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The transnational religious leader, regime change, and state sovereignty: the unlikely case comparison of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam

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THE TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADER, REGIME CHANGE, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE UNLIKELY CASE COMPARISON OF POPE JOHN PAUL II AND ABDULLAH YUSUF AZZAM

by

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Dedicated to my husband, Sean, for years of faith,

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ABSTRACT

The role of religion in shaping geopolitics and its associated norms is often overlooked by international relations scholars. This influence can be examined through the lives of transnational religious leaders (TRLs), particularly those who contribute to new definitions of state sovereignty through their involvement in regime change. Two seemingly incomparable figures center in this paper's case studies- Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Pope John Paul, through the roles of pastor to a transnational community and head of an international organization, lent international legitimacy to the Solidarity movement, which contributed to the fall of Communism in Poland. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam authored the theological concept of "defensive jihad", led the transnational Afghan Arabs in armed resistance against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan during the Soviet Afghan war, and contributed to the creation of a global jihadist movement.

Traditionally, Westphalian sovereignty claims that the territorial state holds ultimate authority over the affairs within its borders and that it is the primary actor in the

international system. This dissertation examines how the characteristics of a TRL and the characteristics of the associated transnational social movement (TSM) qualify regime change as an indicator of challenges to conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty and modern state sovereignty. Characteristics of TRL include leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to secularization, and relationship to modernity. Characteristics of TSM include political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and nature of transnational activism. In both case studies, a transnational leader used soft power, based in a transnational religious identity and civil society, to contribute to a transnational social movement that helped alter the domestic authority structures in Poland and Afghanistan. As individual actors determining the actions of nation states, these TRLs ultimately challenged state sovereignty. Pope John Paul II's theological worldview was compatible with the Westphalian system, and he contributed to the birth of a stable, democratic Poland with sovereign authority within internationally respected borders. Azzam, however, envisioned an alternate world order based on religiously defined, pre-Westphalian boundaries. His theological and pragmatic contributions to the Afghan Arabs and the modern day jihadist movement further challenged the Westphalian system.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IS Islamic State

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

IUMS International Union of Muslim Scholars

KOR Workers' Defense Committee

MAK *Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahedeen* (Special Services Office for Arab Afghans)

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

PDPA People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PRC Policy Review Committee

PZPR Polish United Workers' Party

SCC Special Coordinating Committee

TCS Transnational Civil Society

TIE Transnational Ideas Entrepreneurs

TIN Transnational Ideological Network

TRL Transnational Religious Leader

TSM Transnational Social Movement

WRON Military Council of National Salvation

INTRODUCTION

One need only to open a newspaper to grasp the profound influence of religion upon international affairs - from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, to Al-Qaeda cells in Afghanistan and globally, to Kashmir, to the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, to warfare in Darfur, to the influence of Evangelic Christianity upon US politics. At the time of writing this paper, the Islamic State (IS), formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatens American interests in the Middle East and the future of stability in the region. This fundamentalist Islamic group uses methods of terror and violence considered extreme even by Al Qaeda. By publically beheading American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff and British aid worker David Haines and by threatening to kill journalists and aid workers if US and British involvement in Iraq continues, they prove that a transnational religious organization with violent means and a vision of a pre-Westphalian world order can threaten one of the most militarily powerful countries in the world. The Islamic State seeks to establish a Caliphate, first over the region including Iraq and Syria, and eventually on a global scale. This Caliphate, defined as a group of theocratic nation states ruled by a single Islamic ruler, would threaten world order and the system of nation-states as it exists today. To exemplify this, consider the statement, in the early summer of 2014, of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who supports taking over Iraq and Syria:

> Rush O Muslims to your state. It is your state. Syria is not for Syrians and Iraq is not for Iraqis. The land is for the Muslims, all Muslims.

> This is my advice to you. If you hold to it you will conquer Rome & own the world, if Allah wills.[1]

This quote demonstrates this IS leader's vision for a global Caliphate and the effect of religious ideology in recentering collective identity from the nation state to the religious community.

The actions of the Islamic state provoked public reactions from religious communities and leaders internationally. Pope Francis, head of the institutional Roman Catholic Church in Rome and the transnational Catholic community worldwide, has spoken out about the persecution of the Christian minority in Iraq by IS. In a Sunday blessing in August, 2014, the pope said that happenings in Iraq left him in "in dismay and disbelief". The pope addressed reports of "thousands of people, including many Christians, driven from their homes in a brutal manner; children dying of thirst and hunger in their flight; women kidnapped; people massacred; [and] violence of every kind", and responded by saying, "All this gravely offends God and humanity. Hatred is not to be carried in the name of God. War is not to be waged in the name of God."[2]

Religious leaders from the Muslim community have responded as well. The Grand Mufti Shawqi Allam, one of Egypt's top religious authorities, has publically stated that IS is damaging to Islam. The International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) has condemned the forced expulsion of Iraqi Christians from Iraq. Mehmet Gormez, head of the Religious Affairs Directorate, the highest religious authority in Turkey, said that

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1 Damien McElroy, "Rome Will Be Conquered Next says Leader of Islamic State," *The*

2 Pope Francis, quoted in David Freddoso, "Many Muslim leaders have denounced the Islamic State," *Washington Examiner*, August 14, 2014.

Muslims should not be hostile towards "people with different views, values, and beliefs, and regard them as enemies."[3] As a final example, Iyad Ameen Madani, Secretary General for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation denounced the exportation of Christians, claiming that IS has "nothing to do with Islam and its principles that call for justice, kindness, fairness, freedom of faith and coexistence."[4]

Though the Islamic State seems to be challenging the system of sovereign states, and certainly Iraq and Syria's sovereignty, it could be argued that is behaving very much like a state. It is effectively governing eight million Syrians and Iraqis, with several hundred thousand of those governed being in support of the Islamic State. It is headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has assumed the title Caliph. Beneath him, al-Baghdadi has a chief advisor on Syria and a chief advisor on Iraq, each of whom lead 5–7 governors. There are nine councils, including the Leadership Council, the Shore Council, the Military Council, the Legal Council, the Fighters' Assistance Council, the Financial Council, the Intelligence Council, the Security Council, and the Media Council. The Islamic State is not just a strong military force, it is also attempting to govern the areas of Iraq and Syria it has claimed control over; in some cases it is even providing social services. All of this raises the question: can the Islamic state eventually be considered a Westphalian state with sovereignty over its borders?

President Obama is clear on this. He does not believe that IS is a state. In a special

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3 Rebecca Hamilton, "Updated Muslim Leaders Join the Condemnation of Isis," *Patheos Blog,* August 13, 2014.

4 Ibid.

public statement on US strategy towards IS on September 10, 2014, he said:

> Now let's make two things clear: ISIL is not Islamic. No religion condones the killing of innocents, and the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was formerly Al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq and has taken advantage of sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It is recognized by no government nor by the people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way.[5]

Obama does not acknowledge the state-like attributes of IS and deems it a terrorist organization, even comparing it to "cancer" later in the speech.[6] Yet in terms of the establishment of a territorial Caliphate with a bureaucratic infrastructure and ruling structure, the Islamic State has already done more state building in its short existence than in the many years since Al Qaida was founded. Yet, it has a long road towards recognition as a sovereign state with legitimate power by the international community.

Though IS is exhibiting state like behavior, there is evidence that the jihadists fighting for IS make up a transnational body. In IS' attempt to take over the city of Ayn al-Arab, Syria, on September 25, 2014, there was evidence that the IS fighters were from places as disparate as Egypt, Belgium, Turkey, and Italy.[7] ISIS recruits come from around the world, responding to a religious identity that transcends nation-state boundaries, to fight for a new, sovereign state with territory defined by that identity. Even Americans

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5 Barack Obama, quoted in "Transcript: President Obama's speech outlining strategy to defeat the Islamic State," *Washington Post,* September 10, 2014.

6 Ibid.

7 Piotr Zalewski, "How Islamic State Wages War," *Businessweek*, September 26, 2014.

have traveled to join IS in Syria. On August 23, 2014, Douglas McAuthur McCain became the first American to die in Syria while fighting for IS.[8] This provided evidence that American IS members are going abroad to fight instead of training to be terrorists at home. American IS members in Syria exemplify foreign fighters motivated by a religious transnational ideology that super cedes national loyalty.

Current events such as the rise of the Islamic State fly in the face of common wisdom in international relations theory – the notion that after the Peace of Westphalia, religion lost political salience in the international system. This legacy has been challenged by the prominent role of religious institutions, transnational actors, and popular belief systems in global politics since the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Religious ideas have driven prominent political events in the past few decades, such as Israel's victory in the six-day war of 1967, the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, and Solidarity in the democratization of Poland. Yet oddly, international relations literature is only recently coming to recognize religion as an important force in predicting and analyzing world events.

Though there are many angles through which one could study the role of religion in international relations, the question of religion and sovereignty is perhaps particularly understudied. Westphalian sovereignty has been challenged in the 21st century by a resurgence of religion, particularly as an ideological basis for humanitarian intervention, inter and intra-state violence, diplomacy, and social movements. IS challenges traditional

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8 Michael Schmidt, "American Fighting for ISIS killed in Syria," *NYT*, August 26, 2014.

Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty in its pre-Westphalian vision of world order, i.e., a Caliphate. It envisions the world in terms of a war between Islam and the secular state, and particularly between the Islamic world and the US. Even the iterations of its name reflect the growing commitment to a goal of universal Islamic rule – from ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) to ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) to IS (Islamic State). A religious community's understanding of state sovereignty shapes its role in world politics and the nature of its transnational activism. The Islamic state poses an interesting vision of the sovereign state that is both Westphalian and pre-Westphalian in nature.

