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GRADUATE SCHOOL

THESIS

ORIGINS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE OF 1904

Submitted by

MIRIAM PALMER CHAMBERS

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In partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree

of Master of Arts

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"ORIGINS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE OF 1904"

1. Introduction

A diplomatic revolution took place in 1904 through the Anglo-French Alliance concluded in that year. It is memorable, not alone for its far reaching after affects upon world diplomacy, but in tracing its origins, we find the whole tangled web of Europe's economic, philosophical, and political developments in the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. More than that, its roots take us into practically all corners of the earth in an effort to locate and interpret the forces lying behind each nation's needs, fears, and policies.

It will be necessary to lay the largest stress upon the background of these developments, and then the agreements themselves, reached in the Anglo-French understanding, will be practically self-explanatory.

My purpose will be to make a comprehensive survey of the many factors underlying this subject, rather than an intensive, detailed treatment of any one side. Traditional Anglo-French rivalry will be outlined down to its modern aspects. There will be a resumé of British, French, and German foreign policy with its underlying economic basis and clashing imperialistic interests. An attempt will be made to evaluate the elements which led both England and France to distrust German aggressiveness and draw near to each other by a mutual settlement of outstanding difficulties. The steps leading up to this settlement will be traced and the terms of the bargain itself discussed. There will be a sketch of those persons most responsible for its consummation and a brief review of a few of the more important general results in its effect upon European diplomacy.

II BACKGROUND

1. Anglo-French Rivalry -- Traditional

We can understand at the present time how this Entente was a natural outcome of existing conditions, but a casual glance back through the six centuries of bitter rivalry makes it seem to the uninitiated all the more remarkable. This is especially true if they do not understand that it has been a precedent with England, since she first emerged as a powerful nation, to change sides as interest dictated in order to wield a balance of power and maintain commercial and naval supremacy.

Anglo-French rivalry in the fourteenth century manifested itself in the Hundred Years War. Feudal and political issues were but lesser causes, the main questions being nationalistic and economic. It was largely a fight for the growing tendency toward nationalism and unity in each state, coupled with the desire for economic control of Flanders.

Later, during the age of the Tudors, England emerged as a definite factor in Continental politics, being a balance between the Hapsburg Emperor Charles V and Francis I of France. Also in the following rivalries between France and Spain, she allied herself with one side and then the other. Finally religious antagonism, but more especially questions of trade caused her to definitely break with Spain. The repulse of the Armada marked the beginning of the end of Spanish sea power and the rise of English supremacy.

During the Stuart period with its struggle between King and Parliament and the commercial rivalry with the Dutch, England and France maintained comparatively friendly relations until after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and a breaking of the Dutch monopoly of the carrying trade.

Then came the supremacy of France on the Continent, (built up largely through the efforts of Cardinal Richelieu) her rise as a sea power, and the establishment of a large colonial empire. Once more the old rivalry flared up and there followed the Second Hundred Years War or series of wars.[1] They were begun in opposition to the ascendancy of Louis XIV which threatened the European balance of power. They were continued as a colonial and commercial struggle and were fought out in America, the West Indies, India, and on the sea as well as on the Continent. They ended with a return of the old struggle for European equilibrium as well as commercial interests in the Napoleonic wars.

England's commerce and colonial empire had grown at the expense of Spain, then Holland and now France. However, the hostility of the eighteenth century was tempered in the nineteenth until there was official friendliness, varying at different times in degree of cordiality, but never reaching open hostility in spite of several crises, such as the Four Power Treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in 1840 and trouble over the marriage question of the young Spanish queen in 1846. To be sure, England and France cooperated in the Crimean War in 1854, but the alliance was only temporary and friction became intense again over the colonial question in different parts of the world, culminating in the Fashoda affair of 1898.

Anglo-French Rivalry -- Modern Imperialistic

This growing tension between the two countries in the last

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1. War of the Palatinate 1689-97, Spanish Succession 1702-13, Austrian Succession 1740-48, Seven Years War 1755-63, American Revolution (French entrance) 1778-83 and the French revolution and Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815. In all these France and England were on opposite sides.

quarter of the nineteenth century was expressed by Lord Lyons in June 1884 when he wrote from France: "The two nations come into contact in every part of the globe. In every part of it questions arise which in the present state of feeling excite mutual suspicion and irritation."[2]

The oldest question was probably that of the Newfoundland fishing rights dating from the Treaty of Utrecht 1713. Then too, the French penal colony of New Caledonia was very obnoxious to the British in Queensland and there were also rival claims of sovereignty over the New Hebrides islands.

Furthermore, French and English commercial interests clashed in the island of Madagascar. Keen rivalry was also felt in Asia over expansion in Siamese territory. Besides this question there had been misunderstanding concerning the adjustment of claims in the hinterland of the Niger and Congo basins.

Perhaps the greatest friction was caused by strained relations over the control of Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan. The beginning of the twentieth century brought the situation in Morocco to an acute stage also.

So we see that the modern imperialistic policies of Britain and France were clashing in the Oceanic islands, in Asia, and in both north and central Africa.

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2. Egerton, H. E. "British Foreign Policy in Europe", p.339 quotes "Life of Lord Granville" Vol.II p.333

2. OUTLINE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

General Resumé

For the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, Britain enjoyed a position of uncontested supremacy. She had developed into a huge factory, was confident in her economic and industrial prosperity and proud of her wealth which made London the financial capital of the world. She owned rich tropical lands and settlement colonies in temperate zones. She had an unrivalled merchant marine and a powerful navy which commanded the sea routes by means of many strategic naval stations and bound the Empire together as well as protecting and defending the scattered dominions.

Thus, British interests tended more toward democratizing England and working out a system of Imperial control for the lands already secured, than in adding more colonies or entering into Continental affairs.

The two leading factors in British foreign policy had been to protect the Empire by maintaining commercial and naval supremacy over the trade lanes of the world, especially those leading to the East where India was considered the "jewel of the Empire", and secondly, to oppose any attempt made to overthrow a balance of power in Europe. This last, she had discarded, temporarily, at least, since after the Congress of Vienna the equilibrium in Europe was maintained for over half a century through a concert of power among the nations.

In the last half of the nineteenth century, after

the death of Palmerston in 1865, British policy reflects the control of three outstanding statesmen, Gladstone, Disraeli, and Salisbury.

The Liberals, under Gladstone, were concerned primarily with domestic legislation--internal reforms for England and the Irish question. They were "Little Englanders" or anti-imperialists.

Conservative interests, under Disraeli, looked beyond Britain to overseas dominions and imperialistic aspirations. Examples of their activity within a period of only four years may be found in the annexation of the Fiji Islands 1874, purchase of the Suez Canal shares 1875 and the establishment of the Dual Control over Egyptian finances 1876, Victoria made Empress of India 1876 and a protectorate declared over Baluchistan in the same year, the Transvaal annexed 1877, and Cyprus gained in 1878. Modern imperialistic desires had been aroused and furthered by the writings of such men as Dilke, Seeley, Froude, Kipling, Sir Harry Johnston, and the founding of the Imperial Federation League in 1884 through the efforts of Forster.

Aloofness from Continental affairs could not continue, for other nations entered the competition for empire and Britain, under Salisbury's leadership, found it necessary to defend her monopoly and adjust territorial friction arising in all parts of the world. Salisbury as an "internationally-minded" statesman realized that in order to accomplish proper adjustments while still maintaining the peace of Europe and also British supremacy, a policy of caution toward coalitions and alliances was essential. This policy has been translated into the famous phrase "splendid isolation."

SPECIFIC OUTLINE

In tracing the factors which led to the abandonment of the above mentioned policy, a starting point may be made with the changed conditions in Europe following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the hegemony of the new German Empire in Europe.

Prussia and England had been traditional friends and allies, as France and England had been enemies, and it was Bismarck's policy to keep the relation as such. Germany had no colonial empire to rival the British and Bismarck's declaration that Germany was a "satiated state" with plenty of problems at home, lulled British fears for the early part of the last quarter of the century.

Twice during the decade 1870-80, Bismarck made tentative overtures to Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) concerning the possibility of an alliance. The first attempt was in 1875, the year of the Franco-German war scare, and again in September 1879 before the Austro-German pact, it was suggested that England join and make it a Triple Alliance, which was refused.[1]

The first definite emergence of England in Continental politics during this period was in connection with the reopening of the Eastern question by the Russo-Turkish war in 1877. In this crisis England acted in concert with other European nations (but no binding alliances) to maintain the status quo in Constantinople and overturn Russian gains in the San Stefano treaty.

For years it had been a part of England's policy to uphold the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian aggression threatening the control of English routes to the East. The treaty

1. Ward and Gooch "Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy" Vol. III p. 144-7

of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey March 3, 1878, discriminated against the interests of some of the Balkan states in favor of those under Russian influence and an oversized Bulgaria was created which was directly under Russian control. Immediate protests from all the powers whose interests were at stake led to the Congress of Berlin in June and July 1878. Salisbury defined English policy toward Turkey in a letter to the English Ambassador at Vienna: "All practicable support should be given to races which are likely to act as barriers to the advance of the Slavonic Power."[2]

There followed a general territorial readjustment and the results were that Russia came away embittered against Germany and England as well as against Austria; England had received Cyprus by a convention with Turkey June 4, 1878, and Austria and Germany drew together in a Dual Alliance leading to that system of counter alliances which dominated European politics from then to the World War and still continues.

During the decade 1880-90 the thoughts of practically all the European nations turned to colonial affairs. It was the time of feverish colonization in Africa, Asia, and the islands of the Pacific. Among other acquisitions England had occupied Egypt. Because of gaining predominant interest in the Suez Canal in 1875, securing Cyprus 1878, and practical control of Egypt 1883, England could disregard as vital the friction which arose

2. Ibid. p. 134

with the Sultan, for she had now secured her own key to the East and no longer needed to pursue her policy of supporting the Ottoman Empire. This gave Germany an opportunity to secure a predominant influence there which we shall follow out later.[3]

The period 1880-98 was occupied largely with the adjustment of colonial conflicts and with a friendly cooperation with the Triple Alliance as against Franco and Russo-British rivalry.

The first of the colonial settlements was on July 3, 1880 when conflicting commercial interests in Morocco led to the Conference of Madrid, which declared the independence of Morocco and guaranteed the most-favored-nation treatment to all signatories of the agreement. The opening of the interior of the Congo region and the necessity for regulating international interests in Central Africa, led to the Colonial Conference of Berlin 1884-5. Also in 1885 there was an Anglo-German agreement relative to Southwest African claims of the two nations.

On November 22, 1887, Bismarck wrote a personal letter to Salisbury inviting England to form an alliance with Germany's two allies, Austria and Italy, for the preservation of the status quo in the Near East.[4] Salisbury was disinclined to make a formal compact, but concluded a Mediterranean agreement for friendly cooperation with Austria and Italy to insure the status quo in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

By 1889 Boulangism[5] had created a tension between France

3. See page 48-57
4. Hammann, Otto. "The World Policy of Germany" p.25
5. See page 19-20

and Germany; Russia had been made antagonistic by the publishing in 1888 of the terms of the Austro-German alliance[6] and was drawing closer to France, while both France and Russia had conflicting colonial interests with England. It seemed an auspicious moment to tempt England to an alliance, so on January 11, 1889 Bismarck instructed Count Hatzfeldt, the Ambassador to London, to open confidential negotiations with Salisbury. In March, Count Herbert Bismarck was sent to London to discuss the offer. Germany's argument was that "the peace of Europe can best be secured by a treaty between Germany and England pledging them to mutual support against a French attack. A secret treaty would ensure success in such a war, but its publication would prevent the war. Neither France nor Russia will break the peace if they know for certain that they have England against them."[7]

However, Salisbury, according to his policy, refused a binding compact and the question was shelved in his reply, "Meanwhile we leave it on the table without saying yes or no. That is, unfortunately, all I can do at present."[8]

In June 1890 there followed, not an alliance, but another evidence of friendly adjustment in the Zanzibar-Heligoland agreement. This determined the respective spheres of both nations in East Africa and recognized a British protectorate over Zanzibar in return for ceding Heligoland to Germany. The value of Heligoland had not been adequately realized in England,--an estimate

6. See page 27
7. Gooch, G. P. "Germany" p.44
8. Gooch, G. P. loc,cit.

on fortifications had been £2,000,000 which was thought too high for a small island that was likely to disappear beneath the sea.

Also in 1890 a treaty was signed with France relative to the lands of the Niger and recognizing a French protectorate over Madagascar, while France confirmed the English protectorate over Zanzibar. Friction arose in 1893 over Siam (settled temporarily January 15, 1896) while at the same time another African agreement was made with Germany--West Africa. The following year the Anglo-Congolese treaty (May 12, 1894) caused a protest from both France and Germany, but English aspirations for a north-south route through Africa to facilitate the Cape-to-Cairo railroad project and frustrate the French west-east hopes of linking their colonies, led to the plans for the reconquest of the Sudan and the Grey delcaration of March 28, 1895.[9]

During this time, internal troubles in Turkey and the massacres which took place in Asia Minor led England to fear that a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was imminent. Some secret discussion on the subject of a possible partition of the Empire was carried on between London and Berlin, the nature of which is not very definite.[10] The German Government under Holstein's[11] influence feared that Salisbury's object was to involve the Continent in wars and have someone else pull her chestnuts out of the fire for her, so Hatzfeldt was not authorized to enter into negotiations.[12]

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9. See page 22
10. Ward and Gooch. op. cit. p.275, also Brandenburg, Erich. "From Bismarck to the World War." p.23
11. Baron von Holstein--head of the political division of the Foreign Office. Count Hatzfeldt--German Ambassador at Court of St. James. Lord Salisbury--British Premier and Foreign Minister both--1895-1900
12. Brandenburg, Erich. op. cit. p71, also Hamman, Otto op.cit.p.64-5

Interest was soon drawn away from this as matters in the Far East claimed the attention of the European powers, following the Treaty of Shimoneseki, April 1, 1895, imposed on China by Japan. During the beginning of the struggle (October 1894) England had suggested joint intervention which was unfavorably received. She had feared the collapse of the Chinese Empire resulting in detriment to British trade and she also wished to maintain China as a bulwark against Russian aggression in eastern Asia. Later, she saw that her trade was suffering very little and as Japan was a powerful, rising power, she did not wish to alienate her, thinking to gain more from her friendship. With this apparently in mind, she refused to join with Germany, Russia, and France in intervening after the treaty and so she paved the way for the Anglo-Jap alliance of 1902.

