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The concept of the self in the metaphysics of Charles Arthur Campbell

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GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF IN THE
METAPHYSICS OF
CHARLES ARTHUR CAMPBELL

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem of the Dissertation

This dissertation focuses upon the concept of the "substantial self" in the metaphysics of Charles Arthur Campbell in order, by critical examination, to consider whether the "substantial self" can, as he understands it, be taken as a final metaphysical category.

It is not an uncommon feature of our everyday experience that we believe ourselves somehow to be the same throughout our changing experiences and growth. The old man, carefully and fearfully picking his way across the icy patch, believes himself to be somehow the same as the little boy who with agility and daring once walked the fence rail. We go to sleep weary from a long day's work and awake refreshed, alert for the challenges of a new day, and yet we believe ourselves to be the same selves that went to sleep, beaten and tired by the ordeals of the previous day. We hate and love, we compete ruthlessly and cooperate to build a stable social structure, and though we know we are different, we are yet somehow the same.

There is apparently no mystery or occult quality attached to self-sameness through change for unreflective thought. Our language betrays our common-sense innocence by abounding in the casual use of personal pronouns such as "I", "me", and "myself". That we change and yet remain the same seems, on the face of it, to be an article of unreflective faith. How we can change and undergo the process of physical and psychological growth and still remain the same is a problem for critical reflection.

Where unreflective consciousness finds no problem in its dreaming innocence, critical speculation finds a great deal of perplexity. How can we understand this self-sameness through change that is a presupposition in all normal persons? What theoretically satisfying explanation can be given for this element of unreflective faith? How are we to understand this man's claim that he, who is now shoveling snow from his footpath, is the same he who shoveled snow as a boy from his grandmother's footpath? His claim to self-sameness is all the more perplexing when we come to consider certain facts. Examine this shoveler carefully; his breathing is labored; his face is flushed, his movements rather lethargic; he pauses every few moments to rest, leaning on the handle of his shovel. Imaginatively examine this 'same' shoveler some forty years ago. His breathing is much more nearly normal; he attacks his task with a relish and a healthy vitality; he seldom pauses in his work; and when he

does, it is to pelt a passing friend with a barrage of snowballs. Can these be the same person, and if so, in what sense of the word "same" can we understand them to be identical?

However, an interrogation of our imaginative snowshoveler will reveal him to be adamant concerning his self-identity with the vastly different shoveler of the past. Even when confronted with this difference, he will only admit: "Yes, I'm not the man I used to be." But if he is not the man he used to be, is he then a totally different self? "No," the reply will surely be returned, "I'm different, of course, but I'm the same somehow." One of our tasks will be to seek to understand both how and why he is somehow the same and yet different.

The problem is two-edged in that we have the problem of understanding how we can change and become somehow different, and yet be, at the same time, somehow self-identical. On the other hand, we have to reconcile how we can be somehow permanent and yet require change for our completion. In "pre-reflective" experience and thought, these two aspects of the problem are seldom seriously faced either as being of any unusual significance, or as being separate problems. An interrogation of almost any normal person will reveal that he believes both that something about him perdures, and that he changes.

However, what common sense has joined together, philosophers have managed to rend asunder. Some thinkers in the history of philosophy have fastened upon the notion of permanence and have defined the self as a substance that has changing qualities but that also is a hard core of unchanging essence. Others, on the other hand, have seen in the changing states of growth and development the paradigm for philosophical explanation; hence the conception that "all things flow".

Both attempts to get at the ultimate nature of things have recognized that the common-sense view, though uncritical and unreflective, has set the major problem of metaphysics; namely, constructing a categoreal scheme of explanation that is adequate both to the seeming flux of things and the seeming permanence. Although it would be an extremely fascinating and enlightening task to trace the growth of our knowledge of self-sameness through our expanding experience, such a study is not our central task. Rather, our task will be an attempt to elucidate this common-sense "knowledge" of continuity through change, of permanence in flux, by means of coherent and empirically adequate general ideas.

While this genetic growth of self-sameness might be an interesting sidelight to our inquiry, our main purpose, to repeat, is to discover whether the notion of the "substantial self", as developed by C.A. Campbell, is warranted by the evidence of our personal experience, and whether this notion is able to elucidate coherently our dual experience of change

and self-sameness. The theoretical understanding of self-identity through change involves the analysis of the process of becoming, and also the notion of potentiality. If we are to elucidate our experience of the baby's becoming the adolescent, of the adolescent's becoming the adult, and at the same time examine the problem of the self-identity of the self that is becoming, we must formulate some general category in terms of which the process of becoming can be made intelligible. If the boy becomes the man, and the man is somehow identical with the boy, then it is incumbent upon us to construct a general idea in terms of which such an occurrence is intelligible. The general idea must clarify and explain the somehow of the seeming perishing of the boy, through the process of growth, and elucidate the somehow of the boy and man being the same.

The theory of the substantival self is an instance of the kind of explanation that is sought. Our investigation turns upon Campbell's formulation of this notion and its general adequacy to elucidate our personal experience. The main thrust of our study is an explication and criticism of the import of the notion of "substantival", as applied to selfhood in the thought of Charles Arthur Campbell.

2. Biographical Sketch of Campbell

Charles Arthur Campbell was born January 13, 1897. At the age of twenty-nine, Campbell married Ruth Stewart, the

younger daughter of Claud Stewart. The Campbells have two children, a daughter and a son.

As a young boy, Campbell attended Glasgow Academy and to the present day retains an interest in that fine Scottish public school. He attended Glasgow University and later Balliol College, Oxford University. In these institutions, his major fields of concentration were moral philosophy and metaphysics.

Campbell served as a second lieutenant in World War I in the Tenth Border Regiment. He entered military service in January, 1915 and was stationed at home and in Egypt during his tour of duty. He was invalided out of military service in October of 1917.

Campbell's first teaching position was as a Lecturer in Moral Philosophy in 1925. For several years at Glasgow, Campbell was the junior philosophical colleague of Professor H.J. Paton who at that time held the Chair of Logic and Rhetoric at Glasgow University. Campbell's admiration for, and personal indebtedness to, Professor Paton is acknowledged in several of his published works.¹ His immediate superior, the Professor of Moral Philosophy, was A.A. Bowman. Evidently Professor Bowman exerted a rather significant influence

1. See C.A. Campbell, "In Defence of Free Will," An Inaugural Address delivered in the University of Glasgow on April 26, 1938 (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Co., 1938), p. 5. See also C.A. Campbell, Scepticism and Construction (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931), p. xi. Hereafter referred to as SC.

upon Campbell's theory of the self. Says Campbell:

"A.A. Bowman's The Sacramental Universe has discussions of selfhood of which I also think highly . . ."¹

In 1932, a year after publication of his first major philosophical work, Scepticism and Construction, Campbell accepted the Professorial Chair in Philosophy at the University College of North Wales, Bangor, Wales. In 1938, Campbell was recalled to Glasgow University to the Chair of Logic and Rhetoric and remained there until his recent retirement in August, 1961. Of his decision to retire, Professor Campbell has written: "Though I am not 'obliged' to retire for another half-dozen years, I don't much believe in philosophers going on to seventy!"²

In the years 1953, 1954, and 1955, Professor Campbell delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews. These lectures were later published (1957) under the title, On Selfhood and Godhood.³

Professor Campbell has always been an avid supporter of the athletic program at Glasgow University. While in attendance there as a student, he was awarded his 'Blues' for outstanding performance in rugby. There is a legend relating to Campbell's athletic prowess told by younger

1. Personal letter, May 2, 1960.

2. Personal letter, October 26, 1959.

3. C.A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957). Hereafter referred to as OSG.

faculty members at Glasgow University. It is said that new and young members of the Faculty Tennis Club have frequently mistaken Campbell's age as a sign of his weakness as a likely opponent. Even when he was over sixty years of age, Campbell was engaged in correcting such misapprehensions by roundly beating his younger colleagues in tennis matches. Besides tennis, Campbell is reputed to be a superb billiards player and a better-than-average golfer in the land where golf was invented!

Campbell is now retired and living in Callander, Scotland, a lovely little town in the Trossachs area of Scotland. There he is completing work on several articles begun at an earlier date, but never finished. When he is not writing, he is either golfing, gardening, or enjoying his grandchildren.

3. Limitations

Campbell has written a great deal about two areas which lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. A great many of his articles published in philosophical journals are addressed to contemporary problems in moral philosophy. These articles exhibit Campbell's perspicacity as a philosophical critic and his powers of critical analysis. The articles are written mostly in a critical vein with only scant overtones of his constructive position. Insofar as they elucidate his view of the self and its final reality, they will be used as resources of data for this dissertation. We shall not become

involved in any detailed analysis of Campbell's critical work in moral philosophy, for such involvement would lead us astray into controversies in contemporary moral philosophy which are not germane to the focus of this study.

Furthermore, this dissertation is concerned with Campbell's metaphysical analysis of selfhood. While he has indicated that he believes there is a rapprochement between metaphysical and religious views of the self, the focus of this study is restricted to Campbell's metaphysical view of selfhood. The analysis of Campbell's position vis à vis the deliverances of religious consciousness respecting selfhood would so broaden the inquiry as to make it unmanageable. It should be noted, however, that the omission of consideration of the self in Campbell's religious philosophy affects, in no fundamental way, the understanding of his final view of the self. The deliverances of religious experience are in no way additive in providing evidence requiring basic changes in Campbell's theory of the self. Religious experience as a source of evidence relevant to the determination of an adequate view of the self supports, on Campbell's view, the evidence from other modes of experience, e.g., moral, cognitive, and volitional.

Finally, we are interested in Campbell's total thought only as it bears upon the questions confronted by any investigation attempting a constructive view of the self:

For example, How is the self known? What is the nature of the self? Criticism of Campbell's views is carried out with a view to discovering an adequate view of the self.

4. Methodology

The method of this study, accordingly, is expository, critical, and constructive. Campbell's view of the nature of the self is expounded and analyzed. The crucial problems confronting any constructive attempt to formulate an adequate doctrine of the self are examined in the light of Campbell's arguments. An effort is made to state the nature of the problems which Campbell himself faces in developing his view of the nature of selfhood and its final metaphysical status. The purpose of this inquiry, however, is not simply an articulation of the problems relative to the self and an exposition of Campbell's constructive efforts to deal with these problems. The dissertation aims at critical evaluation of Campbell's philosophy of the self. Where weaknesses seem to appear in his position, an attempt will be made to formulate meaningful alternative positions. By the nature of the case, these constructive suggestions will be put forward tentatively and cannot always be examined in great detail.

Throughout the dissertation reference will be made to other philosophers who have addressed themselves to the problems intrinsic to formulation of a theory of the self.

Chief among the philosophers referred to are Alexander, Bowman, Bowne, Bradley, Paton, Ryle, and Tennant. The purpose of such reference will be to illustrate or further elucidate Campbell's position either in a critical fashion or in support of Campbell. On some occasions, references will be used to suggest fruitful lines of development of views stated by Campbell. In other instances, the references will be used to challenge Campbell's theories or as attempts at refutation of his thinking. The use of these references is guided by the overall methodology; that is, as providing further explication of Campbell, or as providing critical issues which Campbell's arguments must meet.

A word is in order regarding terminology. The terms 'self', 'mind', 'soul', and 'spirit' will be used interchangeably in the text. This usage is, in general, consistent with Campbell's. Any variations in usage will be noted at relevant points.

5. Organization of the Dissertation

The organization of the dissertation reflects the methodology employed. Campbell's efforts to deal with the philosophical problems of selfhood are expounded and critically evaluated. Where it seems appropriate, constructive suggestions for resolving problems are made and, occasionally, Campbell's views are developed beyond his

published statements. Campbell's view of the self and his attempts to deal with the problems relevant to selfhood are the continuing foci of the critical and constructive efforts.

In Chapter II, the problem of the efficacy of introspection as a mode of self-knowledge is considered. Campbell's analysis of introspection and its efficacy is explored and critical points are made.

Chapter III is an examination of Campbell's appraisal of evidence of the cognitive life for the doctrine of the self. The conception of cognition held by Campbell is presented and reference is made to the implications of the cognitive experience for the theory of the self.

In Chapter IV, the importance of self-consciousness for the theory of the self in Campbell's philosophy is explored. Campbell's position regarding the structure of self-consciousness is given critical attention and his important distinction between self-identity and personal-identity is explained. The latter part of Chapter IV represents a constructive attempt to deal with the problem of the relationship between self-identity, consciousness, and unconsciousness. Since Campbell has nowhere in his published works addressed himself to this particular problem, this section is largely an attempt at creative and independent construction.

Chapter V is concerned with the nature of self-activity as Campbell construes it. The distinctions made by him be-

tween different modes of self-activity are presented and illustrated. Exploration of Campbell's analysis of self-activity leads directly to a consideration of his view of freedom and its significance for the theory of the self.

Chapter VI is a critical examination of the view of obligation developed by Campbell. Campbell's moral philosophy is shown to have important implications for the relation of the self to objective reality. Campbell's statement of these implications receives close critical attention in the final part of the chapter.

In Chapter VII Campbell's metaphysical criterion is investigated. The place of non-contradiction in Campbell's metaphysics is explicated and the relation of this notion to Bradley's epistemology is discussed. The nature and rationale of Campbell's metaphysical scepticism are analyzed and critically evaluated.

Chapter VIII is a consideration of the metaphysical conclusions reached by Campbell with special reference to the metaphysical status of selfhood and the relation of the finite self to ultimate reality.

The final chapter contains the conclusions reached in the study. In this chapter, Campbell's view of the self and its metaphysical status is evaluated and critical issues are raised. The discoveries of the dissertation as a whole are summarized.

6. Special Sources of Data

The writer had access to special sources of data of an unpublished nature. During the course of a full academic year (1960-61), the writer was in residence at the University of Glasgow as a Fulbright scholar. Professor Campbell was the supervisor for the research project undertaken by the author during the year of the Fulbright grant. As a result, while writing the first draft of this dissertation, the author met weekly with Campbell for tutorial sessions lasting from one to two hours for a nine month period. Certain of these interviews bear materially on certain issues in the dissertation, and the data used from these interviews will be indicated by footnote references. Furthermore, the writer has engaged in a fairly extensive correspondence with Campbell on matters pertaining to the dissertation. This correspondence will also be used as data.

The author also had access to unpublished written material by Campbell. An article by Campbell (as yet unpublished) entitled, "The Mind's Involvement in Objects",¹ has been read and the contribution of this article to Campbell's theory of knowledge is incorporated in Chapter III of the dissertation.

The writer had a copy of the "Philosophical Lecture Notes" used by Professor Campbell in the Logic Ordinary Class at

1. This essay is to be published in a forthcoming volume of essays, edited by James Scher and entitled, Towards a Definition of Mind.

Glasgow University.¹

7. Previous Research in the Field

No study of Campbell's theory of the self and its meta-physical status has been undertaken in the past. Studies have been done which analyze facets of his moral philosophy. In a dissertation by Mr. Young Pai entitled, "The Free Will-Determinism Controversy and Its Educational Implications", a facet of Campbell's moral philosophy (the doctrine of free will) receives some attention.² The purpose of Mr. Pai's study is the formulation of a concept of human freedom which has special significance for education. Mr. Pai interprets Campbell's contra-causal conception of freedom as a causeless event, and hence, as unintelligible. As our examination of Campbell's view of freedom will show, Campbell does not think the free act is a causeless event, and he would admit that it is unintelligible if by 'unintelligible' one means a reason cannot be given for it. To suggest that Campbell's view of contra-causal freedom is unintelligible in this sense seems to beg the question.

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1. These Lecture Notes are published in syllabus form by Craig & Wilson, Ltd., Glasgow, Scotland.
 2. Young Pai, "The Free Will-Determinism Controversy and Its Educational Implications" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Education, Rutgers University, New Jersey, 1959).

In another dissertation by Mr. Amedio W. Armenti entitled, "Intuitionistic Criticisms of the Ethical Theories of Bradley and Green",¹ attention is given to Campbell as one who modifies Bradley and Green's moral philosophies. Mr. Armenti considers Campbell a follower of Bradley and Green and suggests that Campbell's revisions of their moral philosophies correct some of the difficulties noted by the ethical intuitionists. Campbell is identified by Mr. Armenti as an ethical idealist. While he has good reason to view Campbell as deeply indebted to idealism in his moral philosophy, it is extremely doubtful whether Campbell would be happy to be called an ethical idealist. The following selected passages from Campbell's published works will be sufficient to settle this point.

The meaning of the moral ought is destroyed on the Idealist philosophy.²

There is no doubt, however, of the extreme reluctance of the idealist to confess his bankruptcy as a trustee of the moral values.³

It has commonly been felt, and I have tried . . . to show . . . that only by subterfuge can a case be made out for the significance of morality on a metaphysic like that of Absolute Idealism.⁴

1. Amedio W. Armenti, "Intuitionistic Criticisms of the Ethical Theories of Bradley and Green" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1959).

2. Campbell, SC, p. 185.

3. Ibid., p. 186.

4. Ibid., p. 247.

CHAPTER II

CAMPBELL'S ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTS AND EFFICACY OF INTROSPECTION

It has often been claimed that the foundation for empirical self-knowledge lies in the results yielded by introspection. Introspection has been hailed as having a unique advantage over other modes of knowing the self, in that it can give us direct access to data which no other mode of approach can give. Our examination of introspection will be guided then by the concern to ascertain whether Campbell's view of introspective analysis gives us a trustworthy foundation for self-knowledge, with a view to determining the extent and efficacy of this method as Campbell understands it.

1. The Objects of Introspection

The straight-forward assessment of the trustworthiness and efficacy of introspective analysis is barred by a host of ambiguities surrounding its definition, its limit of application, and its special object. The ambiguities center in two distinct, but related questions. What are the objects of introspective analysis? Does introspection give us a unique mode of access to these objects which is different, in principle, from any other mode of access? This latter

question may be taken as raising the question of whether introspection is trustworthy either as a mode of cognition or as a source of data.

Campbell believes that the former question, as to the nature of the objects of introspection, can be answered only by first determining what the special character of introspection is; that is, by distinguishing it from other forms of knowing or perceiving.¹ This does not presuppose that we are able to describe introspection apart from the objects toward which it is directed. Such a procedure is certain to miss the mark. Introspection has often been distinguished from other modes of cognition or sources of data revealing objective fact by comparing it with other forms of perception, namely, with extrospection. In extrospection, we are looking 'without' for the sake of determining the objective character of external objects. In introspection, we are 'looking within' with a view to determining, describing, or reporting the character of the mind's states and acts.

For reasons which will become apparent as we proceed, introspection has variously been called 'internal perception', 'an inner sense', and so forth. These characterizations no doubt originated in order to distinguish introspection as a species of perception, from sense perception. The distinguish-

1. Cf. Campbell, OSG, p. 117.

ing mark of introspection, argues Campbell, is that it is directed to a datum that is essentially private to the observer, namely, to his own state of experiencing.¹ Objects of sense perception, in principle, are 'public' objects in that they can be brought under the scrutiny of any competent observer suitably placed. The objects of introspection do not have this character of publicity and are not, in principle, capable of direct public check. Only the person having the stomach-ache can describe its intensity, its location, and its general felt character by directly 'observing' it.

Let us pursue this example of the stomach-ache further in order to bring out clearly Campbell's notion of the distinctive character of introspection. Presumably, an uninvolved and sensitive observer might be able to infer from certain behavioral data that another person has some kind of pain. If the observer was especially acute and the behavioral data of a specified sort, he might further determine that the pain was in the stomach. In arriving at the conclusion that the other person has a stomach-ache, he would, no doubt, rely on a vast store of knowledge and personal experience. It would, in fact, be an educated guess informed by his knowledge of the physical organism, the behavioral symptoms of certain pains, and memories of his own stomach-aches. The object of his judgment would be an existent

1. Ibid., p. 111.

state of being in the consciousness of the other person.

What he would not have direct access to would be the 'enjoyment' of the existent state, that is, its 'lived-throughness'. Empathetic though he might be in calling up and even 'living through' a similar state, he would have no direct means of comparing his 'enjoyed' state with that of the other person. The lived state of pain in the other person would be as impenetrable to his vision as the blackest of nights.

2. Ryle on Error in Introspection

The assertion that only the subject living through his experience has direct access to the lived quality, the 'appearing', of that experience raises the question of the possibility of error. Can a subject, living through an experience of pain, fail to apprehend correctly the character of his lived experience? Is self-consciousness infallible in its own apprehension of its lived state? Ryle has argued that on a popular view of self-consciousness this must be the case, for by definition self-consciousness is "self-intimating".

The states and operations of a mind are states and operations of which it is necessarily aware, in some sense of 'aware', and this awareness is incapable of being delusive.¹

Ryle goes on to suggest that on this view the very definition of awareness entails the notion that what the awareness is

1. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 158.

aware of is self-evident. But, if this is the case, continues Ryle, how can we make mistakes about that which is supposedly self-evident to us?

There is no contradiction in asserting that someone might fail to recognize his frame of mind for what it is; indeed it is notorious that people constantly do so. They mistakenly suppose themselves to know things which are actually false; they deceive themselves about their own motives; . . . they do not know what they are dreaming, when they are dreaming, and sometimes they are not sure that they are not dreaming, when they are awake . . .¹

In what Ryle affirms about the supposed self-intimating character of self-consciousness, he is clearly right. In some sense, Campbell is prepared to agree that the mind directly apprehends its lived experiences. However, it is possible that Ryle has confused what it is that is so directly apprehended.

Ryle has argued that the experienced fact of making mistakes about what we are aware of in lived experience is enough in itself to explode the theory that the mind has a direct, self-intimating apprehension of its lived states. But has he really proven his point? Notice the form of his objection. A person might believe himself to know something which is actually false; a person might believe himself to be motivated by such and such, and in point of fact be mistaken about his motivation. Surely Ryle cannot mean that consciousness as a direct apprehension of a lived state

1. Ibid., p. 162.

of belief is mistaken, for we cannot make sense of such an assertion. Obviously, only a sentence, proposition, judgment, or statement about that lived state can be mistaken, and clearly not the direct apprehension of it.

Furthermore, and this is the crucial point, if a person supposedly knows something, and in fact is in error in his judgment about that something, his direct apprehension of the lived through experience is clearly not affected in its immediacy by the error of his judgment. Ryle's argument proves only that we do not in fact know what we experience as a certainty. It does not prove that, in any sense, we are unable to recognize the lived through state of certainty in an immediate way.¹ Ryle has confused the object of direct apprehension, which is lived immediacy, with the object possibly referred to in lived immediacy. What is apprehended in lived immediacy is a special mode of lived through experiencing, which, no doubt, involves judgments of cognition, motivations, feelings, and desires. What is immediately apprehended is the lived quality of these experiencings, certainly not the epistemological or ontological objects to which they might refer.²

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1. Suggested by Campbell in a personal interview, Nov. 18, 1960.
 2. It is interesting to note that in The Concept of Mind, p. 158, Ryle, in discussing the kinds of mistakes we all make with regard to organic sensations, actually admits veridical apprehension of these in other aspects--the very aspects the introspectionist alone claims to know!

We can only clarify this vital distinction by translating the supposed apprehension into judgment. A lived experience of belief might be reported propositionally as: "I believe the tree is red." In this judgment, I am reporting a direct apprehension of a psychological state of mind, namely, of believing, and I am attributing a certain characteristic to an external object, namely, redness as qualifying a tree. Now, it seems clear that although I might be incorrectly attributing a certain quality to an external object, that error does not infect--in fact, is irrelevant to--the apprehension of the state of belief. Only by keeping clear on this distinction can we keep clear on the distinction between psychological immediacy and epistemological certainty. It does not appear that we have to say that the actuality of the first entails the actuality of the second.

Another source of Ryle's confusion is not difficult to ascertain. He asserts: "A mind cannot help being constantly aware of all the supposed occupants of its private stage"¹ The naive belief that self-consciousness must be defined as constant awareness or apprehension of all the details of experience has never been seriously entertained. In fact, certain thinkers have found it necessary to distinguish between 'awareness' and 'explicit awareness' in order to indicate distinguishable (but perhaps not fully articulated) gradations in lived experience. Lived experience is far too

1. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 154.

complex in its richness and variety to lend itself to the belief that it necessarily involves a constant and clear grasp of all of its shadings and fluctuating boundaries. Ryle never shows cause why self-awareness should necessarily involve constant and infallible detailed apprehension of all of its complex and intricate character.

The question of what meaning we can attach to the direct apprehension by the subject of his own lived experience is essentially the question of what the objects of introspection are, and whether introspection yields a unique kind of knowledge of the acts and states of lived experience. It will be clear that we have already committed ourselves to the view that in some sense of the word 'apprehension', the subject has a direct apprehension of its lived experiencing. Whether this constitutes knowledge, only a complete explication of the problem of how the subject knows its lived experiencing will tell.

3. Alexander's Definition of Introspection

Campbell would claim that only the person who undergoes the lived state can have direct access to his lived experience. Since Campbell has admitted his indebtedness to Samuel Alexander for the view of introspection which he develops, some attention will be given to Alexander's conception of introspection.¹

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 111.

Alexander has defined introspection (for psychological purposes) as "enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest".¹ We need not detain ourselves here with a complete explication of the technical meaning that Alexander attaches to 'enjoyment' except to point out that by introspection in its most generic sense Alexander simply meant the "experiencing of our own mental states".² Alexander defines introspection as "enjoyment", i.e., lived through experience.³ Our failure to realize that introspection has as its object the 'lived through' experience of a subject has led to no little confusion concerning the object of introspection. Alexander warns us that:

If you fail, . . . to find in your experience the act of experiencing the enjoyment, but find only the object and nothing else; for instance, if you find the tree but not the enjoyed perceiving of it; the reason is that you are seeking for the enjoyed as if it were an object contemplated, and naturally can find no perceiving or imagining or thinking which stands to you in the same relation as the tree . . .⁴

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1. Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. II (New York: The Humanities Press, 1927), p. 89.
 2. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 18.
 3. We find in F.R. Tennant a view of experience similar to Alexander's "enjoyment". Tennant calls it erlebnis and characterizes it as follows: "It denotes not knowledge, even the simpler kind called acquaintance, but being that is prior to knowledge. Whether we know a mental erlebnis immediately or mediately, is not of vital importance; but the view adopted here is that a mental state such as longing is, like color, directly apprehended, not inferred, by self-conscious subjects." F.R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I (Cambridge: At the Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 15-16.
 4. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol. I, p. 20.

Before we unqualifiedly accept the outright identification of introspection with "enjoyed" or "lived through" experience, it might be wise to distinguish the import of 'lived through' experience from Alexander's notion of 'enjoyment'. Alexander tended to identify awareness of an object with an awareness of an awareness of an object. Hence, we find him affirming: "I am aware of my awareness as I strike a stroke or wave a farewell. My awareness and my being aware of it are identical."¹ Alexander would have us take every act of consciousness as an act of self-consciousness (since "an awareness of an awareness" is what we ordinarily mean by self-consciousness). This is not to affirm, warns Alexander, that every consciousness is identical with self-consciousness, in the sense that there is fully objectified awareness in every state of mind. Rather, it affirms that, for example, feeling and feeling that we are feeling are one and the same.

Alexander, however, is careful to distinguish introspection for distinctly psychological purposes from the general character of introspection. It is clear from this that in Alexander's thought there are two rather distinct views of introspection. Introspection is first "enjoyed" experience, self-consciousness. Secondly, introspection, defined for psychological purposes, is "enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest".

1. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 12.

There is an important truth affirmed in Alexander's theory and it seems to rest in his assertion that when we are living through our experience, there is an aspect of experience which is not, in any ordinary sense, an object, but is there as certainly as objects. Beyond the focus of explicit consciousness, there lies an area which later we refer to as vague bodily sensations, fluctuating centers of emotion, and dimly present layers of feelings which form the psychic bedrock of our lives, but which we can recognize more easily than we can describe. It is the area which Bradley called "immediate experience" and Whitehead termed "causal efficacy". It is experienced not as an object like 'blue' or 'table', but as a state of living experiencing.

Introspection defined as "enjoyment", as lived through experiencing, serves, for Alexander, as a definition of one character of experience. Introspection defined as "enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest" is, in principle, different from simple lived through experiencing, for it introduces what might appropriately be termed the factor of "explicit attention".

4. The Distinction between 'Primary' and 'Secondary' Attention

Following Alexander's lead, Campbell would distinguish two distinct modes of attention; what can be termed 'primary

attention' and 'secondary attention'.¹ At a later stage in our discussion we shall give a more comprehensive analysis of primary and secondary awareness. For the moment, we shall only discuss their general characteristics, bearing in mind that our primary concern is to seek to determine what the objects of introspection are. 'Primary attention', Campbell takes to be experience as it is lived through or enjoyed. 'Secondary awareness' presupposes 'primary awareness', and its special interest is the articulation of 'primary awareness'.

An illustration might clarify the foregoing distinction. It is not uncommon for our attention to be completely (or almost completely) absorbed in the contemplation of an object or event in the external world. Suppose we are intensely involved in the attempt to identify a butterfly specimen on a flower before us. In such a case, secondary awareness would be in almost complete abeyance, while primary awareness would be present to a degree measurable by the intensity of our concentration on the butterfly specimen. At any moment, however, the intensity of our focal attention might be diminished, for example by the unperceived arrival of another person on the scene who asks: "What are you seeing?" Almost immediately our absorption in the object is diminished and we alter the focus of our

1. When asked about this distinction, Campbell referred the writer to Archibald Allan Bowman, A Sacramental Universe. The Vanuxem Lectures, ed. by J.W. Scott (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 166ff.

attention to a new object, namely, what we are actually experiencing in observing the butterfly. With this change in the focus of our attention, secondary self-awareness is increased in the total experience.¹

The analysis of this situation reveals that two factors are clearly involved: (1) There is an object of focal attention, in this case, the butterfly specimen; and (2) there is an act of observation brought to bear upon it (the observation of the butterfly specimen). As Bowman cogently points out:

The subsequent state differs from this I in that the activity of observing the object has now itself entered into the relation of objectivity; it has itself become an object of interest.²

The transition involved is not, however, merely the transition from one 'object' to another. It is not the same, for instance, as moving from page to page in a picture book. What becomes the object with the emergence of secondary awareness is really the activity of observing the butterfly, that is, our consciousness of observing and seeking to identify the object before us. We should note that the butterfly, or object in the external world, characteristically reports itself to us via an objective relation. This is not normally the case with our subjective states, for it is not characteristic of

1. Cf. Bowman, ibid., pp. 166ff.

2. Ibid., p. 266.

mental processes that we experience them as objects to us.

We can assume that with this analysis we have opened the door to the major problems with regard to introspection. In the first place, does introspection have as its object a contemporary state of experiencing or a past state of experiencing which we now recall in memory? Secondly, does the 'objectification' of the primary state of awareness modify it to such an extent that we would not be able to say that the object we set out to introspect and the object now before us are one and the same? We will consider the former question first and deal with the latter at a later stage in our discussion.

Inherent difficulties which some thinkers have found with "introspection of the present moment" have led them to the conclusion that all introspection is retrospection. The first task before us will be to examine the claim that introspection of the present moment fails of its 'proper object'.

Campbell has argued that the proper object of introspective analysis is experiencing as lived through. The question now before us is whether Campbell believes it consistent to maintain that current states of experiencing can be examined by introspective activity. The affirmation of the trustworthiness of introspection in yielding significant data about current mental processes and states is disputable on two different grounds. First, the failure, in practice,

of introspection to yield consistent and uniformly affirmed judgments concerning the basic modes of experiencing.

Secondly, the objection that, in principle, introspection of the present moment just is not possible. We shall deal with the former objection first.

5. Practical Objections to Introspection of the Present Moment

Does introspection fail in practice to give us reliable information about current mental states and processes? In its earliest formulation, introspection was believed to be the main source of empirical information about the workings of minds. Psychologists were embarrassed, however, to find that introspective reports often revealed conflicting testimony concerning certain characteristics of mental states and processes. If introspection enjoys the grand advantage of having direct access to the data, then the conflicts ought, in practice, to be easily resolved. For example, we find psychologists and thinkers, given to the use of introspection, alternately affirming and denying the presence of a faculty called "will". Surely, if we have direct access to the functioning of our minds through introspection, all that is required of us is to look and see whether such a faculty is present. In some such manner, the case is argued.¹

Now the inability of introspection to yield uniform conclusions concerning problems which supposedly it alone

1. See Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 165-66.

could judge does seem to constitute a serious objection to its use as a reliable method. However, it must be pointed out that few, if any, have ever claimed that the reports of introspection are uniformly infallible. Moreover, although it is possible that early enthusiasm led to excessive claims for introspection and substantial errors in its practice, it is also apparent that present sympathizers are more temperate in both their claims and in their care in applying introspective methods. As Campbell suggests:

Very much can be done in the way of correcting initial errors and oversights by frequent repetitions of the experience to be introspected, and by careful comparison of one's findings with the findings of other workers in the same field.¹

Furthermore, those desiring to maintain the general trustworthiness of introspection to yield knowledge of the broad, basic modes of experiencing do not have to defend the proposition that introspection is a trustworthy instrument for examining all the details of an introspective situation, no matter what its experiential complexity. The basic modes of experiencing such as conation, feeling, and cognition are generally agreed upon by those availing themselves of introspective data. This criticism does, however, provide a check upon those who might claim that introspection is able to give a detailed analysis, completely comprehensive, of all the elements involved in a complex mental experience. Thus, it

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 116.

can be concluded that while conflicting introspective reports provide reasonable grounds for caution in ascertaining the limits of efficacious introspective analysis, we cannot suppose that it provides an insurmountable roadblock in determining the general modes of experiencing.

A second practical objection, first raised by Hume and offered recently by Ryle, is that given certain specific kinds of experience, introspection of these current states or processes is impossible.¹ Ryle points out that the process of introspective analysis demands a detached scrutiny of the workings of the mind, and that in certain states of mind, for example, panic, anger, terror, such dispassionate introspection is impossible. However, Campbell might point out that this objection impugns the possibility of introspection only insofar as it ignores the fact that introspection is originated by a special interest in the introspecting agent to learn something about his experiencing. So long as this interest moves the introspecting observer, introspection in the psychological sense of "enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest" is certainly possible. On the other hand, in states of mind such as terror, fury, convulsive hilarity, the interest in dispassionately examining one's state of mind has waned or is altogether absent. Ryle's criticism is telling only if we assume that all current states of mind are amenable to

1. Cf. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 165-66.

accurate introspection, and there is no good reason to make such an assumption. Ryle further argues that the impossibility of introspection of current states of experiencing such as fury, terror, and so on, suggests that all introspection is retrospection, and it is really retrospection which gives us knowledge of such states. Be that as it may, if introspection is defined (as Campbell defines it) as "enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest", then the citing of a kind of enjoyment which excludes the possibility of a scientific interest does not prove that there are not other 'enjoyments' amenable to such an interest. From the proposition, some current mental states cannot be accurately known by introspection, the conclusion does not follow that no current mental states can be known by introspection.

Both of the criticisms of the efficacy of introspection in practical application are valuable in determining the limits of the claims of introspective method. Neither is convincing as a telling argument against the view that introspection at least yields knowledge of the general modes of current experiencing.

6. Campbell's Objection to Introspection of the Present Moment

The criticisms just discussed attempted to undermine confidence in introspection by pointing up difficulties and conflicts which arise when introspection is put to the practical test. We have to consider now criticisms that

suggest that it is impossible, in principle, as well as in practice, for us to introspect current lived through experiencing.

It has been suggested that introspection of a current state of lived through experiencing depends for its efficacy upon the possibility of the subject dividing himself into two. For example, if we set out to report a process of observing a tree by means of introspection, the object of our introspection would be a lived through state of observing. In such a case, it is argued, the organ to be observed and the organ observing are one and the same, and it is impossible under such conditions to show how the observation could take place. There is one aspect of our lived through experiencing which, in principle, we can never observe, and that is the introspective activity whereby we reflect upon or observe our observing. For note, what would be required in such a case would be two acts of attending which would be occurring simultaneously. We would have to be attending to our observing and attending to our attending to observing. If the introspecting process is identical with the object to be introspected, in principle, we could never discover how the one could know the other, since there is no other. The only conclusion possible, it would seem, is that we cannot directly introspect our present introspecting.

However, such an outcome is not conclusive proof that present lived through experiencing cannot be introspected.

Rather, it proves that some areas of current experiencing are not in principle capable of being introspected. What is required, if the objection to introspection of the present moment is to be demonstrated as impossible, is to show that introspection of current lived through experiencing always fails of its 'proper object' and that it must fail by the very nature of the case.

A criticism of this order arises in relation to the process of attending to or reflecting on current lived states. It will be remembered that Campbell defined introspection following Alexander as "enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest". Campbell argues that introspection of the present moment fails of its proper object because of the modification of the proper object by the introspective activity, whether it be reflective or attentive activity.¹

The proper object of introspection of the present moment would be the lived immediacy of present experiencing. Hence, if introspection of the present moment is to succeed, it must report this lived immediacy as it is for the experiencing of it. The aim of introspective analysis would be a description of the internal character and pervasive constituents of present, lived immediacy. Campbell's concern is: can this lived immediacy be made accessible to us

1. Cf. Campbell, OSG, p. 114.

through introspection?

One of our common experiences is to be intensely involved in some project and suddenly to become aware of a persistent pain. Now we assume, quite rightly perhaps, that the pain was there before we noticed it (before we attended to it) and that our noticing it did not create or manufacture the pain. We are given to describing this kind of experience by saying that while we were unconscious of the pain through lack of focal attention, the pain was always there. It was only the shifting of our attention that brought the pain into the focus of self-consciousness.

It would generally be agreed that the process of noticing the pain, of attending to it, did not create the lived through experience, but it certainly might have modified it. If a case can be made that attention modifies a lived through experience, then it would seem to offer a telling objection to introspection of current states of experiencing. If a person, gripped in the spell of some powerful emotion, is instructed to reflect upon or attend to this lived state with a view to describing it, would not the very activity of attending with a scientific interest alter or modify his current state? It is maintained that the process of attending would so modify the state that what he would be reporting would be, in fact, his felt state as so altered.

Campbell, for reasons quite similar to these, argues that the process of attending results in such an alteration,

and concludes that introspection of the present moment must fail of its proper object.

There is in fact no mental state or process that can remain unaffected by being reflected upon 'with a scientific interest'. We can, of course, in a sense introspect a present pain. But the point is that this 'present pain' is not the pain we set out to introspect. That pain has undergone modifications through the influence of introspective activity directed upon it. The present pain is what it is, at least in part, through such influence.¹

If, as Campbell has argued, introspection of the present moment fails of its proper object because of the modifying activity of attending with a scientific interest, then he would urge the necessity of rethinking our conclusions as to the proper object of introspective activity. If the objects of introspection are not present lived through experiencings, perhaps they are 'objects' of memory, re-lived through with a scientific interest. Interpreted in this fashion, introspection consists in laying hold upon the flying skirts of our subjective processes at the moment when they are passing from the immediacy of present experience. This is precisely the alternative that Campbell suggests:

It is insufficiently appreciated that when we want to introspect we begin (and indeed continue) by re-living, through memory, the experience in which we are interested In introspection the past experience is lived through again, but now with the difference that the self-awareness is both raised to a high degree and is also scientifically oriented.²

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 112.

Now Campbell is prepared to admit that the recognition that all introspection is retrospection entails certain limitations as to the extent of possible introspection due to the fallibility of memory. He believes, however, that "the disabilities entailed in our having to rely upon memory in introspection" are exaggerated.¹ For example, it is recognized that experiences far removed in time are usually more obstinate to recall for subsequent introspection than experiences of a vivid character of the more recent past. Furthermore, even events of relatively recent temporal proximity might offer difficulties because of their complexity or because the elements in the experience were only vaguely apprehended.

On the positive side, however, we might record the fact that those states and processes of the mental life which we are most likely to want to introspect frequently recur in the natural course of our life. Even if they do not, argues Campbell, we are able to call them up for introspection "by an act of constructive imagination".²

It is important that we interpret retrospection in such a way that it constitutes genuine intro-spective observation. Campbell is perfectly right in insisting that what we introspect is an experience 're-lived' or 're-enacted' in the

1. See ibid., p. 114.

2. Ibid., p. 115.

present moment by means of memory. Retrospection has often been attacked on the ground that it cannot give us knowledge of the time-conditioned subjective. For example, it might be argued that the only way in which we can examine a past experience is through memory which is always working with ideas. The experience, as past, is something outside of my present subjectivity and, hence, can only be recalled and presented as a thought. My present state of lived awareness is defined then as a 'remembering of a past experience'. The experience remembered, since it is no longer part of my present 'enjoyed' state, offers itself, in the only form that it can, to retrospection as an ideal object. But since it is not as an idea that it was lived in its present moment, we cannot say that retrospection gives us direct knowledge of the past experience, since it gives us the past in ideal form, and not in its lived and experienced character.