An avenue to capture how religion challenges, accepts or modifies sovereignty is that of transnational religious leaders and their involvement in transnational social movements that shape regime change. A *transnational religious leader (TRL)* is an individual leader of a religious community who, as guided by a religious ideology, acts toward political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and immaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across state lines in the achievement of those ends. Transnational religious leaders are able to create and mobilize a community of people bound by religious values that exists beyond the territorial boundaries of states. By mobilizing an international community based on religious principles to challenge the domestic politics of states, transnational religious leaders challenge, and perhaps ultimately alter state sovereignty. From this phenomenon arises the following research problem: *How do transnational religious leaders and their*

transnational social movements' contributions to regime change impact conceptions of state sovereignty?

This question is important because if transnational religious leaders do indeed alter conceptions of state sovereignty, then there is a gap in international relations literature that should be remedied. It is also important from a public policy perspective in that world leaders should be increasingly informed of the importance of religion in predicting and responding to world events. Instead of wearing the blinders of outdated secularization theories, they should learn to harness the power of religion for peacemaking, democratic nation building, and diplomacy. This question also has broader theoretical implications, and may raise the question: did Westphalia ever effectively relegate religion to the private sphere? Can religion and the Westphalian system co-exist? Does it depend on the religious leader or the religious denomination? If all sovereignty is challenged by globalization, what are the specific claims that transnational religious organizations and transnational religious leaders are making upon the sovereign state?

I will hypothesize that the presence of transnational religious leaders, in addition to certain characteristics of TRLs and of their transnational social movements (TSMs), contributes to regime change, and consequently impacts state sovereignty. The enabling characteristics of transnational religious leaders will be analyzed through characteristics of the leaders and of their associated TSM. The TRL personal attribute categories include: leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to secularism, and relationship to modernization. The transnational social movement community characteristics will be analyzed though the categories: political theology, mobilizing

structures, political opportunity structures, and nature of activism. To determine how these variables and characteristics impact how TRL influences regime change, and ultimately conceptions of state sovereignty, I use two seemingly disparate historical cases, accessing the causal pathways through archival research centered on two transnational religious actors. In each case I will test the strength of these categories, ultimately identifying three categories that best explain the variation in how conceptions of sovereignty are impacted in each case and another three categories that access what makes transnational religious leaders' challenges unique from that of other transnational actors.

The first case considers John Paul II, the Solidarity movement, and the democratization of Poland. John Paul II, the first Polish pope, was the leader of the Roman Catholic Church during the last decade of Communist rule in Poland (1978–1989). He supported the Solidarity movement, a popular labor movement in Poland, through the role of pastor (through pilgrimages to Poland, public homilies and statements, and theological writings) and the role of head of the international organization of the Roman Catholic Church, something akin to a head of state (through diplomacy, public and private communications with world leaders, and public statements on world affairs). He wielded primarily soft power through these roles. John Paul II was comfortable with the Westphalian system of sovereignty states and understood international diplomacy. He had the respect of world leaders, and particularly US leadership, which regularly communicated with him on events in Communist Eastern Europe. Although he accepted Westphalia, he believed that culture and spirituality were the real drivers of history, not

realist military power. Perhaps his greatest triumph was giving the Polish people a vision of themselves and of their history that transcended communism. Although he was comfortable with the secular state, he did not believe that modernity decreased the role for, or importance of, religion in world affairs. John Paul II successfully contributed to the fall of Communism in Poland, and Eastern Europe more generally. Through the Solidarity movement and other regional movements fashioned after it, Poland, and a number of other Eastern European countries, managed to democratize through non-violent means.

The second case study considers Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the philosophy of defensive jihad, and the Soviet-Afghan war. Azzam was known as "the fighting cleric." Originally from Palestine and educated in Saudi Arabia, he reworked the theological framework for "defensive jihad", to mean that every Muslim, regardless of country, was responsible to wage jihad on invaders of Muslim lands. He actualized this concept by organizing Afghan Arabs, volunteers from various countries who came to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. One of his pupils was Osama Bin Laden, who ultimately disagreed with Azzam on his regional jihadist focus. Azzam wielded soft power through his persuasive theological writings, public speeches, and charismatic personality. He wielded hard power in the sense that he recruited Afghan Arabs, supplied them with weapons (mostly donated secretly by the United States), and determined their military objectives. His long-term vision of a Caliphate, although he aimed to achieve it one country at a time, made it impossible to wholly accept the Westphalian world order. Believing in the establishment of theocracies, Azzam rejected the secular state and modernization. Azzam's success in

his objective in Afghanistan is mixed. The presence of foreign fighters may have contributed to Soviet withdrawal, but the country was left in a state of civil war for years afterwards. However his contribution to the philosophy of defensive jihad changed the course of the jihadist movement and is used to justify international acts of terror to this day.

Through a comparative historical analysis of these two cases, using archival data, I argue that both leaders challenged traditional definitions of Westphalian sovereignty and modern definitions of state sovereignty through their role in regime change. Each actor primarily executed influence through soft power. John Paul II accepted the Westphalian system of secular states, though perhaps not the cultural agenda of modernity. Azzam rejected secularism and modernism altogether. They both challenged Westphalian sovereignty in the sense that they were individual leaders of transnational communities that managed to change the course of nation states. They mobilized people across state boundaries towards a political end, verbalized through theological language. However, their regime change goals varied in that John Paul II accommodated to basic Westphalian world order, and Azzam did not. John Paul II and Azzam Krasner's four definitions of sovereignty (international, domestic, interdependence, Westphalian)[9] and his later "shared" sovereignty[10], in addition to Daniel Philpott's three faces of

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9 Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

10 Stephen Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security*, Vol. 29 No. 2 (Fall, 2004): 85–120.

sovereignty[11] and Stacey's "relational sovereignty"[12], offer new frameworks through which to analyze these historical cases. This paper contributes to modern discussions of sovereignty by detailing a process of regime change through which sovereignty is challenged. This picture also must be tempered by considerations of legitimacy. In other words, was the Communist state in Poland or Soviet invasion of Afghanistan legitimate? A discussion of the relationship between transnational religious leaders, regime change, and sovereignty will follow each case study. The characteristics of the transnational religious leader and transnational social movement that challenge conceptions of state sovereignty will be isolated and analyzed in each case.

The dissertation is structured in five parts. First, it reviews literature on international religions and religion, transnationalism, hard versus soft power, secularization, modernization, social movements, regime change, and sovereignty and identifies an appropriate space for its contribution. Second, it lays out research methods and hypothesizes a relationship between transnational religious actors, transnational social movements, regime change goals, contributions to regime change, and conceptions of sovereignty. More specifically, it analyzes how characteristics of transnational religious actors and transnational social movements impact conceptions of state sovereignty through regime change. It analyzes which characteristics best analyze the TRL's vision of regime change and the meaning of Westphalian sovereignty. Third, the

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11 Daniel Philpott. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

12 Helen Stacey. "Relational Sovereignty." *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* Vol. 99 (March 30–April 2, 2005): 396–400.

dissertation considers the case of Pope John Paul II, Solidarity, and the democratization of Poland. Fourth, it considers the case of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, defensive jihad, and the Soviet-Afghan War. Finally, general conclusions are drawn, and transnational religious leaders find a place as an important unit of analysis in international relations literature, particularly as pertaining to state sovereignty.

CHAPTER ONE

Theoretical Landscape

The hypothesized causal relationships in this dissertation, presented in Chapter Two, are built on five basic variables: the transnational religious leader, transnational social movements, a regime change goal that may or may not be consistent with Westphalia, regime change and state sovereignty. These variables are informed by a broad base of social science literature. This chapter investigates the theoretical context for these variables and identifies a place in the literature in which this study makes a contribution. It forges a theoretical pathway to be followed in each case study. First, the subject of the place of religion in international relations theory is itself a subject of debate and creates a broader context for the importance of studying both transnational religious leaders. Second, both transnational religious leaders and their associated transnational social movements must both be placed in the broader context of transnational literature. Third, the characteristics of both transnational religious leaders relate to literature on leadership, hard versus soft power, secularization theory, and modernization theory. Fourth, the characteristics of both transnational social movements relate to literature on the role of ideas in movements, mobilizing and political opportunity structures, and the nature of transnational activism. Fifth, the role of both transnational religious leaders in causing regime change relates to literature on regime change as an intervening variable and regime change as related to transnational movements. Finally, the two transnational

religious leaders perhaps make their clearest contribution in the body of literature on sovereignty, as related to conceptions of both Westphalian and modern state sovereignty.

Religion and IR

Much of international relations literature simply does not address religion, and certainly not as an important variable to analyzing international affairs. John Esposito and Michael Watson, in a review of the significance of religion in the global order, agree that religion is not considered significant by Western academics. They find, "In particular, with very few exceptions, 'standard texts' in politics and international relations wholly or very largely ignore religion."[13] They offer several points of disagreement with this approach. The worldwide resurgence of religion in the twenty first century can be witnessed in, "South Africa's apartheid movement, Muslim politics, liberation theology in the Third World, Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, Hindu fundamentalism in India, conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Lebanon."[14] They acknowledge that from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the twentieth century:

> The modern state has followed its own course of development to become the most powerful of society's institutions… Its advance has seen the role of religion recede, first and foremost in the West but, as the twentieth century progressed, increasingly in other regions of the world as well.[15]

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13 John Esposito & Michael Watson, eds., *Religion and Global Order* (Cardiff, Wales: University of Whales Press, 2000), 17.