From Asia we must go back to Africa. Trouble was brewing in South Africa and the Jameson Raid January 1, 1896 focused all eyes on that part of the world. The famous congratulatory Kruger telegram sent by the Kaiser on January 3, after consultation with three of his Ministers,[13] had been preceded by an approach to France on the question of cooperation with Germany in colonial matters in view of the continuous expansion of the British Empire.[14]

Public opinion in England considered this incident an unwarrantable interference in her internal affairs and feeling became extremely hostile toward Germany. However, it was the first step toward waking in diplomatic circles the fear that her serene policy of isolation between the Triple and Dual Alliances was becoming

13. See page 47
14. Brandenburg, Erich. op. cit. p.83 quotes Instructions to Count Munster January 1, 1896. "Grosse Politik" XI, 69.

dangerous rather than splendid. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Colonies and more of a firebrand than the calm and cautious Salisbury, struck the first warning note on January 21, 1896 when he said, "A few weeks ago England appeared to stand alone in the world, surrounded by jealous competitors and by altogether unexpected hostility. Differences between ourselves and other nations, which were of long standing, appeared suddenly to come to a head and assume threatening proportions."[15]

Anti-German feeling ran so high in England that more conservative officials in Germany became alarmed at the Kaiser's impetuosity and attempted to smooth matters over. In March, Italy had suffered her crushing defeat at Adowa in Abyssinia. French support of Menelik and also Russian interest alarmed Italy and Austria, all the more as England had refused to renew the Meditteranean Pact of 1887. English support for the Triple Alliance was strongly needed, so Germany attempted to show England that her own near Eastern interests were in danger and persuade her of the desireability of joining them.[16] Salisbury, knowing of the previously attempted European bloc following the Raid, answered courteously but coldly.

The following year, 1897, the Diamond Jubilee in London may have restored British pride and self-esteem in her consciousness of leading the world in sea power, trade, and empire; but it also may have added to the growing feeling that outside of the Empire, she had no friends. Joint participation of France and Russia with

15. Egerton, H. E. "British Foreign Policy." p.351-2
16. Brandenburg, Erich op.cit.p.90, Marschall's description of conversation of Kaiser with Ambassador Lascelles. Marschall's Despatch to Hotzfeldt March 4, 1896 "Grosse Politik" XI, 235-6

Germany in the opening of the Kiel Canal 1895, as well as their mutual cooperation in the Far East made English isolation even more pronounced. Overtures were made to Russia in January and March 1898, but this approach was terminated by Russia seizing Port Arthur.[17]

Then England paused and looked about. Where could she turn for firends? Russia was her dreaded rival in Manchuria and Persia. Germany was suspected of supporting the Boer uprising in South Africa, there was friction over Samoa and Canada,[18] she was a keen commercial competitor beginning to undermine English markets in various parts of the world, and she had just (March 28) passed a bill for a large increase of her navy. Turkey was becoming more and more under German economic and military control and besides, Egypt was still an open sore between Turkey and England. French interests were clashing with British in Indo-China, Madagascar, Newfoundland, Morocco, and even then the Marchand expedition was on its way, with definite destination unknown, to claim part of the Egyptian Sudan. Even the United States was estranged over Samoa and the Venezuela boundary question.

Surely Chamberlain had cause to say on May 13, 1898--Since the Crimean War nearly fifty years ago, the policy of this country has been a policy of strict isolation. We have had no allies--I am afraid we have had no friends. A new situation has arisen. All the powerful states of Europe have made alliances

17. Gooch and Temperley "British Documents on the Origins of the War." Vol. I Ch.I, also Ward and Gooch op. cit. p. 257, and Johnson and Bickford. "Contemplated German Alliance at Turn of the Century" p. 31 quotes Tsar's letter to Kaiser from "Die Grosse Politik" XIV 3803.
18. See page 60

and we are liable to be confronted at any moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even the most extreme politician would be able to contemplate it without a certain sense of uneasiness. We stand alone!"[19] The Boer War and its storm of criticism confirmed this.

In the meantime, certain influential officials had come to the conclusion that the difficulties with Germany were not as insurmountable as the combined ones of France and Russia, so negotiations were opened and Germany, who for years past had been angling for an alliance, now found herself sought by England. Salisbury was absent because of poor health and the affairs were largely in Chamberlain's hands. All cards were laid on the table and Chamberlain stated frankly that if an alliance were not completed with Germany, then one with France and Russia was not impossible.[20] The reasons for its rejection by Germany will be discussed fully in a later chapter.[21]

A friendly agreement was concluded, however, concerning the proposed loan to Portugal and the possible division of her colonies. This secret convention was signed in August 1898, but never became operative and the following year England secretly renewed her old treaty of protection with Portugal in the Windsor Treaty October 14, 1899.

Immediately after the Anglo-German Portuguese agreement in 1898, there occurred the Fashoda incident.[22] From this period on to 1904, British diplomacy must be interpreted in its changing

19. Fullerton, W. M. "Problems of Power" p.65
20. Brandenburg, Erich op.cit. p.160
21. Chap.II part 5--Attempts toward Anglo-German agreement.
22. See page 22-23

relations to Germany and France. There were more attempts at Anglo-German rapprochement and more Anglo-French friction, but in general, events were moving slowly but steadily toward the formation of the Entente of 1904. What was the main cause of this trend of events? I think we may look for it in the rise to power of Germany with its attendant fears aroused in both England and France.

3. OUTLINE OF FRENCH POLICY -- HOME AND FOREIGN

The disastrous close of the war of 1870 had shattered the French political hegemony on the Continent which she had enjoyed practically since the days of Richelieu. It precipitated besides, an internal crisis in the efforts to establish and secure the government under the Third Republic. It became necessary to defend the country against enemies within and without and regain some of the lost prestige.

In 1875 France gained strength through two important measures. February 25 saw the final passage of the Constitutional Laws establishing the Republic and on March 28 measures were passed which increased the army by adding a fourth battalion to every regiment. This apparently warlike measure, coupled with the rapidity the French war indemnity had been paid, aroused the fear in high German military circles that France had only been half crushed and was already preparing for a war of revenge.

There followed what is known as the War Scare of 1875. On May 6 there appeared in the Times a sensational article by M. deBlowitz, a Continental correspondent, giving a summary of what had recently appeared in the German press and predicting that war was on the point of breaking out. Immediate tension followed in spite of Bismarck's published statement of denial in the North German gazette: "The language of the European press is all the more unintelligible as absolutely nothing has occurred which is of a nature to trouble the relations existing between the French

and German Governments."[1]

However, England, being aroused probably through fear of Belgium being threatened, thought it best to protest and did so, by means of a letter from Queen Victoria to the Emperor. A personal visit from the Tsar and his Minister, Gortchakoff, brought Russian influence to bear, also. If Bismarck had any real intentions of forcing an issue the project was abandoned.[2]

To keep France isolated and prevent her regaining Alsace and Lorraine as well as her prestige, Bismarck fortified himself by alliances with Austria, Russia, Italy, and Rumania. He kept England friendly and he encouraged French colonial expansion as an antidote for the lost provinces.

So France devoted her energies under Jules Ferry toward building up a larger colonial empire. Except for the loss of Egyptian interests in 1882, the period 1880-85 was one of expansion. A protectorate was declared over Tunis in 1881, a Senegal and Niger expedition was undertaken in 1883, gains were made in the Congo in 1884, and the French established themselves also in Madagascar and in Tongking.

Ferry's policy had entailed enormous expense, it alienated Italy over Tunis and helped to cause her entrance into the Triple Alliance, it aroused friction with England over each acquisition, but it gave France a favorable position as a colonial power during the important colonial agreements made in the next decade.

1. Tardieu, Andre. "France and the Alliances" p. 125.
2. Schmitt, B. E. "England and Germany" p.131 believes the war scare may have been that Bismarck wanted to relieve the internal pressure of the Kulturkampf by a vigorous foreign policy.

However, it created strong political opposition at home and on Ferry's fall from power in 1885, coupled with reverses in Indo-China, much of the colonial enthusiasm waned for a time and thoughts were again turned toward France's position on the Continent. There she seemed isolated indeed. The Triple Alliance 1882 had been followed by an Insurance treaty between Russia and Germany 1884. In 1887 the Triple Alliance was renewed as well as the Reinsurance treaty and England joined Austria and Italy in the Mediterranean Pact.

Just at this period there occurred a crisis in what proved to be internal as well as external affairs.[3] In 1886 Freycinet chose as Minister of War, General Boulanger who had seen service in Algeria, Italy, and Cochin-China in 1870, had been Director of Infantry at the War Office in 1882, and in 1884 had commanded the army in Tunis. Boulanger proved to be a firebrand. He immediately set out to restore French prestige, and revived the old desire for the "revanche." He inaugurated a series of reforms in the organization and munitioning of the army, erected new barracks, and increased the troops on the eastern frontier. Immediately the Germans felt their superiority challenged and in November 1886 and March 1887 army bills calling for an increase were passed.

Then while suspicions were rife, an incident happened on the border which brought public opinion on both sides to fever heat. On April 20 a French police commissary named Schnaebelé was arrested by the Germany after having crossed the border on the strength of an

3. Lavisse, E. "Histoire de France Contemporaine" Vol. 8 by M.J.C. Seignobos, p.117-143

invitation to confer with a German colleague concerning an administrative matter. The question was of little real importance for he was soon released, but General Boulanger took this opportunity to bring in a bill to mobolize an army corps and this provoked counter manifestations in Germany in another army increase and harsher measures in Alsace and Lorraine, practically closing those provinces to French citizens.

The two Governments managed to keep cool and the crisis passed, but there was another side to the Boulanger affair. He had become the idol of a large part of the French people. A Belgian Chargé analyzed his appeal thus, "In Boulanger, the whole of France personifies her dreams of future greatness."[4] The Clerical, Monarchist, and Bonapartist parties saw a chance of overturning the Republic through Boulanger's leadership. For a time the opposition became alarmingly serious, but at the psychological moment Boulanger failed to take advantage of the chance for a coup d'etat and the movement collapsed.

Approaches were being made at this time by Bismarck to England for an alliance against France and possibly Russia,[5] so France began to feel stronger than ever the need of any ally for herself. The other nation in a similar situation was Russia. In 1888 the terms of the Austro-German pact of 1879 (directed against Russia) had been published, and in 1890 Germany had allowed the Russo-German Reinsurance treaty to lapse.[6] Besides, Russia and Germany were engaged in a tariff war and Germany had closed her banks to Russian loans. German support of Austria, Roumania, and Turkey

4. Gooch, G. P. "History of Modern Europe". p.134
5. See page 10
6. See page 30

blocked Russian designs in the Balkans and Near East, so she was ready to draw closer to France despite the difference in temperaments and governments. Mutual enmity to England was an equal if not a greater factor.

Their approchement had begun in 1888 when Russian capitalists needing money for their growing industrial enterprises and particularly for the Government project of a Trans-Siberian railroad, negotiated a loan with the French Government. Government bonds were placed on the market and the French people, taking them up, became creditors of th Russian Government. This form of popular finance gave millions of French citizens an economic interest in the stability of the existing Republican government and helped strengthen it by discouraging revolution. Further loans were made in the next decade.

In 1889 Russia placed an order for the manufacture of 500,000 rifles in France on assurance that they would never be used against the French. The fall of Bismarck in 1890 facilitated matters when his policy of isolating France and holding Russia friendly was no longer potent. Also, the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891 was a further signal and the visit of the French fleet at Cronstadt July 5 paved the way for a treaty of alliance which was signed August 22. The following year a military convention was drawn up, but not ratified until 1894, due to the death of Tsar Alexander III and a necessary readjustment following the accession of Nicholas II. In 1893 the Russian fleet had been fêted at Toulon and in January 1895 a formal acknowledgment was

made of the alliance. This was followed by more evidences of good feeling in the Tsar's visit to Paris 1896 and President Faure's return visit in 1897. France was no longer isolated, both France and Russia had a rear guard for their German frontiers, and Europe was divided into a balance of power again between the Triple and Dual Alliances.

To return to colonial matters, in 1890 France and England had concluded an agreement over Zanzibar and Madagascar, but the French return to a high protective tariff in 1892 caused more friction. In 1894 France and Germany joined in a protest over the Anglo-Congolese treaty. Friction in Siam was partially adjusted between England and France on January 15, 1896 and the Niger question on June 15, 1898.

The most serious rivalry was that of the Sudan. British and Egyptians had abandoned their efforts to subjugate it after the disaster of Khartoum in 1885. Renewed interest came as a result of the Cape-to-Cairo project as against the French Cape-Verde-to-Somaliland hopes. Also the dervishes were again becoming restless and Britain felt that the time had come to assert her authority. In 1895 Sir Edward Grey, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons in answer to a question that the British Government would regard any attempt by another power to occupy any part of the Upper Nile valley as an unfriendly act. In 1896, Kitchener at the head of the reorganized Egyptian army began the reconquest.

Despite the Grey declaration, Hanotaux considered the

Sudan as being under the sovereignty of the Sultan and all nations had equal rights there, so Marchand had been despatched from the French Congo to establish a post on the Upper Nile, reaching Fashoda July 10, 1898. After the successful battle of Omdurman, Kitchener learned of Marchand's occupation, marched south to meet him on September 19, and ordered him to retire. On Marchand's refusal the case was referred to the Home Governments and the tension became acute in both countries.

France was seriously handicapped by the disorganized condition of her army and officials as evidenced in the Dreyfus affair. She was also doubtful of having Russian support so the new foreign minister, Delcassé, accepted the British ultimatum and relinquished rights to the Bahr-el-Ghazal region in return for territory east and southeast of Lake Tchad. From this there was born a strong inclination to have a general clearing up of colonial matters between the two countries.

M. Hanotaux, Foreign Minister 1894-98, had championed Ferry's ideas of colonial expansion in direct rivalry with England, but Delcassé realized that colonial expansion was difficult if not impossible without English consent and he sought to gain from her friendship what he could not achieve through her enmity. It took six years to accomplish this and other causes of friction arose during the process.

Throughout the period of colonial rivalry just discussed, there were important Continental policies. The formation of the Dual Alliance required an adjustment in diplomacy. Germany, instead

of accepting its challenge, attempted to act in concert with it and thus nullify its effect as directed against herself. Russia was kept on a friendly basis through the constant interchange of personal letters between the Kaiser and Tsar, and Germany also refused to entertain in the negotiations with England any policy directed against Russia.[7] To France on the death of its leaders, ex-President MacMahon, President Carnot, and Jules Simon, the Kaiser sent personal letters of sympathy. The three countries co-operated in other instances,--at the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, and in a mutual protest at the Treaty of Shimoneseki, forcing its revision in favor of China. Unsuccessful attempts were made in 1896 by Germany to form a coalition against England in order to save the independence of the South African Republics. These were repeated by Russia in 1900 , but France refused to consider it because of the condition imposed by Germany requiring the territorial status quo of the three countries to be observed, thus necessitating the abandonment of hopes for regaining Alsace-Lorraine.

Between these two attempts occurred the Fashoda incident and the serious internal crisis of the Dreyfus affair.[8] From an army scandal, it developed into a fight for the very existance of the Republic. The core of the anti-Dreyfusard coalition, composed of the mob element, the army, Catholics and Royalists, was anti-Republican. Until the crisis was over the Government was practically paralyzed, which accounts in part for the complete surrender in the Fashoda situation.

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7. See page 56-7
8. Lavisse, E. op. cit. p.193-98

The outbreak of the Boer War intensified the anti-English feeling in France, but French official policy was now in the capable hands of Delcassé who had been connected with the Colonial Office from 1893-98 and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1898-1905.

Several personal visits to St. Petersburg 1899 and 1901, helped to strengthen the bonds of the Dual Alliance which had been wanting in intensity as each country looked after her own affairs. Russia had been turning her attention to questions in the Far East while France was occupied at home with the Dreyfus affair, then a religious struggle, and growing interests in Morocco.

The main tenet of Delcasse's policy aside from the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, seems to have been to safeguard France as a Mediterranean power and his efforts from 1900 to 1904 were directed toward settlements with Italy, England, and Spain which would secure this.

