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By Norman R. Bennett

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**ZANZIBAR, PORTUGAL, AND MOZAMBIQUE:
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The evolving cultural region of the Swahili-speaking peoples of the east coast of Africa, stretching southwards past the island of Mozambique, fell under the general domination of the Portuguese masters of the western Indian Ocean after the beginning of the sixteenth century. Lacking the manpower effectively to garrison even the most important holdings of their world-wide empire, the Portuguese never made any significant attempt to occupy most settlements along the East African coast. When the attacking Arabs of Uman won their great victory at Mombasa in 1698, the Portuguese permanently withdrew to posts south of Cape Delgado, leaving the northern coast open to the Arabs, except for a brief reoccupation of Mombasa in the 1720s. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Swahili peoples found themselves intermittently subject to controls imposed by both Arabs and Portuguese. The Arabs, under the BuSaidi dynasty of Uman, were beginning to build the important state based at Zanzibar; the Portuguese, their European homeland in serious political decline, were clinging as best they could to their remaining settlements. The Swahili polities naturally preferred to live independent of either the Portuguese or the Arabs, but their long-present inability to combine into larger, more powerful states effectively left them subject to the influence of one or the other.

Despite their weaknesses, the Portuguese in East Africa, an independent administration since 1752, remained an important factor in the Cape Delgado region. The northernmost posts of the Portuguese were located in the Querimba Islands, with the principal establishment at the small port of Ibo. But the garrisons, too weak to repel any determined attack, merely served as symbols to mark Portuguese claims to the northern coast.¹ As the strength of the Arabs of Zanzibar grew, the Mozambique authorities continually worried about their limited hold, particularly toward the end of the century when Arabs, Africans, and Europeans, ignoring the Portuguese regulations restricting commerce,

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¹For a description of the region, José Christiano d'Almeida, "Relatorio do Districto de Cabo Delgado com referencia no Anno de 1880," *BM*, 8 (18 February 1882), 76; Adrien Balbi, *Variétés Politico-Statistiques sur la Monarchie Portugaise* (Paris, 1822), 117; René Pélissier, *Naissance du Mozambique* (Orgeval, 1984), I, 46-50. For a useful rendition of eighteenth century affairs, Fritz Hoppe, *Africa Oriental Portuguesa no tempo do Marquês de Pombal (1750-1777)* (Lisboa, 1970). Please see the list of abbreviations used in footnotes at the end of this paper.

avoided their poverty-stricken ports for those under Arab or Swahili control.² Because of the resulting loss of revenues, added to a natural – if impractical – desire to regain their lost empire, the Portuguese of Mozambique, particularly from the 1780s, suggested to Lisbon the undertaking of offensive moves against the Arabs, many of the schemes centering around the placing of an ally in power in Mombasa. There were no resources to spare for adventures and the proposals passed without implementation.³

Without a secure hold on the region until the final capitulation of Mombasa to the BuSaidi in 1836, the Arabs left the Portuguese in peace: the southernmost Arab post, since 1785, was at Kilwa. The Swahili living between the Arab and Portuguese posts consequently, during the beginning decades of the nineteenth century, enjoyed a practical independence conditioned only by the nearness of the closest foreign garrison. The Swahili residing to the immediate north of the Portuguese centers, seeking to profit from the European presence, often held positions within the administration of Mozambique, their acceptance of salaries and other honors allowing the Portuguese to maintain the fiction of their sovereignty over the northern coast.⁴ But whatever the nature of their relationship to the Portuguese, these Muslim rulers and their subjects naturally felt more drawn to the Arabs of Zanzibar, particularly after the great BuSaidi ruler, Said bin Sultan, turned his attention to East Africa. Prominent families, for example, sent their sons to Zanzibar for a proper Muslim education;⁵ others maintained commercial links via the dhow trade which tied their coast to the Arab island.⁶

The politics of this Muslim coastal world were marked by shifting political relationships between the various Swahili rulers and outsiders. A natural unresolved problem in the unstable flux was the location of the boundary separating the territories claimed by the Arabs and Portuguese. The influence of the Arabs was limited: "from Cape Delgado to Quiloa," said a British visitor, "it would appear there is little authority acknowledged to any but the kings or

²Edward A. Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves: Changing Patterns of International Trade in East Central Africa to the Later Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), 39ff. Examples of Portuguese complaints are given in Nobre to Castro, 18 August 1784, MC 21; Sanches to Arcos, 12 January 1820, MC 67; Castro to Tigre, 6 April 1789, 26 April 1789, Tigre to Castro, 1 March 1789, 16 July 1789, MC 26; Pinto to Costa, 13 February 1800, MC 37; Pinto to Sa, 25 November 1801, Pinto to Costa, 24 February 1801, MC 38.

³For the Mombasa dream, José Justino Teixeira Botelho, *História Militar e Política dos Portugueses em Moçambique de 1833 aos nossos Dias* (Lisboa, 1936), 489-96. See also: Vasconcelos to Castro, 7 August 1784, MC 44; Costa to MU, 28 September 1887, with enclosures, MC 23; Souza to Castro, 22 August 1795, with enclosures, MC 31; Coutinho to Costa, 9 January 1798, MM 32; to Coutinho, 25 November 1881, MC 42; Costa to Coutinho, 11 January 1802 in Sa to Coutinho, 13 January 1805, MC 39; Botelho to Barros, 1 December 1828, MM 6.

⁴For a discussion of the Portuguese policies to the Swahili in Mozambique, see Nancy Jane Hafkin, "Trade, Society, and Politics in Northern Mozambique, c. 1753-1913," (Ph.D. thesis, Boston University, 1973). Hafkin deals with the Swahili at Quitangonha, Sancul, Sangage, and Angoche.

⁵Jeronymo Romero, *Memória Acerca do Districto de Cabo Delgado* (Lisboa, 1856), 32.

⁶Statistics are difficult to come by, but some idea of the value of trade with Zanzibar at a later date can be gained from the reports given in *BM* from 1854 onward.

chiefs residing there."⁷ Although the Portuguese normally claimed the coast stretching to Cape Delgado (10° 40"), by the early nineteenth century their last garrison occupied Ibo. This weakness allowed the Swahili residing around what was described in 1886 as "the vast and splendid bay" of Tunghi, to become the focus of a long argument between Zanzibar and Portugal, which ended in the 1880s by involving all of the Great Powers represented in East Africa. The Swahili lived in villages, Tunghi to the north and Minangani to the south, on each side of an estuary then known as the Minangani River.⁸ The Portuguese later admitted that they had possessed no authority over the Tunghi region until 1765, claiming in that year the local ruler had accepted a commission in the Mozambique service.⁹ Whatever the truth of the assertion, the Swahili ruler of Tunghi maintained his freedom of action, his exactions upon the Portuguese becoming serious enough around 1778 for an expedition to be sent against him.¹⁰ The administration rebuilt its fort at Ibo in 1791, but the disorder in the northern region – subject for many years to the devastating raids of the Sakalava of Madagascar – persisted, causing the Tunghi sultan to seek effective support from both the Portuguese and the Arabs.¹¹ Since meaningful Arab aid was not available until the 1840s the Swahili accepted the reality of the nearby Portuguese presence, threatening to leave their service for the Arabs when salaries went unpaid or military support (usually in the form of supplies) was lacking. The Portuguese, not greatly worried about the threats because of the lack of an alternative to them, fitfully answered the Swahili requests.¹²

The arrival in the mid-1820s of an energetic governor for Mozambique, Sebastião Xavier Botelho, led to the first significant negotiations between Arabs and Portuguese relating to their mutual problems. The new governor, aware of the increasing Umani involvement in coastal affairs, feared their armed descent upon his command, at once seeking additional military support from Lisbon.¹³ But Botelho realistically accepted the futility of such requests, soon recognizing the dependence of Mozambique upon the provisions and other merchandise

⁷Nourse to Farquhar, 8 December 1822, Nourse to Sied bin Mahamed, 17 August 1824, Adm. 7/47, Nourse to Admiralty, 5 January 1823, 22 January 1824, Adm. 7/48, PRO.