14 Ibid., 18.

15 Ibid., 23–24.

However, the twenty first century, according to Esposito and Watson, does not follow this pattern. Two major trends in world events that have over time increased the significance of religion in global politics are 1) the downfall of communism and the "renewal of religion's place in society in the ex-Communist bloc"[16] and 2) the Islamic resurgence, "symbolized above all by Iran's Islamic Revolution."[17] On a more systemic level, religion contributes to the development of a new world order in its interactions with contemporary capitalism, neo-liberal globalism, and civil society and ecumenism. But even when there is congruence in these fields, "a principle opposition, and alternative principles, to the existing global order reside in religion."[18] In other words, religion, which has always posed a challenge to a Westphalian system in which states were primary, now has more influence in an increasingly transnational world, a world in which power also resides in society, not just the state, a world in which transnational ideologies and transnational organizations hold increasing significance.

Other authors raise the issue of the significance of religion to the discipline as well. In *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty first Century*, Scott M. Thomas holds that three events in international relations- the Iranian revolution, the rise of Solidarity and the Polish Revolution, and the events of 9/11- have raised a newfound awareness

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16 Ibid., 19.

17 Ibid., 20.

18 Ibid., 35, referencing R.H. Roberts.

about how the global resurgence of religion is transforming international relations[19]. He writes about the first lesson learned from these events:

> There is a global resurgence of religion taking place throughout the world that is challenging our interpretation of the modern world-what it means to be modern-and this has implications for our understanding of how culture and religion influence international relations.[20]

According to Thomas, the twentieth century may be the last modern century. Post-modernity in the twenty first century challenges that idea that there is a single grand narrative- the Western concept of modernity- one that social scientists have primarily used to explain religion and international relations. Thomas' second lesson is that the global resurgence of religion "indicates international relations needs to consider the wider debates in social theory over modernity, post modernity, and secularization." Specific events in international affairs also give reason to consider these debates. Thomas references Keohane, who is in agreement, writing:

> The attacks of September 11 reveal that all mainstream theories of world politics are relentlessly secular with respect to motivation. They ignore the impact of religion, despite the fact that world-shaking political movements have so often been fuelled by religious fervor.[21]

Third, Thomas questions how ideas or religious beliefs influence policymaking. He asks "whether religion can be defined simply as a set of ideas or even symbols that constitute a

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19 Scott Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty first Century* (New York, NY: Norton, 2005), 10.

20 Ibid.

21 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. *Power and Independence*, 3rd ed. (NY: Longman, 2001).

cultural form of soft power."[22] He also questions the way research programs involving culture and religion are framed in international relations, "because they often involve unstated assumptions about the nature of religion and liberal modernity."[23] Finally, he finds that globalization has facilitated "a constantly evolving role of religion in international relations"[24], referring to "new religious leaders in the sociology of religion that are shaping the global cultural, religious and political landscape."[25]

Although international relations literature largely does not acknowledge the impact of religion upon world politics, there are some scholars working at this intersection, making a contribution not only to the field of political science but also to the policy world. In *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*, Toft, Philpott, and Shah offer advice to policymakers as they face a world in which religion and religious players hold increasing significance. They hold two theses. The first states that "a dramatic and worldwide increase in the political influence of religion has occurred in roughly the past forty years," according to "the set of ideas that a religious community holds about political authority and justice, or what we call political theology."[26] The second thesis explains the "wildly different politics of religious actors" according to the

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22 Scott Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, 12.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 13

25 Ibid.

26 Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York: Norton, 2011), 9–10.

"mutual independence of religious authority and political authority."[27]

Among various aspects of religion in the 21st century, the authors consider the topics of religious terrorism and religious civil wars. They find that religious terrorism deserves more attention than secular terrorism for two reasons. First, religiously motivated terrorism is more deadly.[28] Second, religious terrorism is related to the global trends of globalization, democratization, and modernization.[29] They write:

> Religious terrorism is a 'glocal' phenomenon in which global dynamics and local issues are interlinked. Whereas most religious terrorism was conducted locally, today there exists a vast network of local groups with global ties that share ideas, resources, and personnel to wage their terrorist campaigns. Because all these trends are likely to persist, if not intensify, in the coming years, we will continue to see demonstrations of religious terrorism like those we saw on September 11, 2001. The bottom line is that religious terrorism is an urgent matter.[30]

The authors also review basic facts about religious civil wars. First, religious civil wars are "more destructive than nonreligious civil wars, causing more deaths among combatants and noncombatants alike."[31] Second, "they last longer by an average of two years."[32] Third, they continue, "civil wars where religion is a central component recur

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27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 122.

29 Ibid., refers to Hoffman.

30 Ibid., 122.

31 Monica Toft, "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War," International Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 98.

32 Ibid., 116.

twice as often as civil wars lacking religious motivation."[33] Fourth, "they make up an increasing proportion of all civil wars."[34] Finally, religious civil wars increasingly involve Islam.[35] They find that there was a rise in the proportion of civil wars with religion as a basis either peripherally or centrally in the 1970s, paralleling the rise in religiously motivated terrorism. The trend is related to "three broad trends that explain the global resurgence of religion more generally: modernization, democratization, and globalization."[36] The book ends by offering ten recommendations to policy makers, or "ten rules for surviving God's Century."[37] The book essentially encourages policy makers to be aware of the significance of religion in world politics and to harness it to make good public policy.

Though Esposito and Watson, Thomas, Toft, Philpott and Shah, and others are contributing to a growing literature on the impact of religion upon international affairs, there are still major subject areas in need of research. One such area pertains to the subject of transnational religious leaders and state sovereignty.

Transnational Literature

An avenue through which to study the intersection of religion and international

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33 Monica Toft, Presentation "Religion, Civil War, and International Order," BCSIA Discussion Paper, Discussion Paper 2006-03. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (July, 2006): 9.

34 Ibid., 9.

35 Toft, "Getting Religion?", 113.

36 Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, *God's Century*, 172.

37 Ibid., 207.

relations is the transnational nature of religious leaders, communities, ideologies, and movements. A broad body of literature on transnational civil society sets the stage for the study of our independent variables, transnational religious leaders and transnational social movements. The definition of a transnational religious leader is informed by literature on transnational civil society. Lipschutz defines transnational civil society as "the self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by decentered, local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not there."[38] According to Haynes, transnational civil society aims "to cultivate regular, expanding interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization."[39] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye count the presence of transnational networks as one of four conditions that comprise complex interdependence, and argue that these networks limit governments' abilities to control outcomes.[40] Thomas Risse-Kappen, Matthew Evangelista, and Daniel Thomas argue that transnational networks contributed to the end of the Cold War by promulgating ideas about national defense, human rights, and democracy.

In her classic work, *The Third Force*, Ann Florini examines the rise of transnational civil society. She writes, "Transnational civil society networks-the

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38 Ronnie Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society." *Millennium*, 21, 3 (1992): 390.

39 Jeffrey Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power.* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2012): 145.

40 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (3rd edition) (New York: Longman, 2001).

emerging third force in global politics-tend to aim for broader goals based on their conceptions of what constitutes the public good. They are bound together more by shared values than by self-interest."[41] Transnational civil society attempts to shape international norms in two ways: directly (by persuading policy makers to change their minds about what is the right thing to do) and indirectly (by changing public perception of what government should be doing). Florini finds that transnational civil society "exercises influence through its ability to make someone, policy makers or publics, listen and act. The currency of its power is not force, but credible information and moral authority."[42]

According to Florini, broad trends that are enabling the growth of strong transnational civil society include the growth of domestic civil society, technological changes, growing focal points for transnational civil society to meet around, increased funding, and the ability of transnational civil society coalitions to learn from and build on previous efforts.[43] She emphasizes that to be successful the transnational civil society must be "firmly connected to local reality"[44] because "vigorous domestic civil societies provide the nodes for transnational networks."[45] Florini analyzes transnational civil societies' limits of power. There is "no single, coherent transnational civil society

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41 Florini, Ann M., *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 7.

42 Ibid., 11.

43 Ibid., 217.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 218.

agenda."[46] The networks are powerful only as long as they hold credibility. When the transnational civil society forgets that its power is soft and acts as though its power is hard, "it not only fails to achieve its immediate objectives by also undermines the moral authority that is its real claim to influence."[47] According to Florini, the bases of legitimacy and accountability of transnational civil societies can be broken down into superior knowledge, delegation/government approval, and representativeness. Looking towards the future, she predicts increased partnering between transnational civil societies and the private sector, more direct participation in the management of global issues, and the creation of a global polity, "not a world government, but something of a common culture with broadly shared values."[48] Florini lays a conceptual groundwork for the analysis of the transnational nature of the religious leaders in the following case studies.

Keck and Sikkink take the concept of transnational civil society one step further in defining transnational advocacy networks. They write, "by building new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations, transnational advocacy networks multiply the channels of access to the international system."[49] These networks are unique in their advocacy. They "are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be

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46 Ibid., 213.

47 Ibid., 214.

48 Ibid., 237.

49 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1.

easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their "interests."[50] Ideas play a distinctive role in defining transnational advocacy networks. They write, "Since (transnational advocacy networks) are not powerful in the traditional sense of the word, they must use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the information and value contexts within which states make policies."[51] Transnational advocacy networks differentiate themselves from other transnational networks in their motivation, which is driven by shared principles, ideas and values. Keck and Sikkink's transnational advocacy networks are "noteworthy in part for their ability to alter the foreign and domestic behavior of governments, not-withstanding their own lack of direct coercive capacity."[52] The transnational religious leaders in this study contribute to the creation and mobilization of transnational advocacy networks to achieve their goals.

Transnational Religious Leaders (TRL)

A transnational religious leader (TRL) is an individual actor who, as guided by a religious ideology, acts towards political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and nonmaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across state lines in support of those ends. When analyzing the differences between transnational religious leaders, the strength of four characteristics will be measured: leadership, hard versus soft power, relationship to secularism, and

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50 Ibid., 8–9.

51 Ibid., 16.

52 John M. Owen, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change 1510–2010* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 34.

relationship to modernity. The following provides the theoretical support for these categories.