The economic troubles between France and Italy, as evidenced in the tariff war during the 'nineties, were settled by a commercial treaty in 1898. A diplomatic understanding was arrived at in 1900-02. The Franco-Moroccan accords of 1901 and 1902[9] had given France a predominant interest in that country which was confirmed by Italy in return for a free hand in Tripoli. Italy also gave the assurance that she would consider the Triple Alliance as a purely defensive matter and would not become either the instrument or an auxiliary of aggressive measures against France.[10]

Tentative approaches were made to Spain to settle the

9. See page 74
10. Lavisse, E. op. cit. p.310

Moroccan question, but these were not concluded until after the Anglo-French agreement of 1904.

4. GERMAN HEGEMONY IN EUROPE

If, as has been stated, the main cause of the formation of the Entente Cordiale was fear of Germany, then it will be necessary to survey the German growth during this period in order to prove or disprove the theory. Under the masterly strategy of Bismarck, Germany reached the apogee of political domination on the Continent. This was paralleled by an almost phenomenal industrial and commercial expansion, both movements resulting in an outgrowth of world policy championed by Emperor William II. A survey of these factors will show the grounds for the English and French fears.

a. POLITICAL HEGEMONY

BISMARCK'S HOME AND FOREIGN POLICY AND TRIPLE vs. DUAL ALLIANCE

Unification of the German Empire and its elevation to a place of primary importance on the Continent had been attained simultaneously. It was Bismarck's first care to preserve what had been accomplished internally and defend the newly achieved political importance.

Isolation of France to prevent a war of revenge prompted the formation in 1872 of a friendly concert, or Dreikaiserbund, among the rulers of Germany, Austria, and Russia to consult each other in international affairs.

German interests for the next four years were concerned mainly at home with the religious trouble known as the Kulturkampf, by which the Catholic party successfully opposed the state domination of the clergy. As noted before,[1] the war scare of 1875 may have been used partly as an outlet for distracting attention from this movement.

In 1876, due to the deadly rivalry of Austria and Russia over ambitions in the Balkans, the Dreikaiserbund lapsed. Bismarck as the "honest broker" of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 further incurred Russian enmity and being forced to choose between the two, Bismarck decided to ally himself more closely with Austria in the Dual Alliance of October 1878. By this pact each nation promised to assist the other in case of attack by Russia and to adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality in case of attack by any other power (meaning France), the terms of this treay remaining secret until 1888.

Fortified by this alliance, Bismarck now saw the need of securing a period of peace in which to develop the industrial and commercial activities of his country. Extravagant speculation and over production in the decade following the French war indemnity had brought on an economic crisis. The industrial leaders began an agitation in opposition to free trade. They were backed by the landowners in the agricultural districts who found it difficult to compete with Russian, Argentine, and United States grain imported free of duty. Added to this was the need of increasing the Imperial

1. See page 18

revenue, so in 1879 Bismarck championed a return to the protectionist policy to foster home production.

Another internal measure was his state social legislation from 1883-89 (accident, sickness, and old age insurance) to forestall and suppress the rising Social-Democratic movement among the Radicals.

The industrial expansion of the country led to the necessity for securing colonies as sources of raw material as well as for markets and an outlet for overpopulation. Almost against his will Bismarck was forced to sanction the colonial movement during the 'eighties. He had felt that Germany's greatness depended on her internal strength and he was a royalist rather than an imperialist. He had looked upon colonies more as apples of discord to toss among his rivals,[2] as is evident from a reported conversation between him and Lord Beaconsfield in 1878, "Do not quarrel with Russia, let her take Constantinople while you take Egypt. France will not prove inexorable. Besides, one might give her Syria or Tunis."[3]

Before embarking on an extensive program of colonial expansion, Bismarck felt it necessary to further secure German primacy on the Continent. He wrote, "The idea of coalitions gave me nightmares,"[4] so his marvelous skill in diplomacy was exerted to prevent their formation except in Germany's favor. His policy, which proved successful as long as he was in control, was for France to be kept in isolation, England not antagonized, and Russia returned to a feeling of friendliness.

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2. Bullard, Arthur. "Diplomacy of the Great War", p.17
3. Rose, J. H. "Origins of the War", p.98 from Oppert, Correspondent of the Times at Berlin.
4. Ibid. p.9 quoted from Bismarck--"Reflections and Reminiscences." Vol. II p.250-3

In 1882 the Dual Alliance was expanded to include Italy whose ancient grudge against Austria was not as strong as recent ones against France.[5] In 1883 Roumania was added to the Triple Alliance. True to his policy of retaining Russian friendship, Bismarck in 1884 attempted to renew the old entente of the three Emperors. Tsar Alexander II had died in 1881 and Gortschakoff in 1883 and Bismarck hoped to find the new administration more sympathetic. In 1884 was concluded a special agreement between Russia and Germany known as the Insurance treaty. The union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria 1886 led to differences between Russia and the Central Powers and in 1887 the Tsar wished to withdraw, but Bismarck persuaded him to a Reinsurance bond for three more years.

In the meanwhile England had cooperated with Austria and Italy in the Mediterranean agreement of 1887 and following the Franco-German war scare of 1887-8, had been approached by Germany for an alliance subsequent to previous attempts of 1875 and 1879.

The accession of William II in 1888 and the consequent friction ensuing between the new aggressive ruler and the old master diplomat whose iron hand as Chancellor had virtually controlled all matters for twenty years until his fall in 1890, led to a transformation in European politics. Bullard says, "Bismarck left to his nation a tradition of statescraft which only genius could manage. His technique in the hands of lesser men has not worked so smoothly."[6]

The new Chancellor, Caprivi, was a military man and a

5. Napoleon breaking the treaty of 1859, French support of the Pope, and the French protectorate over Tunis 1881.
6. Bullard, Arthur, op. cit. p.22

political novice and was conscious of lacking Bismarck's skill. The question of the renewal of the Russo-German treaty was uppermost at the time. Both Hammann and Brandenburg lay the responsibility for its non-renewal to Baron von Holstein, "the greatest intellectual force among statesmen of the post-Bismarckian period,"[7] a silent, rather mysterious, but extremely potent factor behind German diplomacy. Caprivi and the new Secretary of State, Baron von Marschall, influenced by Holstein, began to have doubts about renewing the treaty. They feared that Russian influence in Bulgaria might bring on a general war and besides, the treaty was thought to be incompatible with the Austro-German and the Roumanian treaties (which were considered more valuable.) Also, it was likely to alienate England. In Hammann's words, "The decisive factor in deciding whether there should be a new treaty or whether the Russian proposals should be rejected was, therefore, the fear that an acceptance of the clauses dealing with the Straits, [promising control of them and Constantinople to Russia as compensation for her neutrality in certain cases of war] if disclosed, contained enough inflammatory material to irritate England and blow up the Triple Alliance."[8]

However, the refusal to renew it was the signal, which, added to other causes, led directly to the drawing together of Russia and France into the Dual Alliance. Europe became divided into two armed camps with England as spectator growing more and more uneasy.

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7. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.23
8. Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p.48, also Flick, A. C. "Modern World History" p.511

In the Dual Alliance the electric current lacking before between the two sources of unrest--Alsace-Lorraine and the Balkans, was now set up. The chief concern of the Kaiser, according to Brandenburg, became to manipulate and nullify the effectiveness of the Alliance by removing the inflammable material from the two danger zones in Europe and piling it up in the Far East.[9] Thus, we have the cooperation in 1895 against the Shimoneseki Treaty, joint intervention in the Boxer uprising of 1900, as well as interest in the Boer War situation.

The rashness of the Kruger telegram episode had been partially counteracted and until after 1900 the Kaiser had managed to prevent his friendship with Russia and France from seriously affecting the cordial relations with England. Hammann believes that "the responsibility for Germany's lost opportunities for rapprochement with England must be placed to the account of Bulow's favorite theory that England always made other nations pull her chestnuts out of the fire, and partly to Holstein's academic policy and his dogma that the antagonism of England and Russia was an immutable fact. He also considered it impossible that Morocco could ever form a bridge for an entente cordiale between England and France."[10]

After 1900 the aggressive world policy of the German triumverate, Emperor William II, Chancellor von Bulow, and the Naval Secretary, Admiral von Tirpitz, became more evidently menacing and after the unsuccessful attempts at rapprochement in 1898-1901,[11]

9. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p. 59
10. Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p. 116
11. See page 56-65

England awoke to the same fear that France had entertained since 1870.

b. GERMAN ECONOMIC EXPANSION

The economic expansion of a country has for its basis the growth of population and its shift to urban life, development of industries based on raw materials and using the new applied scientific methods assisted by organized capital, the extension of foreign trade, and the building up of a large merchant marine. These lead naturally to the desire for a strong navy, the acquisition of colonies, economic penetration into other countries, and political influence.

England and France had already gone through practically all of these steps. This was because they had achieved their unification centuries before and had gained (England especially) by an early start through the Industrial Revolution.

Germany began late, but she profited by the earlier mistakes of the others, took advantage of modern industrial methods already in use, organized and applied them so efficiently that her marvelous development first astonished, and then frightened those countries which she rivalled and threatened to surpass.

GROWTH OF POPULATION

Since 1870, the number of births in Germany has been larger in proportion to her population than any other European state except Russia. Her death rate has decreased and since 1900 the emigra-

1. Helfferich, Karl. "Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth." p.17

tion has fallen to such a negligible quantity[2] that there is much pressure from overpopulation. Comparative statistics of population for Germany, England and France show approximately:

DATE	GERMANY	ENGLAND	FRANCE
1875	42,700,000	33,100,000	36,900,000
1905	60,600,000	43,200,000	39,200,000

An increase of 42 per cent in Germany as against 31 per cent in England and 6 per cent in France.

This situation was a serious question for France with a population almost stationary. "The German increase during two months equalled that of France for five years."[3] Need for more man power was probably one of the factors leading to the formation of the Alliance with Russia as well as furthering the desire for more colonies as possible sources of supply for auxiliary troops.

The large German population increase required the enlargement of the food supply. More intensive cultivation of the soil was practiced ith improved scientific methods of drainage, fertilizers, and use of machinery, so substantial gains were made in the yield of crops. However, Germany ceased to be self-subsistent after 1883 and in 1900 food imports amounted to 29 per cent of the total imports.[4]

SHIFT OF POPULATION TO URBAN LIFE

There was a gradual exodus from the country to the city and the economic system changed from agricultural to industrial and

2. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. p.73 Emigration 1880--200,000 a year
1900-- 20,000 a year
3. Schapiro, J. S. "Modern and Contemporary European History" p.272
4. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. p.74

commercial. In 1882 a census of the occupations of wage earners and their families showed[5] 19.23 millions employed in agriculture against 18.5 millions in 1895, while manufacturing rose from 16.06 millions in 1882 to 20.25 in 1895, and trade and commerce 4.53 millions in 1882 to 5.97 millions engaged in that occupation in 1895.

In 1871 there were only 8 large towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, but by 1900 this had grown to 33. The ratio of urban to rural population changed.[6]

	1871	1900
Town population (5,000 and over)	23.7	42.26
Rural communities (under 5,000)	76.3	57.74

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

To support the increasing urban population, new industries must be created. Industrial development rests largely on coal and iron resources. Germany has coal deposits in the Rhineland, Westphalia, Silesia, and the Saar valley. The iron ore in Lorraine became of great value after the process invented in 1878 made it possible to burn out the phosphorus and use even the slag for fertilizer.

The physical sciences were developed and applied so that labor saving machinery, steam, electricity, combustion motors, and gas engines further aided industrial growth. Chemical processes were used in producing fertilizers, artificial indigo, vanilla, coal tar dyes, pharmaceutical preparations etc. These products were

5. Cambridge Modern History Vol.XII p.169
6. Dawson, W. H. "Evolution of Modern Germany", p.39

produced much more cheaply because the processes demanded less time, power, and raw materials and recovered for new uses the by-products and waste.

Germany soon challenged England as the "workshop of the world" for her exports of machinery, textiles, leather goods, wood work, chemicals, and pottery were of the same type as England's and therefore rivalled her.

France exports largely elegant articles of art, luxury, and fashion--silks, wines, toilet articles, furnishings for parlor, wardrobe, and boudoir and she imports the coarser fabrics, so her needs are reciprocal rather than antagonistic to England and Germany.

It was between England and Germany then, that this industrial production was serious, as evidenced in the following tables.[7]

COAL PRODUCTION

UNITED KINGDOM		GERMANY
	Tons	Metric tons (2204 lbs.)
1880	146,969,000	46,974,000
1890	181,614,000	70,238,000
1900	225,181,000	109,290,000
	Increase 53.9%	Increase 132.6%

IRON ORE

UNITED KINGDOM		GERMANY
	Tons	Metric tons
1880	18,026,000	7,239,000
1890	13,781,000	11,406,000
1900	14,028,000	18,964,000
	Decrease	Increase 161,9%

7. Schmitt, B. E. op.cit. p.100

PIG IRON

UNITED KINGDOM		GERMANY
	Tons	Metric tons
1880	7,749,000	2,713,000
1890	7,904,000	4,651,000
1900	8,959,000	8,507,000
	Increase 15.6%	Increase 213.6%

CRUDE STEEL

UNITED KINGDOM		GERMANY
	Tons	Metric tons
1880	----------	----------
1890	3,579,000	2,232,000
1900	4,901,000	6,362,000
	Increase 36.9%	Increase 185%

England had led in iron production of the world until 1900 when the United States got first place, but in 1903 Germany gained the first rank.[8]

The cotton industry was next to feel the rivalry. The average annual number of spindles employed in Germany in 1870-74 rose from 4,262,000 to 8,450,000 in 1900-04 and the consumption of raw cotton from 2.2 million cwt. to 6.8 for the same years. Also, the estimated annual consumption of raw sheep and lamb's wool averaged 174.5 million lbs. in 1875-9 and was 345.3 in 1900-04.[9] A comparison of cotton importation statistics of Liverpool and Bremen show in bales;

	LIVERPOOL	BREMEN
1885	2,558,798	530451
1895	2,090,123	918,955
1905	2,485,686	1,612,066

A decrease for Liverpool as against 222.7 per cent increase for Bremen.

8. Ogg, F. A. "Economic Development of Modern Europe," p.227
9. Ashley, Percy "Modern Tariff History" p.105-6

Another example is the indigo production. Indigo had been one of India's great staples. At the beginning of the decade 1890-1900 her total crop was estimated from $20,000,000 to $25,000,000 with both culture and trade almost exclusively in English hands. Then Germany, by chemical processes, made artificial indigo from coal tar products, producing three-fourths of all the indigo used in the world, so in the early years of the twentieth century the total yield of India had fallen to one-fourth its former amount.[11]

The impetus to German industrial growth had come largely through the unification of Germany making possible a comprehensive, coordinated, national industrial policy. The receipt of the French war indemnity had given capital for this expansion and the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine with their resources and output, added greatly to the development as did also the increase in population. The systematic support of home industries by protective tariff after 1879 led to its use as a weapon or a bargain for securing better concessions in foreign trade.[12] Commercial treaties with foreign countries opened new markets.

