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The panpsychism of James Ward and Charles A. Strong

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Dissertation

THE PANPSYCHISM OF JAMES WARD AND CHARLES A. STRONG

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem

This dissertation is concerned with panpsychism as a metaphysics and more especially as a solution to the mind-body problem. Ward and Strong are chosen for investigation primarily as representatives of the two significant kinds of panpsychistic theory, as thinkers who have conscientiously followed out the implications of monadism and the mind-stuff theory, and whose writings clearly reveal the merits and defects of these systems. The attempt is thus made to clarify the distinction between Ward's idealistic and Strong's realistic panpsychism. In order to attain this end certain questions must be answered. What methods of philosophical investigation do the holders of these systems follow? To what extent do these systems rest upon an empirical basis? How adequately do they explain the mind-body relation? How successfully do they account for the factor of continuity in nature? What are their implications for ethics and the philosophy of religion? Since the major interest of this dissertation is metaphysical, epistemological factors are introduced only when they have a specific bearing upon the metaphysical.

2. Definition of Fundamental Terms

Many terms are defined at the time of their actual introduction and use in this paper. Yet a few are so fundamental to



the dissertation as a whole and are used on so many occasions that they may well be defined at the start. Most important of all is the term panpsychism itself. It is derived from the Greek words $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, all, and $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$, soul. Panpsychism, in common with other forms of mentalism, holds that every real entity is psychical or mental, possessing the attributes of a spiritual being. Its distinctive character consists in its theory that the physical world is composed of individual psychical elements which bear essentially the same relation to the world ground as do human minds.

Panpsychism...does not insist that 'mind' has no degrees and must be present if at all in unlimited fashion. Quite the contrary, panpsychism insists always upon the graduated or relative character of mentality. It... emphasizes that a dog's mind is less of a mind than a man's, and that of a moron less than that of a genius. And it points out that this diminution of mentality need not stop at the dog or the frog or even the amoeba. Relatively and for many purposes we may say that the dog is mindless; still more that a protozoon and even more emphatically that a molecule is mindless, unconscious, purposeless. But that such creatures are absolutely without the least degree of that which reaches a high degree in human awareness and purpose--this the panpsychist will not admit. And he further will not admit that the lower degrees of awareness are due to the dilution of mind by its mixture with increasing doses of another something, matter. He points out that when consciousness is lowered, as when one is falling asleep, there is no intrusion of a foreign element but simply the decrease in vividness of the aspects of awareness itself. The limit of this decrease in vividness is not matter but non-existence. The absolute opposite of infinite awareness is simply complete unawareness.¹

One of the advantages of this statement is that in most respects it applies to all varieties of panpsychism. Yet there are at least two important, well defined, and quite distinct kinds of

¹Hartshorne, BH, 169-170.

panpsychism.

The first of these is the idealistic or monadistic type. It is defined by Ledger Wood as "a form of metaphysical idealism, of which Leibniz's theory of monads is the classical example, according to which the whole of nature consists of psychic centers similar to the human mind."² These psychic centers, it should be noted, are independent in the sense that they never combine to form a higher type of mind. The well developed mind is always a higher indivisible monad, never a combination of lower monads. An association of lower monads may, however, form the bodily environment of the mind.

The realistic type of panpsychism, generally known as the mind-stuff or mind-dust theory, differs from the monadistic type primarily in its failure to preserve the unity, indivisibility, and independence of the psychic centers. In fact it is doubtful whether the psychic substance of the realistic panpsychist can be referred to as composed of centers. This mind-stuff goes below the level of 'psychic centers similar to the human mind', and its elements may combine to form such a mind. This view "recognizes no irreducible and ultimate egos, souls, spirits or personalities."³ The following words of Durant Drake well describe this view.

The term 'panpsychism' may properly be applied to our theory, but we must understand that it is only mind-stuff that is universal, not mind itself....The whole

²Runes, DP, 223.

³Spaulding, NR, 268.



world is indeed in a sense alive. But it does not know itself to be alive. It is an enormously intricate pattern of psychic units, continually changing their interrelations. But these units have no way of knowing anything of the pattern or the change. They are, perhaps, all alike.... If this is so, it is only the ceaselessly varying patterns that are different, not the units themselves....The stuff that is deployed in this or that order throughout the universe is the same sort⁴ of stuff that composes us, sentient beings that we are.

I do not see how there could be perception or memory or any other conscious process, except as a phase of the life of complex organisms. If so, consciousness must not be attributed to anything of which we know except living organisms. By saying that all matter is 'psychic' in nature I mean merely that it is of similar substance to that of which our life is composed.⁵

How the unity of consciousness may be explained by a theory which recognizes only psychic particles as ultimate will be seen in a later treatment of the relation of this view to the identity theory of mind-body relation.

With respect to the term realism as used in this paper it should be noted that it does not refer to the ontological reality of universals as in mediaeval philosophy nor to a belief in the trustworthiness of sense-perception as in naive realism. Unless otherwise noted, the term realism is here used only to refer to physical realism, critical realism, and neorealism--all dualisms.

With respect to the mind-body relation the several theories are defined in terms of causal relation between the mind and the physical organism. Automatism means that body completely determines mind and mind never influences body; parallelism means that

⁴MPN, 99.

⁵Art.(1930), 288.

neither body nor mind ever influences the other; interactionism means that body and mind influence each other mutually.⁶

James Ward was born at Hull, England, on January 27, 1843. He was educated at Spring Hill College, Birmingham, at the universities of Berlin and Göttingen, and at Trinity College, Cambridge. While at Göttingen he was strongly influenced by Lotze. From 1870 to 1872 he held a pastorate at Cambridge, resigning it because of his loss of faith in conservative Christianity. In 1875 he became Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1885 his reputation was established by the publication of his article on psychology in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. In 1894 he was Gifford Lecturer at Aberdeen, these lectures being later published as Naturalism and Agnosticism. In 1897 he was elected to the new Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic at Cambridge. From 1907 to 1910 he delivered another series of Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews. These formed The Realm of Ends, published in 1911. He continued to hold the chair at Cambridge through his eighty-second year. His death, the result of an automobile accident, occurred March 4, 1925. Other factors in his life will be mentioned in connection with his influence and

⁶Cf. Pratt, PR, 236. Sometimes included under parallelism is the view that what is perceived as consciousness through introspection is identical with what is perceived as brain through the senses. Actually, however, greater clarity may be achieved by calling this view the double-aspect theory or identity theory.

place in philosophy.

Charles Augustus Strong was born at Haverhill, Massachusetts, on November 28, 1862. In 1884 he received his A.B. from the University of Rochester and the next year an A.F. from Harvard. He then studied at Rochester Theological Seminary and in Germany and France. His studies in Germany resulted in his losing faith in conservative Christianity and this brought about a permanent estrangement between Strong and his father who was the president of Rochester Theological Seminary. From 1887 to 1889 Strong was instructor in philosophy at Cornell. The year 1890 found him a docent at Clark University. Next he became associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago (1892-1895). He then went to Columbia University where from 1895 to 1903 he was lecturer in philosophy and from 1903 to 1910 professor of philosophy. He then retired to Fiesole, Italy, where he spent the remainder of his life, most of which was spent in invalidism. He continued, however, to write books and articles until the time of his death, which occurred at Florence on January 23, 1940.

3. Organization

The organization of this paper is built around the concept, already stated, that there are two significant kinds of pan-psyichism, the monad theory and the mind-stuff theory. The second chapter is devoted to tracing the historical background of these two theories from primitive animism and hylozoism through Nicolaus of Cusa and Leibniz in the case of monadism and through



Spinoza, Fechner, and Clifford in the case of the mind-stuff theory. The third chapter is in the nature of an orientation, attempting to clarify the relation of these kinds of panpsychism to contemporary schools of metaphysics and to the major theories of mind-body relationship. The fourth chapter presents several factors held in common by Ward as supporter of the monad theory and by Strong as supporter of the mind-stuff theory. The fifth chapter undertakes a presentation and analysis of the more important characteristics of Strong's thought. The sixth chapter does the same with the thought of Ward. The seventh chapter concerns itself with the influence and place in philosophy held by Strong and Ward and hence necessarily the influence of the theories which they represent. In the evaluation of the work of these two thinkers, the criticisms already made against them are reviewed and amplified. In the eighth and final chapter certain implications of the two kinds of panpsychistic theory under consideration are traced with respect to psychological theory, to human freedom, to the problem of evil, and to immortality.

4. Previous Studies in the Field

On the subject of Ward the first two works which should be mentioned are two dissertations previously written in the Boston University Department of Philosophy, that of John Sedberry Marshall entitled The Continuum in James Ward's Psychology submitted in 1926 and that of Joseph Scott Pennepacker entitled

The Body- and Problem in James Ward's Philosophy submitted in 1936. These dissertations both present thorough treatments of specific phases of Ward's thought. Their interpretations of Ward's concept of the continuum differ to some extent, Marshall emphasizing its metaphysical and Pennepacker its psychological implications. Though their treatments necessarily involve Ward's monadism in more than an incidental way, this does not constitute the central thought of either dissertation. The present paper differs from the dissertations of both Marshall and Pennepacker in that Ward is here considered primarily as a representative of idealistic monadistic panpsychism whose works clearly reveal the merits and defects of such a system.

Aside from these dissertations the best work on Ward has undoubtedly been that of his British associates, G. Dawes Hicks, Norman Kemp Smith, James Muirhead, George F. Stout, and W. R. Sorley. Especially noteworthy are the articles written by Hicks⁷ and Sorley⁸ just after Ward's death. The section on Ward in Norman Kemp Smith's Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge (1924) is also somewhat illuminating. Both Smith and Hicks have been accused of reading too many of their own ideas into their interpretation of Ward; yet their personal acquaintance with Ward and their observation of the development of his system give their opinions considerable weight. The

⁷Art. (1925).

⁸Art. (1925).

relation of Stout to Ward was more that of disciple to master, but he undoubtedly clarifies certain points of Ward's thought, and his interpretation is not wholly free from criticism.

Certain other brief treatments of Ward that are worthy of mention include the section by Rudolf Metz in his A Hundred Years of British Philosophy (1938), where Ward's psychology is considered to be of much greater value than his philosophy, the chapter on Ward by Peter Bertocci in his The Empirical Argument for God in Recent British Thought (1938), the sketch of Ward's thought in Arthur Kenyon Rogers's British and American Philosophy since 1800 (1928) which gives an illuminating criticism of Ward's attitude toward the physical sciences, and the brief treatment of Ward's epistemology in Douglas Clyde Macintosh's The Problem of Knowledge (1915).

Of more importance than any of these writings on Ward are his own works. From the standpoint of relevance to the problem of this dissertation, the most important of Ward's books is The Realm of Ends (1911), but much valuable material is also to be found in Naturalism and Agnosticism (1899), Psychological Principles (1918), and Essays in Philosophy (1927), the last being a collection of articles published posthumously with a memoir by Ward's daughter, Mrs. Olwen Ward Cambell. In addition to these major works, there is the long and extremely valuable series of articles which Ward wrote through the years for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, for Mind, for the Hibbert Journal, and

for various other magazines in both England and the United States.

On the subject of Strong one of the best treatments is that by Charles William Morris in his Six Theories of Mind (1932). After he had written this material, Morris submitted the manuscript to Strong, and the latter's comments are included in the foot-notes. Morris clearly shows the strong organic relation between the several aspects of Strong's thought. He feels that Strong's metaphysics is formulated to support his epistemology, whereas the writer of this dissertation believes that the epistemology is formulated to support the metaphysics. Morris's treatment brings out the relation of Strong's thought to that of other critical realists.

Other good material on Strong is to be found in Arthur Kenyon Rogers's English and American Philosophy since 1800 (1938), though this necessarily fails to take into account changes in Strong's thought which occurred after this book was published. Perhaps the most sympathetic and understanding interpretation of Strong is to be found in the brief tribute paid to him after his death by Santayana in The Philosophy of George Santayana edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (1940). Here Santayana explains Strong's philosophical viewpoint in the light of his background and environment. Of the many reviews of Strong's books the best are undoubtedly those by Roy Wood Sellars⁹ and William P. Montague.¹⁰

⁹Art.(1919).

¹⁰Art.(1938).

These men show a true insight into Strong's work, and both admit that they have been forced to reconsider phases of their own systems in the light of Strong's penetrating analysis.

As in the case of Ward the writings by Strong himself are of more importance than anything written about him. His important books are Why the Mind Has a Body (1903), The Origin of Consciousness (1918), A Theory of Knowledge (1923), Essays on the Natural Origin of Mind (1930), and a Creed for Sceptics (1936). A special problem concerning these works of Strong has to do with the changes in his philosophical viewpoint, both in his epistemology and his metaphysics. Strong himself often attempts to solve this difficulty by reviewing his philosophical development. Yet the difficulty is increased by the fact that, in the opinion of this writer, Strong's latest writings do not reveal his best thinking. His intellectual development probably reached its peak in the Origin of Consciousness. Though he remained an acute thinker, and though he may have made certain points more explicit and changed his mind about others, he never seems to have written with quite as much vigor again. This is borne out by the fact that the Origin of Consciousness was his last unified book of any length. A Theory of Knowledge is very brief, and the Essays and A Creed for Sceptics are partly collections of articles. For the purposes of this dissertation, moreover, The Origin of Consciousness is most important because in it his view of the mind-stuff theory is made most explicit. Like Ward, Strong has to his credit a long list of articles published chiefly

in Mind, the Philosophical Review, and the Journal of Philosophy.

The sources for study of the historical background of panpsychism include first of all the classic treatment of animism by Edward B. Tylor in his Primitive Culture (1871), the support of Tylor's position by William MacDougall in his Body and Mind (1911), and the challenge of this classical view of animism presented by Dr. Ruth Benedict in her articles in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1930), and in Franz Boas's General Anthropology (1938). The sources of the investigation of hylozoism include Aristotle's treatment of the Ionian physicists in De Anima, the pre-Socratic fragments found in John Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy. Attention is paid to the difference of interpretation of hylozoism between Burnet and Leon Robin. For panpsychistic elements in the philosophies of Averroës, Nicolaus of Cusa, and Paracelsus reliance is placed in such secondary sources as the histories of philosophy by Ueberweg, Windelband, Erdmann, Thilly, Weber, and W.K. Wright. The available works of Leibniz are all examined together with the interpretations by H. Wildon Carr in his book entitled Leibniz (1929) and by Bertrand Russell in his Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900). The Ethics of Spinoza are examined because of Spinoza's influence upon those who came to hold the mind-stuff theory. Fechner's panpsychism is most clearly presented in his Elemente der Psychophysik (1860). The English translation of the passages cited is by William MacDougall. William K. Clifford in his

Lectures and Essays presents the first and in some respects the best statement of the mind-stuff theory.

In addition to the material on or by Ward and Strong and the sources of the historical background, as much other literature on metaphysics as possible has been consulted with special emphasis on recent works having some relation to panpsychism or to the mind-body problem or both. The scope of this reading may be found in the bibliography.

5. Method of Procedure

The discussions of the problem, the organization, and the previous studies in this field have to a large extent already indicated the method of procedure. An exposition of the points in the historical background and in the systems of Ward and Strong which are specifically related to our problem is combined with an attempted internal and external criticism of these factors. Special attention is given to the method used by these thinkers and to how consistently these methods are carried out. To this end the relation of the empirical to the formally logical in the thought of Ward and Strong is especially examined. For example, in a certain phase of his thinking Strong insisted upon rigorous use of the analytic method, carrying his analysis of psychic states well beyond the empirical evidence. Yet he possessed enough respect for the empirical factor not to follow the analysis to its logical limits and hence arrive at neutral

entities. He insisted that the analysis should go beyond what was empirically justifiable yet not so far as was logically justifiable. Hence he seems to have arrived at a purely arbitrary compromise between the two in his mind-stuff. This point will be elaborated in its proper setting in the chapter on Strong. It is cited here merely to show that our emphasis will be first of all on internal criticism, searching for incoherent factors within the systems themselves. The question of the relative adequacy or inadequacy of other systems of metaphysics, the central point of external criticism, though it is important, will be considered secondary to the more internal type of approach. Comparison of systems will be limited largely to the relation of the two major systems within panpsychism itself as represented by Ward and Strong.

As has been indicated this dissertation is interested in Ward and Strong primarily as representatives of the monadistic and mind-stuff theories. Hence we shall give most attention to the works of Ward and Strong which present their best exposition of these ideas.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PANPSYCHISM

1. Primitive Animism

The origin of a concept has frequently little if anything to do with the truth of that concept. The lowly origins of the doctrine of immortality, obscured as they are by savage superstitions, cannot legitimately be used as an argument against the truth of survival after death. Neither can the truth of panpsychism be attacked on the ground that it was anticipated to some degree by the humbler doctrine of primitive animism. The fact that primitive man conceived the objects of the physical world to be animated and controlled by spirits is irrelevant to the truth of the view that physical nature is composed of centers of elementary awareness.

The great importance of primitive animism has been recognized by modern anthropologists, one of the first authoritative treatments of the subject being that of Edward B. Tylor.¹ This belief in spiritual beings probably dates from paleolithic times, and its distribution and influence give it a place with such factors as the invention of fire.² According to Tylor,

the theory of Animism divides into two great dogmas, forming parts of one consistent doctrine: first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of

¹Cf. Tylor, PC, I, 417-502; II, 1-361.

²Benedict, Art.(1930), 65.

continued existence after death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits upward to the rank of powerful deities....Animism in its full development, includes the belief in souls and in a future state, in controlling deities and subordinate spirits, these doctrines, practically resulting in some kind of active worship.³

Tylor held animism to be a rational belief based upon inferences from dreams and visions combined with observations of sleep, trance, and death.⁴ In this view he is supported by McDougall, who contends that "in their main outlines Dr. Tylor's account of the ghost-soul and his theory of the genesis of the idea seem to remain unshaken."⁵

This view has, however, been effectively criticized by Dr. Ruth Benedict, who points out that animism is not so much the result of a rational concept as of primitive man's total reaction to his situation. Thus primitive man naively fails to distinguish between the animate and inanimate orders.

The division of the world into animate and inanimate with accompanying appropriate behaviors for each is alien to folk custom even among ourselves and has to be learned by each generation of our children.... Throughout man's history it has been the mechanistic theory of the universe that he has found fantastic, not the animistic one. He is equipped with a consciousness of his own purposes and motivations, but no stretch of the imagination is sufficient to give him a conception of the workings of inanimate life. His experience of his own inner life he uses to picture to himself those other sequences of which he has no such knowledge.⁶

³Tylor, PC, I, 426-427.

