillary affects. In essence, a commitment to training is a commitment to improve the organization. This, however, may be only part of the answer.

A relationship between the Modified MEOCS scores, the amount of training, and the perception of racial profiling was found. The hypothesis held that racial profiling would be problematic in organizations where training was low. This was presumed even though respondents were likely to reply in the negative to

inquiries regarding racial profiling. A two-year study on statewide traffic stops by the regions largest circulating periodical provided affirmation of this central hypothesis.

These statistics provided reasonable evidence of the existence of racial profiling based on the number of motor vehicle stops and searches of minority motorists. Higher Modified MEOCS scores and higher levels of training in racial profiling did not lead to an increased perception of racial profiling. However, it did lead to decreased levels of search disparity between minority and majority motorists. This is an important finding. Training may have not influenced attitudes, but it did influence behavior.

The following Modified MEOCS results support many of the studies suppositions. However, one of the central propositions of the study was that training and attitudes would closely parallel one another. That is, as the amount of training increased, the perceptions of and attitudes against racial profiling would also increase. This, however, was not the case. Several Modified MEOCS queries of interest are reported below.

Table 13.0- *Modified MEOCS Question Two- If The Race Problem Can Be Solved Anywhere, It Can Be Solved In A Police Department.*

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	3	2.7
SOMEWHAT AGREE	26	23.2
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	43	38.4
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	22	19.6
STRONGLY DISAGREE	18	16.1
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

Table 13.1 Modified MEOCS question Three- Majority Males Have A Better Chance than Minorities or Women To Get the Best Assignment.

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	6	5.4
SOMEWHAT AGREE	7	6.3
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	22	19.6
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	39	38.4
STRONGLY DISAGREE	38	33.9
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

Table 13.2 Modified MEOCS Question Four- Majority Member Get Away with Breaking the Rules That Result In Punishment for Minorities.

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	3	2.7
SOMEWHAT AGREE	7	6.3
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	16	14.3
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	24	21.4
STRONGLY DISAGREE	62	55.4
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

Table 13.3 Modified MEOCS Question Five- Minorities and Women Get Away with Breaking the Rules that Majority Males are punished for.

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	11	9.8
SOMEWHAT AGREE	26	23.2
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	21	18.8
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	21	18.8
STRONGLY DISAGREE	33	29.5
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

Table 13.4 Modified MEOCS Question Six- Minorities and Women Frequently Cry "Prejudice" Rather Than Except Responsibility for Personal Faults.

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	8	7.1
SOMEWHAT AGREE	35	31.3
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	30	26.8
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	22	19.6
STRONGLY DISAGREE	17	15.2
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

Table 13.5 Modified MEOCS Question Seven- This Organization Provides A Good Career Opportunity for Minorities and Women.

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	19	17.0
SOMEWHAT AGREE	49	43.8
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	24	21.4
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	12	10.7
STRONGLY DISAGREE	8	7.1
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

13.6 Modified MEOCS Question Eight- This Department is fully committed To the Principle of Fair Treatment to All Its Members.

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
STRONGLY AGREE	11	9.8
SOMEWHAT AGREE	23	20.5
NEITHER AGRE/DISAGREE	22	19.6
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	26	23.2
STRONGLY DISAGREE	30	26.8
DIDN'T ANSWER	0	0
MISSING	0	0
TOTAL	112	100

The inquiries are grouped as such because they point to a dichotomy. The trend of the first several questions appears to indicate that the cohort suffers from reverse discriminatory practices. For example: 76.8 percent of the cohort (N = 77) strongly disagreed with question number four: Majority members get away with breaking the rules that result in punishment for minorities. Yet, 48.3 percent (N = 54) disagreed with question number five: Minorities and women get away with breaking the rules that majority males are punished for. The group appears to indicate that there is unequal treatment of majority males, but approximately half of this group does not believe that minority group members receive special treatment, either.

Over sixty percent of the cohort (N= 68) agreed with question number seven: This organization provides a good career opportunity for minorities and

women. Conversely, only 30.3 percent of the cohort (N= 34) agreed with question number eight: This department is fully committed to the principle of fair treatment to all its members. This would appear to indicate that the group perceives there to be inequitable treatment of group members, yet minorities and women may still be able to advance in this inequitable system.

These items are discussed simultaneously because they emphasize a consistent perspective. That is, the correlations appear split amongst two distinct groups. These are the over represented group made up of White males; and the underrepresented group made up of minorities and women. Although the sum totals are not identical, thirteen women were included in the study and seven minorities, the underrepresented group amounts to twenty; the over-represented group amounts to ninety-five. Seven respondents were eliminated because they refused to answer several of the Modified MEOCS queries.