One secret of this successful expansion lay in the coordination of the various processes of production. The Krupps, for instance, produce all that they require from ore to the finished product. Their organization includes coal mines, coking plants, iron mines, smelting works, steel working up to the manufacture of machines, cannon, other munitions, and armor plate; also electrical

11. Schulze-Galvernitz, Dr. G. von. "England and Germany--Peace or War?" In American Review of Reviews (November 1909) p.604-5.
12. Ogg, F. A. "Economic Development of Modern Europe", p.224-5

works, river vessels for transporting coal and ores, and a high sea fleet.[13]

Business undertakings are consolidated into Kartells in which each firm retains its individuality, accepts certain rules in regard to production which eliminates wasteful competition, and shares in the effort to keep prices stable and remunerative and secure the maximum of economic success.

The prequisite basis of capital for extensive technical equipment and labor is concentrated through stock companies and the credit system. An intimate correlation exists between the industrial and banking systems. The large Berlin banks owned shares in provincial banks and also blocks of shares in industrial companies and have representatives on their governing boards.[14]

Facilities of land and water transportation have been increased. The railways are largely owned and operated by individual states, but supervised by an Imperial Railway Board establishing uniform regulations for the entire Empire. Low rates are allowed on export goods to enable the German manufacturer to better compete in foreign markets. If new industries are begun, rates on raw materials imported are lowered in order to encourage the enterprise.[15] To show the comparative growth of railroads in the United Kingdom and Germany, we find that:[16]

	UNITED KINGDOM	GERMANY
1870	15,239 miles	11,600 miles
1900	21,826	31, 173
	Increase 43.2%	Increase 168.7%

13. Helffrich, Karl op.cit.p.42
14. Allen, G. H. "The Great War--Causes and Motives" Vol.I p.73-4
15. Schapiro, J. S. op.cit. p.305
16. Hurd and Castle op.cit. p.238

Inland water transportation was made cheap and easy by the construction of 6,000 miles of natural and artificial waterways and channels of shallow rivers were dredged out.

EXTENSION OF FOREIGN TRADE

The necessity of importing huge quantities of raw materials to make over into manufactured articles and the surplus exported in return for food and more raw materials, led to the need of expanding the foreign trade. The Germans applied the same thorough scientific methods in extending their trade and securing raw materials and markets as they had in the industrial production. They realized that the commercial field was already full of earlier competitors whom they must rival and undermine. German business methods which challenged the English trade were built up on an efficient system of cheap goods, effective advertising, competent well-trained salesmen, catering to individual and national tastes, and government assistance.[17]

Cheap goods were made possible by the plentiful supply of labor whose living standard was lower and more economical than the English, as well as by the mechanical labor saving devices and the scientific processes by which the goods were produced.

The English had followed the traditional customs, had offered standard wares in standard forms, and had demanded quick payments through English banking houses. The Germans, after studying the markets, offered wares made especially to suit the taste or

17. Schmitt, B. E. op.cit. p.100

needs of the customers, gave long credits, and allowed easy payments. Their wares were just as serviceable, less expensive, and gave more complete satisfaction in many instances. The English acknowledged the superiority of German methods. The English Consul at Rio de Janeiro said, "The Germans have conquered South America by the peculiar study they have made of its requirements," and the Consul at Riga, "A German seizes every opportunity of pleasing his customers."[18]

This success in salesmanship was based mainly upon the thorough training given the commercial representatives through the technical schools and mercantile colleges. Not only industries and trades were taught, but foreign languages, characteristics and methods, so the commercial houses could secure a trained corps of excellent technically trained salesmen with a knowledge of the customs and needs of the foreign market.

Ambassadors and Consuls acted as commercial agents also, keeping the home industries informed as to conditions and needs of the various markets. Government assistance, both of the various states and the Imperial Government, was given to the training schools, protective legislation was passed, while the state controlled and regulated charges on inland transportation. Manufacturing interests were furthered by Industrial Associations and Chambers of Commerce, and foreign trade was promoted by an Association of Export Firms of the large industrial towns who had agents abroad to keep them posted on arrangements for transport of goods, tariffs etc.[19]

As early as 1885 the English had begun to feel the effects

18. Tardieu, Andre op. cit. p. 54
19. Dawson, W. H. op. cit. p. 94

of the industrial rivalry. Being a free trade country, she received free of duty almost all exports of rival countries while compelled to pay on goods sent to those countries duties ranging from 10 per cent to as high as 130 per cent.[20] From August 1885 to December 1886 a "Royal British Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry" met and collected an immense number of consular reports and statistics and suggested that British business interests were making ineffective opposition to German competition. Another Parliamentary commission reached the same conclusion in 1896.[21] In 1887 a law was passed by Parliament requiring all goods not manufactured in England to be so marked, but the label, "Made in Germany" has had the effect of widely advertising German goods.

An English commercial attache in a study of English trade from 1885-95 wrote, "Our industrial supremacy is no longer the proven fact it used to be. We no longer are in the enviable situation of former times when we never met in the markets of the world any serious competitors in the sale of our manufactured products. The good old times are over; the evolution and progress of all nations has forces us to face new conditions."[22] Again, in 1902 an official document devoted to a comparative study of the economic development of Great Britain and her principal competitors concluded with, "If peace is not disturbed, Germany and the United States will certainly continue their industrial and commercial development. The competition which these countries are offering us in the neutral markets

20. Ogg, F. A. "Economic Development of Modern Europe" p.272
21. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. p.98
22. Viallate, Achille. op. cit. p.49 quotes W. S. H. Gastrell, "Our Trade in the World in Relation to Foreign Competition 1885-95" p.2

and even in our home market, unless we prove active, will become more and more serious."[23]

One of the real causes of the inferiority of English industry should be sought in England itself, the lack of widespread scientific education systematically organized being the real reason for slowness of economic advance.[24] Asquith analyzed it thus, "A defective knowledge, the use of inferior methods, lack of flexibility and versatility, an obstinate industrial conservation, these are the true enemies of English industry, they harm it infinitely more than all the customs, tariffs and all the dumping syndicates that were ever created."[25]

English trade was not really so decadent, but only by contrast with the sudden rapid development of Germany, it seemed to be progressing slowly.[26]

Merchandise for which returns have been received,--exclusive of bullion and specie.[27]

IMPORTS FOR TWELVE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 1900, POUNDS STERLING

Germany	United Kingdom	France
277,853,000	523,075,000	187,912,000
(For twelve months ending December 1903)		
299,176,000	473,349,000	185,956,000
EXPORTS--SAME YEARS		
220,717,000	*291,192,000	164,348,000
248,979,000	*290,890,000	166,794,000

* Exports of British and Irish produce and manufactore. The table shows a German increase while the British decreased.

23. Ibid, p.49 quotes Memorandum by A. E. Bateman (1902) "Comparative Statistics of Population, Industry and Commerce."
24. Ibid p.51
25. Asquith, H. H. "Trade and the Empire" p.31 Speech at Cinderford October 8, 1903.
26. Whelpley, J. D. "The Trade of the World" p.63
27. Great Britain, Board of Trade. "Foreign Trade and Commerce." Reports 1901 and 1904

Holt and Chilton gives the total imports and exports for Great Britain as:[28]

1875	--	$3,250,000,000	-- 49 per cent increase
1905	--	4,850,000,000	

And for Germany

1875	--	$1,500,000,000	
1905	--	3,300,000,000	-- 120 per cent increase

We know also that from 1870 to 1900 Germany rose from fourth to second place in international trade.[29]

Durham[30] points out however, that only in Europe has Britain cause for fear of German competition. In 1899-1903 Germany sold to European countries £ 65,434,000 more per annum than Britain and in 1904-08 she sold them £ 92,012,000 more. This is largely due to her position in Central Europe. The important markets are at her door and she can get goods into them generally at the cost of one handling and one train journey at very cheap rates.

IN THOUSAND POUNDS STERLING

TO	FROM GERMANY			FROM ENGLAND		
	1899-1903	1904-1908	Increase	1899-1903	1904-1908	Increase
European Countries	173,284	224,280	50,990	107,850	132,268	24,418
Non-European foreign countries includ. Hongkong	43,055	64,921	21,866	75,278	111,068	35,790
British possessions excluding Hongkong	9,259	11,476	2,217	98,859	118,513	19,654
TOTAL	225,598	300,677	75,079	281,987	361,849	79,862

28. Holt and Chilton "History of Europe 1862-1914" p.297
29. Bullard, Arthur op.cit. p.56
30. Durham, Geoffrey "Foreign Trade of Great Britain and Germany" in Contemporary Review (October 1910) p.398-402

As regards European trade, Germanu made better progress than England, but England surpassed in non-European foreign countries where competitors were on more even terms as far as transportation is concerned and also progressed more in the British possessions.

GROWTH OF THE MERCHANT MARINE

Foreign trade is dependent upon an adequate mercantile marine and the growth of the shipping industry in Germany kept pace with the needs. In 1871 Germany had approximately 147 steamships with a net tonnage of 81,994 and 4,372 sailboats net tonnage 900,361, totalling 4,519 ships with 982,355 tonnage. This was increased by 1904 to 1,622 steamships with 1,739,690 tonnage and 2,258 sailboats of 497,607 totalling 3,882 ships of 2,237,297 net tonnage[31] which means 127.7 per cent increase.

The German share in the merchant marine of the world in 1874 was 5.2 per cent, in 1894--6.5 and in 1905--9.9[32] while the Hamburg-American and the North German Lloyd lines were the two largest shipping concerns in the world; but comparison with statistics of the United Kingdom show the total net register of tonnage to be:

	UNITED KINGDOM	GERMANY
1870	5,690,789	982,355
1880	6,574,513	1,181,525
1890	7,978,538	1,433,413
1900	9,304,108	1,941,645

The British strengthened their general lead by 2,654,029,[33] so the challenge was not as large as to cause immediate fear, greatest

31. Dawson, W. H. op. cit. p.70
32. Dawson, W. H. loc. cit.
33. Hurd and Castle op. cit. p.305

competition coming after 1904.

NAVAL EXPANSION

The growing merchant marine however, required also the growth of a navy to support and protect it and in this factor we find the main root of English suspicion. The Germans admit this. Hammann says, "The increasing rivalry of England and Germany in mercantile policies and international commerce did not of itself need to lead to political discord had Germany not adopted an extensive naval policy."[34]

In 1889 the British Naval Defense Act had laid down the two-power standard directed against France and Russia. The inauguration of a new German naval policy as expressed by the Kaiser, "Our future lies on the water"[35] brought Germany within the sphere of active rivalry.

Admiral Mahan in his summary of the position of England in 1713 had said, "The sea power of England was not merely in a great navy.....Neither was it in a prosperous commerce.....It was in the union of the two carefully fostered that England made the gain of sea power over and beyond all other states."[36] The Germans had taken this as an example and under the active instigation of the Kaiser and the able organization of Admiral von Tirpitz, Marine Minister since 1897, an ambitious naval bill was passed March 28,1898 providing for seventeen battleships, eight coast defense

34. Hammann, Otto op. cit. p.250
35. Gooch, G. P. "History of Modern Europe" p.231
36. Robinson, Howard. "The Development of the British Empire" p.83 quotes A. T. Mahan "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783" p.225

vessels, nine large and twenty-six small cruisers. This program was doubled June 12, 1900 and what gave it especial interest was the explanatory memorandum annexed to the law. This definitely announced German intentions to become a mighty naval power. "To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies in the existing circumstances there is only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest sea power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world."[37]

A Navy League was organized in 1898 to win popular support for the new German sea aspirations. It has been said that the League was financed by the Krupp family and other manufacturers who would benefit by an increase of the fleet.[38] The League grew from 286 local branches with a contributing membership of 250,000 in 1900 to 3,600 branches and 635,00 members in 1904.[39] There were numerous methods of spreading propaganda--monthly papers, pamphlets, items of naval news sent about once a week to papers, a Naval album published, lectures and illustrated lantern slides, uniforms, badges and bunting supplied for local festivities. The most effective department was that which arranged excursions to Naval ports for school classes from inland districts to arouse enthusiasm.[40] "The increase of the fleet may have been defensive in theory and intention, but it was aggressive in its effect."[41]

The British feeling concerning this challenge to her sea power is well expressed by Sir Edward Grey: "There is no comparison

37. Hurd and Castle op. cit. Appendix II
38. Ibid. p.209
39. Holt and Chilton op. cit. p.301
40. Hurd and Castle op. cit. p. 210
41. Ibid p.285

~~comparison~~ between the importance of the German navy to Germany and the importance of our navy to us. Our navy is to us what their army is to them. To have a strong navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce, but it is not the matter of life and death to them that it is to us."[42]

ACQUISITION OF COLONIES

The colonial question had not interested Germany until about 1880. Then the need of colonies became urgent as a means of securing necessary raw materials as well as outlets for surplus production, capital, and population. There were political reasons as well,--to enhance German prestige and power by participation in the general imperialistic movement.

The most valuable colonies had already been acquired by the other nations, but Germany secured West and East Africa, the Cameroons, Togoland, and islands in the Pacific. German hopes of uniting West and East Africa led in a large measure to the support of the Boers. The Kaiser wanted to declare a Transvaal Protectorate and despatch troops immediately after the Jameson raid, but his Ministers talked him out of it because of its danger and suggested a telegram of congratulation instead.[43] Hammann says that Germany wanted to safeguard her economic interests in South Africa and could not take the initiative in declaring a protectorate unless South Africa made proposals to the European powers to obtain guarantees against similar attacks.

42. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. p.201
43. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.84-5.

Then the German Government could support them, so the telegram was meant to assure them of German interest in case the proposals should be forthcoming.[44]

ECONOMIC PENETRATION

German colonies were small in area and poor in quality as compared with those of the other nations, so commercial penetration became of more value than acquiring actual colonies. Brazil, being shut out from political acquisition by the Monroe Doctrine, fell to a large extent under German economic control. Morocco also, since the Convention of Madrid 1880 had been the scene of active commercial interest. In China a fortified naval base was secured by the lease of Kiau-Chau on March 6, 1899 and with it, the commercial control of the adjacent territory, thus making the greater part of the province of Shantung into a German sphere of influence.

The scene of greatest activity was in the Ottoman Empire. As early as 1880 a commercial society was founded in Berlin with a capital of 50,000,000 marks to promote the penetration of Asia Minor.[45] In 1883 General von der Goltz was sent at the request of the Sultan to reorganize the Turkish army. A branch of the Deutsche Bank of Berlin had been established in Constantinople and in 1890 a Turko-German commercial treaty was made. In 1889 and again in 1898 the Kaiser visited Constantinople, on the latter visit extending the journey to the Holy Land where at a memorable speech at Damascus

44. Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p. 69-71
45. Marriott, J. A. R. "The Eastern Question", p.404

November 8, 1898, he named himself protector of all the Sultan's Mohammedan subjects through out the East.

J. E. Barker says, "The Germans were attracted toward Asiatic Turkey not only because of its vast economic possibilities, but also because of its matchless position at a spot where three continents meet, where three continents may be dominated, where Russia and the British Empire may most effectively be attacked, where the rule of the world may be won."[46] Communication between Europe and Asia was carried on mostly by the two water routes,--around South Africa and the shorter one through the Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal, both controlled by England. A quicker and easier one would be by railroad. One that extended from Berlin through central Europe and the Balkans to Constantinople and from there across Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf would hold a strategic menace to the British Empire, while it would also open up a country of unrivalled and so far, undeveloped resources. Von Bulow speaks of it, "This land can hardly be surpassed for fertility and for its great possibilities of development in the future. If one can speak of boundless prospects anywhere, it is in Mesopotamia."[47] So the project known as the Bagdad Railway was launched.