TRL- LEADERSHIP

However great the idea, ideas are useless without a leader to guide them. According to Philpott:

> Ideas do not perform their labors in the abstract… In history, these labors are enacted by particular people in particular places, by townspeople, political organizers, theologians, professors, lobbyists, parliamentarians, generals, and head of state, by people who discuss, persuade, preach, pressure, order, cajole, and shoot…[53]

Ideas alone do not make an effective transnational religious leader. Leadership matters. To isolate the impact of transnational religious leaders upon social revolution, domestic politics, and the mechanics of mobilization, they must be considered as individual actors. Theory on transnational religious leaders should take into account classic leadership literature, such as James' Macgregor Burn's *Transformational Leadership*. This work distinguishes between transactional and transformational leadership. Transactional leadership "motivates through the measured application of promised rewards and threatened punishments,"[54] while transformational leadership motivates by "transforming the identities and goals of individuals to coincide with those of the group."[55] Burns also

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53 Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped modern International* Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 67.

54 Michael Lovaglia, Jeffrey Lucas, and Amy Baxter, "Transactional and Transformational Leadership: Their Foundations in Power and Influence," in Carol Pearson (ed.) *The Transforming Leader* (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2012), 23.

55 Ibid., 23.

theorizes an ideal leadership that minimizes coercive power and enables followers to accomplish goals that even the leader may not have fully realized. Thus both the leader and the follower are encouraged towards greatness and transformation.

Transnational religious leaders are unique in transnational literature. There is sparse transnational literature assessing individual religious actors. There has been an assumption in international relations theory that secular leaders would emerge in politically dominant positions instead of religious leaders. The implication was that in "order successfully to build nation-states, political leaders would have to remain as neutral as possible from the entanglements of particularistic claims, including those derived from religion."[56] As the role of religion and religious leaders in international relations expands, this assumption is called into question.

TRL - "HARD POWER" VERSUS "SOFT POWER"

In the 1970's, Nye and Keohane, Karl Kaiser, Edward Morse and others, "stressed the growing role of transnational, international and multi-national actors, and global, non-military forces such as technology, trade, communications, and culture, in shaping policy."[57] Transnational networks influence state behavior, and the state "does not monopolize the public sphere."[58] These scholars sought to describe the sphere of international interactions under a variety of names: transnational relations, international

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56 Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power*, 147.

57 Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978): 893.

58 Peterson, M.J., "Transnational Activity: International Society, and World Politics," *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 21:3 (1992): 375–376.

civil society, and global civil society.[59] Although they did not directly address transnational religious leaders, they proved that there was a space for nontraditional, non-state actors in international relations. TRLs have been successful in leveraging transnational civil society for political ends and in shaping the course of domestic politics, thereby contradicting traditional norms of sovereignty. This makes TRLs an important international force that could be further addressed within transnational literature.

One of the few scholars who directly studies religious actors is Jeffrey Haynes. He researches what he calls religious transnational actors, and finds that, "While varying widely in what they seek to achieve, they also share an important characteristic: each seeks to use what I call "religious soft power" to advance their interests."[60] They "all wish to see the spread and development of certain values and norms, which impact on international security and order." They seek "to influence international relations by their ability to disseminate ideas and values."[61] Haynes holds that religious transnational actors must have soft power in order to be successful in international relations.[62]

"Soft power" as a concept was developed by Joseph Nye in 1990.[63] Nye writes that soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and

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59 Lipschutz, *Reconstructing World Politics*.

60 Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power*, 5.

61 Ibid., 6.

62 Ibid., 10.

63 Nye, *Soft Power.*

policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced."[64] On the other hand, he defines hard power as the capacity to use military, financial or diplomatic force or to threaten to use it. Haynes adopts this notion of soft power, writing:

> Soft power attracts or co-opts people; it does not coerce them. Soft power influences people by appealing to them not by forcing them to comply. Soft power covers certain attributes-including, culture, values, ideas- collectively representing different, but not necessarily lesser, forms of influence compared to "hard" power.[65]

When religious transnational actors use soft power, it is "religious soft power."[66] It is a unique form of soft power because its appeal is based in theological ideals and values. According to Haynes, in order to be successful, religious transnational actors must both disseminate an attractive cross-border message and adapt to local circumstances.[67]

Haynes finds that the amalgamation of extant non-state transnational actors, both secular and religious, comprises 'transnational' or 'global' civil society."[68] Transnational civil society has three components according to Haynes. First, "like domestic civil society, transnational civil society (TCS) encompasses various, principally non-state,

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64 Nye, *Soft Power*, 12.

65 Haynes, Religious *Transnational Actors and Soft Power*, 11.

66 Ibid., 14.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., 7, references Glasius, Kaldor and Anheier, *Global Civil Society 2006/2007* (New York, NY: Sage Publications, 2006).

groups with social and/or political goals."[69] Second, these groups "interact with each other across state boundaries and are not overtly manipulated by governments, although they might have links."[70] Third, TCS takes a variety of forms and some are secular in orientation.[71] The transnational leaders addressed in the case studies each contribute to the development of transnational civil society and leverage it as they use soft and hard power to accomplish their aims.

TRL – Relationship to Secularization

If transnational religious leaders impact state sovereignty through revolution and regime change, that process may be accessed through literature on secularization, modernization, and religion and international relations more broadly. Secularization is a historical process in which religion and religious institutions lose social significance. The secularization thesis holds that as societies progress through modernization and rationalization, religion loses social authority and significance.[72]

Mark Juergensmeyer, in *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, surveys religious activists from around the world and characterizes them as religious nationalists, finding them to have both religious and political interests. These

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69 Ibid. 7.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3–32.

religious nationalists respond "in a religious way to a political situation."[73] He compares the loyalty to a secular vision of the nation and to a religious worldview, writing:

> For that reason, I believe the line between secular nationalism and religion has always been quite thin. Both are expressions of faith, both involve an identity with and a loyalty to a large community and both insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested in the leadership of that community.[74]

The line between politically defined and religiously defined ambitions is not always easy to define. Juergensmeyer suggests that certain religious denominations are more compatible with the secular basis for world order. He references a Christian theologian, Arend Theodor van Leeuwen, who suggests that the secular basis for politics is not only European, but specifically Christian. In his book, *Christianity in World History*, van Leeuwen "argued that the idea of separating out the things of God from the things of people in such a way as to deny the divine nature of kingship was first formulated in ancient Israel and then became a major motif of Christianity."[75] In the term secularization, van Leeuwen specifically was referring to the separation of religious and temporal spheres.[76]

The social functions of traditional religion and secular nationalism are similar, and Juergensmeyer designates "ideologies of order" as a category to include them both.

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73 Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 6.

74 Ibid., 16.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., 17.

Other writers have suggested different terms- consider Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities" or Ninian Smart's "world views". Clifford Geertz speaks of ideology as a "cultural system." Juergensmeyer writes:

> Both religious and secular-nationalistic frameworks of thought conceive of the world in coherent, manageable ways; they both suggests that there are levels of meaning beneath the day-to-day world that give coherence to things unseen; and they both provide the authority that gives the social and political order its reason for being. In doing so they define for the individual the right way of being in the world and relate persons to the social whole.[77]

He finds that these two "ideologies of order" – religion and secular nationalism- are potential rivals, vying to be the ultimate authority for social order."[78] He predicts that this confrontation will become increasingly significant, and he asks the question: "Will the confrontation between religious and secular nationalism harden into a new Cold War?"[79]

Juergensmeyer identifies negative characteristics of religious nationalism as "the potential for demagoguery and dictatorship, the tendency to Satanize the United States and to loathe Western civilization, and the potential to become violent and intolerant."[80] He identifies the positive characteristics of religious nationalism as the following: "religious nationalists' appreciation of tradition and historical rootedness, and their

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77 Ibid., 31.

78 Ibid., 33.

79 Ibid., 193.

80 Ibid., 195.

insistence on grounding public institutions in morality."[81] A third classification he sets forth is "aspects of religious nationalism that we cannot live with easily but that we might have to learn to coexist with."[82] This classification includes: 1) the insistence of religious nationalists on divine justifications for human laws and democratic institutions 2) the assumption that certain lands are the province of only one religion 3) their exaltation of communitarian values over individual ones. In Juergensmeyer's survey of religious nationalism around the world, Juergensmeyer claims that all religious nationalists aim to take down the secular state and replace it with a government founded on religious principles. This "anti-modernist" trend encompasses a new world order comprised of religious groups vying for theocratic states. Juergensmeyer predicts that religious nationalism will expand and urges American policy-makers to cooperate. He alludes to the possibility of a synthesis in which elements of democracy are upheld and carried in new religious states.

According to Jose Casanova, four developments took place in the 1980s that "gave religion the kind of global publicity which forced a reassessment of its place and role in the modern world."[83] The developments included: the Islamic revolution in Iran (beginning in the 70's), the Solidarity movement in Poland, the role of Catholicism in the Sandinista revolution and other political conflicts throughout Latin America, and the public reemergence of Protestant fundamentalism as a force in American politics. He

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81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., 196.

83 Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 3.

writes:

> What was new and unexpected in the 1980s was not the emergence of "new religious movements", "religious experimentation", and "new religious consciousness"-all phenomena which caught the imagination of social scientists and the public in the 1960s and 1970s- but rather the revitalization and the assumption of public roles by precisely those religious traditions which both theories of secularization and cyclical theories of religious revival has assumed were becoming ever more marginal and irrelevant in the modern world.[84]

Casanova's central thesis posits the "deprivatization" of religion in the modern world, meaning that "religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatizing role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them."[85] He comes to this by breaking down traditional secularization theory into three parts, analyzing each separately, and finding that secularization theory only partially captures the path of religion.