But Campbell would maintain that there is an error in this analysis, because it simply is not true to say that we have access to past experience only via ideas. Retrospection involves the re-living or re-enactment of past experience in a present mode of subjective enjoyment, not simply of ideal construction. What is made an object in retrospection is a present lived experience interpreted as a re-living of a past experience. The characteristic mode of the re-lived experience is not objective, although it becomes that when

we subject it to introspective analysis.

7. The Grand Advantage of Introspection

In the light of this interpretation, Campbell goes on to insist upon what he calls the 'grand advantage' of introspection as over against extrospection. He believes this advantage establishes knowledge of the inner life on a plane superior to knowledge of external objects.¹ In introspection, argues Campbell, the objects we are trying to introspect are lived experiencings as they are for the experience of them. In extrospection, the objects we are concerned to become acquainted with are objects not simply as they are for the experience of them, but also as they are in themselves.² In the case of external perception, we may be certain that the rose appears red, but we cannot with the same degree of certainty affirm that the external object actually has the quality of red as it appears through our experience. In introspection, Campbell suggests, this distinction between the object as it appears or as it is experienced and as it is in itself does not seriously arise. We can attach no meaning to the question: What is the character of a lived through experiencing as not lived through? But we can attach meaning to the question: What is the character of external objects as not lived through in my experiencing?

1. Cf. OSG, p. 117.

2. Ibid.

Are we then able to overcome the supposed inherent difficulties of introspection of the present moment by admitting that all introspection is retrospection? Is introspection a case of re-living through memory mental states and processes with a scientific interest? Now the 'proper object' of introspection of present enjoyed experiencing would be that experience as so lived in the present. Campbell has argued that introspection of the present moment fails of its proper object because introspective activity once directed towards this proper object necessarily results in an alteration of that object. On Campbell's view, the proper object of introspective activity is a memorial situation of re-living a state of lived experiencing, which is now past. Campbell is careful to point out that the object of introspection, a past experience lived through again, is lived through with a difference. Now the difference he takes to be that the self-awareness is "both raised to a high degree and scientifically oriented".¹

What actually escapes us in our attempt to re-live the pain of a moment ago is the unique lived immediacy of that moment. That moment, with its unique immediacy, is past and is no more, except insofar as it is or can be made an aspect or element in present enjoyed experience. Thus, we must admit, with Campbell, that much of what we call

1. Ibid., p. 112.

introspection is really retrospection; that is, the re-living of the past in the present.¹

8. Campbell's View of Introspection Questioned

Although introspection of the present moment fails of its proper object in a great number of instances, is it necessary to maintain that it fails in every instance? Here Campbell would answer in the affirmative, for he cannot conceive of the lived immediacy not being modified, if ever so slightly, by introspective activity directed upon it. It is at this point that we must part ways with Campbell and maintain that in certain instances, introspection of the present moment does not fail of its proper object. In so doing, we realize that we must affirm the modification of the total felt state (of lived immediacy) by reflective analysis, and, at the same time, affirm that the object of introspection remains, in its essential character, unaltered.

As we have suggested before, introspection has as its object a lived through experiencing of the present moment. Campbell and others have argued that the attempt to bring such a state before the mind by introspective activity necessarily involves an alteration of the state. But, it should be pointed out that insofar as the state is brought before the mind, what we have done is to construct or make

1. We will reserve judgment for the moment on the question whether the experience as 're-lived' is an exact reproduction, as Campbell believes it to be, of the past experience.

an object of the state. In principle, there seem to be no grounds for affirming that the process of objectification of lived through experiencing, at the same time and in all cases, necessarily involves the destruction of the enjoyed experiencing.

Let us take the case of a persistent pain in our finger. We might readily grant that attention to, reflection on, the pain is felt as a difference in our total lived state, but it is not necessarily felt as an alteration of the pain. And this latter point seems crucial. Campbell would admit that in a sense we could introspect a present pain, when interpreted as a re-lived or re-enacted experiencing, but he is obviously doubtful whether the pain being introspected is the same pain that we set out to introspect. Furthermore, Campbell would argue that the attempt to introspect presupposes that we already have had an experience which we now want to introspect. In the case before us, we have the pain first, and we then try to introspect it in the present moment; for we recognize that, in some form at any rate, it continues into the present moment. The point at issue, for Campbell, is whether or not its present form is not, however slightly, modified by our mental attitude of scientific curiosity towards our object. If so, we can correctly introspect the pain in its form at the present moment, but it is not the pain in the form of its lived immediacy that we set out to introspect.

Let us move to another example, in which one in a deep despondency is asked to give us an introspective report of his lived through experiencing. He obviously proceeds by making his felt state an object to himself, by translating his feelings, his mood, into perceptions and ideas. Now the act of translation is, in itself, felt as a difference in his total state, but does this necessarily warrant the conclusion that the feelings and moods are destroyed by translation, or even changed? Isn't it possible that the original experienced despondency remains and it is the original felt despondency which judges the objectified state?

For example, if we report our present state of lived experience as a happy, cheerful, glorious state, when in fact we feel depressed, gloomy, and tired, we are likely to experience quite a jar between our description and our actual feelings. That is, we feel a disharmony between our introspective report and what we actually feel. The objectification of our enjoyed experience through attentive or reflective activity is felt as an addition, and is, in fact, a new element in a different felt state. This new, objectified element gives the feeling of change, of alteration, in our general felt state, but not a feeling of change in our special mood. The judgment about my lived experience brings with it either a feeling of "harmonious addition without change", or, if incorrect, "a feeling of

incongruity".¹

It might be argued against the view here set forth, i.e., that some current modes of experiencing can be introspected, that we have underestimated the innovating character of introspective activity. Under no conditions, it might be argued, can we maintain that the special object of introspective analysis is not altered by reflection upon or attention to that object. In support of such a contention, Campbell argues, for instance, that the experience of pain "must to some extent undergo change by being reflected upon by the victim of it".² Campbell points out that one of the most effective ways of relieving

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1. F.H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1914), p. 168.
 2. Campbell, OSG, p. 114. Apparently in regard to the modifying activity of attention, Campbell has altered his position in his later work, OSG. In SC, an earlier work, he argues: "The activity of attention is required to bring them judgments about enjoyed experiences into due relief, but the business of this activity is simply to make explicit what is assumed to be there already implicitly, without transformation or addition. Anything more than this defeats the very purpose of attention." SC, p. 104, italics added. In the passage from which this quote is taken, Campbell is analyzing the notion of 'reflex judgments' or judgments grounded in immediate self-awareness. The warrant for these judgments is experience as lived or undergone, and there is, according to him, no "interpretive activity" involved in our immediate grasp of these judgments. Campbell seems to argue here that attention to these lived states raises implicit judgments to explicit awareness, but fails to alter or modify these judgments. However, it is difficult to see why "implicit judgments" about lived states should not suffer alteration by focusing "explicit attention" upon them, if primary states of experience are modified by the same process.

a person's pain is to distract his attention from the pain. Arguing in this vein, evidence could be brought forth to demonstrate that a person by discipline and "prolonged practice" in the art of concentration might be able to make himself impervious to pain at will.¹ Campbell concludes:

If, then, as happens when he sets out to introspect, a man's attention is directed away from the pain, it seems inevitable that the experience of the pain will be modified in some degree, however slight.²

Obviously, one difficulty that Campbell sees centers in the activity of attending. If a person is living through an experience of pain, then he must to some degree be noticing or attending to that pain. Here attention is used as a synonym for awareness, even though that awareness be involuntary or vague. If this same person sets out to introspect his present awareness, he is called upon to attend to or reflect upon his vague or involuntary noticing of pain. It is Campbell's argument that the activity whereby we shift the focus of our attention from the merely noticing of the pain to the attending to or reflecting upon this noticing is bound to modify the original noticing to some slight extent. His reasoning is based on the empirical evidence that distraction of attention often alters the object being attended to.

What can be said about this line of reasoning? In the first place, it is obvious that Campbell's argument stands

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 114.

2. Ibid.

or falls upon the legitimacy of the assertion that all instances of introspective activity are instances of distracting attention from one state of attending to another. But why adhere to this assertion at all unless it is rooted in and substantiated by our actual experience? Logic alone cannot teach us that there is a difference between the two attentive states, or that there has been a modification of the original state by a re-focusing of our attention. The difference between the two modes of experiencing, if there be two, must be an experienced difference. Campbell is cognizant of this fact and appeals to experiential evidence to sustain his case, for example, referring to a most effective way of relieving pain by distracting a patient's attention from that pain. However, the appeal to experience is not always a happy solution, for experience can be fickle and often lends support to both of its suitors.

One can imagine, and many of us have actually experienced, situations where the distraction of attention simply did not alter in any noticeable way our experience of pain. However, we need not restrict ourselves to the lived experience of pain, which certainly lends more support to Campbell's view than do certain other modes of experiencing. Take, for example, a lived experience of depression and examine the effect of distracting one's attention from that state. Modern man has been ingenious in inventing and creating artificial means for escaping from his lived de-

pressions, such as television, movies, group activities, and so on. However, few of us have not had the experience that all of our means of diversion were futile, that regardless of our distractions and escape mechanisms, the depression persisted, unaltered in its lived quality.

Needless to say the evidence for either view is not unambiguous. It must be admitted that re-focusing of attention more often than not does serve to modify the primary lived states that we set out to introspect. One might argue that the modification was so slight, or so vague as to render it experientially unnoticeable. The probability of this hypothesis is enhanced by the large number of instances in which distraction of attention is efficacious in altering the primary state of lived experience. Nevertheless, in the absence of experiential data, by means of which alone we are able to support the general hypothesis of "inevitable alteration", we are not able conclusively to affirm its veracity. Moreover, the absence of a felt or experienced difference in the special object of introspection, lends direct support to the view that some current objects of introspection persist unaltered when attended to with a scientific interest.

We have, however, gone somewhat astray from our original purpose which was to examine the assertion that all instances of introspective activity are instances of distracting attention from one lived state and focusing

attention in some other fashion. Up to this point, our purpose has been to show that the judgment that alteration of attention necessarily involves modification of the original object must be decided on experiential grounds. We have further indicated that certain alterations of attention are not experienced as also involving modifications of the original state of experiencing. We are now prepared to consider a further objection which might be brought forth to dispute the possibility of introspective analysis of current experiences.

9. A Further Objection to Introspection of the Present Moment

Introspection of the present moment, it might be argued, necessarily involves two acts of attending by the subject, and since these acts would be occurring simultaneously, this in turn would require two separate subjects. That is, the subject would have to be attending to a present pain, and at the same time attending to his attending to pain. Now it is clear that the supposed critic sees the divisibility of the subject attending as being inherently impossible. If there are two current acts of attention, then there must be two subjects attending.

However, must we admit that it is intrinsically impossible for a unitary subject to attend twice at once? In fact, far from this being impossible, it appears to be an experiential commonplace. We drive our car, attending to the

mechanical requirements requisite for keeping the car operating; we attend to the developing traffic patterns, and at the same time we carry on an earnest and often highly abstract conversation with our passenger. It is possible, of course, to argue that this apparent case of divided attention is really a case of the rapid to and fro switch of attention. This latter hypothesis is by no means substantially supported by experiential evidence, for it is difficult to find adequate empirical grounds for the "rapid, to and fro switch of attention" hypothesis. It might even be suspected that it is an alternative put forward to avoid what would surely be a problem of immense difficulty, namely, seeking to understand how one subject could attend twice at once.

What precisely would it mean to affirm that we can attend twice at once? If we assume that the two acts of attention are radically separate acts, distinct lived experiences, then there is no avenue of escape but to assert the absurd hypothesis that one subject divides himself into two subjects each of whom has a radically separate experience. So long as we hold this view, it is clear that we must admit two separate subjects for these two separate, but contemporary experiences. However, it does seem possible to view these two experiences as distinguishable, but not radically separate. In that case, they would be distinguishable aspects of one complex, unified experience,

and would require only one subject. There is no inherent contradiction or affront to actual experience to maintain that the subject is able to distinguish within lived experiencing, distinctive levels of attention and foci of attention. In fact, such an approach becomes an imperative if we are going to give an adequate account of experience in its lived immediacy.

But even this view of experience does not provide a panacea for all of our difficulties. Even if there are distinguishable levels of attention and foci of attention, the objection might be pressed in the following manner. Is it possible, in principle, to perform two acts of explicit attention at the same time, without requiring that there be two separate subjects of these acts?¹ For note, in our example of attending to driving the car and attending to a highly abstract conversation at the same time, we are not 'enjoying' our experience with a scientific interest. Our primary attention, the lived through experience of driving and talking, seems to require only one subject. Even though the acts of attending are distinguishable in this case, there is no reason to suppose that they are radically separate acts by two different subjects. In fact, an appeal to memory seems to indicate that they are acts or experiences of the same subject, for the driver

1. This is perhaps what Campbell takes to be inherently impossible. Cf. OSG, pp. 113-14.

could recall both his lived through attention to driving and his attention to the discussion.

What is at issue here (with our imaginary critic) is whether one subject could perform two acts of attending at the same time; one, an act of primary attention; another, an act of secondary or explicit attention of the order of introspection. Having previously distinguished these forms of attention, we must first attempt to indicate more carefully the differentia between the two forms. By primary attention, we simply mean to refer to experience in its lived character; that is, in its immediacy. Primary attention is constituted by a direct apprehension which is pre-cognitive, unarticulated, with distinguishable, but generally undistinguished levels and foci. It is experiencing as it is undergone, having about it a quality of sheer givenness. Secondary, or explicit, attention, arises out of primary attention and aims at the articulation and elucidation of the distinguishable aspects of primary attention. It is, in short, experience in its scientifically curious character which aims at illuminating primary attention by lifting it to a heightened form of awareness.

Now our essential concern here is not a detailed analysis of the character of experience, but rather, an attempt to determine what kind of activity introspection is. Clearly, for the view here set forth, introspection for scientific purposes is secondary attention or explicit

attention. Introspection is, strictly speaking, discursive activity and is primarily an act of analytic attention which isolates certain distinguishable aspects of the current lived immediacy for special articulation and elucidation. Setting aside, for the moment, the problem of whether introspective activity modifies the primary enjoyment towards which it is directed, there seems to be no inherent difficulty in maintaining that one subject is capable of two current acts of attention, so long as we recognize the distinctive character of the two modes of attending. In fact, we are forced to admit that something of this order occurs when we set out to introspect a lived through experience. Unless the primary attention or enjoyment is given, there is no datum which we can be curious about.

10. Summary and Criticism of Campbell's View of Introspection

The proper object of introspection, according to Campbell, is a state of lived experience, which in principle is accessible only to the subject undergoing that 'enjoyed' experience. The lived immediacy as a present existent mode of experiencing is directly apprehended only by the subject enjoying that experience. The lived through character of present experiencing is not directly apprehended by introspection, for introspection is attention to that state guided by a scientific interest. Thus, introspection is a secondary state of explicit attention which is scientifically

oriented toward the articulation and elucidation of the experience as it is for the experience of it. Against Campbell's position, it has been argued that introspective activity alters the general state of lived immediacy but not necessarily the special state of primary attention which is the special object of the introspective activity. Insofar as introspection constitutes an attempt to lift the primary enjoyment to explicit attention with a view to elucidating and articulating an aspect of its lived immediacy, it fails of its proper object.

That is to deny (as Campbell does not) that introspective activity reproduces exactly, or is an exact copy of the special lived immediacy which is its proper object. It fails of the proper object either because the state of lived immediacy has perished and is no more, or because, by the very nature of the case, secondary attention, because it is mediative and discursive in character, is simply not the same as the primary attention. In the former case, the temporal gap between the lived experience and the initiation of introspective activity provides sufficient grounds for affirming that the lived immediacy we set out to introspect is no more, in its immediacy. Or, the initiation of introspective activity might in some cases so distract attention from the lived immediacy as to slightly or profoundly alter its lived character. In any case, intro-

spection then becomes retrospection. In some cases, on the other hand, we might affirm that the special object of lived immediacy continues in the present, irrespective of the activity of introspection. Thus, we would say that it is accessible to introspection in the present moment, but not necessarily directly grasped in its lived character by the introspective activity.

Campbell is correct in insisting that introspection, in most instances, is retrospection or the re-living of past immediacy re-created in the present. We re-live in the present (through memory) a past experience with a view to elucidating and articulating the character of that past experience. However, the re-living of an enjoyment of the immediate or distant past must not be taken (as Campbell does take it) as an exact reproduction of that immediacy in the present lived experience. For Campbell to argue that the re-lived reproduction is an exact reconstruction of the enjoyment as it was seems to entail the view that we were directly cognizant, at the time of its occurrence, of its determinate character. If such were the case, it is difficult to see how the re-living of that immediacy could improve upon our former grasp of it. Clearly, the great advantage of being able to re-call and re-live our past states and processes of experience is that by means of the scientific interest we now have in these states, we are able to render our knowledge of experience more acute and complete. Re-living

our past experiences through memory brings an illumination and articulation of those past experiences which supposedly we did not grasp through our primary attention.

If we are unable to assent to a direct cognitive grasp of our lived experience through introspection, and if we must admit that in retrospection we do not exactly reproduce the past state of experience, what is the warrant for believing that introspective judgments can give us some knowledge of our inner life? If we expect introspection to give us infallible judgments about our lived experience, we can see from the foregoing analysis that our hope is in vain. However, if we seek only warranted assertions about our mental life, then introspection is able to provide that warrant. There is no more reason to assume that our mental life is disorderly, or that the events that occur in our experience are indeterminate, than it is to assume that natural events are disorderly or indeterminate.

It should be recognized, however, that if we are to adhere to this principle of the orderly and determinate quality of lived experience, we must be prepared to provide certain checks against faulty or inaccurate introspection. First of all, as Campbell previously suggested, it is possible by frequent repetition of the experience to be introspected to check our introspective judgments and to correct our initial errors. It is also possible to compare our findings with the findings of other workers availing them-

selves of the use of introspection. Insofar as introspective activity is retrospective, and the experience to be examined is in the recent past, then we have to rely on the testimony of memory. Now we have to admit that memory is faulty and often leads us astray, but there is no good reason to assume that memory invariably is inaccurate. Used critically, memory is an invaluable, even necessary, guide not only in introspection, but in any cognitive activity. Finally, if certain lived experiences persist in their immediacy even after we have initiated introspective activity, then there seems to be some warrant for saying that the lived or felt state itself is active in a judgmental manner. We have suggested before that an inconsistent or inaccurate introspective judgment is often felt to jar with experience as it is enjoyed. Now, we use the word felt advisedly, for it is genuinely experienced by way of feeling that there is a positive disharmony between the introspective report and the experience as it is lived through. This feeling is not a germinal judgment, although it could be, and often is, developed into a judgment.¹

11. Introspection and Self-Knowledge

Our discussion of introspection has avoided the question of whether the self is or can be an object of introspective

1. See Essays On Truth and Reality, pp. 182-88, where Bradley has argued extensively for this point.

analysis. In asserting that by means of introspection it is possible to make warranted assertions about the states and processes of experience, we have left open the question of whether we were, at the same time, making warranted assertions about the nature of the self. We have not then raised explicitly the problem of self-knowledge which it is now our concern to discuss. Our inquiry focuses upon the problem: To what extent, if any, can the self be an object of introspective analysis?

The problem of the general possibility of self-knowledge is an issue of immense complexity and a detailed analysis of this problem would carry us far beyond the scope of our present concern. Without entering upon a lengthy analysis of the formal conditions making possible self-knowledge, it is still possible to recognize some of the crucial issues involved.

Campbell would urge that if we are to have knowledge of the self, either direct or indirect, somehow the self must be revealed or manifest to us. Furthermore, the arena of revelation must be experience as it is lived through. Now, this principle is of utmost importance, for if the self remains hidden and in no way manifests itself in experience, it is, for all intents and purposes, nothing. Lotze appears to be supporting Campbell's argument when he maintains:

We have to conceive its [the self's] nature as it must be in order that it should pass through what we know in ourselves as its states, and perform what we find in ourselves as its actions.¹

In discussing the objects of introspection, Campbell reached the conclusion that the proper objects of introspection are states and processes of experience as they are lived through. Now it is not a meaningless question to ask: What is living through experience? This is but to recognize that experience involves an experient, that awareness involves a subject. Tennant argues that 'awareness' is a meaningless term, a mere nonsense-word denoting 'nonentity', unless it be an elliptical expression for "awareness of something by something".²

From the recognition that all enjoyed experience involves the notion of an experient, Campbell believes there is no direct path to the affirmation that this subject is identical with what we mean by the self. In fact, the reason why we are constrained from making this identification is the ambiguity that confronts us in seeking to define the self.

Now apart from specific theories about the self, its determinate structure and ontological character, there are

1. Lotze, Microcosmus, Book II, tr. by E. Hamilton and E.E.C. Jones, p. 168, as quoted by Campbell in OSG, p. 118.

2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 17.

generally two alternatives that we can adhere to concerning knowledge of its nature. First, the self is known only by its empirical manifestations in the stream of experience. In this case, the total self would be the contemporary series of mental events together with the history of past events. In the second place, we might maintain that the self is manifest in present and past experiences, but never completely exhausted in these manifestations.

Regardless of which definition proves to be most adequate, from what we have already discussed about the objects and efficacy of introspection, certain conclusions relevant to the problem of self-knowledge seem to follow. If, in introspecting, the mental states we are investigating are separated by any temporal interval from the act of noticing them, then the latter act is clearly a memorial situation; it is retrospection and nothing more. If the mental processes are continuous with the act of introspective observation, then the element of memory is interpretable as introspective. In either case, our aim is to gather some information about a mental state or operation, and in that instance we must distinguish one state or operation from the remainder of our total consciousness. In short, to make it a distinguishable object of attention, it must be isolated within the total functioning of the subject. Introspection then as an act of psychological investigation rests in actual practice

upon the possibility of so isolating our mental states that we may observe them.¹ A mental state or operation so isolated does not constitute a self, i.e., a total self. In the first place, if we view the self as the collection of present experiences and past history, the introspective act reveals only one aspect in the collection. If, on the other hand, we view the self as manifested in present and past experiences but not exhausted by them, then the introspective act again only reveals to us one particular manifestation of the self, and not the whole self.

We might conclude from these facts that the introspective method as ordinarily understood is able to illuminate in no way the self as such, that is, the total self. Campbell, however, does not believe that we are forced to such a conclusion. His contention is that in introspection of isolated states or operations of the self, we are able to discover pervasive features which characterize the nature of the total self.

The basic modes of experience disclosed by introspection will be real manifestations of the real self, and as such will furnish evidence for valid conclusions about the self's nature.²

Anyone availing themselves of the introspective method, argues Campbell, will agree that the basic classification

1. Bowman, A Sacramental Universe, pp. 264-65.

2. Campbell, OSG, p. 116.

of experience under the general rubrics of feeling, conation, and cognition is correct and reveals the true nature of the self. Our knowledge of the total self is grounded in evidence derived from introspection and inferences made therefrom.

12. Campbell's Distinction between the 'Empirical' and the 'Non-Empirical' Self

Since Campbell does not believe that the total self is apprehended by introspection, he thinks it necessary to distinguish between the 'empirical' and the 'non-empirical' self. This distinction is not intended in Campbell's philosophy to be a distinction between ontological entities. Nor is it equivalent to the Kantian distinction between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self, the former being the self as it is in-itself and the latter the self as it is apprehended by the human mind.¹ Says Campbell: "In my view . . . it is false to suppose that the self in the form in which we apprehend it is not the self as it really is."²

While Campbell believes that the self as apprehended in experience is the real self, he does not infer from this that the total self is apprehended in experience. It is this latter distinction to which he is pointing in his distinction between the empirical self and the non-empirical

1. OSG, p. 107.

2. Ibid.

self.

What I mean by the empirical self is the self considered in respect of its functioning in human experience. And what I mean by the non-empirical self is that same self considered in respect of a possible functioning outside of human experience.¹ *[Italics added.]*

The sole purpose for making this distinction is the recognition that the self might not be exhausted by its functioning in experience and in order to allow for this possibility Campbell makes the distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical self.

Our task now is to examine the different modes of human experience in order more precisely to determine the nature of the self.

1. Ibid.

CHAPTER III

IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUDGMENT-THEORY OF COGNITION FOR THE COGNIZING SUBJECT

1. The Mind's Activity in Cognition¹

According to Campbell the judgment-theory of cognition "finds one of its sharpest contrasts with rival theories in the emphasis it places upon the activity aspect of cognition".² The judgment-theory, asserts Campbell, takes account of the activity phase of cognition which often tends to be obscured in certain empiricist theories of cognition. In fact, one of the key principles affirmed in the judgment-theory is "that there can be no cognition apart from a cognizing subject".³

In some empiricist accounts of cognition, the activity aspect of the complex cognitive event is apt to be overlooked or discounted. Especially is this the case in those empiricist views which emphasize the fundamental role played by sense experience. As Campbell points out, these theories,

1. This first section draws heavily upon an unpublished essay by Campbell entitled "The Mind's Involvement in Objects".

2. Campbell, OSG, p. 65.

3. Ibid.

in the analysis of the earlier phases of cognition, underplay or obscure the role of the cognizing subject and tend to cast the subject in the role of the passive onlooker.¹ In these theories, great emphasis is placed upon the 'brute' quality of sense-data (their givenness), and the subject tends to become the passive spectator of the 'sensual performance' before him.

In fact, this tendency to play down the active participant in cognition, in favor of the spectator role, can finally lead to treating even the spectator role as a convenient fiction.²

Hence a transition is often unconsciously made from treating the sensory cognition as a passive reception of a sensum by a subject mind, to treating it as just the occurrence of a sensum.³

This leads directly to the immensely complex question of the role of sensa in cognition. Are sense-data atomic events which somehow organize themselves into a unity capable of reflexive apprehension, correlation, inference, and recollection? Does the recognition of sensa give the lie to any theory of the mind's activity in cognition? On the

1. See OSG, pp. 65-66.

2. Hume's theory of cognition is perhaps the best illustration of this tendency. For Hume, the impressions and ideas are the actors and the audience! Ryle's critique of the "Ghost in the Machine", and emphasis upon the mythological character of consciousness, is a modern version of the Humean theme. See Ryle's A Concept of Mind, Ch. I.

3. Campbell, OSG, p. 66.

other hand, does the affirmation of the mind's activity necessarily deny an effective role to sensa in the cognitive life? It is Campbell's view that sensation, "though not itself a mode of cognition" is nevertheless "a vital determining factor in cognition".¹

2. Passivity of the Mind in Judgment

Campbell is prepared to admit that the mind can never be a mere passive onlooker in cognition and that it must, to some extent, be active in determining and initiating changes in its cognitive field when a judgment is made. On the other hand, the evidence also warrants the recognition that oftentimes in judgment the factor of passivity is far more striking than that of activity. A particularly clear example of this sort of judgment is what Campbell calls "elementary sensory judgments", or judgments in which we affirm that a certain sense quale--a color, sound, or smell,--qualifies our physical environment.² What is characteristic of these judgments is that apart from being initiated by the activity of the subject, there is a feeling of being compelled to judge in a determinate manner. In such cases the "compulsion is felt as coming from a source external to the judging mind".³ Admitting the postulate that in any judgment whatsoever, there is a

1. Ibid., p. 68.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

feeling of compulsion to judge in a determinate manner, is it possible to circumscribe more carefully the source of the compulsive factor? Campbell argues that we are able to, taking as a case in point the feeling of logical compulsion. The feeling of logical compulsion is, according to him, internal to the mind and thus,

is in that respect quite different from the special kind of compulsiveness of which we are conscious in simple sensory judgments If a colored patch is presented to me and I am asked what color I see, I normally feel a compulsion to judge that the patch has this and not that determinate color.¹

This distinction between experientially different kinds of 'givens' is formulated by Brightman² in terms of the "nonrational" and the "rational" Givens. Brightman characterizes the "nonrational given" in the following manner:

Every moment of experience reveals factors which in themselves have no logical structure and which are entailed by no logical necessity. Examples are sense qualities, desires, emotions, pleasures, and pains.³

We are not, warns Brightman, to confuse the affirmation of nonrational elements in experience with the affirmation of irrational elements. Thus, for Brightman and for Campbell (as we shall see) *sensa* are brute facts, given in immediate

1. Ibid.

2. Cf. Brightman, Person and Reality, ed. by P.A. Bertocci in collaboration with J.E. Newhall (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), pp. 56-60.

3. Ibid., p. 58.

experience and compelling us to judge, if we judge at all, in a determinate way concerning them.

The idealist tradition with which Campbell has associated himself in his judgment-theory of cognition has usually given little attention to the role of sensation in cognition. Where the idealists have concerned themselves with the role of sensation, they have tended to overestimate the extent of the intellect's activity in the elementary sensory cognitions. Some idealists, while admitting that there is a datum of a sensory nature before the intellect, have insisted further that this sensory datum already "bears the mark of intellect upon it". The result is that sensory cognition has as its object, according to the usual idealist argument, always an interpreted datum. The object of sensory cognition is viewed then as a joint product of the interpretative activity of the mind and given sensory quale.

It is Campbell's contention that the idealists have overestimated the role played by the active intellect in simple sensory cognitions. It is clear that in the latter phases of cognition when 'signs' and 'symbols' play a dominant role that the process should be termed "interpreting data". It is rather in the earliest phases of basic sensory cognition that the question arises as to whether the process can correctly be called "interpreting data".

Where is the interpretation, and what is it that is interpreted, in a basic sensory cognition where a blue patch, say, is first cognized as blue? Here there is no passage, such as 'interpretation' involves, from that which is initially apprehended to the interpretation of it. There are no initially apprehended characteristics to be interpreted.¹

Thus, when presented with a yellow patch, we feel compelled by an extra-logical compulsion to affirm or assert 'yellowness' of the patch. The compulsion, as felt, is the experiential evidence for asserting that we are passive with regard to the presented datum.

The determinate content the judgment affirms is due not to interpretation by the intellect but to the extra-logical compulsion exerted by pure sensation or pure sensing.²

3. Sensa as Determinants of Cognition

What, then, according to Campbell, is the status of sensa in cognition? Clearly, Campbell means to defend the position that the givenness of sensa is not a mode of cognition, but rather functions as a determinant of cognition. 'Pure sensation' falls generally within the field of experience. Campbell rejects the view that sensa can be identified in an outright fashion with a process in the brain, although he would admit that there is good evidence for a correlation between brain processes and sensation. His final conclusion is that in their intrinsic natures,

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 69.

2. Ibid.

sensations are experiences, and they are experiences

for which the distinction of subject from object does not exist; an experience in which sensing and sensed are in indivisible unity.¹

Thus they fall, for Campbell, within "the general category of immediate experience, or feeling".²

It is clear that Campbell's discussion of the role of sensation in cognition is double-edged. It is obviously a rejection of the sense-data orientation to cognition in that it explicitly refutes the typical claim of this theory that sensa are atomic, independently existing 'facts' and that sensing is equivalent to cognizing. On the other hand, it is intended as a critique of excesses in some idealistic accounts of cognition which overestimate the part played by the mind in basic sensory cognitions.

In Campbell's account of sensation as a determining factor in cognition, we are likely to be misled by his use of the descriptive adjective "external", when he speaks of the extra-logical compulsion characteristic of sensation. He uses this term in differentiating the feeling of compulsion attendant upon sensation from that feeling of logical compulsion which he describes as "internal to the mind".³ One is apt to assume that the "externality" of the compulsion characteristic

1. Ibid., p. 70.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 68.

of sensation has a spatial reference, or for that matter an objective reference. However, in Campbell's final deposition of the problem of sensation in cognition, he makes it clear that sensation "falls within the general field of experience" and specifically within immediate experience, wherein there does not exist a distinction between subject and object.

In the frame of reference in which he is arguing, it is difficult to ascertain the reasons why Campbell emphasizes the fact that sensory compulsion is felt as coming from an external source and logical compulsion from an internal source. It is possible that he would want to insist that logical compulsion is more organic to the activity of the subject than is sensory compulsion. But even granting that the compulsions are introspectively different in lived quality, they are both organic to the experience of the subject. If sensation is an aspect of immediate experience, it is hard to see how the compelling force it has can be felt as coming from a source external to the judging mind.

Perhaps the distinction that Campbell has in mind is that between psychical compulsion and logical compulsion. It could be argued that both kinds of compulsion can lead to the affirmation of a judgment of a determinate content. In the case of the sensory or psychical compulsion, the sensation relevant to the ensuing judgment can be seen as

that which functions as the determinant of the judgment. In the case of logical compulsion, the ideal element which mediates the inference would be that factor which determined the specific ideal-content of the judgment. Thus, we might insist that the basic sensory judgment arises due to the force, the coercion of a psychical event and is not explicitly inferred logically. It should be pointed out, however, that while the psychological condition determining the specific content of the judgment is not, strictly speaking, the logical condition for the judgment, it performs the same mediate function in determining a judgment of a particular content.

In fact, we can push the analogy even further by arguing that the psychical compulsion is actually the mediating element by means of which the judgment becomes explicit. Campbell speaks of the extra-logical compulsion prevalent in basic sensory judgments, and this compulsion is extra-logical precisely to the degree that it mediates not ideally, but through immediate experience.

In the light of the foregoing, we might return once again to the question of the meaning of the term 'external' as applied to a compulsion determining the ideal content of a basic sensory judgment. In what sense is the compulsion to judge in a determinate manner 'external' to the judging mind? Let us take the simple sensory cognition of the quale yellow when, for instance, it is first cognized.

Upon being presented with a yellow patch, we feel compelled to judge, "that is yellow". As Campbell has indicated, certain idealist thinkers have overestimated the role played by the intellect in basic sensory cognition such as this represents. These idealists have argued that the object of the sensory cognition is always an interpreted datum. Campbell has suggested that there is "no passage, such as 'interpretation' involves, from that which is initially apprehended to the interpretation of it".¹ It seems clear that Campbell's argument rests upon the conviction that there has been no inference, ideally mediated, from what has been apprehended in its immediacy. In that sense, then, the judgment "that is yellow" is not reached by logical inference or by an ideal development of a more primitive premise by means of a mediating middle term. That which performs the function of inference is extra-logical, e.g., an immediate apprehension of a sense quale, and hence, is "external" to the accomplished judgment. "External", then, means: not directly implicated in the judgment compelled by the psychical state.

On the other hand, given the judgment theory of cognition, even the basic sensory judgment, "that is yellow", is in a sense fully mediated, although perhaps

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 69.

not directly or explicitly.¹ It will be remembered that all judgments claim to qualify ideally objective reality and can be reformulated into 'R is such that S is P'. In the judgment in question, 'that is yellow', although there is a felt extra-logical compulsion to judge in this particular manner, it could not be maintained that the mediation of this judgment remains entirely external. In the "such that" is contained every condition required by the judgment, although these conditions are not there explicit or in their special character. Thus, even the 'psychical condition' giving rise to the extra-logical compulsion to judge in a particular manner appears with-
in the judgment and is internal to the judgment. As Bradley argues the point:

So far as the special mediation required is not made explicit, every judgment fails so far to be complete, and is imperfect logically. And it is in this sense only that a judgment can be characterized by that which can also be termed 'external'. In every judgment all its logical conditions are included in principle, but there are, on the other hand, particulars, which, as particulars, remain outside of the actual judgment.²

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1. The affirmation that by means of an unexplicated 'such that' the ideal content is always fully mediated does not entail the conclusion that the unknown conditions, required by the judgment, can be fully explicated. The judgment form demands a 'ground' of mediation but whether this 'ground' can be fully articulated is entirely a different question.
 2. F.H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. II (2d ed. rev.; London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 499.

4. The Meaning of 'Extra-Logical Compulsion'

It is time we took a closer look at the nature of the 'extra-logical compulsion' characteristic of elementary sensory cognitions. The theory, as Campbell has developed it, does not necessitate the view that whenever we are 'given' a brute sense quale, the appropriate judgment must follow. It is clear why this reading cannot be given to his theory.

This understanding seems contrary to our ordinary experience. In the course of an ordinary sequence of experience in daily life, we are bombarded with a multiplicity of brute sensations, but we would hardly say that each and every one had cognitive meaning for us. In fact, we are usually so engrossed in other activities that we neither notice them, nor do we attach any cognitive significance to them. It is only when we are interested intellectually in the world that these pervasive 'brutes' issue in judgment.

If we assume that whenever they are given, the appropriate judgment must ensue, then we obviously have given up the judgment theory of cognition. A close examination of what we are affirming in this alternative will show this to be the case. In such situations the judgments which appropriately follow upon the sensation would follow necessarily by virtue of the character of the sensation and would, in no sense, involve the activity of the subject.

Thus, the sensations would exhibit the sole agency in prompting the judgment, and the subject would contribute nothing. Aside from the fact that it would be impossible to account for the possibility of error in sensory judgment on this view, there is the further difficulty that so long as we are sensing, we would also be judging cognitively. At this point, we are likely to let our language confuse us, for we would not be judging. But judging would be occurring.

It will be noted that with the assertion that judging is reducible to the occurrence of sensing, we have given the basic premise of the judgment-theory of cognition, i.e., the activity of the subject as an essential characteristic of cognition. To interpret the felt extra-logical compulsion accompanying sensory cognition as inevitably issuing in a judgment of a determinate character, is an inaccurate reading of Campbell's theory. All that the notion of extra-logical compulsion entails is that if the mind judges at all, it feels compelled to judge in a specific fashion. Campbell, in this regard, views cognition as essentially teleological in character with its own peculiar aim. Whereas 'immediate experience' (of a sensory nature) might be the stimulus to a felt compulsion to characterize reality in a specific manner, it is the theoretic interest of the mind which determines whether explicit judgment will or will not occur.

5. Subject as Involved in Cognition

This discussion of the view that Campbell takes of the role of sensation in the cognitive life serves to highlight his view of the activity of the subject in cognition. It is impossible on the judgment-theory of cognition to view the subject of cognition as merely the scene of the cognitive drama, for the subject is involved in the cognition of objects. Furthermore, to recognize the aspect of activity in cognition involves equally the recognition that it is the "subject that is active".¹

Certain philosophers, notably Hume, have tried to do without the "cognizing subject", and have looked upon cognition as the occurrence of certain sensations. It is Campbell's thesis that even if the judgment-theory of cognition is not accepted as a telling critique of such views, it is still impossible to dispense with the idea of the cognizing subject. Furthermore, it is a mistake to look upon "that which is active in activity" as "the activity itself".² It cannot be denied that certain thinkers are embarrassed by suggestions that there is a distinguishable subject acting in particular cognitions, and hence, would like to reduce the subject active to the

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 70.

2. Ibid.

activity itself.

It is clear from some of the earlier psychological writings of William James that he, at one time, seriously entertained the view that the thoughts were the only thinkers. We find James maintaining that

the same reality can be cognized by an endless number of psychic states, [and that the] feelings from our viscera and other dimly felt organs . . . may be very vague cognizers of the same realities which other conscious states cognize and name exactly.¹ *[Italics added]*

Here James was defending the view that the unity of mental life depends upon successive selves 'appropriating' or 'absorbing' the psychical immediacy of their predecessors. The cognizing subject here is reduced to the series of thoughts. "The passing thought then seems to be the thinker."²

If the passing thought be the directly verifiable existent which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond.³

Anyone who addresses himself to this attempt to 'exorcise' the distinguishable subject in cognizing, will find himself, suggests Campbell, perpetuating a blatant absurdity. Campbell, with acknowledgement to Bowman, argues his case in the following manner:

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1. William James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, as quoted by Bowman in A Sacramental Universe, pp. 173-74.
 2. Ibid., p. 342.
 3. Ibid., p. 401.