⁴Tylor, PC, I, 428-452.

⁵McDougall, MB, 4.

⁶Benedict, Art.(1938), 636.

This view of animism as the result of man's failure to recognize a distinction between these two orders reveals a more adequate understanding of the primitive mentality than does the rationalistic view of Tylor. Furthermore a question raised in this discussion of animism will prove to be of great significance in the later treatment of panpsychism; namely, whether or not the distinction between these two orders is a valid one, whether any sharp line may be drawn between a realm of conscious beings and one of unconscious physical objects.

2. Hylozoism

Historically and perhaps also logically, next in the development toward a panpsychistic metaphysics lies the theory of hylozoism. This term is derived from the Greek ὕλη (matter) and ζωή (life). This is "the doctrine which endows matter with an original and inherent life and conceives life and spiritual process in general as a property of matter."⁷ Hylozoism differs in several significant respects from animism. The former did not grow as a superstitious belief held uncritically by a group of primitive men. Rather hylozoism was consciously formulated by individual thinkers and hence was more precisely defined. It is definitely a philosophy, independent of religion as animism was not. Probably also the spiritual process in hylozoism is more immanent than that in animism. The ghost spirit of animism might temporarily inhabit a body or physical object, whereas the spiritual factor of hylozoism

⁷Armstrong, Art.(1902), 489.

forms more the inherent nature of the object.

Yet, though hylozoism is more a product of reason than is animism, it is questionable whether the former, like the latter, does not after all rest upon the failure to distinguish between an animate and inanimate order. According to Burnet,

in the days of Thales, and even far later, the distinction between matter and spirit had not been felt, still less formulated....The uncreated indestructible reality of which these thinkers tell us was a body, or even matter, if we choose to call it so; but it was not matter⁸ in the sense in which matter is opposed to spirit.

Though this factor is recognized by Robin, he contends that it is irrelevant.

It does not matter that in Thales' time, men were still unable to distinguish between matter and mind. That his doctrine was a protest against the common experience which contrasts life with the apparent inertia of matter is sufficient ground for calling it a form of Hylozoism.⁹

The theory of hylozoism was thus first represented by the Ionian physicists. According to Aristotle, "certain thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of Gods."¹⁰ It is noteworthy that the arguments which Aristotle brings against this hylozoism closely resemble those brought against modern panpsychism by its opponents. Though such later presocratic

⁸Burnet, EGP, 15.

⁹Robin, GT, 38.

¹⁰De Anima, 411a7.

thinkers as Heraclitus and Empedocles went well beyond the ideas of the Ionian physicists, their work apparently presupposed a type of hylozoism.¹¹ Thilly finds evidences of hylozoism as late as the Stoics. "Their metaphysics is the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy translated back into Hylozoism."¹²

3. Early Vitalism

1. Averroës. The next important contributions toward the development of panpsychism are to be found in mediaeval philosophy. In this line of development the name of Averroës (1126-1198) has come to be included primarily because certain phases of his thought are referred to by Windelband as panpsychistic.¹³ Far from the more commonly accepted use of the term, Windelband is here talking about the relation of the one universal active intellect to individual minds. Ueberweg describes this relation as follows:

[Averroës assumed] that there was only one active intellect in the world and that man had only the 'disposition' in virtue of which he could be affected by the active intellect; when the active intellect came in contact with this disposition there arose in us the passive or material intellect; the one active intellect becoming on its entrance into the plurality of souls particularized in them just as light is decomposed into the different colors in bodies....Averroës did not identify this universal mind...with the Deity himself, but conceived it...as

¹¹Cf. Gomperz, GT, I, 66, 245.

¹²Thilly, HP, 108.

¹³Windelband, HP, 340.

an emanation from the Deity.¹⁴

The chief aim of Averroës was, of course, adequately to interpret Aristotle. The influence of Neoplatonism and of his own Mohammedan religion upon his thinking kept him from fully achieving this goal. Yet despite this, his denial of individual immortality showed him to be a more accurate student of Aristotle's philosophy than were his contemporaries, the scholastics.

Though the so-called panpsychism of Averroës has to do mainly with the relation of the universal mind to the mind of the human individual, it was considerations resulting from this problem of individuation that led two later thinkers, Nicolaus of Cusa and Paracelsus, to a position much closer to that of modern panpsychism.

ii. Nicolaus of Cusa. The thought of Nicolaus of Cusa (1401-1464) is especially interesting in that James Ward himself recognizes in it the seeds of later theories of monads.¹⁵ In his view that each entity mirrored the universe¹⁶ and that each individual thing possessed a uniqueness impossible to duplicate¹⁷ Nicolaus anticipated Leibniz, but in his theory that "every being preserves its existence by virtue of its

¹⁴Ueberweg, HP, I, 416.

¹⁵Ward, RE, 64.

¹⁶Ueberweg, HP, II, 24.

¹⁷Windelband, HP, 347.

community with all others"¹⁸ he seems to point more to the interacting monads of Ward than to the windowless monads of Leibniz.

A certain infinity...belongs likewise to each individual thing, in the sense that in the characteristics of its essence it carries within itself also the characteristics of all other individuals....In this way every individual contains within itself the universe, though in a limited form peculiar to this individual alone and differing from all others.¹⁹

Thus the relation of the individual to the universe is that of microcosm to macrocosm, the former mirroring the latter. Since God is present in each individual thing,²⁰ the system of Nicolaus leads to a pantheism which he vainly attempts to avoid.

The far-reaching implications of the system of Nicolaus are clearly pointed out by W.K. Wright.

He almost seemed to anticipate Kant when he says that attention and discrimination are present in sense perception, and that time and space are products of the understanding and therefore inferior to the mind that produces them. He sounds Hegelian when he asserts that what seems to our reason to be opposites really coincide in a higher unity. At times he thinks of God as the creator of a world external to Him in orthodox mediaeval fashion; at other times he tends to bring God and the world more closely together in a manner anticipatory of Spinoza. When he affirms that each individual thing is infinite in its own way and mirrors the universe from its own point of view, he is suggestive of Leibniz.²¹

iii. Paracelsus. Not to be omitted from these precursors of nanpsychism is the name of Theophrastus von Hohenheim, more commonly called Paracelsus (1493-1541). Though he was not

¹⁸Ueberweg, HP, II, 24.

¹⁹Windelband, HP, 247.

²⁰Thilly, HP, 231.

²¹Wright, HP, 23-24.

entirely free from magic and charlatanism in his practice of medicine, his writings nevertheless reveal much of genuinely philosophical and scientific value. He revived and elaborated the theory of Macrocosm and Microcosm.

Although the doctrine of the Macrocosm and Microcosm was of primitive antiquity, and had even last been emphasized by Raymond of Sabunde, who had not remained unknown to Paracelsus, yet it is only since and by means of the latter that it was made the central point of the whole of philosophy.²²

In his medical theory there is some anticipation of the homeopathic doctrine.²³ Each thing is ruled by a vital principle called the archeus. Disease checks the activity of this archeus, and the physician must stimulate its functioning so as to overcome the retarding force.²⁴

The fundamental metaphysical presupposition of the unity of all vital force led of itself to the thought that there must be also a simple, most efficacious, universal remedy for the strengthening of every Archeus whatever, a panacea against all diseases and for the maintenance of all vital forces.²⁵

Paracelsus' view of a self-contained universe, imbued throughout by a vital life principle is summed up by Werkmeister as follows:

In Paracelsus' world-view transcendent factors and forces gradually disappeared, and all creative elements, nay, life-giving spirit itself, he found in the things about him. The dualism of form and matter, of substance and force, he denied; and out of

²²Erdmann, HP, I, 613.

²³Cf. Ueberweg, HP, II, 24.

²⁴Cf. Thilly, HP, 234.

²⁵Windelband, HP, 374.

cause and effect he wove an intricate pattern of pulsating, throbbing life, a universe that was sufficient unto itself, that was form and matter in one, and evolved its law and order from within.²⁶

4. Early Panpsychism

i. Leibniz. The first thinker to formulate an explicit panpsychism was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). The central concept of Leibniz is that of force, or the capacity of action.²⁷ Since activity is to be found only in mind, the structure of reality must be mental. Leibniz defines substance in terms of force.²⁸ The real world is composed of individual centers of awareness and force which are called monads. These are "the true atoms of nature, and, in fact, the Elements of things."²⁹

Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple or compound. Simple substance is that which has no parts. Compound substance is the collection of simple substances or monads. Monas is a Greek word which signifies unity, or that which is one.

Compounds, or bodies, are multitudes; and simple substances, lives, souls, spirits are unities. And there must be simple substances everywhere, because without simple substances there would be no compounds: and consequently all nature is full of life.³⁰

From the standpoint of natural processes the monad is indestructible. "The Monad can begin only through creation and

²⁶Werkmeister, PS, 7.

²⁷Cf. Carr, LEI, 86.

²⁸NE, Bk. II, Chap. 1, para. 9. PNG, para. 1.

²⁹Mon., para. 3.

³⁰Leibniz, PNG, para. 1.

end only through annihilation. Composites, however, begin or end gradually."³¹ The monads are completely self-contained and unaffected by contact with other monads. As Leibniz puts it, "The Monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out."³² The monads range in type from a very low grade to the very highest Monad of Monads, which is God. The created monads may be classified into three groups: first, bare monads with extremely dim and confused 'petites perceptions' analogous to a human being's state of dizziness or dreamless sleep³³; second, souls with a certain amount of memory, feeling, and attention³⁴; and third, spirits which include reflective self-consciousness, reason, and a capacity for knowledge of eternal and necessary truths.³⁵

These three types of monads are not sharply divided but rather merge into each other. All three types are constantly undergoing internal change motivated by desire or appetite, the constant striving to attain new and clearer perceptions.³⁶ All three types mirror the entire created universe, but the spirits transcend the two lower groups in their mirroring of

³¹ Mon., para. 6.

³² Mon., para. 7.

³³ Mon., para. 21.

³⁴ Mon., paras. 19-20.

³⁵ Mon., para. 29.

³⁶ Mon., para. 15.

God as well.³⁷ Spirits alone participate in the moral order known as the city of God.³⁸ Every monad, whatever its grade, possesses individuality, each differing from every other and each mirroring the universe "according to its own fashion."³⁹ Yet though this individuality endures in all monads, only the spirits possess what could be called personal immortality since only they possess memory of self.

The immortality which is required in morals and in religion does not consist merely in this perpetual existence, which pertains to all substances, for if in addition there were no remembrance of what one had been, immortality would not be at all desirable.⁴⁰

God has so ordained everything that spirits not only shall live forever, because this is unavoidable, but that they shall also preserve forever their moral quality, so that his city may never lose a person, quite in the same way that a person never loses a substance.⁴¹

The Supreme Monad deals with the monads which He has created in two ways. Toward the bare monads and souls which compose the realm of nature, he acts as an architect or mechanic; toward the spirits he acts as monarch. Thus there results the division expressed in the title of one of Leibniz's essays, The Principles of Nature and of Grace.

Since the monads are windowless, their relations toward each other are directed and controlled by a principle known as

³⁷ Mon., paras. 29, 83. Cf. also Russell, LEI, 141.

³⁸ Mon., para. 85.

³⁹ Mon., paras. 9, 63.

⁴⁰ DOM, para. 34.

⁴¹ DOM, para. 36.

pre-established harmony. This principle is especially useful in accounting for the mind-body relation. The mind of a man is a high grade monad or spirit; his body is composed of many bare monads. In the case of animals the relation is between a soul and the bare monads composing the body.

It is evident, then, that every living body has a dominating entelechy, which in animals is the soul. The parts, however, of this living body are full of other living beings, plants and animals, which in turn, have each one its entelechy or dominating soul.⁴²

His dissatisfaction with the dualism of Descartes, with the occasionalism of Geulincx, and with the psycho-physical parallelism of Spinoza was probably a most important motive in Leibniz's formulation of his system. By interpreting all reality as psychical, he had eliminated qualitative dualism. By his doctrine of monads he had maintained quantitative pluralism, thus preserving the value and independence of the individual. Yet the problem facing all such atomic systems is that of relating the units in such a way as to account for the unity found in nature, and especially to explain the relation between mind and body. This is the problem which the doctrine of pre-established harmony was designed to solve. It was supposed to show how the monads, which could not consciously interact, could act together as a composite being.

The soul follows its own laws and the body has its laws. They are fitted to each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances,

⁴²Mon., para. 70.

since they are all representative of one and the same universe.⁴³

In order to clarify this doctrine Leibniz follows the analogy of two clocks which might be made to agree by mutual influence of one clock upon the other, by constant efforts of the clock maker, or by their own accuracy. Putting the soul and the body in place of the two clocks, he examines the three theories as follows.

The way of influence is that of the common philosophy; but as we cannot conceive of material particles or properties or immaterial qualities which can pass from one of these substances into the other, we are obliged to abandon this view. The way of assistance is that of the system of occasional causes; but I hold that this is making a Deus ex Machina intervene in a natural and ordinary matter, when, according to reason, he ought not to intervene except in the manner in which he cooperates in all the other affairs of nature.

Thus, there remains my hypothesis; that is, the way of harmony preestablished by a preventient divine contrivance, which from the beginning has formed each of these substances in a way so perfect, and regulated with so much accuracy, that merely by following laws of its own, received with its being, it nevertheless agrees with the other, just as if there were mutual influence, or as if God in addition to his general cooperation constantly put his hand thereto.⁴⁴

Leibniz considered the doctrine of pre-established harmony to be the greatest achievement of his system. "He loved to call himself the author of the system of the pre-established harmony."⁴⁵ He especially stressed its advantages

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⁴⁴ Third Explanation of the System of Communication between Substances, paras. 7, 8.

⁴⁵ Russell, LEI, 136.

over occasionalism. To him one original miracle seemed preferable to a constant series of divine interventions. "The harmony, or correspondence between the soul and the body, is not a perpetual miracle, but the effect or consequence of an original miracle worked out at the creation of things."⁴⁶ Yet actually his rejection of occasionalism seems rather perfunctory. It is questionable whether Leibniz ever fully considered the hypothesis of a continuously working immanent God. By occasionalism he may mean only the doctrine of a God, existing apart from the world and interfering in its affairs on all occasions when it is necessary to maintain the appearance of parallelism and of a moral order.

When Leibniz speaks of pre-established harmony as having been worked out at the creation of things, he introduces another problem. If all monads have existed since a single time of creation, what is the status of the individual soul or spirit before the birth of the individual animal or man of which it is destined to become the entelechy? To explain this Leibniz relies upon the theory of preformation held by the embryologists of his day.

The organic bodies of nature...always come from seeds in which there was without doubt some preformation, /and hence/ it has been decided that not only is the organic body already present before conception, but also that a soul, in a word, the animal itself, is also in this body; and it has been decided that, by means of conception the animal is disposed for a great transformation, so as to become an animal of another species. We can see cases somewhat similar outside of generation when grubs become

⁴⁶Fourth Letter to Clarke, para. 39.

flies and caterpillars become butterflies.⁴⁷

Now that the theory of preformation has been superseded by that of epigenesis, Leibniz could not find support in the same kind of embryology.

Leibniz supported his theory of preformation by reference to the microscopic embryology of his day. It is, however, sufficiently evident that he could not account for the equal influence of both parents. When this is taken into account, we lose the simplicity of the one dominant monad, but we get a theory uncommonly like Weissmann's continuity of the germ-plasm. A few years ago, therefore, we might have referred to Leibniz as anticipating the latest results of modern science; but since the fall of Weissmann, we must deny ourselves this pleasure.⁴⁸

Probably the best support of the theory of pre-established harmony lies in the view that

each monad always represents the whole universe, and therefore the states of all monads at every instant correspond in that it is the same universe they represent....It is evident that the monads, if each of them mirrors the present state of the universe, necessarily keep pace with one another.⁴⁹

Thus, though the monad never perceives anything outside itself, it gains knowledge through its mirroring of the universe. The clearer this mirroring is, the more adequate perception it will have, especially of its own nature and that of its immediate environment. Whatever may be said concerning the weaknesses of the theory of pre-established harmony, it is to be questioned whether any system of monads is as self-consistent

⁴⁷Mon., para. 74.

⁴⁸Russell, LEI, 154.

⁴⁹Russell, LEI, 138.

without its inclusion. This problem will arise especially with Ward.

In the formulation of his system Leibniz relied upon the investigation of conscious experience, especially immediate experience. When, for example, he describes the nature of the bare monads, he draws upon the experiences of indistinct perceptions at times of fainting, dizziness, and dreamless sleep.⁵⁰ The nature of the real he found in his own mental processes. The importance of this subjectivist approach is emphasized by Whitehead in the following words.

He [Leibniz] approached the problem of cosmology from the subjective side, whereas Lucretius and Newton approach it from the objective point of view. They implicitly ask the question, What does the world of atoms look like to an intellect surveying it? What would such an intellect say about the spectacle of an atomic universe?...But Leibniz answered another question. He explained what it must be like to be an atom. Lucretius tells us what an atom looks like to others, and Leibniz tells us how an atom is feeling about itself.⁵¹

This empirical approach is basic to panpsychism, and in fact to some extent to all forms of idealism.

Several basic principles underlie the system of Leibniz. He emphasizes the law of identity and the law of contradiction. "The first of the truths of reason is, as Aristotle rightly observed, the principle of contradiction or, what amounts to the same thing, of identity."⁵² Second only to the law of

⁵⁰ Mon., paras. 20-21.

⁵¹ Whitehead, AI, 168-169.

⁵² Leibniz, On Descartes' Principles, On Article 7.

contradiction Leibniz places the principle of sufficient reason.

Our reasoning is based upon two great principles: first, that of Contradiction,...and second, the principle of Sufficient Reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise. More frequently, however, these reasons cannot be known by us.⁵³

The attempt to apply the principle of sufficient reason involves consideration of God. "It is thus that the ultimate reason for things must be a necessary substance, in which the detail of the changes shall be present merely potentially, as in the fountain-head, and this substance we call God."⁵⁴

Another principle to which Leibniz attached very great importance was that of continuity. "It is one of my great maxims, and one of the most verified, that nature never makes leaps."⁵⁵ Though there may be something to be said for the continuity of time and space, continuity in the series of substances seems to be supported by little concrete evidence.

According to Bertrand Russell,

why Leibniz held that substances form a continuous series it is difficult to say. He never, so far as I know, offers a shadow of a reason, except that such a world seems to him pleasanter than one with gaps.⁵⁶

If there was little reason to hold to the principle of continuity

⁵³Mon., paras. 31-32.

⁵⁴Mon., para. 38.

⁵⁵NE, Preface, tenth paragraph.