⁸Constancio José de Brito, "Relatório," *BM*, 3 (15 January 1887), 17-18; Claudino Augusto Carneiro de Souza e Faro, "Relatório do Inspeção das obras públicas em Africa," *BM*, 9 (3 March 1888), 146.

⁹Gomes to Petre, 12 April 1887, *Negocios Externos, Documentos Apresentados ds Cortes na Sessão Legislativa de 1888 pelo Ministro e Secretário d'Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Negociações com o Zanzibar* (Lisboa, 1888), 108. Since the Portuguese, along with most other nations, alter documents for presentation in works of this sort, I will rely upon the originals whenever possible.

¹⁰Botelho, *História Militar*, 505. See also Costa to Correa, 19 April 1788, Correa to Gov., 4 March 1788, MC 25.

¹¹Botelho, *História Militar*, 568-569; Mendoca to Galveas, 11 December 1811, MC 55; Gomes to Schmidthals, 20 September 1887, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 195-196.

¹²Portugal to Menezes, 6 March 1816, MC 59; Caldas to Albuquerque, 26 July 1817, 6 July 1817, 13 April 1817, MC 60.

¹³Botelho to Torres, two letters of 30 December 1825, MC 75; Sebastião Xavier Botelho, *Resumo para Servir de Introducção á Memória Estatística sôbre os Domínios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental* (Lisboa, 1834), 75-77. Hafkin, "Northern Mozambique," reports for 1824 a Mozambique fear of Arab and Swahili attack (p. 177).

carried by Arab vessels, probably the most significant trading partners of the Portuguese.¹⁴ He soon had written to Said bin Sultan concerning commercial matters.¹⁵ Said was prepared to deal with the Portuguese, one of his relatives, Sayf bin Amad, arriving at Mozambique in February 1826. According to Botelho the Arab ruler asked for a treaty of friendship, the succeeding deliberations ending in an agreement of 22 February 1826, relating to both commercial and political matters. When Said received the treaty he made several additions, returning it to Mozambique in 1828. The revised accord, signed by Sayf and Botelho on 28 March 1828, and ratified by Said in Zanzibar in October, generally provided for less restrictive trading regulations for the subjects of each power. One important article dealt with the boundary between the Arab and Portuguese territories: according to the treaty the dominions of the sultan did not reach beyond "Mugau" (the region south of Kilwa), while the Portuguese holdings ended at Tunghi.¹⁶ The advantage belonged to the Arabs: their territorial limits remained indistinct and subject to interpretation while the Portuguese had retreated from their normal claim to Cape Delgado. Ratification in Portugal was necessary before the treaty became binding, but, as often happened, no immediate orders reached Mozambique concerning the agreement's fate.¹⁷

Said bin Sultan, learning that his subjects still were charged the old customs rates when trading in Mozambique, in 1830 sought news of the 1828 accord.¹⁸ By then the province had a new governor, Paulo José Miguel de Brito, a more orthodox official than Botelho, who regarded the 1828 treaty as too favorable to the Arabs. Over 200 Arab vessels yearly visited Mozambique, he noted, while only a few Portuguese traveled to Zanzibar; he also felt that the agricultural imports brought by the Arabs had an adverse impact upon production in Mozambique. The governor nevertheless had no wish to antagonize his powerful neighbor, cautiously explaining to Said that the treaty had not been ratified, but offering, in the interests of friendship, to honor the article awarding lower import duties if the Arab vessels arrived in port with the documents required by the accord. Brito suggested to the Zanzibar sultan that additional negotiations be undertaken in Mozambique to clear up the difficulties he perceived in the 1828 treaty, but it does not appear that Said sent the requested delegate. The sultan did, however, arrange for his vessels to carry the documents required for visiting Mozambique.¹⁹ Both the Zanzibar and Mozambique governments were busy with other matters for the next few years, Said bin

¹⁴ Brito to Gov., 2 December 1825, Botelho to Torres, 30 December 1825, MC 75; Sebastião Xavier Botelho, *Memória Estatística sobre os Domínios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental* (Lisboa, 1835), 359, 394.

¹⁵ Said bin Sultan to Botelho, 5 November 1825, MC 76. Said was answering Botelho's letter.

¹⁶ Botelho to Torres, 10 August 1826, MC 41; Botelho to Torres, 30 March 1826, MM 78; Botelho to Barros, 1 December 1828, with a copy of the treaty, CG 4; Botelho to Noronha, 10 July 1828, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 6-8.

¹⁷ The Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 28 July 1817 recognized Cape Delgado as the border. *Ibid.*, 5. The 1828 treaty was never ratified by the Portuguese. See Kirk to BG, 16 November 1871, E-61, ZA.

¹⁸ Said bin Sultan to Gov., 22 February 1830 in Brito to Basto, 2 April 1830, MM 18.

¹⁹ Brito to Basto, 2 April 1830, enclosing Brito to Said bin Sultan, 15 March 1830, MM 18, Said bin Sultan to Gov., 8 February 1830 (sic), MM 22. For examples of the documents, Amad bin Sefo to Gov., 23 February 1831, MM 22.

Sultan striving for the final conquest of Mombasa, the shaky Portuguese administration becoming embroiled in hostilities during 1830-31 with the Swahili ruler of Quitangonha. During the latter war a Muslim boycott of Mozambique Island caused a severe food shortage, while the Muslims of both the coast and Zanzibar sent aid to Quitangonha. Some Portuguese saw such activity on the part of Said bin Sultan as an indication that he planned the conquest of their northern coast.²⁰

Said bin Sultan in reality had little interest in warfare with the Portuguese, and relations between Zanzibar and Mozambique soon returned to their normal course. In 1840 new governor Joaquim Pereira Marinho wrote the sultan announcing his arrival, despite indications that relations had been broken off between the Arabs and Portuguese; the Arab replied in friendly fashion to a request for renewing relations.²¹ In September 1843 Governor Rodrigo Luciano de Abreu e Lima visited Zanzibar on a British vessel to talk with Said concerning contraband and slave trade matters, concluding arrangements on both.²²

The various contacts between Zanzibar and Mozambique serve as a backdrop for affairs in the northern border region. Whatever the details of Arab-Portuguese commercial dealings at an official level, the Swahili rulers of the north persisted in what the Portuguese regarded as a contraband trade.²³ At the same time, however, the Swahili continued their relationship with the Portuguese; Assani, the ruler of Tunghi, for example, complained to the governor in 1828 that the officer in charge of the Cape Delgado district had seized some of his slaves for his own use. Recognizing the usefulness of the Swahili's support, the governor quickly resolved the affair in his favor, seizing the opportunity of the correspondence to place Assani officially on the Portuguese list of paid indigenous officials in 1829.²⁴ The payments apparently were continued through most of the 1830s,²⁵ probably partially in response to the frequent exhortations received from Lisbon for establishing customs posts in the northern district.²⁶ During an 1832 visit the local Portuguese commander reported Assani living within governmental regulations,²⁷ but as the decade progressed, and the

²⁰Hafkin, "Northern Mozambique," 141, 143, 146; Gov. Moz. to Gov. Cape Delgado, 7 January 1831, NJH; Maia et al. to Cadaval, 22 March 1832, MM 26; Brito to Cadaval, 20 April 1831, MM 20.

²¹Marinho to Bomfim, 29 October 1840, CG 4; Marinho to Bomfim, 4 March 1841, CG 5; Abreu to Marinho, 25 March 1841, Lopes to Xavier, 17 June 1841, 3 August 1841, GG 2.31.

²²F. L. Barnard, *Three Years Cruize in the Mozambique Channel* (London, 1848), 73; Lima to MU, 21 November 1843, CG 6.

²³Brito to Botelho, 9 October 1826, Lemos to Botelho, 20 July 1829 enclosing Souza to Lemos, 16 July 1829, GG 2.31.

²⁴Assane Menhe Mosalo na Chirazi to Brito, 16 April 1828, Gov. to Assane, 15 September 1829, Brito to Gov. Cape Delgado, two letters of 16 September 1829, Assane to Gov., 15 January 1830, Fazenda Cape Delgado to Gov., 18 February 1830, Brito to Assane, 10 March 1830, NJH.