In 1888 Turkey gave a concession to financial interests headed by the Deutche Bank to purchase the line already built from Haidar Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Ismid and continue it to Angiora. The Anatolian Railway Co. was formed in 1889 to work the

46. Barker, J. E. "Great Problems of British Statesmanship," p.60
47. Viallate, Achille op. cit. p.46 quotes Prince B, von Bulow in "Imperial Germany", English translation 1914, p.98.

concession. Angora was reached in 1892 and a new concession extended the line to Konia, which was completed in 1896. The right to build to Bagdad and Basra was secured by a convention in 1899 and in 1903 a concession was granted by the Sultan for ninety-nine years to a new corporation, the Bagdad Railway Co. (in which the Anatolian Co. took shares) authorizing the extension of the line including branch lines to a terminus at a point on the Persian Gulf.

In 1900 the Germans had endeavored to buy a concession from the Sheik of Koweit for a Persian Gulf port, but he refused, backed by British support. He had secretly accepted protection from the British Government against the Sultan in 1899 for a promise not to cede any territory without British consent. Russia had also been unwilling to allow the railroad to pass so near her Caucasus frontier and had forced the Germans to plan a more southern route. In 1900 a branch line had been begun by the Sultan, with German support, from Damascus south to Medina and Mecca, menacing the English control of Egypt as the main line menaced India.

The new concession of March 5, 1903 included mining rights, harbor facilities and privileges of inland navigation as well as a large kilometric guarantee. The railway was not likely to be self-supporting and this guarantee would necessitate an increase of the Turkish customs and a reorganization with German backing. This would fall heavily on the British imports which exceeded those of other countries.

The Germans needed financial support in the construction of the line and the British at first thought it better to participate

than to have it built without their control. The German financial project proposed that she, England, and France each raise an equal amount and the remainder go to small neutral countries. However, England feared that neutral interests would be sold out to Russia. Also, the bonds were to be Turkish Government securities which were sure to depreciate in value and give the Deutsche Bank an opportunity to buy them in at a low rate and acquire practical ownership.

It had been represented to England at first that the railroad would be under international control. Besides doubts as to the sound financial methods, she found that it would be entirely in the hands of a company under German control through appointing a majority of the directors, when the Convention between the Turkish Government and the Anatolian Railway Co. was published, so the British group withdrew.

A French group in the Ottoman Bank had reached an agreement with the Deutsche Bank in 1899 through the interests of M. Rouvier. After the British withdrawal, the new arrangement suggested to France was 40% German, 40% French and 20% neutral consisting of 10% Austrian, 5% Swiss, 2% for Milanese bankers and the remaining 3% for bankers in Constantinople, all more or less under German influence. With the English and Russian hostility to the project added to his own suspicions, Delcassé withdrew his Government's support. Some French capital did enter, but contrary to the expressed wishes of the Government. Thus the Bagdad Railway enterprise placed France and England on common ground in their distrust of Germany.[48]

48. Material for the Bagdad project found principally in Gooch and Temperley. op. cit. ch. 12; Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p.240-44; Fraser, David. "The Short Cut to India", ch.3,22,24,25; Schmitt B. E. op. cit. ch.10; Stuart, G. H. "French Foreign Policy", p.102-07; Chéradame, André "The Bagdad Railway"; Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.299-301

In concluding the discussion of the general economic rivalry between Germany and England, a German himself acknowledges that, "Our rise depended essentially on the English policy of the open door. We were sojourners in England's house, paying guests of the Anglo-Saxons. The secret of our success, apart from our organization and the training of our working classes, lies in the fact that England and the countries which are the great producers of raw materials, granted us an open door and allowed us to draw on their vast reservoirs of raw materials."[49] Realizing the truth of this, a movement in England known as the tariff reform had been initiated to substitute for free trade a system of preferential trade between the colonies and mother country,--a sort of "Imperial Zollverein" or customs union with a protective tariff against foreign goods. This was not accomplished before 1904, but the agitation has continued.

c. GERMAN "WELTPOLITIK"

Commercial rivalry was not alone the cause of suspicion and fear against Germany. Her sudden accession of wealth and power inspired great self-confidence which demanded recognition. Their national achievements impressed the conviction upon the Germans that they possessed superiority in civilization and were therefore called to a place of leadership among the nations.

In this desire for world prestige the imperial idea seems to have been inherited from the old Holy Roman Empire. In 1900 the Kaiser said, "I hope that to Germany it will be granted to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as

49. Egerton, H. E. "British Colonial Policy in the 20th Century" p.117-18 quotes Emil Zimmerman--"The German Empire of Central Africa", English translation with Introduction by Edwyn Bevan, p.2.

was once the Roman Empire."[1] Nowhere is the passion for world power so clearly shown as in a further utterance of the Kaiser on July 3, 1900, "The wave-beat knocks powerfully at our gates and calls us as a great nation to maintain our place in the world--in other words to pursue world policy. The ocean is indispensable for German greatness; but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again arrived at without Germany and the German Emperor."[2]

This doctrine dominated the governing classes and the idea of superiority was impressed on the masses of the German people through education and literature. The most influential possibly of the interpreters of this extreme national ardor was the man known as the "Bismarck of the Chair"--Henrich von Treitschke who was Professor of History, first st Heidelburg and then at the University of Berlin. "In the hands of this Prussian historian who combined great learning with fervent patriotism, History became a form of political propaganda."[3] He taught that the state was all powerful and it was the duty of Germany to expand her power by force of arms. He implanted the idea also that England was the greatest enemy who must be conquered before Germany could fulfil her mission of spreading German Kultur throughout the world.

The philosophy underlying this ideal of weltpolitik as well as its outward manifestations may be seen in Treitschke's prophecy:

1. Ogg, F. A. "German Ambition for World Power", p.33
2. Dawson, Wm. H. op. cit. p.349
3. Schapiro, J. S. op. cit. p. 170

"When Germany's flag covers and protects this huge empire, to whom will the sceptre of the universe belong? Who will impose her will on other nations enfeebled or decadent? Is it not Germany who will have the mission of assuring peace to the world? Russia, a huge giant in process of formation and with feet of clay, will be absorbed by her internal and economic difficulties. England, stronger in appearance than in reality, will doubtless see her colonies separate from her and will wear herself out in barren struggles. France a prey to her domestic strife and quarrels, will sink more and more into final ruin. As for Italy, she will have enough to do if she wishes to bestow tranquillity on her children. The future, therefore, belongs to Germany with whom Austria will unite if she has a desire to live."[4]

Utterance such as this from a young nation startled the old established ones from their smug complacency, especially when the pretensions to world empire were backed up by such manifestations as the commercial expansion, the enlarged navy and activities of the Navy League, the Drang Nach Osten movement toward Asiatic Turkey, and the ambitions of the Pan-German League.

The latter was founded in 1886 and reorganized in 1893 without formal government sanction, but it inflamed the national spirit. Their propaganda on behalf of German expansion embraced cultural, political and economic aspects. The object was to revive German national sentiment, preserve German thought and customs in Europe and across the seas where German colonists were found, and weld their nationalists everywhere into a compact mass as a nucleus for the spread of German Kultur.[5] Their political dream was of incorporating and controlling all Teutonic people in Central Europe between the Baltic and Alps, and from there to push southeast through the Balkans toward Asia Minor.[6] To pave the way for this political union they desired

4. Tardieu, André op. cit. p.51-2
5. Rose, J. H. op. cit. p.64, also Davis, W. S. op. cit. ch.XVII
6. Comstock, G. C. "Why Germany Wanted War", p.52

to form an economic unit by extending the existing Customs Union through Middle Europe with a protective tariff against outside nation.[7]

In 1902 at Aix-la-Chapelle the Kaiser confessed that, "It is to the empire of the world that the German genius aspires."[8] What nation has not dreamed of someday securing its "place in the sun"? However, national aspirations are not always proclaimed aloud in such an arrogant manner. Seymour says that the opposing elements of confidence and fear that Germany might be blocked from her dreams of dominion produced the tone of belligerence manifested in Germany around 1900.[9]

The basis may have been in economic conditions, but it was largely these bellicose manifestations which alarmed the people of England and France and caused them ultimately to draw together for mutual support.

7. Prothero, G. W. "German Policy Before the War", p.30-1
8. Ogg. F. A. "German Ambition for World Power", p.33
9. Seymour, Charles op. cit. p.109

5. ATTEMPTS TOWARD ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE

There had been no strong traditional enmity between England and Germany, the greatest fears of rivalry really lay in the future. Bismarck's policy had been to keep England in friendly cooperation with the Triple Alliance and previous efforts toward a closer union have already been mentioned.[1]

Of English attempts at a rapprochement in the spring of 1898 there is very little documentary evidence in the British archives, for the parleys were in Joseph Chamberlain's hands and were treated as a private matter.[2] Until his Memoirs are published our information must come for the most part from Die Grosse Politik which treats the subject fully from the official German documents.

Tentative suggestions were made by Chamberlain in conference with Count Hatzfeldt on March 29 and April 25, but the way had been opened by previous conversation between Lord Balfour and Hatzfeldt, the general tenor of which was that there was no essential conflict between German and English interests.[3]

Bülow instructed Hatzfeldt that Germany could not consider a treaty unless it was ratified by Parliament, as otherwise, if a change in ministry occurred, England could easily elude her treaty obligations should a war come. Brandenburg[4] interprets his motives as being afraid if the treaty were made and published and then rejected by Parliament, that Germany would be hopelessly compromised with Russia.

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1. See pages 7&9
2. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. Intro. to vol.II, also Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.257 and 276
3. Johnson and Bickford op. cit. p.25 from "Die Grosse Politik" XIV 3778,3779,3780.
4. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.107-8

Since the accession of the new Tsar in 1894 there had grown up a seemingly cordial feeling between the cousins "Willy and Nicky". Germany's exposed eastern frontier made it advisable to keep diplomatic relations friendly. She felt that an Anglo-German treaty directed against Russia and France was not worth the risk when the English navy would be of little value in helping defend German frontiers. The few colonial concessions which England might give were too cheap a price to pay for a possible war with Russia. The Kaiser even sounded out the Tsar, telling him of the negotiations and asking what Russia would offer Germany if the English offer were refused.[5] However, Bülow not trusting Russian policy, did not wish to definitely close the subject with England for he wanted to keep her friendly as a spard card against Russia in case the need arose.[6]

After Salisbury's recuperation and return, the propositions were place before him, but he did not favor any formal binding treaty until a case of necessity arose through actual serious menace to British interests. "Finally, both sides agreed it would be better first to prepare public opinion and dispel the feeling of ill humor. So the idea of an allinace remained a 'possibility of the future' (Bulow)".[7]

Attempts at an alliance from this until their abandonment in 1902 show a pendulum-like movement between rapprochement and the increasing causes of friction. Throughout this period 1898-1902,

5. Johnson and Bickford op. cit. p.31
6. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.107-8
7. Hammann, Otto op. cit. p.79

the two Governments maintained an officially friendly and correct attitude, but between the people of the two nations, stirred by a hostile press, the breach became wider.

In October 1899 the long threatening Boer War broke out. Public opinion on the Continent in general favored the South African republics and the press, particularly in France and Germany, bitterly criticized the British policy. The Kaiser, however, wishing to erase the memory of the ill-considered telegram of 1895 in view of the possibility of further negotiations with England, chose this as an auspicious moment for a visit to his grandmother, Queen Victoria. Von Bülow who accompanied him, had conversation with Chamberlain and in his speech at Leicester, November 30, Chamberlain propounded the idea of an Anglo-German-United States alliance: "If union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world."[8]

Immediately following this in 1900 relations became strained again. In the last part of 1899 had occurred the Bundesrat incident. Several German mail steamers suspected of carrying contraband had been stopped and searched off the coast of Africa by British cruisers. The Bundesrat had been detained, but on protest from the German Government the British Government had ordered its immediate release, a suitable compensation paid to the German Shipping Co., and an assurance that German ships would not again

8. Seymour, Charles op. cit. p.138, quoted in Annual Register 1899 p.227

be molested on mere suspicion.[9] However, indignation ran high in Germany and von Tirpitz exploited the indicent to show the need of an adequate protective German navy in support of the new Navy bill of 1900.

In the meantime, attempts to form another coalition against England were in progress. The initiative seems to have come from Russia, although Stuart[10] attributes it to a suggestion of the Queen of Holland made to the Russian Tsar. On the other hand, Sir Valentine Chirol says[11] he has been assured that, "The original suggestion of French, Russian and German intervention to stop the war was made in one of the many private letters with which the German Emperor constantly importuned the Tsar in the shape of an appeal to follow up the generous initiative he had taken in inviting the Powers to the Peace Conference of the Hague, by an opportune word of friendly remonstrance in London against the danger to the peace of the world involved in the South African War."

The facts we are sure of are that the Russian Ambassador Muravieff proposed in Paris and Berlin in February and March 1900 the united intervention of the three powers between England and the Boers. The German office would not consider it except on the condition that the three powers should mutually guarantee the integrity of their territories.[12] To France this would mean acquiescence in the Treaty of Frankfort and giving up hopes of the revanche. As the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was still a vital part of their policy

9. Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.279
10. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.40
11. Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.280 footnote, ch. IV written by Sir Valentine Chirol, Director of the Foreign Department of the Times.
12. Prothero, G. W. op. cit. p.69-70 also Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.142

the offer was refused and the attempted coaltion collapsed.

However, on President Kruger's visit to the European capitals, the Kaiser officially refused to receive him, but the inconsistence of his policy is shown in the advice he sent to Edward, the Prince of Wales, on February 4, 1900 as to the conduct of the war and comparing it to a club football match.[13] This letter was published in the English Blue Book and impaired feeling on both sides. A German's own estimate of the effect of this is, "This is a genuine instance of those irresponsible actions of the Kaiser which, however little influence they exerted in individual cases on the march of events, roused so much ill-feeling in other nations and their leaders against himself and German policy."[14]

On the other side, German official opinion became highly indignant when the King of Portugal was royally received on board theEnglish fleet at Lisbon and the Treaty of Windsor became known, for this seemed to nullify the secret Anglo-German agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies. Fresh fuel was added over the unsuccessful German efforts to secure a terminus for the Bagdad railway at Koweit which had been blocked by the English support of the Sheik. Again, there had been friction over the Canadian preferential tariff granted to British imports in violation of the treaty of 1865 between Britain and the German Zollverein which had granted German equality in the British colonies with those of the mother country. When the dispute arose, England with a year's notice terminated the treaty and would make no new one which did not

13. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.144 quotes "Grosse Politik" XV 553
14. Ibid. p.145

recognize the fiscal autonomy of the British dominion. Then Germany had excepted Canada from the benefit of the most-favored-nation clause, levied her highest tariff to which Canada retaliated by a surtax, and controversy followed.[15]

The pendulum soon swung back and there was an approach at cooperation again during the Boxer troubles in China in the summer of 1900. On October 16, was concluded the Yangste Convention in which both England and Germany agreed to observe the principle of the open door in China and "The two Government agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory as far as they can exercise influence."[16]

This last phrase was misinterpreted by Russia as quoted in the Russian memorandum, "that ports on rivers and littoral of China wherever the two Governments exercise their influence, should remain free and open to commerce." Salisbury's reply to Mr. Charles Hardinge after receipt of the Memorandum states that, "Russia implies that the action of Great Britain and Germany is limited to those provinces in which they have special interests, but the original intention is that action extend to the whole of the Chinese Empire as far as the two powers can exercise influence."[17]

In spite of this explanation and warning, the following year (1901) Russia obtained a concession on the left bank of the Pei-ho River in immediate proximity to Tientsin and England approached

15. Ashley, Percy op. cit. p.101 also Ward & Gooch op. cit. p.301-2
16. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. ch. I, p.15, enclosure no. 17.
17. Ibid. p. 18 enclosure no. 21

Germany as to upholding the agreement against such transactions. Bülow in the Reichstag March 15 stated that there were no German interests of importance in Manchuria, the fate of that province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany, and the agreement of 1900 was in no sense concerned with Manchuria.[18]

The English considered the clause to maintain unimpaired the integrity of the Chinese Empire as applicable to the province of Manchuria, while Germany thought themselves not bound to enter this Russian controversy on the ground that they did not exercise influence in that part of the Chinese Empire. This difference in interpretation seriously affected the new attempts for an Anglo-German defensive alliance which had been reopened.