Let X be the psychical operation of cognizing or apprehending, and Y be the object that is cognized or apprehended. Now presumably the apprehended implies an apprehender of some sort. What then is the apprehender of Y? According to those who deny a distinguishable subject, it can only be X, the actual operation of apprehending. But this is surely absurd. An apprehending cannot be that which apprehends. What is 'known' cannot be known to the operation of knowing. It can be known only to a subject which, while engaged in the knowing, is not itself identical with the knowing.¹

Campbell concludes then that it is impossible to dispense with a cognitive subject which is distinguishable from (though not completely separable from) the specific cognitions in which it is actively involved.

6. Three Distinguishable Aspects of Cognitive Situations

It will be clear from the foregoing argument that Campbell is able to discern three distinct elements that are involved in any cognitive situation. It is equally apparent that these distinguishable aspects are arrived at by means of an analysis of a unified cognitive experience. That these factors are discernible cannot seriously be denied without ignoring the implicit (if not explicit) claims of cognition. The three essential elements of the cognitive situation may be characterized (following Campbell's lead) as: (1) the cognized, the object known; (2) the cognizing, the psychical operation of knowing; and, (3) the cognizing subject, the knower.

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 71.

Campbell has argued that the activity or psychical operation of cognizing cannot be that to which the object is known. "What is 'known' cannot be known to the operation of knowing."¹ The basis for this assertion lies in the alleged absurdity of maintaining that an operation of cognizing can be that which cognizes.

It is further suggested that if we take what is active in activity to be the activity itself, we will be committing "an outsize example of what Professor Ryle would call a 'category mistake'".² A category mistake is defined by Ryle as the representation of a certain set of 'facts' as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when in fact they belong to another.³ In the Concept of Mind, Ryle attempts to show that the origin of category mistakes (specifically with regard to mental concepts) is to be discovered in the improper usage of language. He defines his project as the examination of "the logical behavior of a set of concepts all of which are regularly employed by everyone".⁴ What Ryle hoped to show by an analysis of the peculiar logic of certain mental concepts was that it was the misuse of these terms which led philosophers to adopt such notions as the "privacy of consciousness", the

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 70.

3. Ryle, A Concept of Mind, p. 16.

4. Ibid., p. 319.

"soul", and so on. In defining the purpose of his study, Ryle sets down the following:

Its object has been to show that the two-worlds story is a philosopher's myth, though not a fable, and, by showing this, to begin to repair the damage that this myth has for some time been doing inside philosophy. I have tried to establish this point, not by adducing evidence from the troubles of psychologists, but by arguing that the cardinal mental concepts have been credited by philosophers themselves with the wrong sorts of logical behavior.¹

We have briefly characterized Ryle's project in his Concept of Mind merely to place in its proper context the doctrine of the category mistake. A category mistake for Ryle is solely the result of an improper use of language, i.e., an inaccurate understanding of the logical function and application of certain groups or types of terms. At the very least, Campbell looks upon the tendency to talk about what is active in activity as the activity itself as an example of this kind of confusion about the peculiar 'logic' of certain mental concepts. To employ mental concepts such as subject, self, knower, agent, as though they had the same 'logic' as such mental concepts as seeing, believing, thinking, imagining, is, on Campbell's view, an improper use of these concepts.

It is clear from what has gone before that Campbell does not reach the conclusion that what is active in

1. Ibid., p. 329.

activity is a subject distinguishable, though not separable from, the activity by means of an analysis of the logic of "mental-activity-concepts" and of "mental-subject-concepts". This is not to deny that this avenue of argumentation is open to him, but rather to point out that his argument rests on other grounds. It is in fact antithetical to Campbell's whole vision of philosophy to consider problems such as this represents as merely puzzles about the use of certain words. Assuming, then, that Campbell's purpose is not merely to unravel the "logic" of certain concept categories, how are we to assess his argument?

When we take up Campbell's analysis of the fundamental notion of self-consciousness in the next section, we will find him arguing from very strong evidence the thesis that the subject of experience cannot be reduced to any particular mode of its activity. The knower of the known might also be the feeler of the felt, the agent engaged in moral decision and 'effortful activity'. Insofar as Campbell's thesis is affirming that the subject of experience is more complex than its actual manifestation in any particular activity, his point is well taken. However, it is obvious from the foregoing argument that "something" more is involved in the thesis of a distinguishable subject than the mere recognition that the subject of experience can be engaged in several different modes of

activity. What seems to be explicitly involved in Campbell's theory of the subject of experience is the notion that activities "manifest" the subject, qualify the subject, but do not exhaust its actuality.

7. Summary

Here we reach the crucial problem that confronts us with regard to Campbell's view. Suppose we admit (quite rightly) that we are able, by means of an analysis of the cognitive situation, to distinguish a cognizer, a cognizing, and a cognized. Suppose further that we adhere to the principle that we are able to make these distinctions primarily because each of these 'elements' functions in an analytically discernible manner. In that manner, we are able to distinguish an objective factor in cognition because we find an element in cognitive experience which functions as that towards which the knowing act is directed. On the other hand, the recognition of the objective factor leads invariably to the recognition of a subjective factor in cognition in that for there to be an object known, there must be a subject to which it is known. In short, the subjective and objective factors mutually imply each other, for we could not define their functional significance within cognition without referring the one to the other, and vice versa. Moreover, having found that the judgment-theory is the most adequate

analysis of cognition, we are led to believe that knowing is not the passive occurrence of a meaningful reference to objective reality, but rather is an act of the subject which is intellectually interested in correctly characterizing the object of knowledge.

To attribute an 'ideal content' to reality is viewed then, not as the mere occurrence of a judgment, but rather as the judging of the subject. The 'ideal content' is taken as characterizing objective reality in and through the act of judging. Having reached this point in our analysis of cognition, we then show that we have distinguished a cognizer, a cognized, and a cognizing. Admitting that our analysis has elucidated certain aspects of a complex mental experience, what has it told us about 'matter of fact'? Insofar as the analysis is correct, it has revealed to us the necessity for recognizing a distinguishable cognizer which is involved in knowing, but not reducible to the activity of knowing. A fuller explication of this 'fact', i.e., of the nature of the cognizing subject, can only be undertaken in conjunction with a thoroughgoing analysis of what it means to be a subject of experience. This involves, as Campbell views it, an analysis of the concept of self-consciousness.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSIS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE THEORY OF THE 'SUBSTANTIVAL' SELF

1. Implications of Cognitive Awareness for Selfhood

Campbell concluded from the analysis of the judgment-theory that we cannot dispense with a distinguishable subject, engaged in cognizing, but not completely identified with cognizing. In the analysis of self-consciousness, Campbell carries forward his examination of the cognitive subject by exploring the nature of this subject from the standpoint of its own experience of itself.

The analysis of self-consciousness begins, for Campbell, with the recognition that the judgment-theory implicitly gives credibility to the view that the cognizing subject is always to some degree aware of itself, or self-conscious. This proposition is implied in what the judgment-theory affirms:

All judgment involves reference to an 'objective' reality which the judging mind is seeking to know. But an essential part of the meaning which 'objective reality' carries for the judging mind is its independence of that mind. Hence a mind that is aware of objective reality is always also in some degree aware of itself as subject. It follows that

all cognition implies in the cognizing¹
subject some degree of self-awareness.

Campbell is prepared to admit that the degree of self-awareness in cognition might be "exceedingly small", but points out that often the degree of awareness of 'objective' reality is likewise small. If we are prepared to admit some awareness of an independent 'object' towards which our thinking is directed, we must also be prepared to admit that this 'objectivity' "defines itself, for the cognizing mind, at least in part, by contrast with 'subjectivity'".²

2. The Cognitive Subject Described as 'Substantival'

Since the evidence of cognition tends to suggest the presence of an active subject in all cognizing, Campbell believes that there are good reasons for characterizing this subject as 'substantival' in some sense of that word.

Its most important and . . . perplexing, characteristic is that it is, for itself, somehow the self-same being throughout its different experiences; and the self-same being not merely in contemporaneous experiences, but in experiences far removed from one another in time.³

From the foregoing, it is evident that Campbell believes that the subject of experience is capable of sustain-

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 74.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

ing itself in two significant ways. First, since the subject of experience is the subject of different experiences, such as thinking, feeling, willing, desiring, and so forth, it sustains its unity through qualitatively different 'states'. That is to say, the subject of experience is a 'unity-in-difference'. Secondly, the subject of experience sustains its identity trans-temporally, i.e., through successive, as well as changing, states of experience. There is a third claim evident in Campbell's characterization of the self-sameness of the subject of experience, and that is that the subject is to some degree aware of its sustained identity.

We are presently concerned simply with an elucidation of Campbell's claim that the subject is aware of its identity through successive and changing 'states'. The arguments supporting this claim will be explored in due course. What then does it mean to be aware of the subject, as well as of the objects, emotions, desires, feelings, and so on, that flow through our life in a never-ending stream? Campbell has admitted his indebtedness to Bowman regarding this problem.¹

Bowman speaks of "this brooding sense of self identity" in the face of the 'vicissitudes' of changing 'states' and temporal flow.² In fact, argues Bowman, the self and its

1. See OSG, p. 71.

2. Bowman, A Sacramental Universe, p. 260.

unique unity is defined in terms of its ability to 'transcend' the vicissitudes of change, which to other structures would be destructive of their identities.

There is about a self a degree of flexibility that can only be explained on the assumption of a central energy of organization sufficiently potent to subdue to itself, and so to unify,¹ an indefinitely variable mass of material.¹

Thus, Bowman describes the character of self-awareness in the following fashion:

However varied and disjointed, however bewildering and incoherent, however intermittent and unconservative, that experience may be, it differentiates itself within a unity of organized feelings which remain one with itself through all its vicissitudes, and passes unbroken across the gulf of sleep, the vacant interspaces of forgetfulness and the blank of pathological oblivion. There is no normal experience that is not charged with this brooding sense of self-identity It is not something which we discover in ourselves by a centripetal movement of the mind, but something that discovers itself to us in the very process by which, regardless of our subjectivity and inattentive to its symptoms, we issue from the inner citadel of our selfhood to meet the challenge of an outer world. It is in the sally of the spirit into the realm of the natural that the consciousness of the objective first reveals its inner secret as a consciousness of self.²

When we speak, then, of self-awareness we mean at least this much: (1) There is a same self amidst qualitatively different 'states' of mind; and (2) The same self endures through successive 'states' of mind; and (3) The self to some degree is aware of this self-sameness. These are

1. Ibid., p. 238.

2. Ibid., p. 260.

rather broad claims involving certain conclusions about the nature of selfhood, and it now becomes our task to examine them to discover whether such claims can be justified.

3. Self-Identity and the Memorial Situation

One of the most direct paths to the recognition of the necessity for affirming an identical self which sustains itself trans-temporally is found in the analysis of the memorial situation. As Campbell puts it,

'remembering' brings out in an especially striking manner the self's identity in difference.¹

When, for example, we say "I (remember that I) heard a Mozart Quintet last week", we seem to imply that the "I" who is now engaged in the psychic act of remembering, is the same "I" (in some sense) who, a week ago, heard the Quintet. It must be pointed out that the appeal to the memorial situation is not an appeal to a phenomenon as providing a standard or criterion for the continuity of the self. Obviously, memory cannot provide us with a convincing proof of the continuity of the self across a wide breadth of one's life span. As Tennant has remarked:

An ordinary memory judgment (proper) which is neither a historical judgment nor an event caused by an unperceived happening in the past, consists partly in implicit aware-

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 74.

ness of subject-continuity; neither assuming nor proving, but asserting it.¹

We could hardly claim that the self-sameness of the subject consists in memory, for such a view is refuted many times over by the radical discontinuity that is demonstrable in the rememberings of certain subjects. It is not the continuity of memory that grounds the identical self, but rather the fact that there can be memorial situations at all.

The claim of the memory situation, a claim in the absence of which the situation ceases to be one of memory at all, is that the remembering subject and the remembered subject are somehow the same being in experiences that are different both temporally and qualitatively.²

4. The Formal Arguments for Self-Identity

We turn now to a more formal consideration of the reasons for postulating a self-same subject of cognition. As Campbell points out, the argument for this view derives especially from Kant. The argument, stated in its simplest form is that the apprehending of any object involves distinguishing it from other things, and distinguishing it implies a subject common to the apprehension both of the object and that from which it is distinguished.

The argument proceeds by drawing the implications from two propositions concerning the act of cognition or

1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 84.

2. Campbell, OSG, pp. 74-75.

apprehension: (1) Cognition is never of an atomic simple; (2) Cognition is always of a related plurality as a related plurality. In regard to the former, an object, unrelated to any system of knowledge or to any other object, can have no significance for us. It cannot enter meaningfully into judgment for the essence of judgment is either the denial or affirmation of the union of a predicate with a subject. As Campbell notes:

Even a 'this' is for cognition, a 'this-not-that'; apart from its apprehended distinction from, and therefore relation to, a 'that' it could not be cognized as 'this'.¹

T.H. Green has drawn attention to this point in his argument against the possibility of cognizing an atomic simple. The belief that we do apprehend an atomic simple is supported by those instances when we find ourselves manipulating data of consciousness without an awareness, either in memory or in present apprehension, of ever having related them by an intellectual activity. We assume that the absence of a direct awareness of an active relating by the intellect means that the data are independent of the mind's activity, and thus, apprehended as mere sensation. Concerning this interpretation, Green argues:

For a sensation can only form an object of experience in being determined by an intelligent subject which distinguishes it from itself and

1. Ibid., p. 75.

contemplates it in relation to other sensations; so that to suppose a primary datum or matter of the individual's experience, wholly void of intellectual determination, is to suppose such experience to begin with what could not belong to or be an object of experience at all.¹

Green's argument is that the apprehension of an atomic sensation, for example, cannot be an element in the cognitive life; indeed, cannot even be an element in any human apprehension.² Hence, we never apprehend mere red; that is, red unrelated to any other aspect of our experience. We always experience red as following after black, as being darker than pink; that is, in relation to something or other. The prerequisite, however, for there being a discerned relationship is that the terms, objects, or experiences related are present to the same subject. What must be clearly appreciated is the fact that the objects, terms, or experiences are related in consciousness, and

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1. T.H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 50.
 2. See Blanshard's discussion of the possibility of an apprehension of an atomic simple in primitive perceptual experiences, in The Nature of Thought, Vol. I (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 56ff. Blanshard rejects the notion of an apprehension of a mere particular and unrelated datum because on that basis we could never explain the advance of knowledge which implicitly involves the extension of systematic relatedness. As Blanshard makes the point: "We must so construe the world we first live in as to make escape from it conceivable." Ibid., p. 57. Blanshard clearly sees that any analysis of primitive experiences which views cognition as originating in unrelated and insular atoms of experience, meets insurmountable difficulties in accounting for the advance of knowledge.

it is for this reason that we affirm the self-same subject or relator. If we inquire whether the phenomena are related apart from consciousness, we have raised a question to which we can attach no meaning.

The identity of the subject is brought out in a striking manner in the awareness of succession in time or change. What is involved in the cognition of changes in time, for example the striking of a clock?¹ Let us suppose that the hour is six o'clock, and we hear the clock tolling the hours. In temporal succession we hear six strokes. It is clear that: (1) We must hear each stroke separately; (2) If we are to 'know the time', we must be able to count the strokes and to remember those we heard in the preceding moments. In other words, we must be the same self to which each successive stroke is present, if we are to unite the tollings into the conception, 'six o'clock'. Only given this condition would it be possible for there to be more than a mere succession of subjective states, and thus a unified object. We are able to see from this that the possibility of there being an object rests upon the identity of the self, and the manifestation of the sameness of the self rests in turn upon the object. As Tennant has aptly put it:

1. Both Paton, in Defence of Reason (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1951), pp. 101-102, and Campbell, in OSG, p. 76, use this example as illustrative of the identity of the subject experiencing succession in time.

Just as one finger cannot rub itself without rubbing another, so the ego does not know itself, save in knowing that objects are presented to it, and feelings, etc., are thereby invoked in it.¹

Granting for the moment that the unity of the self is the necessary condition for there being an apprehension of temporal succession, must the self be conscious of its identity in its different apprehensions? Paton, while arguing firmly for the subject's self-identity in cognition does not press for the subject's consciousness of self-identity.² "Self-identity might conceivably be present apart from consciousness of self-identity."³ Campbell, on the other hand, insists that not only must we insist upon the self-identity of the subject in different cognitions but, further, we must press for the subject's consciousness of self-identity.

It seems to me, therefore, that while the identity of the cognizing subject is a necessary, it is not, without consciousness of that identity, a sufficient condition of cognitive awareness.⁴

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1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 78.
 2. Tennant displays an obvious reticence towards insisting upon the consciousness of the subject's identity in all cognitive awareness. "The subject is present in all consciousness, but only at the level of awareness of consciousness (i.e. self-consciousness) is the subject revealed." Ibid., p. 77.
 3. Paton, In Defence of Reason, p. 103.
 4. Campbell, OSG, p. 77.

Why does Campbell insist upon the subject's consciousness of self-identity in different cognitions? In short, he argues that the discernment of any relationship between two objects, A and B, is impossible apart from the subject's awareness of its self-sameness in the different apprehensions. In fact, argues Campbell, successive apprehensions by a subject unaware of its self-identity

must fall apart into separate 'worlds' just as surely and completely as though he, the self-same subject, were in fact two different subjects.¹

He concludes:

The prius of any discernment by the subject of a specific relationship between A and B is surely that the subject is aware of A and B as having at least that general relationship to one another which consists in their both being objects for him, the one self. He must, in other words, be conscious of his own identity in the different apprehensions.²

We might refer back to our example of the striking clock to elucidate this point further. Both Campbell and Paton agree that an identical self is a necessary condition for cognitive awareness of the successive strokes of the clock. Campbell insists further that without consciousness of self-sameness, the identity alone is not a sufficient condition for the apprehension of the successive strokes as successive. In order for us to apprehend the second stroke as the second stroke /as subsequent to the first/, we must

1. Ibid., p. 76.

2. Ibid.

be conscious of being the same self which heard the first, which now remembers it, and which is conscious of hearing the second stroke. The crucial point for Campbell's argument is that

I do not 'remember' having heard the first . . . unless I am aware that it was I, the being who now hears the second stroke, who heard the first stroke.¹

It would appear from the foregoing that Campbell intends to defend the principle that any awareness of objects involves as its necessary and sufficient condition a self-identical subject aware of its self-sameness in different apprehensions. While it has not been set forward in so many words, this seems to imply that all consciousness involves 'self-consciousness' in some sense of that term. The most direct way to submit this principle to critical scrutiny is to examine the hypothesis that we can have consciousness of an object without at the same time having consciousness of a self-identical subject.

5. Can there be Consciousness of an Object without Consciousness of a Subject?

Assuming as a postulate that the self-identical subject is a necessary condition for there being a consciousness of an object, we are further inquiring whether there can be a consciousness of an object without at the same time there being a conscious experience of an identical self.

1. OSG, p. 77.

Thus, on this hypothesis, we have to recognize that the consciousness of the object, O, takes place within the 'subjective system' of the self, S, but does not involve a consciousness of S. If it is not a consciousness of S, then it is a consciousness of O, the object. The total situation amounts to C, which is a state of consciousness within the 'subjectivity' of the self, or manifesting the self, S, and while it is not a consciousness of S, it is a consciousness of an object, O.¹

Let us first then examine the view that C, the conscious state, is a consciousness of O, taking O to be a mental activity (since it is not a consciousness of S, the self). However, it is clear that a mental activity such as fear, hate, desire, and the consciousness of it are one and, therefore, indistinguishable. But if C is identical with O, there can be no point in describing C as a consciousness of O. In that case C, the conscious state, being one with O, the mental activity is a revelation of nothing but itself. If, however, the conscious state reveals nothing beyond itself, then it cannot reveal the identity of the subject. In this case, the mental

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1. The argument as it is developed here is largely dependent upon a line of reasoning developed by Bowman in A Sacramental Universe, pp. 256-58. Regarding this argument by Bowman, Campbell has said: "Nowhere else to my knowledge is there so penetrating an analysis . . . of what it means to be a subject of experience." OSG, p. 71.

activity could not be described as my mental activity, your mental activity; it is mental activity, experientially unowned and unrelated.

However, the question immediately arises as to whether we have not, in this argument, reinstated the apprehension of an atomic simple. Could such a mental activity be experienced at all? It is clear that a mental activity so isolated and restricted could not be a conscious experience. Bowman, in substantial agreement with Campbell, suggests the following alternative:

The only way out of the impasse is to assume that a consciousness of the system to which it belongs is given with every emotion and with every conative condition. The identity of every such subjective event defines itself for consciousness within the comprehensive identity of a subject-self.¹

We are now in a position to examine another alternative, namely, that C, the conscious state, is a consciousness of O, taking O to be an 'external' object, and is a consciousness of nothing else. While we seem on safe ground in affirming that we cannot distinguish a mental activity from a consciousness of that activity, such a course is clearly not open to us with regard to the consciousness of an 'external' object. Perhaps this can best be clarified by an example. If we are aware of a mental activity, say desiring, we cannot meaningfully distinguish between our consciousness of desire and the

1. Bowman, A Sacramental Universe, p. 257.

desiring. In short, our awareness and the desiring, in this case, are one and the same.¹ With our awareness of an object, for instance a flower, the case is slightly altered in that the subjective and objective are mutually determining features in the complex. The awareness of a flower is specified in the 'field' of conscious states solely by being an awareness of this flower. In other words, that which distinguishes this state of consciousness from other states of consciousness is that this state is an apprehension of this particular flower.

As our previous analysis has shown us, the identity of the object rests upon the identity of the cognizing subject. The necessary condition for there being an awareness of a flower is an identical self. The question now before us is whether there can be a consciousness of an object and nothing more.² It will be remembered that Campbell has argued that without the subject's awareness of his identity, an object could not enter our cognitive

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1. We are speaking here, of course, of what might be termed primary, enjoyed apprehension, not reflective or introspective apprehension. In our inquiry into the 'object' of introspection, we found it necessary to distinguish between primary and secondary apprehensions.
 2. This argument leads to sheer confusion if the special use of the term 'object' is not rigidly held before the mind. When we speak of 'revealed object', our reference is a 'lived state of experiencing' or an 'enjoyment'. The question of the epistemological immediacy of an 'external' object is not being considered.

life. From the foregoing analysis, we have seen that our awareness of a flower, for instance, is distinguished from other kinds of awareness by what is apprehended in the awareness, namely, the flower. But if our consciousness of the flower were defined solely by the flower, then it would seem that it makes little sense to talk of a consciousness of an object as though the consciousness of were not simply the object and nothing more. On the other hand, we saw earlier that the object defines itself, at least in part, by reference to the subject. Thus, if the identity of the object is determined in part by its relation to awareness, we cannot reduce the awareness to a revelation of the object and nothing more, for by so doing we destroy both the term and the relation upon which the object depends for its identity.

We can conclude from this lengthy and rather involved argument that the assumption that we can be conscious of an object and nothing more is shown to be impossible. No such apprehension is possible and thus, it becomes evident that in all apprehension of an object there is an awareness of the subject having the experience.

An experience which is on the face of it the awareness of an object is, less obviously, but to the analytic reason no less veritably, a conscious experience of what it means to be a subject. In the very act whereby experience reveals the out-term in the subject-object relation, it itself stands revealed as a reality of the subjective order.¹

1. Bowman, A Sacramental Universe, p. 259.

What precisely then is Campbell pressing for in his formulation of the principle of the subject's awareness of his self-sameness in cognition? First, it would seem, Campbell is concerned to expose not only the identical subject as a necessary condition of cognitive awareness, but also the subject's awareness of his self-sameness as the sufficient condition. Secondly, there seems implicit in his argument a conception of self-consciousness [apprehension of the subject's self-sameness] which does not necessarily involve, at the same time, a reflective awareness by the subject of his self-sameness. Campbell seems to be maintaining that the subject's apprehension of his self-sameness in cognitive awareness is not a mode of cognitive awareness, in the usual sense of that term 'cognitive'. The definitive character of the subject's 'apprehension' of his self-sameness in cognition is that it seems to be 'subjective' through-and-through. The apprehension involved seems to be akin to what Tennant has called "erleben", an 'apprehension' lived through subjectively. The mode of apprehension in question is more primitive than reflective self-consciousness, and is presupposed by the latter. Tennant describes it as follows:

For knowledge of ourselves is based on the erleben that is more ultimate than knowing that knows either I or anything else. We can 'feel that we are', so to speak, though this consciousness cannot adequately be described in terms of cognition.¹

1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 78.

It is at once clear why Campbell's view will not permit him to identify the apprehension involved as essentially cognitive in character. It will be remembered that Campbell defined cognition as involving judgment and an identical self, aware of its self-sameness in cognitive awareness. If the apprehension in question were essentially cognitive, then it would rest itself on a more primary consciousness of the self-sameness of the subject involved in the cognition. In other words, if in cognizing an object in the external world, we were, at the same time and in the same way, cognizing the identity of the subject involved in cognition, we would be forced to postulate a further apprehension of the subject's self-sameness, that is not essentially cognitive in character. It is only if we can take apprehension in this latter sense as 'lived awareness', rather than as cognitive awareness, that Campbell's recommendation (that the subject's apprehension of his self-sameness is the sufficient condition of cognition) proves warranted.

6. The 'Substantial' View of the Self

Campbell, then, argues that cognitive awareness necessarily involves an identical subject; a subject, however, which is aware of its self-identity in its different cognitions. In Campbell's words,

we are led by the argument . . . to posit a self which is something 'over and above' its

particular experiences; something that has, rather than is, its experiences, since its experiences are all different, while it somehow remains the same.¹

In short, it is a 'substance', and our subsequent discussion will be devoted to explication of the meaning we can attach to describing the self in this manner. We do not, insists Campbell, "have any acquaintance with it by itself, but only as manifested in particular changing experiences".²

The affirmation of a substantial self involves then:

(1) A subject distinguishable from its experiences: (2) A subject which "has" rather than "is" its experiences; (3) A subject which is manifested in and through its experiences.

Campbell notes that

to deny that the self is reducible to its experiences is by no means to deny that the self manifests its real character (in whole or in part) in and through these experiences.³

Thus, the usual objections against "soul substance" views which attack the unknowability of the soul, carry little

1. OSG, p. 77.

2. Ibid. With regard to the thesis that we do not have any acquaintance with the self 'by itself', it should be noted that this does not deny the possibility of having acquaintance with the subjective states and acts through which it is manifested. Some thinkers, notably Ward, have insisted that we know even the states and acts of mind only inferentially. See James Ward, "'Modern' Psychology: A Reflexion," Mind, II, No. 5 (January, 1893), 54-82. To such a thesis, Tennant has cogently replied that "if pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, differ respectively in quale, they must have quale; and quale is known by acquaintance, and not intelligibly". Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 79.

3. OSG, p. 82.

weight against Campbell's view. It is clear that the self is not an indeterminate, unknowable noumenon underlying and supporting experience, but in no way involved in experience. For Campbell, the self is always determinate being, characterized by the experiences which manifest its actual character.

An adequate statement of the substantival view of the self confronts two demands which press for consideration. The first raises the question whether the view of the self as a being involved in its experiences, but not reducible to them, can be meaningfully stated. The second strikes at the notion of the unity and continuity of the self by demanding some reconciliation with the data of abnormal psychology, and certain data of normal life. Abnormal psychology teaches us that there often occur radical 'breaks' in the self's life, and we might note especially in this regard the phenomena of 'split' personality and 'multiple' personality. In the light of such phenomena, how are we able to sustain the notion of the self as an identical substance? Further, we do not have to appeal to unusual psychological phenomena to raise doubts about the substantival description for we have, in the ordinary course of life, certain events which seem difficult to reconcile. The substantival description of the self as manifesting its actual nature in and through its ex-

periences, does not describe the self's unconscious "experiences". We sleep; we awaken; we go under anaesthesia; we return to consciousness. A severe knock renders us insensible. How does the self sustain its identity across these gaps if its determinate character is defined in terms of its manifestations, or in terms of its conscious experience? We must now turn our attention to these perplexities, raising first the question of the meaningfulness of the substantival description and then examining the relation between self-identity and personal identity, and that between self-identity and the unconscious.

7. The Meaningfulness of the Substantival View

As an explanatory notion any view of the self is obliged to submit itself to the standard of adequacy. It must be capable of extension to the total range of the self's experience, normal and abnormal, and must make these areas intelligible. On the surface, the most telling objection to the substantival description is that it explains nothing. The idea of an identical substance 'over and above' its experiences amounts to an unnecessary multiplication of entities. This introduces us to a crucial distinction with regard to Campbell's view of the self which, if ignored, would lead us to a total misconception of his philosophy of the self.

When we raise the question of the meaningfulness of the substantival view of the self, Campbell takes great

pains to indicate in what sense he believes this view to be meaningful. It is meaningful in that it is an adequate description of what self-consciousness tells us about the self. In order to be perfectly clear on this point, we shall allow Campbell to describe his theory in his own words.

It may be desirable to add, in order to avert possible misapprehensions, that to be meaningful is by no means the same thing as to be intelligible, where 'intelligible' is a synonym for 'capable of being understood'. The self as we have described it would be intelligible (in this sense) only if it were possible to understand how it remains one amid the plurality of its changing experiences. No claim is made here that the self is, even in principle, capable of being 'understood'; We are aware of our self as of such and such a nature, not of how it is what it is.¹

We confront here an aspect of Campbell's thought which we have, hitherto, had little opportunity to discuss.² It is clear that he intends to give a 'phenomenological' analysis of selfhood. Adhering to the principle that we must describe the self as it is in all self-conscious experience, Campbell does not mean to suggest that his description of the self as it is for all self-conscious experience is an ultimately satisfying metaphysical notion. The concept of the self has, for Campbell, the status of an intellectually incorrigible notion, or a phenomenal

1. OSG, p. 83.

2. The aspect referred to, the distinction between "phenomenal" truth and "noumenal" truth, will be the focus of a more extensive analysis in a later chapter.

truth, as contrasted with an intellectually satisfying notion, or a noumenal truth.¹ To elucidate further the character of the meaningfulness of the substantival view of the self, we can set down Campbell's view of phenomenal truth, although we will leave discussion of this aspect of his thought to a later chapter. We are here concerned simply with the character of the notion as it relates to the self. Campbell defines "phenomenal truth" in the following manner:

The all-important distinction must be observed between a bond of union which satisfies because it is intrinsically satisfactory, and one which satisfies only because we see that under the conditions of finite life we cannot hope to transcend it. This is the key to the right appreciation of the status of the 'truths' guaranteed by self-awareness. They are intellectually satisfactory only in the latter sense . . . from the point of view of finite experience . . . the questioning mind itself cannot free itself from the recognition of the authority of self-awareness.² [*Italics added.*]

Thus, Campbell would appeal directly to the deliverances of self-awareness for the warrant of his description of the self as an identical substance.

There is indeed a 'ground', if we like to use it so, in the fact of self-awareness itself. This is what warrants the connection we affirm. But--here is the crucial point--self-awareness is a ground which the mind must realize that it is absolutely meaningless to impugn.³ [*Italics added.*]

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1. See Scepticism and Construction, pp. 82-112, and OSG, pp. 396-99.
 2. SC, pp. 106-107.
 3. Ibid., p. 105.

While in this passage, Campbell is discussing the warrant for reflexive judgments, there is every indication that the particular description he gives to the self is guaranteed by the very same warrant! Note the following:

It must be a strangely doctrinaire theory of meaning that would oblige us to denounce as meaningless a description which describes what the self is for itself in all self-conscious experience.¹

In pointing out that Campbell is giving a phenomenological description of what the self is for all self-conscious experience, one must carefully define the sense in which the term "phenomenological" is used. It will be remembered that Kant maintained that we cannot know what the self is in itself, but only can know it as it appears to us under the categories and in time. Introspection, accordingly for Kant, yields a knowledge of the "empirical self", and "object self" and tells us nothing about what the self is in itself. For Kant, the self, as known, is subject to the same categories of apprehension as any other object. Hence, we only have phenomenal knowledge of the self, and not noumenal.² Campbell rejects the Kantian view of introspection and insists that

one may perfectly well agree with the argument from self-conscious experience to a distinguish-

1. Ibid.

2. Cf. Paton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience, Vol. II (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951), pp. 398ff.

able subject-self without being committed to any of the special arguments which lead Kant to assert that we can have no theoretical knowledge of the self as it really is.¹

Campbell, in giving a description of the self, believes that he is describing an "actual" existent and his conception of introspection bears this out.

If, however, Campbell is developing a description of the self adequate to the subject's experience of himself, of what is self-identity an identity? Since the warrant for the description of the self as substantial lies in self-awareness, we must seek our answer there. It is obvious from the foregoing arguments that the identity of the self is at least an identity of a conscious subject. The "I" who is now conscious of writing is the same "I" who desires a cup of coffee and who remembers that he saw a friend yesterday. In all of these different experiences, I am aware of my self-sameness; otherwise, as we saw, they fall apart into separate worlds of experience.

8. Relation of Self-Identity to Personal Identity

It is of the utmost importance that the distinction between self-identity and personal identity be clearly drawn. As Campbell points out:

Not a few of the perplexities to which discussion of the self and its identity commonly gives rise

1. OSG, p. 81.

have their source . . . in a failure to appreciate that 'self' and 'person' cannot conveniently be treated as interchangeable expressions.¹

The reasons for making such a distinction are found in our ordinary discourse about ourselves. Campbell notes that one common way in which we speak about ourselves is "I was not myself when I did that". Upon careful analysis, we discover that this expression has some very interesting implications.

Suppose, for example, you have acted in an extremely violent fashion towards a good friend, and when the heat of passion has subsided, you realize how uncharacteristic of you that behavior was. You might remark in such a circumstance, "I really wasn't myself when I did that". The use of the term "I" in this example clearly indicates that in some measure the self was involved in the action. Yet the statement "I was not myself" seems to deny in some way that there was involvement of self in the act.

It seems, argues Campbell, that what the expression asserts is the failure of the self to act in a characteristic manner, and not, strictly speaking, the failure of the self to act at all. One way, then, in which the self is being thought of in this situation is as "the bearer of a specific character".² During the course of

1. Ibid., p. 85.

2. Ibid., p. 86.

a man's experience he comes to develop certain characteristic ways of behaving, and, commonly enough, views himself and is viewed by others as the kind of person who responds in certain orderly and dependable ways. Thus, when he acts 'out of character', he is moved to deny or repudiate such action insofar as it is not expressive of his 'normal' behavior.

The interesting thing about this phenomenon is that he admits on the one hand self-involvement in the act, and denies that his character was involved. Careful analysis of this admission reveals that it implies a person's recognition of self-identity in a contra-personal act.

Commenting on the same kind of situation, Campbell says:

While thus allowing that in some sense his self-identity was retained in the act, he will vigorously dispute that it was his self-identity as a 'person'.¹

This distinction can be focused more sharply by considering the question: Why do we refer to the author of a contra-personal act as "I"? The rationale is clear enough, Campbell believes, if we examine what is involved in remembering a contra-personal act. The pre-condition of the memorial situation, as pointed out previously, is the ontological identity of the subject involved in "the remembering experience . . . with the subject of the remembered experience".² Thus, while there is an implicit recognition

1. OSG, p. 86.

2. Ibid., p. 87.

of self-identity in remembering a contra-personal act, there is also an implicit denial that the "I" remembering and the "I" remembered are the same person, or character. Hence, in the judgment, "I was not myself . . .", we find the implicit affirmation of self-identity and an implicit denial of the personal identity. Campbell concludes that:

The self-identity . . . accepted is identity of the self as . . . spiritual entity; whereas the self-identity . . . denied is the identity of that same spiritual entity considered only in respect of its manifestations as a 'person'.¹

It follows from this then that self-identity is a much wider notion than personal identity. While this distinction enables us to avoid certain unnecessary perplexities, we must recognize that it does not justify the conclusion that there exist two separate, ontological entities. 'Personality'² and 'self' are aspects of a single ontological entity, and designate only distinguishable aspects. "The self may function when the person does not, but the person cannot function when the self does not."³ Actually, the personality is a function of the self, or it is the self acting in character.

1. Ibid.

2. Campbell uses the terms 'person', 'personality', and 'character' interchangeably.

3. OSG, p. 88.

In fact, Campbell believes that the self develops its personality gradually as a means of acting upon and reacting to its environment. Dispositional systems are developed out of the dynamic interchange of self (with all its native capacities) and the environment. These adjustive habits are developed purposively, in order for the self to handle the demands of the environment and its own organic demands with much greater economy of focal consciousness. For example, in the course of our development, there might emerge a whole system of dispositions related specifically to driving, so that when emergency situations arise, we do not have to think through reflectively all our learned responses before we are able to act in an efficient manner. These "sub-systems", says Campbell, are

in relatively close integration with one another--only on that account can the mind be described as a system of sub-systems--and normally they are maintained in relatively close integration.¹

The integration of the sub-systems is essential if there is to be an effective adjustment of the self as it interacts with its environment. If the sub-systems did not exhibit an amazing degree of integration, our behavior would be radically chaotic and disconnected.

We might illustrate this with our driving example. Assume that we have developed a sub-system of dispositions

1. Ibid., p. 90.

or tendencies which enable us to adjust more effectively and more quickly in emergency situations on the highway. At the same time assume that we have sub-systems of moral dispositions which structure, to a degree, our conduct towards other persons. Add the further complication that certain dispositional systems function in the structuring of our perception, and we begin to see the complexity of our dispositional sub-systems and the necessity that they should exhibit an amazing degree of integration. To illustrate both the integration and how it probably functions, we might imagine the following situation. We are driving down a motorway when suddenly a small child runs into the path of our car. Almost at once the dispositional systems are activated; our perception is structured; moral demands function; and our behavior patterns for action in a driving emergency make their claims. The situation, as described above, prohibits a careful weighing of the possible courses of action with all of their moral and physical consequences.¹

Integration of the sub-systems is of two kinds, Campbell points out. (1) "The different sub-systems are in substantial harmony with one another; they do not excite

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1. It could be argued that the response made in this situation, for all of its appearance of being automatic and mechanical is, upon closer analysis, teleological through and through. In any case, it illustrates strikingly the amazing integration of our dispositional systems and their joint interaction.

to mutually contradictory ways of behaving."¹ And (2)

There is ease of transition from one sub-system to another; so that the self, when for the time being functioning in terms of one sub-system, is not debarred thereby from responding readily to stimuli appropriate to the evocation of other sub-systems.²

Our previous example illustrates the two forms of integration. The integration is never perfect, however, and disintegration may be great. A breakdown in the second form of integration is due largely to disintegration with regard to the first form.

Just because the self is one, incompatibility between its sub-systems engenders a distressing sense of 'conflict', and one of the many ways in which the self seeks relief from this conflict is 'dissociation'.³

When two specific sub-systems, say X and Y, are in radical conflict, then the following situation can result:

Each is able to be retained and indulged, and the inner tension nevertheless resolved, if the two can be so completely detached from one another that the self's conscious life in relation to X totally excludes its conscious life in relation to Y, and vice versa.⁴ [*Italics added.*]

When comprehensive groups of sub-systems have remained in complete detachment from the "main-stream" over a long period, it is understandable that the self functioning in the detached group acquires a radically new, 'secondary' personality. This secondary personality might differ in

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 90.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

4. Ibid., p. 91.

startling respects from 'primary' personality, which is manifested in the dominant phase of conscious life. Hence, we get the phenomenon of 'dual' or 'multiple' personality.

Campbell insists that it is

absurd to suggest that, because two 'persons' have emerged, we must posit two selves--two ontologically different spiritual entities.¹

The self, which by its action upon and reaction to the environment, on the basis of its native endowment, built up the specific group of presently detached sub-systems, was the same self that built up the group persisting in the main-stream. The natural interpretation is that it is the same self which functions throughout.

As supporting evidence for this thesis, Campbell notes the frequent success of

a psycho-therapy aimed at 'restoring' integration of personality by breaking down the barriers that have been subconsciously erected to separate the detached groups from one another.²

He further points out that

successful therapy seems to presuppose that the 'two persons' are different manifestations of a single entity, the 'one self'.³

But is this strictly so? Successful therapy might only presuppose that one of the personalities exhibits those

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

3. Ibid., p. 92.

dispositional faculties which would result in a successful adjustment to the environment. Since that is the case, therapy should be directed to the end that that personality be re-enforced, nurtured, and supported. Some therapists would view the problem solely from the perspective of efficient adjustment. Neither can cope well enough to "get on with the business of living". Since that is so, one personality (that exhibiting those dispositions most in harmony with the social system with which it must interact) must be assisted in the process of integrating its system of adjustive sub-systems.