These statistics seem to mirror other studies. Weisburd (2000) and Barlow & Barlow (2000) found the attitudes of non-White police officers fell somewhere between Black and White respondents. It is the number of non-White respondents, in actuality the lack of non-White respondents, that is significant, though (n= 7). The fact that four White police supervisors surveyed only four Black respondents and three other non-White officers indicates that they not only did not attempt to get a representative sample, they may have in fact avoided non-Caucasian officers. White police officers did not perceive racial profiling as a problem; non-White officers did. Race and ethnicity were a predictor of racial

profiling attitudes; training was not. The findings of the first major research question tended to support the findings of PERF and Bayley (2001)

5.3 DISTRIBUTION

The issue of distribution may have affected the Modified MEOCS results. The Charlie Police Department supervisor who distributed and collected the surveys was a union official. It is likely that these surveys were distributed to fellow officers whom the supervisor socialized with. Conversely, neither of the police supervisors who distributed these surveys were union officials in the Bravo and Nora Police Departments. It may be that these surveys were more randomly distributed in the Bravo and Nora Police Departments. The situation at the Sierra Police Department was unique. The officer who distributed the surveys had just been appointed to the Sierra Police Officers union after a corruption scandal led to change union officials. I do not believe distribution of the surveys at the Sierra Police Department was skewed.

5.4 TRAINING

The differences between the Charlie and Sierra Police Departments emphasize the importance of training. The Charlie and Sierra Police Departments have similar Part I crime indices. The number of part I crimes per police officer further emphasizes the similarities. These two departments have similar attitudes towards their respective organizations, as well as similar attitudes regarding

reverse discrimination. However, the Sierra Police Department instituted department-wide training; the Charlie Police Departments did not. This appears to have affected the incident rates of racial profiling; rates that are reported in the disparity indices below. Training is only part of the solution, though.

5.5 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The Modified MEOCS was utilized in an attempt to understand an organization's values, racial climate, and the presence of racial profiling. Racial profiling training was also measured and compared. The Modified MEOCS scores found that training and organizational culture, not attitudes and perceptions, were predictors of racial profiling practices. It also found that the most prominent intervention methodology in policing (i.e. police training), had a discernible effect on the proliferation of racial profiling. Attitudes appeared unaffected, although behaviors were.

The organizational culture of a department strongly influences the daily practices of its officers. The organizational culture of a group is determined by a series of communications, attitudes, and values. When these variables become contrary to the values of the organization, they become the antecedents to various problems and abuses such as racial profiling. Supervisors and administrators must ensure that organizational values are accurately conveyed. As Scheft states in the qualitative section, "The chief who tells his officers to be

courteous and fair by day, then screams, plays politics and tells racist jokes in the guard room at night, sends a message loud and clear."

The police subculture often operates in opposition to the police organization. As Thibault, found, "No policy can be implemented without taking [this group] and their actions into account." (Thibault, 1995, p. 45) The strength of the alliances that make up this subculture were examined to determine if they led to racial profiling using the four different scales of the Modified MEOCS.

There was no "Organizational Culture Scale" per se. This was determined by extrapolating the results of four variables: Training, Organizational Commitment, Racial Climate, and race based disparate motor vehicle stops. Organizational commitment involves a loyalty of sorts to the organization. Officers who hold adversarial attitudes towards the organization are not likely to be committed to it. Training, on the other hand, indicates that the organization is committed to improving itself. Racial Climate is part of the internal value system of an organization. A department with a poor Racial Climate is not likely to engage in egalitarian policing. That is, racial profiling is more likely. Finally, disparities of race based motor vehicle stops were found to be a product of training. Thus, the sum total of these variables was offered as an organization's culture. I was able to conclude this based on fifteen years of immersion in, and study of the police subculture.

5.6 GROUP CONTRAST

There were some important disparities found among sub-groups. For example, sergeants are first line supervisors who enjoy the closest working relationship with line personnel. They, more than any other rank, often have the most accurate picture of what occurs at the execution level. Captains, conversely, are division commanders assigned to administrative duties. They are far less likely to spend time with line level personnel during the execution of their duties, and are more likely to base their attitudes on general impressions. Sergeants reported the highest level of racial profiling; Captains reported the lowest. There is an obvious information gap between the two ranks. It is possible that this lack of communication undermines enforcement practices. Captains may set policy, but sergeants ensure that policy will be properly carried out.