⁵⁶Russell, LEI, 65.

in Leibniz's day, there is even less today. The general principle that nothing in nature occurs in leaps is contradicted by the occurrence of mutations and by the evidence from quantum mechanics. Yet this principle has been emphasized by many panpsychists in their protest against any break between the nature of the organic and the inorganic realms.

The unique individuality which Leibniz attributes to each monad rests upon the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Concerning this Leibniz says

There are not in nature two real, absolute beings indiscernible from each other; because if there were, God and nature would act without reason, in ordering the one otherwise than the other; and that therefore God does not produce two pieces of matter perfectly equal and alike.⁵⁷

This too is a principle held by many other panpsychists.

ii. Fechner. A somewhat different type of panpsychism was formulated by Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887). Spinoza had introduced the double-aspect theory which he derived from his definitions of substance as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself,"⁵⁸ of attribute as "that which the intellect perceives as the essence of substance,"⁵⁹ and of mode as "the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is perceived through something other

⁵⁷Fifth Letter to Clarke, para. 21.

⁵⁸Spinoza, Eth., Pt. I, Def. ii.

⁵⁹Ibid., Def. iii.

than itself."⁶⁰ For Spinoza the only substance is God,⁶¹ a being possessing infinite attributes,⁶² two of which are extension and thought.⁶³ Thus the human mind and human body are modifications of these infinite attributes of extension and thought in God. Yet it is important to note that extension and thought and hence the human mind and the human body are but two aspects of the same substance.

Substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So also the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways.⁶⁴

From this, according to Spinoza, it follows that "body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be."⁶⁵ Thus these two aspects of the same mode merely run parallel to each other. Looked upon through subjective introspection the mode appears as conscious mind; looked upon through an inspection of its physical properties, this same mode will appear as body. "The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of

⁶⁰Eth., Pt. I, Def. iv.

⁶¹Eth., Pt. I, Prop. 14.

⁶²Eth., Pt. I, Def. vi; Pt. I, Prop. xi.

⁶³Eth., Pt. II, Props. 1-11.

⁶⁴Eth., Pt. II, Prop. vi, note.

⁶⁵Eth., Pt. III, Prop. ii.

extension which actually exists and nothing else."⁶⁶

This double-aspect theory of mind and body has been adopted by the school of panpsychism founded by Fechner and interpreted in a somewhat different way. Instead of being one of an infinite number of attributes, mind becomes for them the central factor, the intrinsic characteristic of the substance. Thus mind and body are indeed two aspects of the same factor, but the factor is not a third substance but rather mind itself. Thus the brain is the same thing as the mind. The difference lies in the point of view of the investigator, whether he is using the senses or self-consciousness.⁶⁷

Fechner, who first set forth this view, illustrated it as follows.

When anyone stands inside a sphere its convex side is for him quite hidden by the concave surface; conversely when he stands outside, the concave surface is hidden by the convex. Both sides belong together as inseparably as the psychical and bodily sides of the human being, and these also may by way of simile (vergleichsweise) be regarded as inner and outer sides; but it is just as impossible to see both sides of a circle from a standpoint in the plane of the circle, as to see these two sides of humanity from a standpoint in the plane of human existence.⁶⁸

Again Fechner states the position even more explicitly. "What appears to you who yourself are spirit, when at the inner standpoint as spirit, appears from the outer standpoint as

⁶⁶ Eth., Pt. II, Prop. xiii.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ueberweg, HP, II, 321.

⁶⁸ Fechner, EP, I, Introduction.

the bodily substratum of this spirit."⁶⁹ Thus, according to Fechner, no spirit can have an immediate perception of another spirit, but must rely upon its apparent corporeality.⁷⁰

Fechner carried his doctrine beyond the mind-body relation of human persons. Like most panpsychists he developed an atomism. Yet his psychic atoms differed from those of Leibniz in that they could form not only a part of the body of a higher being but actually part of his mind. This, of course, followed from his theory of the identity of mind and body. Thus not only are men centers of consciousness composed of psychic atoms, but also the world, the other planets and all great physical bodies are animated by conscious spirits.

Fechner does not wish his atomism...to be confounded with monadology, with which, on the contrary, it engages in a life-and-death struggle. His atoms are just the simplest phenomena, and therefore what exists in consciousness, i.e. in the consciousness of God, and thus of all...Fechner says that his view stands in a relation of complete antagonism to one view only, namely monadology.⁷¹

Fechner was the acknowledged precursor of those thinkers who hold the mind-stuff or mind-dust theory. Undoubtedly the greatest problem faced by Fechner as by all 'mind-stuffists' is the explanation of the unity of consciousness. In the system of Leibniz an organism was centered around soul or spirit which was itself one high grade monad. The unity of

⁶⁹Fechner, EP, I, Introduction.

⁷⁰Cf. MacDougall, BY, 138.

⁷¹Erdmann, HP, III, 289-290.

consciousness was accounted for by the unity of this single monad. Yet in the system of Fechner there is no counterpart to such a central source of unity. Here the body is not composed of a lower type of monads; the body is merely another aspect of the mind. The mind is not one monad but an aggregate of psychic atoms. Actually Fechner attempted not to explain but to deny the unity of conscious experience. In this he set the course for later adherents of the mind-stuff theory. In his doctrine of psycho-physical continuity and discontinuity he finds the explanation of mental unity in the spatial proximity of the corporeal attributes of mind. Thus he points out that "the psychically unitary and simple are resultants of a physical manifold, the physical multiplicity gives unitary or simple resultants."⁷² Such an explanation would allow no element of necessity in this apparent unity, but this Fechner willingly admits. His study of the earthworm had convinced him each ganglion had its own separate consciousness, and from this he had inferred the existence of separate streams of consciousness in the higher vertebrates.

He held that empirical facts justified the view that if the human cerebrum could be divided by the knife into two halves, each half would enjoy its separate consciousness; and that, if the brains of two men could be effectively joined by a bridge of nervous matter, as the two halves of the human cerebrum are joined by the corpus callosum, the two men would have a single common consciousness. It seemed, then, to him that a condition of the unity of consciousness is continuity

⁷²Fechner, EP, II, 526.

in space of the nervous matter....The further and essential condition of the running together of lesser consciousnesses to form the larger consciousness of the individual is, Fechner suggests, that their material aspects shall form a spatially continuous system, every part of which in its psychical aspect rises above the 'threshold of consciousness' of that individual.⁷³

While the evidence from cases of multiple personality is insufficient to support such a view as Fechner advocates, while the difficulties of the concept of compounding individual consciousnesses into larger wholes are extremely great, and, while the concept of the 'threshold of consciousness' seems self-refuting^{73a} it must also be said that Fechner was more ready to follow out logical implications of his theory than any holder of the double aspect theory or mind stuff theory since his time.

iii. Clifford. The double aspect or identity theory of mind and body together with psychic atomism was further developed by William K. Clifford (1845-1879).^{73b} It was he who first popularized the notion of mind stuff as the basic element of which the real world is composed. Clifford's epistemology is worthy of note. The objective order of the space-time world as investigated by physical science is, he believes,

a group of my feeling, which persists as a group in a certain manner; for I am at present considering only the objective order of my feelings. The object, then, is a set of changes in my consciousness, and not anything out of it....The inferences of physical

⁷³ MacDougall, BM, 294-295.



73a "The conception of the 'threshold', which is fundamental to Fechner's whole psycho-physical scheme and especially to the doctrine of psycho-physical continuity, remains utterly obscure, a metaphor of extreme vagueness merely. The phrase 'threshold of consciousness' possesses a misleading plausibility which has secured for it a wide popularity. The consciousness, it is assumed, exists whether above or below the 'threshold', and its being above the 'threshold' is merely the condition of its aggregation in the complex whole of individual consciousness. The 'threshold', above which consciousness is said to rise, must be then in every case the 'threshold' peculiar to the individual whose consciousness is in question; yet (according to the doctrine) this individual has no existence as such apart from the 'threshold'; the 'threshold' is in short constitutive of the individual. It must, I think, be admitted that a 'threshold' pure and simple, regarded as the bond that holds consciousness together, is in no way superior, rather vastly inferior to the conception of a soul as a unitary being" (MacDougal, BM, 296).

73b Clifford took the view chiefly from Wundt (cf. Clifford, LE, 286). Yet Wundt's master, Fechner, was, as has been shown, the true source of the idea. According to MacDougal, "we owe to him [Fechner] the first statement and the most elaborate defense of it" (BM, 137).

science are all inferences of my real or possible feelings; inferences of something actually or potentially in my consciousness, not of anything outside it.⁷⁴

However, a knowledge of other minds he puts on a different basis. Unlike the objects of the physical order, these other minds are independent of the conscious experience of the individual.

The inferred existence of your feelings, of objective groupings among them similar to those among my feeling and of a subjective order in many respects analogous to my own,--these inferred existences are in the very act of inference thrown out of my consciousness, recognized as outside of it, as not being a part of me. I propose, accordingly, to call these inferred existences ejects, things thrown out of my consciousness, to distinguish them from objects, things presented in my conscious phenomena.⁷⁵

It is furthermore this recognition of ejects as independent of my consciousness that has led men to believe that objects also are external to their consciousness.⁷⁶ Ejective facts or changes in consciousness run parallel to objective facts or changes in the brain. There is no causal relation between these two factors.⁷⁷ Following Hume's method of analysis Clifford reaches the conclusion that

as your consciousness is made up of elementary feelings grouped together in various ways (ejective facts), so a part of the action of your brain is made up of more elementary actions in parts of it grouped

⁷⁴Clifford, LE, 274-275.

⁷⁵Clifford, LE, 275.

⁷⁶Cf. Clifford, LE, 277.

⁷⁷Clifford, LE, 279.

together in the same ways (objective facts).⁷⁸

From this Clifford reasons that such elementary feelings can exist independently.

A feeling can exist by itself without forming part of a consciousness. It does not depend for its existence on the consciousness of which it may form a part. Hence a feeling (or an ejet-element) is Ding-an-sich, an absolute whose existence is not relative to anything else.⁷⁹

Clifford attempts to explain the union of these elementary feelings into a single consciousness just as Fechner had done by the spatial association of their physical counterparts.

These ejet-elements which correspond to motions of matter, are connected together in their sequence and coexistence by counterparts of the physical laws of matter. For otherwise the correspondence could not be kept up. That element of which...even the simplest feeling is a complex I shall call Mind-Stuff.⁸⁰

He sums up his doctrine by saying that "matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff is the thing represented,"⁸¹ and that "reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex which is made up of elements themselves not rational, not intelligent, not conscious."⁸¹

The resemblances between Fechner's views on the mind-body relation and on the nature of reality and the views of Clifford stand out plainly enough. Yet, unlike Fechner, Clifford does

⁷⁸Clifford, LE, 282.

⁷⁹Clifford, LE, 284.

⁸⁰Clifford, LE, 284.

⁸¹Clifford, LE, 286.

not believe in God. Though the Ding an sich is mental it is not related to a Supreme Mind. Clifford bitterly assails the organized religions of his day.

I can find no evidence that seriously militates against the rule that the priest is at all times and all places the enemy of all men....If there is one lesson which history forces upon us in every page, it is this: Keep your children away from the priest, or he will make them enemies of mankind. It is not the Catholic clergy and those like them who are to be dreaded in this matter; even the representatives of apparently harmless religions may do incalculable mischief if they get education into their hands.⁸²

Clifford's humanistic ideas are well expressed in the following words.

A helper of men, outside of humanity, the truth will not allow us to see. The aim and shadowy outlines of the superhuman deity fade slowly away from before us; and as the mist of his presence floats aside, we perceive with a greater and greater clearness the shape of a yet grander and nobler figure--of Him who made all Gods and shall unmake them.⁸³

The modern panpsychists have in general followed some variation of Leibnizian monadism or of the mind stuff theory. For the most part the former group has followed Leibniz in holding to theism, while the latter group has tended toward the atheistic humanism of Clifford. This will be seen to have been true of Ward and Strong.

⁸²Clifford, LE, 382-383.

⁸³Clifford, LE, 386.

CHAPTER III

CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF PANPSYCHISM

1. Panpsychism and Realism

That type of panpsychism which has its basis in the mind stuff theory has been held by certain modern realists, including Charles A. Strong and Durant Drake. It has even been looked upon with some favor by such a neo-realist as William P. Montague, who clarifies his position as follows:

Panpsychism really connotes two distinct theories: (1) the positive view that all matter has something psychical about it; (2) the negative view that all matter is nothing but psychical. With the first of these views I am in entire sympathy. It is only against the second or negative doctrine that I shall argue.¹

The neo-realist's concept of neutral entities would keep him from admitting that matter is nothing but psychical, yet Montague's continued interest in and sympathy toward panpsychism is clearly brought out in his more recent work, The Ways of Things, where he even acknowledges the possibility that Eddington's type of panpsychism may be the correct view.²

Strong, one of the two American critical realists to accept panpsychism, gives the fullest development of the realistic type. His work will be examined more fully in a

¹Montague, Art.(1912),

²Montague, WT, 293-294.

later chapter. Drake's view differs little from Strong's. There are, however, other realists whose systems contain at least elements of panpsychism. C. Lloyd Morgan's concept of emergent evolution possesses strong resemblances to panpsychism. For example, he remarks that

the whole physical system from bottom to top is also from top to bottom a psychical system. Of this total psychical system in its entirety the emergent quality of mind is high-level only; but all lower levels are psychically as well as physically involved.³

If Whitehead be considered a realist and if the mental pole of his actual entity be sufficiently emphasized, he also may be placed in this class, though it should be noted that his atoms are monads rather than 'stuff,' and that his later writings have shown an increasingly idealistic trend of thought. The panpsychistic element in Whitehead's thought is revealed in the following passage.

In its self-creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the 'subjective aim' by reason of which the actual entity is a determinate process.

This subjective aim is not primarily intellectual; it is the lure for feeling. This lure for feeling is the germ of mind. Here I am using the term 'mind' to mean the complex of mental operations in the constitution of an actual entity.⁴

Whitehead, who was formerly more of a realist than he now is, forms a good point of transition from the realistic to the idealistic type of panpsychism. It may be said of the

³Morgan, EE, 194.

⁴Whitehead, PR, 130.

realists who hold panpsychism that in most cases they have been driven to it by their inability to explain experience in materialistic terms. Recent developments in physics have made it impossible for the realist to remain a materialist. Even Roy Wood Sellars must now refer to himself as "a reformed materialist."⁵ As, therefore, the realist faces the situation honestly, he finds it necessary to reinterpret matter so as to take into account the recent developments in quantum and wave mechanics. If in addition to these physical data he takes into account the factor of mind, he may move toward the idealistic position. Yet since he is unwilling to go all the way with the idealist, he may find in some type of the mind-stuff theory a convenient stopping place where he may hold to many of the characteristics of 'matter' with just enough of 'mind' thrown in to save his position from complete untenability. While some thinkers have walked this road and others appear to have made a start in that direction, it should be pointed out that Strong's journey was in the opposite direction. He started as more of an idealist and became gradually more realistic until he reached the compromise of the mind-stuff theory.

2. Panpsychism and Idealism

Panpsychism is so much an idealistic hypothesis that some

⁵Sellars, Art.(1941), 424.

writers are inclined to limit the term solely to its idealistic form, and exclude the mind-stuff theory from classification under panpsychism. For example, Ledger Wood has recently defined panpsychism as "a form of metaphysical idealism, of which Leibniz's theory of monads is the classical example, according to which the whole of nature consists of psychic centers similar to the human mind."⁶ Such a definition would, of course, exclude Clifford and his realistic followers. Yet since some of these have consistently referred to themselves as panpsychists and have done much to popularize the term, their elimination seems unwarranted. Suffice it to say that the Leibnizian monadic theory is the older tradition in a panpsychism which includes both groups.

The idealistic type of panpsychism will, of course, place more emphasis on time and less on space than will the realistic type.⁷ The idealistic type generally finds the unity of consciousness in a single monad or psychic center rather than in an aggregate of psychic atoms held together by the spatial connection of their physical correlates. The idealistic panpsychist will, therefore, favor interaction over the double-aspect theory. The idealistic panpsychist may be either a quantitative pluralist such as Ward or an absolutist such as Miss Calkins or Hartshorne. On first thought it might be asked

⁶In Runes, *DE*, 223. See Ch. I, above.

⁷Cf. Hartshorne, *BH*, 174-175.

how an absolutist could explain the individuality of the psychic entities if they are only parts of the absolute, but actually it would seem little harder to explain the apparent individuality of lower monads or cells than it would be to explain the apparent individuality of human minds.

Virtually all idealistic panpsychists believe in a God; most of them are theists; whereas most realistic panpsychists, as has been pointed out, follow the atheism of Clifford. To many idealistic panpsychists God takes the form of a Supreme Monad or Cell. For Whitehead, who is closer in this respect to the idealistic panpsychists, God is the primordial actual entity composed like all other actual entities of a physical pole, a mental pole, and a superjective nature.⁸ Similarly for Stace

God is a cell, or a super-cell. And by a super-cell I mean only a cell of great magnitude in regard both to the data and its consciousness. But the structure of God is the same as that of any other cell. He is composed of consciousness and private data. His omniscience will mean that to every actual datum in every other cell in the universe, and to every possible datum in its world-pattern, there corresponds in His cell an actual datum.⁹

Panpsychism and idealism fit together more naturally than do panpsychism and realism. Idealism has always emphasized consciousness, maintaining that it held the clew to the nature of reality. Panpsychism has done likewise, specifically

⁸Whitehead, PR, 134-135.

⁹Stace, NW, 252-253.

centering consciousness or feeling in individual units. Realistic panpsychism is at best a compromise, which hardly does more than add certain mental characteristics to 'matter'.

3. Panpsychism as a Solution to the Mind-body Problem

1. Panpsychism and interaction. Panpsychism arose as, perhaps more than anything else, an attempt to solve the mind-body problem. As has already been mentioned the type of relation between mind and body most commonly accepted by the monadistic type of panpsychism is interaction. For Leibniz the interaction between monads, if it may properly be called that, was determined by pre-established harmony. The monads of Ward interacted by means of what he called 'sympathetic rapport', a term borrowed from Lotze and signifying a kind of immediate contact between monads.¹⁰ Panpsychists who hold to interaction between mind and body base their belief on empirical evidence, and since both interacting units are of the nature of mind, there seems to be no insurmountable metaphysical obstacle to accepting this explanation. In the words of Stace,

Nothing is inconceivable save what is logically contradictory, and interaction involves no contradiction. It is no longer plausible to declare a priori from an armchair that something in nature is 'impossible' because it outrages some prejudice of ours. No a priori argument against interaction has the slightest weight. Experience is the only

¹⁰Cf. Ward, RE, 256-257.

arbiter. And experience leaves no doubt that interaction occurs.¹¹

The argument most frequently brought against interaction between mind and body has to do with the law of the conservation of energy. This argument may be stated as follows:

Mind cannot act on body without giving rise, in body, to a gain or loss of energy, which is not balanced by an equivalent loss or gain. But no gain or loss of bodily energy is discoverable which is not balanced by an equivalent loss or gain. Therefore mind cannot act on body at all.¹²

Perhaps the best refutation of this argument is given by C.D. Broad, who concludes his statement as follows.