Casanova essentially dissects the commonly-held mainstream theory of secularization, and analyzes it in three parts, "secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere."[86] The first theory of secularization is secularization as the segregation of secular spheres from religious standards and institutions. Casanova then develops two sub theses, writing:

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84 Ibid., 5.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid., 211.

> …Two other sub theses have often been attached which allegedly explain what will happen to religion as a result of this process of secularization. One sub thesis, the decline-of-religion thesis, postulated that the process of secularization would bring in its wake the progressive shrinkage and decline of religion until, some extreme versions added, it eventually disappeared. The other sub thesis, the privatization thesis, postulated that the process of secularization would bring in its wake the privatization and, some added, the marginalization of religion in the modern world.[87]

Casanova develops these theses by conducting a comparative historical study of public religions in the modern world, making claims related to each part of the secularization theory.[88] His cases include: Spain, Poland, Brazil, Evangelical Protestantism in the US, and Catholicism in the US. He finds the first thesis, secularization as differentiation, to be "the valid core of the theory of secularization" and "a general modern structural trend."[89] However, he finds the second thesis, the decline of religious beliefs and practices, to not be a modern structural trend, but merely a dominant historical trend in Western societies.[90] He writes that "the more religions resist the process of modern differentiation, that is, secularization in the first sense, the more they will tend in the long run to suffer religious decline, that is, secularization in the second sense."[91] He finds the third thesis, privatization of religion, to not be a modern structural trend. He writes:

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87 Ibid., 20.

88 Ibid., 212.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid., 213–214.

91 Casanova, 214.

> …There are public religions in the modern world which do not need to endanger either modern individual freedoms or modern differentiated structures… Privatization is not a modern structural trend but, rather, a historical option. To be sure, it seems to be a modern "preferred option," but it is an option nonetheless.[92]

In other words, Casanova finds that religion is not in the process of functional differentiation from the secular spheres of state, economy and science, as secularization theory claims.[93]

The studies conducted by Juergensmeyer and Casanova and other modern scholars who refine traditional secularization theory create a lens through which to view transnational religious leaders' attitudes towards secularization and, in turn, to study how those attitudes impact behavior, particularly political behavior on the global stage.

TRL – MODERNIZATION THEORY

Similar to discourse on secularization, theoretical discourse on modernization helps contextualize how traditional religious leaders contribute to revolution, regime change, and altered state sovereignty. In *Multiple Modernities*, S.N. Eisenstadt writes:

> The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world-indeed to explain the history of modernity- is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs.[94]

In Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities, modernity and Westernization are not

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92 Ibid., 215.

93 Ibid., 19.

94 S.N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1 (Winter, 2000): 2.

identical, and Western patterns of modernity are not the only "authentic" ones."[95] He writes:

> The appropriation of non-Western societies of specific themes and institutional patterns of the original Western modern civilization societies entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation of these imported ideas.[96]

As different iterations of modernity have developed, the nation state is often the center of collective identity among activists and protesters who lead social movements. Eisenstadt writes:

> The ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation-state, its position as the charismatic locus of the major components of the cultural program of modernity and collective identity, have been weakened; new political, social, and civilizational visions, new visions of collective identity, are being developed.[97]

He offers examples of such social movements, including 1) movements with a local scope or agenda (ex. ecological movements, the women's movement in the West) 2) Fundamentalist movements (Muslim, Jewish, Protestant Christian communities) 3) "ethnic" movements (Soviet Union, Africa, and the Balkans).

According to Juergensmeyer, these social movements do not signal Fukuyama's "end of history", as in the end to ideological clashes between programs of modernity.[98]

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95 Ibid., 2–3.

96 Ibid., 15.

97 Ibid., 16.

98 Ibid., 18.

Nor do they signal Huntington's "clash of civilizations" between the secular West and societies that reject modernity. Eisenstadt writes:

> Rather the trends of globalization show nothing so clearly as the continual reinterpretation of the cultural program of modernity; the construction of multiple modernities; attempts by various groups and movements to reappropriate and redefine the discourse of modernity on their own new terms. At the same time, they are bringing about a repositioning of the major arenas of contestation in which new forms of modernity are shaped, away from the traditional forum of the nation-state to new areas in which different movements and societies continually interact.[99]

Transnational religious leaders fit into Eisenstadt's paradigm in that they are often leaders of social movements that lead unique programs of modernity, programs that may not fit into the traditional Western paradigm. Transnational religious leaders can reject, accept, modify, or even lead programs of modernity. Understanding how a transnational religious leader views modernity is critical in examining his/her relationship with revolution, regime change, and sovereignty.

Transnational Social Movements

TSM – Political Theology

Philpott proposes two roles by which ideas exert influence on politics and social revolutions. The first role of ideas is to "convert people to new identities, leading them to want new political ends."[100] In its second role, ideas wield social power, coaxing heads of state to pursue new courses and to "interest in a new constitution of international

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99 Ibid., 23–24.

100 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 46–47.

society."[101] The transnational religious leaders studied in this project used the power of shared ideas and values to mobilize people internationally to influence domestic political ends. Often these ideas had a theological nature that transcends territorial boundaries, but have localized consequences. Fox and Sandler find that religion and religious ideas influence human behavior. Religion has several basic influences:

> First, it can influence people's worldviews, which in turn influences how they think and behave. Second, it is an aspect of identity. Third, it is a source of legitimacy, including political legitimacy. Fourth, it is associated with formal institutions that can influence the political process.[102]

These basic influences, particularly religion as identity translated into political legitimacy, are present in the two case studies of this paper.

In analyzing transnational religious leaders, a distinction must be drawn between theological and political ideas. Sometimes the theological ideas used by religious leaders have political content. In *Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, Hegghammer finds that the jihadist movement in Saudi Arabia is driven primarily by extreme pan-Islamism. In Saudi Arabia, "support for suffering Muslims abroad became a major source of political legitimacy and social status."[103] Hegghammer distinguishes jihadism from Islam, and theological categories from political content, writing:

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101 Ibid., 50.

102 Jonathan Fox and Samuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion Into International Relations*. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 2.

103 Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1.

> Many of the theological descriptors commonly used in the literature on Islamism, such as salafi, Wahhabi, jihadi salafi, and takfiri, do not correspond to discrete and observable patterns of political behavior among Islamists. I therefore rely instead on terms that signal the political content of the ideology at hand or the immediate political priorities of a given actor, such as "revolutionary" or "pietist"… A social movement is by definition united by a shared set of political preferences… This is not to say that the terms Salafism or Wahhabism should be discarded, only that they are more useful for analyzing theological discourse than political behavior.[104]

He finds that the relationship between theology and militancy is not a causal one. Wahhabism shapes the way in which activists articulate and legitimize their agenda – it doesn't determine the "core content of their activism."[105]

Like Hegghammer, a central concern of this paper will be to understand the relationship between theological discourse and mobilization for political action. How does theology influence mobilization? How can we separate theological content from political content in the language of social revolution? How does theology influence domestic politics, and ultimately the international understanding of state sovereignty?

TSM – MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

In the volume *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*, John D. McCarthy contributes identifies categories through which social movements are analyzed, applies them to transnational social movements, an identifies areas for future research. He expounds upon six core concepts: strategic framing processes, activist identities, mobilizing structures, resource mobilization, political opportunity structures,

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104 Ibid., 5.

105 Ibid., 5.

and repertoires of contention.[106] The definition of strategic framing is borrowed from McAdam, who wrote, "The conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action."[107] McCarthy points out that having an activist identity is not enough; one must have the opportunity to act, and the costs of transnational activism are higher than domestic activism. A *mobilizing structure* includes "the more or less formally organized everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action, ranging from religious groups and neighborhood associations to workplace cliques and friendship groups."[108] Transnational social movements must mobilize "some labor, financial support, and in-kind support, and legitimacy in order to increase their chances for survival."[109] Resource mobilization also matters. Financial support is even more important for transnational social movements than for local social movements.

A *political opportunity structure* captures the relationship between the state and the social movement. McCarthy writes:

> The emergence, shape, and development of that movement are interpreted as a collective response to the development of the scope,

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106 Florini, *The Third Force*, 243.

107 John McCarthy and Mark Wolfson, "Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the Cooptation of Civil and State Infrastructures," in Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg (eds.) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University press, 1992, 244. References Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing-Process-Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (ed.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.

108 McCarthy and Wolfson, "Consensus Movements", 249.

109 Ibid., 253.

> resources, and penetration of the modern state-as national states aggregated power and resources, movements came more and more to target state authorities with demands for social change in existing societal arrangements.[110]

Dimensions of political opportunity structures include: 1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 2) the stability of elite arrangements 3) the presence of elite allies 4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression.[111] The most popular thinking holds that as authority becomes increasingly invested in transnational bodies, social movements become more transnational in scope and target. However, the impact of national political opportunities should not be disregarded. Finally repertoires of contention refers to characterizing movements by the mix of strategies and tactics they employ. Strategies are "a mix of public education, direct aid to victims of injustice, and attempts to change structures directly," yet he finds acts of transnational movements to be understudied.[112]

A social movement can be defined as "an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups and organizations to promote or to resist social change with the use of public protest activities."[113] Political movements, more specifically, are movements that "make changes in power arrangements, especially those

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110 Ibid., 255.

111 McCarthy and Wolfson, "Consensus Movements", 255. References McAdam et al., "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 10.