There was also obvious race based disparities. A study of the Milwaukee Police Department by Kurlander (2000) found these disparities as well. However, upon closer examination, the Modified MEOCS cohort was found to be overwhelmingly Caucasian. That is, 89.2 % (n= 99) were White, only 7.2% (n= 8) were minorities. Kurlander found the perception of racial profiling to be significantly lower among Caucasian officers versus their African American counterparts. The Modified MEOCS reported similar results; however, non-White participants were underrepresented.

Attitudes regarding the extent of racial profiling were not commensurate with group behaviors. Attitudes did not appear to mirror behaviors. Yet, this research perspective was derived from a predominately (77 %) White, male cohort. This demographic reflects national statistics on police officers; approximately seventy percent of police officers nationwide are White males. A material contrast between the attitudes of Black and White police officers existed. However, only four Black officers completed the survey.

It is likely that the moderation of racial profiling practices lies in the identification of the divergence between officers from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Further research is needed to identify what is likely to be a complex set of psychosocial, environmental, and situational variables that influence this contrast.

5.7 THE FIFTH COMPARISON GROUP

Much time was spent on the experimental design of this study. Five police departments were initially chosen. Departments with racial profiling training were compared with comparable departments without racial profiling training. The Alpha Police Department, the largest police department in the region, was included as a base line. Not only did the four departments in the study abut it; they derived much of their part I crime from it.

These four medium-size, urban police departments were contrasted as well. Along with the Charlie, Nora, Sierra, and Bravo Police Departments, the

Alpha Police Department was also surveyed. The Alpha Police Department has elevated levels of part I crimes (rape, robbery, murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and larceny), compared to the other four urban departments. However, the rates were not so disparate that testing couldn't be done. I had expected to gain valuable information from the Alpha Police Department because of its centrality and size. The Alpha Police Department has 2000 sworn members and service approximately 600,000 citizens. The Part I index crime rate for Alpha is 6.35; 17.5 part I crimes per officer occur each year.

The response members of the Alpha police department had to the MEOCS were so profound that it was included in these findings. The disclosure statement (See Appendix) was provided to explain and clarify the purpose of the study. As the statement indicates, all participants and their respective departments were to remain anonymous. Furthermore, the results were to be made available to all participants, and the study was conducted to fulfill my educational requirements. There was no hidden agenda, and it was explained that the Modified MEOCS was taken verbatim from the US Military MEOCS.

Fifty surveys were distributed, only four were returned. A Lieutenant Commander from the Alpha police department contacted me. He had distributed the surveys but had only perused the first few questions. "They appeared innocuous to me," he stated. He never took the time to read the entire survey, and thus was ill prepared for the severe backlash that he received from his subordinates. To further quote the Lieutenant Commander, "I never got down to

number eleven and twelve-A. We were a lot better off before all of this affirmative action stuff started." He was incredulous. "The shit hit the fan. We don't have a racial profiling problem over here. But with all the litigation going on over the last exam, some of the guys thought it was a sick joke."

Black officers were the most vociferous. Some of these officers were involved in a civil suit against the Alpha police department because they believed their most recent promotional exam was discriminatory. White males subsequently sued the Alpha police department because they were passed over for promotion by less qualified Black officers. What I found particularly ironic, though, was the Lieutenant Commander's statement that 'we don't have a racial profiling problem over here.' It was obvious to me that they had a serious racial profiling problem even inside the department. This was based partly on the upheaval that erupted after the MEOCS was distributed. It was also based on past experience.

The most vivid example I have witnessed of racial profiling involved a funeral for a popular Alpha officer. The staging area was a parking area behind a police station near the funeral home. To enter the parking area you had to walk down a long series of inclined stairs. I paused as I walked down to look at the sheer number of Alpha officers. I immediately noticed, though, that they were grouped exclusively by race and rank. All of the Black officers stood together; all of the White officers stood together, and all of the non-White officers stood together. Even the superior officers were separated based on race. It will likely be

the most obvious confirmation of segregation that I will ever experience. It was also the first time I became cognizant of the prominent and undeniable racial divide amongst fellow police officers.

The Lieutenant Commander explained that officers who received the Modified MEOCS welcomed part II. It was the wording of Part V of the Modified MEOCS that many of the officers found offensive. I was unable to analyze any of the surveys because even the completed surveys were destroyed under threat of union action. The precinct where the MEOCS was distributed has the highest crime rate within this major US City. It is well documented that precincts where officers are in such constant danger exhibit high levels of "esprit de corp" (Ianonne, 1987, p. 195) and "unity." (Thibault, 1995, p. 26) However, it appears that race and ethnicity transcend this synthesis, even in the most intimate units. Apparently Randall Kennedy's postulation that 'race matters,' is quite accurate.