²⁵Bernades to Gov., 21 September 1833, MM 30; Carvilho reports from 1830 onward, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*; 26; NJH; information from Perry da Camera, *Distrito de Cabo Delgado* (1886).

²⁶See GG 1.

²⁷Maia et al. to Cadaval, 22 March 1832, MM 26; Maia et al. to Bastos, 20 August 1832, MM 28; Bernades to Gov. Amize, 14 June 1832, Bernades to Brito, 3 March 1832, 21 July 1832, MM 29.

Portuguese became more familiar with the growing power and prosperity of Zanzibar,²⁸ the Mozambique authorities grew increasingly concerned about their limited authority in the region. Often the only information received from the Cape Delgado ports came to the capital via Zanzibari vessels, while the governor in 1837 had to admit that, instead of following orders to strengthen the northern garrisons, he had withdrawn troops from them for use in Mozambique town.²⁹ In an 1840 report a visiting official admitted that the district was in sad administrative condition, its only significant trade carried on by Arab craft.³⁰

The declining Portuguese presence, contrasted to the increasing presence of Arabs and others from Zanzibar, naturally led the Swahili rulers to reconsider their existing relations with each. In 1844 an Indian merchant gained a footing in Tunghi, openly dealing with Arab visitors. When a small Portuguese force was despatched to prevent the illegal trade, Muhammad (or Ahmad) bin Sultan, ruler of Tunghi since about 1837, refused to obey their commands, compelling the Portuguese to leave his territory. Subsequent Portuguese pressure may have caused the Indian's departure, but Muhammad was left alone since he remained ready to resist any direct Portuguese interference. Nonetheless, continuous contacts were maintained between Tunghi and the local Portuguese, the latter endeavoring to follow orders from the governor to end all misunderstandings with the Swahili ruler, the efforts hindered however by Muhammad's contention that the Portuguese were remiss in providing him the financial and other support owed because of his place in their administration.³¹ With only about seventy soldiers in all of the Cape Delgado district, the administration clearly could do little more than exhort the coastal peoples to follow Portuguese regulations.³² An additional sign of their collapsing authority was the 1848 suspension of the Cape Delgado commander for involvement in the illegal slave and contraband trade.³³

At about this time one of the few non-Portuguese visitors to the Cape Delgado region, the French commercial investigator Loarer, fortunately included Tunghi in his itinerary. In his conversations in August 1848 with Muhammad bin Sultan, Loarer reported that the Swahili chieftain claimed independence of both Portugal and Zanzibar;³⁴ the Frenchman accepted the validity of the assertion and awarded Muhammad an authority reaching about ten days (around 120 miles) into the interior. Tunghi enjoyed a busy trade, even including some American visitors, while several Zanzibari were present during Loarer's stay. Loarer had

²⁸See Norman R. Bennett, *A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar* (London, 1978), 14ff.

²⁹Aracaty to MU, 6 October 1837, 9 December 1837, GG 3.

³⁰Marinho to Bomfim, 24 September 1840, with enclosure, GG 4.

³¹Jeronymo Romero, *Supplemento d Memória Descritiva e Estatística da Districto de Cabo Delgado com uma Notícia Acerca do Estabelêcimento da Colonia de Pemba* (Lisboa, 1860), 148-149; Gov. to Gov. Cape Delgado, 3 August 1844, 14 October 1844, 14 February 1845, ? March 1845, 10 January 1846, 7 March 1846, 11 November 1846, NJH.

³²Romero, *Memória*, 10, 19-20; Valle to UM, 20 April 1848, CG 9.

³³Lima to UM, 29 December 1849, CG 7.

³⁴Loarer had a tendency to emphasize the independence of localities which appeared suitable for French trade, but he was nonetheless an acute observer. See also Charles Vogel, *Le Portugal et ses Colonies* (Paris, 1860), 578.

asked the Portuguese governor about his hold on the north coast, receiving the standard assertions that Muhammad was a paid official and his port was closed to foreigners. In Zanzibar he learned from the important BuSaidi official, Sulayman bin Hamid, that Said bin Sultan had named Muhammad governor, explaining this course by asserting that although Cape Delgado once had been a recognized boundary with the Portuguese, the movement of the Arabs southward had brought Tunghi into the Zanzibar dominions.³⁵ There does not appear to be any justification for a BuSaidi claim to Tunghi at this early date – Said bin Sultan, for example, had informed the British in 1844 that his territories ended at Cape Delgado.³⁶ But Sulayman's opinion obviously presaged trouble for the Portuguese.

Muhammad bin Sultan continued following policies designed to increase the wealth of his polity. In 1850, for instance, the British seized an Indian at Tunghi for participation in the slave trade.³⁷ The Portuguese reported the continuation of the contraband trade, even while claiming that Muhammad was receiving his usual salary.³⁸ When the Cape Delgado commander, Jeronymo Romero, remonstrated against the commercial activities, Muhammad replied that he had never received his subsidy, and retorted that he required the revenues gained from trade to meet his expenses. Romero sent a vessel to Tunghi in 1852, to check on the presence of Frenchmen seeking slaves, without apparently causing much friction. Then in early 1854 the Portuguese learned that a Zanzibari governor and garrison had arrived in Tunghi, apparently by agreement with its ruler, to signal its incorporation into Said bin Sultan's realm.³⁹ Governor Vasco Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes decided to react carefully, blaming the occupation on unauthorized actions of the Zanzibar customs master during the absence of the sultan, and delegating ex-governor Joaquim Pinto de Magalhães to visit Zanzibar to resolve the questions.⁴⁰ The death of Said bin Sultan in 1856 and the subsequent quarrel over the succession effectively distracted the Zanzibar administration from any consideration of the border problem.

Unable to act, the Portuguese simply maintained a close watch on Tunghi affairs, waiting for some opportunity to return their former subordinate to the fold. Receiving cordial replies to his correspondence, Romero sent a naval officer to Tunghi in early 1858, offering its ruler his former status. Muhammad simply replied that he now was a subject of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Romero claimed that the Swahili leader found the Zanzibar presence onerous, but the assertion is

³⁵Notes sur la côte orientale d'Afrique tirées du travail de M. Loarer; Exploration de la côte orientale d'Afrique exécutée par le brick le Ducouëdic pendant les années 1846-47-48 & 49, Rapport commerciale, première partie, O.I. 2/10; Ile de Zanguebar, No. 3, Commerce d'Exportation, O.I. 5/23, AOM.

³⁶Said bin Sultan to Aberdeen, 23 July 1844, Enc 71.

³⁷Hamerton to Wyville, 14 June 1850, FO 84/815.

³⁸Carvalho to Alves, 24 December 1852, Moçambique, Alfândegas, maços 1875-78, 1379, AHU.

³⁹Romero, *Memória*, 27-29; Romero to Bandeira, 15 March 1855, Correspondence with British Representatives . . . Relating to the Slave Trade, 1877, FO 541/21; Picalugal to Magelhes, 25 March 1854, Bacar Machamo to Souza, 16 March 1854, Picalugal to Lobo, 29 April 1854, GG 2.32.