112 McCarthy and Wolfson, "Consensus Movements", 257.

113 Friedhelm Neidhardt and Dieter Rucht, "The Analysis of Social Movements: The State of the Art and Some Perspectives for Future Research" in Dieter Rucht (ed.) The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA (Boulder, CO: Campus and Westview Press, 1991), 450.

structured through the state, a central part of their program."[114] Building further on the concept of political movements, "in each society, there are movement that, regardless of their specific or individual goals, have similar basic demands and a common constituency: these sets of coexisting movements constitute movement families."[115] These movement families emerge during periods of intense protest activities, increased turmoil, and the emergence of new forms of collective action; these periods represent the peaks of protest cycles.[116] Tarrow defines social movements as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities."[117]

TSM – NATURE OF ACTIVISM

This study of transnational religious leaders is also informed by literature on transnational activism. Although the literature is young, in 2005, Sidney Tarrow outlined a method for studying transnational activism in *The New Transnational Activism*. Tarrow identifies six processes of transnational contention: global framing and internalization, diffusion and scale shift, and externalization and coalition forming.[118] He delineates rooted cosmopolitans and transnational activists. The term "rooted cosmopolitan" was

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114 Craig Jenkins, *The Politics of Protest: Comparative Politics on States and Social* Movements (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2004), 83.

115 Donatella Della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht (eds.), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (2nd Ed.) (New York, NY: Macmillan, 2009), 450.

116 Tarrow, Sidney. *The New Transnational Activism*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13–14.

117 Ibid., 4. Referencing Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons.* (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984).

118 Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism.*

first used by Mitchell Cohen in 1992, when he called for "the fashioning of a dialectical concept of rooted cosmopolitanism, which accepts a multiplicity of roots and branches and that rests on the legitimacy of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, but with common ground."[119] Tarrow builds on that definition, writing:

> What is rooted in this conception is that, as cosmopolitans move physically and cognitively outside their origins, they continue to be linked to place, to the social networks that inhabit space, and to the resources, experiences, and opportunities that place provides them with.[120]

Alternately, transnational activists are:

> A subgroup of rooted cosmopolitans whom I define as individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies.[121]

Two types of activists include "nesting pigeons" and "birds of passage." He writes, "…nesting pigeons use their ties to their home communities to foster development and to keep family ties alive, birds of passage, 'cheaply, safely, and in a self-satisfying way, can play national hero on the other side of the world'."[122] The nature of activism can also be defined along more simple terms, such as if the actor uses violent or nonviolent means. But Tarrow contributes a lens through which to study where the activist is rooted, where

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119 Mitchell Cohen, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism," *Dissent* (Autumn 1992): 480, 483.

120 Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, 42.

121 Ibid., 43.

122 Ibid., 54–55, 74.

his or her alliances lie, and how he practically achieves his political ends through activism.

Regime Change

In this paper, regimes are considered upon their merit as indicators of challenges to conceptions of sovereignty. Krasner explores the concept of the international regime as an intervening variable, which can be related to the case studies. He defines international regimes "as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area."[123] He conceptualizes them as standing between basic causal factors (power, interest, values) and outcome/behavior. He distinguishes between principles/norms and rules/procedures, writing "changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes"[124] and "changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself."[125] He finds:

> If principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules and procedures, then a regime has weakened.[126]

After establishing this definition of regimes, he is able to weigh their worth as intervening variables.

He references three schools of thought about regimes. The first, represented by

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123 Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization*, 36, 2 (1992): 185.

124 Ibid., 187.

125 Ibid., 188.

126 Ibid., 189.

Susan Strange, is consistent with the structuralist orientation towards a world of rational self-seeking actors. It holds that actors (individuals, groups, classes or states) define the system through their own interests, power and interaction. Principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures have little impact on outcomes and behavior. The second school, modified structural, is represented by Robert Keohane and Arthur Stein. They start with a world of sovereign states maximizing their interest and power. They find that for most situations regimes are irrelevant because there is a direct link between basic causal variables and related behavior. However, under certain circumstances where individual decision making leads to suboptimal outcomes, regimes may be significant.[127] The third approached, held by Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, and Oran Young, is informed by a Grotian perspective. It holds that regimes are pervasive phenomena of all political systems. Hopkins and Puchala suggest that elites with transnational ties are the practical actors in international relations. Sovereignty is a behavioral variable, not an analytic assumption.

Another scholar contributes to regime change as a variable by analyzing its micro and macro level processes in a transnational world. John Owen distinguishes transnational ideological networks (TIN) from traditional definitions of transnational networks. Transnational ideological networks are "networks organized around an ideology or plan for ordering public life."[128] He writes, "TINs aim not simply to change policies or laws, but to replace, in country after country, one regime with another to

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127 Ibid., 192.

128 Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*, 34.

preserve a regime against replacement."[129] He adopts David Easton's definition of a regime as being constituted by "institutions, operational rules of the game, and ideologies (goals, preferred rules, and preferred arrangements among political institutions)."[130] In favoring one regime, Owen finds that TIN's engage in contentious politics, referencing McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly. Although all TINs are radical, they are not all violent or even revolutionary. Yet they do perpetually strive to alter domestic regimes internationally either because they believe regime change coincides with their interests or because they are internationalists. Regardless of their motivation, they all "recognize their common interests and interdependence across states, and… help one another through various means, including the sharing of information, strategies, and tactics, and the clarification of principles and goals."[131] Owen notes that individual transnational ideas entrepreneurs (TIEs) "attempt to persuade, and are more likely to succeed the more credible actors adopt them; for example, a regime type gains credibility when a major power implements it."[132]

Owen uses a micro and macro level of analysis to explain how transnational ideological networks and their rules impact regime change. One the macro level, a transnational regime contest causes, on the micro level, events that polarize elites. Elite

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129 Ibid.

130 David Easton, John Gunnell, and Michael Stein, "Introduction: Democracy as Regime Type and the Development of Political Science," in *Regime and Discipline: Democracy and the Development of Political Science* edited by David Easton, John Gunnell, and Michael Stein (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 8–9.

131 Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*, 35.

132 Ibid., 76.

polarization causes rulers forcibly promoting regimes on the micro level, which causes the original variable on the macro level, a transnational regime contest. Owen's hypotheses center on transnational ideological polarization, which he defines as "the progressive segregation of elites and mass public across states along an ideological axis, so that political preferences among elites across states are simplified and intensified."[133]

His micro-level hypotheses include:

F*igure 1 - Owen's Micro-Level Hypothesis*[134]

OWEN'S MICRO-LEVEL HYPOTHESES
1. *Regime instability→ transnational ideological polarization→ ex ante forcible promotion*
2. *Great-power war→ transnational ideological polarization→ ex post forcible promotion*

Owen's macro-level hypothesis revolves around long waves of regimes. A long wave endures until one regime type suggest that vastly superior on terms all elites accept. The patterns can be explained according to the following causal relationships:

Figure 2 - Owen's Macro-Level Hypothesis[135]

OWEN'S MACRO-LEVEL HYPOTHESES
1. *Predominant regime fails some elites→ regime crisis→ new regime emerges→ transnational ideological contest*
2. *No regime type superior→ transnational contest continues*
3. *One regime manifestly superior→ end of contest*

133 Ibid., 37.

134 Ibid., 71.

135 Ibid., 72.

Owen provides a useful framework for analyzing the interaction between domestic variables and international variables. His transnational ideological contest will prove useful in analyzing macro-level forces in this paper's two case studies.

In analyzing the regime change that takes place in our case studies, literature on the relationship between domestic and international politics is relevant. The relationship between international relations and domestic politics is more interactive than many comparativists allow for. According to Gourevitch:

> The international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them… International relations and domestic politics are… so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes.[136]

Transnational religious leaders peddle in ideas. They are powerful because of ideas which transcend territorial boundaries. They are able to use this power to shape international legitimacy towards a state. The international system, through ideas or ideology, can greatly impact internal political development, for example, "Catholic versus Protestant; Napoleon and the French Revolution versus the Ancient Regime; fascism, communism and bourgeois democracy against each other. These lines of ideological tension shaped not only the international system but internal politics as well."[137] The international state system imposes on domestic society through revolution – "the outbreak and outcome of

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136 Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978): 911.

137 Ibid., 883.

these revolutions is unintelligible without an examination of international factors."[138] This is applicable to the study of transnational religious actors, who preach revolution internationally, and ultimately, either through the structure of international coalitions or through the perception of state legitimacy, impact domestic politics, and sometimes domestic regime change. Gourevitch holds that students of comparative politics "treat domestic structure too much as an independent variable, underplaying the extent to which it and the international system are parts of an interactive system."[139] Gourevitch's model suggests that valuable in analyzing the interaction between domestic and international structures in the case studies.

Sovereignty

Sovereignty is a "big" idea.[140] It has defined how we think about international relations, law, and politics in the modern era. According to Robert Jackson, "Sovereignty is one of the constituent ideas of the post-medieval world: it conveys a distinctive configuration of politics and law that sets the modern era apart from previous eras."[141] Jackson writes, "Sovereignty is a distinctive configuration of state authority. By 'state' I refer to the conventional meaning: a defined and delimited territory, with a permanent population, under the authority of a government."[142] Sovereignty is "both an idea of

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138 Ibid., 900.

139 Ibid.

140 Robert Jackson (ed.) *Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea* (New York, NY: Polity, 2007), 1.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid, 6.

supreme authority in the state, and an idea of political and legal independence of geographically separate states."[143] Sovereignty is a pluralistic arrangement of authority in that there are many sovereign states. He continues, "Their independence is independence in relation to each other. Their supremacy is supremacy over their own subjects or citizens."[144] Fundamentally, for Jackson, "Supremacy and independence cannot exist separately."[145]

Successful sovereignty demands authority and power. The relationship between authority and power was famously expounded upon by Thomas Hobbes: "Covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."[146] Jackson finds that Hobbes:

> Closely bracketed sovereignty and power, the authoritativeness of states and the capabilities (and capacities) of states, because he recognized the futility and uselessness of sovereignty without power.[147]

Successful sovereignty also demands legitimate authority. Transnational religious leaders can translate state legitimacy in the eyes of the international community into domestic politics and regime change. The politics of transnational civil society is "centrally about the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimized (by governments,

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143 Ibid, preface x.