5.8 CONCLUSION

I was pleasantly surprised by the outcome of the study. Methodologically, there appeared to be few holes in the experimental design. One error that did affect the outcome of the study came down to a matter of nomenclature. The Modified MEOCS was 'modified' merely by changing the words "military" or "unit" to "police" and "department" One additional inquiry was added, "Racial Profiling is a serious problem in this police department?" I believe that using the adverb "serious" had a substantial effect on the responses the cohort made.

Even officers who had recently received racial profiling training were in strong disagreement with this inquiry. In general, it appeared that only minorities and females agreed with this inquiry. Although such a variance was predicted, a more representative sample of officers, one that included more African Americans officers, would have held particular significance. An examination of the research by Weisburd (2000) on integrity in policing supported this anecdotal finding. African American police officers perceived racial profiling to be more of a widespread problem than their Caucasian counterparts.

The numbers in New Jersey and Maryland are irrefutable. Although minorities accounted for between 12 and 17% of the motorists in each study respectively, they accounted for between 70-80 % of all searches by police. (Meeks, 2000) Justifications for these tremendous discrepancies were based on a number of well-established and tutored police directives: furtive actions, suspicious activity, alarm at the sight of police, etcetera. Since police officers of every race base their very existence on a threat assessment of each individual they encounter, the question arises, "Is it possible that officers find African-Americans to be a greater threat to their safety than Whites?" The answer appears to be absolutely. Cleary (2000) found that police officers associate criminality to Blackness. One can only wonder then how many Caucasians escaped detection of criminality simply because officers placed their attention and scrutiny on African-Americans.

Police officers most frequent interaction with the public occurs during motor vehicle stops. One of the tenets of traffic enforcement is to base enforcement decisions on the violation, not the violator. (Geller, 1991, p. 167) However, this theory is rarely adhered to. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that once an officer has properly identified a motorist during a traffic stop, and the motorist's paperwork is in order, a search of the motorist or vehicle, without more, would be unconstitutional. When an individual's past criminal record is taken into account, though, the likelihood of a search is exponentially increased.

Criminal records checks are routine during traffic stops. Approximately one-in-four adult African-American males are currently involved in the criminal justice system. These facts, as well as the reality that seventy-seven percent of police officers are White, may explain why African-Americans are searched at a higher rate than Whites. African-Americans are disproportionately profiled and surveilled as well. As Meehan and Ponder discovered, officers disproportionately profile and surveille African-Americans using mobile data terminals (MDT's) located in their police cruisers.

Racial profiling is a reality of policing. In fact, it is a reality throughout our society. However, what makes the practice so disturbing in law enforcement is that police officers have the legal authority to deprive citizens of their right if they have committed a crime. Being a minority driving a motor vehicle does not, by itself, qualify. The maintenance and perpetuation of police norms, both good and

bad are foreordained from the very onset of an individual's police education. Police academy training ensures that officers will be ready in case of a gun battle. Rarely, however, are they taught the appropriate conflict resolution skills to dispel the most minor of problems. Furthermore, cultural diversity training, or what is known as multi-cultural education in secondary education, is valueless unless it is provided with great care and effort.

The training and education police officers receive are critical to providing egalitarianism in policing. However, police training is often looked at as a finite, limited, and necessary evil. The time, effort and resources earmarked for police training must be dramatically shifted if the tacit prejudice of racial profiling is to be appropriately addressed. However, training in this area will be useless if recognition of the problem doesn't precede it. Once the problem is acknowledged, training must be instituted that unequivocally conveys that racial profiling is not tolerable. This process will not be properly addressed in an overcrowded police academy classroom. Especially when it entails four hours of non-participatory lecture.

Resources must be appropriately apportioned for police training. Resources must also be made available so that a support system is offered for officers and their families. The overwhelming pressure of the subculture in policing is undeniable. It is almost akin to familial ties. Many police managers, with little or no additional training, solidified this naturalization through the perpetuation of, "esoteric knowledge and appropriate behavior patterns before

the novices are accepted by the initiated." (Thibault, 1995, p. 25) Ultimately, values and behaviors of the group become shared; and unfortunately, racial profiling is a part of the value system of American police officers.