⁴⁰Menezes to UM, 26 July 1854, CG 13.

without other corroboration.⁴¹ The civil strife in Zanzibar over the succession briefly raised Portuguese hopes that the Arabs might have to evacuate Tunghi, but Majid's victory quickly dashed that dream.⁴² Meanwhile Tunghi continued to function outside the Portuguese system, Portuguese vessels paying duties as other foreigners when they visited their former port. By 1859 the Mozambique governor considered that the contraband trade there was "enormous."⁴³ Muhammad bin Sultan died in 1860; his successor Abdulaziz bin Sultan did nothing to alter the existing situation.⁴⁴ It is worth emphasizing at this time that a principal reason for the caution of the Portuguese governors was the vital role played by Zanzibar in the economy of Mozambique, a role which continued in importance in succeeding years with the opening of the Suez Canal and the spread of steam-driven vessels throughout the reaches of the western Indian Ocean world. Zanzibar served as the link for vessels trading between Mozambique, the Suez Canal, and Bombay: the Portuguese nation lacked sufficient vessels of its own for servicing their colony. Another related factor was the importance of Ibo's contribution to the economic life of the colony; by this period the port was the headquarters of a busy French trade in sesame, cowries, and other products.⁴⁵

Thus it is not surprising that Mozambique's governor admitted his inability to regain Tunghi, and suggested to Lisbon a negotiated solution to the problem.⁴⁶ In 1861 the government authorized João Tavares de Almeida to conclude a treaty settling the Tunghi affair in Portugal's favor and to gain a commercial accord similar to those held by the Europeans and Americans resident in Zanzibar.⁴⁷ Almeida arrived in Zanzibar in October 1861, engaging in difficult negotiations – "the filtration of Portuguese, through Kiswahili and bad French, into Zanzibar Arabic, is not favourable to the precise expression of diplomatic ideas," said British consul Lewis Pelly – ending with a treaty concluded on 28 December. The problem of language was not the only factor complicating the deliberations. Pelly shared the British contempt for the Portuguese – Livingstone said that "a more used up syphilitic race does not exist

⁴¹ Almeida to UM, 26 October 1858, enclosing Muhammad bin Sultan to Romero, received 6 September 1858, CG 16; Romero, *Supplemento*, 150; Romero to Sec. Gov. Moz., 6 January 1858, 19 February 1858 (enclosing Romero to Rebocho, undated and Romero to Muhammad bin Sultan, 17 February 1858), 25 February 1858, 29 March 1858 (enclosing Rebocho to Romero, undated and Muhammad bin Sultan to Romero, 18 March 1858), Carvalho to SGM, 19 October 1858 (enclosing an undated letter of Muhammad bin Sultan).

⁴² SGM to Gov. Cape Delgado, 23 March 1859, CG 16; Menezes to UM, 6 July 1857, CG 14.

⁴³ Menezes to UM, 20 November 1855, CG 13; Sicard to SGM, 30 January 1861, GG 2.32; "Discurso pronunciado pelo Governador Geral da Provincia na occasião da abertura da Sessão da Junta Geral da Provincia dia 3 Outubro de . . . 1859," *BM*, 52 (29 December 1860), 214.

⁴⁴ Almeida to UM, 8 February 1862, CG 20; Romero, *Supplemento*, 150.

⁴⁵ For statistics for Ibo for 1863-74, *BM*, 49 (28 November 1874), 222. Other figures can be found throughout *BM*.

⁴⁶ Almeida to UM, 4 March 1860, CG 17.

⁴⁷ Papeis relativas ao Sultão de Zanzibar, Miscelânea, Moçambique, 1832-67, 783, AHU; Silva to Gov., 14 March 1861, GG 2.9. Livingstone suggested, in view of his explorations of the Ruvuma, that the governor wanted to secure the region for Portugal. R. J. Campbell, *Livingstone* (London, 1929), 278-279.

in the world" – and threw his considerable support behind Majid. The sultan had no interest in removing his men from Tunghi, refusing to respond to Almeida's proffers. According to Pelly, the Portuguese official threatened to break the negotiations if Majid did not give in, the sultan standing firm after receiving British encouragement. In the end Almeida decided to conclude a commercial treaty, basically a most-favored-nation arrangement, leaving the unresolved border affair to a subsequent negotiation; he reasoned that any other conclusion could lead to a crisis disrupting the important trade between Zanzibar and Mozambique. The governor also admitted that his province's military strength was no match for that of Zanzibar.⁴⁸ Before becoming valid the treaty needed to be accepted by the Portuguese government and returned for ratification in Zanzibar. The Lisbon authorities did order its acceptance, but their Mozambique subordinates never proved able to manage a visit to Majid in Zanzibar.⁴⁹

Meanwhile the Zanzibaris retained Tunghi in their dominions. In 1872 Barghash sent soldiers to act against Africans raiding in the Cape Delgado region, his actions being accepted without notice by the foreign community in Zanzibar.⁵⁰ When the important British official, Bartle Frere, visited the East Coast in 1873, including Tunghi Bay, he concluded that "the Southern and Eastern limits of . . . the sultan's possessions are fixed."⁵¹ Nonetheless, the British, vital allies of the BuSaidi, had not really made any official decision about the location of the border, usually remaining content to cite Cape Delgado as the limit.⁵² The continuing affair did not mar the peaceful relations between Zanzibar and Portugal, the latter continuing powerless to act within the means existing in Mozambique. In July 1874, for example, new governor José Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes disembarked in Zanzibar for friendly talks while proceeding to Mozambique, concluding an arrangement for the appointment of a consul to serve the resident Goan community. The governor was impressed enough by his reception to recommend that his government award a medal to Barghash; the suggestion was accepted and Barghash was decorated in March 1875.⁵³

By the late 1870s the Portuguese were ready to undertake some cautious action in the Cape Delgado district to help protect their claimed rights against

⁴⁸For the text of the treaty, and other related documentation, *Negócios Externos. Documentos Apresentados às Cortes na Sessão Legislativa de 1884 pelo Ministro e Secretário d'Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Negócios Consulares e Comerciães* (Lisboa, 1884), 29ff. Almeida to UM, 21 November 1861, CG 18, Almeida to UM, 7 February 1862, CG 19; Almeida to UM, 8 February 1862, with all the documents concerning the negotiations, Ss-Oa-1, AHM; Pelly to Forbes, 23 November 1861, 10 June 1862, E-31, ZA; V. Lovett Cameron, "Colonisation of Central Africa," *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, 7 (1875-76), 279.

⁴⁹Castro to UM, 18 May 1864, CG 22; Coutinho to UM, 23 December 1867, Castro to UM, 2 October 1867, CG 25; Kirk to BG, 16 November 1871, E-61, ZA.

⁵⁰Kirk to BG, 22 August 1872, 19 September 1872, E-62, ZA.

⁵¹Frere to Granville, 7 May 1873, FO 84/1391.

⁵²Elton to Prideaux, 17 February 1874 in Prideaux to FO, 18 March 1874, FO 84/1398.

⁵³Menezes to UM, 16 September 1874 (two letters), 23 February 1875, CG 29; Prideaux to Derby, 5 August 1874, FO 84/1399; Elton to Gov. Moz., 12 March 1875 in Menezes to UM, 30 March 1875, CG 29; Kirk to Derby, 10 March 1875, FO 84/1416.

the increasing European activity in East Central Africa.⁵⁴ A new district commander, Perry da Camera, began offering vassalage agreements to local rulers, although his governor, not wishing to rouse Zanzibar unnecessarily, did not give formal recognition to the accords.⁵⁵ The governor, Francisco Maria da Cunha, had stopped in Zanzibar in September 1877, informing Barghash that an agent was coming to conclude the long-delayed commercial treaty; after the talks, despite Barghash's denial, he contended that the sultan had agreed to a recession of Tunghi.⁵⁶ The renewed Portuguese interest, also expressed in diplomatic exchanges in London and Lisbon, led to discussions among British officials concerning what policy should be adopted for the Portuguese-Zanzibar dispute. The British in East Africa were firmly on the sultan's side. John Kirk noted that Tunghi had been held by Zanzibar since Said bin Sultan's time, capping his argument with the conclusion that it was not in the British interest to encourage the extension "of so miserable a rule as that of the Portuguese in East Africa." The sentiment was later matched by Consul Henry O'Neill, when he spoke regarding the effort to end the slave trade in Arab and Portuguese territories: "the fact is the sultan has the power and will to enforce his treaty obligations. The Portuguese have neither."⁵⁷ In Britain, Lord Derby, less interested in friction with the Portuguese than his East African subordinates, concluded that the Tunghi region was really Portuguese territory, but he recommended avoiding any involvement in the affair until absolutely necessary. The British ambassador in Lisbon concurred, later informing Lord Salisbury that if direct action was avoided, the Tunghi problem would "pass into a state of permanent coma."⁵⁸

The British had underestimated Portuguese tenacity. Spurred by the persistence of Lisbon, Governor Cunha wrote Barghash concerning new negotiations. The sultan agreed to talk, informing Kirk that he was prepared to offer the Portuguese the same commercial terms possessed by other powers.⁵⁹ Arriving in Zanzibar in early October 1879, Cunha first attempted merely to get the commercial sections of the unratified 1861 agreement reaccepted. The Zanzibari negotiator refused, adamantly insisting on a new treaty. Cunha, obviously not trusting the British, had declined Kirk's offer of aid, thus further increasing his difficulties. The governor was, said Kirk, "a haughty man and gives himself airs," significantly adding, "but I don't think he will get what he comes for." Faced with the failure of his mission, Cunha accepted the Zanzibari

⁵⁴Cunha to UM, 12 June 1877, 24 August 1878, CG 30; Cunha to UM, 15 August 1878, with enclosures, CG 31.