The argument from energy has no tendency to disprove two-sided Interaction. It has gained a spurious authority from the august name of the Conservation of Energy. But this impressive principle proves to have nothing to do with the case. And the real premise of the argument is not self-evident, and is not universally true even in purely intra-physical transactions.¹³

ii. Panpsychism and automatism. The theory of interaction just discussed recognized a mutual influence of mind and body upon each other. The theory of automatism holds to a complete determination of mind by body with no influence of mind upon body. According to this view, "consciousness is always caused by the brain, entirely determined in its nature by the brain, and in its turn never determines or influences anything, whether bodily activity or further mental content."¹⁴ Though

¹¹Stace, NW, 69.

¹²Stout, WM, 87.

¹³Broad, MPN, 109.

¹⁴Pratt, PR, 238.

such a view may not be logically self-contradictory, it possesses some rather fatal weaknesses. If consciousness is totally inefficient, why should it ever have appeared in the process of evolution?

If thoughts are connected with each other only indirectly through the processes of matter and physical energy, it is difficult to see how there can be such a thing as logical necessity, or even the establishment of reasonable probability. We should thus be compelled to think as we do not because one hypothesis is a more reasonable conclusion from the facts and premises than another, but because the physical laws that hold in the nervous system produce this hypothesis and not that.¹⁵

In any case there will be no possibility of a panpsychist's ever accepting this theory of mind-body relation. His doctrine is one which emphasizes rather than discredits the importance and causal efficacy of consciousness.

iii. Panpsychism and parallelism. Interaction involved a causal relation between mind and body and in turn between body and mind. In automatism the causal relation went from body to mind only. Parallelism allows for no causal relation whatever from mind to body or from body to mind. These two factors merely run parallel to each other, the series of events in the one having a corresponding series in the other. However, the parallelist, if he is a thinker, finds it necessary to look beyond this description for an explanation for these two series of events running parallel to each other. What is the reason for such a correspondence? As has been shown in

¹⁵Pratt, PR, 238-239.

analyzing the views of Fechner and Clifford, the panpsychist who recognizes such apparent parallelism explains it by interpreting conscious mind and physical brain as identical, the mind being what is perceived through introspective self-consciousness and the brain what is perceived through the senses. Apparently this fits in well enough with the panpsychism of mind-stuff theory, since for any panpsychist the psychological entities must admittedly possess a physical appearance. The difficulties of such a theory will be examined when Strong's treatment of the mind-body problem is discussed.



CHAPTER IV

FACTORS COMMON TO THE THOUGHT OF WARD AND STRONG

1. The Psychological Approach

Both Ward and Strong began their teaching careers as psychologists. The work which first made Ward famous was his article on Psychology for the Encyclopaedia Britannica published in 1895. It was he who perhaps more than any other individual changed the English psychological emphasis from structural to functional. Some authorities consider his work in psychology to have constituted a greater contribution than his work in philosophy.¹ However that may be, his efforts in philosophy have been undertaken from the psychological approach. In this connection he remarks that

epistemology and ethics, the theory of knowledge and the theory of conduct raise questions which depend in large measure for their solution on the con-
clusions we reach concerning this problem /of what
constitutes the true standpoint and scope of
psychology/. In the history of British thought, in
particular, the influence of the conception of
psychology on metaphysical and ethical speculation
is unusually striking.²

Especially noteworthy here is Ward's definition of psychology which is given in the following passages:

Psychology cannot be defined by reference to a special subject matter as such concrete sciences, for example,

¹ Cf. Metz, HYBP,

² Ward, PP, 1.



as mineralogy and botany can be; and yet, since it deals in some sort with the whole of experience, it is obviously not an abstract science in any ordinary sense of that term.³

Psychology then we define as the science of individual experience--understanding by experience not merely, not principally, cognition, but also, and above all, conative activity or behaviour.⁴

Such a definition of psychology is one which might well drive its author beyond the commonly accepted limits of that science. In fact, in Ward's great book, Principles of Psychology, there are references to epistemology, axiology, and even metaphysics which would not appear in a present-day text-book on psychology. This may be partly accounted for by the fact that psychology and philosophy had not become as clearly separated in Ward's day as they have today. Nevertheless it remains that Ward went from psychological emphasis to a philosophical one and that his chief metaphysical speculations at least were the work of his later years. Thus when he attacked a problem of epistemology or of mind-body relation he had at his disposal a wealth of psychological data which could be used as evidence. He could likewise correlate these with the data of biology of which he was also a thorough student. Yet though Ward's psychology was not without its physiological emphasis, this failed to influence his thinking in the direction of materialism as it did Strong's.

Strong also is psychological in his approach. He was for a time professor of psychology at Columbia University. He too expressed dissatisfaction with the general trend of modern

³Ward, PP, 26.

⁴Ward, PP, 28.



psychology. In 1930 he wrote that

psychology, despite the vast amount of excellent work that has been done, remains as respects theory in a state of confusion because its fundamental conceptions are not clear. It is still, as Williams James said many⁵ years ago, not a science but only the hope of one.

The hope for improvement in psychology lies, Strong believes, in a greater physiological emphasis.

The hope of psychology ever becoming a science lies in its keeping in close touch with neurology. The structure of the nervous system must supply the ground-plan of the mind, its functions must furnish the key to the mind's activities. It is impossible to understand the mind aright by contemplating it from within.⁶

Like Ward Strong is not only interested in psychology as such but in relating it to problems of epistemology and metaphysics. His works all deal more with these latter two fields than with psychology, though there is constant reference to psychological data. For example, Strong expresses his satisfaction that his theory of awareness "permits us to reconcile completely the psychological relation between ideas, which must be causal, with the logical relations which are necessary to their conveying truth."⁷

Whatever may be the differences between the psychology of Ward and Strong, it is significant that both constantly emphasize it and use its data in the formulation of philosophical theories. It may be considered important also that the two

⁵Strong, ENM, 4-5.

⁶ENM, 5.

⁷ENM, 221.

outstanding panpsychists of their day both approached philosophy through psychology.

2. The Emphasis upon Evolution

Though their interpretation of it is quite different, both Ward and Strong give a prominent place in their systems to the factor of evolution. For his part Ward strongly stresses the principle of epigenesis and shows its difference from the earlier preformation theory.

The so-called evolution of the world is really epigenesis, creative synthesis; it implies continual new beginnings, the result of the mutual conflict and cooperation of agents, all of whom, though in varying degrees, act spontaneously or freely.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts--that is the cardinal characteristic of evolution as understood by the pluralist. A unity that is not more than its constituent elements is no real unity at all: it is only a formal or mathematical whole. All real synthesis entails new properties which its component factors in their previous isolation did not possess.⁹

In one place Ward appears to accept the over-optimistic idea that evolution implies progressive advance.

"Stability and progression," he remarks, "are correlative conditions of psychical as they are of all other, evolution."¹⁰

Though Strong may presuppose the change from preformation to epigenesis, he does not emphasize it. The conclusion which Ward draws from it would hardly be compatible with his system, which has no place for such a unity of consciousness, but

⁸Ward, RE, 271-272.

⁹Ward, RE, 101-102.

¹⁰Ward, PP, 415.

rather seeks to deny it. Strong's interest in evolution is to show that "a psychic ego can come by evolution only out of a psychic world."¹¹ It seems probable that this statement would hold good for any type of evolution whether it involve preformation, epigenesis, mutations, or emergents. Nevertheless this idea is sharply questioned by Morris Cohen and his point is certainly worth noting.

Evolutions who accept the principle of continuity without qualification believe that since conscious life appears in the course of cosmic history it must have been latent in the cosmic dust or nebula from the beginning. If this latency is anything more than the bare fact that what happened was possible, this argument has force only to those who do not believe that real novelty or new combinations can appear in time--a view which goes back to the original eighteenth century form of evolution, as exfoliation of that which was originally involved or folded up. But the theory of epigenesis which replaced it in biology might replace it also in general philosophy.¹²

In spite of Cohen's contention, it appears from a passage already cited¹³ that C. Lloyd Morgan at least would deny the emergence of a psychical entity from something not itself psychical.

If anything the thought of Strong seems more dominated by the concept of evolution than is that of Ward. In Strong's case it sometimes appears doubtful whether he is using the theory of mind-stuff to explain evolution or whether he is using evolution to support the theory of mind-stuff.

¹¹ Strong, OC, 322.

¹² Cohen, RN, 306.

¹³ ,

3. Rejection of Qualitative Dualism

Both Ward and Strong reject qualitative metaphysical dualism, this rejection being of course an essential element in panpsychism. Ward launches out vigorously against any such dualism:

This whole distinction of phenomenon and epiphenomenon is but the old story of the Cartesian dualism over again. But after puzzling the world for nearly three centuries, it seems--at least as a philosophical tenet--in a fair way to disappear. Make two mutually exclusive halves out of one concrete world: in the one you will find only your own so-called subjective states and have to become a solipsist; in the other the organisms you would find there you could call only automata at the best.¹⁴

Metaphysical dualism Ward believes to be responsible for many problems and difficulties, two of which he emphasizes in the following words.

These two problems--the relation of body and mind and the reality of external perception--have continued to vex philosophic thinkers from Descartes' day down to our own, nor will they cease to trouble us till dualism is laid to rest.¹⁵

In Naturalism and Agnosticism Ward devotes the greater part of one volume to the refutation of dualism. One of the most interesting things in this treatment is his account of how such dualism arose.

The naive dualism of ordinary thought and language was traced to the union of naive realism based on the notion of the transsubjective, with the hypothesis of introjection or animism....As scientific

¹⁴Ward, RE, 7.

¹⁵Ward, PP, 12.

knowledge and philosophic reflection advanced this naive dualism led on to a further dualism of the empirical and the rational, such as we find, for example, in the Cartesian philosophy and its development.¹⁶

As part of his attack on dualism, Ward makes a very brilliant assault upon the idea of substance. He refers to this category of substantiality as, "before all others...the stronghold of Cartesian, nay, of all, dualism."¹⁷

What, then, is the source and the validity of this conception of an unchangeable substratum as applied to things? All that we know of anything resolves into changes that it produces in other things or undergoes through them....The changes which constitute the whole of our direct experience of things can...in no way be explained by this bare potentiality of everything and actuality of nothing.¹⁸

As will be brought out in more detail in a later chapter, Ward opposed to dualism a spiritualistic monism of a panpsychistic type.¹⁹

Strong also rejects dualism, making mind-stuff the sole basic reality.²⁰ But unlike Ward he uses the concept of substance. What for Ward was the chief enemy of monism becomes for Strong its leading support.

If phenomenalism is in error, its opposite, the recognition of a real thing distinct from a sense-datum but apprehended in that form is the truth. This is what has always been meant in philosophy by substance;

¹⁶Ward, NA, II, 182.

¹⁷Ward, NA, II, 192.

¹⁸Ward, NA, II, 192-193.

¹⁹Ward, RE, 13, 67.

²⁰Strong, OC, 14, 322.

and the best name for the anti-phenomenalistic view is (not realism, which is ambiguous but) substantialism.²¹

Strong goes on to complain of the extreme difficulty of winning anyone to his position.

If it is an uphill task to convince philosophers of the reality of substance, what is to be said of the enterprise of proving to them that feelings are not necessarily as they appear to be? This is a labour truly Herculean. He²² who essays it has need indeed of the physical method.

4. Acceptance of Quantitative Pluralism

Though both Ward and Strong reject qualitative metaphysical dualism in favor of monism, they accept quantitative pluralism.

According to Ward,

it is assumed that there exists an indefinite variety of selves, some indefinitely higher, some indefinitely lower than ourselves. But even the highest if there be a highest, will, it is assumed, be only primus inter pares, one among the many, and not an Absolute really including them all.²³

Quite different from this plurality of selves is the plurality of mind-stuff. In the words of Strong,

as to its distribution: mind-stuff is certainly plural, but the problem is to specify the sense in which it is so. In other words, it has parts--since a visual sensation or a complicated thought evidently contains many simultaneous details--and these parts have relations between them.²⁴

Again Strong asks,

²¹Strong, ENM, 22.

²²Strong, ENM, 23.

²³Ward, RE, 52; cf. also RE, 436-443.

²⁴Strong, OC, 24.



The parts of mind-stuff are of course separately real, but are they discrete--are they detached from one another and separated by gaps? Are there units of mind-stuff, or is it a continuum? Is a mass of mind-stuff like a shower of sparks or a heap of gold-dust, or is it rather to be compared to a leaf of gold-foil or a flame?²⁵

Though Strong's answer is inconclusive, he does go on to say that the search for unity in the psychic state has revealed "only a plurality of elements in the form of a field."²⁶

Since Strong believes in the self as a complex of mind-stuff with little intrinsic unity,²⁷ and since he fails to consider the concept of a God, he is of course a pluralist with respect to selves, with no possible danger of his becoming an absolutist.

It would be presumptuous of us /says Strong/ in dealing with so difficult a subject-matter, to assume that we have got to the bottom of it and excluded the possibility of an existential unity. But perhaps we will be justified in saying that, as between Hume's position and that of believers in a 'simple and indivisible²⁸ soul,' the balance inclines in favor of the former.

Thus Ward and Strong are pluralists, yet the selves composing Ward's pluralism each possess a unity not to be found in the atomistic system of Strong.

5. The Ultimate Character of Elementary Awareness

Certainly one outstanding difficulty faced by all pan-

²⁵Strong, OC, 24.

²⁶Strong, OC, 25.

²⁷Strong, ENM, 255-273; OC, 282.

²⁸Strong, OC, 286.

psychists is the need of explaining physical nature in terms of psychical entities. The practice of virtually all panpsychists, including Ward and Strong, is to explain this by an analogy with elementary awareness or feeling as it is experienced by the human individual. It has already been shown that this was the practice used by such earlier panpsychists as Leibniz and Clifford, and it may be asked whether there is any more empirical way in which the problem could be faced. These thinkers recognize that immediate experience is the most certain clue to the nature of the real. Within such a consciousness they experience periods of more 'elementary awareness' perhaps caused by dizziness, stupor, or the gradual process of awakening from a heavy sleep. Feeling is thus, they believe, more elementary than full consciousness, and the psychic units which compose the physical world will hence be analogous to this lower type of feeling.

Ward believes these lower entities to be selves. "Even the lowest," he says, "will possess whatever be the irreducible minimum essential to being in any sense a subject or self at all."²⁹ Speaking of this lower self, Ward further states that

when...we imagine this complexity [of the organism] decreased without limit, we reach the concept of the bare monad whose organism, so to say, reduces to a point, and its present to a moment; which can only react immediately and to what is immediately given. In other words such monads deal only with their environment and, so long, that is, as they remain bare monads, they severally deal with it always in the

²⁹RE, 52.

same way.³⁰

Thus for Ward the very simplest psychological units possess in the simplest possible form the characteristics of the more complex self. Though these bare monads compose the environment of the higher self, they never become a part of that higher self.

Strong, too, finds the nature of the physical world in feeling or sentience. Yet he carries the process of analysis much farther. Instead of having simple entities merely forming the environment for more complex entities, he holds that the simple entities, which are much simpler than Ward's bare monads, actually form a part of the complex ones. This is because, though Strong uses the same introspective method that Ward uses, the former believes that feelings, or the elements that go to make up feelings, can exist independently of other aspects of the self.³¹ Thus instead of a world of nature made up of minute selves Strong conceives of a world made up of psychological elements capable of becoming the parts of selves.³² It is noteworthy, however, that the psychological elements of Strong have apparently the same 'dimensions' as the bare monads of Ward. Strong refers to them as "units of energy or sentience in points at instants."³³

³⁰RE, 257.

³¹Cf. Strong, OC, 306-307.

³²Cf. Strong, OC, 317-322.

³³Strong, ENOM,

It is of some importance that Ward and Strong both admit the fact that their concept of physical nature as made up of psychical entities goes far beyond the evidence of introspective experience. According to Ward,

The naked, slumbering monads of Leibniz, the monads whose so-called perception is absolutely confused or undifferentiated, are as much an abstract ideal as the mass-points of the physicist. Body without extension and a subject without consciousness are limiting concepts, not known realities within experience.³⁴

For Strong's part he states that

To assert that any unanalyzed feeling does in fact consist of such parts is indeed to go beyond the evidence of introspection. That is, it is to go beyond what introspection of the unanalyzed feeling itself has told us, and apply to it what we have learned from introspection of the analyzed. But this is perfectly legitimate. We act no otherwise when, looking through a microscope, we ascribe retrospectively to the object the characters which the microscope reveals.³⁵

In general it may be remarked that the differences between Ward and Strong correspond quite closely to those between Leibniz and Clifford.

³⁴Ward, RE, 195.

³⁵Strong, OC, 307.

CHAPTER V

CHARACTERISTIC FACTORS OF STRONG'S PANPSYCHISM

1. Fundamental Character of Introspection

Some of the more important views of Strong, especially those held in common with Ward, have already been set forth. A more systematic treatment of Strong's system will now be attempted. Mention has already been made of his emphasis upon introspection, but this cannot be stressed too strongly, since it is a key to his entire system. One instance was cited where Strong urged that greater attention be paid to the physiological side of psychology. Nevertheless one reason for this was his belief that "study of the nervous processes accompanying awareness of our feelings may throw light on the nature of the introspection."¹ Again he makes the claim that "introspection may be held to be approximately adequate knowledge."² In fact his whole conception of the nature of the real comes avowedly from introspection. This is revealed in the following tribute to the adequacy of introspection.

Truth of greater philosophical value is to be derived from the consideration that, as we have been evolved out of the lower organisms and they presumably out of inorganic matter, these humbler existences must have fundamentally the same nature as ourselves. What this

¹ENOM, 6.