The study was undertaken with great hope. Far from perfect, the data offered some notable findings. The values of the police subculture do affect racial profiling practices. The amount of training effects racial profiling practices; it does not appear to affect attitudes. The quality of training was not even considered, it was assumed.

Fifteen years is a long time to be immersed in a system. Values of this system gradually become a way of living. Police officers are cynical because it is the only way they can deal with the onslaught of never ending human tragedy. An 'us versus them' mentality is absolute. Inevitably, an officer's perspective on life changes. Officers begin to look at each individual they encounter, both in and out of uniform, in one way: is this person a threat to me? Maybe this is why police officers die at such premature ages.

We now know that people equate the color of an individual's skin to criminality. Police officers accept this reality, but must take it a step further. Many officers, I would venture to guess most officers, equate 'Blackness' with criminality and threat. The self-fulfilling prophecy is perpetuated with the fact that one-in-four Black males in America are involved in the criminal justice system. We must look at this equation in a more rational light, though.

Blacks, especially males, are perceived as criminal to most Americans. They are also perceived as threatening to many Whites. One quarter of the adult Black male population is involved in the criminal justice system. Most police officers are White. Most inhabitants of wealthier suburban communities are also White. When a wealthy White suburbanite sees a Black male driving down their street, the conclusion they are likely to reach is, 'this threatening Black man is hear to commit a crime. I should call the police'. The White police officer that responds is likely thinking along the same lines, except she has no one to call to report it to; she has to investigate it. Hence, the Black doctor who just moved in up the street is stopped, violated, and humiliated. This is the reality of being Black in a mostly White America.

5.9 RECOMMENDATIONS

PREJUDICE AND BIAS

Prejudice and bias are a permanent reality in our society. It is distinction that knows no boundaries. Every race and ethnicity holds biases and prejudices of some form or another. For anyone to think that these biases will ever be resolved is unwise. Because prejudice and bias will continue to permeate our society, it will also continue to permeate law enforcement.

I use both words because someone can be biased and not be prejudiced. Bias connotes a partiality towards one group than another. Prejudice, on the other hand, connotes an utter intolerance towards a group. Bias was evident in

the Pilot Study scenarios. The Alpha Reliability for the two scenarios was .82. The t-test performed found undeniable bias. (t = 3.33; df = 25; significance = .003) However, I would also state that prejudice was absent many of the members of the department where the Pilot Study was conducted. The Modified MEOCS study did not find outright prejudice, either.

The Modified MEOCS study did find that racial profiling was a highly charged issue. The study found that bias was evident based on the disproportionate rate Black motorists were stopped compared with White motorists. What was also interesting, though, was the extent officers went to avoid even discussing racial profiling. For example, many of the officers that agreed to take part in this study refused to acknowledge the existence or absence of racial profiling. Nearly eighteen percent (n= 20) neither agreed nor disagreed; 7.1 percent (N= 8) did not answer, and 1.8 percent (N= 2) were missing from the system. Nearly twenty-seven percent of the cohort (N= 30) avoided a direct response when queried regarding racial profiling. No other inquiry contained in the Modified MEOCS saw such avoidance.

This study found empirical evidence of generalized bias and prejudice in the research group. When these officers acted on these partialities, their actions amounted to racial profiling. Meehan and Ponder's (2002) study was the most unmistakable illustration of racial profiling that I examined. They found that the African Americans were surveilled at a higher rate by police. The further African Americans ventured from their predominately Black neighborhood, the greater the

increase in surveillance. African Americans were also more likely to be stopped as a result of this surveillance. This is the definition of racial profiling. Through this study, though, I was able to grasp the complexities that explain why officers disproportionately target minorities.

I found several attributes that repeatedly influenced racial profiling practices. Prejudice was obviously one. This cannot be eliminated, however, even with effective training, supervision, and leadership; however, it can be attenuated. Another included organizational commitment. Police officers who were found to have higher levels of organizational commitment engaged in lower levels of racial profiling. The last issue that influenced racial profiling practices in this study was training. Officers who received higher levels of training, regardless of quality, engaged in lower levels of racial profiling.

CULTURE

A number of other metaphors have been used to describe the closed society that encompasses the police subculture. These included the organizational culture, the thin blue line, and the police system. Neiderhoffer (1967) postulated some thirty-five years ago that it was, "the police system, not the personality of the candidate that is the more powerful determination of behavior and ideology." (p.160).