⁵⁵Camara, *Delgado*.

⁵⁶Cunha to UM, 8 November 1877, enclosing Barghash to Cunha, 12 de lua de 1294, CG 31; Kirk to FO, 15 September 1877 (enclosing Cunha to Barghash, 15 September 1877), 21 September 1877, 15 October 1877 (enclosing Barghash to Cunha, 15 October 1877), Q-18, ZA.

⁵⁷Kirk to FO, 10 January 1877, 4 April 1877, Q-18, ZA; O'Neill to Salisbury, 5 February 1880 in Pouncefote to Kirk, 23 February 1880, Q-24, ZA; Elton to Derby, 30 December 1876, with his Memorandum on Tonghy Bay, Correspondence . . . Relating to the Slave Trade, 1877, FO 541/21.

⁵⁸Morier to Derby, 20 April 1877, Derby to Morier, 31 May 1877, *ibid*; Morier to Salisbury, Correspondence . . . Relating to the Slave Trade, 1879, Q-20, ZA.

⁵⁹Cunha to UM, 17 April 1878, CG 31; Cunha to Barghash, 12 September 1879 in Kirk to FO, 16 September 1879, Barghash to Cunha, 17 September 1879 in Kirk to FO, 17 September 1879, Q-22, ZA.

position, working out a new commercial accord. The governor explained to Lisbon that the differences with the 1861 accord were minimal, but he did not hide his disappointment when talking with the French representative in Zanzibar, charging that Kirk had worked with Barghash against Portuguese interests. Kirk simply noticed that Cunha had committed "fatal mistakes" during the pourparlers, gaining for his country thereby "a secondary and subordinate position" in Zanzibar. Cunha's efforts to reopen the Tunghi question were even less successful, the Zanzibaris for the first time advancing a firm claim to the coastal lands as far as the settlement of Minangani. When the Arabs threatened to end the negotiations, both commercial and political, if Cunha persisted in his demands, the governor, reasoning as Almeida had in 1861, left the issue to the future. But Cunha did gain one concession, an agreement by Barghash for the appointment of a special commission within six months to resolve the disputed border.⁶⁰ Kirk informed the Foreign Office that the commission agreement was of concern to Britain, the possible negotiations requiring close attention because of the British interest in Tunghi Bay. A surprised Salisbury replied that he was "not aware that Her Majesty's Government have any rights in Tongy Bay," requesting explanations from Kirk. The consul in return stressed the concessions made by BuSaidi rulers enabling the British to pursue slavers in the region; the unimpressed Foreign Office simply noted that Kirk's view should be remembered if negotiations ever took place.⁶¹ The Portuguese later discovered differences between the Arabic and Portuguese versions of the treaty, but when Barghash refused to recognize anything but the Arabic wording, the Portuguese backed down: the accord was ratified in Zanzibar on 18 June 1883.⁶²

The Arab position in Tunghi Bay thus appeared increasingly secure. When the British consul for Mozambique, traveling in a Portuguese vessel, attempted to visit Tunghi, the inhabitants refused him landing rights until he proved he was not Portuguese. In April 1881 another Briton found an Arab governor with a garrison of seventy soldiers at Tunghi.⁶³ Despite their continuing military weakness, the Portuguese remained determined to displace the Arabs; individual officers, sharing the imperialistic fervor of the 1880s, began to think of aggressive action. Even during the 1879 negotiations, for instance, the naval officers present with their governor had talked openly of seizing Tunghi.⁶⁴ Words became actions during the next few years, the Mozambique administration taking new steps in 1882 to strengthen their northern district. Early in the year a

⁶⁰Cunha to MU, 12 September 1879, 30 September 1879, 15 October 1879, PR 1; Cunha to MU, 1 December 1879, Ss-Oa-1, with a copy of the treaty of 25 October 1879, AHM; Kirk to FO, 15 October 1879, 27 October 1879, with the Zanzibar-Portuguese note on the border talks, dated 25 October 1879, Q-22, ZA; Kirk to FO, 7 January 1881, Q-25, ZA; Ferry to MAE, 28 October 1879, PZ 5; Kirk to Mackinnon, 16 October 1879, Mackinnon Papers, 23, SOAS.

⁶¹Kirk to FO, 27 October 1879, Q-22; Pauncefote to Kirk, 26 February 1880, Q-23; Kirk to FO, 16 April 1880, Q-24; ZA.

⁶²Ribeiro to Gov., 30 June 1883, S.2-Oa-1, AHM; Ribeiro to UM, 18 May 1883, SR 1; Miles to FO, 22 June 1883, E-78, ZA; Kirk to Granville, 3 July 1882, FO 84/1622; Ledoulx to MAE, 20 June 1883, PZ 6.

⁶³Kirk to FO, 12 November 1880, Q-24, ZA; Foot to Kirk, 8 August 1881 in Kirk to Granville, 3 September 1881, FO 84/1600.

⁶⁴Kirk to FO, 12 November 1880, Q-24, ZA.

Portuguese vessel steamed northward with orders to probe along the coast to ascertain the strength of the Zanzibari occupiers, in the process avoiding all hostilities with the Arabs and Swahili. Upon reaching the contested region, the Portuguese were prevented from landing. Barghash later disavowed the conduct of his men, since the Portuguese ostensibly merely were seeking provisions, but the realities of the situation were obvious to all. The Portuguese had to limit their actions to the appointment of a dynamic commander at Ibo, José Raymondo de Palma Velho, and the issuing of a regulation of 19 December 1882 authorizing the establishment of a customs post at Minangani.⁶⁵

Responding to Palma's desire for action, the Mozambique administration sought authorization and support from Lisbon for a forward policy: they won approval for a cautious advance.⁶⁶ Initial steps included the naming of Swahili subordinates to posts in the northern region, among them a father and son, Chinga João Calheiros and João Calheiros, who were named for the Tunghi area. Much remains unclear about the two Calheiros, but it appears they deceived the Portuguese, instead serving the interests of Zanzibar.⁶⁷

The continuous jockeying for advantage around Cape Delgado suddenly was interrupted when the treaties signed by Carl Peters in late 1884 inaugurated the partition of Barghash's dominions. The Portuguese quickly realized that the sultan's occupation of the Tunghi region could lead to the area falling under the sway of one of the Great Powers. Kirk, for example, in late 1884 had requested and received a "spontaneous" declaration from Barghash not to award a protectorate within his dominions, which he said reached to Tunghi Bay, without British consent.⁶⁸ The new Portuguese attitude was manifested by the 1884 appointment of the well-known Portuguese explorer, Alexandre Alberto da Rocha de Serpa Pinto, as consul in Zanzibar. Because of duties elsewhere in East Central Africa, however, Serpa Pinto did not take up effective residence in Zanzibar until 1885. To counter his absence, the Mozambique administration sent José Joaquim de Almeida to Zanzibar in July 1885, with instructions to revise the existing commercial accord and reopen the border issue, meanwhile informing Bargash that the Portuguese planned to occupy the right bank of the Minangani.⁶⁹

The pressures upon Zanzibar mounted rapidly. The German claims for a protectorate behind the coast opposite Zanzibar were recognized by Barghash,

⁶⁵Gov. to UM, 15 September 1881, Ribeiro to Cabral, 21 February 1882, Cabral to ?, 21 February 1882, PR 1; Commander of *Mindello* to Gov. Cape Delgado, 14 February 1882, NJH; O'Neill to Granville, 24 February 1882, 13 March 1882, Correspondence . . . Relating to the Slave Trade, 1883, Q-22, ZA; Miles to Granville, 5 April 1882, FO 84/1621; Coelho to Gouveia, 20 August 1882, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 6, BM, 53 (23 December 1882), 375.