²OC, 231.

nature is, is revealed to us by introspection. For we have every reason to suppose introspection adequate not only as respects the specific details of its objects, but also as respects their general nature-- what we have called 'the psychic character.' By this I mean that which all psychic states have in common.... Since the objects of introspection...are existences, not mere qualities, and since this is what they have in common, the psychic character must be that by which they exist, and, if all things in the world have ultimately the same nature, then they too must be psychic.³

2. Identification of Givenness with Consciousness

For Strong givenness, awareness, and consciousness have the same meaning. He explains it thus:

For us to be aware of a thing is for the thing to be given--these are a single relation viewed from opposite ends. Put as the fact that things are given is the least disputable of all the aspects of consciousness, I propose...to speak of awareness as 'givenness'.⁴

One reason for Strong's emphatic rejection of materialism and neo-realism is that in the idea that all existences are either physical or neutral there is forgotten "the fact that all experiences, in order to be such, have to be given, and that an experience which is not given is not an experience."⁵ Thus "consciousness is the function by which things are given."⁶ Strong stresses the idea that givenness is not a

³Strong, OC, 233-234.

⁴Strong, OC, 30.

⁵Strong, OC, 31.

⁶Strong, OC, 36.

datum of experience. "In being aware of things we are not aware also of our awareness of them--we are aware exclusively of the things."⁷ Because givenness is always to some person it is conceived by Strong as an external relation. What is given is not an existence but only an essence or appearance.⁸

The fact that the essence rather than the existence is given makes Strong an epistemological dualist and gives him a means of accounting for error in perception which the neo-realists lack.

However, there is met a difficulty in interpreting Strong caused by one of his rather frequent changes of view. Thus with respect to the data of perception he writes in 1920 as follows:

The question will be whether a datum can be so concrete as even to have a sensible vividness, and yet not be an existence, but only an entirely concrete universal, a universal of the lowest order. This would mean that the same datum exactly might be given to another person, or to the same person at a different time and place; in such wise that the datum would not be in time and space. That the data of perception are in fact universals of this description is the thesis of this paper, and what has been meant by calling them essences.⁹

In 1931, eleven years later, Strong expresses a change of view on this subject.

I used to regard the sense datum as an 'essence' or universal; but I have changed my mind about this. I now think it is a particular, occurring only when

⁷Strong, OC, 36-37.

⁸Strong, OC, 78.

⁹Strong, Art.(1920), 231-232.

it is intuited; that it depends for its temporary being on the intuition of it, and therefore does not exist independently or continuously; that though not in space and time, it is yet bound down to certain places and times; that it is a phantasm or apparent, generated by the activity of the self.¹⁰

This change, though Strong makes a good deal of it himself, does not alter either his epistemological dualism or his ability to account for perceptual error. The latter in fact may be said to be strengthened, since more weight is placed on the fact that it results from the activity of the self rather than directly from the existing object.

The reason why Strong's changes in view are especially likely to cause difficulties in treating his system is that his more significant works were written before these changes occurred. Morris, in his excellent treatment of Strong, finds his earlier books so superior to his later writings that he bases his study almost entirely upon the former.¹¹

The identification of givenness with consciousness is questioned by Morris, who would limit consciousness to a more advanced form of givenness. According to him,

it would appear to be more just to say that an element is given when it is functioning or could function in a symbolic or conscious process than to say that for an element to be given a symbolic or conscious process must take place. Accordingly it seems advisable not to identify givenness and consciousness, but to regard consciousness...as a more complicated form of givenness or thereness which involves symbols.¹²

¹⁰Strong, Art.(1931), 217-218.

¹¹Morris, STM, 217n.

¹²Morris, STM, 224.

This would, however, be limiting consciousness, somewhat as Whitehead does, to an advanced form of thought, which Strong calls intellection.¹³

3. The Psychic State as Vehicle of Givenness

In the following treatment the word 'essence' will necessarily be used in citing passages from Strong's Origin of Consciousness. In the light of Strong's changed view with respect to the nature of the datum, it is suggested that the term essence may well be interpreted merely as appearance with no reference to a universal. According to Strong, "There are such existences as 'psychic states' which must be distinguished from essences and are the means by which essences are given--the vehicles of their givenness."¹⁴ The fundamental importance of psychic states is revealed by the light they throw upon the nature of the self. Strong points out

(1) that all psychic states, if not actually existent within a body, are at least inseparably bound up with it--since if certain bodily processes fail to go on they cease to exist; (2) that the only psychic states which I can myself experience are those bound up with my own body, and that these are in some peculiar sense mine; (3) not only so, but that if all my psychic states should cease to exist there would be an end of me. The hypothesis which seems to me best to explain these facts is that psychic states are states of the psyche or self.¹⁵

He makes it clear that "a psychic state," then, is only another expression for "the psyche in a certain state."¹⁶

¹³OC, 118.

¹⁴Strong, OC, 79.

¹⁵Strong, OC, 103-104.

¹⁶Strong, OC, 105.

This does not mean that the states are one thing and the self another, and that the two are externally attached, as we sometimes awkwardly conceive attributes and the thing of which they are attributes to be attached....Water cannot exist except in some state, either boiling or merely fluid or frozen. In just the same way the psyche cannot exist except as composed of sensations, feeling, desires....The self, in a word, is a changing thing, now in one state, now in another, and in order to think of it truly we must think not of an impossible self in the abstract but of a self in a certain state, a self concretely characterized.¹⁷

Actually the psychic character may be defined as "the character that all psychic states, sensations, mental images, pleasure and pain, emotions, desires have in common."¹⁸ Attention is "the psychical fact par excellence--the very essence of what we mean by a psychical fact."¹⁹ It is important to Strong's theory that

the psychic state by itself is not conscious (any more than it is given to consciousness); it is conscious only quâ used as a symbol--only as a vehicle of an attention. What we really mean by 'consciousness' is this relation of symbolism as exercised by a psychic state.²⁰

In view of this vehicular theory of psychic states, certain additional facts of the nature of consciousness may be considered. Givenness or consciousness may be described as "simply the meaning or intent which the sensation acquired through becoming in fact the index of the object."²¹ One of

¹⁷Strong, OC, 104.

¹⁸Strong, OC, 23.

¹⁹Strong, OC, 87.

²⁰Strong, OC, 123.

²¹Strong, OC, 122.

Strong's main object is, as we have seen, the explanation of how mind could have originated out of the physical world in a natural manner. The vehicular theory, he believes, aids him in achieving this objective.

Givenness then is not a supernatural power, but only a natural implication of the function of the sensation in guiding adjustment. It is as such a natural implication that the vehicular theory may fairly be held, despite its ultimateness, to have explained its origin.²²

"Nothing then prevents us from supposing...that external things are in their intimate being of the same nature as the psyche."²³

It is the consideration of the nature of psychic states also which leads Strong to his extremely atomistic view of reality.

In so far as isolated centers of psychic life exist, and they certainly exist in immense numbers, reality must be plural, it must consist of separate though doubtless closely connected parts. Again in so far as many distinct sensations or psychic elements co-exist within each center, reality must be still further divided up.²⁴

This concept of a vehicle of knowledge has been held in various forms by critical realists and others. Morris points out clearly the several types of this theory. According to him,

Three major types of analysis are possible: (1) The vehicle might be a part or component of the physical world (which of course includes the organism)(Dewey) ... (2) The vehicle might be intrinsically mental, and so not a component of the physical world. It may,

²²Strong, OC, 130.

²³Strong, OC, 125.

²⁴Strong, OC, 127.

however, be (a) the mental aspect or side of the same world which has also a physical aspect or side, whether the double-aspect view be held in an unrestricted fashion (Morgan, Strong, Drake) or be limited to the brain or some portion of the brain (Sellars), or (b) Neither a part nor an aspect of the physical world, still remaining a mental existent (Lovejoy). The vehicle might be neutral, in the sense of being neither intrinsically mental nor a component of the physical world. While so neutral it could be (a) a particular (Broad) or (b) a universal or essence (Santayana).²⁵

In abandoning the concept of the datum as a universal essence, Strong removed his system to some extent from the sphere of critical realism. It may be significant that in his later writings, A Theory of Knowledge (1923), Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind (1930), and A Creed for Sceptics (1936), though his thought may not be greatly different, he largely drops the terminology of 'vehicle', 'psychic states', and even 'givenness'. It seems possible that this may be a further indication of a growing separation between the thought of the other American critical realists and that of Strong.

Actually the entire vehicular theory as presented by Strong is open to serious question. Morris points to

a peculiar circularity in the argument for the existence of psychic states. These states, supposed to be discovered by introspection, are actually presupposed in order to render the introspection trustworthy, since the identity in nature between the vehicle and the object known is the ground for the confidence in the validity of introspection. Actually psychic states are simply postulated on the ground that they are necessary to account for givenness, and if givenness could be otherwise explained, the necessity for postulating such states would be lost.²⁶

²⁵Morris, STM, 215-216.

²⁶Morris, STM, 222.

There is some question whether the nongiven psychic states of Strong are adequate to explain givenness as he conceives it. Also, as has already been indicated, the identification of all givenness with consciousness may be open to some question, the point at issue being whether givenness is vehicular and whether the simplest form of givenness is identical with consciousness.²⁷

4. The Identity Theory of Mind and Body

Strong holds the position that mind and body are but two aspects of the same reality, the mind or self being the object of introspection and the body the object of sense perception. The history of this double-aspect theory from Spinoza through Fechner and Clifford has already been traced.

The mind-body problem has been a factor to which Strong has devoted much attention. His first important book, Why the Mind has a Body, was a careful and rather exhaustive treatment of this subject from a more idealistic standpoint than that of any of his subsequent works. Though even in that day (1903) he held to the identity theory, the physical aspect he believed to be merely phenomenal, the mental aspect being the real. He even refers to the theory as psychophysical idealism, describing it in the following words:

When the parallelism of mental and physical events is

²⁷Cf. Morris, STM, 223.

metaphysically interpreted, no real parallelism remains....Psychophysical idealism is thus, at bottom, a doctrine of identity rather than of parallelism. It realizes intelligibly the postulate of one reality with two aspects set up but not realized by psychophysical monism. By making the physical series merely phenomenal, it does away completely with the absurd dependence of the mental on the physical asserted by psychophysical materialism, while acknowledging the undeniable dependence of the mind on the other realities which with it appear as the body. Subordinating the physical to the mental and conceiving the latter as alone real, it accords as neither the materialistic nor the monistic doctrine does with the fundamental principle of all idealistic philosophy.²⁸

Strong has changed his metaphysical position to a considerable extent since the writing of this statement. Yet strangely enough, as he has become more and more of a realist, he has at the same time approached nearer to the interactionist theory of mind-body relation. Some seventeen years after he had written the above passage, he states, in the preface to The Origin of Consciousness, that in relation to the three theories of interactionism, parallelism, and automatism, he would place his view as a fourth theory, rather than merely including it as a type of the second. In this later theory he holds that

the mental states instead of being the effects, are the causes of the brain-events--or, to speak exactly, the causes of the brain-events being perceived, and themselves the existences (or an integral part of an 'extract' from the existences) that appear to the senses under that form.²⁹

Going on to explain this change of viewpoint, Strong mentions

²⁸WMP, 343-344.

²⁹OC, 3.

that

at the time when my other book was written I was aware that this fourth theory involved a reconciliation of parallelism, if not with interactionism, at least with a species of interaction. For though, according to it, the mind, as parallelism asserts, never acts on brain (since it is the existence or a part of the existence that appears as the brain), yet on the other hand it does interact with the existences that appear as the non-cerebral parts of the body, and is far indeed from being inefficacious: so that the psychic efficacy which interactionism had at heart is at last firmly established. Since my book was published, it has become clear to me that if what we refer to is not the mind or psyche as an existence but consciousness, i.e. the function of awareness, then in regard to this the thesis of the conscious automaton theory is true, and is by our fourth theory reconciled with the other two: consciousness (not the datum of introspection but the function) is indeed a passive resultant of the operation of the brain or the existence that appears as a brain, and as inert and inefficacious as the most advanced materialist could desire. So that our panpsychist theory actually reconciles with one another and takes up into itself all three of the other causal theories--which is no small recommendation for a psychophysical hypothesis.³⁰

One of the last statements which Strong wrote on the subject of the mind-body problem was in his little book, A Creed for Sceptics, published in 1936. It is somewhat similar to the one just quoted, yet it has it in a few illuminating remarks, which we shall quote.

I remain /he says/ to this day a parallelist and a denier of the efficacy of consciousness. But I confess that, quite recently, the interactionist argument caused me some searchings of heart. Why indeed should consciousness be there at all, if it is not useful?³¹

He goes on in this section to say that it was his substitution

³⁰Strong, OC, 3-4.

³¹Strong, CS, 55.

of the word 'self' for brain that gave him the clue to the situation.

It is not consciousness, then, that has been evolved but cognition, of which consciousness--the presence of phantasmal data to the self--is only the view from within. What is really happening when we are conscious is that the self is cognizing a real thing, for the sake of reacting to it appropriately; and the datum is only the shadow of the real thing falling on or rather becoming visible to the self....In a word, the interaction--for there really is interaction--is not between consciousness and the brain, but between the self and the other parts of the world.³²

It is interesting to note in passing that the statement to the effect that there is interaction between the self and the other parts of the world, if merely taken by itself, would be perfectly compatible with the view of the mind-body relation held by modern personalism. The distinction from Strong's position is, of course, that the personalist's 'self' would not be identified with the brain, which is placed in the same category with the rest of the physical world, but be a unity.

It must be admitted that Strong's synthesis of these theories of mind-body relation is extremely ingenious. In the light of this hypothesis it becomes clear why he so forcefully emphasized the idea that consciousness is not a datum of experience but rather the function by which things are given.³³ In fact virtually every element both in his epistemology and his metaphysics is utilized in this solution of the mind-body problem. This brings out how organic Strong's system really

³²Strong, CS, 55.

³³Strong, OC, 36.



is. Even so seemingly minor a point as the inseparability of intuition from intent in cognition is involved in the formulation of the theory. Strong's view that the world of nature is composed of the same stuff that the self is made up of takes on an even greater importance when it is seen that this is used to explain, not only the identity of mind and brain, but also the interaction of the self with the remainder of the body.

It is probably the case that the various parts of this synthetic solution of the mind-body problem are just as valid and no more so than the part of Strong's system upon which each rests. The reconciliation of interaction with parallelism depends upon both the mind-stuff theory and the vehicular theory of givenness. The reconciliation of automatism with the other two theories depends mainly upon the vehicular theory and Strong's view of cognition as composed of intuition and intent.³⁴

Actually, when the synthetic solution to the mind-body problem is considered, it is found that parallelism is the dominant theory with which both interaction and automatism are being reconciled. Thus the defects of parallelism or the identity theory are virtually the same here as if that theory were unrelated to the other two. Strong may refer to it as a fourth theory which reconciles all three, but actually it is with parallelism that it stands or falls.

³⁴Strong, CS, 24.



The double-aspect, or identity theory as held by Strong is to the effect that "the soul known through introspection, is the same existent which when it is known through perception, appears as the nervous process or as the entire organism."³⁵ It is easy to see how such a theory comes to be associated with panpsychism. The panpsychist believes that all reality is ultimately psychical, yet around him he perceives a world of physical objects. It is only natural for him to conclude that the psychical appears through sense experience as the physical. Introspection reveals to him the nature of the psychical; sense perception reveals a bodily organism upon which the mind is in some sense dependent. Why then may not these two factors be considered as two aspects of the same thing?

Since there is no conclusive empirical evidence for the idea that such an identity of mind as shown through introspection with body as shown through sense perception does exist, it is clear that this view is speculative, that it is rather postulated to fulfil the needs of a system than as the result of observed facts. Yet it may be questioned whether this theory goes much farther beyond the empirical evidence than certain other phases of panpsychism. Is there, for example, any more empirical support for the existence and functioning of the bare monad in the Leibnizian type of panpsychism than for this postulated identity between mind and

³⁵Strong, ENM,

body? It has been mentioned that the use of immediate experience as a clue to the nature of all reality is a thoroughly empirical method. Yet when this method is carried to the limits that it is by a holder of the identity theory, its empirical character necessarily diminishes.

The evidences from the functional character of the brain, for example, the capacity of one part of the cerebrum to take over the work of another part which has been damaged, would seem to show that correlation between the physical brain and the conscious mind seems hard to explain on the basis of the identity theory.

It seems possible that the entire hypothesis of identity may be based on a confused interpretation of what the relation of mind to the organism really is.

The organism...as observed by the biologist may be only a part of a substantial whole. Most readers

will admit that they are more than the combined report of biologists would show. It is this fact which is at the basis of such vague distinctions as that between observing from the inside and from the outside. The point here insisted upon is that the difference between the contents of the perspectives is a matter of more or less, and not the difference between the inside and the outside (interpreted as the mental in contrast to the physical) of a two-sided substantive.³⁶

Further, it may be questioned whether there is "any warrant given for attempting to localize the entire field of the given as the inside of the brain or organism."³⁶

The whole concept that what the individual perceives through introspection as the mind is 'inside' what other individuals perceive through the senses as his brain, seems extremely crude. If the two things are different aspects of an identical factor, can this really be considered genuine parallelism?³⁷

If the self-observer and the outside observer are only seeing different components of one and the same substantive, no psychophysical parallelism results, since all components are alike physical in the sense of being a physical substantive; 'introspection' reveals no domain of pure consciousness; the physical is not destined to be an otiose accompaniment of physical processes; and no motive is left for mentalizing the field of the given in its entirety.³⁸

One of the clearest criticisms of this identity theory is made by Spaulding, who asks whether the difference between what appears to the senses as brain and what appears to introspection as mind may not be as great as the difference between

³⁶ Morris, STM, 244.

³⁷ Some confusion may be avoided by eliminating use of the term ³⁸'parallelism' to designate the double-aspect theory.
Morris, STM, 245.

what are commonly spoken of as the physical and the conscious.

The difference that is introduced by 'proving' in some way, either that what appears to be mental is really physical, or that what appears to be physical is really conscious, is only one of name, provided the character and behavior of 'things' is ascertained empirically and not artificially by a priori argument. On the other hand if by 'making' the apparently physical really psychical in character, something is introduced into the physical world that is in conflict with empirically ascertained physical principles, then one can no longer maintain the major premise of Psychism, that the detailed results of empirical investigation are to be accepted on their face value, and that the apparently fundamental difference between the physical and the psychical is due only to a difference in the point of view.³⁹

In part, the validity of the identity theory depends upon Strong's concept of mind-stuff which is now to be examined.

5. Nature of Mind-Stuff

The basic reality out of which all else is composed is for Strong mind-stuff. He describes the attributes of mind-stuff as the facts that "(1) It is in time, and (2) in space; (3) it is capable of change; and (4) it possesses the psychic character."⁴⁰ Already in the discussion of Strong's pluralism some of the reasons for his arrival at this view have been observed. He uses the method of analysis much in the way in which Hume used it. This analysis Strong tries to make as empirical a process as possible. He endeavors to show, as far as he can, how feelings are experienced as being composed of

³⁹Spaulding, NR, 269.