The initiative in 1901 is ascribed by British documents to have come from Baron von Eckardstein who was the Secretary in charge of the German Embassy at London during the absence of Count Hatzfeldt, but the Germans on their side say that English fear of a Russo-United States rapprochement led to the renewed activities. According to the English version, a despatch dated March 18, 1901 from Lord Lansdowne[19] to Sir Frank Lascelles, Ambassador to Berlin, tells of Eckardstein sounding him in regard to a defensive alliance against Russia and France. The proposal was that so long as Germany or England was attacked by only one of the other two powers, the Alliance would not be operative, but it would call for mutual assistance in case of attack by both powers.[20] Lansdowne replied

18. Ibid. p.26
19. Lord Lansdowne had been appointed Foreign Minister in 1900
20. Gooch and Temperley. op. cit. ch.X p.60-1, enclosure no.77

that there were many difficulties which would require careful consideration.

On the return of Salisbury and Hatzfeldt in the late spring, conversations were resumed and the German proposals demanded that the Triple Alliance be received into the compact and maybe eventually include Japan, and also required that it receive Parliamentary ratification. Salisbury doubted his ability to carry Parliament on this question as evidenced in his memorandum of May 29, 1901 which states that the British Government cannot undertake to declare war for any purpose unless the country approves. If public opinion is against it, the Government will be turned out. The treaty would have to be laid openly and ratified by Parliament and there was impropriety in attempting to determine by secret contract the future conduct of a Republican Assembly upon an issue of peace or war.[21]

Besides, there was the question as to whether England would get enough in return for helping defend the German, Austrian, and Italian frontiers. The Kaiser stated to Edward VII[22] on August 25, 1901 at Wilhelmshöhe that the Germans would have nothing to do with the treaty unless it were ratified by Parliament and their allies were included.[23]

The ministers of both countries were suspicious and cautious, so negotiations were practically dropped during the summer vacation months. In the autumn there occurred more hostile outbreaks in the press. German newspapers launched venomous attacks

21. Ibid. p.68 no. 86
22. Edward VII had ascended the throne January 22, 1901.
23. Hammann, Otto op. cit. p.113

upon the conduct of the British troops in South Africa and the massing of the non-combatant population into concentration camps. Chamberlain in a speech at Edinburgh October 25, answered that the military measures might be severe, but a worse precedent could be found in those practices of other nations, referring among other instances to those of the German troops during the war of 1870.[24] This was scathingly replied to by Bülow in the Reichstag in January.

In the meanwhile the English ministers had decided that while an alliance with Germany might be possible, one which included the Triple Alliance was out of the question, so on December 19, 1901, Lansdowne appraoched Count Metternich, who had succeeded Hatzfeldt. He inquired whether, instead of a formal alliance, Germany would consider a common interest proposal, to which Metternich replied that it was a case of the whole or none and in view of the public feeling in the two countries, they would be unable to work on a treaty at that time.[25]

On January 30, 1902 the German suggestion of an alliance between Great Britain, Japan and Germany made in 1899 bore fruit in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but without the participation of Germany. Japan became England's soldier in the Far East[26] in this first formal pact that England had entered into since her days of splendid isolation. She was in a better position to disregard the German offer and this was further confirmed on February 8, 1902

24. Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.284
25. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. p.82, no. 94 Lansdowne to Lascelles December 1901.
26. Rohrback, Paul. "German World Policies" (trans. Von Mach 1915) p.158

when Edward VII saw Eckardstein privately after abig official dinner at Marlborough House and said:

"The renewed abuse of England in the German press and the unfriendly and sarcastic remarks of Count Bülow in the Reichstag have aroused so much resentment among my Ministers and in public opinion that for a long time at least, there can be no more question of Great Britain and Germany working together in any conceivable matter. We arebeing urged more strongly than ever by France to come to an agreement with her in all colonial disputes and it will probably be best in the end to make such a settlement, because England only wants peace and quiet and to live on a friendly footing with all other countries."[27]

So the attempts at an Anglo-German entente were abandoned. "Germany did not reject the alliance--she lost it."[28] As Brandenburg expresses it, "The English had offerend us their hand and had withdrawn it when we made the conditions of acceptance too onerous for fulfilment. They never came back to us. They went instead to our enemies."[29]

27. Lee, Sir Sidney. "Life of Edward VII" Vol. II, p.144 quotes Baron von Eckardstein--"Ten Years at the Court of St. James." p.230
28. Johnson and Biskford op. cit. p.57
29. Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p.181

6. RESUMÉ OF GENERAL CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE ANGLO-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT

After following the checkered course of the Anglo-German pourparlers from 1898-1902, a general resumé is necessary in order to understand the factors underlying their failure, so we may get a clearer understanding of why England was so willing to turn to France. The causes may be generally classified as economic, political and psychological.

Under the first group we may place the previously discussed topics of the Bagdad Railway project, the less important question of the Canadian tariff, and the steadily increasing industrial development of Germany resulting in keen commercial rivalry which in turn led to colonial friction and an enormously increased navy.

The importance of the commercial rivalry is well expressed by Whelpley: "In the great total of German trade and in the rapidity with which it has risen to its present volume and value lies the reason for the anti-German agitation in England. On the surface this antagonism is political and relates to armaments, but its roots lie in the trade of the world and it is fed upon commercial rivalry."[1]

Others believe that it takes more than commercial rivalry to inflame the masses of people, which may be accepted as largely true, as long as the cost of their economic standard of living is

1. Whelpley, J. D. op. cit. p. 42

not materially affected, but this does not exclude commerce as one of the main causes even if it may not be the most potent. Hammann analyzes it thus:

"It will not do to make English commercial jealousy responsible for the change in Anglo- German relations. This jealousy had repeatedly disturbed relations and helped hinder and impede the return to mutual confidence, but if this had been the prime motive in English policy, the doors in all England's possessions would scarcely have remained open to the German merchant as was actually the case." [There was being agitated in England a strong movement against free trade even at this time.] ....."Nor was the rapprochement frustrated so much by the increase itself in the German navy as by the political propaganda that was let loose"....."The exaggeration of Germany's claims to sea power actually brought about the Anglo-German estrangement."[2]

Turning now to the political side and summing up, we find a series of misunderstandings and suspicions. Probably the most outstanding are those of the suspected German support of the Boers, the Bundesrat incident, and the European attempts at a coalition against England. Then there was the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Windsor, Samoan trouble, the difference over the Yangste Treaty interpretation, and the Anglo-Jap Alliance excluding Germany. Besides these, the Pan-German movement caused alarm, especially in its Drang Nach Osten policy which aimed to put Turkey under the political tutelage of Germany as well as being economically dependent. Added yet, there was the apparent cordiality between Russia and Germany while Russia was still England's enemy. Then there was the slowly growing entente between England and France as mutual recognition of Germany as their common rival began to dawn upon them. Last, we may say that when the influence of Queen Victoria, who died in 1901, and of Salisbury who retired in 1902, was removed, the breach quickly widened.

2. Hammann, Otto, op. cit. p.251-3

Most important of all probably in determining the trend of events are those psychological factors which are so hard to define because of their intangible nature. For this very reason, however, they are often more powerful agents than those actual material things which we may see and deal with accordingly.

The difference in ideals and temperament caused the British air of superiority and the new German assertiveness to clash. Many of the fundamental elements of German policy were the natural outcome of her own economic growth and of the general economic conditions of the world, but the suspicions of the other powers in defending their own situation was chiefly due to the unfortunate manner in which the German policy was so often asserted. The Germans felt that world dominion was their rightful goal and the chief obstacle to its attainment was the British Empire, while Britain naturally resented any challenge to the preeminent position she had held so long.

Ill-considered speeches of the Ministers of both sides had engendered more misunderstanding, as for instance, the Kruger telegram, Chamberlain's Edinburgh speech, Bülow's Reichstag addresses, and bombastic utterances of the Kaiser. Mutual suspicions had been further fanned into bitterness by the press of both countries. "Publicists and journalists dissected Anglo-German relations from every conceivable view point, exaggerated differences and minimized points of common interests. On both sides facts were garbled, motives imputed, official statements belittled, and an

outrageous lack of perspective revealed. There was not enough effort to discover the other nation's point of view."[3]

The whole question of why the attempted rapprochement failed may be summed up in a quotation from Brooks: "In diplomacy the spirit is everything. If there is confidence, good-will, and a sincere desire for conciliation, the most formidable looking issue proves easy of solution. If none of these qualities and conditions are present, then the most trivial issue may engender a crisis."[4]

7. GENERAL FACTORS LEADING TO THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

It has been stated that England and France were drawn into an understanding by the common fear and suspicion of Germany rather than through natural instincts of friendship.[1] The Anglo-German basis of rivalry has already been discussed. The main factors underlying strained Franco-German relations were the ancient hatreds, the "constant rattling of the German sabre" since 1870, and the more recent recognition that with her stationary population, it was hopeless for France to cope alone with German expansion on land and her growth of power. More specifically, "between France and Germany was still a valley of dry bones in Alsace-Lorraine that a breath would people with armed men,"[2] or as Rose tersely expressed it, "the crux of the Franco-German trouble is at Metz."[3]

It is very likely true that there were few natural instincts of friendship to draw France and England together. It

3. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. p.154
4. Brooks, Sidney "England and Germany" in Atlantic Monthly May 1910, p.620
1. Holt and Chilton op. cit. p.314
2. Young, George. "Nationalism and War in the Near East." p.153
3. Rose, J. H. op. cit. p.110

was more of a business proposition made to the advantage of each and became possible largely because both had the requisite materials essential to a mutual bargain.

On the economic side the difference in the type of industrial production of each country made them supplement rather than antagonize one another as rivals. In the words of King Edward, "I know of no two countries whose prosperity is more interdependent."[4] England was France's best single customer, 30 per cent of the total French export going to England in 1902.[5]

Political issues furthering a rapprochement were the desires for mutual leeway in Egyptian and Moroccan affairs, and a need to establish a more even balance of power in order to destroy the German hegemony. The evident satisfaction of Germany over the Fashoda tension had shown both countries that it was time to put an end to the German policy of playing off one against the other in order to further her own prestige. The interest and efforts toward reconciliation of certain officials in both countries aided much in preparing the way, also.

Aside from the material factors, we must not undervalue those unconscious motives which add so much at times toward changing and shaping policies. Many bitter criticisms had appeared in the French press during the Boer war, to be retaliated in England over the Dreyfus affair. There had been also, an apparent British scorn for the inconsistent and temperamental

4. Coolidge, A. C. "A Quarter Century of Franco-British Relations" p.13
5. Jaray, G. L. "La Politique Franco-Anglaise et L'Arbitrage International", p.69

French and a corresponding French hatred and contempt for the so-called gross and stupid English, but their ideals of culture and democratic living were not really so incompatible. The French recognized English achievement as something to be admired and even the British superiority yielded to the charm of French culture.[6] An entente was not such a seemingly difficult goal to attain after all.

6. Coolidge, A. C. op. cit. p.5

III ACTUAL STEPS IN THE FORMATION OF THE ENTENTE

UNOFFICIAL EFFORTS LEADING TO THE TREATY OF ARBITRATION

Among the earliest records we have of unofficial efforts toward bringing the two nations closser together is in 1896. In that year a society of "Entente Cordial--association for the development of more cordial relations between the United Kingdom and France" was formed in London with the encouragement of the Prince of Wales.[1] Its object as stated was to use its influence to develop a better knowledge and higher appreciation of the two nations and promote friendly intercourse and common action between them socially and commercially.

Major Roper-Parkington, President of the English Association of the Entente Cordiale (a group composed mostly of members of Parliament) tried to form a like association in France. At a reunion in the Grand Hotel in Paris, M. de Lanessan was elected President and a resolution adopted: "The réunion privée held at the Grand Hotel April 15, 1897 decided to form in Paris a group having for an object the development of cordial relations between the French and English people in view of the prosperity of the two countries and the friendly regulation of all their interests."[2] This was quoted in Le Matin April 16. The society campaigned among the Chambers of Commerce for their support, but there was some hesitation to publicly approve. It was thought best to educate public opinion first, but the Fashoda incident intervened,

1. Lanessan, J. L. de. "Histoire de L'Entente Cordiale Franco-Anglaise" p.218
2. Ibid. p.231

bringing so much hostility that the attempts were abandoned for the time.

The next initiative came from Mr. Thomas Barclay[3] through whose efforts the British Chambers of Commerce were invited to meet in Paris in 1900. Barclay thought that the best way to bring about an Entente and produce better feeling was to have an object of a non-material character which people could agree about without any sacrifice of interest on either side. Such a rallying point might be a permanent treaty of arbitration.[4]

He immediately began a campaign to stimulate interest through the chambers of commerce, municipal councils, trade unions, leading politicians, articles in papers, and public addresses, so that he could be sure of French support before approaching England. Throughout 1901 and 1902 resolutions in favor of the proposed treaty were passed both in France and England by chambers of commerce, trade associations, peace societies, and municipal councils, showing that the movement was gaining headway.

OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

On the diplomatic side, conversations relative to conditions in Morocco and Siam were going on between Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon (French Ambassador) all during 1902-03, as is shown in communications between Lansdowne and Sir Edmund Monson (British Ambassador.)[5] These concerned an arrangement for the partition of Siam into spheres of influence and the prospective

3. President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris in 1900.
4. Barclay, Sir Thomas "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscenees" p. 195
5. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. ch.XIV

liquidation of Morocco.

The situation in Morocco had not become acute until recently. British interests centered mainly in her trade relations and on preventing any strong nation from fortifying the coast opposite Gibraltar. French interest became more pronounced after the loss of the Egyptian Sudan. The French were heavy creditors of the Moroccan Government and commercial agreements were made in 1901-02 with the Sultan to facilitate the peaceful penetration of the country by French trade. Also diplomatic accords secured the right for the French to police the border between Morocco and Algeria. In 1903 French army officers were put in control of native Moroccan troops, so France had definitely established herself in the country, but she had found obstacles to her policy in both British and German officials in Morocco and a conflict was likely to occur unless some settlement could be made.