⁶⁶Gov. to UM, 25 August 1884, 20 September 1884, with enclosures, SR 1.

⁶⁷Dias to Gov. Tunghi, two letters of 2 March 1885, 24 March 1885, Souza to Palma, 13 October 1885, 12 December 1885, Camara, *Delgado*: NJH.

⁶⁸Kirk to Granville, 6 December 1884, 8 December 1884, FO 84/1679.

⁶⁹GG 8, for letters from Serpa Pinto, July 1884 onward; A. Das Neves e Mello, *Zanzibar* (Lisboa, 1890), 94-96; Kirk to Granville, 10 July 1884, FO 84/1678, 18 July 1885, FO 84/1727; Kirk to Salisbury, 20 September 1885, FO 84/1728; Castilho to MU, 16 July 1885, enclosing Min. Foreign Affairs to MU, 30 September 1885, Castilho to Almeida, undated, SR 2; Piat to MAE, 29 July 1885, PZ 7.

abandoned by his British allies, in August 1885. Then a three-power commission – Britain, France, and Germany – was named to determine the exact extent of Barghash's coastal dominions. When the commissioners arrived in Zanzibar, Serpa Pinto immediately sought to ascertain the southern limits of their interest, the Lisbon authorities simultaneously seeking the naming of a Portuguese delegate among its members. But none of the three powers favored the proposal and, much to the dismay of Lisbon, the commission proceeded on its work without Portuguese representation.⁷⁰ Serpa Pinto rushed into negotiations with the beleaguered Barghash on December 24th, striving to gain the coastal territory as far north as Cape Delgado, drawing from it a line westward to the Ruvuma River. On the 30th Serpa Pinto increased the pressure, informing Barghash that Portugal, as earlier reported by Almeida, was sending troops into the disputed region. On 8 January 1886, Mozambique governor Augusto de Castilho Barreto e Noronha telegraphed Serpa Pinto that the Portuguese had been fired on while occupying an island in Tunghi Bay and hoisting their flag on the right bank of the Minangani. The governor threatened additional action if satisfaction was not forthcoming for the actions of the Zanzibari garrison. In a conversation with the French consul, Serpa Pinto claimed that the sultan had agreed in principle to the Portuguese advance, but that on its arrival the expedition found the occupying Zanzibaris had not received orders from Zanzibar. There is no confirmation for the Portuguese consul's version of events. When Barghash remained firm, Serpa Pinto gave the sultan the choice of immediate compliance or of a break in relations with Portugal. The aroused consul apparently lacked the authority for the ultimatum, however, since, when the British sought clarification in Lisbon, the threat was withdrawn. Barghash meanwhile demurred on taking any action until he learned of the Tunghi events directly from his governor, eventually discovering that his men had not resisted the arrival of the Portuguese on the off-shore island, though they stood prepared to fight if any incursion on the mainland was attempted.⁷¹

The expected visit to Tunghi Bay of the British, German, and French commissioners had prompted the Portuguese military measures. In January 1886 the Portuguese arrived on the disputed coast, but finding it likely that any effort to raise their flag meant hostilities, they instead proceeded to Tekomaji Island. The governor of Tunghi protested against the occupation without forcing hostilities. Later the Portuguese landed on the right bank of the Minangani; the Arabs, after some peaceful arguing, withdrew and left the Europeans in possession of the small settlements located there. The claim advanced in

⁷⁰Pinto to Bocage, 8 November 1875, and related correspondence, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 27ff; Lister note, 11 November 1885, FO 84/1716; Kirk to Salisbury, 13 November 1885, FO 84/1729; Salisbury to Petre, 9 January 1886, FO 84/1765; for other correspondence see also FO 84/1705, 84/1712, 84/1715, 84/1716, 84/1718 and Pt 220, 221; Salisbury to Kitchener, 17 October 1885, FO 30/57-8. Portugal even offered to support the British viewpoint on the commission if Britain backed their admission. Despite the refusal, both London and Berlin regarded Cape Delgado as the boundary.

⁷¹Serpa Pinto to Castilho, 5 December 1885, and succeeding documents, GG 230; Kirk to Salisbury, 30 December 1885, FO 84/1729, 12 January 1886, FO 84/1797; Kirk to FO, 8 January 1886, 12 January 1886, 15 January 1886 (enclosing Serpa Pinto to Kirk, 10 January 1886, Hamid bin Said al Khamisi to Barghash, 30 Rabia al Akho 1330, Serpa Pinto to Barghash, 24 December 1885, 12 January 1886, and Serpa Pinto draft treaty), E-93, ZA; Raffray to MAE, 20 March 1886, PZ 8. See also the sources in fn. 72.

Zanzibar that the Arabs fired on the Portuguese was not substantiated.⁷² With their occupation completed the Portuguese, obviously endeavoring to reduce both local and international opposition to their action, issued new customs regulations for the region similar to those in force in Zanzibari territory.⁷³ Thus the Portuguese were present in Tunghi Bay when the vessels of the commissioners arrived in late January. The delegates visited both Arabs and Portuguese. The former, under their governor Said bin Salim al BuSaidi, at first appeared ready to resist their landing, since they felt the newcomers were Portuguese. After investigating the peaceful situation the commissioners continued on their voyage, learning later to their great surprise that Palma had reported their withdrawal before the resolute attitude of the Portuguese.⁷⁴

Meanwhile in Zanzibar the irrepressible Serpa Pinto persisted in pressuring Barghash. When a minor quarrel erupted in April 1886 over the status of a Goan – a convert to Islam who had reconverted to Christianity – Serpa Pinto broke relations with Zanzibar without waiting for approval from Lisbon, charging that Barghash had been guilty of conduct "offensive to the national dignity." The ostensible reason was what Kirk described as a "certain amount of irritation" upon Barghash's part concerning the Portuguese consul's conduct in the quarrel – he had roughly dismissed one of Serpa Pinto's frequent missives by referring him to a subordinate with this message: "You are fond of much writing and I am a man of much business." The affair was settled without undue disruption, with Barghash agreeing to receive a Portuguese commissioner within six months for a negotiated settlement of the border impasse. Serpa Pinto, in ill health during much of his stay in Zanzibar, left the island in mid-April.⁷⁵

The Portuguese offensive actions, both around Cape Delgado and in Zanzibar, had caused considerable displeasure in London. When Salisbury learned of the expedition to Tunghi Bay, he requested Lisbon "strongly to defer

⁷²Costa (?) to ?, 25 January 1886, S.2-Ne.6, AHM; Commander *Cuanza* to ?, two letters of 10 January 1886, Cyllindo to Palma, 20 June 1886, NJH; J. R. da Palma Velho, "Relatório do districto de Cabo Delgado referido ao anno economica de 1885-1886 . . .," *BM*, 35 (28 August 1886), 441; Palma's account, dated 28 January 1886, in *J. do Commercio*, 23 March 1886, in Petre to Rosebery, 24 March 1886, FO 84/1766; Lloyd to Kirk, 5 February 1886 in Kirk to FO, 15 February 1886, E-93, ZA; Lloyd to Admir., 13 March 1886 in Lister to Kirk, 22 April 1886, E-91, ZA.

⁷³MU to Gov. Moz., 7 February 1886, GG 2.9 M.2, AHM; Portaria 130, 31 March 1886, *BM*, 14 (3 April 1886), 141-142.

⁷⁴Costa (?) to ?, 28 January 1886, S.2-Ne.6, AHM; Castilho to MU, 3 February 1886 and following correspondence, *BM*, supp. of 5 (30 January 1886), 46-7; German document sent 19 January 1887, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 207; Kitchener to FO, 10 February 1886, with commission proceedings, FO 84/1797; Kirk to Salisbury, 15 February 1886, with enclosures, FO 84/1772; Raffray to MAE, 23 April 1886, PZ 8 – Raffray called the Portuguese assertion "ridiculous bragging."