⁴⁰OC, 318.

parts. Yet this analytic method is partly logical, for when he reaches the limit beyond which empirical investigation cannot possibly be said to reveal further 'parts' of feelings, he carries the process on by means of a logical extension of the method. The unity of consciousness he emphatically denies. Any apparent unity of consciousness he believes to be the result of 'joint givenness'. "And this of course being not even a real unity, is no argument at all for an existential unity of mind."⁴¹ However, Strong does find "one contingency in which...the psychic state would apparently be one: namely, in case it consisted of a single unanalyzed feeling."⁴² Here again he questions whether the unity is real or only apparent. "Are unanalyzed feelings composed of parts, or are they not? Does analysis consist in the revelation of parts that preexisted, or--we must always say--in the creation of parts?"⁴³ He admits that such parts cannot be felt. Yet he insists that they exist and compose the feeling.⁴⁴ Hence, he believes, introspective discrimination shows feelings to exist of unfelt parts.⁴⁵ Having reached this point he asks whether these unfelt parts which are discoverable may be composed of still more minute parts which are undiscoverable. Having gone

⁴¹OC, 282.

⁴²OC, 303.

⁴³OC, 303.

⁴⁴OC, 306.

⁴⁵OC, 308.

beyond the directly empirical, he proceeds to argue logically that they are.

If the psychic state is such a sum and so immensely plural, how comes it to be taken by the introspecting ego for a unit? Where and how does the fusion take place?...We are endowed with certain powers of discrimination which permit us to separate the parts of feelings from each other up to a certain limit; but beyond that limit we are powerless to separate them. These powers have been given us for practical purposes and practical purposes do not require a higher degree of discrimination. But where we are unable (or do not take the trouble) to discriminate, we treat the total datum as one.⁴⁶

Strong urges, however, that "there is no reason why we should stop at the limit set by our power of introspective discrimination."⁴⁷

Before Strong's analytical process is traced farther toward his mind-stuff, it may well be asked why Strong has followed the course which he has. What part does this successive reduction play in his philosophy as a whole? Why, if he wishes to use the method of analysis to such an extent does he not apply the limit of rigor and vigor and actually carry it on until it reaches the inevitable limit of neutral entities? The organic structure of Strong's philosophy has already been noted, and this limited use of analysis proves to be no exception to the rule. His study of the nervous system has led him to a knowledge of its intricate structure. If he is to justify his theory of the identity of mind and brain, he must explain why so apparently simple a factor as the psychic state should

⁴⁶Strong, OC, 310.

⁴⁷OC, 308.

be another aspect of so extremely complex a one as the brain.

It [the analysis of feeling into pre-existent parts] evidently has a direct bearing on one of the difficult questions which the panpsychist theory of the relation of mind and body involves, why a thing so apparently simple as the psychic state should appear under the⁴⁸ form of anything so complex as the brain process.

The reason why Strong halts his analysis before it reaches neutral entities is for one thing his insistence that the ultimate stuff be enough of the nature of mind to explain how mind evolved from it, and for another his requirement that this stuff be subject to change, a quality not easily accounted for in a neutral entity.

As far as Strong's analysis had been traced, it revealed 'microscopic' parts of the unfelt components of feeling. Yet these might not be uniformly alike. For Strong the final step is taken when he points out that "if one goes back far enough towards the elements of things--we should expect parts to be reached which are of the same kind; if at least, the world of physics is ultimately expressible in terms of a single kind of element."⁴⁹

It is now possible to turn to a further examination of Strong's mind-stuff, which he claims to be "simply the psychical as it really is."⁵⁰ The negative characteristics which he attributes to the mind-stuff are quite significant. It lacks

⁴⁸Strong, OC, 303-304.

⁴⁹OC, 314.

⁵⁰OC, 317.



the functions of cognition and will, unity, and sensible qualities.⁵¹ The primary reason for these lacks is the fact that these characteristics are not possessed by the brain and hence if possessed by the mind-stuff would interfere with the correspondence between the two in the identity theory of mind-body relation. (Is it not true that Strong is more influenced by this problem than by any other factor?)

A review of the positive characteristics of mind-stuff, namely that it is in time, that it is in space, that it is capable of change, and that it possesses the psychic character,⁵² reveals that the first three factors all belong to matter, that is, matter as considered by the materialist. The basic element of Strong's metaphysics is thus virtually identical with matter in all but one respect, a characteristic vaguely referred to as the psychic character, a factor which, as we have seen, completely lacks those mental factors of cognition, will, unity, and sensible qualities. What is this magic factor "without which our panpsychism would be merely materialism?"⁵³ Strong's answer is, "Feeling--not necessarily 'felt' or introspected feeling--is on the panpsychist theory the substance of the ego, and by consequence the substance of the world out of which the ego originated."⁵⁴ At length, after going through

⁵¹OC, 317.

⁵²cf. OC, 318.

⁵³OC, 319.

⁵⁴OC, 320.



the formulation of an entire epistemological and metaphysical system with many side journeys to attack potential opponents of the view, Strong has reached his goal. Was it a goal worth reaching? Has it really answered the problems of the relation of mind to body and the origin of consciousness? May it not rather be said that "the basic stuff seems to be called mind-stuff only by an act of grace."⁵⁵ This psychic character of mind-stuff "is indispensable if when it is arranged in the form of an organic whole or psyche, it is to be conscious."⁵⁶ What agent is responsible for arranging this 'stuff' in the form of such an organic whole? Strong's philosophy provides no answer.

Thus it seems doubtful whether Strong actually accomplishes what he sets out to do. Can the origin of mind from this stuff so lacking in the most important characteristics of mind be considered a natural process? Apparently these particles of mind-stuff have the capacity of arranging themselves into an organic whole capable of consciousness. Is not such an event as much an unexplained miracle as the arising of mind out of matter? Why is so much attention paid by Strong to the physical aspect of the self? Why is the psychic state of introspection laboriously analyzed into a factor matching in complexity the structure of the brain? Why is the mind-stuff materialized to the extent of becoming virtually nonmental?

The answer to all

⁵⁵ Morris, ST, 222.

⁵⁶ Op, 317.



the questions is probably the idea that the physical aspect accounts more adequately for the fact of continuity in the physical world than does the purely psychic side.⁵⁷ Thus is one of the thorniest problems of an atomistic panpsychism solved by calling in the aid of material qualities. The factor of continuity is accounted for by the materialistic attributes and the origin of consciousness explained by the adding of the barest possible aspect of the mental, independent or unfelt parts of a low grade of feeling. This all goes back to the view of Fechner and Clifford that what unity there is to mind is explainable in terms of the spatial proximity of the physical correlates. No wonder^{that}, as Strong's thought develops, he allows less and less significance to consciousness; no wonder that in his later writings he comes to place more and more emphasis upon intuition, instinct, and animal faith.⁵⁸ In 1903 he could write that "since consciousness is the only reality of which we have any immediate knowledge, and therefore our only sample of what reality is like, we have no other conception of reality."⁵⁹ In 1936 he wrote:

Most philosophers immensely exaggerate the importance of consciousness in the world. It is probably a rare accident, inevitable under the conditions, but without cosmic significance. Because we see everything through spectacles of consciousness, we imagine that nothing can exist in the absence of spectacles; but this is

⁵⁷Strong, CS, 93.

⁵⁸cf. ENM, 92.

⁵⁹WMB, 295.

human self-importance, an amusement to the gods.⁶⁰

Though it is not impossible to see how the second statement could grow out of the first, an examination of the contexts reveals a very great change of perspective. The insistence upon the identity theory of mind-body relation, the belief that the origin of consciousness should be explainable in terms of a so-called natural manner of evolution perhaps without sufficient consideration of epigenesis and emergence, and the growth of a more pronounced atheism all contributed to this change.

CHAPTER VI

CHARACTERISTIC FACTORS OF WARD'S PSYCHOLOGY

1. Points of Relation with Leibniz

i. Monads as Ultimate Entities. This dissertation is concerned with Ward primarily as a modern representative of monadistic metaphysics. Of chief interest therefore is the relationship between the thought of Ward and that of Leibniz. Like Leibniz, Ward accepts psychical centers or monads as the basic entities of which the real world is composed. "The well-known Monadology of Leibniz may be taken as the type, to which all modern attempts to construct a pluralistic philosophy more or less conform."¹ Also like Leibniz he classifies the monads into various grades, ranging from the lower limit of the bare monad to the upper limit of a Supreme Being. "The naked, slumbering monads of Leibniz, the monads whose so-called perception is absolutely confused or undifferentiated, are as much an abstract ideal as the mass points of the physicist."² Again Ward points out that

since the complex involves the simple, bare--or as Leibniz called them, naked--monads must exist. And now how are we to conceive such a bare monad? It cannot be a dominant monad, for this would imply subordinate monads: it cannot therefore have a body distinct from itself. In some sense then, it would seem, it must be its own

¹ RE, 53-54.

² RE, 195.



body or disappear altogether from the universal connexion of things. But we must not understand this to mean that apparently all mental characteristics are gone and only material characteristics are left. The true solution seems rather to be that we have reached the limit of both.³

Speaking of the psychical nature of the bare monad, Ward concludes that the noteworthy factor here is that of immediacy or pure sensation, "an ideal limit to which our simplest experiences never descend."⁴ The reactions of such bare monads are always immediate and to what is immediately given.⁵

Discussing the nature of the dominant monad or soul, Ward contends that this dominance must indeed "be regarded as due in part to at least to its innate or essential superiority, not solely to the accident of its position."⁶ To accord with evolution, however, it must be said that such dominance has not always been realized, but must at some stage have been purely potential.⁷ The relation of the dominant monads to the lower monads with which it is associated at this potential stage is clearly illustrated by Ward in the following words.

Agamemnon and the men he was to lead were all much on a par as infants together in their cradles. And the fact that as evolution advances diversity increases suggests that all the differences that eventually emerge were originally latent. Such absolute origin as

³RE, 255-256.

⁴RE, 256.

⁵RE, 257.

⁶RE, 196.

⁷RE, 196.



the lower limit of evolution is as much beyond all experience as the absolute beginning of his own life is beyond⁸ the conscious experience of any individual among us.

When he comes to treat the subject of God, Ward recognizes that for Leibniz God was more than a Supreme Monad.

We approximate...to the theism of Leibniz, who was ...driven beyond the limits of his monadology proper. Not as Monas monadum, but as transcending all monads, God according to Leibniz as 'infinite intellect' contemplates the absolute totality of possible world and gives reality to that which his goodness has selected as the best.

Thus Ward's monadology in so far as the intrinsic nature and gradation of the monads are concerned, is quite similar to that of Leibniz. In saying that God is something more than the Supreme Monad, he is probably as he himself thinks, only carrying out what was implicit in Leibniz's own thought. It is in their interrelations to one another that Ward's monads show their greatest difference from those of Leibniz.

ii. Monads with Windows. One of the factors in which Ward departs farthest from Leibniz lies in the former's adding windows to the equipment of all the monads. Ward sees in the windowless character of the Leibnizian monads a symptom of the subjective idealism and occasionalism which he rejects,¹⁰ involving, as he believes the interpretation of presentations as

⁸RE, 196-197.

⁹RE, 197

¹⁰Cf. Ward, RE, 259-260.

psychic states. With respect to the association of bare monads with a dominant monad as in the body-mind relation, Ward believes that the windows are clearer between the monads and other members of their own association ^(e.g., a human body) than between such monads and members of other associations ^(e.g., other bodies), 'diaphanous' in the former case and 'opaque' in the latter as he puts it.¹¹ In contrasting the facts of mind with those of so-called physical phenomena, Ward remarks that "no one has followed Leibniz in maintaining that percipients (his monads) are without windows through which to look on this common world, but at least he was right in maintaining that they have no windows by which another can look in."¹² This is but one way of expressing the independence and privacy of the individual mind.

iii. Ward's Rejection of Pre-established Harmony. The ability of the Leibnizian monads to mirror the universe including its changes without windows was due to the principle of pre-established harmony. The addition of windows makes pre-established harmony no longer necessary. The whole assumption of pre-established harmony is, Ward believes, invalid and does not fulfil the purpose required of it. It leads to too subjective a view. As he says,

We may still entertain the hypothesis that the

¹¹Ward, RE, 466.

¹²Ward, EP, 238.

immediate objects of experience are ultimately, in some underground way, offsets or emanations of the subject. If we do this in Leibniz's fashion,--suppose, that is, that each several subject evolves its own experience from within,--we have a world which is really no world at all, a world in which there is no community or interaction, but only the semblance of them. And even this semblance, as in the famous example of the two clocks, is only secured by the altogether extraneous assumption of a pre-established harmony in the respective developments of the isolated, independent, windowless monads.¹³

Actually Ward recognizes pre-established harmony to be a form of occasionalism, all types of which he rejects.¹⁴ "That God should have created monads without windows and taken on himself the function of supplying their place--whether continuously as the occasionalists assumes, or once for all, as Leibniz held--seems then a needless complication."¹⁵

Furthermore Ward saw in pre-established harmony a result of Leibniz's acceptance of the theory of preformation current in his day, "the supposed unfolding of an organism regarded as completely pre-existing in miniature within the germ."¹⁶ "For Leibniz indeed it [preformation] was but a corollary of his doctrine of pre-established harmony, that hopeless theological pendant of his pluralism."¹⁷

¹³NA, II, 119-120.

¹⁴RE, 250.

¹⁵RE, 260.

¹⁶RE, 98.

¹⁷RE, 100.



iv. Individuality of the Monads. It has already been noted that the idea of there being no windows through which the inner nature of the monad may be observed from without tends to support its partial independence. Ward further agrees with Leibniz that each monad possesses a complete individuality. "The modern pluralists...hold with him [Leibniz] that there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference."¹⁸ Again Ward points out that "experience justifies the doctrine of Leibniz: no two things are entirely alike, and no two things are entirely different." This individuality tends to interfere with the concept of the unity of reality. "On the pluralistic view every one of the finite individuals is related to all the rest but only for himself. In the Leibnizian language each mirrors the whole from a unique standpoint, and therefore not the whole, but only an aspect of the whole."¹⁹ To go beyond a mere totality and conceive of unity in the universe one must make the step from mere pluralism to theism, which is exactly what Ward does in the Realm of Ends. "The pluralists' universe in the light of this transcendent Being would thus have a unity which it would otherwise lack."²⁰

¹⁸ Ward, RE, 64; Leibniz, Mon., para. 9.

¹⁹ RE, 228-229.

²⁰ RE, 229.



2. Interaction between Monads and Mind-Body Relation

The central point of the entire theory of monads is the mechanism of their interaction. Leibniz explained this interrelation by means of pre-established harmony. Ward contends that

in a world of such things motion, that is to say, change would be impossible save through the intervention of a transcendent cause or prime mover. This difficulty, which the physicist allows, is, it is contended, only to be escaped by regarding matter in more or less Leibnizian fashion, as but the manifestation of the interaction of perceptive and appetitive monads or entelechies.²¹

In rejecting the pre-established harmony and attributing windows to the monads, Ward opened the way for the introduction of another type of interaction, 'sympathetic rapport'.

The doings and sufferings of persons are both alike immediate: what brings them into relation is a sympathetic rapport or interest that rests upon cognition. All that is strictly personal in social intercourse is of this nature. It entirely consists, in the first place, of the apprehension or the knowledge on the part of one person of the 'attitude,' the feelings and intentions displayed or announced by other persons; secondly in their cooperation or opposition actual or prospective; and finally, following on this, in the new feelings and intentions of the person interested, to which the knowledge leads.²²

²¹RE, 62-63.

²²RE, 218. The material quoted above forms the fullest definition of rapport given by Ward. The only additional remark of significance is his identification of rapport with telepathy (RE, 463). The term rapport can only refer to an intimate and harmonious relation. The meaning of mutual dependence which it expresses has a special relevance to the interaction between bare monads. As used by Ward the term rapport is similar to the prehensions of Whitehead, which latter is a more clearly developed concept. The most common use of 'rapport' in modern psychology is to describe "the peculiar relation sustained by a hypnotized person to the hypnotizer during hypnosis" (Ealdwin, DPT, II, 415).

Interaction of this type applies even to the bare monad "whose organism, so to say, reduces to a point, and its present to a moment; which can only react immediately and to what is immediately given."²³ These bare monads in Ward's system serve to "provide all the 'uniform medium' for the intercourse of higher monads that these can require without any need for such divine intervention as occasionalism demands."²⁴

This type of interaction of higher monads through the medium of bare ones is important as Ward's proposed solution of the mind-body problem. The dominant monad or mind has an especially intimate or functional relation to the lower monads composing its own physical organism. The relation of this same dominant monad to another dominant monad is more external and foreign in character. The lower monads of each organism interact not only with their own dominant monads but with the external environment composed of lower monads of other organisms. Thus through the medium of the immediate elements of their lower monads two dominant monads may establish contact with each other, may become en rapport.²⁵

3. The Principle of Continuity

In some respects Ward holds less rigidly to the principle of continuity than did Leibniz and in other respects more so.

²³RE, 257.

²⁴RE, 257.

²⁵Cf. RE, 256-259, 461-467.

Modern pluralists, he indicates, "from their purely empirical standpoint...could not maintain that there is an actual infinity of monads."²⁶ In place of an infinite regress from the complex to the more simple, Ward has substituted a merely indefinite one,²⁷ actually attempting to go no further than the bare monad which has already been described.

Yet though for Ward continuity does not imply an infinity of monads, it nevertheless carries him beyond Leibniz in affirming that no real qualitative gap occurs between the lower animals and man.

Even Leibniz, regardless of his cardinal principle of continuity, was driven to admit a difference in kind between the souls of animals and the spirits of men, a difference so great that he compares the relation of God to the animals with that of an inventor to his machine, but God's relation to men he compares to that of a prince to his subjects or a father to his children. At the moment of birth he supposed that God gave reason to each soul 'by a special act or by a kind of transcreation'.²⁸

In neither the biological nor the sociological fields does Ward find any evidence of such a gap.

As regards the sociological side of man's origin, then, the advance from animality to rational personality through intersubjective intercourse, there is, it must be confessed, prima facie, neither any definite evidence nor any absolute need for assuming supernatural interference. The progress of knowledge and cooperation so long as we can trace it, the same contingency, the same 'heterogeny of ends' that characterize biological

²⁶ RE, 64

²⁷ Cf. RE, 254.