Since the therapist is dealing with functional systems exhibiting a relative degree of integration and independence, he does not have to presuppose that the personalities are manifestations of one self. Some might be willing to agree that the functional systems are functions of, perhaps, a physiological organism, a body, or some such thing, but they wouldn't necessarily have to agree that they were functions of a spiritual substance. Such therapists would insist that the primary task is the re-integration of the adjustive dispositional systems of a functional system which shows indications that with a little modification and structuring here and there it could be returned to 'normal' life. It seems clear that the therapist does not have to assume that he is dealing with two functional systems of the same spiritual entity.

In summary, we can say that there are good reasons for maintaining that the conception of self-identity is a much wider one than that of personal identity. Furthermore, it is evident from the previous investigation that the self, as a spiritual substance, is capable of acting in a contra-personal manner, even though it normally functions in accordance with its personality or character. Given the appropriate circumstances, we discovered that the self might act in a secondary-personal manner, as in the extreme case of multiple personalities. Since there appears to be a time in the history of the finite self which is prior to the actual development of a determinate character, a time when the self is engaged in forming its individual personal traits, then we must infer that the self, at this time, is something less than personal. Hence, another mode of functioning of the self could be termed "infra-personal".¹

Is it possible that the self functions in a supra-personal manner? Campbell believes so, and our analysis of the modes of self-activity will reveal the reasoning behind this conclusion. In the acts of "moral decision" and "effortful willing" we discover that the self transcends the causality of character. Such activity Campbell calls creative in nature because in the exercise of it,

1. Cf. OSG, p. 92.

the character is developed or reformed. To call such functioning of the self "supra-personal" seems most appropriate.

9. The Problem of Continuing Self-Identity and Unconsciousness

The substantival view of the self allegedly confronts a rather serious difficulty in accounting for the continuing identity of a spiritual substance through apparent intervals of 'unconsciousness' in the life of the self. Campbell believes there are three plausible solutions to this problem.¹

(1) One plausible 'solution' to this problem, suggests Campbell, is to deny that unconscious intervals are more than just apparent. It could be argued that in reality they are merely occasions when consciousness is at a very low level; that is, 'inexplicit' to an extreme degree. There is a great deal of empirical evidence (both in everyday life and in clinical experience) which would support the view that, so far as human beings are concerned, there is no strictly unconscious state, in the sense of a state which has in it no glimmering of consciousness.

This solution notes the continuity between conscious and unconscious states and the almost indefinite range in

1. Campbell has never explicitly addressed himself to this problem in his published works. The characterization of Campbell's thinking on this problem comes from two sources: (1) A condensed, but fairly formal, written summary of his views which he has given the author, and (2) interviews on successive Thursdays during May of 1961.

the diminution of awareness. The view suggests that unconscious states, in relation to the continuing subject of experience, are simply weak and diffused levels of awareness. Consciousness admits of an extensive range of gradations, beginning with the most acute and sensitive stage of awareness and shading off by introspectively imperceptible degrees to states of extremely low intensity and range.

There is certain empirical evidence that awareness, interpreted in this primitive sense, is an aspect of all our conscious experience. The definitive feature of this mode of consciousness is its almost total subjective character, or its 'lived' quality. It could be defined as primary attention, a level of awareness where objects are not clearly distinguished and the subject-object aspect of awareness is not explicitly experienced. For example, we often, while diligently searching for some object, are chagrined to find that it was 'right in front of our noses', but we didn't, for some reason, perceive it. Now it would be difficult to maintain that the object was not somehow in our field of vision, and hence, an aspect of our experience. In such instances, we would tend to say that the object somehow was part of our experience, but it was not discriminated. The only way in which we can speak of this object, in relation to other objects in our experience, is to say: "I did not

see it." But the assertion, "I did not see it", clearly means I did not "focus it in my attention", or "I did not make it an object of explicit awareness". Unless we are willing to reduce consciousness to reflective self-awareness, or explicit presentation, we must be prepared to say that we can be aware of some objects in different ways. We can examine the object of experience explicitly by means of introspection; a state of awareness can be the focus of attention; or we can be un-self-consciously aware of objects, feelings, emotions, and so on, that occur on the fringes of our lived awareness.

One of the factors that functions with regard to feeble attention and subsequent inability to bring the low level of awareness to explicit awareness, is that attention is usually selective and pursues a special interest. As Blanshard says:

We may attend to something so feebly as to be unaware of having heeded it, though clear proof may be forthcoming later that we both noticed and retained it.¹

In support of this hypothesis, Blanshard quotes a favorite example from Morton Prince.

On one occasion I saw her (one of his patients, a Miss B) pass by in the street while I was standing on the door-step of a house some fifteen or twenty feet away, well outside the line of her central vision. She was in a brown study. I called to her three times, saying, "Good morning, Miss B.", laying the accent

1. The Nature of Thought, Vol. II, p. 182.

each time on a different word. She did not hear me, and later had no recollection of the episode. In hypnosis she recalled the circumstances accurately, and reproduced my words with the accents properly placed.¹

Blanshard concludes quite rightly that if a level of awareness so feeble as this will be recorded in 'memory', "it is hard to set any limit to what may become subconscious capital".² It is possible that the self functions in two distinct, but homogeneous modes of awareness. (1) It functions at the level of explicit perception, usually dominated by a special interest and, hence, is selective in its explicit responses to stimuli and its activities with regard to its explicit experience. (2) In addition to its 'secondary' function with regard to 'interest', it functions in a more primitive fashion in its attention to extraneous and uninteresting perceptions.

As Blanshard points out:

Any good book on abnormal psychology . . . will furnish masses of organized evidence for behavior that is 'intelligent' and yet seems to have no connection with the consciousness of the moment They embrace such things as the writing down of mathematical solutions in sleep, the complicated performances of some sleep-walkers, and the extensive use of subconscious invention in scientific and literary work.³

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1. Ibid., as quoted from Morton Prince, The Unconscious, p. 56.
 2. Blanshard, ibid.
 3. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 179. With regard to the latter, cf. ibid., Vol. II, Chapter XXIV.

We might briefly note other evidence which tends to support the thesis in question. In the first place, most usual forms of unconsciousness are amenable to rapid transition to the level of reflective or explicit awareness. This is particularly true of sleep, from which the transition is often rapidly made to waking life. Our 'unconsciousness', with regard to certain experiences occurring on the fringes of our attention, can usually be displaced by a simple shift of the focus of our attention. Secondly, most 'unconscious' states can be described as "receptive of" and "responsive to" external stimulation, though the level of awareness seems to be far below the threshold of explicit self-awareness. This empirical fact is of great importance and has been too frequently ignored. The case of the 'soundly' sleeping mother who is undisturbed by moderate auditory stimulation in her immediate vicinity, but who awakens immediately at the faint cry of her infant, seems to indicate not only that she notices certain sensations, but also that she discriminates between them. Another phenomenon which points to a level of awareness during sleep is an unusual, but common occurrence in dream life. Our dreams often incorporate, in some form or another, any moderate noise which usually would be sufficient to awaken us. In this way our dreaming protects our sleep.

Freud has urged that our dreams are highly complicated affairs involving a considerable 'output' of self-activity, in their functions as the "sentinels of our sleep".¹ The "dream work", according to Freud's thesis, is a function of the self's activity, and comes to grips with those turbulent emotions which threaten to endanger our sleep. It allows their expression in a disguised form in the drama of our dream. Should the emotions become too recalcitrant to the selective and reformative activity called "dream work", we awaken rather than allow the emotions and urges to parade before us in their naked and terrifying glory. We need not pursue this any further, for it is possible to submit an almost overwhelming amount of evidence which supports the hypothesis that below the threshold of explicit consciousness, there is a mode of awareness that is more primitive than, yet distinguishable from, explicit awareness.

This 'solution' is entirely plausible and, indeed, very simple. There is no difficulty in understanding how a spiritual substance could continue over gaps of relatively inexplicit consciousness.

(2) An alternative 'solution', Campbell urges, would be to suggest that no solution is necessary. On this view, gaps of unconsciousness are admitted, but it is held

1. This thesis is developed at some length in Freud's essay, "On Dreams," tr. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1952).

that the intervals in the continuity of spiritual substance which this seems to entail are not a serious matter. Why, after all, should there not be discontinuity of temporal existence in a spiritual substance--so long, at any rate, as the intervals are not so frequent and prolonged as to make it absurd to speak of it as 'substance' at all? Campbell maintains in regard to this alternative that common sense does not find anything absurd in the notion of a self being asleep, or in a coma, even when the sleep or coma are assumed to be such that consciousness is in total abeyance.

(3) A third 'solution', and that to which Campbell adheres, is that the continuing identity of a spiritual substance need not be affected in any way by spells of total unconsciousness. This conclusion is reached by him because he believes that the identity of the spiritual substance is not to be interpreted as an identity of consciousness. Campbell admits that self-identity is known only in and through consciousness, but it is known as that which has consciousness. Campbell argues that

it does not follow that this identical being must always be in a state of consciousness--/it follows/ only that I have no direct evidence of its existence save when it is in a state of consciousness.¹

In this passage Campbell makes perfectly clear his belief that the 'I' who is now conscious and known may well be

1. Quoted from personal notes written by Campbell on this problem in May, 1961.

ontologically identical with a being which is sometimes not conscious.

Campbell suggests that:

The supposed contradiction in the supposition of a self or spiritual substance as existing without consciousness arises from the mistaken belief that what the analysis of self-conscious experience reveals is an identity of consciousness, rather than an identity of a subject which is conscious.¹

Campbell seems to imply that if one adheres to the view that the self is an identity of consciousness then ex hypothesi, there cannot be a self devoid of consciousness. However, he believes that the analysis of self-conscious experience yields a subject which is conscious, and if this is the case, then there is no reason why the self should not exist without consciousness.

Campbell would insist that this third solution is not incompatible with holding that the essential nature of the spiritual substance is mind--if one accepts the commonly held view that there are unconscious states of mind. This interpretation is also consistent with his doctrine of mental dispositions which Campbell believes do not imply actual consciousness but only the potentiality of consciousness.² Dispositions, urges Campbell, suggest the presence of 'mind' as a perduring structure.

1. Ibid.

2. Cf. OSG, p. 127.

The dispositions with which we have been concerned are dispositions which, so far as the evidence of observation goes, arise from mental experiences, are excited into activity by mental experiences, and issue in mental experiences. They are called, therefore, . . . 'mental' or 'psychical' dispositions, and . . . must be accounted for, primarily at least, in terms of modifications of the mind's structure.¹

In regard to dispositions, Campbell does not discard out-of-hand the hypothesis that mental dispositions involve modification of bodily structure. However, since he holds that the unity of mind and body is merely de facto, mental dispositions cannot be accounted for merely by modifications of bodily structure alone.²

Campbell believes that the notion of a spiritual substance is a misnomer if it is not supposed that at least mind is of its essence. His hypothesis is that mind persists even when consciousness is absent. The unity of the self is then the unity of a mental structure which perdures over gaps of unconsciousness. While Campbell would not rule out solution (1) above (unconsciousness is only a diminished level of awareness), he tends to believe (3) is more plausible because he finds it rather difficult to believe that the self never lapses into total unconsciousness.³

1. OSG, p. 128.

2. Cf. ibid., pp. 95ff.

3. Personal interview, June 1, 1961.

10. Critical Examination of Campbell's Account of the Self

The principal difficulty with Campbell's view of the substantial self lies in understanding how a 'spiritual substance' can have (own) experiences without being its experiences. One might admit that there are cogent reasons for denying that the self can be reduced to its conscious experiences, since conscious experiences in the history of a self are diverse and successive. It would be difficult to adhere to the view that a mere series of different conscious states are sufficient for the constitution of a self. If Campbell's analysis of cognitive awareness and memorial awareness is correct, as it appears to be, then something more than an aggregate of conscious experiences seems a necessary precondition for the occurrence of these kinds of awareness. Campbell has argued that the

self . . . is something 'over and above' its particular experiences; something that has, rather than is, its experiences.¹

In other words, the unity of the self is a transcendental unity which is qualified by conscious experiences, but is not (literally) its conscious experiences. The self owns its manifestations, but it is not a unity of its manifestations.

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 77.

Campbell's argument for self-identity, based on the analysis of cognition and memory, seems to imply that the question of the necessary identity of the self as knowing is quite different from the question of the identity of the self as something known. His effort seems to be directed towards demonstrating the logical necessity of affirming the existence of an identical subject-self--that is, a knower, and so on--rather than a self as known. Thus, when he speaks of the manifestations of a self, he appears to be referring to a subject-self considered by means of an objective mode. Since he does seem most interested in the subject-self as contrasted with an object-self, his argument raises the crucial question of the relation between these two--that is, between the transcendental self and the empirical self.

The use of the term "transcendental" with respect to the self seems fully justified by Campbell's position. While insisting that there must be one self which is somehow the same in its different apprehensions, Campbell also maintains that this identical self is not merely a part of the world which it knows. The self may make itself an object to itself, but it remains the precondition, as subject, of there being any objects which are presented to it, including that object-self upon which it seeks to reflect. In short, even though the self can enter the 'objective manifold', in a very fundamental sense it

remains 'aloof'.

If the foregoing analysis of Campbell's view is substantially correct, there appears to be a rather serious problem at the very core of his conception of selfhood. On the one hand, the identical self for Campbell is a necessary inference from its manifestations. The self that is inferred from self-conscious experience is thought to be 'over and above' (transcend) its particular manifestations. Yet Campbell's continual insistence is that the self is revealed in its manifestations. The self inferred is surely the subject-self, while the self 'revealed' is the object-self. Since the self is not reducible to its manifestations, the subject-self is not the object-self. The question which Campbell must confront is: How is it possible for that unified self, which transcends successive experiences and changing experiences, still to be able to take its place as object in the flux of experience? In short, what is the relation between the object-self (the empirical self) and the subject-self (the transcendental self)?

This relationship Campbell defines as one of "ownership" and he further suggests that it is "unique" and "indefinable".

There is . . . an apprehended relationship in virtue of which I call experience 'mine', but it is not a relationship of experiences to one another. It can . . . only be stated

as a relationship of experiences to me, an identical subject conscious of having or owning them; a relationship of 'belonging to' which is unique and indefinable, but the apprehension of which is ingredient in all self-conscious experience.¹

The foregoing passage seems to indicate that Campbell believes that there is an immediate apprehension of the relationship of ownership in all self-conscious experience. It would appear, however, that the so-called apprehended relationship of ownership is really only arrived at mediately. It seems to be an inference based upon the formal analysis of the precondition of self-conscious experience. It is not at all certain that the relationship is a direct deliverance of consciousness. Campbell would seem to be on safer grounds were he to urge that there is at least implicit in self-conscious experience the relationship of ownership, but that it is made explicit only by an analytic act of reason.

It should be noted that Campbell has merely named the mysterious relationship existing between the transcendental self and its manifestations; he has not made that relationship intelligible. The doctrine of ownership as Campbell uses it is equivalent to taking note of a fundamental mystery--it is not an intelligible elucidation. But to give a mysterious relationship a name is not to solve the problem resulting from a philo-

1. OSG, p. 80.

sophical construction which distinguishes between a transcendental self and an empirical self, and thereby establishes a relationship between the two which is finally unintelligible. Campbell would have us believe that the relationship is unintelligible because it has about it a 'brute' quality--it is immediately apprehended, and that is that! It has been urged above that the relationship is inferred and hence might be called a "philosophical construct".

One can sympathize with the difficulty which Campbell is attempting to overcome in his doctrine of "ownership". The activities of cognizing and remembering do seem to require, as their necessary precondition, a formal unity beyond themselves. Yet, at the same time, these conscious experiences must manifest the subject-self in some manner. Otherwise, the activities or manifestations bear no relation to a self. If self-conscious experience is to manifest a self, the question of the relation between the manifestations and the self manifested needs critical attention.

Campbell's problem is that his transcendental self must, by his own construction, stand in some relation to 'content'.¹ Since the self must stand in some relation to

1. 'Content' here referred to are psychic manifestations, for instance, thinking, remembering, comparing, feeling, desiring, and so forth.

its content, it must 'suffer' the consequences attendant upon such a relationship. Thus, if the manifestations of a self are temporal and changing, then the transcendent self which Campbell defends--if it is related to these contents--must itself undergo alteration and development. However, if this occurs, and it appears that it must, it is difficult to understand what remains identical!

There would appear to be only one way in which Campbell's view of the self, as being 'over and above' conscious experience, can be made intelligible, and that is if the self is viewed not as a substantial entity, but rather as an ideal construction.¹ Only then, it would seem, can we understand how the self transcends its given content. The fact is that Campbell's formal arguments for self-identity, based on cognition and memory, do not require an enduring substantial unity, but rather require only that we think of the self, or consider the self, as having a more or less formal identity. Is it possible that Campbell has mistaken for the necessity for a logical or formal identity, the necessity for a substantial identity? The reason that Campbell's unified self is able to transcend all particular manifestations is that it seems to be an ideal construct

1. The argument as here developed owes much to F.H. Bradley. Cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (2d ed., 9th impression; Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 267-269.

rather than an actual, existent 'stuff'. As an ideal construct, the self is removed from the travail and flux of its manifestations.

Campbell's concept of the self is an attempt to explain the dual character manifested in every finite center of experience. There is a dialectical tension characteristic of every present context of experience, and this tension leads, on the one hand, to the attempt to hold tightly to the self's being in time (for Campbell, the self's real manifestations in conscious experience), while, at the same moment, the center of experience is driven towards an ideal construction whose purpose it is to wrestle a degree of permanence and continuity from the passing and changing contents. The self's existence, then, is coordinate with the purpose or fulfilment of purpose which gives rise to its construction. And, as Bradley has put it, "the soul exists precisely so far as the abstraction is maintained".¹

1. Ibid., p. 269.

CHAPTER V

SELF-ACTIVITY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL

1. The Reality of Self-Activity

In our analysis of the involvement of the self in cognitive awareness, we were dealing primarily with the manifestation of the self as a theoretical being. Our examination of the notion of self-activity is concerned with the manifestation of the self as a practical being. The first question that we shall take up in our analysis of the concept of self-activity relates to the origin of the idea of activity in human consciousness. Where do we actually get the idea of activity?

i. The Origin of the Idea of Activity

With regard to the question of the origin of the idea of activity, Campbell believes that we can count on general philosophical agreement. We do not get the idea of activity by observation of the external world. Campbell insists:

There we may observe changes of various sorts, but nothing that could of itself even suggest the notion of an agency or activity that brings about changes.¹

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 130.

Anthropological studies have shown us that man, at the most primitive level of his development, tended to view the objects of the external world as though they were possessed by spirits capable of exerting agency. The animistic perception of the external world is a classic example of this kind of thinking. There is general agreement that this ascription of 'spirits in things' results from man's functioning in terms of anthropocentric categories.¹ In short, it is by internal perception that we come to think of ourselves as agents, and we 'read into' the processes of the external world a character originally discovered within our own experience.

Certain philosophers, while not denying this reading of the facts, would insist that the idea of activity is a fiction. What can it mean to call the idea of activity a fiction or a myth? According to Campbell, there are only two things which can be meant by calling the concept of activity a fiction, and, following his lead, we shall examine these two views successively.

ii. Activity as Reducible to its Constituents

In characterizing the first, Campbell notes:

It may be urged that when we analyze the idea of activity with care, observing what precisely

1. Cf. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, pp. 179ff.

it is that we actually experience in those experiences which we are accustomed to speak of as experiences of 'activity', the constituents that are then disclosed turn out to be of such a character that we are no longer prepared . . . to label the experience one of 'activity' at all.¹

It is clear that the mere fact that 'activity', as experienced, can be analyzed into a certain complex of ideas, images, and bodily feelings does not, in itself, militate against the validity of the doctrine of 'activity'. What is required if the analysis is to convince us that the concept of 'activity' is a fiction, is a showing that: (1) the alleged experience of activity can be resolved into analytically observable, separate processes; and (2) that none of the analytica adequately answer to the concept of activity. The analysis must convince us in some fashion that there is nothing more in our experience of activity than the 'distillates' of our analysis, e.g., bodily feelings, muscular enervation, ideas, images, and the like. Since we are unable to observe anything in the analytica to answer to the concept of 'activity', our concept is fictitious either as a description of the isolated aspects of the complex experience, or as describing their amalgamation.

In his critique of the view, Campbell asks:

How can he judge that the constituents disclosed by his analysis of the experience are

1. OSG, p. 131.

such that he is not really entitled to call the experience an experience of 'activity', except in the light of some different idea of activity already in his possession which he takes to be a genuine idea of activity, an idea of 'activity proper'?¹

In his estimate of the argument, Campbell is surely right, for as Tennant insists: "Knowledge of illusion is correlative with knowledge of real counterpart of some kind."² The attempt to explain away activity always presupposes some other doctrine of activity which is not illusory.

iii. The Standpoint of the Subject of Experience

We are able, however, to rescue something significant with regard to the perception of activity in this attempt to relegate activity to the status of illusion. The critic who attempts to explain away the experience of activity by use of the foregoing argument is entirely justified in asserting that we cannot discover anything in the analytica answering to a satisfactory exemplification of activity. It is not that the critic has made an incorrect analysis of the constituents of the experiential complex that we usually call 'activity'. The analysis of the experience of activity into its aspects, for instance, images, feelings, ideas, and so on, is accurate insofar as it reveals what we 'objectively' experience when we experience 'activity'. The critic has been unable to find anything

1. Ibid.

2. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 31.

answering to the concept of 'activity' in the constituents isolated by his analysis, because he has sought for activity where it cannot possibly be discovered, or in what we objectively experience in experiences of activity.

Campbell reminds us that

activity, if it is anything, is a function of the subject qua subject. It cannot be 'objectified'. To attempt to analyze the experience of activity from the standpoint of the external observer, ignoring the standpoint of the subject qua subject . . . is--if I may borrow Stout's apt adaption of Berkeley's phrase--to blindfold ourselves and then complain that we cannot see.¹

The inability of certain philosophers to discover a subject-acting-in-his-experience is largely due to the fact that they have interpreted experience as universally of one form; that is, the 'presentation' of an object to a subject. On such a view, it is little wonder that the subject of experience has been viewed as a mere passive spectator, undergoing experiential changes, but doing nothing. As Campbell suggests, this "error is in part explicable . . . by the fact that it is not his subjective activity, but the objects to which it is directed, that commonly interests the experiencing subject".² Tennant also roundly condemns the one-sided approach of "presentation-alism".

Consciousness is wider than cognition thereof, and is presupposed by it; hence it is idle to

1. OSG, p. 132.

2. Ibid., p. 133.

attempt to explain away the activity of certain subjective functionings, on the ground that it is not a 'content' known with explicitness. To deny activity in cognition, on the strength of the fact that it is not presented along with the object cognized, seems like denying our seeing, when we see things but do not see our seeing them.¹

Campbell draws an important methodological conclusion in the light of such argument, namely, that the only adequate way in which we can discover and describe the activity of the subject is through an introspective analysis of what it "feels" like to be an active being. Not only does the concept of activity meaningfully describe certain experiences of the subject, but also we can identify the experience of activity by "re-living", "re-enacting" volitions or experiences of effortful willing.

iv. The Efficacy of Activity

However, we have not yet completely vindicated the notion of activity. There is a second sense in which it might be said that the concept is a fiction. Suppose we grant that we have a unique experience of activity, and that no amount of internal analysis of this experience can shake our confidence in calling it an experience of activity. "Isn't it possible", it might be asked, "that even though we experience ourselves as 'active', our 'activity' accomplishes nothing; it has no efficiency"? In

1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 29. Cf. also pp. 31ff., ibid.

other words, if it could be shown that we are not, in fact, efficaciously active when we experience ourselves as being active, then in a very real sense our experience of activity is deceptive and illusory.

For example, a man might feel himself to be extremely active in willing to wiggle his ears, but an appeal to certain 'external' facts, e.g., a glance in the mirror, might reveal that his activity is totally ineffective. Our would-be ear-wiggler undeniably experiences himself to be active, but an appeal to external facts renders his experience of activity questionable. This trivial example contains the kernel of a difficult problem for the successful vindication of the concept of self-activity. If in some cases we genuinely experience activity and are apparently deceived by our experience, perhaps in all cases in which we feel ourselves to be active in bringing about something we are deceived.

In the case of "unsuccessful" volition, we are able to discern two principle difficulties for the vindication of self-activity. First, there is the suggestion that it is possible that whenever we experience ourselves as active we are deceived in believing ourselves to be active in any sense. The conclusion might be drawn that activity, however it is conceived, is unreal. Secondly, it might be urged that we cannot discover an intrinsic connection between an act of willing (namely, effortful

activity), and the bodily movements which ordinarily ensue.¹

The first point suggests that any experience of activity is deceptive no matter how we define activity. In respect to this, Campbell argues:

The fact that the paralyzed man's arm does not move when he wills it to move does not in the least entail that he was wrong in his conviction that he was really active. All that it entails is that he was wrong in his expectation that his 'spiritual' activity in willing would produce a certain bodily result--an entirely different thing. The failure to achieve the end to which his activity was directed has no tendency to disprove that he was active--spiritually active--in trying to achieve that end.²

This seems to be a correct appraisal of the situation.

The man who tries to move his ears and who observes himself in the mirror in order to verify this rare accomplishment, no doubt expects a specific bodily movement to follow upon his willing. However, if he is sadly disappointed in not achieving his objective, this does not imply that his activity was unreal, but rather that it was not efficacious. We could say with some justification, "the spirit was willing but the flesh was weak". Whether or not the hopeful ear-wiggler experiences him-

1. Our phrasing of this problem closely follows that of Campbell. Cf. OSG, pp. 134ff. In this section, Campbell is confronting the objections that Hume raised to the concept of activity.

2. OSG, p. 134.

self to be 'spiritually' active in the sense of exerting an effort of will, only his own direct experience can tell. If the person tells us he is trying to wiggle his ears, it is pointless to ask whether he is really trying. As Tennant says:

Illusion is out of place when talk is of immediate experience: at that level, all that happens simply is, and illusion is an ex post facto condemnation of certain happenings, because in some respects they are unlike others.¹

Nevertheless, the recognition that "the evidence of direct experience is conclusive" in determining whether we are 'spiritually' active is not of great value if we cannot show that there is an intrinsic connection between our spiritual activity and "the coming to be of its objective".² Agency without power is vacuous agency. For all intents and purposes, it is worth very little especially when we consider it in the light of the moral life. If it can be shown that our spiritual activity is without efficacy in realizing its objective; in fact, that there is no intrinsic connection between the two, then it would be meaningful and correct to speak of our experience of activity as illusory.

It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to examine in detail Hume's arguments against the concept of activity

1. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 31.

2. Campbell, OSG, p. 135.

and Campbell's defence of the idea. However, we shall try to cover the salient points in broad outline. In essence, Hume attempts to show that the connection between our activity (volition) and the ensuing bodily movement is merely a de facto connection. Campbell points out that Hume's argument rests upon the assumption that the immediate object of our volitional activity is a bodily movement.¹ If this premise is correct, suggests Campbell, we would have to grant that Hume's argument carries the field, for Hume has correctly shown that between the willing to move a limb, for instance, and the subsequent bodily movement, a whole series of physiological and cerebral processes intervene. Now we have no "internal perception" of an intrinsic connection between our willing and the intervening processes. That is, we are unaware of how the "power of will" is mediated.

Campbell defends himself against this argument by maintaining that Hume is in error in assuming that the immediate objective of our willing is a bodily movement. Campbell introduces a series of arguments which tend to show that the proximate object of our willing is not a bodily movement but, rather, is "the producing of the appropriate sensations".² While granting that the

1. Cf. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, and an Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1894).

2. Cf. OSG, pp. 137ff.

connection between the ulterior object (bodily movement) and our willing of that object is de facto (and hence "learned from experience"), Campbell insists that it is absurd to think that the connection between the immediate object (production of certain sensations) and our willing this is also contingent.

The question is whether a plausible case can be made for the view that it is also from experience that we learn that there is a connection between willing these kinaesthetic sensations and their occurrence Any such view presupposes that there is a stage at which we will these sensations without any expectations whatsoever that they will ensue. What, then, could possibly induce us to will them in the first instance?¹

Campbell continues:

I do not see how the 'experiment' of willing a thing, with a view to its coming into being, could ever suggest itself to a mind which did not already regard willing as an act which tends to bring about that to which it is directed.²

But suppose that our activity is not successful in bringing about its immediate object, or, as interpreted by Campbell, the appropriate kinaesthetic sensation? For example, suppose we are actively 'trying' to move a limb which is completely anaesthetized. In such a case, we would be aware, presumably, of exerting a great effort of will, but since our volition is unsuccessful in realizing its proximate object (the appropriate sensations)

1. Ibid., p. 140.

2. Ibid.

it would appear that our direct experience of effortful willing was deceptive insofar as that experience informed us that we were exerting 'power'.

With this conclusion, we cannot concur, for our experience does not inform us that we are not exerting power, but rather, that our willing is futile. This reading of the situation makes it imperative that we recognize a significant qualification with regard to the relation of our volitional activity and the coming to be of its objective.

It is enough, in order for the volition to be an active power, that the exercise of it intrinsically tends to bring about the sensations willed; even though the co-operation of other factors, which may or may not be present, is required to ensure a successful issue.¹

Thus, examples of unsuccessful volition, such as the case cited above, tend not so much to cast doubt upon the discernment of an active power, as rather to make us aware that the co-operation of other factors is required if our willing is to be efficacious. Activity in the mode of volition does not occur in an unstructured, indeterminate context. The success of our activity in bringing about its objective is not determined merely by the amount of energy exerted, but also by the determinate context in

1. OSG, p. 141.

which the effortful activity functions.¹

We conclude then that it is entirely justifiable to speak of an intrinsic connection between our volitional activity and the coming-to-be of its objective, in the sense that our volitional activity intrinsically tends to bring about its approved end. The connection between volitional activity and the coming-to-be of its objective is not a necessary connection in that upon the occasion of willing, the objective must follow automatically. It is a necessary connection in the broader sense of 'necessary', in that willing intrinsically tends to bring about its approved end. Furthermore, we must recognize, as Campbell does, that even if we admit that our volitional activity tends to realize its approved end, this in no way entails that we can fully comprehend how it does so. Campbell reminds us that

for finite knowledge . . . there must be some things that just are, and the basic facts of our own nature may reasonably be supposed to fall into this category. We do not know how we are what we are.²

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1. Peter A. Bertocci, in his discussion of the nature of will-power and its efficacy makes this point quite clearly. Cf. Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 227ff. Argues Bertocci: "The power of the will (will-power) refers to the actual efficacy, as opposed to the effort being expended by the person, of the willing to realize a chosen objective The power of that will to realize the approved goal depends not completely on the activity of willing but on factors within the personality and the environment, impinging upon the person at the time of choice." Ibid., p. 228.
 2. OSG, p. 143.

Here we must let the argument rest, for we need now to press on to a consideration of Campbell's constructive account of activity. Admitting that activity is a fact about our natures which we can directly discern, we shall now attempt to discriminate its various modes.

2. Modes of Self-Activity

Assuming that the self is active, it now becomes our task to discern the different ways in which it can be active. We shall consider first whether the self is always active during its waking life, and if there are distinguishable modes of self-activity.

i. Undergoing and Doing

In the grip of some overwhelming fear, we would be inclined to say that the subject is paralyzed both physically and psychically by his terror. It is not uncommon for a person to "freeze up" in a situation of overpowering fear; that is, to become physically immobilized to such an extent that he cannot make the appropriate bodily responses which might alleviate his fear, and to be psychically impotent in the sense that the fear becomes so overpowering that the subject is unable either to 'think' his way out of the situation or 'will his way clear'. Yet if this is the case, how can we meaningfully speak of the subject as active with respect to his fear, for it would seem that, insofar as his fear possessed him, he

was totally passive with respect to it. On the other hand, we are given to thinking of the self as an active being, and that the self is active in some sense, during every moment of its waking life. Our experience of being passive with regard to a particular emotional or sentient state is so forceful that we cannot deny that so far from our 'acting' in such states, we seem to be 'acted' upon. If we are to retain the notion of self-activity, we must, in the light of experiences such as this, be prepared to distinguish different ways in which the self is active.

If we set out to examine retrospectively an experience of overwhelming terror, we would probably discover that for a slight duration, we 'felt' ourselves to be totally 'possessed' by the experience. It was something that was happening to us, but in which we felt that we were doing nothing. With regard to the lived-through state of fear, we would not think it adequate to describe the mental experience of fear as passive, but rather ourselves as passive with respect to it. Within the experience of fear we would, no doubt, be able to discern certain changes in imagery, perception and, perhaps, even in bodily feelings. Thus, it would be an inaccurate reading of our experience to say that the experience did not exhibit at least some of the characteristics of activity. The distinguishing mark of this activity, however, would be that it was something undergone rather than done by

the self; that is, it forced itself upon us in a brute fashion and it was not something we set out "to do". It would seem then that there are two rather distinct kinds of activity that can be discerned in relation to the self: activity that is undergoing, and activity that is doing.

Campbell formulates the distinction we have in mind in the following manner:

There is an all important difference . . . between the self's awareness of itself as a scene of activities, and its awareness of itself as active, let alone effortfully active.¹

In this passage Campbell distinguishes between activities of the self, which he later calls "self-activity proper", and activities within the self, which are undergone by the self, but which the self does not experience itself as actively engaged in.

ii. Functional Activities or Activities Within the Self

Taking the latter first, as we have suggested, the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of these experiences is the self's apparent passivity with respect to them. The self experiences these activities as an intrusion, rather than as something in which he is actively displaying his energy. Campbell chooses the terms, "functional activities" to signify those kinds of activities which go on within the self.

1. Campbell, Scepticism and Construction, p. 143.

It is not difficult to discover examples in our experience of what Campbell has called 'functional activities'. For instance, the self can experience itself as passive with regard to certain intellectual activities that occur below the level of explicit awareness, while at the same time be self-consciously active in some other endeavor.¹ However, as Campbell points out, we need not appeal to subconscious intellectual processes to illustrate this point.

Often when we are trying to settle ourselves for sleep after a hard evening's brain work, ideas connected with the task we are struggling to lay aside keep surging up and 'milling about' in our minds. It is not to be denied that we have here activity in some sense belonging to the self. But though we think of the activity as going on in the self, we do not regard our self as active in their regard. What our self is doing is trying to go to sleep, and it is with this endeavor that we naturally identify whatever self-activity proper there is in the situation.²

What is lacking in the "surging up and milling about" of ideas in our minds is the subject's conscious identification with the objectives of these 'activities' within him with that which he is actively engaged in trying to accomplish. If this analysis of the situation is accurate, then we can only conclude that there is a kind of intellectual

1. Cf. Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, pp. 188-190, on the 'agency' of the dispositional systems.

2. OSG, p. 144. See also Campbell, SC, p. 145. Campbell's point is that "self-activity proper" is activity self-consciously initiated by the self, while functional activity is activity consciously (or perhaps unconsciously) undergone by the self.

activity within the self, which happens to the self, but which the self does not directly experience itself as initiating. This indicates quite clearly that we are able to distinguish, by introspective examination, a kind of activity belonging to the self which it undergoes, but which is quite distinct from "self-activity proper".

Bodily activity can be "functional" in the same sense, namely as not being directly or indirectly an expression of "self-activity proper". Campbell reminds us that bodily movements can become automatic with little, if any, involvement of the self. In the bodily contortions of the person suffering from St. Vitrus Dance, self-activity proper is at the vanishing point, and the patient literally suffers the jerks and tics of his body:¹ In like manner, the conative life can be interpreted as "functional" activity in some of its manifestations. We often are aware of ourselves as battlegrounds of conflicting and competing desires which force themselves upon us in brute fashion. In such cases, the self does not actively approve and seek these ends; in fact, the competing desires are often actual impediments to the achievement of ends that the self does approve and actively seek.

1. See Campbell, OSG, p. 145.

The most obvious contrast discovered in experience between functional activity and self-activity proper is found in our feeling-consciousness, or in experiences of pleasure and pain. In such mental states, the subject seems to be completely passive, but Campbell believes these states should be placed in the category of "functional activity". He argues that we usually speak of pleasure and pain as being present in our experience in different degrees of 'activity', as when we say that "the pain became more active". It is not so clear in relation to pleasure, but we do speak of 'taking an active pleasure in . . .'.¹

iii. Self-Activity Proper

Activity is a pervasive feature of every moment of our lives, either in the sense of functional activity, (or activity undergone), or in the sense of self-activity proper, (or activity in the mode of doing). Of course, our normal experience is that the two kinds of activity belonging to the self occur together, e.g., while the self is actively pursuing some end, the self might be passive with regard to desires, emotions, pleasures and pains which go on within the self. Campbell

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1. Ibid. The difference noted here is not simply that between intensional and non-intensional action. Campbell believes that introspection reveals the two situations to have a different felt quality. In self-activity proper, the self literally feels himself as actually engaged in end-seeking.

suggests that it is plausible to believe that at certain times self-activity proper might be in complete abeyance while functional activity within the self is present. Typical cases exhibiting this situation would be the few moments following the advent of a violent pain, when the subject is so absorbed in his feeling-consciousness that self-activity proper is in complete abeyance. Or, as previously discussed, in the case of overwhelming emotions, such as fear-paralysis.

For the most part of our waking lives, however, we are actively seeking some end or other which we either explicitly or implicitly approve. This end-seeking is essentially conative in nature and its distinguishing mark is the self's conscious approving of, and identification with, the end sought and the seeking of it. Desire, which is usually considered as part of the complex of the conative life is not, as such, a mode of self-activity.¹ Oftentimes, desire is felt as being in actual opposition to the end that the self is actively engaged

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1. Campbell, in developing his moral philosophy, makes a distinction between the "end of desire" and the "end of the self-as-such". Cf. SC, pp. 211-217. As Campbell argues the point, there is always a 'self-referent' in desire, which makes it something consciously approved by the self. Campbell would argue that desires can 'happen' to a person in the sense that they are conceived as something which will satisfy the self, but since they might not be what the self is actively seeking, they would be activities within the self while not being activities of the self.

in seeking. The crucial point is that there is a felt difference between desiring something (or, feeling a sense of privation) and actively exerting oneself to obtain what one desires. While desire in the sense of the feeling of privation might engender self-activity, it is only when we approve the end of desire and actually exert ourselves to achieve the end that self-activity proper is present. Thus, self-activity proper Campbell confines to conscious volition.

It follows then that action upon impulse is not a mode of self-activity proper. Impulsive activity is distinguishable from volitional activity because the former is 'automatic' with no interval during which the self deliberates and approves the end sought.¹ In volition, on the other hand, the self adopts (with varying degrees of explicit awareness) the end of desire as its own end. Of volitional self-activity, Campbell maintains:

The genus is the self's identification of itself with a conceived end; and this, though present in varying degrees of explicitness, it is not paradoxical to regard as 'pervasive of normal waking experience'.²

In rejecting impulsive activity as a mode of self-activity proper, Campbell notes the following:

1. Cf. Campbell, SC, p. 143. See also his OSG, p. 147.

2. OSG, p. 148.

In pure impulsive or instinctive action 'no self' has been engaged in the transaction. Presuming that the self were conscious of the act, it would be conscious of it merely as a process enacted in it, not as in any sense a process enacted by it.¹

3. Moral Decision Activity

It is Campbell's conviction that there is a distinctive kind of self-activity involved in what he calls situations of moral decision. The self-activity there is distinguishable, according to Campbell's thesis, from the self-activity involved in ordinary volition.

"Moral decision" is commonly used in two rather distinct ways: first, it is the outcome of the intellectual and reflective analysis of alternatives each of which seemingly qualifies as a 'duty-claim' with a view to deciding which of the two or more of a man's conflicting claims really is his duty; second, "moral decision" is used to denote not the decision as to what our duty is, but the subsequent decision as to whether or not we shall do what we have decided is our duty [e.g., not as descriptive of the process of determining what our duty is, but of the act of determining "whether we shall do our duty".²] The latter, of course, is a situation of moral temptation where the subject feels a conflict between the claim of his duty and his strongest desire.

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1. Campbell, "Prolegomena to a Theory of the Moral Criterion," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII (1936-1937), p. 184.
 2. Campbell, OSG, p. 148.

Decision here is unqualifiedly a moral matter and, according to Campbell, constitutes the very core of the moral life.¹ It is in moral decision of this kind that we are able to discover a distinctive kind of self-activity.