An excellent statement of French policy is given in a despatch from Lansdowne to Monson August 6, 1902, in which Lansdowne quotes Cambon's setting forth of Delcasse's ideas:[6]

"The French Government were 'partisans du statu quo' and conceived that in this respect they did not differ from us. They had colonial dominions amply sufficient not only for present wants, but for wants for generations to come. They had passed out of the period of expansion and had no wish to add to their responsibilities by further acquisitions. The colonial policy of France was therefore essentially conservative and in pursuit of such a policy M. Delcasse believed that it would be possible for them to move in accordance with us. This seemed to him all the easier because we were not really competitors. The French did not produce the same commodities as we did, and they were therefore not rivals of ours in markets of the world as were the United States and Germany. All that France therefore desired was

6. Ibid. p.264-6, enclosure no.322

to ensure the security of what she already possessed. So far as Delcassé could see, there were only two points at which her position was insecure--Siam and Morocco."

Affairs in South Africa and Venezuela occupied the minds of British statesmen at this point so negotiations for a general settlement were postponed, but efforts toward an arbitration treaty continued. Monson to Lansdowne May 22, 1903 stated that "M. d' Estournelles de Constant-Deputy--has busied himself among his colleagues in the Chamber for the purpose of forming a group (in accordance with French Parliamentary system) with the object of pushing propaganda for an Arbitration Treaty.....The real author of the campaign in favour of the scheme of an Arbitration Treaty is Mr. Thomas Barclay, a former President of the British Chamber of Commerce at Paris."[7]

On June 13, 1903 the Commercial Committee of the House of Commons sent an invitation to visit the British Parliament to the group in the French Parliament interested in international arbitration. The visit took place in July and at a banquet offered the French deputies and senators at Westminster Palace, many of the leading diplomats of both countries were present,--Balfour, Chamberlain, Campbell-Baunerman, Asquith, Dilke, Caillaux, Lanessan, de Constant, etc.[8] At this banquet Chamberlain said, "I believe in an Entente Cordiale between the two countries ~~and this Entente Cordiale between the two countries~~ and this Entente depends less on conventions and treaties than on mutual sympathy between the two people."[9]

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7. Ibid. p.290 enclosure no.353
8. Lanessan, J. L. de. op. cit. p.248-9
9. Ibid. p.252

Much in the way of gaining mutual sympathy had already been accomplished. The French capital had finally been won over largely through the influence of the visit of King Edward VII in May 1903. As Prince of Wales he had been a popular figure in France and they succumbed once more to his tact and charm when he came in 1903 in his role as King. As a people the French are inclined to be rather impulsive, sensitive, their enthusiasm is easily kindled, and they are peculiarly susceptible to sentimental appeal. As Gibbons says, "symbols count far more than realities with the French."[10] Just as Benjamin Franklin won the popular fancy during the days of the American Revolution, the Russian Naval officers on their visit before the Dual Alliance, and Lindbergh in our own day, so Edward VII struck the note of friendship when in speaking to the members of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris he said, "the days of conflict between the two countries are, I trust, happily over."[11]

President Loubet's return visit was paid in July and Delcassé had a long personal interview with Lansdowne at which it was recognized that it was not impossible to find for each of the problems with which they were confronted, a solution equally advantageous to both parties.[12]

On October 14, 1903 a Treaty of Arbitration was signed. This was the first of its kind among the great European nations. It was accompanied by an official note stating that it was "the

10. Gibbons, H. A. "The New Map of Asia", p.243
11. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.113
12. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. p.294-7, enclosure no.357 Lansdowne to Monson.

outcome of the movement in both countries in favor of affirming the general principle of recourse to arbitration, whenever that method can be safely and conveniently adopted."[13]

NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING TREATY OF 1904

With the signing of the Arbitration Treaty to prepare the way, negotiations were resumed for settling the outstanding points of difficulty. In spite of the questions causing friction between England and France being purely colonial ones, the fear of Germany lay beneath the surface of the desire for this settlement. Lansdowne to Monson July 2, 1903 told of an interview with M. Étienne[14] concerning the prospective entente, "at the conclusion of which M. Etienne expressed the belief that the most serious menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a good understanding between France and England was the only means of holding German designs in check, and that if such an understanding was arrived at, England would find that France would be able to exercise a salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us from many of our troubles with that country."[15]

There seems to have been five actual steps taken in drafting the texts of the treaty if we wish to outline the process.

1. Lansdowne consulted his colleagues and also Lord Cromer (British Consul-General and Agent in Egypt) as well as

13. Barclay, Sir Thomas op. cit. p.234
14. Vice President of the French Chamber of Deputies
15. Gooch and Temperley op. cit. p.292-3 , enclosure no.356

Sir Eldon Gorst (financial advisor to Egyptian Government 1898-1904, later assistant under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs). Then he laid before Cambon October 1, 1903, unofficially and confidentially, a statement of the conditions upon which they would be disposed to agree.[16] The French unofficial answer was received October 26.[17]

2. Following this, a series of official drafts were prepared during December-February 1904 by the British Foreign Office.

3. Cambon presented the French drafts to Lansdowne March 21, 1904 and Lansdowne made a number of suggestions for amendments.

4. Cambon presented revised drafts on March 29-30 embodying some of Lansdowne's amendments. Other suggestions for amendments were then discussed. These related mostly to the Spanish coast line in Morocco, the Egyptian debt question, mutual commercial privileges in Egypt and Morocco, the Suez Canal control, as well as negotiations concerning compensations for Newfoundland in Nigeria, and over gaining French diplomatic support so there would be mutual help in obtaining the execution of the declaration.[18]

5. The last step was taken when the final text was agreed upon April 6 and the treaties signed April 8, 1904.[19]

16. Ibid p.311-17, enclosure no.369--Lansdowne to Cambon
17. Ibid p.320-23, enclosure no.373--Cambon to Lansdowne
18. Ibid. p.364-73, enclosure no.416--Lansdowne to Monson April 8, 1904
19. Ibid. p.373, enclosure no.417 gives outline of drafting steps.

IV THE TREATY OF APRIL 8, 1904

1. GENERAL NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

"The Franco-British Entente as inaugurated in 1904 was not an alliance in the strict sense of the word, for there were no formal promises of military or naval support."[1] Alliances require that an issue be stated rather definitely and then be backed up and neither country was willing to go quite so far at this time.

Instead of a defensive military convention, the Entente Cordiale was merely an understanding on those issues which had long been a source of conflict between the two countries and on the face of it presented little more than an adjustment of colonial difficulties through mutual concessions and guarantees. Even Article 9 of the declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco, providing for mutual diplomatic support was not directed against any definitely specified country or coalition. Yet, under the surface was the feeling that with a treaty based on such broad general interests, it was almost inevitable that cooperation would develop naturally in case questionsof world-wide importance should arise.

Let Delcassé himself speak on the nature of this arrangement: "The Convention is equally advantageous to the two nations, in that each one of them obtains satisfaction upon the points which concern them most. And it is very fortunate that it should be thus, since this arrangement instead of being a nest for

1. Hayes, C. J. H. "Political and Social History of Modern Europe" (1815-1914) p.702

quarrels has had for its object the intent to wipe away everything which might counterbalance the superior reasons and powerful interests which command England and France to live in confidence and in good understanding."[2]

2. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

The agreement as signed by Lansdowne and Cambon consisted of two declarations, one concerning Egypt and Morocco,--the other, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides. There was also a convention relative to Newfoundland and territory in Central and West Africa. Attached to the declaration on Egypt was a Khedivial decree of sixty-eight articles laying down regulations for administering the Egyptian debt. Also, there were five secret articles not made public until 1911. The provisions of the treaty were as follows: Declaration relative to Egypt and Morocco.

This declaration consisted of nine articles of which the general import was a mutual recognition of the paramount interests of Great Britain in Egypt and France in Morocco.

Before considering this declaration some attention should be given to the earlier relations of France and England in Egypt. French interest in Egypt grew largely out of her trade relations with the Levant. England saw in Egypt the key to the East and India. Since the time of Napoleon's Egyptian campaign 1798-99, the two nations have had rival interests there. The Suez Canal was a French engineering project, but the British gained the controlling interest by the purchase on November 25,1875 of the

2. Stuart, G. H. p.131 quotes "Annales de la Chambre" Vol. 741, p.404

Khedive's shares of Canal stock when the Egyptian Government had become bankrupt. The Canal has been called "the spinal cord of the British Empire" and in order to protect it permanently, it was necessary to control Egypt. A financial crisis in 1876 led England and France (the heaviest creditors) to appoint supervisors over the finances and this was strengthened into a Dual Control in 1880.

Egyptian resentment over foreign interference manifested itself in the Nationalistic uprising under Arabi Pasha in 1880-1882. The French were having trouble at home with a financial crisis and also feared the outcome of the Triple Alliance which had just been signed. Consequently France did not feel in a position to intervene with the British in Egypt at this juncture so through her refusal to cooperate, she lost her sphere of influence. In 1883 the Dual Control was abolished by Khedivial decree and a sole British advisor took its place, Britain declaring it her intention to remain in the country only long enough to reestablish order and prosperity. She set 1888 as the date of evacuation, but the occupation had continued in spite of French protests.

Now in regard to Egypt, Great Britain declared she had no intention of altering its political status. France recognized the predominant position of Britain in Egypt (withdrawing her own shadowy claims) and promised not to raise again the question of the temporary character of the British occupation by demanding a time limit, nor interfering in any other way. Adjustment was made concerning the public debt, safeguarding the interests of

British, French, and other creditors. The Egyptian Government was given a free hand in the disposal of its own resources so long as punctual payment of interest on the debt was assured. French schools were to enjoy the same liberty as before, a French "savant" continued to direct the Egyptian antiquities, all rights enjoyed by the French through treaties, conventions and usage including the coasting trade between Egyptian ports were to be respected. Liberty of commerce was guaranteed for thirty years with the privilege of renewal for five years at a time and Britain promised to adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1888 (never made operative) insuring the neutrality and free passage of the Suez Canal.

As for Morocco, France also declared she had no intention of altering its political status. Britain recognized France's special interests there and agreed not to interfere in French intervention to maintain order in a country whose territory was coterminous for a great distance with other French possessions in Africa. She also promised to place no obstacles in the way of French assistance to the Sultan in bringing about needed administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms. There was a clause insuring commercial liberty for Britain and France on equal terms for thirty years and Britain was confirmed in her rights (as was France in Egypt) gained through treaties conventions and usages including coasting trade since 1901. Both powers agreed not to erect fortifications on the coast opposite Gibraltar within certain defined limits, nor allow any other power to, although this clause did not apply to points

actually held by Spain on the Moroccan shore. In consideration of Spain's territorial and political interests, provision was made that France should come to an understanding with her and communicate the result to Great Britain when the accord was concluded. (This was done in October 1904). The last article provided for mutual diplomatic support in carrying out the provisions of this Egyptian-Moroccan declaration.

The phrase "diplomatic support" seems to be the keynote of the whole understanding. Its wording was intentionally obscure so that this would not be construed as a binding pledge, but leaving room for independent action and future interpretation.[3] The fate of Europe seemed to depend upon the nature of this interpretation. What would "diplomatic support" mean to England and France? To what extent would they feel bound to back it up? This was answered in the crises of Algeciras, Agadir, and 1914, but in 1904 it was still a question for the future to decide.[4]

DECLARATION DEALING WITH SIAM, MADAGASCAR AND THE NEW HEBRIDES

Siam. Both governments disclaimed any intention of annexing Siamese territory, but French influence was recognized as predominant in the territory to the east of the valley of the Menam River, while Great Britain received the same freedom of action to the west of this valley. It was really a continuation of the Declaration of January 15, 1896 which had fixed the boundaries of Siam,

3. Grey, Viscount of Fallodon, "Twenty-five Years" p.295 vol.I
4/ Bullard, Arthur op. cit. p.77

making the upper Mekong the boundary between British and French spheres of influence. This declaration of 1904 pared down Siam leaving practically nothing but the narrow strip of the Menam valley as a buffer state between the two spheres of influence.

Madagascar. Under a treaty of 1865 equal treatment had been guaranteed all trade and in the convention of 1890 France had agreed that the rights and immunities enjoyed by British subjects should not be affected. However, in 1892 France laid a protective tariff g iving preference to French goods. Salisbury protested that this was a violation of the treaty rights and Hanotaux found means of evading these rights by annexing the island.[5] This was done in 1896 and French goods entering were exempt from all import tax while foreign goods were excluded by prohibitive duties which drew constant protest from the British. Now however, Britain abandoned her protests against the French tariff and France made a similar concession to Britain in Zanzibar.

New Hebrides. Conflict over the ownership of these islands had resulted in disputes as to land titles and jurisdiction over the natives and since 1887 the islands had been administered by a mixed English and French naval commission which had proved highly unsatisfactory. Now in order to improve conditions arising from lack of adequate jurisdictional control, it was agreed to prepare an arrangement to settle the difficulties in administering the islands.

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5. Moon, P. T. "Imperialism and World Politics". p.135 also Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.218-22.

CONVENTION SETTLING NEWFOUNDLAND DISPUTE AND GRANTING CONCESSIONS IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

French fishing privileges gained in the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 had been curtailed later when Newfoundland became a self-governing colony (1855). The colonial assembly passed laws (especially the Bait Act 1886) violating French rights under the old treaty. France protested and much friction ensued. Now, however, France gave up the right of drying fish on the Newfoundland shore, but retained the privilege of fishing in territorial waters and also of obtaining supplies and bait. There was a pecuniary indemnity for French citizens who were obliged to abandon their shore establishments because of this settlement.

Additional concessions were granted France by Britain in Africa. She received a modification of territory at the mouth of the Gambia River allowing her a water approach to territory drained by the Upper Gambia. Also, Britain ceded a group of islands known as the Iles de Los w hich were of strategic importance in commanding the city of Konakry, the capital of French Guinea. Besides, there was a rectification made in the frontier between Nigeria and the Sudan giving France a direct route from the Niger to Lake Tchad without passing through the desert land.[6]

The second declaration and the convention had no bearing on any outside interests other than those of the two signatory

6. Text of treaty--Gooch and Temperley op. cit. ch.XV, revision and final form. Discussion of provisions in Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.309-17. Pinon, R. op. cit. p.298-302; Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.117-126

powers. They related to strictly local and personal matters, though both France and Great Britain seemed to ignore entirely the rights and wishes of the original owners of the lands they parceled out between them. Mr. Gibson Bowles sarcastically but aptly remarked, "The dispute between France and England was not how little they could concede to one another; no, it was how much belonging to someone else they could concede to each other."[7] It was the first declaration (Egypt and Morocco) which contained the nucleus of the agreement leading to outside opposition and resulting in a closer bond of the entente than had been patent at first.

The five secret articles provided for possible changes in policy altering the status of Egypt and Morocco and for contingencies that might arise in connection with the Spanish hold on the coast opposite Gibraltar. Article I provided that economic commercial and strategic arrangements as stated in the open declaration should reamin intact in case either goverment found themselves constrained through force or circumstances to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco. This meant mutual support of the principle of commercial liberty and would safeguard the free passage of Suez and Gibraltar.