²⁸ Ward, RE, 91; Leibniz, *Théodicée*, para. 91. Such a distinction between animals and men is also found in Descartes, *Discourse VI*, 57-59.

development.²⁹

The development of higher forms Ward believes to be the result of epigenesis brought about by the interaction of actual units.

Reality is entirely actuality: the potential, the possible, the problematic, on the other hand, belong exclusively to abstract thought. But that, while it never progresses, is never commensurate with reality. Actuality again is entirely experience: its factors are never abstract possibilities, they are living agents; and the result of their interaction is a perennial epigenesis, the only creation that pluralism recognizes.³⁰

The problem of continuity is fundamental to Ward's philosophy because upon it rests his entire panpsychism. When he finds physical nature to be made up of physical centers, he admittedly goes far beyond the empirical evidence.

In support of this bold assumption an appeal is made to the principle of continuity, confirmed as it is by the fact that every advance of knowledge so far has only disclosed simpler forms of life and further analogies between organic and what we call inorganic.³¹

Yet this principle upon which Ward so strongly relies is contradicted by evidences of discontinuity in nature. The theory of emergent evolution and the behavior of quanta according to modern theories of physics definitely point to the idea that there are leaps in nature. Yet the principle of continuity has not lacked defenders even in the face of this evidence.

C. Lloyd Morgan, himself, while expounding the doctrine of

²⁹Ward, RE, 93.

³⁰Ward, RE, 108.

³¹Ward, RE, 433.

emergence, nevertheless attempts to preserve continuity.

There may often be resultants without emergence; but there are no emergents that do not involve resultant effects also. Resultants give quantitative continuity which underlies new constitutive steps in emergence. And the emergent step, though it may seem more or less saltatory, is best regarded as a qualitative change of direction, or critical turning point, in the course of events. In that sense there is not the discontinuous break of a gap or hiatus. It may be said then that through resultants there is continuity in progress.³²

Furthermore, men were not wanting who should challenge the view that the quantum theory undermined the validity of the principle of continuity. Köhler, while admitting that "quantum physics demonstrated a strange discontinuity in the behavior of atomic entities and of light,"³³ nevertheless insists that the macroscopic level of physical investigation appears more fruitful than the microscopic.

Although the existence of macroscopic things is a common feature of perception and of nature, at least the apparent continuity of thing-percepts seems illusory when compared with the atomic constitution of corresponding physical objects. I should, however, hesitate to admit this much. When we hear that the pavement of the street, that our table, and that our organism are much more empty space than anything else, the underlying notion is clearly that particles are tiny bits of 'matter,' that where we have such matter there is really 'something,' while between particles in this sense there is not much worth mentioning....What does it really mean if...we still distinguish between the electron and its field. I do not know of any empirical evidence which would support the distinction....We still trust 'the particles themselves' more than their fields, as though--in the case of the pavement--we could safely tread on the particles but should beware

³² Morgan, *WE*, 5.

³³ Köhler, *PWWF*, 172.

of 'mere field.' As a matter of fact, insofar as 'particles' are known to be fields and field structures they fill the volume of a macroscopic object completely, and to this extent the object is a continuum. It is only as a field-continuum that it coheres. And the support which the coherent gives to our fact is entirely due to this continuum.³⁴

Even if, in the realms of emergence and of quanta, real discontinuities are revealed in nature, this very fact presupposes a recognition of the principle of continuity. According to Hartshorne,

the real world is full of discontinuities (e.g., the quantum). But these discontinuities are measurable as greater or less because we can see them against a background of continuity, such as the continuity of space, time, color qualities. Now, that such continuities are broken in the particular way they are is a logically arbitrary fact. A continuity cannot imply any one discontinuity, for every continuum implies an infinity of different ways in which it might be disrupted.³⁵

As Merklemeister points out,

even perceptual discontinuity presupposes the notion of a continuum, and a cautitive principium can be avoided only if the continuum has first been defined without reference to perception.³⁶

Although the principle of continuity is useful and important, its application to nature is by no means universal. Although Morcan labors to preserve a type of continuity in emergence, it is nevertheless true that

the later and more complex forms...always constitute a novum, and thus make the evolutionary advance discontinuous in the sense that the properties and

³⁴ Köhler, *EMF*, 177-179.

³⁵ Hartshorne, *EB*, 134.

³⁶ Merklemeister, *ES*, 168.

characteristics of the later stages cannot be reduced to or predicted from the properties and the characteristics of the earlier stages.³⁷

Hölder's contention that the macrocosmic level of physics is more important for practical purposes than the microcosmic in no way disproves the fact that discontinuity exists in the latter level. To see whether the principle of continuity applies in a given case, empirical verification is necessary. To use the principle, as Ward does, as an instrument to probe beyond empirical limits seems totally invalid.

Unlike Leibniz Ward seems to have been more interested in the law of continuity as a speculative principle than in its mathematical basis.

Actually the principle of continuity as used in support of Ward's panpsychistic theory of nature involves the implicit presupposition that the relations of real objects to God must all be external. The theory that all entities of the physical world must be psychic centers analogous to the human mind overlooks or denies the concept that the objects of physical nature could be internally related to God and only persons need be considered as externally related to Him. Such a theory of panentheism would, to be sure, involve a gap between the physical world and the world of persons, and hence would deny the principle of continuity. Yet in view of the limitations of that principle, would the theory of the internal relation of the

³⁷Werkmeister, PS, 507.

physical world to be any less empirical than the pan-psychistic theory.

It is the influence of the principle of continuity that causes Ward to reject occasionalism in favor of his theory of sympathetic rapport between dominant monads through the medium of the interaction of bare monads.

Since we cannot actually verify the indefinite regress which the existence of bare monads implies, and since we cannot show that the indirect mediation of our finite intercourse is not a fact, we have no means of deciding between the two alternatives. The most that we can say is that the pluralist alternative is the prior as well as the simpler, and it seems adequate.³⁸

Again Ward speaks of occasionalism as "too cumbrous, and, so to say, unscientific, to be intellectually satisfactory."³⁹ Such a statement seems not only too a priori and dogmatic, but uses the term scientific in a way which Ward frequently opposes in the prolegomena of his Naturalism and Monisticism.⁴⁰

Finally, Ward's use of the principle of continuity appears to run counter to the observable evidence for continuity and order in nature. Using the principle to establish the existence of an indefinitely large number of sensitive and cognitive psychic entities of a low type seems to be an inadequate method of accounting for what order, uniformity, and continuity there

³⁸ RE, 260.

³⁹ RE, 257.

⁴⁰ Ward frequently attacks certain of his contemporaries for using the prestige of science to disseminate their own philosophical views (cf. NA, I, 8ff.). Is he not guilty of the same offence when he terms occasionalism 'unscientific'?

is in physical nature. Associations of such entities, with each entity possessing its semblance of autonomy, would hardly explain it. Synthetic rapport between such entities seems unempirical to the point of utter fancy. Any world faced with the task of coordinating so large a group of simple units would be busier than any God of whom an occasionalist would be likely to conceive.

CHAPTER VII

INFLUENCE OF THE PANPSYCHISM OF STRONG AND WARD

1. The Influence of Strong

i. Strong's influence upon other critical realists. For most of his career Strong was associated with the school of critical realists which included Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, James Bissett Pratt, Arthur Kenyon Rogers, Roy Wood Sellars, and George Santayana. In 1920 Strong contributed to the volume edited by Drake entitled Essays in Critical Realism. For a time he was an outstanding defender of the vehicular theory of knowledge, which was held in some form by most critical realists. Thus he bridged the gap between mental states and objectively independent things by means of a datum having the nature of a universal essence. Later, as has been seen, he abandoned this view, conceiving the datum to be rather a particular phantasm generated by the activity of the self. Though Drake was the only critical realist who completely followed Strong in his panpsychism, there is no question but what Strong wielded a leading influence over the entire critical realistic movement. He was held in especially high esteem by Sellars and Santayana.

ii. Strong's influence upon his opponents. Though Sellars was not far from Strong's epistemological position, he was as a physical realist metaphysically quite far removed from the

latter's mind-stuff theory. In his review of The Origin of Consciousness Sellars says, "It has helped me to clarify my thought on many points and forced me to defend my own prepossession."¹ Later he adds that "it is a warning that both neo-realist and idealist must be prepared to meet a new antagonist in the coming years."² Actually it is his opponents among the neorealists that were most impressed. He was an untiring critic of their theory of knowledge, continually pointing out that it made no place for the factor of error. Actually Montague wrote answers to these attacks³ and showed an increasingly favorable attitude toward panpsychism. In his review of Strong's A Creed for Sceptics Montague goes so far as to say that the type of panpsychism which he favors differs somewhat from that of Strong.⁴ Spaulding,⁵ as has previously been mentioned, attacks the double-aspect theory in a way which appears to show his familiarity with Strong's version of it. In fact a number of critical treatments of the mind-stuff theory are apparently directed chiefly against Strong even when his name is not mentioned.⁶ The acuteness of his arguments

¹Sellars, Art.(1919), 319.

²Sellars, Art.(1919), 319.

³Cf. Montague, Art.(1924), 578-582; Art.(1912), 272-278.

⁴Montague, Art.(1938), 580.

⁵Cf. Spaulding, NR, 268-273.

⁶E.g., Pratt, PR, 214-215; Santayana, RM, 181-188.

appears to cause opponents of the theory at once to search for answers. He has a way of answering possible objections to his view even before they have been brought against it by others that is very effective and at times not a little disconcerting. There seems little question but what his influence upon his opponents has been of considerable weight.

iii. Strong's place in philosophy. In modern philosophy what place may be assigned to Strong? How important a figure is he? In this regard the words of Charles W. Morris are worthy of note.

The attention which Charles A. Strong has devoted to the topic of mind gives him a central place among the critical realists in this respect. No contemporary philosopher has worked more ably or persistently on this problem. It is accordingly advisable to consider his position in some detail, especially since it unites upon a panpsychistic world-view motives found in critical realism with an emphasis upon behavior as vigorous as that of any pragmatist.⁷

To this should be added the tribute of Strong's close friend, Santayana, who says of him,

Never was fortitude more entire than in this man. Sure of his vocation, if not always of his steps and his method, he continued undaunted by neglect and comparative isolation, never losing confidence in the importance and ultimate success of his labours. Nor was he turned aside by the hopeless and protracted afflictions that affected first his wife's health and then his own. Crippled and physically helpless for twenty years, he kept a single eye upon his chosen task, tirelessly revising and perfecting every detail of his theory.⁸

⁷Morris, STM, 217.

⁸Santayana, Art.(1940), 596-597.

Also worthy of note are these additional words of Santayana, comparing Strong's philosophical method to his own.

He was meagre, persistent, scientific; I was rapid, sceptical and ironical. He had zealously preserved his allegiance to a traditional morality and a precise scientific truth as the heart of religion; whereas I tolerantly observed religion always superposing itself upon truth and morality upon nature.⁹

Surely this comparison is not unfavorable to Strong.

The question not fully answered by these tributes concerns the full nature of Strong's contribution. How original was his work? Did he select the most important points for his investigation? What permanent value attaches to the result of his labors? Strong's last article,¹⁰ written upon his death bed was an attempt to clarify the position which he had finally reached. He still classifies himself as a critical realist and points out the relation of his critical realism to his acceptance of the concept of substance. As for his debt to his predecessors, he is now no longer talking about Fechner, or Paulsen, or Clifford. In this last article it is Spinoza to whom he expresses his great obligation.

Yet though the basis of the double aspect theory is found in Spinoza, Strong's system most closely resembles that of Clifford. Strong's work comprises an able presentation and defense of the mind-stuff theory with the double-aspect theory of mind-body relation. Yet is there anything here that was not present

⁹Santayana, Art.(1940), 597.

¹⁰Strong, Art.(1941).

either explicitly or implicitly in the thought of Clifford? This seems somewhat doubtful. In one respect at least Strong seems definitely inferior to Clifford. The latter, it will be remembered, found ~~the~~ the objects of physical phenomena and the objects by which he recognizes the existence of other minds to be the result of a process of inference.¹¹ In place of such inference Strong relies chiefly upon intuition and animal faith.¹²

Concerning his choice of questions for investigation, it has already been pointed out (Chapter V) that Strong had a preconceived notion of what must constitute the natural origin of mind out of nature. His entire system might be viewed as an attempt to find logical and empirical evidence to support this a priori concept. Yet his combination of logical and empirical arguments lead, as we have seen, to a rather inconsistent position with respect to the use of analysis. He dare not carry the logical analysis too far lest all semblance of the psychical be lost and his concept of the natural origin of mind should be lost. On the other hand, in order to reconcile the continuity of nature with the type of mind-stuff which he has postulated, he must sacrifice virtually all significant factors of the mental to ^{the} physiological. In order to explain the assembling of psychical particles into a whole by means of

¹¹Cf. Clifford, LE, 274-286.

¹²Cf. Strong, ENM, 92-103.

the spatial proximity of their physiological aspects, he is forced to deny even the unity of mind. The changes in his view through the years mostly take the form of additional concessions to physicalism until in his last articles he seems to be slipping away even from the shadow of the mental which still remains in his view of basic reality.

Strong's contribution may then be that of clearly showing that the mind-stuff theory of realistic panpsychism is an untenable compromise between idealism and materialism, that once one has gone so far as to believe that sentient reality is composed of particles having both physical and psychical aspects, there is nothing to prevent one from being completely submerged into the quicksands of materialism. Strong's life work has shown that not even the intenuity of a truly great philosophical mind is sufficient to place such a theory on a sound empirical and logical basis. Strong's masterful treatments of epistemology will certainly retain their importance as long as American critical realism in its original form remains a prominent viewpoint. His work on the mind-body problem, however, acute though it may be, rests to too great an extent upon the questionable substance of mind-stuff. One leaves a study of Strong's writings with the feeling that he has been in the company of a great mind who wrongly formulated the problems to be attacked and who consequently devoted his intellectual talents to the defense of untenable positions.

2. The Influence of Ward

i. Ward's influence upon British idealism. As has already been indicated Ward's influence upon the psychology of his day was probably greater than that upon metaphysics. Yet upon British idealism the effect of his work was quite marked. At the time when he began his work, the central emphasis of British idealism lay in absolutism of the Hegelian type. He was responsible for promoting a pluralistic movement in idealistic circles. In fact the growth of the pluralistic tendency among idealists, voluntarists and pragmatists alike, which took positive form near the turn of the last century was probably partly due to the influence of Ward. Yet aside from his general influence upon British philosophy and particularly upon British idealism, Ward's impact upon a select group of prominent disciples was a most important factor. Such men as George F. Stout and F. R. Tennant may have been more instrumental in spreading Ward's ideas than he was himself. In fact so great has been the influence of Stout upon British thinking that the ideas of Ward which he has emphasized have met with wider acceptance than any other points of his system. Ward's influence in Britain has spread beyond the limits of the idealistic group and has had considerable effect upon the thinking of such realists as Samuel Alexander and John Laird.

ii. Ward's influence upon later panpsychism. Ward may be

said to have been one of the first recent philosophers to have accepted Leibniz's monadism as the basis for a system of theistic pluralism. Since then the type of metaphysics based upon Leibnizian monads has become more widely accepted among philosophers in both England and the United States. The actual entity of Whitehead, the cell of Stace, and the monad of DeWitt H. Parker all belong to variations of such a modified monadism. Ward saw in the Monadology of Leibniz "the type, to which all modern attempts to construct a pluralistic philosophy more or less conform."¹³ More recently, in his Experience and Substance, published only last year, Parker states that "the natural and inevitable type of metaphysical system is some kind of monadology."¹⁴

iii. Ward's place in philosophy. Rudolf Metz in his treatment of Ward remarks that seldom has a man had so important an influence in his own nation and at the same time so little in the way of reputation outside its borders.¹⁵ Outside of his psychology he received some name for his attacks upon certain well-known scientists who were opposed to religion and the spiritualist world-view. Such men as Haeckel, Clifford, and Huxley he vigorously opposed. Though the manner in which he

¹³RE, 54.

¹⁴Parker, ES, 345.

¹⁵Cf. Metz, HYBP, 399.

opposed them was confused, the fact that much which he did attack has since ceased to exist in the same form may show that this part of his work was not without its effect.¹⁶

Next to his great work in the historical development of British psychology, the value of Ward's labor may actually be in reviving and modifying Leibnizian monadism. The preformation theory, the pre-established harmony, the windowless monads, and other theories Ward discarded as incompatible with scientific discoveries. Yet he retained the central idea of nature consisting of psychical entities of a low degree of conation and cognition. The fact that in this way all monads, high and low, have external relations with God differentiates this position from absolutism. Probably the weakest point in the monadism of both Leibniz and Ward is their reliance upon continuity as a speculative principle.

To be sure, this monadic system cannot now be empirically verified, nor does there seem to be much hope for such a verification in the future. And the position is not demanded to satisfy abstractly logical considerations. Nevertheless the fact that so many leading philosophers do accept such a

¹⁶Cf. Perry, *PPS*, 90-92. "There have been two main ways of defending spiritual interests against naturalistic deductions from the results of science. All that the scientist is inclined to claim for the universality of his laws may be granted freely, and then the sting removed by reinterpreting the whole situation in such a way that mechanism now enters as a subordinate element into a higher category, which, accordingly, does not compete with it at all. Or, on the other hand, we may attempt in various ways to weaken the force of the scientific claims themselves....Ward's criticism does not identify itself unambiguously with either of these methods" (Rorters, *CAI*, 320-330).

panpsychistic system without empirical confirmation clearly indicates that many do recognize strong logical reasons for accepting it.

The monadistic system advocated by Ward makes no such compromise with materialism as does the mind-stuff theory of Strong. It is at once thoroughly idealistic and as pluralistic as is compatible with theism. Yet it is difficult to see how a physical nature composed of bare monads connected only by interaction and with a semblance of freedom can logically account for the observable uniformity and order within the world.

3. Progress of Panpsychism beyond Strong and Ward

1. Increasing evidence from the philosophy of science.

The evidence of physical science has shattered materialism. Not even the most extreme physical realist can longer adhere to a belief in the existence of matter in the sense of solid atoms. The reduction of physical nature to the activity of electrons and perhaps of waves and quanta makes it easier to interpret it as mental in nature. Further, as we have seen, certain discontinuities in the behavior of quanta might conceivably be explained by the behavior of monads. However the microscopic data support the position of monadism better than the macroscopic phenomena. It may be a misnomer, however, to say that this could result in progress beyond Strong and Ward, since Strong knew about most of the advances in physics and Ward many of them.