The primary groups in this police system include police administrators, informal leaders, and union officials. These groups determine the attitudes,

behaviors, and customs of a police organization. First and foremost, however, it is police administrators who have the greatest affect. Without honest, fair, and strong leadership, the police system denigrates into a self-service rather than a public service system. In fact, freshman officers are excluded from this system until they exhibit the appropriate pro-social behaviors.

What constitutes appropriate behavior is a subject open to ambiguous interpretation. Thibault (1995) included cynicism, a loss of autonomy, and the adoption of esoteric knowledge as a part of this rite of passage. In some police department, this esoteric knowledge includes targeting minorities. An officer is likely to behave, "radically different" (Scheft, 2003) in such a department versus a department where only egalitarian and moral policing is accepted.

A department's organizational culture is a set of rules, standards and values. Every officer must live by these principles. These ideals are often one of the most powerful influences in a police officer's life. I compared the police subculture to familial ties in the study. A more powerful comparison, though, might be a powerful gang. In the early 1990's, as violent crime skyrocketed to historic levels, Boston police officers took a novel approach to battling urban gangs. Officers throughout the two thousand-member department displayed color t-shirts. A police cruiser was emblazoned on the shirt and underneath was the statement, '*Boston Police, the Baddest Gang in Town.*'

There was a bit of irony in this novel display. Boston officers who fought daily to stem the tide of gang violence now proclaimed their membership in the

'badddest gang of all.' However, the validness in this phrase is a genuine depiction of the police subculture. I believe one of Scheft closing quotes sums up the affect a police department's organizational culture maintains. "In short, culture can truly change hearts and minds but, failing that, it can certainly change actions." The organizational culture of a department emanates from leadership.

TRAINING

Training that involves racial profiling is a highly charged and controversial subject. Interestingly, the APA guidelines on multi-cultural education and training note, "Culture-centered faculty introduce material that many students have never thought of, may not care about, and may have reluctance to engage in. Thus the challenge...include[s] ensuring a safe learning environment, knowing the course content, and managing emotions that emerge." (Jackson, 1999; APA, 2003)

Emotions ran quite high during a break in the racial profiling training Dr. Bayley (2001) led. Interestingly, the three officers who acknowledged a racial profiling problem were segregated from the rest of the group that had expressed strong disagreement. The criteria of a safe and unemotional learning environment were obviously absent. Following this break, Dr. Bayley wisely avoided broaching the racial profiling issue again. This was unfortunate, though.

The benefits of exploring the range of emotions that evolved created an ideal setting for learning. According to the American Council on American Education & American Association of University Professors (2000), such a

learning environment can realize benefits, "At the individual...Institutional [and]...Societal," levels. How can such an environment be created and maintained with such a highly emotional and dogmatic issue at hand? Not very easily.

Scheft reported an interesting and valuable observation. During the many hours he has spent teaching racial profiling, he noticed that the most affective learning came only when there was input from African American officers. Not African American instructors, but African American brother and sister officers. Referring to the APA guidelines once more, "Decades of research have been conducted and multiple theories developed to reduce prejudice towards other groups, most developing around the central premise that greater knowledge of and contact with the other groups will result in greater intercultural communication and less prejudice and stereotyping." (Brewer & Miller, 1998; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 2000; APA, 2003) Training offers contact and exposure for the mostly-White police cohort. This is critical since it has been found that lower exposure to "other-race" members leads to increased prejudiced. (Meissner & Brigham, 2001)

Racial Profiling must be included as a part of every police officer's training. This includes probationary officers during their academy training, and, more importantly, veteran officers during their in-service training. These veteran officers, as has been previously mentioned, are critical in establishing the organizational culture of a department. Younger, less experienced officers look to these veterans and assimilate their behaviors and beliefs. If veteran officers

model egalitarian behaviors and beliefs, these attributes will trickle down to others. The state of California currently requires five hours of cultural diversity training per year. (D. Paul, personal communications, February 3, 2003). This must be the minimum amount of time set aside for an annual review of such a critical subject matter.

The final aspect of training that needs redress is supervisory training. Ianonne (1987) noted over thirty years ago that police sergeants (first line supervisors) were the 'backbone' of a police department. Not only is this an accurate assessment, but first line supervisors have the greatest effect and affect on line level personnel. Even with this knowledge, though, the average time spent in supervisory training programs that I examined averaged about two weeks. It is still possible, in fact, to be a line officer one day, and a supervisor the next. Dr. Nolan found that the progressive and intensive training he received became useless within 3-5 years. How long would it take, then, for 2 weeks of training to become useless?