Article II declared no present intention of making a change in capitulations or judicial organization of Egypt, but if it should be considered desirable to do so, France would not

7. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.128

refuse assent on the understanding of a similar free hand in Morocco.

Article III definitely specified which part of Morocco should come under Spanish influence if the Sultan should cease to exercise authority over it. Spain, however, must pledge herself not to alienate the whole or a part of the territory placed under her jurisdiction.

Article IV provided that this arrangement was binding upon Britain and France even if Spain declined to enter into it.

Article V was a reference to the terms of management and repayment of the Egyptian National debt in case the other powers refused to accept the arrangements.[8]

Sir Sidney Lee seems to think that much misrepresentation of the character and purpose of these secret articles developed later in Germany and among English writers in sympathy with her,[9] but the reason for withholding them from publication seems very evident and is well expressed by Stuart: "This was a perfectly fair arrangement as far as Britain and France were concerned and even Spain's legitimate interests were safeguarded. However, Spain might prefer to be consulted in advance, the Sultan might object to even the possibility of a protectorate and Germany might imagine that her interests were being jeopardized, so it was decided inexpedient to publish these articles with the rest of the declaration."[10]

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8. Text of secret articles in Pinon, R. op. cit. Appendix Document VIII. Discussion in Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.119-120; Brandenburg, Erich op. cit. p. 202-3; Pinon, R. Ibid. p.302-3
9. Lee, Sir Sidney op. cit. p.255
10. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.120

3. RATIFICATION OF TREATY

Public opinion had been prepared for the treaty and on the whole it was received with approbation in both countries. The British Parliament expressed satisfaction over the agreement and Lansdowne at the close of his covering despatch said concerning it, "It may perhaps be permitted to the Government to hope that in thus basing the composition of long standing differences upon mutual concessions and in the frank recognition of each other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance of international good-will and the preservation of the general peace."[1]

Satisfaction was not quite so general in France for they felt that they had confirmed a certainty in return for only a possibility, as England already seemed firmly established in Egypt and France was not yet predominant in Morocco. There was also sharp criticism from some quarters concerning the Newfoundland agreement, but the general policy of an accord with England was approved, so the treaty was ratified in the Chamber by a vote of 443 to 105 and in the Senate 215 to 37.[2] Delcasse remarked, "Thus thanks to a mutual good-will we have succeeded in settling the various questions which too long have weighed upon the relations between France and England."[3] This was possible because the agreement had been made a mutual bargain.

1. Gooch, G. P. "History of Modern Europe", p.344
2. Ward and Gooch op. cit. p.317
3. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.127

4. PERSONALITIES RESPONSIBLE

The larger part of the credit for bringing about the entente has been variously assigned by different authorities to different men, but all seem to agree that those most instrumental were (not in any attempted order of importance) Sir Thomas Barclay, M. Delcassé, King Edward VII, Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon.

Sir Thomas Barclay's efforts leading to the Treaty of Arbitration of October 14, 1903 have already been discussed. Unofficial influence is often a very potent factor and Barclay's determination to bring about a reconciliation, his campaigns to enlist the support of the Chambers of Commerce and Trade Unions of both countries was largely instrumental in converting provincial opinion. This left the two capitals to be won over later through the friendly exchange of visits of the British sovereign and the French President.

The largest share of the honors seems to be divided between Delcassé and King Edward VII and there has been much difference of opinion as to whom the major part belongs. Giving both their due credit, it seems that we concede to Delcassé the title of originator of the movement. While King Edward VII and Chamberlain were flirting with the idea of an Anglo-German agreement up to the year 1902, M. Delcassé appears to have made up his mind from the first to bring about an Anglo-French understanding. He had a full knowledge of the problems this would entail, having been connected with the French Colonial Office since 1893. On becoming Minister of the Foreign Office in 1898 he stated

the keynote of his policy when he said in November of that year, "I should not wish to leave this office without having re-established good relations with England."[1] We know of his attempts through Cambon to suggest the opening of negotiations on other matters of friction after the Fashoda settlement. Edward VII himself acknowledges these efforts in the private interview he had with Baron von Eckardstein after the dinner at Marlborough House on February 8,1902.[2]

If we acknowledge the originating activity of Delcassé, (in spite of Tardieu whose opinion was, "The English King was the initiator of the rapprochement. He it was who both conceived and facilitated it.")[3] we must certainly give to Edward VII the credit for smoothing away the persistent feeling of hostility between the two nations and breaking the ice so that negotiations might be carried on in a far more cordial atmosphere. His ability and success was due both to his personality and his training. He possessed the happy faculty of saying and doing the right thing at the right time and place. This natural tact and sympathy was developed through the long years of his travel and association in a social way as Prince of Wales with the diplomatic centers of the world. R. B. Mowat calls him the first English sovereign since William III who may be called a European statesman. "He knew well the personnel of high politics on the Continent, he had the point of view of a great nobleman who had moved all his life in diplomatic circles and had a wide experience of affairs."[4] He understood the effect and value of personal contact and made

1. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. quotes from Victor Bérard, "La France et Guillaume II" 1907, p.23
2. See page 65
3. Tardieu, André op. cit. p.60
4. Mowat, R. B. "History of European Diplomacy" p.268-9

large use of it. "He treated France as a friend with whom he had had a misunderstanding and France, sensitive as himself, understood the spirit of his proffered compromise."[5] His personal popularity, as Prince of Wales, with large sections of the French people is well expressed by one of their own nationality who said, "The Prince of Wales? Oh, with him, it is very different. He loves us. But you others, you do not love us."[6]

This early devotion he revived on his memorable visit as King in 1903 through the charm of his personality and the friendly utterances he made. The effect of his visit and speeches upon French feeling is reflected in a report from the Belgian representative in Paris and circulated by the Belgian Foreign Ministry--dated May 13, "It is said there (Paris) that Edward VII has won the hearts of all the French. Seldom has such a complete change of attitude been seen as that which has taken place in this country during the last fortnight towards England and her sovereign."[7]

The opinion of Edward's own subjects is well shown in the speeches of two famous men--Mr. Balfour and Sir Charles Dilke. The former stated in the House of Commons May 11, 1910: "He (Edward VII) did that which no Minister, no Cabinet, no Ambassador, neither treaty nor protocols nor understandings, which no debates, no banquets nor speeches were able to perform. He, by his personality alone, brought home to the minds of millions on the Continent the friendly feelings of the country over which King Edward rules."[8] That is a general evaluation, but a specific one dealing

5. Lee, Sir Sidney op. cit. p.728
6. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.108 quotes Mr. A. E. Vizetelly in "Republican France", p.462
7. Lee, Sir Sidney op. cit. p.241
8. Seymour, Charles, op. cit. p.150-1

with this occasion was made by Sir Charles Dilke, "The great and sudden improvement in the relations between the English speaking world and France is largely due to the wisdom and courtesy with which the King made clear to France that there was no ground for the suspicions with prevailed."[9]

Even if King Edward did not actually initiate and carry through the negotiations, his work was as important in its field--to prepare and sustain public opinion. The pressure and support of public opinion is a powerful agent and a fundamental basis in a government responsible and responsive to popular sovereignty as is England and also France.

The Marquis of Lansdowne, British Foreign Minister, also deserves great praise for his share in negotiating and drafting the terms of the settlement. Gooch says that Lansdowne's skillful handling of the treaties with Japan and France revealed his rare diplomatic ability.[10] He had been in favor of a rapprochement with France some time previous to actual negotiations. Barclay states that Lansdowne had written him two months before Salisbury's resignation (which took place in July 1902) expressing hearty concurrence in his (Barclay's) efforts to bring about an arbitration treaty.[11] The visits of Edward VII and Loubet gave the ministers in their suites the opportunity for conversation bearing upon actual negotiations and the burden of working out the details of the agreements was largely placed upon Lansdowne and the French Ambassador to the Court of St. James, M. Paul Cambon.

9. Stuart, G. H. op. cit. p.113 quotes "Life of Sir Charles Dilke" p.501
10. Gooch, G. P. "History of Our Time" p.26
11. Barclay, Sir Thomas op. cit. p.212

Concerning the ability of Cambon we have tributes from both English and French. Sir Sidney Lee characterizes him as admirably fitted to advance the cause of Anglo-French friendship. He attributes to him prudence, pertinacity, adaptability, long sightedness, uniting charm of manner with strength of will and says, "He was the ideal instrument for carrying out the policy of his chief."[12] M. Lemonon states: "It is M. Cambon who has arranged the details of the relations between London and Paris with a cleverness and skill to which one cannot give too much credit."[13]

The whole question of apportioning the credit seems to be excellently summarized by Sir Sidney Lee, the eminent biographer of King Edward VII, when he says, "To Delcassé must be given credit for initiating the Anglo-French Entente, to Lansdowne and Cambon must be given credit for bringing the negotiations to a successful issue, but credit for influencing public opinion not only in France, but also in England in favor of the Entente, credit for lulling the French suspicions of 'perfide Albion' and English suspicions of France, credit for creating an atmosphere in which an agreement could be reached, must go to Edward VII."[14]

5. GENERAL RESULTS OF THE ENTENTE

The importance of this Entente was evident in its results on the two signatory powers and its more far-reaching effects on the diplomacy of Europe and the world. It marked the end of

12. Lee, Sir Sidney op. cit. p.217
13. Lemonon, Ernest "L'Europe et la Politique Brittanique", p.348
14. Lee, Sir Sidney, op. cit. p.254

British isolation and her re-entry into active participation in European politics. With it, France freed herself from her subservience to German influence and gained the courage to take the initiative in diplomacy and maintain it. Both countries had a mutual assurance of diplomatic support in case of opposition from Germany.

Germany had lost her favorite instrument of foreign policy (to continue the Anglo-French discord), her political hegemony of the Continent was broken, and new Continental balance of power restored. Von Bülow stated in the Reichstage April 12, 1904 that "from the point of view of German interests we have nothing to complain of."[1] He spoke of material interests which were not then seriously threatened, but it was thought that the German prestige was, and they came to feel that it was necessary to show the world that questions could not be decided without German participation and approval. In an effort to maintain this prestige we had the two Moroccan crises and the World War, in which other factors of course entered in.

During the period from 1904 to the outbreak of the War, the balance and center of the naval power in Europe was shifted, as England left the burden of policing the Far East to Japan and the Meditteranean to France and increased those units in the home waters.

Among all the countries concerned there resulted a frenzied competition in both naval and military armaments. This

1. Schmitt, B. E. op. cit. p.225

was largely responsible for the feeling of mutual apprehension and suspicion as the Entente Cordiale, transformed in 1907 into the Triple Entente by the Anglo-Russian accord and mutually drawn together closer by the succeeding crises, faced and challenged the Triple Alliance, the gauntlet being thrown into the ring in the general conflagration of 1914.

V. SUMMARY

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 has been called "the most important event of modern diplomacy." In tracing its origins we have found it to be the outgrowth of most of the political, economic, and national imperialistic movements of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with roots going even deeper into the past and spreading out into all parts of the world.

Traditional enmity with France as the greatest Continental power and Britain's colonial and commercial rival for world empire had brought the two nations into almost constant conflict. Even after the shattering of French political hegemony by Germany in 1870, there was still left the Anglo-French colonial friction. Both empires were rapidly expanding to their fullest extent and clashing interests were inevitable.

Britain's almost unquestioned position of supremacy and her interest in imperial and domestic problems rather than continental ones, had led to her apparent indifference and aloofness during the earlier years of the nineteenth century. After the awakening of feverish imperialistic aspirations on the part of all the nations during the last two decades of the century, Britain had found it necessary to defend and adjust her own monopoly. This was done through a series of colonial conferences and settlements during the 'eighties and 'nineties.

The threatened encroachments of France and Russia upon British interests led Britain to cooperate with the members of the Triple Alliance, for they, at that time, had no vital colonial

or commercial conflicts. The efforts of Germany to make this friendly attitude into a closer bond failed, however, and Britain still maintained her policy of caution toward formal binding alliances.

The close of the century saw a change in this policy of isolation. Russia and France had drawn together into a Dual Alliance and Germany, in order to neutralize its effect, was cooperating with both members and a coalition against Great Britain was threatening. Matters between France and Britain became acute at Fashoda and then the outbreak of the Boer War brought the realization that "splendid isolation" became dangerous when it meant no friends. Allies were becoming essential and so Britain turned first to Germany, but a combination of factors prevented this rapprochement. Then an alliance was concluded with Japan in 1902 which checkmated Russian aggression in the East and Britain next turned to an entente with France to settle the outstanding colonial friction and provide a safeguard for growing suspicion against Germany.

Here we seem to have the crux of the matter. Friction with Russia and France had been so evident and absorbing during the last quarter century that Britain had scarcely realized the steadily growing German competition. The marvelous economic expansion of Germany during the years following her unification and political hegemony on the Continent, now began to rival and threated to undermine the British supremacy which she had enjoyed for so long. Efficient scientific methods of production, organi-

zation, and marketing gave the Germans an advantage in the world markets. They did not actually surpass the total British trade receipts, but the large relative increase made the British seem to be progressing but slowly, if at all, and gave grave fears for the future.

The menace was not only of an economic character. German nationalistic philosophy and aspirations dreamed of world power. This policy of extending the political as well as the commercial empire throughout the world disturbed the British imperialists who saw the necessity of defending their wide-flung dominions against the challenge of a new and aggressive nation.

So long as Germany remained a land power only, Britain had felt that she could afford to be indifferent, or at least non-aggressive toward German diplomatic hegemony on the Continent, but when at the turn of the century Germany began her naval activity menacing British maritime interests, then Britain felt that the continental balance of power must be restored as a foil. The most obvious method of accomplishing this was by an understanding with France who also feared the growing German power.

French policy since 1870 had been to maintain the Third Republic, to regain Alsace-Lorraine, and also her old prestige that Germany had destroyed, by breaking out of the isolation in which the German system of alliances had placed her. The government came through several crises successfully and in the meanwhile interest was found in colonial activity. This did not exclude the desire for the revanche, but it brought France into friction with Britain and Italy which, combined with the German antagonism,

led to the formation of the Dual Alliance with Russia.

Colonial friction with Britain reached its height over the Egyptian Sudan and France realized that further expansion was practically impossible for either country without consent and mutual adjustment.

Also, Germany was becoming a great naval power as well as the greatest military power and the French army in cooperation with the British navy might be the only means of an effective check upon what they considered as the alarming growth and aggressiveness of the German Empire.

From unofficial commercial and also diplomatic sources, efforts were begun to prepare the way for a settlement of outstanding difficulties which might lead to a closer understanding between the two countries. A treaty of arbitration smoothed the way and in April 1904 was concluded the famous agreement known as the friendly understanding or Entente Cordiale.

This settled colonial questions of friction and provided for mutual diplomatic support. Public opinion in both countries had been prepared for it and it was approved because (to sum up) France recognized that with her stationary population, it was nearly hopeless to cope with Germany on the land and further realized that she could better gain from Great Britain by compromise what she could not hope to do by opposition in the colonial field.

Britain, on her side, had awakened to the consciousness that France was no longer the rival to be feared, but that it was German competition which threatened British industry, commerce,

and challenged her control of the sea and her empire as well as the balance of power on the Continent.

So Great Britain and France "buried the hatchet" and the diplomatic revolution was effected, which, as its roots lay in all parts of the world, has had world-wide results.

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