⁷⁵Kirk to Anderson, 1 March 1887, FO 84/1822; Barghash to King Portugal, undated, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 43; Hawes to FO, 13 February 1886, FO 84/1751; Kirk to Rosebery, 2 April 1886, FO 84/1798; Petre to Rosebery, 16 April 1886, 18 April 1886, FO 84/1766; *Bulletin Général de la Congrégation du St. Esprit et de l'Imé. Coeur de Marie*, 14 (1887), 607; Serpa Pinto to Castilho, 15 April 1886, 17 April 1886, GG 2.30; Neves e Mello, *Zanzibar*, 97-8; Kirk to FO, 15 April 1886, 16 April 1886, 17 April 1886, E-93, ZA; Kirk to FO, 30 April 1886, FO 84/1773, enclosing Barghash to Serpa Pinto, undated; Cazenave to Chimay, 5 June 1886, CPC 18; Raffray to MAE, 17 April 1886, PZ 8; Petre to Rosebery, 5 March 1886 FO 84/1766. When Serpa Pinto left, he was replaced by a Goan vice consul. The outraged Kirk marked the news with a "!" Kirk to FO, 10 May 1886, E-93, ZA.

any action which might be construed into a hostile act against the Sultan." The Portuguese, promising to issue orders to their forces to avoid conflict, replied that their planned actions were undertaken to increase the efficiency of their policies against the slave trade, contending that Zanzibar in any case did not claim the right bank of the Minangani. When the news of the occupation, along with the conduct of Serpa Pinto, was evaluated, the Foreign Office decided that either the Portuguese government had intentionally deceived them or their subordinates had disobeyed orders.⁷⁶ The French and the Germans shared the British view.⁷⁷ Lacking allies and effective military forces, the Portuguese were left, even after their success in Tunghi Bay, in a potentially very dangerous position.

For the moment, however, a crisis was avoided and both Arabs and Portuguese limited their endeavors to peaceful competition for the support of inhabitants of the Tunghi region.⁷⁸ The Great Powers were more upset at Portugal's disregarding their advice than at its aggression toward Zanzibar. The Foreign Offices of both Britain and Germany went no farther than stating their displeasure, despite their commissioner's report that Zanzibar territory stretched to Tunghi Bay, not really caring whether the boundary lay there or at Cape Delgado.⁷⁹

In January 1877 the Portuguese renewed the negotiations broken off at Serpa Pinto's departure from Zanzibar, with Governor Castilho proceeding to Zanzibar as head of the delegation. Castilho shocked Barghash by asserting vigorously that the sultan's letter agreeing to the deliberations had formally conceded Tunghi Bay to the Portuguese. Barghash angrily refused Castilho's patently false claim, concluding to the governor that, since his borders had been fixed by agreement between Britain, Germany, and France as a result of their commissioners' reports, he no longer had the ability, even if he had the desire, to modify them. With the negotiations stalled, Castilho received authorization in early February from Lisbon to seize Tunghi Bay. On the 11th he sent an

⁷⁶Salisbury to Kirk, 2 January 1886, 12 January 1886, 14 January 1886, E-91, ZA; Petre to Salisbury, 1 January 1886 (enclosing Petre to Bocage, 31 December 1885, Bocage to Petre, 1 January 1886), 2 January 1886, 10 January 1886, 15 January 1886 (enclosing Bocage to Petre, 15 January 1886), 20 February 1886, FO 84/1766; Malet to Salisbury, 4 January 1886, FO 84/1759; Freycinet to Billot, 4 January 1886 and following despatches, Pt 221; Anderson on Kirk to FO, 15 January 1886, FO 84/1772; Lister to Kirk, 19 February 1886, E-91, ZA.

⁷⁷Raffray to MAE, 6 March 1886, 13 March 1886, PZ8.

⁷⁸Costa to Gov., 31 May 1886, *BM*, 24 (12 June 1886), 294; Cyllindo to Gov. Cape Delgado, 30 June 1886, *BM*, 34 (21 August 1886), 431-432; Constancio José de Brito, "Relatório," *BM*, 3 (15 January 1887), 18; Clindo to Palma, 21 June 1886, 30 June 1886, NJH; Palma to SGM, July 1886, GG 8.

⁷⁹FO to Kirk, 2 June 1886, FO 84/1771; Kitchener to Rosebery, 5 May 1886, FO 84/1799; Kirk to FO, 8 January 1886, FO 84/1777; Raffray to MAE, 12 February 1886, PZ 8; Courcel to Freycinet, 9 February 1886, A1 69. For the German complications in their own negotiations with Portugal concerning the boundary of German East Africa: Salisbury to Malet, 26 January 1887, FO 84/1834, 28 January 1887, FO 84/1836. The files of the *Legação de Portugal em Londres, 1887 a 1896 (A-160)* and *Legação Portugal em Berlin, 1887-1908 (A-153)*, MNE, are not complete. Many despatches related to the affair probably were removed for inclusion in diplomatic publications and not returned.

ultimatum to Barghash demanding the cession of the disputed region. When the sultan declined, Castilho broke relations with Zanzibar and prepared for war.⁸⁰

Portuguese vessels were already present in Tunghi Bay awaiting word from Castilho; Barghash, aware of their presence, was prepared to despatch a large force to resist any landing, but British consul Frederick Holmwood persuaded the sultan to rely upon the support of Britain and the other powers.⁸¹ While the diplomats talked the Portuguese acted, bombarding and seizing the lightly manned Zanzibari posts, after they had refused to surrender, on 23-27 February 1877. Barghash's commander, Ali bin Said, retreated into the bush with his remaining forces, to make preparations for future resistance. The Portuguese also seized the sultan's unarmed steamer, *Kilwa*, then on its usual trading run to the Cape Delgado region. Barghash once again talked of sending troops to the area, this time led by his British general, Lloyd Mathews, "a step," he said, which "he regretted he had not taken before," but again the sultan deferred to Holmwood's advice to remain on the defensive. The Portuguese took advantage of the lack of resistance to push their occupation north to Cape Delgado, founding a new center, Palma (named after the commander of the expedition) to safeguard their gains.⁸² By March and April the Portuguese occupiers had been attacked by the Arabs and their African allies; the men supposedly acted without orders from the sultan. The details of the fighting, unfortunately, remain unclear. Even in 1889 the Portuguese were insecure enough in their new positions to withdraw their men nightly from Tunghi to the safety of their off-shore vessels. As far as commercial conditions were concerned, the victory was meaningless.

⁸⁰Castilho to MU, 3 March 1887, and following documents, *BM*, 11 (12 March 1887), 97; H. M. Stanley undated fragment, King of Portugal to Barghash, 17 January 1887, and other documents, FO 97/602; Castilho to MU, 4 March 1887, enclosing Barghash to King Portugal, 6 April 1886, 18 January 1887, Castilho to Barghash, 7 February 1887, two of 11 February 1887, 29 January 1887, Barghash to Castilho, 3 February 1887, 12 February 1887, and the rest of this file, SR 4; Raffray to MAE, 15 February 1887, PZ 9; Holmwood to FO, 15 February 1887, E-99, ZA; Billot to Freycinet, 26 February 1887, with enclosures, 14 February 1887, 16 February 1887, Pt 224; Holmwood to FO, 2 February 1887, with enclosures, FO 84/1850; Bonham to Salisbury, 23 February 1887, FO 84/1851.

⁸¹Holmwood to FO, 11 February 1887, 12 February 1887, E-95, 15 February 1877, E-99: ZA.

⁸²Castilho to MU, 4 April 1887, 20 April 1887, 20 July 1887, SR 4; Castilho to MU, 3 March 1887 and following documents, *BM*, 11 (12 March 1887), 97-100; Portaria 202, 10 March 1887, *BM*, 18 (30 April 1887), 191, Holmwood to FO, 24 February 1887, E-100, 25 February 1887, E-99, 21 March 1887, E-100, ZA; Raffray to MAE, 18 March 1887, PZ 9; Robert Nunez Lync, *An Apostle of Empire: Being the Life of Sir Lloyd William Mathews, K.C.M.G.* (London, 1936), 81. The Portuguese appointed Abdulaziz bin Sultan as capitão-mor of Tunghi; he was dismissed, however, in April 1888. Portaria 250, 28 May 1887, *BM*, 22 (28 May 1887), 234; Portaria 213, 26 April 1888, *BM*, 17 (18 April 1888), 281.