This research determined that training may have not influenced attitudes, but it did influence behavior. The amount of quantity and quality of training didn't seem to be as important as the breadth of training. Every officer must be trained to understand that racial profiling is wrong and unacceptable.

Police leaders must accept the reality that racial profiling exists in policing. They must also accept that it is a genuine, bona fide, widespread problem. A problem that affects law enforcement's ability to effectively carry out its mission to

"protect and serve." Minority police officers are convinced that racial profiling is widespread. Yet, their White counterparts, who outnumber them nearly 8-to-1, reject the existence of a racial profiling problem. These differing perspectives must be brought into closer consensus. This study found that the way to attain this is through effective leadership, supervision, and training.

The public reaps improved, more effective police services when police leaders invest in internal improvements in a department. This study found that training was one way of doing this. Until a comprehensive commitment is made to address racial profiling, it will remain a reality of 21st Century policing.

APPENDIX A

PILOT STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE-PART A

1) An officer responds to the area of *Bravo Av.* near *River Street* for a report of a fight in progress. Upon arrival the officer observes a young Black male, wearing a Black hooded sweatshirt, baggy jeans, and sneakers, kicking another male on the ground. The suspect flees in a late model Honda Civic with lettering across the back window. After a brief pursuit, the suspect is caught. He is arrested, tried, and convicted of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon; to wit: a shod foot. What is your sentencing recommendation?

a) Outright Dismissal of the Charges -----

b) Unsupervised probation for 6 months -----

c) Supervised probation for 6 months -----

d) Incarceration in house of correction for 3 months -----

2) An officer responds to a report of a disturbance at a frat house on D*ent St.* Upon arrival you observe a group encircling two men who appear to be fighting on the lawn. You disperse the group and observe a young White male in a shirt and tie fighting with another individual. You observe this individual kick the other combatant on the ground. He observes you and flees. After a brief foot chase, the suspect is caught. He is arrested, tried and convicted of assault and

battery with a dangerous weapon; to wit: a shod foot. What is your sentencing recommendation?

a) Outright Dismissal of the chargers -----

b) Unsupervised Probation for 6 months -----

c) Supervised Probation for 6 months -----

d) Incarceration in the house of corrections for 3 months -----

PILOT STUDY QUESTIONAIRRE-PART B

	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE
3) I have received racial sensitivity training	--	--	--
4) I am sensitive to the issue of racial profiling	--	--	--
5) Racial bias is a factor in some police actions	--	--	--
6) I socialize with individuals of a different race	--	--	--
7) I believe racial profiling may exist in law enforcement	--	--	--
8) I believe racial profiling may exist in my department	--	--	--
9) I may have unknowingly practiced R P* in the past	--	--	--
10) I treated both dfs ** equally in the scenarios	--	--	--

(* RP= racial profiling; ** dfs= defendants)

APPENDIX B

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

5/15/02

Dear Police Brethren:

Attached is a modified version of the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey. (MEOCS) It has been revised for law enforcement use. You have been asked to participate because your department fits a demographic profile ideal for research on attitudes and behaviors in policing. The purpose of the study is to measure police officers' attitudes regarding their brother and sister officers; racial attitudes in their respective departments; and the impact of training on these attitudes.

There is guarded optimism that specific attitudes, trends, and tendencies can be identified via rank, race, gender and training. All results are strictly confidential; you are not asked to identify yourself anywhere in the survey. Furthermore, your respective department has been codified to ensure confidentiality. Several hundred officers throughout the area are being surveyed. This information will be computed, reviewed, and analyzed, and will be made available for your examination. This study will fulfil the final requirements of my doctoral studies at BU. Your help and input are greatly appreciated.

Fraternally,
Lt. Michael Gropman
Brookline Police Department

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLIMATE SURVEY

Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree /Disagree	Strongly Agree	Strongly Disagree
1). I would accept almost any type of assignment in order to stay in this organization.	1	2	3	4	5
2). I find that my values and the organization's are very similar.	1	2	3	4	5
3). I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.	1	2	3	4	5
4). I could just as well be working in another organization as long as the type of work was similar.	1	2	3	4	5
5). I feel very little loyalty to this organization.	1	2	3	4	5
6). This organization really inspires me to perform my job in the very best manner possible.	1	2	3	4	5
7). It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave this organization.	1	2	3	4	5
8). I am extremely glad to be part of this organization compared to other, similar organizations that I could be in.	1	2	3	4	5
9). Assuming I could stay, there's not too gained by sticking with this organization to retirement.	1	2	3	4	5
10). Often, I find it difficult to agree with the policies of this organization on important matters relating to its personnel.	1	2	3	4	5
11). For me, this organization is the best of all possible ways to serve my community.	1	2	3	4	5
12). Becoming part of this organization was definitely not a good move for me.	1	2	3	4	5
1A). Minorities were better off before this equal opportunity business got started.	1	2	3	4	5
2A). More severe punishments are given out to minority as compared to majority offenders for the same offenses.	1	2	3	4	5

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLIMATE SURVEY

Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree /Disagree	Strongly Agree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

3A). Majority supervisors in charge of minority supervisors doubt the minorities' abilities.