144 Ibid, 8.

145 Ibid, 12.

146 Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan* (Redford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2007), 109.

147 Jackson, *Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea*, 17.

institutions, and other groups).”[148] Krasner makes the distinction between authority and control, writing that “authority involves a mutually recognized right for an actor to engage in specific types of activities.”[149] According to Philpott, “sovereignty is supreme legitimate authority within a territory.”[150] According to Wolff, authority is the right to command and the right to be obeyed, which differs from power.[151] Authority is legitimate when “it is rooted in law, tradition, consent or divine command and when those living under it generally endorse this notion.”[152]

The peace of Westphalia established sovereignty as “a territorial definition of political authority.”[153] According to Philpott, Westphalian sovereignty has “three faces”. First, Westphalia made the sovereign state the most powerful and legitimate form of political unity. Second, it found a government with control over its territory to be the criteria for statehood. Third, Westphalia removed previously legitimate restrictions on a state’s activities within its territory.[154] These three faces encapsulate the most traditional definition of sovereignty, that a sovereign, territorially defined state had supreme authority within its borders and was part of a world order in which states were the

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148 Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, “Globalization and Inequality,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 24 (3) (1995): 468.

149 Krasner, *Organized Hypocrisy*, 3–4.

150 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 3.

151 Martin Wolff, “With the Nation-State Survive Globalization?” *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb 2001).

152 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 2.

153 Jackson, *Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea*, 17.

154 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 7.

dominant actors. This definition remained relatively unchallenged for centuries.

However, in the late twentieth century, particularly the 1990s, the conversation about sovereignty started to change. At that time, "World summits on human rights, the environment, population and women brought states together with relevant and often obstreperous NGO forums and created a new arena for world politics: transnational civil society."[155] The older theoretical discourse, united in the principle that states were the only meaningful actors in the international system, seemed inadequate to capture this experience. New theories were created in response. Bull discussed state cooperation with his "Grotian" concept of "international society." Keohane, Krasner and others "elaborated on the idea of state cooperation via treaties, international organizations, and regimes."[156] Neomedieval discourse started to raise "the possibility of multiple overlapping institutions, organizations, and practices in conjunction with cooperating states that limited and shared sovereignty."[157]

Stephen Krasner has written extensively on sovereignty. In his early works, he identifies four different types of sovereignty. International legal sovereignty involves "the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence."[158] Westphalian sovereignty refers to a political

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155 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori, *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 9.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, 3–4.

organization, "based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory."[159] Domestic sovereignty refers to political authority within the state and its ability to exercise effective control within state borders. Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public officials "to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their states."[160]

Krasner's four meanings of sovereignty -interdependence sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty, and international legal sovereignty- "are not logically related, nor have they empirically always occurred together."[161] Political leaders often use the international legal sovereignty of their states to compromise Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. Furthermore:

> Issues of globalization and human rights, which have recently received so much attention, are old, not new, problems. States have always struggled to control the cross-border flow of ideas, goods, and people. The right of rulers to unilaterally and autonomously establish laws for their own polities has been challenged by external actors concerned about international security, minority rights, and fiscal responsibility.[162]

In conclusion, Krasner finds that "Sovereignty's resilience is, if nothing else, a reflection of its tolerance for alternatives."[163] Krasner holds that the norms of sovereignty were never strong, that they have always been challenged. Sovereignty no longer refers to its

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159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,* 248.

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.

traditional definitions, such as domestic order within borders, independence from other states, non-intervention, and ability to enter into international agreements. More recently, sovereignty has "come to be associated with the idea of control over trans-border movements."[164] He even goes so far as to call sovereignty "organized hypocrisy."[165]

Krasner updated these definitions in 2004 with the notion of "shared sovereignty." He discusses the incentives developed countries have for "promoting better governance in failed, failing, and post conflict countries."[166] In such countries where the domestic sovereignty does not live up to the international legal or Westphalian sovereignty, he finds that two arrangements could offer a solution. The first solution would be that of a trusteeship or protectorate. The second would be "shared sovereignty in which national rulers would use their international legal sovereignty to legitimate institutions within their states in which authority was shared between internal and external actors."[167] This shared sovereignty would involve "the engagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time."[168] Krasner writes: "National actors would use their international legal sovereignty to enter into agreements that would compromise their Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty with the goal of improving domestic sovereignty. One core element – the principle of autonomy – would

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164 Krasner, 2.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid., 1.

167 Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty", 105.

168 Ibid., 108.

be violated."[169] The incentives for shared sovereignty among political decision makers include: avarice, post conflict occupation, desperation, and elections.[170]

Other social scientists offered updated definitions of sovereignty around the same time. Helen Stacey argues for a new conception of sovereignty called "relational sovereignty", writing:

> Relational sovereignty defines sovereignty as a measure of care by government for its citizens whereby external actors ascribe the level or the standard that another government must reach in servicing the needs of that government's citizens. External actors rationalize this external appraisal as a standard of governance that a nation's citizens must surely want for themselves, were they only able to effectively have their government supply it to them.[171]

Relational sovereignty is similar to Krasner's shared sovereignty in that it involves foreign countries setting the standards that a domestic government should reach in order to be considered sovereign. Krasner, however, calls for the foreign country to share the responsibility of creating the stable government necessary for that sovereignty. The concept of relational sovereignty developed at a time that the European Union was expanding and dialogue about international organization and governance was developing.

Susan Rudolph offers an alternate vision for sovereignty in the world of transnational civil society. She writes that, "Once a non-state arena is imagined, in which states are significant but not only players, it becomes possible to specify a space for

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169 Ibid.

170 Ibid., 113–118.

171 Helen Stacey, "Relational Sovereignty," *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,* Vol. 99 (March 30–April 2, 2005): 399–400.

transnational civil society in global politics."[172] She delineates civil society as "inside" the state and transnational civil society as "outside" the state. She finds that, "Transnational activity is guided by imaginary maps whose boundaries do not approximate the spaces depicted on political maps", and considers the transnational realms of Catholic Christianity and the Tijaniyya Sufis as examples of arenas governed by considerations other than sovereignty. Such arenas do not replace or supersede political maps showing territorially defined states. She writes:

> We can imagine them as transparent plastic overlays, alternative meaning systems superimposed upon the meaning system of political maps. They do not replace state-defined space; they provide alternatives to it… What this suggests is less a waning of states than a more complex set of interrelations in which rival identities and structures jostle the state. New alliances and goals become possible as domestic civil society joins up with transnational civil society to challenge states and as states in concert employ elements in transnational civil society to limit particular states' sovereignty.[173]

Rudolph's vision of sovereignty offers a new layer of meaning to the case studies in this paper, both of which involve multiple, overlapping, transnational civil societies.

The ultimate goal of this paper will be to parse out and understand how conceptions of state sovereignty were altered in the two case studies. This finding will attempt to be accessed through the variables of transnational religious leaders, transnational social movements, and regime change. As transnational religious actors who lead transnational social movements based on religious ideology impact state

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172 Rudolph and Piscatori, *Transnational Religion,* 9.

173 Ibid., 12.

authority, they in turn change conceptions of sovereignty. According to Keck and Sikkink, if sovereignty is a shared set of understandings and expectations about state authority that is reinforced by practices, then changes in these practices and understandings should in turn transform sovereignty."[174] Philpott finds that "norms of sovereignty are… (matters of) basic authority. They are not solely matters of power but also of legitimate authority. Revolutions in these norms are rare, but they are revolutions of the most basic sort."[175]

Sovereignty evolves through revolution. According to Philpott, "tumult yields novel orthodoxy."[176] Revolutions which have led to a change in sovereignty in the past have been based upon transnational ideas adopted by transnational social movements and their leaders. According to Philpott, there have been several revolutions in sovereignty after Westphalia (the first revolution): Napoleon's failed attempt at empire, 19th century minority rights and national self-determination (French revolution, WWI), and the end of colonialism. But the greatest revolution since Westphalia was the creation of the European Community, now the European Union, in which "a significant political authority other than the state has become legitimate."[177] Because of this revolution, "the Westphalian paradigm is being weakened and (the sovereignty of) the state is again…

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174 Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 37.

175 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 9–10.

176 Daniel Philpott, "Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Winter, 1995): 353

177 Ibid., 9.

problematic."[178] These historical revolutions set a precedent for the dynamics of the two case studies of social movements based on transnational religious ideals in this paper. The Solidarity movement's role in the democratization of Poland and the Afghan Arab's role in the Soviet Afghan war and the birth of a global jihadist movement add further challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty. This mounting challenge may someday contribute to a change in the Westphalian system and the place of individual transnational religious leaders within it.

We are living in a world in which sovereignty is no longer wholly defined by the ideals of Westphalia. As transnational religious leaders and their domestic social movements based on transnational religious ideas lead to global political change, they are redefining conceptions of sovereignty. Transnational religious leaders' contributions to global political change, social movements, and regime change are no longer the exception to the rule – they are offering a challenge to conceptions of traditional Westphalian and modern sovereignty that is systemic and weighty. The following chapters will attempt to isolate a causal relationship between the variables of transnational religious leader, transnational social movement, regime change and conceptions of state sovereignty, proving that the great revolutions in sovereignty that Philpott identifies are still evolving, and perhaps new iterations even being birthed today.

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178 Ibid., 9.

CHAPTER TWO

Research Design

Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam - the first man grew up in Nazi occupied Poland, went on to lead the international Roman Catholic church, and contributed to the fall of Communism in his native country, and some argue, to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe through nonviolent revolution. The second was an Arab from Palestine, a mentor to Osama Bin Laden, and is known as the "fighting cleric". He went on to both author the theology and provide the opportunity for violent "defensive jihad" in the Soviet Afghan war, which contributed to Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan, and ultimately to the birth of global jihadism.