The most forthright way of examining the kind of self-activity involved in a situation of moral decision is to reconstruct imaginatively such a situation and then analyze what characteristics we might discover in the experience. This analysis reveals, for Campbell, two readily discernible facets. It is, first of all, experienced as a decision which the subject himself makes; it is, for the subject, a manifestation of his own activity.² It is the second characteristic revealed in the experience of moral decision which sets it off from ordinary volitional activities of the self, where there is no felt conflict between duty and desire. As Campbell analyzes it:

The decision whether or not to rise to duty . . . is experienced as something which, though . . . issuing from the self, does not issue from the self's character as so far formed.³

i. Character and Moral Decision

By "character", Campbell means the "relatively stable and relatively systematic complex of emotive and conative

1. Cf. SC, pp. 133ff.

2. Cf. ibid., p. 135.

3. OSG, pp. 149-150.

dispositions" which have developed in the course of the self's adjustment to its environment (conceived in its broadest sense).¹ The character of the self determines to a large extent which responses will be made in certain situations, and which desires will emerge. The dispositional system likewise determines which will be the strongest desires in the self in a given situation. It is for this reason that moral decision cannot be thought of as flowing from character, for one of the distinguishing marks of moral decision is that it is a decision whether or not to combat strongest desire and rise to duty. It is, in fact, a decision whether or not to oppose our character as so far formed. The important thing to note about the self-activity characteristic of moral decision is that in it the self is active as "somehow transcending its own formed character".²

Campbell's thesis is that in at least one experiential situation, namely that of moral decision, character does not function as the determinant of action. On this thesis, it is perfectly consistent to maintain that in the vast majority of practical choices, "character" remains the determining factor in that it structures what will emerge as our strongest desire and hence, informs the decision.

1. Ibid., p. 150.

2. Ibid.

It is only in cases where there is a felt conflict between duty and strongest desire that the determinant of the activity is the 'self' insofar as it transcends character.

Even on our view . . . formed character does determine conduct over by far the greater part of a man's life. But of course an element of paradox in the view inevitably remains. Unless moral decision is something quite different from what it is experienced as being, the self which makes the decision (we have to say) must be something 'beyond' its formed character.¹

ii. Meaningfulness of Creative Self-Activity

But how are we to understand this aspect of the self which transcends formed character? The difficulty here, Campbell suggests, lies in understanding an act which is the self's act, but which is not explicable in terms of causal continuity with formed character. It involves the difficulty "of understanding anything that is genuinely creative".²

If an act is creative, then nothing can determine it save the agent's doing it. Hence we ought not to expect to 'under-

1. OSG, p. 152. It is evident that Campbell's argument rests upon a distinction between 'self' and 'character'. The justification for this distinction does not rest solely upon the deliverance of our practical consciousness in the experience of moral temptation, although the direct evidence of experience in this case is fairly clear. In a previous section we discussed other reasons which showed the distinction between 'self' and 'character', i.e., 'personality', to be entirely justified.

2. OSG, p. 153.

stand' it, in the sense of seeing how it follows from determinate elements of the self's character; for then it would just not be a 'creative' act. We can expect to 'understand' it only in the sense of being able to 'attach meaning' to it.¹

If the phenomenological analysis of moral decision is substantially accurate, then a person by introspective examination of his own experience of moral decision should be able to attach meaning to creative self-activity. Campbell never tires of pointing out that it is only from the standpoint of the subject qua subject experiencing that we either 'come upon' or 'attach meaning to' the notion of self-activity and, in this case, of creative self-activity.

There is one way, and one way only, in which the disruption of causal continuity between character and act could make itself decisively known. That is through the subject's own immediate experience of himself in acting.²

In distinguishing in the experience of moral decision a mode of self-activity which is not characteristic of ordinary volitional activity, we have made a major stride towards articulating two of the distinctive modes of self-activity proper. That kind of volitional activity issuing from formed character, Campbell calls "expressive" self-activity. "Creative" self-activity is that activity in which the self transcends character as so far formed,

1. Ibid.

2. Campbell, SC, p. 131.

for example, as in moral decision. Our analysis is not yet complete, for we are able to discern a further mode of "creative" self-activity which Campbell labels "moral-effort" activity.¹

4. Moral-Effort Activity

Since moral-effort activity is discovered in the same kind of experiential situation as moral decision activity, or in situations of conflict between duty and strongest desire, our first task will be to distinguish between the two insofar as that is possible.² Our method of studying moral-effort activity is the same as that employed in the analysis of moral decision activity, i.e., the imaginative re-enactment of a situation of moral temptation and a thorough phenomenological analysis of the retrospected state. Campbell argues:

Will-energy is made known to us in direct experience, and in no other way. Only by actually or imaginatively 'living through' the kind of situation in which it functions can we hope to appreciate its character.³

According to Campbell, such an analysis should at least

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1. For a discussion of this mode of activity, see Campbell, "The Psychology of Effort of Will," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XL (1939-1940), pp. 49-74.
 2. Campbell would insist that while we can in analysis distinguish between the two modes of activity, they cannot in practice be separated. They are aspects of a unified experience, and--as we shall see--mutually imply each other.
 3. SC, p. 172.

yield an explanation which would

give an account of the psychical factors involved, and of their relationship, such that any person who faithfully constructs this complex experience in imagination is able to say 'Yes, when these conditions are satisfied in my experience, I do find that I have the experience that I am accustomed to call 'effort of will'.¹

Whereas in moral decision activity, we are creatively active in deciding whether we will rise to duty rather than follow "the line of least resistance" dictated by formed character; in moral-effort activity, we are creatively engaged in exerting effort to overcome strongest desire and to realize the ideal set by duty. The effort exerted in this latter mode of activity is distinctly moral as contrasted with intellectual or physical activity (which it might incidentally involve). Its whole aim is to enable us to overcome our inclinations in order to achieve the ideal which duty sets before us. "In a wide sense of the word 'moral' . . . it seems true to say that effort of will has always a moral orientation."²

Moral-effort activity exhibits upon analysis both of the characteristics we noted as present in moral decision activity; (1) the agent feels himself to be the sole author of the effortful act, and (2) the effort exerted does not flow from character as so far formed.³

1. Campbell, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XL, 53.

2. Ibid., p. 66.

3. Cf. ibid., pp. 69ff.

However, there is a significant difference in degree between the causal discontinuity with character that is characteristic of moral decision activity, and that characteristic of moral-effort activity. In moral decision activity, the activity may be exerted in the direction towards which our character inclines, but with moral-effort activity, the energy created is always exerted towards the realization of the ideal that duty sets. Thus, in a sense, moral-effort activity is that will-effort exerted by a self fully committed to the attempt to achieve the end set by duty even though it actually means acting in opposition to strongest desire.

For Campbell, as we intimated earlier, the moral decision whether to oppose strongest desire and rise to duty is tantamount to deciding actually to put forth the moral effort required here and now.

Moral decision . . . is the decision whether or not to make the effort to rise to duty here and now, in an actually present situation of moral temptation: and a supposed 'decision' to make a moral effort here and now, without in fact making it, seems to me something to which we can attach no meaning at all in terms of possible experience.¹

We need not enter here upon the question of whether moral decision has been interpreted broadly enough to cover cases of resolve, which the existentialists make so much of. Laird appears to have said all that is necessary on

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 155.

this point.

The question of resolve need not receive separate treatment, for it is either identical with choice or else means the choice to choose at some date other than the immediate present.¹

5. Comment upon the Distinction between "Creative" and "Expressive" Self-Activity

The distinction between creative and expressive self-activity has important implications for the doctrine of selfhood. These implications are brought out most clearly by examining the view that all self-activity is of the expressive variety. If we assume that all activity is an expression of character as so far formed, then Campbell is perfectly correct in insisting that whatever self-determination the self enjoys is "formal rather than real".² It might be argued that man's power of self-determination is 'real' in the sense that as a self-conscious being he can choose, in terms of consciously approving his own ends. However, when we raise the further question of why he approves the ends that he does, since we don't have recourse to genuine self-origination (creative self-determination), we must reply "because these are the things he most strongly desires". If we continue to push the question

1. John Laird, Problems of the Self. An essay based on the Shaw Lectures given in the University of Edinburgh, March, 1914 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1917), p. 124.

2. OSG, p. 155.

and ask why does he most strongly desire these things, then, as Campbell suggests,

we are in the last resort forced back . . . upon man's inherited nature and environmental nurture; that is to say, upon two factors without his own control.¹

In another place, Campbell has registered this same judgment. "Determination by the self's congenital tendencies is not, as such, determination by the self."²

The recognition that we can be creatively active in moral decision and moral effort, totally alters the situation.

Here the self is revealed to itself as a being capable of transcending its own 'formed character'; a being with a power, so far as these aspects of its conduct are concerned, of absolute self-origination.³

The implications of the creative mode of self-activity for the problem of free will are obvious. This mode of activity also has important implications for the doctrine of moral responsibility and for the discernment of a moral criterion. It is time for us to turn our attention to the problem of free will to articulate these implications.

1. Ibid., p. 156.

2. Campbell, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII, p. 184.

3. Campbell, OSG, p. 156.

6. The Problem of Free Will

i. Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Having examined in some detail the psychology of the modes of self-activity called moral decision and effort of will, we must now see what bearing the distinctions uncovered in that analysis have upon the problem of free will. The kind of freedom which Campbell sets out to vindicate is that freedom which the moral consciousness affirms as a prerequisite for the moral life. Says Campbell:

It is not seriously disputable that the kind of freedom in question is the freedom which is commonly recognized to be in some sense a precondition of moral responsibility.¹

It is because of this integral connection with moral responsibility that such exceptional importance has always been felt to attach to the free will problem.

But what does it mean to say that free will is a precondition of moral responsibility and hence a postulate of the moral life in general? This is not an easy question to answer, but until we have considered it, we cannot pass on to the more ultimate question of whether free will in its traditional, ethical significance is a reality. Thus, our first task will be to find out precisely what kind of

1. OSG, p. 159. See also "In Defence of Free Will," an Inaugural Address delivered in the University of Glasgow on April 26, 1938 by C.A. Campbell.

freedom it is which seems to be required for moral responsibility.

Our inquiry will be critical and comparative, for when a person acts morally, we usually believe it to be appropriate to judge his act as either morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. When a person so judges, he implicitly distinguishes between acts for which such attributes are relevant and acts for which they are not. A critical comparison then of the acts for which we think it proper to judge as "morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy" with those acts for which these judgments are irrelevant, would give us some insight into the nature of moral responsibility and the freedom required by it. It is suggested here that the grounds or evidence for distinguishing moral acts from immoral acts is the moral consciousness as it is reflected in considered moral judgments.

ii. Free Will: Overt or Inner Act?

A very significant methodological principle is introduced when Campbell maintains:

The first point to note is that the freedom at issue . . . pertains primarily not to overt acts but to inner acts.¹

Our judgments attributing moral praise or blame to the overt acts of others are considered proper and significant

1. OSG, p. 160.

only to the extent that we believe their overt act to reflect "an inner life of choice". It is only when we take the overt behavior of a person to be an expression of an inner life of choice that our moral judgments are relevant. For instance, we do not ordinarily hold an animal morally responsible for its behavior, for we know, on due reflection, that his overt behavior does not reflect an inner life of choice.

It is for this reason that the only evidence for free will is a person's introspection of his immediate experience. No amount of observation of external facts of behavior, whether of organic or inorganic processes, could ever produce a convincing proof of the occurrence of a "free act". The best we could infer from such observed facts is that they are compatible with the occurrence of a free act, not that they require our affirming its reality. It should be pointed out, however, that such compatibility lends equal support to the hypothesis that chance or caprice is operating, and it is rather obvious that either of these would be in opposition to moral responsibility. They clearly would not be its precondition. As Campbell puts it: "Observation from without is in the nature of the case impotent to apprehend the active qua active."¹ And further:

1. Ibid., p. 176.

The sole positive evidence that ever could be adduced for free will must from the nature of the case be of the type of¹ 'immediate experience' or 'feeling'.

We have noted that Campbell's concern is to vindicate that kind of freedom which is a precondition for moral responsibility. The problem which presently confronts us relates to the delineation of that within a self's nature for which it is responsible, and that for which it is not. Granted that we ordinarily hold persons morally responsible for some of their acts and not for others, what specifically is the differentiating characteristic between the former and the latter? Or, as Campbell phrases the question:

Is there any kind of activity, of moral significance, in the finite historical self for which that finite historical self can legitimately be regarded as ultimately responsible?²

iii. Sole Authorship

One of the conditions of an act for which the self is ultimately responsible is, according to Campbell, that the self is the sole author of the act.

It seems plain enough that if there are any other determinants of the acts, external to the self, to that extent the act is not an act which the self determines, and to that extent not an act for which the self can be held morally responsible.³

1. Campbell, SC, p. 137.

2. Campbell, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII, 190.

3. OSG, p. 160.

Thus, an act for which we are to hold a self morally responsible must be an act which is self-determined. The problem arises, however, as to how we are to define influences "external" to the self which cause it to act in one way rather than another. Obviously no man determines the raw material of his impulsive or emotive life, and no man has more than partial control over the material and social environment into which he is born.

Does the condition of 'sole authorship' suffice to make an act a morally free act? Campbell believes that it does not, for he thinks it possible that an act may be a necessary expression of an agent's nature. In such a case, the act would be self-determined, but would be a necessary reflection of his congenital tendencies. It is obvious that we do not praise or blame a person morally for an act he could not help performing--even if his own nature necessitated it.

The question then becomes, upon what grounds can we assert a congenital tendency as "external" to the self? Campbell meets this argument with the following observations:

Assuredly congenital tendencies are constituents in the self's 'nature'. But they are constituents that have a causal history which long antedates the existence of the particular self. Hence, in so far as an act is determined by them, the particular self can be regarded as only the proximate cause of the act. He is the 'cause' only in the sense of being one link or complex of links, in an indefinitely long and intricate chain of causes and effects.¹

1. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII, 184.

Viewed in this perspective, the act can be seen as a necessary expression of the self's hereditary history and hence, as an effect. The agent, in such action, is not the sole determinant of the act. No doubt the self is a kind of causal agent when acting under the determination of congenital tendencies, but it is clear that the agency is 'mixed', being equally an effect in a series of causes, as well as functioning to some degree as cause. Hence Campbell concludes that "determination by the self's congenital tendencies is not, as such, determination by the self".¹

Is it possible then to believe that congenital tendencies exert an external influence upon acts of will? Again, Campbell gives a negative reply, for in his estimation there can be no question that the end of willing is imposed externally upon a passive self. The essence of willing, for Campbell, is self-determining activity, and there can be no act of will unless the self has consciously adopted an end as its end. Campbell argues that these aspects (including environmental influences) are not, insofar as their operation in willing is concerned, wholly "external to the self" at all.

When we analyze the act of willing, it reveals itself to be of such a nature that no end can be willed unless that end is conceived by the self as "its good". In short,

1. Ibid.

the self is always moved by its conception of its own good. But does the line of argument rescue the condition of 'sole authorship' from the pervasive influences of heredity and environment? If we believe that all ends pursued by the self are internalized in the process of the self, consciously adopting these ends as its own goals, then can we conclude that all elements of external influence are thereby purged? Campbell believes not. The argument proves that conduct, qua willed action, is always "self-determined" in the sense that the goals aimed at must always be ends the self consciously adopts. But we are bound to ask what it is which influences the self to conceive of one object as good for itself, another as better, and so on. Only one answer seems possible to this query suggests Campbell.

It seems certain . . . that the self's conception of its own good is influenced directly by its particular inheritance and environment.¹

Since the self does not reflect upon its own good in a vacuum, but rather in the complex of its lived experience, Campbell believes it is infected by the contextual setting in which it formulates its ends. The decision of which goals to pursue rests finally, he says, "upon the relative strength of those of the self's desires and aversions which are relevant to the situation".² Add to this fact

1. "In Defence of Free Will," pp. 11-12.

2. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXXVII, 186.

the fact that the self's desires and aversions are themselves expressions of the self's inherited congenital tendencies or acquired habits and it becomes perfectly clear why Campbell is reticent to accept this form of self-determination as being sufficient for moral responsibility.

It follows that if all that is meant by the 'self-determination' characteristic of all willing is that the end must be conceived as a good for the self, then his self-determination is not of a kind which necessarily carries with it the self's responsibility for the end willed.¹

It is because the self is, at least, partially determined in its conception of what is good for it by things external to it, or things not within its control as, for example, its impulsive make-up, that Campbell rejects this kind of self-determination.

This extensive examination has revealed that the condition of sole authorship is not enough, in itself, to guarantee that the act is one for which it would be proper to hold the agent morally responsible. For in saying that the agent is the sole cause of an act, we might simply mean that the act is a necessary expression of his nature. It is not usual for us to hold a person morally responsible for conduct which to some extent he could not help performing; that is, conduct which, however

1. Ibid.

slightly, followed directly from his nature as so far formed. This leads us to a consideration of a second condition for a morally free act, namely, the recognition that the agent "could have acted otherwise".

iv. Freedom of Open Possibilities

We often praise or blame a man for acts which, upon reflection, we would be willing to admit the agent could not keep from performing in the manner in which he did, as, for example, in the case of bad habits. But careful inspection will reveal that we are not strictly praising or blaming a man for what he does now, but rather for past acts of choice which have generated the firm habit from which his present act necessarily follows. In such a case, our moral judgment has reference to those acts in the past which have contributed to building up his present character. The reason we judge past acts is because we believe that he "could have acted otherwise" then, i.e., at that time he had before him genuinely open possibilities.

A free act, for Campbell, is one not only in which the self is the sole author, but also one in which it is accurate to say that the agent "could have acted otherwise".¹ Campbell takes this assertion about the

1. Campbell has modified this claim somewhat in Appendix B, OSG, p. 216. There he maintains that what "is discerned in introspection is (to take the crucial case of

free act in its categorical sense. He rejects any attempt to formulate this condition in a conditional way, i.e., "could have acted otherwise, if he had chosen otherwise, if he had had a different character, or in different circumstances". Stated in a bald categorical manner, this proposition entails a break in the alleged universal sway of causal law, and it is perhaps for this reason that some interpreters have understood it as a disguised hypothetical proposition of the variety noted above.¹ As Campbell observes:

A contra-causal freedom . . . such as implied in the 'categorical' interpretation of the proposition 'A could have chosen otherwise than he did', posits a breach of causal continuity between a man's character and his conduct.²

Campbell's point here seems to be that the moral ought implies 'can'. We cannot hold a person morally responsible for failing to do his duty if, by the nature of the case, he cannot do his duty. Hence, a situation where moral responsibility obtains is clearly a situation where the person's action was not determined by posterior, or even contemporary causes, but rather is one which is genuinely

moral decision . . .) not a contra-causal activity, but a belief--seemingly ineradicable--that one is contra-causally active".

1. Cf. R.D. Bradley, "Free Will: Problem or Pseudo-Problem," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXXVI, No. 1 (1958), 42ff.
2. Campbell, "Is FreeWill a Pseudo-Problem?," Mind, LX (1951), 459-460.

open. We must now turn to the question of whether or not conditions we have outlined are ever fulfilled in man's volitional life.

v. The Reality of the Morally Free Act

Assuming that the free will we have described is that which is required for moral responsibility, is it reasonable to believe that man possesses such a faculty? We began with the question of whether there was any act of moral consequence for which a man is ultimately responsible. Our analysis revealed that any act of which an agent is the sole author and of which it is correct to say in a categorical sense, 'X could have chosen otherwise', is morally free action, and an act for which a man can be held ultimately responsible. Are there ever occurrences in which these two conditions obtain? Campbell believes so.

In moral effort we have something for which a man is responsible without qualification, something that is not affected by heredity or environment but depends solely upon the self itself.¹

Campbell's thesis is that in the act of deciding whether to put forth or withhold the moral effort required to resist temptation and rise to duty is to be found an act which is free in the sense required for

1. OSG, p. 168.

moral responsibility.¹ It is an act of which the self is the sole author; it is an act of which it is true to say "it could have been otherwise".

Campbell's thesis is quite clearly illustrated in the fact that we are commonly given to "making allowances" in our moral judgments when we believe we have reason to think that a malefactor had an unpromising heredity, or was nurtured in his formative years in a harmful environment. Suppose, for instance, you were asked why you were willing to make an allowance for X, the underprivileged child raised in poverty, constantly submitted to degrading influences, and so on. You could reply something like this: "X has more and stronger temptations or inclinations to deviate from what is right than does Y or Z, who have been more normally circumstanced. That is, he has had to put forth a stronger moral effort to achieve the same level of external conduct." The intended implication is that X is just as morally praiseworthy as Y or Z if he exerts an equivalent moral effort, even though he may not achieve an equal success in living up to his "vision of the good". This clearly implies that moral effort is that something for which a man is unqualifiedly responsible.²

1. See sections on "Modes of Self-Activity", "Moral Decision Activity", and "Moral Effort Activity" in this dissertation.

2. Cf. OSG, p. 168.

It is Campbell's opinion that the free will which he is defending operates only in a comparatively narrow area of the volitional life of the self, viz., in situations of moral temptation. Moral temptation is defined as a situation where there is an experienced conflict between duty, or the claim of the moral right, and one's stronger desires or inclinations. We know, in such circumstances, that if we allow our desiring nature or habitual character to take its course we will act upon our strongest desire rather than rising to duty. If we decide to rise to duty, we feel immediately that we must exert moral effort to overcome our strongest desire. If we decide to resist temptation and to exert moral effort, we feel quite certain that we could withhold the effort; just as, if we decide to withhold the effort, we feel quite certain that we could exert it. The situation reveals itself to be one in which we could have acted otherwise.¹

As Campbell expresses it:

What determines my 'deed', in the act of moral decision, is felt to be nothing but my doing of it. And this 'doing' is of course not some other event antecedent to the deed itself. It is just the deed (or decision) as act, which is the other side of the deed (or decision) as event.²

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1. In the section on "Self-Activity" we saw that effortful willing illustrates the self's transcendence of character causality. Cf. pp. 162-65 of this dissertation.
 2. "In Defence of Free Will," an Inaugural Address delivered at the University of Glasgow on April 26, 1938, p. 30.

vi. Does Campbell Defend Caprice?

It is often urged against the doctrine of freedom of open possibilities that it entails a rather radical unpredictability in the agent's acts and, hence, removes all rational bases for prediction of a person's action. There seems to be good empirical evidence that if one knows the characteristic behavioral patterns of another person, then it is possible to foretell with a high degree of accuracy how that person will respond in certain practical situations. On the view of freedom where a person is able to act contra-causally with respect to his character and faces genuinely open possibilities, it is argued that the rational basis for prediction is undercut. In fact, successful predictions of a person's behavior which supposedly were based on character appear now to be the result of pure chance.

This criticism fails to take note of the relatively narrow range in which moral freedom can operate. Moral freedom operates only when there is a situation of conflict between strongest desire (or what formed character moves us to) and the claim of duty. Thus, in the immense range of practical action where there is no such felt conflict, character is the determining factor and prediction clearly is possible.¹

1. See Campbell, Mind, LX, 460-461.

Does this then leave a small area where it is correct to say "anything can happen"? It might be thought that the phrase "genuinely open possibilities" means 'anything is possible', and that the self can act in any wild fashion. Campbell believes that this reservation regarding his view of free will is the result of confusing it with a doctrine of 'caprice'. A careful examination, however, of Campbell's view reveals that it is just as sharply opposed to the intervention of caprice as it is to causal continuity. Campbell believes that it is impossible for man to act completely out of relation to his characteristic beliefs and desires, or out of his "character as so far formed".¹ Of the function of character in delineating the free act, Campbell says:

No one denies that it [character] determines, at least largely, what things we desire, and again how greatly we desire them. It may thus fairly be said to determine the felt balance of desires in the situation of moral temptation. But all that that amounts to is that formed character prescribes the nature of the situation within which the act of moral decision takes place.²

And further:

The range of possible choices is limited by the agent's character in every case; for nothing can be an object of possible choice

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1. P.A. Bertocci has argued in a similar fashion regarding the situation in which free will operates. Says Bertocci: "Will agency works within the matrix of my total being at a given point of development." Cf. "The Moral Structure of the Person," The Review of Metaphysics, XIV, No. 3 (March, 1961), 373.
 2. "In Defence of Free Will," p. 16.

which is not suggested by either the agent's desires or his moral ideals, and these depend on 'character'.¹

The fact that a person's character limits the range of his possible choice even makes prediction in a case of moral temptation 'reasonable', provided we know something of the person's ideals, desires and, perhaps, moral courage.

Campbell believes that the second main line of criticism of the libertarian position is more illuminating than the one just discussed, for it elicits a more explicit articulation of concepts more fundamental to the argument. The critic's point, as stated by Campbell, is as follows:

Free will as you describe it is completely unintelligible. On your own showing no reason can be given . . . why a man decides to exert rather than to withhold moral effort, or vice versa. But such an act . . . it is nonsense to speak of as an act of a self. If there is nothing in the self's character to which it is, even in principle, in any way traceable, the self has nothing to do with it.²

The problem that attaches to this particular criticism is the difficulty of determining just what the critic means by "intelligible". If he means intelligible in the logical sense of 'capable of being inferred', then his statement is true, for the free act does not follow necessarily from anything. But as Campbell points out, this cannot claim to be a criticism of the libertarian position for, in fact, it is simply a description of it!

1. Ibid., p. 20.

2. OSG, p. 175.

To offer a description of a position as prima facie evidence militating against it has never been thought equivalent to a proof of absurdity. Campbell evaluates this mode of criticism in the following manner:

To 'account for' a 'free' act is a contradiction in terms. A free act is ex hypothesi the sort of thing of which the request for an explanation is absurd. The assumption that an explanation must be in principle possible for the act of moral decision deserves to rank as a classic example of the ancient fallacy of 'begging the question'.¹

But it is entirely possible that the critic has in mind an altogether different sense of the word 'unintelligible'. It may be that what he intends to convey by 'unintelligible' is that a 'free act' of the kind we have described is an act to which we can attach no meaning. It is Campbell's contention that this kind of criticism rests upon a "fundamentally vicious assumption", viz., "that whatever is meaningful must exhibit its meaningfulness to those who view it from the standpoint of external observation".² From the standpoint of an external observer, there can be no question but what it is difficult, if not impossible, to attach meaning to an act of a self, an act which does not follow from character as so far formed. But we have already noted that by the nature of the case, external observation could never satisfactorily establish a break in "character causality" even if it

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 176.

existed. Thus, if 'meaningfulness' is restricted to this latter interpretation, it is obvious that no evidence of an immediate kind could ever be forthcoming to substantiate the claim to a freedom of open possibilities. Says Campbell, in addressing himself to this point:

I call the view that there is no meaning in speaking of a self divorced from its character a 'prejudice' because subscription to it depends, I believe, upon making an uncritical and unwarrantable abstraction from an important part of the evidence; the evidence, namely, which is provided by the self's experience of its own acts.¹

7. Implications of Doctrine of Free Will for Doctrine of Selfhood

If the phenomenological analysis of the previous section is substantially correct, then we find that it is meaningful to talk about an act of the self which transcends character as so far formed. The direct implication is that we must not confuse formed character with the self, for our analysis has shown them not to be the same thing. As Campbell expresses it:

The raison d'être of effort of will seems to be to make moral achievement possible by enabling the self to transcend the status quo of its existing conative tendencies in the direction of the ideal.²

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1. Campbell, "The Psychology of Effort of Will," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XL (1940), 71.
 2. SC, p. 134.

The will-energy which is at the disposal of the self is a different kind of power than the ordinary emotions and desires which the self 'has'. It is quite natural to speak of the self as 'having' (owning) desires and emotions, but it is absurd on the face of it to speak of the self as 'having' an effort of will. An effort of will is something the self 'makes'. Thus, with regard to will-energy we are not merely owners, but rather authors--originators.¹

We have the power to introduce a new energy, to make what we call an 'effort of will', whereby we are able to act contrary to the felt balance of mere desire, and to achieve the higher end despite the fact that it continues to be in the line of greater resistance relatively to our desiring nature.²

This is of vital importance for the doctrine of selfhood, as it posits at the core of the self a potency for creative activity. It lies within the power of the self to reform its inherited and acquired characteristics in the light of its own conceived ideals.

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1. Campbell rejects the notion of caprice primarily because he believes that the creation of will-energy always occurs within the 'arena of character'. This 'new energy' makes it possible for man to transform his characteristic ways of behaving, to create new habits of conduct. Caprice, Campbell takes to be, ex hypothesi, control exercised external to the self, as well as to character. Caprice, for Campbell, is the intervention of some external agency; and he would view this agency as the extremest form of slavery.
 2. Campbell, "In Defence of Free Will," p. 15.

The 'nature' of the self comprehends but is not without remainder reducible to, its 'character';¹ it must, if we are to be true to the testimony of our experience of it, be taken as including also the authentic creative power of fashioning and refashioning 'character'.²

The theory of freedom which has been expounded and defended in this section has important implications for the kind of individuality which we assign to finite selves. Campbell believes that his doctrine of freedom is compatible with a genuine kind of independence, imperviousness, and exclusiveness in finite selves. Since to be an 'individual' means being, to some extent, a self-subsistent, self-sustaining, being, a doctrine which allows some measure of absolute independence is taken as defending an element of vital individuality in finite selves. It is clear that Campbell's view does allow a kind of discontinuity between the self and the surrounding world; in fact, we might say that it makes man, in a significant sense, the "arbiter of his own destiny". Says Campbell:

If I have been right, the self is wholly and absolutely 'self-subsistent' in one respect, namely, in so far as concerns the expenditure of will-energy in moral situ-

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1. Cf. above for a discussion of the crucial distinction between self-identity and personal identity; a distinction to which the doctrine of free will lends vital supporting evidence.
 2. Campbell, OSG, p. 177.

ations. In this respect the control lies solely within the private and exclusive self.¹ *[Italics added.]*

While arguing for this 'absolute' power in the free act, Campbell admits that this free act occurs in a context of "circumstances and agencies" which lie beyond the control of the self. Analyses of these contextual factors are relevant primarily to the success (external achievement) of the free act. The context, then, provides the limiting conditions of the free act in terms of its prospects for visible, external success, but the act as an exercise of 'will-energy', is unconditioned, or, we might say, the degree of energy put forth in the situation is entirely up to the self. Hence, to admit external limiting conditions for the free act is compatible with a genuine independence in the act. This relatively narrow range of self-direction is, for Campbell, sufficient to vindicate moral judgments and to preserve the significance of personal strivings.

1. SC, p. 179.

CHAPTER VI

MORAL EXPERIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SELFHOOD

Our previous analyses of the fundamental modes of human experience have been carried out with a view to elucidating the general nature of selfhood. In the present chapter, we carry forward this project by examining the self in its moral mode of experiencing.

1. Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic Views of Moral Experience

Campbell distinguishes two different approaches to the problem of accounting for moral experience and these are best seen in the light of the kinds of analyses they carry out. Important implications follow for the nature of selfhood on each view. Campbell calls the two the "naturalistic" and the "non-naturalistic" views. Of the former, he says:

Consciousness of the moral ought resolves itself on analysis into a complex whose components are of the nature of the ideas, desires, hopes, fears, etc., found in the context of non-moral experience.¹

Campbell describes the non-naturalistic view as follows:

The moral ought is either ultimate and un-analyzable, or, if analyzable, can be ana-

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 180. See also his SC, pp. 197-98.

lyzed only in terms which include some other ethical concept, such as 'good', in a sense¹ in which that is ultimate and unanalyzable.

It is clear from the above passages that Campbell assumes that the crucial concept of morality is the 'ought'. Such an assumption appears indisputable, for all of our language about morals implies the centrality of the moral ought or of duty. A further assumption of Campbell's position is that it is nonsense to talk about proving the reality of the moral ought or of moral obligation. The evidence for the moral ought is direct experience and, as such, cannot be demonstrated to someone who has not had an experience of it.

The 'naturalistic' analysis of moral experience attempts to dissolve the uniqueness of the experience into its non-moral ingredients. It is a sufficient defence of the phenomenal reality of moral obligation to show that any such attempt is incompetent to explain what it sets out to explain.² Campbell argues:

It has proved in practice a simple enough business to overthrow the sceptical ana-

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 180.

2. A great deal of Campbell's work in Ethics is given to critical analyses of attempts to 'explain away' the reality of moral obligation by resolving it into its so-called non-moral ingredients. The reader is referred especially to: "Ethics without Propositions," Mind, LIX (1950), pp. 273-299, and OSG, pp. 183-200. These critical portions of Campbell's moral philosophy illustrate very nicely his determination to 'clear the field' before

lysis of moral experience by making it clear that if that experience were really as it appears in the analysis, the nature of the emotional and ideal responses called forth by the experience . . . becomes quite unintelligible.¹

Campbell believes the non-naturalistic analysis of moral experience to be the most adequate and, further, that it has important implications both for the doctrine of self-hood and for metaphysics. If this view is true, then:

There is . . . a legitimate inference from the fact of moral experience to the objective reality of the human self to that order which confers upon the life of man a dignity and a cosmic significance . . .²

In focusing the problem of moral obligation as he has, Campbell has intentionally left open the question of the possible relationship of the ought to the good; of moral value to non-moral value. In fact, insofar as the analysis of moral obligation is concerned, it may be true that obligation is subservient to a more fundamental good of a non-moral character. On the other hand, the analyses of obligation may lead to a good of a moral character which is independent of all thought of any other kind of good. All that Campbell insists upon in this respect is:

proceeding to his own constructive position. A detailed examination of Campbell's critical work in moral philosophy is not germane to our present concern with his constructive view of moral obligation.

1. SC, p. 199.
2. Campbell, OSG, p. 180.

In order that a good may approve itself to our consciousness, and thus be esteemed morally good, it must be apprehensible (as, of course, many goods are not) as a good which ought to be ensued by someone.¹

According to Campbell, we know what the ought means only in the experience of it; hence, moral experience must be the touchstone of the adequacy of any analysis. To some extent analogy can be used to describe how it feels, and situations can be described in which it is most likely that it will operate, but these are simply techniques for directing a person to the first-hand 'enjoyment' which alone will exhibit its fundamental character.

2. Emotion and Judgment in Moral Experience

The experience of ought has an element of emotion and judgment in it. For example, if a person believes that he ought to assist a friend in need, the person feels a pro-emotion towards willing means appropriate to that end. What is not so often recognized is the fact that along with the feeling goes an implicit judgment. As Campbell argues the point:

The so-called 'feeling' has an aspect of assertion, or judgment, as well as feeling; that [e.g.] his moral feeling towards promise-keeping includes the judgment that promises ought to be kept Can one really avoid recognizing that what is distinctive about moral feeling is precisely

1. OSG, pp. 181-82.

that it is inseparably united with a judgment of 'oughtness'?¹

The feeling involved in moral experience does not generate the judgment, for it is not distinctly a moral feeling unless the judgmental element is already present. Nor could we say, for the same reason, that the judgment generates the feeling. The correct interpretation seems to be that they are distinguishable aspects of one unified experience, and that there seems to be an intrinsic connection between these two aspects. Campbell calls this the "double-aspect" theory of moral experience.²

Campbell argues further that there is a kind of uniqueness to the moral emotion. "Nothing is more evident about the emotion felt towards the moral ought than its qualitative uniqueness"³ Hence, we cannot think of a consciousness of moral obligation which is not at the same time a feeling of the appropriate pro or con emotion towards the ought. Kant perhaps was attempting to describe the same qualitative uniqueness of the "feeling of respect for duty" when he said:

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1. Campbell, Mind, LIX, 91.
 2. Campbell points out that such a theory is not new, but rather that it has important historical antecedents. "What else but this was in Bishop Butler's mind when he spoke of the moral faculty as alike 'a sentiment of the understanding' and a 'perception of the heart'?" Ibid., p. 92.
 3. Campbell, "Are there Degrees of Moral Emotion?," Mind, XLV (1936), p. 492.

It might be objected that I seek to take refuge in an obscure feeling behind the word 'respect' But though respect is a feeling, it is not one received through any [outer] influence but is self-wrought by a rational concept: thus it differs specifically from all feelings of the former kind ¹

The ought is experienced as having absolute authority over us. "The moral ought . . . is experienced as an unconditioned, or categorical, imperative."² Campbell is cognizant of the fact that the notion of the categorical imperative (which is simply descriptive of the felt quality of moral experience) cannot be conveyed to a person who has not had a direct experience of it. The categorical imperative is only experienced in the context of a felt obligation.

3. The Validity of Moral Experience

Granted that there is an experience of a unique kind of moral obligation, the question now arises respecting the objective validity of the moral consciousness. Could it be that moral experience has only subjective validity and not objective validity? Campbell thinks not, for he believes that when the true nature of the experience of oughtness is appreciated, then objective validity follows

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1. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by Lewis W. Beck (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1959), p. 17.
 2. Campbell, OSG, p. 201.

almost as a corollary. What reasoning leads him to this conclusion?

In the first place, suggests Campbell, the suspicion that the moral ought has only subjective validity arises from the mistaken notion that the essence of obligation lies in moral feeling or emotion. The corrective to this kind of one-sided analysis is the showing that "moral experience . . . requires both feeling and judgment for its proper characterization".¹ To focus on either to the exclusion of the other is to deal with a vicious abstraction.

This matter, according to Campbell, can only be resolved by personal experiment, or by introspective analysis of the fundamental characteristics of the experience undergone. Imagine, for instance, that you have a moral pro-feeling towards doing X. Do you not find, intrinsically bound up with the moral pro-feeling, the judgment "I ought to do X"? Or, on the other hand, assume the situation where the judgment "I ought to do X" describes your state of mind. Is it not clear that there is, inherent in the experience, a moral pro-feeling towards X?²

4. An Objective Moral Order

The recognition that judgment is an essential element in experiencing the moral ought has significant implications

1. Ibid., p. 203.

2. Cf. ibid.

for the question of the objective validity of moral consciousness. For as Campbell argues:

If judgment belongs thus to the essence of moral experience, a subjectivist interpretation of the ought seems to me to be ruled out eo ipso. It belongs to the essence of judgment to claim truth for what it asserts; and truth is always 'of' objective reality.¹

According to the judgment theory,² any judgment can be translated without loss of meaning (indeed, with further articulation of meaning) into the form, 'Reality is such that S is P'. Hence, the judgment (at least implicit in experiences of the ought) that "I ought to do X", means that 'Reality is such that I ought to do X'. This suggests, according to Campbell, that important metaphysical implications follow from accepting the fact that the moral consciousness has objective validity.

If the moral ought is objectively valid, this means nothing less than that a 'moral order' is somehow ingredient in the very nature of things.³

It is important to note at this point that Campbell's affirmation that a moral order is ingredient in the structure of reality is qualified significantly by the term "somehow". Campbell recognizes in the following passage the importance of this qualification.

To develop the 'somehow' into a definite and intelligible concept is, of course, a task of the most formidable character,

1. Ibid.

2. Cf. above, Chapter III.

3. Campbell, OSG, p. 206.

which only metaphysics is competent to discharge--if even it be competent.¹

But while recognizing this qualification, Campbell immediately concludes:

But in order to know that, as distinct from how, a moral order is rooted in the nature of reality, there is no need to wait for a metaphysical theory.²

Consciousness of obligation establishes a relationship between the self and an objective moral order, and imparts to man's earthly life a significance of cosmic proportion. It banishes forever the basic fear, so corrosive of the inner life, that "human existence has no meaning or purpose beyond itself".³

5. Some Observations on the Inference from the Moral Consciousness to an Objective 'Moral Order'

This fact of the self's relation to an objective moral order through its moral experience looms large in Campbell's final metaphysical conclusions. For this reason, it is important to examine more closely the adequacy of his argument. It will be our thesis that his argument is incapable of sustaining this inference of an objective moral order.

In order to get immediately to the crux of the matter, let us set down the points at which we concur with Campbell's

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

analysis. It is agreed that the experience of moral obligation has a uniqueness in its felt element, and that the best description of this 'felt quality' is its unconditioned demand upon us; that is, it is felt as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we concur in Campbell's "double-aspect" view of the experience of the ought: feeling and judgment are intrinsically involved in the experience. The following question focuses our difficulty most sharply: Does the judgment 'Reality is such that I ought to do X', entail that a moral order is ingredient in the nature of things? We shall try to show that it does not, and will suggest how it might have been that Campbell came to make such an inference.