Most indications, however, point to the idea that idealism has little to fear from future discoveries of physical science, and this includes idealistic panpsychism.

ii. Other possibilities of progress. The monadistic panpsychist has always had in some way to account for the appearance of the bare monad to the senses as physical. The higher monad had a body made up of the lower, regressing down the scale until the bare monad constituted its own body and was therefore characterized by immediacy. There has been a tendency upon the part of more recent believers in monads to admit frankly the presence of a physical element as a part of the unit. Thus the physical and mental pole of Whitehead's actual entity,¹⁷ and the consciousness and datum composing Stace's cell¹⁸ are not intended to impair the unity of these factors but rather better to explain the nature of and functioning of these entities.

There has also been a tendency on the part of some monadists to abolish the concept of substance,¹⁹ and this of course constitutes a real gain in the direction of greater empiricism.

This writer believes that any further progress of pan-

¹⁷Whitehead, PR, 356.

¹⁸Stace, NW, 36.

¹⁹Cf. Whitehead, PR, 44.

Psychism must take the direction of the realistic type rather than the mind-stuff type. Strong, it is thought, carried the mind-stuff theory as far as possible. The theory is very limited; Strong exploited all of its possibilities that are of any importance. In other words it is meaningless to speak of progress beyond the panpsychism of Carl; it is probably meaningless to speak of progress beyond the panpsychism of Strong provided the latter's promises are adhered to.

CHAPTER VIII

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PANPSYCHISM

1. Psychological Implications

The psychological implications here discussed refer to the distinction between soul psychology and self-psychology. In his earlier, more idealistic, days Strong held to a theory of self psychology, rejecting any unconscious substratum and believing that the mind was identical with its conscious experience.

The existence of consciousness is our existence. If the soul should continue but consciousness cease, we should be as good as nonexistent; whereas if the soul should be annihilated but consciousness still go on, we should exist as truly as now. Thus our existence is bound up with that of consciousness, not with that of the sou; or, as I said before, the existence of consciousness is our existence.¹

In his later thought when he considers consciousness to be only a functional relation and when he rejects even the unity of mind, he obviously also does not believe in a substantial soul. Yet he has also dropped self-psychology in favor of a mental atomism of the Humean type. This, it would seem, is the natural implication of the mind-stuff theory.

In as far as the monadistic theory is followed, soul psychology may be implied. It seems possible that, despite his

¹WME, 200.

own assertion to the contrary, Ward's distinction between the subject self and object self, I and me, knower and known, a duality with the unity of experience may imply soul psychology.² Surely it is not self-psychology. Again he makes the rather ambiguous statement that "instead of regarding all souls as substances, we have proceeded rather on the spiritualistic interpretation that all substances are souls."³ Parker accepts the view of soul substance,⁴ whereas Stace⁵ and Whitehead⁶ reject it. The conclusion seems to be that monadism may imply either soul psychology or self-psychology.

2. Panpsychism and Freedom

Strong, while recognizing the experience of choice, contends that,

though everything is fated, a man himself as a portion of fate, and the most important portion in what concerns himself. Blessed be causation, which by being universal ensures that our wills should have gratification. That their character which at each moment is determined partly by heredity and partly by the influences that have acted on us need distress us.⁷

²cf. Ward, PP, 35-36; RE, 26.

³RE, 392.

⁴ES, 64-65.

⁵NW, 9.

⁶Whitehead, PR, 44.

⁷CS, 95.

This does not in itself abolish freedom, since the two forms of determination may imply a possibility of free choice. Yet as Strong goes on to attribute the basis of morals entirely to instinct, the meaning of freedom if it does exist seems to be of small significance. From the standpoint of the mind-stuff theory it is difficult to conceive of man being anything more than a creature of instinct, having no real freedom whatever. Ward's treatment of freedom is complicated by his inclusion not only of the subject of causal determination in nature, but also by that of theological determination. However, his conclusion seems to be that between fixed possibilities the creature has the opportunity of free choice. As he puts it, "The total possibilities, ... however far back we go, are fixed, but within these, contingencies, however far forward we go, are open."⁸ A limited type of freedom is also permitted by the monadists, Parker and Stace. According to the former,

The freedom of the monad consists of the inner spontaneity of the matrix self, together with the fact that, however much it yields to the pressure of the environment, it modifies the environment in its turn; thus it is true that the world has made me what I am, it is also true that I make the world that makes me.⁹

According to Stace, "that I am free means simply that my actions --in so far as they are free--issue from my conscious valuations as their cause."¹⁰

⁸RE, 315.

⁹ES, 275.

¹⁰NW, 70.

Thus monalistic panpsychism appears to allow as much freedom as any type of idealism.

3. Panpsychism and the Problem of Evil

Strong's view of the problem of natural evil is clearly stated as follows:

Let a man note what happens through the years--earthquakes, floods, pestilence, wars--and ask himself whether it is conceivable that a world in which such things are possible was created by or proceeded from a mind; he must honestly answer, No. Let him regard the same question regarding specific human ills. Insanity--how can goodness or intelligence have produced that cruellest and most degrading of afflictions? The different forms of disease, the innumerable varieties of insects in tropical forests, the sea which covers far more of the earth's surface than the land, the stars that are so beautiful to look at but so devastating to think of, the vast desolation of interstellar space--all prove that the universe was not made for man or by a being like a man, but is what it is, an ever burning fire.¹¹

For Strong the existence of evil is no more of a problem than that of good. The latter problem, however, he fails to recognize, let alone to solve. The mind-stuff theory is an inherently nontheistic system, conceived as such by Clifford and necessarily so by its very nature. A philosophical amateur like Eddington might indeed read a type of theism into the mind-stuff theory, but a philosopher of Strong's caliber, such a thing would be impossible.

For Ward evil cannot be ultimate; "God and Evil in a word,

¹¹ Strong, *op. cit.*, 93-94.

are contraries: if the problem of evil is altogether insoluble, there is an end of theism: if God exists there is nothing absolutely evil."¹² Actually Ward takes the position that evil is a natural and inevitable result of progress of the individuals within the universe toward the realm of ends.

The world, ever pressing forward, entered on the stage of conscious life as soon as it was possible, not waiting until the fierce strife and turmoil of the elements had wholly abated, but rather driven by struggling with these to new adaptations that tended to raise it above them....The pressure of physical evils having first led to the solidarity of the social state, this has ushered in the attraction of those ideals that Hegel called the objective spirit.¹³

Natural evil as illustrated in the process of evolution is treated by Ward in a traditional manner. "If we ask why the way is so long and the progress so devious and so slow, we can but suppose that it is so because only so can the progress be thorough and the way assuredly the best."¹⁴ It seems evident thus that Ward's treatment of evil is one of the least empirical parts of his system. There has been a tendency for more recent monadists, including Stace, Parker, Hartshorne, and Whitehead,¹⁶ to explain the existence of evil by means of the doctrine of a finite God.

¹²Ward, RE, 319.

¹³RE, 440.

¹⁴RE, 446.

¹⁵Stace, MW, 254.

¹⁶Parker, ES, 358; Whitehead, PR, 524, 532.

4. Panpsychism and Immortality

It is obvious from his treatment of the problem of evil that immortality on Strong's later theory would be impossible, nor is it easy to see how it could be postulated by any follower of mind-stuff.

Ward, on the other hand, attempts to establish the metaphysical possibility of immortality and to argue for it on moral grounds. "The moral ideal, as it leads to faith in God, leads also to the belief that the spirit world has other dimensions than those of time and space that encompass the world of phenomena."¹⁷

¹⁷RE, 429.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate modern panpsychism, especially as it is expounded by James Ward and Charles J. Strong. To this end the historical background and contemporary status of panpsychism are surveyed, the factors common to Ward and Strong examined, the individual characteristics of these two thinkers set forth, their contributions evaluated, and some implications of their panpsychism traced.

From its background of primitive animism, Greek hylozoism, and mediaeval vitalism, panpsychistic metaphysics has followed two different lines of development. The first resulted in the monadistic theory, the outlines of which have been laid down by Leibniz and followed with modifications, by all monadists, including Ward. The second or mind-stuff theory originated with Fechner's modification of Spinoza's double-aspect theory. The more explicit formulation has been set forth by William K. Clifford and further developed by later thinkers, including Strong.

Both Ward and Strong are empirical in the sense that they consider immediate elementary awareness as experienced by human persons to be the clue to the nature of the physical world. For both, the real world is of the nature of mind and so qualitatively monistic. Both treat psychological data as of primary importance. In the thought of both, evolution holds an important

place. In the case of Strong the mind-body problem itself appears to be secondary to the problem of how mind can be conceived to develop naturally out of the physical order. Ward, however, emphasizes epigenesis.

Strong begins with an a priori concept of what must constitute the mind's natural origin out of the physical order. He then looks for evidence that mind did develop in just this way. Accepting the double-aspect theory of mind-body relation, he conceives that the mental experience revealed through introspection is identical with what appears as brain when perceived through the senses. Applying this principle to nature, he finds that what is perceived by the senses as matter also has its psychical aspect. He finds the physiological structure of the brain to be extremely complex and the nature of conscious experience to be apparently quite simple in the sense of being a unity. Hence in order to make the mental aspect more nearly correspond to the physical one, he applies a process of analysis to the former. If the brain is a complex of parts, so also must be the mind.

This process he supports by a carefully formulated dualistic epistemology in which consciousness is reduced to a functional relation and psychic states become the vehicles by which data are given to the self or psyche. Strong's self is similar to that of Hume; it is a series or stream of psychic states. The psychic state is, then, the psyche in a certain state. Mind is

divided into these psychic states, examples of which would include sensations, mental images, emotions, desires and, above all, attention. Though a psychic state which consists of a single feeling seems to possess unity, Strong finds that even such a feeling is composed of lesser, more minute feelings. Thus all psychic states may be conceived of as the sum of simpler parts. The idea that such psychic elements or minute feelings may exist independent of the psychic states of which they are for the time being parts leads to the further concept of mind-stuff, that is, the postulation of even simpler parts which are all of the same kind. This analysis into independent feelings forms the transition from epistemology to metaphysics and shows the organic relation of the two in Strong's system. Thus Strong, in going beyond the single psychic state, admittedly carries his analysis farther than empirical evidence allows. Yet he is reluctant to carry this process of analysis to its natural culmination in neutral entities. He is stopped neither by strictly empirical nor strictly logical considerations, but rather by an a priori factor, his determination to preserve some semblance of the psychic element because he wants continuity in evolution from lower to higher forms. Once he abandoned mind-stuff in favor of neutral entities, his panpsychism would be gone.

Strong's solution of the mind-body problem purports to include the best elements of the identity theory, interaction,

and automatism. Yet an examination of this synthetic treatment reveals that its value depends chiefly on the validity of the identity theory. Among the several defects of this double-aspect theory of mind-body relation, the most important is the difficulty of finding the exact correlations between the nature and activity of mind and brain that would be expected of two appearances of an identical factor. Strong attempts to meet this difficulty by analyzing the mind in such a way as to show its likeness to the physiological structure of the brain. Since the latter may be analyzed into minute parts, this must also be the case with the former. The reason for his attempted reduction of the mental to the physical rather than the opposite procedure lies partly in his effort to explain the higher in terms of the lower, and partly in his scepticism with respect to values. The following out of this idea of reduction leads inevitably to more and more concessions to materialism. The mind-stuff into which Strong analyzes both the self and the physical world is conceived as in time as in space, as capable of change, and as possessing a psychic character. Strong denies real unity to mind, and its apparent unity he attempts to account for by proximity of its parts in space. To follow the course of Strong's thought from beginning to end is to observe one concession after another to materialism until hardly more than the name psychical remains. Yet, since the pure analytic method deals with matter more adequately than with mind, the more

materialistic he grows the more logical he becomes. This probably indicates that realistic panpsychism is an impossible compromise, an unstable position, the logical implications of which leads one inevitably away from mind as a category to something material or neutral.

The mind-stuff into which Strong analyzes psychic states has little of the mental left about it. Its particles are, however, capable of combining in such a way as to form minds. The monadistic panpsychism of *Ward*, on the other hand, makes no such concession to materialism. Rather the psychical centers or monads each possess a genuine unity, individuality and independence. Though the bare monads feel confused and elementary awareness, their structure is patterned after that of the higher monads such as human minds. Thus even the simplest monads mirror the entire universe and possess conative and cognitive functions. The higher monads may in no sense be analyzed into the lower, though they do become closely associated with the lower.

The system of *Ward* differs from that of Leibniz in that the former's monads have 'windows' and do not depend upon a scheme of pre-established harmony to govern their interrelations. *Ward's* discarding of pre-established harmony is partly the result of the theory of epigenesis which had replaced the preformation theory of Leibniz's day. In *Ward's* system the organism of the bare monad is reduced to a point and its present to a moment;

its reactions are immediate and limited to what is immediately given. These bare monads in interaction with one another form the medium of communication between dominant monads or souls. Each bare monad is in a sense its own body and also goes to make up part of the body of some dominant monad. The bare monads forming the body of a particular soul have an especially intimate relation with each other and with that soul, and they possess a less close but equally real relation with monads outside their own association.

Ward's preference for such a monadism over some form of occasionalism as a solution of the mind-body problem does not appear to rest on any very explicit empirical or logical considerations.

Ward's means of going beyond the empirically justifiable is the principle of continuity, derived mainly from Leibniz. As interpreted by Ward this principle implies that all reality is structurally and functionally of one kind. In an indefinite regress from the more complex and highly developed to the simpler and lower all real entities possess in some measure the attributes experienced as belonging to the human mind. No gaps are recognized between various gradations of these entities. Even the break between lower entities and human beings, which Leibniz admitted is denied by Ward. By placing God beyond the order of monads, he considers that he is able to recognize a gap between the highest monad and God without violating this principle of

continuity. Yet the factor of mutations in emergent evolution and the behavior of quanta as revealed by recent physical investigations indicate empirically that the principle of continuity is not sufficiently reliable to become the sole support of such a nonalistic theory of the physical world. Actually the theory that the physical world is made up of a large number of psychical entities of the type of the bare monad seems inadequate to account for the observable uniformity and order of nature.

Important to Strong was his association with the American critical realists. He contributed much to the development of their distinctive theory of knowledge, and it seems probable that his work in epistemology will be considered of more value than his metaphysics. His keen analysis of problems and his penetrating criticisms of opposing views gave him an important voice in philosophical circles and frequently caused those whom he criticized to reconsider and at times revise their theories. Especially was this true of Sellars and Montague. Though he devoted his life, even during long years of illness, to the development and perfection of his mind-stuff theory, it seems that he advanced very little beyond the earlier formulation of W.K. Clifford. Setting himself to the task of perfecting this view, Strong may be said to have revealed that it was not worth the effort. His own frequent changes of view may be considered an indication of the inherent instability, untenability, and general weakness of the theory which he espoused rather than

of its fruitlessness.

In the case of Ward, his influence on British idealism in directing a change of emphasis from absolutism to pluralism was very great. His influence has continued to live in the work of such persons as disciples as Stout and Tennant. At least of Ward's contributions lay in showing that such a monistic panpsychism as that originally formulated by Leibniz could be modified and made compatible with the evidence of recent science. The more recent monistic systems of Whitehead, Stace, and Parker among others indicate that, unlike the mind-stuff theory, monistic panpsychism is a fertile field containing room for much further development.

The mind-stuff theory as held by Strong denies man any meaningful freedom, making him only a creature of instinct; it is nontheistic, treating the factor of evil as a matter of course but offering no explanation of the existence of good. As held both by Ward and by more recent thinkers, the monistic theory may imply either soul psychology or self-psychology, makes genuine freedom of choice between determined alternatives probable, explains the existence of natural evil either by denying that it is ultimately evil (Ward) or by the finitude of God (Parker, Stace), and implies the metaphysical possibility of immortality, relying on moral arguments to support its probability.

Conclusions:

1. Modern theories of panpsychism are reducible to two major types, the monadistic type represented in recent thought by James Ward and others and the mind-stuff type represented by Charles A. Strong.

2. The monadistic theory holds the simple physical entities which compose the physical world to be structurally and functionally analogous to the human mind but not to be analyzed into parts of a more complex kind; every monad of every grade is an indivisible unit; hence the monadistic theory recognizes the unity of consciousness.

3. The mind-stuff theory holds the sentient elements which compose the physical world to be minute parts analyzed out of psychic states which were in turn analyzed out of the human self or psyche; hence the human mind is considered to be an apparent but not a real unity; real unities are simple feeling-units.

4. The mind-stuff theory bases its acceptance of the double-aspect concept of mind-body relation and its analysis of the mind into simple elements on the assumption that the mental must be structurally like the physical; hence the mind-stuff theory is a compromise with materialism, a materialization of mind.

5. The analytical process by which Strong reaches mind-stuff should logically culminate in neutral entities and a

rejection of panpsychism.

6. Ward's view of the existence of bare monads as the basis of the physical world goes beyond empirical evidence. It is supported by the principle of continuity, the universal validity of which is now empirically challenged by biology, emergent evolution, and physics, quanta.

7. Ward's preference for explaining the mind-body relation as interaction of the dominant monad with the lower monads over an explanation in terms of occasionalism is not based on strong empirical or logical consideration.

8. The philosophical possibilities of the mind-stuff theory have been thoroughly explored by Strong and no further important development in this branch of panpsychism seems probable; the monadistic theory has already been carried beyond the stage represented by Ward by such recent writers as Whitehead, Stace, and Parker, and its possibilities are by no means yet exhausted.

9. The mind-stuff theory is generally nontheistic, providing no metaphysical basis for values and ideals; the monadistic theory is generally theistic, providing aequite basis for value experience.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Ernest Reid Calvert was born in Needham, Massachusetts, on July 24, 1912. He began his education in the local schools of that town, but ill health prevented his regular attendance for several years. In 1934 he entered Gordon College of Theology and Missions, where he received the degree of Bachelor of Theology in 1938. At his graduation from Gordon he was elected to the honor society and was a commencement speaker. From the summer of 1936 through May, 1938, he took courses as a special student in Boston University, and in the summer of 1938 he became a regular student at the Boston University Graduate School where he majored in philosophy. In 1940 he received the degree of Master of Arts from Boston University. From 1939 to 1942 he was a graduate assistant in the Boston University department of philosophy.

From 1937 to 1941 Mr. Calvert participated in the religious education work of Dorchester Temple Baptist Church in Dorchester, Massachusetts, and on July 8, 1941, he was ordained to the Baptist ministry at that church. During the year 1941-1942 he did religious education work at the Dudley Street Baptist Church in Roxbury, Massachusetts. The first semester, 1941-1942, he taught sociology at Gordon College.





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