Arab and African traders simply moved their business to the better markets located to the north of Portuguese territory.⁸³

Both the British and the Germans felt compelled to make some effort to uphold Barghash's position, their attitude still prompted more by their annoyance at the Portuguese disregard of advice than of support for the no-longer-important ruler of Zanzibar.⁸⁴ An especial irritant to the British was the fate of over twenty British Indian families, residents of the Tunghi settlements who had lost all their property because of the Portuguese invasion: their claims totaled \$102,000.⁸⁵ The Germans, little interested in the affair, nevertheless followed the British lead. Bismarck had received a telegram from Barghash requesting assistance in February; he had committed himself to assist in ending the hostilities through the appointment of another commission, an alternative acceptable to Zanzibar and Britain.⁸⁶ Thus in July 1887 Visconde de Castilho, as consul, and the well-known explorer H. Capello da Brito, as special commissioner, arrived in Zanzibar with instructions to hold firm for a border at Cape Delgado, but to secure, if at all possible, the line of the Ruvuma. The Portuguese clearly came to ratify the results of their military victory, not to negotiate over the fate of Tunghi Bay. Lloyd Mathews acted for the sultan in the talks, both sides repeating their time-honored arguments. Barghash, now losing interest in his steadily diminishing dominions, realized the futility of the deliberations and informed Germany and Britain that he left the affair for them to resolve. The

⁸³Constancio José de Brito, "Delegação da Alfandega de Cabo Delgado. Relatório," *BM*, 29 (19 July 1890), 323; Euan Smith to Salisbury, 17 November 1888, FO 84/1910; Portal to Salisbury, 1 August 1889, FO 84/1980; Portal to FO, 27 August 1889, E-112, ZA; Holmwood to FO, 16 March 1887, 2 April 1887, 12 April 1887, E-99, ZA; Billot to Flourens, 26 April 1887, 27 April 1887, Pt 224; Piat to Flourens, 11 June 1887, PZ 9; Castilho to MU, 21 August 1887, 25 August 1887, SR 4; Holmwood to Salisbury, 13 April 1887, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 112; monthly reports, February – May 1887, Commander of Tunghie, and other reports in 1889, NJH; Carvalho to SGM, 24 January 1888 and following, NJH; Carvalho reports, April and May 1889, *BM*, 25 (22 June 1889), 395; *BM*, 33 (16 August 1890), 363, for a vassalage agreement for the Kionga region. For a visit reporting Tunghi a place of little consequence, S.-A. Eichard, *La Côte Orientale d'Afrique* (Lille, 1904), 5-6.

⁸⁴The general documents for British and German policy can be found in FO84; 1835, 1836, 1837, 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1855; Pt 224. For the Portuguese consideration of Tunghi as a great colonial triumph, Petre to Salisbury, 3 April 1887, FO 63/1192; Gomes to Petre, 21 May 1887 in Lister to Holmwood, 2 June 1887, E-101, ZA.

⁸⁵Holmwood to FO, 12 March 1887, 18 March 1887, 31 March 1887, E-100; K.D. Jairam to Holmwood, 24 February 1887, E-97; A. Jamal, 18 May 1888, E-104; Lister to Holmwood, 20 May 1887, E-101, ZA.

⁸⁶Arendt to Barghash, 25 February 1887, Holmwood to Arendt, 25 February 1887, E-98, ZA; Barghash to Bismarck, 22 February 1887, FO 97/602; Holmwood to FO, 25 February 1887, E-100, ZA. The Germans stressed their role in the freeing of the *Kilwa*. See Navios para G.G., A-K, AHM.

commissioners recessed at the end of July, leaving the problem to their governments in Europe.⁸⁷

The negotiations moved to Lisbon, but the declining interest of Britain and Germany left the issue in little doubt.⁸⁸ By September the British were wondering what Barghash might accept "short of absolute surrender," the sultan breaking through the growing apathy by suggesting to the British consul that he call a holy war against the Portuguese. He was informed of the "inconvenience of the proceeding," since Zanzibar was defenseless against attack from the sea, and, although it was not said, would not receive British assistance.⁸⁹ Without any new formulas to advance, and with the Portuguese government prepared to fall before relinquishing control of Tunghi Bay, the affair receded into the distant background, especially after the beginning of the Arab-German war in 1888.⁹⁰

Thus the long quarrel between the Arabs and the Portuguese, dating from the arrival of Vasco da Gama in the waters of the western Indian Ocean, came to an end. The peoples of the region between Tunghi Bay and Cape Delgado had enjoyed their continuing practical independence because of the weakness of the Portuguese and the relative strength of Zanzibar. The fall of the BuSaidi dominions to the Germans and British left the inhabitants of the northern coast with no alternative but to be included among the subject populations of Mozambique.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Macdonald to FO, 1 August 1887, Holmwood to FO, 10 July 1887, E-99, ZA; Piat to MAE, 2 July 1887, 12 July 1887, 30 July 1887, PZ 9; Capello to Gomes, 18 November 1887 in Bonham to Salisbury, 2 July 1888 (the letter was translated from the White Book), FO 84/1899; Petre to Salisbury, 23 July 1887 in Lister to Macdonald, 12 August 1887, Petre to Salisbury, 6 July 1887 in Lister to Holmwood, 27 July 1887, E-101, ZA; Castilho to Castilho, 14 July 1887, with enclosures GG 230; Gomes to Capello, 14 April 1887, and following documents, *Negociações com o Zanzibar*, 97ff; Neves e Mello, *Zanzibar*, 100; Holmwood to FO, 3 July 1887, E-100, ZA; Barghash to Holmwood, 3 July 1887, Barghash to Macdonald, 22 July 1887, Macdonald to Barghash, 28 July 1887, F-2, ZA.

⁸⁸ The negotiations may be followed in part in FO 84: 1840, 1854, 1855, 1850, 1885, 1887, 1888; Pt 225, 226; E-100, E-101, ZA.

⁸⁹ Currie to Macdonald, 12 September 1887, FO 84/1850; Macdonald to FO, 26 September 1887, E-99, ZA.

⁹⁰ See FO 84: 1898, 1899, 1900; E-102, E-104, ZA; Pt 226. The Portuguese refused to compensate the British Indians – Gomes to Petre, 3 November 1888, in Petre to Salisbury, 6 November 1888, FO 84/1900. The file, Consulados de Portugal no Zanzibar, MNE, has correspondence beginning only in 1888.

⁹¹ For the subsequent German occupation of some of the Cape Delgado region, Hardinge to Kimberley, 24 June 1894, E-154, ZA; Botelho, *História Militar*, 301-303.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE FOOTNOTES

AHM	Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Maputo
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon
Al	Allemagne, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Paris
AOM	Archives de l'Ancien Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Paris
BG	Bombay Government
<i>BM</i>	<i>Boletim do Governo da Provincia de Moçambique</i>
CG	Correspondencia de Governadores, Moçambique, AHU
CPC	Zanzibar, Correspondance, Politique, Consulate, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Bruxelles
Enc	Enclosures to Secret Letters Received from Bombay, India Office Archives, London
FO	Foreign Office records, PRO
GG	Fundo do Seculo XIX, Governo Geral, AHM
MAE	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
MC	Moçambique, Caixa, AHU
MM	Moçambique, Maco, AHU
MNE	Archives, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon
MU	Ministério de Ultramar
NJH	Summaries of documents found in AHU, AHM, and the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, kindly presented to me by Nancy J. Hafkin
PR	Primeira Repartição, Moçambique, AHU
PRO	Public Record Office, London
Pt	Portugal, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Paris
PZ	Politique, Zanzibar, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Paris
SGM	Secretary to the Governor of Mozambique
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies, London
SR	Segunda Repartição, Moçambique, AHU
ZA	Zanzibar Archives