Firstly, an important distinction should be made between the epistemological status of (1) the experienced unconditionality of the claim of moral obligation (its felt quality); and, (2) the conditioned judgment 'Reality is such that I ought to do X'. While the former is unconditional through-and-through, the latter is thoroughly conditioned. Now Campbell is not unaware of this fact, and qualifies his assertion that a moral order is ingredient in the nature of things by the term "somehow". However, at this point, he does not seem to have made the proper analysis of the qualification 'somehow'. For example, could the 'somehow' be interpreted in a fashion in which

the unconditional character of the 'experienced ought' receives radical transformation in the context of objective reality? If so, and there is no prima facie evidence to the contrary, the statement that there is an objective moral order would stand in need of serious revision. The very fact that Campbell agrees that the 'somehow' or 'such that' might, in principle, not be capable of articulation raises serious doubts, even respecting the categorical assertion that a moral order (as such) is ingredient in the nature of things.

We must raise this latter point, for it is here that Campbell's argument appears to be defective. Careful analysis of his reasoning shows very clearly that his insistence that an objective moral order is ingredient in the nature of things intends to convey the impression that the moral order as such has objective reality. However, on the basis of his own doctrine of judgment, this inference does not seem to follow. It does follow that the judgment 'Reality is such that I ought to do X', is true in some sense. It does not follow, from this alone, that it is true because it entails that a moral order as such is objectively real. To prove the latter point, one would have to demonstrate the perfect self-consistency of morality and this, in principle, cannot be done on Campbell's own showing.¹

1. Cf. above, on the incompetence of metaphysics to demonstrate how.

In fact, the argument which Campbell appeals to here could 'prove' any conceivable objective order, according to the whims of the thinker. For instance, suppose you assert the judgment: "Fairies walk on tip-toes." On Campbell's view, we would have to say, since this is a judgment, that this assertion can be transformed into, 'Reality is such that fairies walk on tip-toes'. Now since the only thing which the judgment can refer to is objective reality, we can add that 'it is true of objective reality that fairies walk on tip-toes'. On Campbell's reasoning, it follows as a direct corollary of this analysis that there is an 'objective fairy order'.

Now while we might be inclined to believe that there is a sense in which this analysis is correct, it does not appear that Campbell would feel that the two orders are on equal footing, and that the implications for human selfhood were of the same significance. But to what would he appeal in order to distinguish between the two 'objective orders'? It is obvious that he is foreclosed from appealing to the different judgments, for analysis of them yields common results, namely that there are 'objective orders'. Would he then appeal to the experienced states accompanying the judgments? In fact, this seems to be the only differentiating factor, for the judgment, 'fairies walk on tip-toes' ordinarily is not accompanied by any direct feeling

of 'assurance' or 'unconditionality'. While the judgment, 'I ought to do X' is always accompanied by a moral emotion which is unconditional in its felt quality.

However, is it not clear that Campbell cannot stress these qualities as being the differentiating factors, for they are phenomenal only, and more importantly would entail that the ought had only subjective validity. Perhaps he would see one further possibility for escaping this difficulty. He might point to the fact that feeling and judgment are intrinsically and intimately conjoined in moral experience, and that the judgment finds support in the felt element of the complex. But even this will not do, for it cannot be shown how an 'experienced unconditionality' could in any way alter the thoroughgoing conditionality of the judgment. Given the judgment theory, the judgment remains conditioned regardless of the experience to which it is confined or conjoined. Hence, we can only conclude that the inference from moral consciousness to an objective moral order is defective, if the assumption is that a moral order as such ultimately exists.

CHAPTER VII
PROLEGOMENA TO CAMPBELL'S METAPHYSICS
OF THE SELF

1. Introductory Remarks

In order to determine the ontological status of self-hood in Campbell's philosophy, two kinds of evidence must be considered. In the preceding chapters we have undertaken (after Campbell's lead) a phenomenological analysis of several modes of experience including cognitive experience, moral experience, and the experience of self-activity. In analyzing these modes of experience, Campbell has limited himself to what he calls "the viewpoint of the subject". This perspective aims at an accurate description of the self as it experiences itself in all self-conscious experience. It will have been noted that with regard to each of the foregoing modes of experiencing, Campbell eventually raises the question of the 'meaningfulness' of the account that he has given.¹

Campbell's contention with regard to each kind of experiencing has been that his views are 'meaningful' in the sense that they give an adequate description of what

1. Cf. above, pp. 106-110, 160-162, 193-94.

self-consciousness in these different modes reveals about the self. However, in discussing the implications of his analysis of these modes of experience for the doctrine of the self, Campbell has persistently distinguished two kinds of 'meaningfulness' which might accrue to the concept of the self: (1) Phenomenological meaningfulness, or adequacy in describing what self-consciousness reveals the self to be as warranted by the direct deliverances of the subject's experience; (2) ontological meaningfulness, or the adequacy of the concept of the self as an "ultimately satisfying" metaphysical notion.¹

Perhaps these two kinds of meaningfulness can be further delineated by a consideration of the kind of question to which they, separately, would be considered an adequate answer, and the mode of investigation which might be employed to answer the question. What kind of question elicits and is satisfied by phenomenological meaning? Campbell would urge that the following questions seek phenomenological meaning: What does the subject of experience discover itself to be in the cognitive mode of experience? What does the subject discover about itself in analyzing the experience of self-activity? These questions require, according to Campbell, a unique method of investigation, namely, introspection. This follows neces-

1. Cf. above, pp. 106-110, 160-62, 184-87, 193-96.

sarily from the fact that the data they seek are not 'objects' over against the self, but rather what the self itself undergoes in these different modes of experiencing. On the other hand, questions attempting to elicit ontological meaning are of a different nature according to Campbell, and they require the employment of a different criterion in the determination of the adequacy of the meaning of the answers given. Questions demanding metaphysical meaning are as follows: Is the self, as revealed by phenomenological analysis, real? Does what moral experience reveal to us about the self have ontological significance? In short, what constitutes knowledge of reality?

According to Campbell, the answers to these latter questions are judged adequate only if they satisfy the criterion of metaphysical knowledge, that is, only if they are "ultimately satisfying to the intellect". Thus, if we are to determine whether the concept of the self is an adequate metaphysical notion, we must first determine what Campbell means by "ultimately satisfying to the intellect".¹

We mentioned at the outset that for Campbell there are two kinds of evidence which must be considered in

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1. It is not self-evident that the phenomenological adequacy of a concept is judged by the same criterion as that employed in determining the ontological adequacy of a concept.

attempting to determine the ontological status of the finite self. Not only must we examine the implications of our phenomenological analysis, we must also evaluate the notion of the self in the light of an epistemological analysis, i.e., in the light of such questions as: What constitutes real knowledge? What are the limits of knowledge? What is the criterion of adequacy for any metaphysical concept? Since this inquiry is a prolegomena to questions regarding the ontological status of the finite self, it becomes necessary for us to discover what Campbell proposes as a criterion of metaphysical adequacy.

2. The Criterion of Metaphysical Knowledge

Bradley has remarked in Essays on Truth and Reality that "if there is to be philosophy its proper business is to satisfy the intellect . . ."¹ With this doctrine Campbell is in complete agreement. Regarding the claims that reason makes upon us, Campbell has set down the following:

The life of reason is the life in which the practice is habitual of founding belief upon critical examination of the appropriate evidence, and of guiding action, save where the

1. F.H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 221. See also, Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Chapter 14. Campbell has remarked in SC, p. 5 that "this definition, which looks innocent enough, nevertheless suggests strongly the necessity of a certain preliminary inquiry as an indispensable basis of all philosophical construction".

urgency of a situation calls for a more immediate response, by reflective comparison of the merits of alternative courses in the light of considered principles.¹

Philosophy, then--for Campbell--is that kind of inquiry which endeavors to construct a view of the general character of reality which will satisfy the intellect. As we have noted, Campbell recognizes that this view of the function of philosophy makes necessary a preliminary inquiry into the basis for philosophical construction. We are able to proceed with construction only when we have settled the preliminary question: What in general would satisfy the intellect? or, What are the formal characteristics of that which the intellect is prepared to accept as real?²

This inquiry can proceed in two ways: (1) By distinguishing the aim or function of reason or intellect in its speculative mode from its other modes of operation; and (2) by explicating the unique standard that informs the operation of 'philosophic reason'. The latter of these procedures is the most germane to our inquiry; further, it provides the foundation for the former approach.

1. Campbell, "The Claims of Reason," Philosophy, XXV, No. 92 (April, 1950), p. 121.

2. Cf. SC, p. 5.

3. Non-Contradiction as the Metaphysical Criterion

Since Campbell's earliest philosophical statements he has consistently maintained that the only avenue to "sound metaphysical construction" is by way of analysis of the nature and implications of the contradictory.¹ We shall shortly be examining the reasoning that lies behind this connection, but Campbell insists that something can be said in advance of such analysis.

Whatever more specific criteria the intellect may from time to time accept in its endeavors to know the real, there is one general and ever-riding criterion from which its allegiance can at no point be withheld, viz. 'non-contradiction'.²

Thus, Campbell affirms that there is one definite and indisputable standard of an 'intellectually satisfying' attribution of the real, and this criterion functions in a negative fashion. The intellect cannot accept as genuinely characterizing the real any content which contradicts itself. But we must now turn to Campbell's analysis of non-contradiction to ascertain its nature and implications for the metaphysical enterprise.

4. Status of the Law of Non-Contradiction

It is not uncommon to hear philosophers speak of the 'law' of non-contradiction. The view is often argued

1. SC, pp. 5ff.

2. OSG, p. 383. See also SC, p. 7.

that non-contradiction is a condition making possible intelligible discourse. Some have insisted that it is an arbitrary 'convention' of a peculiar system of language or of logic. In this section consideration will be given to these alternatives in the light of Campbell's analysis of this principle. An attempt will be made to ascertain whether Campbell believes it to be a 'law'; what kind of 'law' he thinks it to be; and, assuming it to be a 'law' of thought, whether it can also be thought of as a 'law' of things.

It is not easy to see what kind of law non-contradiction really is. Is it similar to a traffic law and hence, prescriptive in nature, or is it like a natural law and therefore descriptive in nature? But if the latter is true, then why does it seem that we cannot alter the law of contradiction? If the former is true, this view seems refuted many times over by the fact that we do contradict ourselves.¹

Campbell argues that the law of contradiction is one which we cannot help accepting.

It would seem, in logic, we are obliged to accept the rule 'p excludes not-p', and if we are obliged to accept it, it is not a convention.²

1. Cf. Donald Henze, "Contradiction," Analysis, XXII, No. 2 (April, 1961), pp. 25-28.

2. Campbell, "Contradiction: 'Law' or 'Convention',?" Analysis, XVIII, No. 4 (March, 1958), p. 64.

Campbell believes that the law of non-contradiction is one which is ultimate for all thinking, for when he uses the expression "we are obliged", he intends the term 'obliged' in its strongest sense. "We are 'obliged' to accept the rule 'p excludes not-p' because 'we can do no other'."¹

Campbell's formal argument for this conclusion goes something like this: Discourse which is intelligible always has determinate meaning; since no self-contradictory discourse is discourse to which we can give determinate meaning, then no discourse that is intelligible is discourse that is self-contradictory.²

Campbell notes that there is a kind of circularity in attempting to prove, that is, demonstrate deductively, the ultimacy of the law of non-contradiction for all thought. For the very process of reasoning whereby one would set out to prove the validity of this principle would, in fact, presuppose it.³ But if the law of non-

1. Campbell, "Comment upon Professor Henze's Criticism," Analysis, XXII, No. 2 (April, 1961), p. 30.

2. Ibid., p. 29.

3. Blanshard has noted this peculiar position with regard to the so-called 'laws' of thought. Commenting on this problem, he says: "Regarding the laws of logic we can neither prove that they hold there in reality nor intelligibly deny that they do. Any 'proof' would be circular. For the demonstration would have to accord with the laws it was proving" Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. II, p. 422.

contradiction cannot be 'proven' in this fashion, does that render it doubtful? Such a conclusion is unacceptable to Campbell, for he is convinced that "complete and final theoretic satisfaction about the validity of the principle of contradiction as a law of thought" can be gained in another manner.¹

In order to support this last assertion, Campbell proposes an ideal experiment, in which we are asked to 'think' a contradiction. Can we literally think a contradiction?² Campbell argues that if one tries to think 'S as both being P and not being P, at the same time and in the same relation', it will be discovered that there is no determinate thought at all. But is it not apparent, it might be asked, that we frequently contradict ourselves in our discourse? Replying to this objection, Campbell contends that ostensible cases of 'self-contradictory thinking' turn out upon analysis to be

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 385.

2. It is important in this regard that the 'law' of non-contradiction be formulated correctly. For instance, the formulation 'S cannot at the same time be P and non-P', while a common way of phrasing the 'law' is nonetheless a defective way. It is very easy to conceive a contradiction given this formulation, for example, 'An apple is at the same time both round and sweet'. However, if the 'law' of non-contradiction is formulated 'S cannot, at the same time and in the same relation, both be and not be P', then the problem of whether it is possible to conceive a contradiction is not so cavalierly dealt with.

always contradictions between distinct acts of thought in a single argument or train of thought--never a single act of thinking S as both being and not being P.¹

Seemingly, Campbell has reference here to the kind of contradiction we fall into in the course of a long and involved argument where, early in the argument we assert S to be P, and after a long duration--having forgotten the original assertion--we go on to affirm S not to be P. The proper analysis of this appears to be as Campbell says it: that we are not concerned in this instance with one act of thought contradicting itself, but with two acts, separated by a temporal span of some duration, contradicting each other. Or, if the argument is of sufficient complexity, we might at one point assert a relationship between S and something which contradicts P, while still maintaining that S is P. When we are reminded of this, however, we are always willing to re-examine the relationship asserted and to correct the error in our thinking by abandoning the paradox.

The underlying thrust of Campbell's argument seems to be that non-contradiction is a law which we are compelled to obey by the very nature of our intellect. His purpose is to accumulate evidence which supports the assertion that we have to accept it as a fundamental

1. Campbell, Analysis, XXII, No. 2, 30. See also Campbell, "Self-Evidence," Philosophical Quarterly, IX, No. 39 (April, 1960), pp. 148ff.

principle of thought, without which thinking ceases to be thinking at all. This is pointed up in his conclusions regarding the status of the law of non-contradiction.

Where we have a principle which we have literally no choice but to accept, to talk of that principle as a 'convention' is nonsense. Acceptance of it is a matter of necessity, not convention.¹

But not only is non-contradiction a law of thought, Campbell believes it to be a law holding good of reality. The reasoning behind this conviction is as follows: If we assert that we cannot 'think' 'S as both being and not being P', it is ridiculous to suggest that in reality 'S might both be and not be P'. Ex hypothesi, this latter suggestion is one that we cannot think; therefore, its formulation becomes merely a linguistic matter.² Thus, the law of contradiction has metaphysical as well as

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 386.

2. Campbell's position in this regard is substantially the same as Bradley's. Says Bradley: "In thought the standard, you may say, amounts merely to 'act so'; but then 'act so' means 'think so', and 'think so' means 'it is' Thinking is an attempt to satisfy a special impulse, and the attempt implies an assumption about reality. You may avoid the assumption so far as you decline to think, but, if you sit down to the game, there is only one way of playing. In order to think at all you must subject yourself to a standard, a standard which implies an absolute knowledge of reality; and while you doubt this, you accept it, and obey while you rebel." Appearance and Reality, pp. 134-35.

logical import.¹ In order to understand just what this 'metaphysical import' is, Campbell's analysis of the nature of contradiction will have to be explored.

5. The Nature of Contradiction

If contradiction is an ultimate law of both thought and things, Campbell still faces the difficulty of showing precisely what contradiction is.² Since contradiction has reference to processes of thought, Campbell believes that analysis of contradiction proceeds most directly by analysis of the logical character of the unit of thought, that is, judgment.

The judgment, says Campbell (following Bradley's lead), is an affirmation of a unity in diversity. It is important to recognize that in this view of thinking as uniting differences, both the union and the differences are indispensable elements. When the differences are not asserted to be unified there is no thinking; that is, no judgment. Nor is the formula of judgment simply 'A is A'. Hegel has sufficiently shown the folly of construing the judgment as an assertion of bare identity. What has to be united in the judgment is differences;

1. In fact, regarding the epistemological status of the principle of non-contradiction, Campbell argues that it is a case of "synthetic a priori knowledge". Cf. Analysis, XXII, No. 39, 154-55.
2. Campbell's account of the nature of contradiction follows closely that given by Bradley in Note "A" of the Appendix to Appearance and Reality. Cf. also OSG, p. 388 and SC, p. 7.

otherwise there is no advance of thought. Hence, it would appear that the correct formula for judgment, if it is to be a uniting of differences, is 'A is B'. Does this then enable an advance to a more adequate view of thinking? Evidently not, for the nature of judgment expressed in this fashion means that what is actually asserted is a judgment equivalent to 'A is non-A' (since B must be 'different from' A). Thus, the formula 'A is B' cannot stand, simply as it is, as the most adequate expression of the judgment.

In fact, this latter characterization of judgment brings us face-to-face with the essential nature of the contradiction. In the judgment, 'A is B', taken simply, we assert and annul in the same act, and this seems to be the essence of self-contradiction. Yet if thinking is to be construed as the uniting of differences, this process must be understood in some manner which does not necessarily yield contradiction. It is at this point that Campbell believes Bradley makes his most significant contribution to the problem of determining the nature of contradiction. Summarizing Bradley's views on this matter, Campbell says:

Beyond a doubt . . . thought requires the uniting of differences for its very life. But it does not follow that thought is prepared to accept a union of differentials irrespective of the manner of their union A merely external union of differences . . . is not in the end acceptable

to thought. It is of the very essence of thought to seek some ground for their union; and so long as no adequate ground is discoverable, intellectual dissatisfaction persists.¹

It might be of some value to review briefly Campbell's concept of judgment to clarify this notion of 'ground'. Any judgment, argues Campbell, is translatable with increased articulation of reference and meaning into, 'Reality is such that S is P'. Thus, the bare assertion that 'S is P' ignores the conditions under which alone it can be seen that this particular union is possible. Taken in the simple form, 'S is P', there is the assertion of a bare conjunction. Herein lies the essence of contradiction for Campbell. "Contradiction consists in uniting differences simply, in and as a bare conjunction."² In short, the judgment requires for its mediation a 'ground' which is not articulated.³

It might be argued against the view that contradiction consists of the bare conjunction of differences in thought, that the largest portion of everyday utterances are of this character, and they are not abhorrent to thought; for example, "the pot is round"; "the picture is brightly colored", and so on.⁴ Ordinary thinking then

1. OSG, p. 389.

2. Ibid.

3. This view of judgment and its relationship to a mediating 'ground' has been discussed in some detail in Ch. III of this dissertation. Cf. also SC, pp. 9ff.

4. Campbell makes note of this common sense objection in OSG, pp. 391-92, and SC, pp. 11ff.

seems to be perfectly satisfied with bare conjunctions of differentials and hence, the assertion that 'thought' rejects such assertions appears to be a phantasm of a false theory. To such an objection, Campbell would reply by distinguishing between thought functioning in relation to the practical problems of life, or uncritically, and thought functioning according to its own internal standards, or self-critically.

When we spoke . . . of thought rejecting 'bare conjunctions of differentials', it was, of course . . . , critical thought we had in mind, thought that is going about its proper business of seeking theoretical satisfaction.¹

Campbell seems to be on solid ground here, for it would seem that if we are going to discover thought's demand for a 'ground', it will have to be in circumstances where thought is most self-critical and most demanding of adherence to its own standards. Purely speculative interest is rare in man, but when it is present, then Campbell seems to be right in insisting that here we are more likely to discover the authentic character of thought's internal demands.

6. Thinking, in Principle, Incapable of Satisfactory Union of Differences

The sceptical ramifications of Campbell's analysis of non-contradiction are elicited most readily by con-

1. OSG, p. 391.

sidering whether thinking is ever able satisfactorily to unite differences. It has been noted above that metaphysics, for Campbell, is man's attempt to elucidate in thought the general character of reality. In the previous section, Campbell's argument that non-contradiction is the absolute standard of thought was elaborated, and it was discovered that thought cannot accept as true (and therefore real) anything which is self-contradictory. The intellect, according to Campbell's argument, will not accept as real any simple union of differentents. The implication of this position is that the only object which the intellect will accept as fully real and thus true, is a fully mediated whole, or a system whose 'ground' of union lies wholly internal to it. Such a unity is the inherent demand of the intellect; but can this demand ever be fully satisfied?

In order to understand Campbell's answer to this query, it is necessary to examine more precisely the character of the only kind of union of differentents which the intellect takes to be intelligible. As indicated above, this union takes the form of a fully mediated whole or system. Says Campbell:

So long as the diversities in question are thought of as self-contained units, thought recoils, and must recoil, from the declaration of their identity. But it is otherwise if the differences are conceived . . . as

diverse expressions of a system which is
a whole of mutually implicatory elements.¹

It is necessary to understand why system is able to unite differences in a manner satisfactory to the intellect. The foundation of Campbell's argument can be discovered by an examination of the relation between system and the "mutually implicatory elements" expressive of it. It is urged by Campbell that the different elements of the judgment are "mutually implicatory members" of a system; the judgment then asserts a connection relative to a system. Hence, the judgment, 'A is B', is not equivalent to 'A as such is B as such', but rather, that A and B are members, expressive of a system, X. Remarks Campbell:

It is the very mark of system that it expresses itself as A only in so far as it is also B (C,D, etc.) In such a whole, diversity, although a fact, is not a fact opposed to identity.²

In short, what Campbell is arguing here is that differences can come together only within a contextual whole whose fundamental characteristics are: (1) systematic unity expressed in, (2) differentiations. Thought, then, rejects de facto connections and strives for full mediation of the elements it conjoins. Can such complete mediation be realized by thought? Campbell believes not, and the rationale for this view must now engage our attention.

1. SC, p. 9.

2. Ibid.

The failure of thought to accomplish a satisfactory union of differentials is not merely a failure in degree; it is a failure in principle. It is paradoxical, argues Campbell, that the path which the mind takes, in keeping with its own internal standards, is one which, by its very nature, cannot lead to a satisfactory union of differences. What necessitates the affirmation of this paradox?

Here Campbell's argument is essentially the argument that Bradley uses in reaching his sceptical conclusion.¹ In summary, the thesis is as follows: Any 'ground' which the mind seeks to articulate (as system) is something which lies beyond (external to) the union of differences which it is to mediate. It cannot lie within the judgment itself, for in that case the judgment would be self-explanatory and would require no mediation. Yet, if the ground is external in any sense to the judgment it mediates, then it sets a new problem for thought; that being, how (and also why) does this 'ground' mediate? Is it self-explanatory? Commenting on the validity of this Bradleian argument, Campbell concludes:

If every ground for the union of differentials achieved by the intellect merely presents us, at a higher level, with differentials united without a ground, then Bradley would seem to

1. OSG, p. 393. Cf. also Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 321-23 and p. 559. See also Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 225ff.

be justified in his contention that the human mind is incompetent in principle to know the reality it seeks to know.¹

This indeed places man's efforts to know reality in a somber light. Man finds within his own mind a standard, viz., non-contradiction, which he must accept as the criterion of both truth and reality. Furthermore, man's intellect compels him to assert that reality is a fully mediated Whole, which is internally mediated through-and-through. In attempting to 'think' such a Whole, however, our minds posit a relational whole whose mediation falls, at least partially, external to the Whole or System. It is precisely at this point that Campbell parts company with Bradley; while Bradley finds, on these grounds, seemingly good reasons for talking about "degrees of truth and reality", Campbell argues that the failure of the intellect is not merely a failure in degree, but in principle. Campbell feels that

we are forced to recognize a radical discrepancy between, on the one hand, the kind of unity at which the intellect ideally aims, and which it can alone accept as giving us reality--viz. a unity in difference . . . and, on the other hand, the kind of unity which the intellect can alone achieve ²

This passage contains the rationale of Campbell's 'supra-rational' thesis regarding reality and also the basis of his distinction between phenomenal and noumenal truth. However, these elements in his metaphysics may be ap-

1. OSG, p. 395.

2. Ibid., pp. 395-96.

proached more obliquely and his reasoning further articulated by investigating his arguments against Bradley's notion of degrees of truth and reality.

7. Campbell's Rejection of Bradley's Doctrine of Degrees of Truth and Reality

i. Statement of Bradley's Doctrine

As has been pointed out, Campbell sets out from Bradleian epistemology in developing his constructive position. The fundamental departure from Bradleian principles occurs in Campbell's rejection of the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality. And entailed in this rejection is Campbell's thesis that reality is not "rationally continuous". Stated in a more positive fashion, the kernel of his 'supra-rational' thesis underlies his critique of Bradley's doctrine of degrees.

It is clear that Bradley's theory of degrees of truth and reality rests upon the view that Reality is a harmonious whole exhibiting the highest possible coherent unity.

We may say that everything which appears, is somehow real in such a way as to be self-consistent. The character of the real is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form The real is the individual It is one in the sense that its positive character embraces all differences in an inclusive harmony.¹

1. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 123.

Thinking, according to Bradley, is an attempt to 're-construct' the Infinite Whole by means of a fully systematic relational scheme. While this is the intrinsic aim of thought, in fact, the connections affirmed by thought are abstractions from the total context of reality and inevitably point beyond themselves for their own completion; that is, for their mediation. As a result, thinking is selective and, in one way, falsifies reality, for the connections it affirms take no explicit account of the 'background of reality' which is required to make the thought fully intelligible. Thus there is, in any judgment, an element of falsity, viz., it is not completely self-consistent.¹

However, while it is correct to say there is an element of falsity in all judgments, it is not the whole story. There is also an element of truth in all judgment, partial though it may be. More importantly, we have available to us a standard for ascertaining the degree of this truth. Bradley describes the standard as follows:

To be more or less true, and to be more or less real, is to be separated by an interval, smaller or greater, from all-inclusiveness or self-consistency. Of two given appearances

1. Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 329ff. See also Bradley's Appearance and Reality, Chapter XV.

the one more wide, or more harmonious, is more real.¹ [*Italics added.*]

This passage makes it quite clear that Bradley's underlying assumption (argued for on other grounds) is that reality is perfectly harmonious and perfectly self-consistent. Furthermore, our thinking, while separated by its very activity from reality, nevertheless employs in its own processes an absolute standard for assessing its partial failures and its partial successes. The partial falsity of a judgment lies in its abstraction from the total context of the Real. As a result, it is defective both in terms of its inclusiveness and its self-consistency. The partial truth of a judgment, on the other hand, rests in its measure of systematic coherence, in its ability to approach "nearer to a single, all-containing, individuality".²

The importance of this doctrine for Bradley's philosophy should not be underestimated. Indeed, a very strong case could be made that the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality constitutes the core of Bradley's philosophical efforts. Bradley himself remarks in the concluding chapter of Appearance and Reality:

The positive relation of every appearance as an adjective to Reality, and the pre-

1. Appearance and Reality, p. 322. See also Essays on Truth and Reality, Chapter VII.

2. Appearance and Reality, p. 323.

sence of Reality among its appearances in different degrees and with diverse values-- this double truth we have found to be the center of philosophy.¹ [*Italics added.*]

ii. Campbell's Critique of the Doctrine of Degrees

If Bradley's theory of degrees rests finally upon the postulate of the rational continuousness of Reality and the relation between thought and reality, then Campbell's critique, to succeed, must attack both of these foundations. Campbell is required to show:

(1) That Bradley's view of reality as rationally continuous is either false or inconsistent with Bradley's own principles; and (2) that Bradley's estimate of thought's absolute standard is inconsistent or incomplete. In fact, Campbell attempts to demonstrate that: (1) the doctrine of a rationally continuous Absolute is arrived at only because Bradley failed to draw out the obvious sceptical implications of his epistemology; and (2) Bradley's view of the relation between thought and reality rests upon an error in analysis, for Bradley's argument presupposes two standards of self-consistency which are never adequately distinguished.

(1) Campbell points out that it is essential to Bradley's view that he maintain that the manner of union of differences in reality be intrinsically different from

1. Ibid., p. 488.

the way in which the intellect brings together different in an ideal relational system.¹ This seeming paradox in Bradley's position to which Campbell directs attention is the fact that Bradley insists that the Whole is non-relational, while maintaining at the same time that the search for a more comprehensive and self-consistent relational system reveals this reality to us! In short, there seems to be, in principle, no continuity between the different stages of finite thought and the final consummation towards which thought is aiming. On this point, Campbell insists:

Since the 'pattern' of Reality is one to which thinking gets not one whit nearer, no matter how elaborately systematic its functioning, we seem bound to say that thought by the pursuit of its own characteristic method does not make the slightest advance towards the articulation of the true nature of Reality.²

That metaphysical scepticism is a direct corollary of this position cannot be denied. Reality and thought-seeking-to-know-reality are strictly incommensurate. Campbell believes that Bradley's epistemology necessitates (entails) this conclusion, even though Bradley does not assert it.

(2) If, then, reality is unknowable, it is apparent that to speak of measuring 'degrees' of truth and reality is, literally, to talk about the impossible. Yet Bradley believed such grading of degrees was a logical outcome of

1. Campbell, SC, p. 31.

2. Ibid., p. 20.

the fact that thinking employs the absolute principle of self-consistency in its operations.

Bradley argued that since Reality is self-consistent, and the intellect is capable of judging its products in terms of gradations of self-consistency, that the intellect's judging amounted to ascertaining degrees of truth and reality. Campbell endeavors to show that there are two different, though undistinguished, meanings of self-consistent in Bradley's argument.

The true self-consistency, that which applies to ultimate reality, Bradley has discovered to lie 'beyond any relational arrangement' (to use his own expression), and to be incapable of envisagement by the intellect. Obviously, then, the ideal of self-consistency which the intellect does admittedly employ in practice in grading judgments cannot be the 'pure' ideal.¹

Here Campbell points to the fact that the intellect cannot project, in principle, the kind of unity in difference which characterizes Reality. Indeed, the characteristic mode of operation of the intellect is to produce a 'relational' scheme and to employ a standard of evaluation relevant only to that kind of scheme. "What such a doctrine implies", argues Campbell, "is surely that the ideal as concretely operative in intellect appears in a bastard form".²

Campbell concludes that there are two ideals presupposed in Bradley's epistemology which Bradley never

1. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

2. Ibid., p. 32.

distinguished. Failure to distinguish these ideals led Bradley to posit the theory of degrees of truth and reality which, in fact, Campbell believes contradicts the basic sceptical thrust of his philosophy. The one ideal is that mode of self-consistency characteristic of Reality and which, on Bradley's own showing, cannot be grasped by finite intelligence. The second kind of ideal is that which is concretely operative in thinking, namely, rational coherence. Campbell calls these ideals the 'noumenal' and 'phenomenal' ideals and the analysis of these lead directly to his doctrine of "phenomenal and noumenal truth".

8. Campbell's Doctrine of Phenomenal and Noumenal Truth

Campbell has argued that the internal demands of the intellect for self-consistency, when properly understood, reveal the functioning of two fundamentally distinct ideals. These ideals are to be differentiated according to the kind of satisfaction which they afford the mind in its effort to apprehend a complete Unity-in-Difference. Are there significant epistemological implications which follow directly from this distinction? Campbell believes that there are.

We must go on to recognize that there is
 . . . a profound difference in epistemological
 status between the 'intellectual unsatis-
 factoriness' of connections which it is in
 principle possible for the intellect to correct,

and the 'intellectual unsatisfactoriness' of connections . . . where this is not possible in virtue of the fact that all finite thinking presupposes their acceptance.¹

In other words, some of the systematic relations affirmed by the intellect are amenable to correction or modification as the mind submits these relations to its operative standard--self-consistency or rational coherence. These connections are judged unsatisfactory by a standard of self-consistency which actually functions in finite thought. On the other hand, those connections pronounced 'unsatisfactory' because they appear not to be modifiable by the advance of knowledge, have been submitted to a standard of self-consistency which finite thinking in principle cannot attain. Thus, there would seem to be some connections affirmed by the intellect which are 'intellectually satisfying' according to one standard and 'intellectually unsatisfying' according to another. Campbell calls these 'phenomenal truths', indicating thereby that they are satisfactory with regard to the only standard of self-consistency concretely attainable by finite thought.

Phenomenal Truth is just another name for that which Truth concretely means for human beings. Philosophy itself (if I am right) can aim no higher than this.²

1. Campbell, OSG, pp. 399-400.

2. SC, p. 98.

There is another order of truth wherein the connections affirmed in judgment would be accepted for the reason that they were intrinsically satisfying, indeed, self-explanatory. This would be "noumenal truth", but

noumenal truth must remain for the intellect only an ideal, though it operates negatively upon the intellect in forcing the relegation of all that falls short of it to the realm of 'appearance'.¹

The crux of the distinction seems to lie in the fact that noumenal truth is not simply a higher order of truth; it is a different kind of truth. Commenting on this matter, Campbell says:

'Ideal' Truth cannot be said to be in any proper sense continuous with that Truth which has significance for the processes of finite thinking.²

Does this argument then lead to a bifurcation of truth into two radically separate realms? Campbell rejects a radical bifurcation, for he is convinced that there is an 'affinity' between the two kinds of truth. It is necessary for Campbell to argue for such an affinity, for otherwise he could not justify the use of the term 'truth' with regard to both of them. Since 'Ideal' truth cannot "in any sense" be said to be "continuous" with truth reached in finite thinking, it is not easy to see upon what rationale such an affinity can be based. The common basis, suggests Campbell, is dis-

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 400.

2. SC, p. 85.

covered in the process of inquiry itself, where the intellect seeks its satisfaction.

Furthermore, this affinity is not optional for man in the sense that it can be believed or can be disbelieved as he wishes. Campbell argues that it is an affinity which man must believe in if he is to think at all.

For it is surely by something we can only call 'an inward necessity of the mind' that our aspiration after intellectual satisfaction, after that non-contradictory union of differentials in which noumenal truth and reality consist, seeks its fulfilment in these progressively more coherent and comprehensive systems of terms in relation in which, in its degree, phenomenal truth consists.¹

Campbell's argument rests here upon a point he has argued with some vigor in another context,² viz., that our minds are so structured that the 'ideal' of noumenal truth leads us to pursue it along the road which can only yield phenomenal truth.

Campbell's conclusion then is that two standards of truth are operative in finite intelligence, and these yield correspondingly different kinds of truth. Noumenal truth is that which would absolutely satisfy the intellect,

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 401.

2. Cf. above.

and its test lies beyond the grasp of finite mind. The standard of noumenal truth functions negatively in finite thinking in that it provides a ground for rejecting any connection of differentials, apprehended concretely by thought, as being intrinsically self-explanatory. Phenomenal truth, on the other hand, has a concrete meaning for finite minds and a positive test can be applied to ascertain the degree of truth realized. Phenomenal truth, while not being (ultimately) intellectually satisfying may, nonetheless, be 'intellectually incorrigible'.¹ Campbell admits the possibility of what he terms 'Final phenomenal truths'.² In order to elucidate this last point, attention will now be given to the meaning and criterion of phenomenal truth.

9. Meaning and Criterion of Phenomenal Truth

If phenomenal truths are the highest truths accessible to the human mind, then philosophy's central effort should be directed towards discovering and articulating these truths. Thus, according to Campbell, in investigating the conditions of intellectual incorrigibility, we are, in fact,

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1. Bradley in Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 209, sets down a distinction very similar to Campbell's. Says Bradley, "It is one thing to say that there are truths which in and for my personal experience are fundamental and incorrigible, and it is another thing to assert that the same truths are infallible absolutely."
 2. Cf. OSG, p. 400, and SC, pp. 106ff.

examining the conditions of what may be called the 'final truths' accessible to man. If Campbell is correct in maintaining that 'Ideal' Truth is discontinuous with phenomenal truth, then it is possible that the meaning of Ideal truth, i.e., rational coherence, and the meaning of phenomenal truth, are quite different. This is, in fact, the conclusion for which Campbell presses. For concrete, human thought, truth means correspondence, because the finite mind is disbarred from Ideal truth. Says Campbell: "Phenomenal Truth means . . . the correspondence of our judgments with the objective reality about which we judge."¹ Thus, while admitting that correspondence is inadequate in defining the ultimate nature of truth, Campbell insists that correspondence is what truth means for the finite intellect in ordinary experience.

However, in order to test the correspondence of our judgments with objective reality, we must know something about objective reality. This might be thought to pose a fundamental problem for Campbell. A critic might urge upon him that this admission of positive knowledge of ultimate reality undercuts his sceptical conclusions respecting the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. If judgments are to be tested for their correspondence with ultimate reality, isn't a knowledge of reality implied in the testing? To this objection Campbell might reply

1. SC, p. 98.

in the following manner: (1) We do in fact know something about objective reality, viz., it must have the character of the non-contradictory. (2) This does not imply a knowledge of positive content, for it has been sufficiently argued that the intellect can give no positive meaning to a whole exhibiting the character of non-contradiction. (3) The non-contradictory functions only negatively with regard to that kind of connection which will ultimately satisfy the intellect, or to a whole whose connections are intrinsic and self-explanatory.¹

In any case, Campbell would insist that the line of argument suggested against his view is irrelevant with respect to the phenomenological point of view. He would point out that the mind does in fact attach positive meaning to the non-contradictory and that it must do so. This viewpoint, he would qualify by pointing out that the positive meaning attached to the non-contradictory by the mind is not ultimately defensible. Such positive meaning is the outcome of an "inward necessity of mind" to seek a fully coherent and systematic relational whole. Even though the mind proceeds in a seemingly self-stultifying manner, it can do no other.

Campbell concludes then that the operative test for phenomenal truth is rational coherence. The fact that

1. Ibid., pp. 91ff.

this test operates at the phenomenal level means that the intellect can attach meaning to it, although it does not mean that it finds it ultimately satisfying.¹ In practice, the more system and order the intellect gets into its experience by its judgments, the more truth the intellect affirms in the judgments. Thus, propositions introducing more systematic unity and comprehensiveness have greater 'degrees of certainty', if not greater degrees of truth.² Propositions are 'true', then, to the degree that they introduce order and coherence into the world of experience. However, since judgments are always 'about' reality, there is an ineradicable 'gap' between the ideal representations of reality and reality itself.

Rational coherence, however, is not the sole test of phenomenal truth. In some cases it can be supplemented by intuition. As indicated previously,³ Campbell contends that idealist epistemology emphasizes too strongly the modification of awareness by intellectual attention. First-person awareness, suggests Campbell, can issue in 'reflex' judgments concerning which we can be 'absolutely certain'.

1. As will be shown shortly, rational coherence, while the main test for phenomenal truth, is not the sole test.

2. Campbell, SC, p. 100.

3. Cf. Above, Chapter III.

It seems to me of the first importance to see that, with respect to subjective feelings, the person's feeling is the ultimate authority as to what is felt.¹

Hence, when a person is enjoying a certain felt state, it is idle to presuppose that philosophical discourse could persuade that person that the experience was not as he judged it to be. Thus, in the reflex judgment, for instance, "I am seeing red", the apprehending subject is the primary authority for the validity of the judgment. As Campbell puts it:

In short, we do have here in these judgments which report our own subjective sensations, assertions not legitimately modifiable by the progress of science, assertions which may, therefore, reasonably claim to be 'intellectually incorrigible'.²

In this passage, Campbell contends that there is a class of judgments whose 'intellectual incorrigibility' is immediately grasped. The connection asserted in the judgment carries its warrant with it. Reflex judgments differ from other judgments in a way which renders them exempt from the test of rational coherence. In a reflex judgment, there is, on Campbell's view, no interpretative activity, or no assertion of connections relative to a systematic whole comprised of propositions coherently structured and related. Campbell is emphatic in denying the presence of 'interpretative activity' by the mind in such judgments.