4A). Minorities get better assignments than majority members.

5A). I understand the feelings of people of other races better since I became associated with the police department.

6A). The police department is fully committed to the principle of fair treatment for all its members.

7A). After duty hours, people should stick together in groups made up of their race (e.g., minorities only with minorities and majority members only with majority members).

8A). Majority males act as though stereotypes about minorities and women are true (e.g., "Blacks are lazy").

9A). Trying to bring about the integration of women and minorities is more trouble than it's worth.

10A). If the race problem can be solved anywhere, it can be solved in the police department.

11A). Majority males have a better chance than minorities or women to get the best assignments.

12A). Majority males do not show proper respect for minorities or women with higher rank.

13A). Minorities and majority members would be better off if they lived and worked only with people of their own races.

14A). I dislike the idea of having a supervisor of a race different from mine.

15A). Majority males are not willing to accept criticism from minorities or women.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLIMATE SURVEY

Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree /Disagree	Strongly Agree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

16A). Majority members get away with breaking rules that result in punishment for minorities.

17A). Some minorities get promoted just because they are minorities.

18A). Power in the hands of minorities is a dangerous thing.

19A). Minorities and women frequently cry "prejudice" rather than accept responsibility for personal faults.

20A). I would not like to have a supervisor of the opposite sex.

21A). This organization provides a good career chance for advancement for minorities and women.

22A). Minorities and women get away with breaking rules that majority males are punished for.

23A). There should be more close friendships between minorities and majority members in this organization.

24A). In this organization, I have personally felt discriminated against because of my race.

25A). Minorities don't take advantage of the educational opportunities that are available to them.

26A). Many minorities act as if they are superior to majority members.

27A). Racial Profiling is a serious problem in this department.

PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE SELECTION

Trained in Racial Profiling	YES	NO			
Gender	MALE	FEMALE			
Rank	PO	SGT	LT	CAPT	CHIEF
Race	BLACK	WHITE	HISPANIC	ASIAN	OTHER

APPENDIX D

PILOT STUDY QUALITATIVE QUESTIONAIRRE

1) My study found that training affected racial profiling practice between comparative police departments. Police departments with more training had lower search rate disparities between minority and majority members. Is training the solution to the racial profiling?

2) The Pilot study (which led to the dissertation) found that perceptions of trained Officers varied considerably regarding the extent and magnitude of racial profiling. There was either outright acceptance of the phenomenon, or outright rejection. What could explain this disparity?

3) Numerous studies have found that there is a large disparity between Black and White Americans regarding the extent, or even existence of racial profiling. A similar disparity exists between police officers (Black vs. White). The police cohort often maintains consistent and even dogmatic views; why is there such a disparity?

4) A police officer's commitment to the organization's appeared to affect racial profiling attitudes. That is, departments with officers who were more committed to their organization showed lower rates of RP. Is the organizational culture of a police department critical in influencing the attitudes and behaviors of its officers?

5) Are there any programs, tactics, or techniques that could be applied universally to decrease RP, or is it a more parochial, localized issue that needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis?

APPENDIX E

MEOCS STUDY QUALITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE

1) This study found that training affected racial profiling practice between comparative police departments. Departments with more training in racial profiling had lower search rate disparities between majority and minority members. Is training the solution to the elimination of racial profiling?
2) The Pilot study found that trained police officers appeared to differ on the extent and magnitude of racial profiling. Results indicated that there was either outright acceptance or outright rejection of the existence of racial profiling. What could explain this disparity?
3) Several studies have found that there is a significant disparity among African Americans and Caucasians. This disparity even exists among African American and Caucasian police officers. Why is there such a disparity?
4) An officer's commitment to an organization's did not appear to influence racial profiling attitudes or practices. Does this indicate that organizational culture is inconsequential in shaping these attitudes and behaviors?
5) Are there any recommendations you would make to police administrators that you feel might decrease racial profiling practices?

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