1. Campbell, SC, p. 102.

2. Ibid., p. 103.

So far as the 'reflex judgment' is concerned, there is no evidence of 'interpretation', and it is because there is no interpretation present that we find that the fuller development of the cognitive life brings with it not the faintest obligation to modify the assertion made in the reflex judgment.¹

In effect, Campbell is denying that there is any 'system' relative to the connections affirmed in the reflex judgment and providing, thereby, the ground for the connection. The central point of his argument is that this particular connection of differences is unmediated; that is, the ground of union is immediate. Self-awareness provides the ground for the connection asserted in the judgment. And regarding this grounding for the judgment, Campbell points out that "self-awareness is a ground which the mind must realize that it is absolutely meaningless to impugn".²

Campbell's reasoning on this point seems cogent, for it is difficult to see how one can say what the character of human experience is without in fact taking experience to be authoritative. To appeal to something apart from human experience as providing a more adequate description of what experience is, seems ridiculous in the extreme. It is almost like saying if you want to know what peppermint tastes like, don't taste it! Campbell concludes:

1. SC, p. 104.

2. Ibid., p. 105.

Any theory of Truth which cannot admit the intellectual incorrigibility of these reflex judgments stands . . . self-condemned. It will certainly not be able to produce any instance in which a judgment guaranteed by self-awareness suffers modification with advancing experience.¹

It should be clearly understood, however, that Campbell is arguing here for the intellectual incorrigibility of reflex judgments, not for their ultimate validity. He is not saying that they are intrinsically, intellectually satisfying. Immediate apprehensions have a brute quality which Campbell believes it is meaningless to impugn; but he doesn't believe that this makes them ultimately satisfying to the intellect. They are, to the intellect, sheer mystery, because they are irreducible facts for human experience. Such brute facts are intellectually satisfying only to the degree that we do not see how, under finite human conditions, we could ever transcend their claim without, at the same time, transcending our finitude. Since the mind does not have the power to transcend the deliverances of immediate experience (immediate apprehensions), it can take them as 'Final Phenomenal Truths'.²

10. Critical Evaluation of Campbell's Theory of Phenomenal and Noumenal Truth

The thesis which Campbell advances regarding two different orders of truth rests finally upon the accuracy

1. SC, p. 105.

2. Cf. ibid., pp. 107ff.

of his analysis of the two types of satisfaction operative in finite intelligence. If Campbell cannot sustain the argument that there are two standards of self-consistency operative in finite minds, then his distinction between phenomenal and noumenal truth is seriously impaired.

i. Campbell's View of the Idealist's
Conception of Truth Questioned

Campbell's view of the nature of truth can, in one sense, be regarded as a sustained attack upon the theory of truth defended by absolute idealism (especially Bradley's particular form of this doctrine). The central thesis that Campbell attacks is the idealist's view that reality is 'rationally continuous'. At the same time, Campbell admits a great indebtedness to idealist epistemology and indicates a rather substantial area of agreement with idealist theory.

I should agree with the contention of Idealism that the demand of the intellect for satisfaction is not to be met short of the whole, and that in the Whole the distinction of [sic] thought and Reality ceases to be. And there can be no particular objection to entitling this perfected attainment 'Ideal Truth'.¹

After indicating this area of agreement, Campbell would go on to urge that the finite intellect can attach no positive meaning to a Whole where the distinction between thought and Reality has ceased to exist. Since this "perfected attainment" is beyond the apprehension of the human mind,

1. SC, pp. 84-85.

'noumenal' or 'Ideal' truth represents a level of attainment which in principle the finite mind cannot accomplish. Thus, reality is 'beyond knowledge'.

It is not at all certain, however, that Campbell's description of the Idealist doctrine is accurate. Bradley, upon whose epistemology Campbell most heavily relies, would find certain difficulties in equating truth, ideal or otherwise, with "perfected attainment"; that is, with the Absolute.

There is a sense in which Bradley would agree that truth and Reality are identical.¹ Since Bradley's metaphysics is an attempt to account for every 'appearance' as being somehow an integrated aspect of an harmonious Absolute, it would contradict the very core of his philosophy to contend that truth remains 'outside' the Absolute. On the other hand, given his belief that no identity is possible without difference, then the union or identity of thought and Reality is not a bare identity: the identity is not expressible as a mere 'A is A'. On the relation of truth and Reality, Bradley has said:

Truth claimed identity with an individual and all-inclusive whole. But such a whole, when we examine it, we find itself to be the Universe and all reality. And when we had to see

1. This discussion of Bradley's view rests primarily upon Appearance and Reality, pp. 482ff, and Chapter V in Essays on Truth and Reality.

how truth fails, as truth, in attaining its own end, we were being shown the very features of difference between truth and reality. And in passing over into reality and in thus ceasing to be mere truth, truth does not pass beyond its own end nor does it fail to realize itself. Hence, being the same as reality, and at the same time different from reality, truth is thus able itself to apprehend its identity and difference.¹

The point of interest is that for Bradley, even 'absolute' truth has an element of one-sidedness in it which can be 'corrected' only by the transcendence of truth itself. It is misleading to call "perfected attainment" 'Ideal' Truth, for perfected attainment is equivalent to a stage of development where truth has ceased to be, and where the distinction essential to truth--between thought and reality--no longer holds.

"Perfected attainment" might be considered the 'ideal' of truth, but could not possibly be 'Ideal Truth'. Truth, in Bradley's epistemology, always contains an element of incompleteness, of contingency.

It might fairly be asked what relevance this digression has for Campbell's view of phenomenal and noumenal truth. It will be remembered that Campbell defined noumenal truth as that peculiar kind of 'unity-in-difference' which would ultimately satisfy the intellect and which is intrinsically self-explanatory. However, if Campbell means by noumenal truth the "perfected attainment" of thought, then clearly

1. Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 116.

our discussion has shown he is not talking about truth at all. To designate the 'unity-in-difference' which will ultimately satisfy the intellect as 'true', is to assert a simple identity between reality and truth. The assertion of this bare identity ignores the differences without which talk of truth becomes meaningless. Truth is always of reality, about reality, and unless the theory of truth takes account of this feature, it does not describe truth.

ii. Basis of Campbell's Scepticism Examined

Campbell's insistence that finite intellect is incapable of attaining noumenal truth is directly related to his metaphysical scepticism. The precise basis of this conception should be clearly explicated and examined. Is Campbell's scepticism a consequence of his belief that the intellect is finite? This question must receive some attention if the correct foundation of Campbell's scepticism is to be elucidated.

It might seem to a critic of Campbell's philosophy that his scepticism is a direct inference from his analysis of the finitude of the intellect. It might be supposed, for example, that Campbell's argument derives its force from the demonstration of the obvious fact of our ignorance, e.g., by gaining the admission of the theoretical possibility that our knowledge of reality

might be otherwise if only we were not so ignorant and limited. If this is Campbell's argument, then each predicate which is asserted of reality is subjected to the fundamental doubt that satisfaction with this predicate results merely from our inability (due to ignorance) to imagine other meaningful alternatives. Thus, to assert, 'Reality has the quality X', is satisfying only (this argument suggests) because we are incapable, due to our finitude, of imagining or conceiving other alternatives, e.g., D,E,F, and so on. The conclusion towards which this line of argumentation tends is that we cannot be satisfied with any predication of reality, for we must always admit the theoretical possibility of unknown alternatives which contradict our present predication. To deny the theoretical possibility of unknown alternatives is to assume something like omniscience, while to agree to this possibility is to vitiate every judgment about reality and to admit a fundamental doubt. The question then is: Does Campbell's sceptical conclusion regarding knowledge of ultimate reality rest upon this kind of argument? In short, does Campbell argue from the theoretical possibility of unknown, contradictory alternatives, to the unsatisfactoriness of all proposed judgments about reality?

It will be seen, of course, that this is a thoroughly vicious kind of scepticism. Its reasoning, while super-

ficially cogent, is, upon closer examination, found to be fundamentally irrational. It rests, in the final analysis, not upon any articulated or rational grounds, but upon sheer impotence. Consider, for example, the case where a person asserts that 'Reality is temporal'. When confronted with this argument, he is asked to admit the theoretical possibility of unknown alternatives, presumably holding true of reality, which contradict his present thesis. But, for the sake of argument, imagine that the person is unable to formulate in thought any alternative which contradicts his original thesis. The search for an alternative possibility ends then in the 'exhibition' of his impotence and finitude. This finitude is thus to serve as the basis of a sceptical conclusion regarding his original thesis. What has occurred in such a case is that blank ignorance has been placed in the house of knowledge. The sceptic has taken his stand upon his sheer incapacity to conceive of an alternative denying his thesis.

The point that is of interest here is that all scepticism which presumes to build on mere privation, rests finally either upon an irrational dogmatism or an unexplicated presumption of positive knowledge. The question that is of concern here is whether Campbell's argument appeals finally to our ignorance (privation) alone for its justification, or whether it rests upon some positive knowledge.

iii. The Concept of Negative Knowledge

The critic of Campbell could urge with some justice that neither alternative could be acceptable to Campbell. For, in the one case, his scepticism would be seen to be founded upon blank ignorance, while on the other hand, it would imply possession of a standard of positive knowledge by the mind. In the former instance, Campbell's scepticism would be revealed to be irrational and, in the latter, it would be shown not to be scepticism at all, for the admission of an absolute standard of knowledge implies that reality is not beyond knowledge.

Campbell would reply to this kind of criticism¹ by arguing that in order to assert that reality is beyond knowledge, it is not necessary to know positively what reality is. It is sufficient for the grounding of scepticism to know what reality is not. If reality, upon examination, cannot be qualified by the property 'X', and further inquiry reveals that finite minds must describe the real world in terms of 'X', then it follows logically, argues Campbell, that finite minds cannot apprehend the real world. Campbell has claimed that it is precisely this way with human knowledge. The analysis of non-contradiction reveals that reality cannot be relational, while the analysis of human thought reveals

1. See SC, pp. 76ff.

that we can only think of reality in terms of a relational system. Hence, reality cannot be 'known' by relational thought. There is knowledge of what reality is not, but no positive knowledge of what it is.

Yet it is clear even to Campbell¹ that this line of reasoning is not without difficulty, for it appears to be founded upon the possibility of merely negative knowledge. It has been a philosophical commonplace that 'every negative implies a positive', and it now falls upon Campbell to show how negative knowledge is possible without implying a positive knowledge of the real.

Campbell has argued that judgments require a 'ground' for their connection of differences, and this principle holds for negative judgments as well as for affirmative. Hence, the judgment, characteristic of Campbell's perspective, 'Reality is not relational', can be transformed into 'Reality is such that Reality is not relational'. A critic might urge against Campbell that the judgment excluding from reality the relational mode of being is justified by, indeed, rests upon, a positive knowledge of reality. Campbell, on the other hand, believes that no positive knowledge is implied as the ground of this negative judgment. His reasoning

1. Cf. SC, p. 76.

on this question must be examined in order to elucidate precisely what Campbell means by 'negative knowledge'.¹

The question is: Does the judgment, 'Reality is not relational', rest upon a positive knowledge of the character of reality? If Campbell is asked to supply the basis for this judgment he would reply by pointing out that 'reality is not self-contradictory', and the relational form, upon analysis, always reveals itself to be self-contradictory. It is apparent, however, that this reply only pushes the query one step further back, for the question must now be raised regarding the basis for the judgment, 'Reality is not self-contradictory'. But we reach here, maintains Campbell, a judgment which then "requires no ground, and which does not, accordingly, imply the recognition of positive content in the subject which the apprehension of a ground would entail".² The apprehension of the connection in this judgment is immediate and intuitive, urges Campbell, and is the pre-condition for all mediation. Viewed in this light, he suggests that it is absurd to ask for a ground.

Considering the question as to whether non-contradiction has a positive significance, Campbell insists:

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1. Campbell's explicit consideration of this objection is undertaken in SC, pp. 78ff. This summary draws heavily upon the reasoning developed there.
 2. SC, p. 79.

Only in a purely formal sense. Formally we can give positive expression to it, as the 'self-consistent', or as 'differences united in a way acceptable to the intellect'. But concretely we know only what is not self-consistent, differences united in a way not acceptable to the intellect.¹

This defence is, of course, perfectly consistent with Campbell's insistence that the noumenal ideal of self-consistency functions only negatively in disqualifying claims to ultimate knowledge.

It is necessary to examine in some detail the structure of Campbell's argument for negative knowledge. Symbolically represented, the argument goes something like this: 'A is not B', because 'A is not C', and 'not-C implies not-B'. Or, reality is not relational, because reality is not self-contradictory, and since relational thinking implies self-contradiction, it cannot give us the ultimate nature of reality. The validity of this argument depends in the final analysis upon 'not-C' being an exhaustive alternative. If 'not-C' is the only possible alternative, as Campbell argues that it is, then the conclusion that reality is non-relational is felt to be fully guaranteed.² Since Campbell

1. Ibid.

2. The structural similarity of this argument with a line of reasoning frequently occurring in Bradley's philosophy should be noted. Bradley maintains at certain crucial points in his metaphysics that what is possible and is seen to be necessary, is reality. Cf. Appearance and Reality, pp. 164, 177, 196, 212.

believes, on seemingly cogent grounds, that the principle of non-contradiction is apprehended immediately and intuitively, and indeed is a genuine synthetic a priori, then the judgment expressing this principle is unmediated. In short, it is self-evident to the intellect.¹

It might be of value to compare the structure of this argument with the argument from privation. In the argument from privation, the invalidity of the judgment, 'Reality is relational', is founded upon an alleged, but unformulated, theoretical possibility which negates the quality predicated of reality. The denial of the original assertion is made then to rest upon an impotence in our minds to formulate or conceive of a contradictory alternative, while all the time it is assumed (on no rational grounds) that it is theoretically possible to do so. Campbell's argument is clearly not structured in this manner. The impotence relevant to his argument is experienced as an inability, following upon careful reflection, in the face of 'not-C', to find a meaningful and intelligible alternative. The difference, in short, is that it is not a weakness in our minds (ignorance) which forces us to the conclusion 'not-C', but rather, it is 'not-C' which is the cause of our impotence, for it is an exhaustive alternative.

1. Cf. Campbell, Philosophical Quarterly, IX, No. 39, pp. 148ff.

iv. Critique of Campbell's View of
Negative Knowledge

An effort must be made to understand Campbell's claim that the ultimate standard of reality, the non-contradictory, has no 'positive significance' for human knowledge. The thesis set forth by Campbell is that the non-contradictory has positive significance only in a "purely formal sense". Further, he has maintained that we are able to know concretely only what is not self-consistent, what does not ultimately satisfy the intellect.

But what does Campbell mean when he insists that the non-contradictory has only "formal" significance? Does the criterion of non-contradiction yield only the formal structure of reality with none of the 'filling', or no content? In essence, this appears to be Campbell's meaning. The criterion available to finite intellect yields only the empty outline of the nature of reality. Any union of differentials discovered in experience, suggests Campbell, is judged to be unsatisfactory by the intrinsic demands of the intellect and hence, to be unreal.

When we ask what it is that the intellect wants, what is the positive meaning of the 'non-contradictory', we can find no answer in any actual experience, but only in the nature of the direction in which the intellect attempts to make progress.¹

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 79.

Thus, Campbell's scepticism bears only, it would seem, on the possibility of an apprehension by the intellect of the 'positive content' of Reality. But if this is the case, then it is not at all clear why he argues that Reality is, in principle, beyond our knowledge, for his claim upon closer analysis appears to be less extensive than this. He apparently claims only that the finite intellect cannot know the actual, concrete 'content' of Reality as a Whole; not that, in principle, it cannot know Reality at all. In short, his sceptical conclusions seem to extend no further than Bradley's for Bradley asserts that human minds cannot know in detail how Reality has the general character which our intellects tell us it must have.

Bradley argues that any finite appearance must undergo a certain amount of 'correction' and 'modification' if it is to take its place in the Absolute, and that the human intellect is ignorant as to 'how in detail' this transmutation takes place. Campbell, commenting on this point, urges:

The natural inference that the reader makes from this language is that we do know 'how in principle' finite objects are 'supplemented and re-arranged' so as to become fully self-consistent, then we must be supposed to know 'in principle' the character of Reality or the Absolute itself.¹

1. SC, p. 35.

Campbell proceeds to argue that a certain laxity in Bradley's language leads to this natural inference that we know 'in principle' how the Reality includes the diverse appearances. He points out that the correct contrast suggested by Bradley's thought is not between 'how in detail' and 'how in principle', but rather between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. How the appearances are transmuted we do not know, but that they are we do know. Once this contrast is explicated, Campbell feels that the difficulty apparently attaching to the view that Reality is beyond knowledge, is seen to disappear.

However, it is not self-evident that this distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' really rescues the sceptical conclusion. For it is quite possible that Campbell's admission--that the human mind 'knows that' Reality is of a certain character--undermines his judgment that Reality is beyond knowledge. This can be more easily seen if the following question is put to him: What feature of Reality is, in principle, beyond knowledge? From the foregoing analysis, it would seem that Campbell could only reply that the positive content, or the 'detail', of Reality is in principle beyond knowledge and not the general structure into which any detail must necessarily fall. Thus, if the general structure of

Reality is not beyond knowledge, then Reality, in a very significant sense, cannot be beyond knowledge.

But even beyond this "purely formal" knowledge, Campbell's argument appears to presuppose a knowledge of 'how in principle' the different imperfect unities proffered by the mind can be corrected in such a way as to be non-contradictory. The judgment, Campbell has maintained, unites differences by means of an unexplicated 'external' ground. The only kind of unity-of-differences which will satisfy the intellect is a union whose ground is 'internal', thus making the union intrinsically self-explanatory. But to adhere to this is surely to assert knowledge of 'how in principle' Reality is non-contradictory, for the failure of the intellect that is suggested by this analysis of the judgment is not 'how in principle', but 'how in detail'. In short, while the intellect does not apprehend what the positive content of a satisfactory unity-of-differences would be, it seems clear that it knows in principle what, in general, the positive character of such a unity is.

Campbell's sceptical conclusions appear to extend only to the possibility of framing a coherent and intellectually satisfying cosmological scheme. It is one thing to say that an adequate cosmological scheme is beyond our knowledge; it is quite another to say that Reality is beyond our knowledge. The subject-matter

of metaphysics is the general character of Reality by Campbell's own admission, and it is not evident that his arguments have demonstrated the impossibility of knowledge of this nature. To be sure, a complete metaphysics aims at an intelligible cosmological construction, but metaphysics might have a less ambitious aim (as indeed it does on Campbell's view), that is, the explication of the general structure of the Real. There seems to be a valid distinction between talk of failure of the first order--that is, in building a comprehensive cosmology--and failure of the second order--that is, in apprehending and articulating the general nature of the Real. The intellect's inability to accomplish the former does not necessarily make defective an effort of the latter kind.

Another line of reasoning would appear to be fatal to Campbell's thesis that Reality is beyond knowledge. Campbell has admitted that what ultimately satisfies the intellect is Reality. Even if it is granted that complete satisfaction and hence, complete knowledge is beyond the grasp of the finite mind, it seems imperative that he admit degrees of satisfaction of the intellect. While he would urge that these degrees of self-consistency attained are of the 'bastard form'--that is, relational--he is driven by his own theory of cognition and formulation of the metaphysical criterion to admit degrees of intellectual satisfaction. The nature of this satisfaction,

admittedly, is not complete, but this is irrelevant, for if the intellect can be satisfied to degrees, then it follows necessarily that the degree of satisfaction is directly relevant to the degree of Reality attained by the intellect. Campbell is forced either to a complete scepticism which is self-defeating or to the recognition that there are gradations of knowledge of the Real. Complete scepticism defeats itself in its own claim, while any other alternative asserts positive knowledge of the Real.

There is no escape from this dilemma along the path of affirming a merely negative knowledge, for our previous discussion has shown that this avenue necessitates the admission of a positive knowledge, if even in a purely formal sense. Any negative judgment satisfies to the degree that it is comprehensive and self-consistent and thereby exhibits the general character of the Real. Insofar as the judgment satisfies, it does in fact more nearly approximate the general character of Reality. Hence, it would not be wrong to say that to that degree it is true and more Real than a judgment of lesser comprehensiveness and self-consistency. But if this is the case, then the doctrine of degrees of Truth and Reality is shown to be vindicated.

Finally, and most important, is it accurate to say that two kinds of satisfaction function in the intel-

lect? Campbell's argument attempting to exhibit two modes of self-consistency seems defective, for he is unable to describe in any concrete, experiential terms the character of the satisfaction relevant to the noumenal ideal. What satisfies the intellect is not a unity-in-difference which is non-relational, for Campbell has shown that the intellect can give no positive character to such a unity.

What satisfies the intellect is perfect rational coherence, and so long as this is lacking in the object it deals with, then it remains unsatisfied. It knows of no other kind of satisfaction beyond the intrinsic demand for perfectly rational system. Relatively coherent systems of knowledge are judged incomplete by the intellect not because of the operation of some noumenal ideal. Indeed, the judgment of incomplete coherence in a relational system can be founded only upon the specific character and nature of the relational system.

Campbell discovers that noumenal truth is not possible because he imagines a peculiar kind of satisfaction of the intellect which differs in kind from rational coherence. He is able to sustain his sceptical conclusion only on the basis of this noumenal ideal, while he repeatedly admits that the only operative standard for the intellect is a self-consistency of the kind which seeks rational coherence in a relational system. The failure

in Campbell's analysis comes precisely here. Intellect is unsatisfied not because, as Campbell says, it operates according to a standard which in principle it cannot satisfy, but rather because it cannot attain a perfect system of the relational sort without passing beyond itself. The point of central significance is that the intellect judges its attainments of 'perfect system' by its own standards of comprehensiveness and self-consistency. There is no noumenal type of satisfaction operating in a negative fashion only, for when the intellect rejects a connection of differentials as being unsatisfactory, it does so on the grounds of their inconsistency as conjoined at this mere point. In short, the operative standard is rational coherence.

v. Critical Evaluation of Intuition as Criterion of Phenomenal Truth

Intuition, or immediate apprehension, is suggested by Campbell as a criterion for certain 'intellectually incorrigible' judgments and, thus, as a source for 'final phenomenal truths'. The belief that reflex judgments, in which immediate experiences are reported, are intellectually incorrigible seems inconsistent with other principles of Campbell's epistemology. The case for the incorrigibility of these judgments rests upon the view that in reflex judgments there is no modification by the intellect forming them. Their immunity from the

modifying activity of intellect rests in turn upon Campbell's belief that 'system' does not impregnate and inform these judgments. The ground of union in the judgments is intuitive (immediate) and hence, cannot be meaningfully impugned.

Campbell's belief that reflex judgments are unmodified by intellectual activity and, hence, uninformed by a 'system of relations', seems plainly to be in conflict with other assertions in his epistemology. For example:

The cognitive process would be self-stultifying if the character of the object which we seek to know were affected by the process of knowing it.¹

Unless and until an experience involves apprehension of something as characterizing the objective reality, it cannot have the status of a 'cognition'.²

Our interest in judging is normally focused upon some aspect of Reality which has already been partially characterized through past judgments, and which it is the business of the present judgment to characterize further.³

In the light of these passages, it would seem that Campbell must alter the claim that reflex judgments are pure reports of subjective experiences, unaltered by the activity of the intellect. If reflex judgments are cognitive in nature, then it would appear that on Campbell's own showing

1. OSG, p. 64.

2. Ibid., p. 43.

3. Ibid., p. 55.

they cannot report with absolute certainty the character of our immediate experience.

However, Campbell would urge, as against the foregoing consideration, the alleged fact that with reflex judgments there is not the slightest tendency for the mind to modify them due to the advance of knowledge. If, for example, a person judges 'I believe that I see green', the advance of knowledge might lead the person to doubt whether it was actually green that he saw, but it could never lead him to feel that his state wasn't one of belief. But if advancing experience results in not the slightest tendency to alter the reflex judgment, it seems appropriate to call such judgments intellectually incorrigible. Closer attention to this claim of 'intellectual incorrigibility of reflex judgments' is called for.

It should be noted that Campbell is not claiming for reflex judgments that they are free from all chance of error. This claim is more extensive than the claim for intellectual incorrigibility, and the former is easily shown to be defective. The proponent of the view that independent facts are revealed in and through reflex judgments is faced with the problem of producing such facts. If he takes as instances of his doctrine simple unrelated feelings or sensations, he has certainly produced instances free of error. However, by discovering

an experience free from error, he has descended below the level of any fact or truth which might be of cognitive significance to the person. This is demonstrated quite clearly by asking the defender of this view: "What, on the basis of this ultimate fact, are you able to deny?" The only thing that can be denied is that this or that particular feeling or experience exists. Atomic experiences, whether they be sensations or feelings, are creatures of defective theory, and upon analysis reveal themselves to be vicious abstractions. For the kind of particular fact which Campbell is concerned to defend as intellectually incorrigible, an advance must be made to the level of judgment, e.g., 'I am here and now feeling a certain kind of physical pain'. Campbell's position is not that such judgments are free from error, but that they are intellectually incorrigible. He admits that they are fallible from the standpoint of the noumenal ideal. As brute facts they constitute a mystery and hence, can never ultimately satisfy the intellect. On the other hand, to the only standard concretely operative in the intellect, they are incorrigible, for the ground of their union is immediate, not mediated.

But are reflex judgments immediate? Surely not, for they clearly occur within the intellectual order of a mind and depend finally upon that order for their intelligibility. Examine the judgment, 'I am here and

now having a certain pain'. In the first place, the pain is referred to a self, 'I', which has a certain order of temporal existence and hence, memory is involved.¹ Beyond this fact, reference in the judgment to 'here' and 'now' places the event in a certain context, the order of which necessarily infects the judgment itself.

Campbell's mistake appears to lie in the confusion of two kinds of infallibility; that a person's immediate feelings and sensations are not corrigible is due to the fact that it is impossible for the human mind to deny its immediate experience. What is sensed is sensed and what is felt is felt. So much is agreed. However, it is not evident that this same infallibility carries over into the reflex judgment that describes or expresses this feeling. The introduction of such terms as 'I', 'here', 'now', 'pain', and so on, seems to indicate that the immediate feeling now expressed in the form of a judgment has been interpreted within the context of a certain intellectual order.

What is Campbell seeking to preserve in maintaining that reflex judgments are guaranteed by immediate apprehension and thus are intellectually incorrigible?

1. The argument developed here depends largely upon a line of reasoning developed by Bradley in Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 204ff.

Philosophical construction begins with 'my' world and 'my' experience, and apart from this foundation the quest for knowledge would not originate. It is to this 'evidential ground' that intellect returns again and again to gain new material for analysis and to confirm old judgments. In practice, then, Campbell is perfectly right in pointing out that most judgments describing subjective states are, in fact, not corrected by advance of experience. The principle underlying this correction is relatively clear. If the intellect admits a radical and ungrounded doubt of such immediate 'facts', then it admits, in principle, the possibility of such an extreme modification of 'my' world that to call the remainder 'my' world is indeed not possible. To argue that the advance of knowledge could so alter the world of immediate experience is to introduce chaos (utter disorder) into 'my' world. It is likely that this kind of consideration leads Campbell to reject the possibility of reflex judgments suffering modification with the progress of knowledge.

The point which must not be overlooked is that, in principle, every reflex judgment is fallible. They are fallible not by reason of the fact that they ultimately fail to satisfy the intellect (as judged by the noumenal ideal). They are fallible insofar as they fail to make

'my' world of experience more systematic and, thus, more ordered. Apparently there are 'facts' which are never corrected by the advance of experience, but analysis of such 'facts' reveals not that they are, in principle, incorrigible but rather, that they contribute positively to the intelligible order of experience.¹ To give up such facts would be to introduce disorder into experience and hence, the intellect rejects such revision. The result suggested by this discussion is that reflex judgments are to be considered stable only to the degree that they contribute to the intellectual order of 'my' world.

This discussion suggests that an important distinction must be made between 'facts' (elements of immediate experience) which are foundational for 'my' world, and these same 'facts' described or expressed in judgments which are then taken to be intellectually incorrigible. It is conceivable that certain reflex judgments are at present so fundamental and incorrigible for me that to seriously modify or alter them would entail the destruction of my personal identity. On the other hand, it is conceivable and even probable that with the advance of experience and knowledge, and an alteration of the intellectual context in which such judgments occur, it would

1. The felt unconditionality of the experience of moral obligation and the ineradicable belief in contra-causal freedom might be instances of such 'facts'.

seem absolutely necessary to alter such judgments. And, further, it is at least thinkable that apart from an explicit modification, such judgments might appear as sheer errors.

It seems necessary, then, to distinguish between the incorrigibility of our immediate feelings and the fallibility of all judgments which report that experience. Campbell's claim that immediate apprehension is a foundation which it is meaningless for the intellect to impugn is correct only with regard to the deliverances of immediate experience; that is, experience as it is lived through or enjoyed. Once judgment has entered in, even if it be reflex judgment, it is incorrect to assert that intelligible order (system) does not impregnate and, thus, inform the judgment.

CHAPTER VIII

CAMPBELL'S METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Importance of the Affinity between Phenomenal and Noumenal Truth

The final test of that which is ultimately real is the non-contradictory. Anything which does not have this character, on Campbell's view, cannot be called real in the full metaphysical sense of that word. Campbell has argued that there is an affinity between

that perfect unity in difference which must characterize reality . . . and the most comprehensive and coherent, but . . . imperfect, unities actually attainable under the conditions of finite experience.¹

The factor most crucial to this affinity is that the intellect in seeking a unity in difference which will ultimately satisfy, takes a path that leads progressively to more coherent and comprehensive relational schemes, but not to perfect or noumenal truth. Furthermore, this affinity, urges Campbell, is something in which man must believe if he is to think about his world at all.

Because of this affinity, it is meaningful to speak of concepts as having final phenomenal truth, or as being "symbolic representations" of the ultimate reality.²

1. OSG, p. 403.

2. See ibid., p. 404.

It is necessary to examine this concept of "symbolic representation" more carefully to discover what importance it has for Campbell's final metaphysical view. If rational concepts can have either symbolic or literal significance, it is important for the understanding of Campbell's final view to know precisely what is meant by a 'symbol' and how its validity is judged. Having exposed the nature of symbol and its criteria of validity, we shall then proceed to examine some of the fundamental notions of Campbell's metaphysics with a view to ascertaining whether they have "symbolic validity" only or whether they have "literal significance".

2. Campbell's View of Symbols

A symbol, according to Campbell, is "anything that is mentally accepted as standing for something other than itself".¹ Since many different kinds of things fall under this general definition, it is necessary to note certain distinctions which appear germane to Campbell's view.

The first distinction which Campbell designates is that between "conventional" and "natural" symbols.² The 'conventional' symbol derives its character primarily from the public agreement to accept it as standing for something or other. It is perhaps the most typical kind of symbol. A 'natural' symbol, on the other hand,

1. Ibid., p. 349.

2. Ibid.

is conceived by Campbell to be that kind of object which stands for something else, not by virtue of public agreement, but because of certain intrinsic qualities which make it especially conducive to symbolizing an object. The distinction is, of course, not a sharp one and is intended simply to suggest that some symbols derive their symbolic character from a more or less formal, public sanction, while others seem intrinsically to be striking manifestations of something else. A natural symbol can become a conventional symbol if it acquires the appropriate sanction of the general public agreement.

A more important distinction that Campbell insists upon is that between 'analogical' and 'arbitrary' symbols. A symbol is considered to be 'arbitrary' if there is nothing intrinsic to its nature which tends to point to its symbolizandum. Examples of such arbitrary symbols are the English letters used in algebraic equations. The letter 'y' in an algebraic equation might be intended to stand for an unknown quantity, but there is nothing intrinsic to the letter 'y' that suggests this quantity. An 'analogical' symbol, on the other hand, is something quite different for Campbell.

We may call a symbol 'analogical' . . . if there is some recognized identity of character between symbol and symbolizandum, in virtue of which the symbol has an intrinsic tendency to suggest to the mind what is to be symbolized.¹

1. OSG, p. 350.

An 'analogical' symbol then is a natural symbol with the distinguishing mark of an alleged identity of character between the symbol and the symbolizandum.

The fact that the human mind finds it useful to work with symbols suggests that the manipulation of symbols is often simpler than dealing directly with the symbolized. The reason for this is probably that symbols usually have reference to highly complicated and abstract objects. In some instances, the use of symbols is a kind of mental shorthand, and in using them the mind avoids what would otherwise be very intricate and time-consuming intellectual operations. In such instances, the use of symbols is a labor saving device and, in principle, it is possible for the intellect to grasp the thing being symbolized by an involved operation. However, as Campbell notes, "sometimes . . . the nature of the symbolizandum is such that it cannot be grasped conceptually".¹ An illustration of this latter possibility is a work of art where the object symbolized does not admit of conceptual grasp. If it sometimes occurs that the mind cannot apprehend conceptually the object symbolized, then the recognized ground of identity of character between symbol and symbolizandum is not intellectually discernible. "It must be," says Campbell, "a felt identity, not a conceived identity."²

1. Ibid., p. 351.

2. Ibid.

3. The Problem of Symbolic Validity

The most important question regarding symbols is their validity in standing for their symbolizanda. Each symbol, for the person holding it, is believed to be actually indicative of the object symbolized. But, as Campbell notes, symbols viewed in this manner have only personal or subjective validity. They are guaranteed simply by virtue of the fact that some person believes they are genuinely valid for the symbolizanda. The more important question for philosophy is whether symbols have objective validity; that is, whether they hold good for all minds necessarily. Commenting on this question, Campbell says:

In order to be able to accept it [symbol of Supreme Being] as a valid symbol . . . religion would rightly insist that its identity with God be shown to be not a 'subjective' identity conditioned by the particular circumstances of particular individuals, but an identity that is in some intelligible sense objective or necessary. It must be a symbol that is valid not just for some minds, but for mind.¹

This question amounts to asking whether there are symbols which the mind feels itself forced to assert as genuinely indicative of the character of symbolizanda. Campbell seems to believe that there are such "rational concepts" or symbols to which the mind is forced by a kind of inner necessity. The validity of such symbols

1. OSG, p. 353.

is attested to not by personal choice or history, but rather "by the very constitution of the human mind".¹

Of greatest interest with respect to the affinity between symbol and what is symbolized is that this affinity is of the same character as that between phenomenal and noumenal truth! In each instance, the mind proceeds by a kind of inner necessity to affirm the connection between, in the one case, the symbol and the symbolizandum; and, in the other, between the path of advancement which thought must take, though it be imperfect, and that which will ultimately satisfy the intellect. The complete picture that unfolds is that man appears to be separated by an intellectually impassable gap from Reality, while at the same time he feels himself forced to accept as valid certain 'rational concepts' or symbols, as genuinely representing objective reality.

4. The General Character of Reality: Unity, Infinity, and Eternity

It is Campbell's belief that certain general characteristics of reality follow as a direct implication from the nature of the metaphysical criterion. If the intellect can only accept as real that unity in difference

1. Ibid., p. 355. Campbell neglects to note that this compulsion to accept the validity of the symbol seems a-logical if not irrational.

which is not self-contradictory, then no bare conjunction of differents can be real. In short, there cannot be a plurality of independent reals. The assumption that there exists a plurality of independent reals cannot be thought out consistently, for this assumption implies thinking the bare union of differents, and this is the essence of self-contradiction. "If the real is non-contradictory, reality must be one."¹

Once the unity of reality is granted, Campbell argues that its infinity follows by a direct deduction.² The argument stated in its simplest form is as follows: Anything finite ex hypothesi, is limited by the 'outside', the 'other'; if reality is one (as argued above), there is no 'outside', no 'other' to limit it; therefore, reality must be complete; hence, it must be infinite.

The eternity of reality follows directly from the analysis of two propositions.³ 1) Reality cannot be in time; 2) Time must be a facet of the real. With respect to (1), an infinite reality could not be in time, for time would be something apart from reality, and that was found to be self-contradictory (according to the argument for unity and infinity). Regarding

1. OSG, p. 405.

2. Cf. ibid.

3. Cf. ibid.

(2), time must be a part of reality, for otherwise it would be something 'apart' from reality and that was also shown to be impossible if reality is one and infinite. As Campbell expresses this point:

If reality is not itself in time, and yet time is somehow in it, it follows that reality transcends and yet includes time; and what transcends and yet includes time, can, I think, fairly be called 'eternal'.¹

These general characteristics (unity, infinity, and eternity) of reality are direct implications, Campbell argues, of accepting the metaphysical criterion. The question arises, however, respecting their significance in representing the Ultimately Real. Are these literal attributes of reality, or do they have only symbolic truth? Campbell appears to be on 'the horns of a dilemma' here. He describes the situation thus:

If we say they are literally true, we seem to contradict our own contention that ultimate reality transcends all possible concepts. If we say that they are only symbolically true, this is hard to reconcile with our having apparently deduced them as straight implications of the principle that reality is non-contradictory--which principle we are presumably accepting as not merely symbolically but literally true.²

Campbell escapes from this dilemma by going 'between the horns'; that is, by showing that the two alternatives are not exhaustive. He suggests that the propositions

1. Ibid., p. 405.

2. Ibid., p. 406.

predicating unity, infinity, and eternity to reality are extremely complex and cannot be taken as entirely affirmative or negative in character. In fact, he argues, there is an element of affirmation and negation in each judgment.

In each we intend to deny something of the real, and we also intend to affirm of it some positive content. What I suggest is that these propositions are literally true in respect of what they deny, and only symbolically true in respect of what they affirm.¹

To illustrate, Campbell analyzes the proposition affirming the unity of reality. He alleges that when we judge reality to be a unity, we are also denying that reality is a plurality of independent reals. This denial is, according to Campbell, literally true, for the proposition that reality is a plurality of independent reals has been shown to be literally false; that is, self-contradictory. However, the affirmation of the unity of reality is only symbolically true, for the intellect is, in principle, disbarred from thinking of a unity-in-difference that is of a positive character. There is, in short, a radical kind of discontinuity between the kind of unity that is thinkable, and the kind of unity possessed by reality. A thinkable unity is a union-of-differences by means of an 'external' ground, while a

1. Ibid.

real unity is "a unity which comprises all plurality within itself".¹

Thus, Campbell concludes that the unity we affirm of the real has only symbolic significance. Because of the affinity between phenomenal and noumenal truth, we are led to feel that the highest possible unity attainable by finite (phenomenal) thinking is symbolic of the complete and perfect unity of ultimate reality. The apprehended identity between the symbol, unity, and the object symbolized, perfect unity (reality), is not guaranteed by conceptual apprehension, but rather by what Campbell calls the "felt identity".

The situation is the same with regard to the propositions attributing infinitude and eternity to the ultimate reality. As Campbell insists: "They have literal truth in respect of what they negate, viz. limitation from without and duration in time."² Since the finite intellect cannot attach positive significance to a Being absolutely free from external limitation and to a Being which transcends, but includes, time, the attribution of these qualities to reality is symbolic only. Campbell sums up his view of these general characteristics of reality thus:

The ultimate reality of metaphysics is a being that transcends all conception, and yet can in a legitimate, though qualified,

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 406.

2. Ibid., p. 407.

sense be characterized as one, infinite,
and eternal.¹

If reality transcends all conception, as this passage asserts, it is reasonable to ask what precisely Campbell means by "transcends". His insistence that reality is 'beyond knowledge' is another way in which he has said the same thing. Is this statement symbolically true or literally true? If it is judged to be symbolically true, upon what reasoning is it so judged? It would appear that the only ground for its symbolic truth is the statement itself. However, if Campbell is to sustain his sceptical conclusion, he must argue that this statement is not merely symbolically true, but that it is literally true. On the other hand, if reality is literally beyond knowledge, then Campbell is affirming in this judgment that something, namely knowledge, lies outside of reality. But this notion he has argued is self-contradictory, for it is literally a proposition which the intellect cannot think. Hence, if Campbell says that reality "transcends" knowledge, he seems bound to admit that reality also includes knowledge. If this admission is made, and it seems clear that it must, then to assert the judgment that reality is beyond knowledge, in any literal sense, is self-contradictory. It has been urged at several points in the text that Campbell fails to give adequate attention to

1. Ibid.

the fact that knowledge must somehow take its place within the identity of the whole. If this must occur, then there is apparently some sense in which reality and knowledge are identical and, hence, the categorial judgment, 'reality is beyond knowledge', taken literally, is simply false. Yet the statement can be taken as symbolic, it would seem, only on the presumption of its literal truth!

5. The Supreme Being of Metaphysics as Spirit or Mind¹

We come now to a consideration of the metaphysical status of selfhood. Is the self, for Campbell, an adequate metaphysical principle of explanation? If so, in what sense is selfhood representative of the total reality? Is it literally representative of the real, or does it have only symbolic truth? Campbell has defined the self as substantival, in some sense of that word, and our concern now is to ascertain whether he believes that the substantival self gives us a literal 'clue' to the ultimate nature of reality.

Once again, the doctrine of the affinity between phenomenal and noumenal truth is crucial. If Campbell is correct in insisting that the intellect must accept the highest conceivable types of unity accessible to it, as

1. Campbell uses 'self', 'spirit', and 'mind' interchangeably in discussing this matter.

symbolic of ultimate reality, then there is good reason to believe that spirit or mind is an exemplification of the highest form of unity accessible to man. The two criteria in terms of which unities are judged as manifesting degrees of perfect unity are internal coherence and comprehensiveness.

To Campbell's mind there are no unities which can seriously rival the mind in their capacity to integrate a broad range of different elements, or in their mode of internal union, exhibit the internal coherence of a mind. Campbell's thesis can perhaps be best illustrated by comparing the unity, characteristic of a mind, with the unity characteristic of a biological organism.¹ The mind as a unity-of-differences is able to incorporate a greater range of diverse elements than a biological organism. Campbell notes:

There is indeed, in principle, no assignable limit to the mind's comprehensiveness. There is nothing in the whole world of space and time that cannot in principle be incorporated in the form of ideas into the living texture of the mind and constitute differences within its unity.²

It is true that a biological organism can appropriate to itself a large portion of its immediate environment, but since it is a physical system, it is possible to assign certain

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1. Such a comparison is used by Campbell to illustrate the superiority of mind as a symbol of reality to any other form of unity. Cf. OSG, pp. 408ff.
 2. Ibid., p. 408.

limits to its ability to 'take in' its surrounding world. If ultimate reality is a unity which includes (in some sense) all possible differences, then it would seem that mind or spirit more nearly approximates that kind of unity and hence constitutes a better symbol for it.

Campbell cogently points out that it is in respect to its internal coherence that the biological organism most nearly approximates the unity characteristic of mind.

There is a genuine sense in which the unity of the organism may be said to constitute its own differences. Everything that the organism receives from without and incorporates into its unity suffers 'a sea-change' [sic.].¹

A biological organism absorbs elements of its surrounding world into its unity, and these elements are so transformed and integrated as to subserve the organic whole. Parts within the biological organic whole become literally 'functions' of that organism.

What is true of the internal coherence of the biological organism is even more true of the mind. Campbell contends that "nothing can enter the mind from without, but only as subjected to a transforming and integrating activity from within".² The fundamental difference that he sees between mind and biological organism is that mind exercises a degree of control over what differences are introduced within the greater unity. The organism re-

1. Ibid., p. 409.

2. Ibid.

mains, to a fundamental degree, dependent upon merely external forces for the differences that affect it. Campbell's reasoning is that the biological organism can be 'forced' to integrate certain differences, as in the case of forced feeding.

But for the mind forcible feeding is strictly an impossibility. The degree of pressure brought to bear upon a mind to accept certain content may be very great indeed, but in principle it is free to reject or to accept whatever is offered it.¹

However, the validity of this reasoning seems to be somewhat weakened by recent studies of psychological warfare, where brain washing is discussed. It is not at all clear that the mind is, as Campbell puts it, free, in principle, to admit content as it deems fit. Subtle pressures on, and stimulation of, the mind can go a long way towards determining precisely what content the mind will incorporate as part of its unity. The fundamental point of distinction between a mind and a biological organism, from the standpoint of their unities, is the range of difference that can be integrated. The mind's activity can, to some degree, determine what content it will admit and integrate, but perhaps it is wise not to make too much of this latter point, for there appears to be definite limits with regard to it. Whether the mind has a greater range of freedom in pursuing

1. Campbell, OSG, p. 409.

its own ends (content) than the biological organism, presents a problem which we cannot enter upon here.

Campbell's conclusion is:

In so far, then, as the unity of the ultimate reality of metaphysics is a unity in differences, a unity of which the differences are its self-manifestations, it would appear . . . that it is the unity of a mind that is by far our best symbol.¹

However, according to Campbell, it is only a symbol. From whatever frame of reference the self is viewed, it will be seen always to involve in its very nature a necessary reference to something beyond itself. Thus, Campbell argues that "mind falls short not merely in degree but in principle of that perfect unity in difference that characterizes the ultimate being".² In the first place, it does not have the comprehensiveness that a perfect unity-in-difference has. The mind can incorporate into its unity an almost unlimited range of ideal determinations of space and time. But, as Campbell notes, "the ultimate being . . . must somehow incorporate space and time themselves within its unity".³ In the second place, when judged from the standpoint of internal coherence, mind falls short of perfect unity. While it is true that the mind, for the most part, is able to determine what differences will be

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 410.

3. Ibid.

incorporated within its unity (and thus is constitutive of its differences to a certain extent), a perfect unity would be the sole and sufficient cause of its differences. In a perfect unity-in-difference, "the differences must spring wholly from its own nature".¹ Since the mind or self is necessarily limited by an 'other', as substantiated by a careful analysis of thought and will,² then it cannot attain a level of internal coherence commensurate with a perfect unity-in-difference.

Is it not possible to think of reality as 'spirit' if we suppose that the differences of finite spirit are 'modified' or 'corrected' (that is, made perfect) in the Supreme Being? Is it not conceivable that a spirit which fully achieved its own ideal would become or be both 'perfect in wisdom' and could will in harmony with its perfect wisdom?³ In other words, can we not conceive of an 'Infinite Spirit' by imaginatively perfecting those facets of the finite mind's nature which limit it? Campbell would agree that we could imagine the transcendence of the finite self, for he admits that we can consider the purely formal characteristics of the transcendent Being.

1. OSG, p. 410.

2. Cf. ibid. See also Chapter XV in OSG and Chapters IV, V above.

3. Campbell considers this possibility and rejects it. Cf. ibid., p. 411.

In such a being, there would remain no aspect of opposition and otherness. However, Campbell would reject the inclination to call this ultimate being an 'Infinite Self', for with the transcendence of those characteristics constitutive of selfhood (limitation from without and incompleteness), we have reached a kind of being where the attribute 'spirit' or 'self' is meaningless.

6. The Self as a Final Phenomenal Truth

While the self is not an ultimate reality on Campbell's view, it is as much of a reality as is accessible to man. The self, viewed as an active center of experience is an intellectually incorrigible fact. The apprehension of the self qua active center is a final phenomenal truth. To be sure, it does not satisfy the intellect's demand for a perfect unity-in-difference, but Campbell believes that no advance in knowledge could modify its finality for the human mind.

Why, it might be asked, is the self qua active center of experience taken to be an ultimate phenomenal truth? The reply that Campbell would make to this query is that the knowledge which pertains to the self in its character as active center of experience is different in principle from ordinary self-knowledge. 'Self-knowledge', in the fullest sense of that term, is reached by a progression of mediate inferences and is fundamentally con-

ditioned by an 'outside' [our cognitive contact with the total environment]. As our knowledge expands and our experience broadens, the self 'suffers' innumerable revisions in its character as a 'system' which integrates differentials. The 'self-knowledge' that is relevant to the self as active center of experience is of a different nature urges Campbell.

This knowledge . . . is not achieved through mediate processes, but given in direct or immediate awareness. And because this kind of self-knowledge is thus immediate, and in consequence free from the conditions which impose the necessity of subsequent modification, the 'self' which is apprehended in this self-knowledge can, indeed must, be accepted as an ultimate (phenomenal) reality.¹

The immediate apprehension which Campbell has reference to in this passage seems to be the 'feeling' of activity characterized earlier as self-activity proper.²

1. Campbell, SC, p. 181.

2. Campbell qualifies this passage significantly in SC, p. 181, First Footnote: "I am not suggesting . . . that we can apprehend bare 'activity' in and by itself. What we apprehend is always a determinate self 'active' in a determinate objective situation." It should be noted, however, that the claim made in this passage is intrinsically different than in the passage quoted in the text above. Campbell here seems to be claiming an immediate apprehension of a determinate, 'active' self. It is one thing to grant to Campbell the validity of the assertion that we immediately apprehend a 'feeling' of activity. It is quite different to admit an immediate apprehension of a determinate self. The latter might be a correct interpretation of the former, but it is an interpretation. In short, it is an inference from 'felt activity' and, hence, does not appear to be a straightforward immediate intuition of a 'determinate self'.

Campbell concludes that the finite self in its character as 'active center' is an ultimate (though phenomenal) reality. There is then an important sense in which we can say that the finite self has ultimate reality. It is an ultimate reality which is accessible to man, even if it is not the ultimate reality. Since Campbell believes that the primary function of constructive philosophy is the articulation of final phenomenal truths, the recognition of the certainty of the self in this sense is not an unimportant issue for his inquiry.

7. The Relationship between the Supreme Being of Metaphysics and Finite Selves

An effort will be made in this section to explicate Campbell's conclusions regarding the relationship between Ultimate Reality and finite centers of experience. At the outset, Campbell admits that "metaphysical argument per se can tell us nothing" about the specific relationship in question.¹ However, metaphysical argument can be informative regarding the most general requirements of the relationship. Since Ultimate Reality is a unity which is constitutive of all of its differentiations, finite selves must be in some way manifestations of the overall unity; that is, they must be 'differences' which are somehow included within the total reality.²

1. OSG, p. 412.

2. Ibid.

Since the manner of union of selves with Ultimate Reality is beyond the comprehension of finite minds, just how finite selves are comprised in the totality is not specified; indeed, cannot be specified. It is for this reason that metaphysical argument can contribute nothing, by itself, to the question of the specific relationship.

This impasse is overcome, according to Campbell, by supplementing the metaphysical argument with insights gained from the moral argument. In the chapter where we considered Campbell's view of moral obligation, we discovered that he believes there is good evidence that an objective moral order is ingredient in the nature of reality.¹ When this insight is seen in the perspective afforded by the metaphysical argument, viz. that reality is a unity, infinite, and eternal, then Campbell believes we can do no

other than take this supreme being to be the source of, and thus the imponent of, that moral law which all rational beings recognize as unconditionally binding upon them.²

From this suggestion, important implications respecting the relationship between finite selves and ultimate reality appear reasonable.

If the supreme being of metaphysics must be viewed as the source (in Campbell's words, the "Author") of the moral order and of finite selves, the relationships in-

1. Cf. Above, Chapter VI.

2. OSG, p. 412.

volved are seen to be very complex. A moral order unconditionally binding upon finite selves is meaningless if those selves do not exercise a certain measure of free control over their lives. Yet, man is a dependent being. For Campbell, the problem is: How are we to interpret man's dependence upon Ultimate Reality in such a way that man's freedom (which is required by an objective moral order) is preserved? Campbell attempts to solve this difficulty in the following manner:

There would seem to be only one way in which we can think a relationship of this kind, and that is as a relationship of creature to creator, where the creator has endowed the creature with 'free will'.¹

Campbell proceeds by describing the essential characteristics of the creature-creator relationship.

If a being owes its whole existence to another being, and to nothing else besides--and that is of the essence of the creaturely status--it can fairly be said to be in a relation of absolute dependence upon that second being. And if we suppose this created being to have had free will conferred upon it by its creator, it can fairly be said to stand in a relation of genuine independence of its creator at the same time as it is absolutely dependent upon him.²

Campbell is quick to remind us that the metaphysical argument yields no information, in any sense, regarding this kind of relationship between finite selves and the supreme being. It is only when the metaphysical argument is brought

1. Ibid., p. 413.

2. Ibid.

into conjunction with the moral argument that the creature-creator relationship is seen to be a "reasonable inference".¹

Campbell next considers the problem of the status of the propositions asserting the creature-creator relationship. Do they have symbolic validity only, or can they be taken as having literal significance? He believes that the latter position is correct. The reasoning is as follows: (1) The principles from which this relationship are deduced, the metaphysical and moral, are literally true; (2) since the moral order is an objective reality, its precondition is a free moral agent; (3) since reality is non-contradictory, everything that is, is dependent absolutely upon the one reality; and (4) these arguments in conjunction yield as direct deductions the reasonable inference of a creature-creator relationship.²

That this position is not without its difficulties, Campbell is quick to admit. He recognizes the fact that the view that the moral argument and the metaphysical argument have literal truth seems to be a flat contradiction. Why does Campbell believe that "there is a fundamental difficulty in admitting the literal significance of both" of these arguments?³

Both the moral consciousness and the theoretic consciousness are intrinsic to man's nature, and both make

1. OSG, p. 413.

2. Ibid., p. 414.

3. Cf. ibid., pp. 415ff.

significant claims about the nature of Ultimate Reality. A constructive philosophy is bound to admit these claims with all of their implications. The fundamental claim of the moral consciousness is that there is a moral law unconditionally binding upon man, and that this law is itself an objective reality. The central claim of the theoretic consciousness is that reality is non-contradictory, and this implies, as we have just seen, that reality is one, infinite, and eternal. The difficulty that Campbell sees is the problem of how these two claims are to be reconciled. If a moral order is objectively real, this entails certain important things about reality. These implications are described by Campbell in the following manner:

The moral law's reality plainly implies the reality of moral agents upon whom it is binding, and implies, accordingly, the reality of finite beings living in a temporal order--since only a temporally ordered world can provide a possible milieu for moral endeavor.¹

The problem is, as Campbell sees it, how we can consistently maintain the reality of a temporally ordered world of finite agents, while admitting that reality is one, infinite, and eternal.

There is, to Campbell's mind, only one avenue of escape from this dilemma. The theory of creation must be taken

1. Ibid., p. 415.

as providing the answer. Argues Campbell:

If the relationship of the finite temporal order, which the moral life presupposes, to the infinite and eternal being is interpreted as that of created being to its creator, the finite temporal order will have a reality of its own, even though the only ultimate reality is the infinite and eternal being.¹

The implications of the concept of creation are twofold, urges Campbell: (1) Relatively independent creatures, e.g., temporal order and finite selves; and (2) dependence upon the creator. Campbell is emphatic in his denial that the creation is "a phase or mode of its creator's being".²

While the creation is not the ultimate reality, it has a reality of its own in relative independence from the creator. Even though it depends absolutely on a being beyond itself for its existence, the creation is not

a mere appearance of the ultimate reality, something which on a fuller understanding of it would lose its essential character as finite temporal being.³

The hypothesis of creation, Campbell admits, is a mystery, but he insists it is not, self-evidently, a self-contradiction. Furthermore, when the claims of the moral consciousness, with their full implications, are considered in conjunction with the metaphysical argument, the hypothesis of creation is seen to be a reasonable inference and literally true of ultimate reality.

1. OSG, pp. 415-16.

2. Ibid., p. 416.

3. Ibid.

8. Campbell's View of Creation Evaluated

The doctrine of creation that Campbell defends is not only a mystery; it does not appear to be supported by certain aspects of his own philosophy. In the first place, it is inconsistent with the basic principles of his epistemological analysis. For example, the claim made by Campbell that creation is not "a mere appearance of the ultimate reality, something which on a fuller understanding of it would lose its essential character as finite temporal being",¹ is incomprehensible given his fundamental metaphysical scepticism. Upon what epistemological grounds, positive or otherwise, can this statement be supported?² If reality is 'beyond knowledge', as Campbell insists that it is, why does he claim in this passage a positive, infallible knowledge of the "essential character" of finite creation? How can he be metaphysically certain that "on a fuller understanding" this creation would not be corrected or modified in its intrinsic character?³ If Campbell is certain of the foregoing facts, then his claim not, in principle, or in detail, to know ultimate reality is flatly

1. Ibid.

2. The argument cannot be supported by 'self-activity', for the certainty of this 'activity' is phenomenological only. Campbell admits that the final metaphysical importance of 'self-activity' cannot be known.
3. The question of metaphysical certainty must be distinguished from the question of phenomenal certainty.

contradicted. To grasp this fact, it is only necessary to see that Campbell is claiming that no possible advance in knowledge could alter the intellect's grasp of the "essential" nature of creation. But is it not clear that the only possible grounds for this judgment is an absolute knowledge of reality, not only in principle, but also in detail!

Secondly, the doctrine of creation defended by Campbell is a metaphysical concept and must submit itself with regard to its adequacy to the metaphysical criterion. By Campbell's own admission, the real is the non-contradictory. Hence, if he is to sustain the argument that the concept of creation is not self-contradictory, he must show how it is possible for something to be absolutely dependent upon something else (as creation is upon the Supreme Being) and yet, at the same time, relatively independent of that Supreme Being. Campbell would argue that how this is possible is indeed a mystery, but it is not self-contradictory. It should be noted that Campbell has not simply asserted this theory of creation as a mystery; that is, as incomprehensible to the intellect. He has urged that it has literal truth. But if it has literal truth, then, ex hypothesi, it is not self-contradictory and the question is, what reasoning warrants this conclusion? The only possible reasoning that could support this conclusion is a knowledge of the

positive character of the non-contradictory, and this Campbell has insisted is not, in principle, possible for the finite mind.

What, in fact, do the concepts 'relatively independent' and 'absolutely dependent' mean in describing the relationship between a finite temporal order and an infinite reality? If we construct a judgment which expresses these attributes and then describe the finite temporal order, we get the following judgment: 'The finite temporal order is both absolutely dependent and relatively independent.' On the surface, this judgment appears to assert that 'A is both B and is not-B, at the same time and in the same relation'. According to Campbell's analysis this is the essence of contradiction, for the judgment asserts and annuls in the same act. Is there any escape for him by way of an appeal to the judgment theory of cognition? Campbell might argue that the judgment 'a finite temporal order is both absolutely dependent and relatively independent' can be transformed into 'Reality is such that a finite temporal order is both absolutely dependent and relatively independent'. Careful analysis of this latter judgment apparently shows that the judgment means that reality is such that it is self-contradictory.

It might appear that there is an avenue of escape from this dilemma for Campbell by attempting to circumscribe more

precisely the import of the terms 'relatively independent' and 'absolute dependence'. For example, Campbell might argue that the finite self, with regard to the structure of its being, is absolutely dependent upon the Supreme Being, while with regard to the use it makes of its faculties, for instance, free will, it is relatively independent of the Supreme Being. Given the doctrine of creation, this would entail the creation by the Supreme Being of a power or force of will which could function independently of Him, though not necessarily in complete independence of created circumstances. Campbell could argue further that this act of creation by the Supreme Being of a force, external to His own control, is to be viewed as an act of 'self-limitation'. Construing the notions in this manner, the apparent self-contradiction is seen to disappear. The finite self is relatively independent to the degree that it has the faculty of free will and absolutely dependent with regard to its being.

On this reading of the situation, the free will of finite selves functions within a created order which conditions it, but still has a measure of complete independence, for instance, in its capacity to exert or withhold 'effortful activity'. Does this not imply that the finite self is, to a degree, discontinuous with the Supreme Being? Only an affirmative reply seems possible. Yet this

admission seems fatal to Campbell's contention that ultimate reality is a unity, for it is logically possible on this view of the finite self's freedom to suppose that the self could 'create' a difference which could not be incorporated into a larger totality. And if a difference is 'created' by a finite self that absolutely resists incorporation into the ultimate unity-in-difference, then the ultimate reality is not infinite, but is literally limited by an 'outside' (Note: not by a self-limitation).

This would entail the literal truth of the proposition that a plurality of independent reals exist. Since Campbell has argued that this is not thinkable, we must assume either that this alternative is not possible, or that reality is self-contradictory. Since the latter alternative is not thinkable, then we must suppose that it is not possible for a finite self to 'create' by use of its freedom a difference that could not be included within the larger unity. Yet, to assert the independence, to even the slightest degree, of free creativity, is necessarily to lend credence to this possibility. If the free act is to any degree discontinuous with the 'Will' of the Supreme Being, then the products of a free act logically can be discontinuous. Therefore, the possibility is shown to be real, even if it cannot be thought.

Campbell might seek to escape this dilemma by asserting that the Supreme Being structures the free will

and the order in which the free will operates in such a way as to guarantee that the products of finite freedom will be amenable to inclusion within the total unity. This avenue of escape is intelligible, but necessitates giving up the view that finite freedom is 'relatively independent' of the Supreme Being, for the free act becomes in this instance little more than the self-manifestation of the total unity. We can only conclude then that the term 'relatively independent' in the context of Campbell's philosophy leads to many paradoxes and puzzles.

Thirdly, even if the doctrine of creation defended by Campbell were consistent with his epistemological principles, it still would rest upon a defective inference. The concept of creation, Campbell has argued, is a direct implication from two doctrines that are literally true: (1) Reality is non-contradictory; and (2) the Moral Order is objectively real. The conjunction of these two arguments leads to the reasonable inference that the relationship between finite selves and the Supreme Being of metaphysics is a creature-creator relationship. Yet one of the propositions supposedly entailing this relationship is reached by a defective inference.¹ The argument that moral consciousness presents man with an unconditional sense of obligation has been examined in some detail earlier. On the basis of this

1. Cf. Above, Chapter VI.

unconditional sense of moral obligation, Campbell has inferred the validity of an objective moral order. This inference has been shown to be inconsistent with the principles of his epistemology.¹ Thus, one of the foundational propositions upon which his argument or inference to creation rests, appears subject to a rather serious doubt. Without the literal truth of this principle, the argument for creation in Campbell's philosophy is seriously impaired, if not utterly destroyed.

1. Cf. Above, Chapter V.

CONCLUSIONS

The central problem of this dissertation has been an investigation of the adequacy of the concept of selfhood as the metaphysical principle of explanation. This problem has been approached through a critical study of the concept of 'substantial self' in the philosophy of Charles Arthur Campbell. In the conclusions which follow, the principal discoveries and unresolved questions of the dissertation will be summarized.

1. Campbell argues that introspection yields significant evidence regarding the nature of the self. As he defines it, introspection is discursive activity and is an act of analytic attention which isolates certain distinguishable aspects of current, lived experience for special articulation and elucidation. The 'object' of introspective analysis is a past state of experience, re-lived in the present through memory. Campbell urges that the re-lived state of experience is an exact reproduction of the past state of lived experience.

We have contended that introspective activity does not have as its 'object' a re-lived and exact reproduction of a past state. The temporal interval between the past lived

experience and the initiation of introspective activity provides sufficient grounds for affirming that certainty, regarding exact reproduction, is, in principle, impossible.

However, Campbell seems to be correct in insisting that there is some warrant for believing that introspective judgments can give us vital data regarding our inner life. While Campbell appears to believe that introspection can issue in reflex judgments which are intellectually incorrigible, it seems more probable that all judgments, including reflex judgments, are, in principle, fallible. We have argued that reflex judgments are amenable to correction by the advance of experience and knowledge.¹ We have suggested that certain 'facts' of immediate experience might be foundational for our world in that they contribute positively to the order of our experience. The main criticism of Campbell, in this respect, seems to be that he has not made the distinction between psychological certainty and epistemological certainty with sufficient clarity.

Campbell does not believe that introspection gives us knowledge of the total self, and in this judgment he seems to be absolutely correct. Introspective examination

1. In a recent letter (August 3, 1962), Campbell has granted the major import of this criticism. Says Campbell: "I think you may well be right about the fallibility in principle of retrospection."

of lived states of experience enables us to make warranted assertions about the pervasive features of experience, for instance, cognition, conation, volition, and so on. Introspection, then, while not giving us direct knowledge of the total self, does provide valuable evidence for conclusions about the nature of the self.

2. All cognition involves judgment, and judgment involves the predication of an ideal content to reality. Hence, Campbell argues that the 'ultimate' subject of every judgment is reality and each judgment ideally qualifies reality. Any judgment can be transformed, without loss of meaning, into the form: 'Reality is such that S is P'. The judgment depends upon unexplicated conditions for its full mediation. We have accepted the judgment theory as the correct model for cognition.

The judgment theory has important implications for selfhood. Campbell notes three distinguishable 'elements' in cognition: (1) the cognized, or the object 'known'; (2) the cognizing, or the psychological operation of knowing; and (3) the cognizing subject, or the knower. Campbell maintains that the subject involved in cognition is distinguishable, though not separable, from the activity of cognizing.

3. The facts of memory and the apprehension of temporal succession imply as their necessary condition an abiding

self. Since a knower is a necessary condition for remembering, comparing, and relating, Campbell argues that the self is 'over and above' its particular experiences. The self is something which has, rather than is, its experiences. The term 'substantival' is attributable to the self because the self seems to be: (1) A continuant; (2) a trans-temporal unity; and (3) a unity manifested in differences.

The principal difficulty in this view of the self lies in understanding the relationship between the 'object' self--the empirical or manifested self--and the 'subject' self--the transcendental self. This relationship, Campbell defines as one of 'ownership', but he has merely named the mystery; he has not made it intelligible. While Campbell believes this relationship has the warrant of immediate experience, we have argued that it is reached mediately.

It has been argued, as against Campbell's view, that he mistakes the necessity for a formal unity for the necessity for a substantial unity. Furthermore, the relationship between a transcendental unity and its temporal manifestations introduces serious problems.

It would appear that the only way in which Campbell's view of the self can be made wholly intelligible, is by interpreting the self as an ideal construction. Campbell's formal arguments for self-identity do not require positing an enduring, substantival entity but rather

seem to require that we think of the self, or consider the self, as having a formal identity. The reason that Campbell's unified self transcends all particular manifestations is that it seems to be an ideal construct, rather than being a concrete, existent substance.

4. Campbell's distinction between self-identity and personal identity is an important and sound distinction. It is supported by his doctrine of free will which he bases upon the phenomenology of self-activity in the modes of 'moral decision' and 'effort of will'. If this distinction is ignored in any constructive attempt to investigate the nature of selfhood, many unnecessary and spurious problems are likely to arise.

Campbell's distinction between 'activities within the self' and 'self-activity proper' appears to rest upon cogent phenomenological analysis. The question of whether our theoretical consciousness must give way to our practical consciousness in cases of conflicting judgments (as Campbell insists it must) can only be adequately dealt with in relation to the final metaphysical criterion.

5. It has been urged by Campbell that the experience of moral obligation is a complex experience involving both judgment and moral feeling. This 'double-aspect' view of moral obligation seems unimpeachable.

However, Campbell's inference from the fact of moral judgment to an objective moral order seems defective for two reasons: (1) The structure of the argument sustaining the inference tends to prove the objectivity of any possible order; and (2) the inference is made to rest upon the judgment theory of cognition while not being wholly consistent with the implications of that theory, namely the inability of the intellect to attain any positive knowledge of reality.

6. Campbell's metaphysical scepticism rests upon the central tenet of Bradley's epistemology, that reality is beyond knowledge. While accepting Bradley's view that non-contradiction is the metaphysical criterion, Campbell contends that the intellect can attain no ultimately satisfying union of differences. The kind of unity which the intellect takes to be intelligible is a unity that is fully mediated and self-explanatory. The inherent demand of thought, however, leads the intellect to a relational unity or system, the connections of which are mediated externally. Thus, the failure of thought to accomplish a satisfactory union of differents is not merely a failure in degree; it is a failure in principle. In short, according to Campbell, there is, in principle, no continuity between the different stages of intelligibility accomplished by finite thought and the final consummation towards which thought is aiming. Reality is unknowable.

This metaphysical scepticism is mitigated in two significant ways in Campbell's philosophy. (1) Campbell believes we can discern two distinct ideals operative in the intellect which are differentiated according to the kind of satisfaction they afford the intellect. These ideals in turn imply two distinct kinds of truth. Noumenal truth is that which would absolutely satisfy the intellect, and its test lies beyond the grasp of finite mind. The standard of noumenal truth functions only negatively in finite thinking. Phenomenal truth has a concrete meaning for finite intellect, and a positive test can be applied to ascertain the degree of phenomenal truth realized. Phenomenal truth, while not being 'ultimately' satisfying to the intellect may, nonetheless, be intellectually incorrigible. There is an affinity between these two kinds of truths discoverable in the process of inquiry itself. (2) While arguing for the possibility of merely negative knowledge, Campbell admits that the principle of non-contradiction does have positive significance, though only in a purely formal sense. Concretely we know only what is not self-consistent; what is not acceptable to the intellect.

Regarding the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal truth, we have argued that the implications of the judgment theory of cognition seem to require that Campbell claim positive metaphysical knowledge at some point. His admission that the criterion of non-contradiction

has positive formal significance seems to undercut his judgment that reality is, in principle, beyond knowledge. We have argued that Campbell's scepticism extends no further than Bradley's, namely, that reality, in its detail, is beyond knowledge.

Furthermore, we have questioned Campbell's contention that there are two ideals of truth operative in finite intelligence. We have suggested that the only operative standard is the demand for rational coherence exhibited in an ideal relational system.

7. It is Campbell's contention that the affinity between phenomenal and noumenal truth lends plausibility to thinking of certain concepts as "symbolic representations" of ultimate reality. The most important question regarding symbols is their validity in standing for their symbolizanda. Campbell believes that there are some "rational concepts" or symbols which the mind is forced to recognize as valid by a kind of inner necessity of mind.

The question as to whether the self is an adequate metaphysical principle of explanation takes the form in Campbell's thought: Is selfhood literally representative of the real, or does it have only symbolic truth? Campbell maintains that there are cogent reasons for believing that selfhood is an exemplification of the highest form of unity accessible to man. In terms of the capacity of the self to

integrate a broad range of different elements, and in terms of the mode of internal union of the different elements, the self approximates the unity of ultimate reality more nearly than any other union of differences.

However, while the unity of mind is the best symbol for the ultimate unity of reality, it is only a symbol. The self is not a literal representation of reality, for from whatever frame of reference the self is viewed, it will be seen always to involve in its very nature a necessary reference to something beyond itself. It falls short of being a literal representation of the ultimate unity both in comprehensiveness and internal coherence.¹

While insisting that the self is a 'clue' to the nature of ultimate reality, Campbell rejects as unwarranted the view that, from this 'symbolic truth', we can infer that the Ultimate Metaphysical Being is an 'Infinite Self'. Campbell would agree that we could imagine the transcendence of the finite self, namely, by imagining the perfection of those facets of the finite self's nature which limit it. However, Campbell would deny that the Being arrived at by such an imaginative, ideal construction was an 'Infinite Self'. He argues that with the transcendence of those characteristics foundational for Selfhood (limitation from without and incompleteness), we have reached a kind

1. Cf. above, Chapter VIII.

of Being where the attribute 'selfhood' is not meaningful. We have found this line of argument to be sound and perfectly consistent with Campbell's metaphysical criterion.

8. According to Campbell, metaphysical argument alone can contribute nothing to the question of the specific relationship between finite selves and ultimate reality. The impasse is overcome, in Campbell's view, by supplementing the metaphysical argument with insights gained from the moral argument. Campbell has argued that a moral order is ingredient in the nature of things. He believes that the Supreme Being of metaphysics must be viewed as the 'Author' of the moral order and of finite selves. Since a precondition of an objective moral order is a certain measure of freedom in the activities of finite selves, finite selves must be viewed as relatively independent of the Supreme Being. At the same time, the finite self is not causi sui, therefore it must depend upon ultimate reality for its continued existence as an active center of experience. The only plausible way of resolving the problem of viewing man as both relatively independent of and dependent upon ultimate reality is to conceive of the relationship between these two orders of being as creator to creature. This relationship, Campbell argues, has literal truth because it rests upon two other assertions

about reality which have literal truth, viz. reality is non-contradictory, and the moral order is an objective reality. These two literal truths in conjunction yield, as a direct deduction, the reasonable inference of a creator-creature relationship.

We have contended that Campbell's doctrine of creation is not supported by certain other aspects of his philosophy. Firstly, it has been argued that the doctrine of creation is inconsistent with his epistemological analysis. The claim that the creator-creature relationship is a literal truth seems to be a departure from his metaphysical scepticism in that it implies a knowledge of the essential character of finite creation. Such a positive knowledge Campbell has continually rejected as impossible. Secondly, the doctrine of creation seems to violate the metaphysical criterion. In Campbell's view, the real is the non-contradictory. Can Campbell show that what creation implies, the judgment that a finite self (and world) exists relatively independent, and, at the same time, absolutely dependent, is not self-contradictory? We have argued that he cannot demonstrate this to be a self-consistent possibility, because the judgment is a flat contradiction! Thirdly, even if he granted that creation per se was not self-contradictory on Campbell's own grounds, it would still rest upon a 'literal truth' reached by a defective argument. We have argued that the proposition that 'a moral order is an objective reality'

is arrived at only by means of a curious argument, which would tend to 'prove' the objective reality of any possible order of being!¹

9. Campbell's acceptance of the fundamental principles of Bradley's epistemology (the theory of the judgment and the principle of non-contradiction) are the bases of his "supra-rational" metaphysics. Evidence gained in the phenomenological analysis of self-activity and its modes tends to support this "supra-rational" thesis.

The principal tension in Campbell's philosophy is the result of his dual commitment to the vital importance of the evidence yielded by phenomenological analysis, and the evidence gained from the analysis of Bradleian epistemological principles. The implications of the judgment theory and the principle of non-contradiction lead Campbell towards a metaphysical monism, a supra-rational Absolute. The data yielded by his phenomenological analysis, while lending support to the supra-rational thesis, do not appear to be uniformly consistent with metaphysical monism. The phenomenological analysis of self-activity leads Campbell to a libertarian position with regard to free will, and the analysis of moral obligation to the inference that an objective moral order is ingredient in reality. This latter conclusion, in turn, lends credibility to the view that the relation-

1. Cf. above, Chapter VI.

ship between the Ultimate Being of metaphysics and finite spirits is that of creator to creature. Thus the evidence of the phenomenological analysis, in conjunction with the evidence of the metaphysical analysis, issue in Campbell's doctrine of supra-rational theism.

Since reality is not rationally continuous (a doctrine supported by both phenomenological and metaphysical investigation), Campbell does not feel obliged to show how certain discoveries of his phenomenology (e.g., contra-causal freedom) are intelligible in the sense of exhibiting their coherence with other facets of his constructive view (e.g., the Supra-Rational Absolute). Thus, he is able to say, in cases where the deliverances of practical consciousness (phenomenology) conflict with the demands of theoretical consciousness, that it is so much the worse for theory!

Yet this tension threatens to rend his constructive philosophy asunder. On the basis of his phenomenological analysis, he finds himself defending certain 'facts' which he maintains are "intellectually incorrigible", while the judgment theory seems to entail the conclusion that, in principle, all 'facts' are fallible and amenable to development and 'correction'. Practical certainty oftentimes appears to be purchased at the price of inconsistency with the implications of the judgment theory.

In his conception of the 'substantial' self this tension reveals itself in the relationship Campbell affirms between the transcendental self and its manifestations. The relationship of "ownership", Campbell argues, is a direct deliverance of immediate experience, while it would appear that it is an interpreted datum and hence, mediated. Campbell seems content to rest with the mystery of the relationship of "ownership", while the implicit demand of the intellect is for intelligibility regarding this relationship. In this situation, Campbell as much as says "so much the worst for theory; some facts (phenomenological) must be final and not amenable to intelligible elucidation". But this is equivalent to 'waving a red flag' at the intellect, which Campbell admits must seek its own peculiar kind of satisfaction.

10. At least two fundamental problems arise out of this investigation and, in remaining unresolved, provide impetus for further inquiry. The first problem relates to the evidential value of phenomenological data in dialectical tension with a model of cognition which demands intelligibility in the form of a rationally coherent system. Or, phrased in a slightly different manner, what is the cognitive importance of a given in experience, and does such a given supersede the claims of theory? The second problem is the problem of the

epistemological and metaphysical foundations for
scepticism. Can a constructive philosophy proceed
from a basis of Ultimate Doubts?

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THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF IN THE
METAPHYSICS OF
CHARLES ARTHUR CAMPBELL

Abstract of a Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

BOSTON UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

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The purpose of this dissertation is an exposition and critical analysis of the concept of 'substantial' self in the philosophy of Charles Arthur Campbell.

Campbell contends that the self is known only inferentially, as a necessary precondition for the experiences of cognition, succession in time, and memory. The self is not reducible to its experiences, but is something 'over and above' its empirical manifestations. The manifested self is distinguishable from the subject self not simply in the analysis of the experiences of cognition, succession in time, and memory, but also by the self's immediate apprehension of creative transcendence of 'formed character' in 'self-activity proper'.

For Campbell, the self has 'phenomenal' reality insofar as it is an intellectually incorrigible notion. The criteria of phenomenal truths are rational coherence and immediate apprehension. The self as an active center of experience is a 'final phenomenal truth'; but if taken as a literal representation of reality, the notion of the self is not 'intellectually satisfying'; that is, it falls short of being that perfect unity-in-difference which the intellect demands of any metaphysical principle.

Ultimate reality, for Campbell, is, in principle, 'beyond knowledge'. However, certain concepts, such as unity, infinity, eternity, selfhood, are valid symbols

of the ultimate unity-in-difference because of the affinity between phenomenal and noumenal truth.

As a result of his analysis of moral experience and his characterization of the metaphysical criterion, Campbell holds that 'God' creates finite selves. The creator-creature relationship has the status of literal truth, for it is directly inferred from two other propositions which are literally true, viz. reality is non-contradictory and a moral order is an objectively real order.

The principal difficulty in Campbell's view of the self lies in his conception of the relationship between the manifested self and the subject self. The subject self owns the manifested self, and we know this, claims Campbell, by immediate apprehension. This alleged direct apprehension of ownership appears to be a rather complex inference grounded in the formal analysis of the preconditions of self-conscious experience. He seems to mistake the necessity for a formal unity for the necessity for a 'substantial' unity. There is no reason for Campbell to posit an existing 'substantial' entity simply because his logical analysis of the aforementioned modes of experience requires him to think of or consider the self as having a formal unity.

Campbell's metaphysical scepticism rests upon Bradleian principles--the theory of the judgment and the principle of non-contradiction. However, Campbell's admission that the criterion of reality, non-contradiction, has positive

formal significance seems to undercut his judgment that reality is, in principle, beyond knowledge. Campbell's scepticism seems to extend no further than Bradley's; namely, that reality, in its detail, is beyond knowledge.

Campbell's doctrine of creation is inconsistent with his epistemological conclusion, metaphysical scepticism, and his metaphysical criterion, non-contradiction. In the former case, Campbell's doctrine of creation implies, in its literal truth, a knowledge of the essential character of finite creation. Such knowledge is impossible by Campbell's own admission. In the latter case, Campbell's view of creation implies that the finite self (and world) are both relatively independent and absolutely dependent. This appears to be a flat contradiction.

Campbell's statement and defence of the judgment-theory of cognition and the principle of non-contradiction appear to be unimpeachable. He seems correct in arguing that the self is the most adequate symbol of Ultimate Reality. Campbell argues convincingly that we must think of the self as a formal unity, but his further insistence that the self must be a 'substantial' unity leads to a dichotomy between the transcendental self and the manifested self. This dichotomy is never overcome or made intelligible in Campbell's conception of the self.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Allie Mitchell Frazier was born March 20, 1932 in Shaw, Mississippi. He is the son of Elsie Mitchell and George Edgar Frazier. He has an older brother, George Edgar Frazier, Junior.

Mr. Frazier received his secondary education in Shaw High School.



Upon graduating from high school in 1950, he enrolled in The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, for his first year of college. At the end of his freshman year, in 1951, he transferred to Millsaps College in Jackson, Mississippi, from which he graduated with an A.B. in 1953. Philosophy was his major field of concentration as an undergraduate. In the fall of 1953, Mr. Frazier entered the Boston University School of Theology and, in 1956, he received an S.T.B. with honors. In the fall of 1956, Mr. Frazier entered the Boston University Graduate School as a Doctoral candidate in philosophy. Mr. Frazier was appointed Borden Parker Bowne Fellow in Philosophy for the years 1957-1959. During 1959-1960 he held a teaching fellowship in philosophy. During 1960-1961 Mr. Frazier was a

Fulbright Scholar at the University of Glasgow, Scotland, where he worked under the supervision of Professor Charles Arthur Campbell.

In 1956, Mr. Frazier was ordained elder in the Methodist Church at the Annual Meeting of the North Mississippi Conference. While working for his Ph.D., he held the position of Director of Religious Education at the First Parish Church in Brookline, Massachusetts and at The First Religious Society in Newburyport, Massachusetts.

On September 18, 1959, Mr. Frazier married Ruth Hollander. Mrs. Frazier is a graduate of Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts, and holds a Master's degree in philosophy from Boston University.

The year following his Fulbright Grant, Mr. Frazier was given a one-year appointment at the University of the Pacific as Assistant Professor in philosophy. 1961-1962 were thus spent in Stockton, California. In 1962 Mr. Frazier was appointed Assistant Professor of philosophy at Bethany College in Bethany, West Virginia. He is also serving there as head of the Department of Philosophy and Director of the Honors Program.