What do these two men have in common? Even placing these figures in the same sentence may be unsettling or create dissonance for some readers. Yet, they have many shared characteristics. They were both leaders of transnational religious communities. They both mobilized people across state lines to work towards regime change, and in both historical circumstances, they worked against the Soviet agenda to varying degrees. Finally, they both challenged traditional and modern conceptions of state sovereignty. There is a current need in political science literature, especially literature involving religion and international relations, regime change, and sovereignty, to clearly define and scientifically analyze the transnational religious leader. Through the analysis of these two seemingly impossibly different figures, this dissertation will offer a systematic framework to understand how transnational religious leaders can, through regime change,

dramatically alter traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty, and challenge modern theories of state sovereignty.

CHOICE OF CASES

These cases were chosen in part because in each case regime change and conceptions of state sovereignty were clearly affected. However, there is a variance around how regime change was prompted and how state sovereignty was challenged. In Poland, John Paul II worked with Western countries to achieve a stable Poland. Though the Catholic Church had a working relationship with both Solidarity and the Communist regime, most of the pope's public actions and statements lent legitimacy to Solidarity in the eyes of the world. This ultimately contributed to the birth of a democracy. In Afghanistan, Azzam appealed to sub state actors in the Muslim world to take violent action to bring about regime change, and this ultimately contributed to the withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and not long after, the birth of a new civil war.

These cases were also chosen because characteristics of the transnational religious leader and their associated transnational social movements pose interesting similarities and differences. The cases lend themselves to controlled comparison to support theory creation. There is historical and circumstantial continuity between these two cases. Both cases occurred in the Soviet context. Both leaders had charismatic transformational leadership styles and enjoyed widespread international followings based on religious ideology. However, their political theologies, social movement structures, and methods of activism were very different. Poland was under Communist rule for decades before the

Pope's sermons, whereas Azzam was speaking out against an ongoing invasion, which already had a significant domestic armed resistance. In other words, one was speaking out against oppression, the other invasion. John Paul aided a nonviolent social movement in its success towards democratic regime change. Azzam led the Afghan Arabs in both theological justification and the procurement of arms and money to support armed conflict with an invading force. The two leaders had vastly different understandings of the secular state and the modern world as a whole. Finally, these cases were chosen because they are informative to current policy problems. As an example, consider the contemporary influence of religious movements and ideology for regime change in the Middle East.

Research Objectives

The first research objective is to theorize the inputs to the presence of a TRL. The second objective is to hypothesize a causal relationship between TRLs, their vision for and contributions to regime change, and their consequent impact upon modern conceptions of state sovereignty. The TRL's goal for regime change, how that goal measures up against Westphalian principles, and his practical contributions to regime change are addressed in the third research objective. The TRL's impact upon modern definitions of state sovereignty, through regime change, is addressed in the fourth research objective.

1. Theorize Enabling Characteristics of TRLs

The first research objective is to theorize the inputs to the presence of a transnational religious leader (TRL). A TRL is an individual actor who, guided by a religious ideology, acts towards political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and immaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across state lines in the achievement of those ends. This understanding of the transnational religious leader is guided by the literature on transnational civil society, particularly the concept that these individuals are non-state actors that are not restricted by the boundaries of nation-states in realizing their goals.[179] This understanding of the transnational religious leader is guided by literature on transnational advocacy networks in that TRLs are mobilizing people to act across state lines to achieve something political based on a theological idea.[180] The transnational religious leaders studied in this project use the power of shared ideas and values to mobilize people internationally to influence domestic political ends. Though the theology and ideology transcend nation state boundaries, the objectives are political with consequences specific to the nation. The enabling characteristic of TRLs, including characteristics of the individual TRL and characteristics of the associated TSM are represented in the following chart.

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179 Liptschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics," and Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power.*

180 Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*.

Figure 3 - Enabling Characteristics of TRLs



TRL-Leadership

The first characteristic of a transnational religious leader is his/her leadership style. Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette find that leadership is an activity and a dialogical relationship. The dialogical approach demands study, not only of the ways that leaders lead through speech and action, but also how followers respond. They investigate where, within movements, leadership actually resides. They analyze it along two planes of inquiry. First, "leadership is exercised at all manner of levels and locations within movements, and not only by those obviously designated as 'leaders'."[181] Second, "the

181 Colin Barker, Alan Johnson, and Michael Lavalette, *Leadership and Social Movements* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 15.

problem leadership addresses - what is to be done? - can alter situationally from moment to moment."[182] A seminal work, James' MacGregor Burn's *Transnational Leadership*, distinguishes between transactional and transformational leadership. Transactional leadership "motivates through the measured application of promised rewards and threatened punishments,"[183] while transformational leadership motivates by "transforming the identities and goals of individuals to coincide with those of the group."[184] Burns also theorizes an ideal leadership that minimizes coercive power and enables followers to accomplish goals that even the leader might not fully realize. Thus, both the leader and the follower are encouraged towards greatness and transformation.

Research questions regarding the leadership style of the Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam include: Did the transnational religious leader adopt a transactional or transformational leadership style? What historical evidence supports this claim? In considering leadership as an activity and a dialogical relationship, how did the transnational religious leader lead? What do the response of his followers and changing historical circumstances say about him as a leader? How did the leadership of his social movement or religious community go on after his death?

TRL-Hard versus Soft Power

The second characteristic of a transnational religious leader is his whether or not he

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182 Ibid., 16.

183 Lovaglia, Lucas, Baxter, "Transactional and Transformational Leadership: Their Foundations in Power and Influence," 23.

184 Ibid.

wields hard or soft power, both, or none at all in the achievement of his aims. "Hard power" refers to the traditional means used by leaders or states to achieve their ends. It refers to coercing a state, group, or individual to do something, often by force or by threat of force. "Soft power", a concept developed by Joseph Nye, refers to the ability to make an individual, group, or state "want" to do something.[185] "Religious soft power", a concept developed by Jeffry Haynes, refers to how "religious transnational actors" spread ideas, values, and norms.[186] An actor using religious soft power might spread ideas through inspirational language or persuasive theological writings. "Hard power" as a concept works best within a realist framework of international relations. "Soft power" is best understood under a liberal or constructivist lens. A transnational religious leader can hold both hard and soft power simultaneously. Questions to access the type of power wielded by the transnational actors in the case studies include: By what means did the TRL achieve his aims? How did he mobilize his followers to action? How did he change the actions of a nation state or multiple nation states? Did he use or threaten to use force? Did he persuade people to want to act towards something? If he wielded both kinds of power, which was dominant and why?

TRL-Secularization

The third characteristic of the transnational religious leader is his or her relationship to the secularized state. In his study of "religious nationalists", Juergensmeyer finds that religious nationalists are individuals with both religious and political interests who

185 Nye, *Soft Power*, 12.

186 Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors*, 6.

"appear… to be responding in a religious way to a political situation."[187] Juergensmeyer also explores the line between religious nationalism and secular nationalism, as well as the confrontation between religious nationalism and the secular state. He even raises the question as to whether certain denominations lend themselves to a degree of comfort with the secular state, while others reject it. Questions to test how the TRL related to the secular state include: How did JPII and Azzam view the secular state? What factors determined this outlook (ex. theology, leadership, political agenda)? Did the TRL aim for the establishment of a theocratic state? Did he accept the value of democracy? How did the TRL relate to international organizations and international leaders? Was the TRL's notion of state legitimacy and authority in international relations informed by his opinion of the secular state? If so, how? How does religious denomination impact this perspective, if at all?

TRL-Modernity

The fourth characteristic of the transnational religious leader is his relationship to modernity or programs of modernization. For decades, secularization scholars claimed that the apex of modernization in secular society would mark the downfall of religion, as measured by church attendance, religious belief, and privatization of religious institutions, among other things. Peter Berger, a sociologist at the forefront of the movement, claimed that the advent of the modern world would create world-wide

187 Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?,* 6.

secularization[188], a notion he recanted in the late 1980's.[189] Secularization has always been linked to the concept of modernization, and in the context of this study, a transnational religious leader's concept of the secular state is often linked to his view of modernity. Modernity is a fluid concept. Eisenstadt introduces the concept of multiple modernities, writing, "The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world-indeed to explain the history of modernity- is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs."[190] Key questions regarding modernity that can be applied to the case studies in this dissertation include: Did the transnational religious leader accept modernity? Did the transnational religious leader accept the privatization of religion? Did the transnational religious leader accept the hallmarks of modernity? Could modernity and religion coexist for the transnational religious leader, or were the two fundamentally opposed? Did the transnational religious leader accept a multiplicity of modernization programs, or just one?

TSM-Political Theology

The first characteristic of the transnational social movement is political theology. Often the theological ideas used by transnational religious leaders have political content that shape transnational social movements. In Hegghammer's study of the jihadist

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188 Peter Berger, *The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation* (1 Ed.) (Garden city, NY: Anchor Press, 1979).

189 Peter Berger, "Secularism in Retreat," *The National Interest,* 46 (Winter 1996/97): 3–13.

190 Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," 2.

movement in Saudi Arabia, he finds that Wahhabism shapes the way in which activists articulate and legitimize their agenda, but not the "core content of their activism."[191] He observes that the "theological descriptors" used in the movement, "do not correspond to discrete and observable patterns of political behavior among Islamists."[192] Understanding the transnational social movement's political theology involves studying the relationship between theological discourse and mobilization for political action. The concept of political theology is also similar to McAdam's "strategic framing process", defined as "the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of them that legitimate and motivate collective action."[193] Political theology is not just about content, but the framing of the message. In their studies of social movements, Hegghammer and Della Porta use a multi-variable framework, including an analysis of the system, the group, and the individual, to address how "human, material, and immaterial resources were marshaled and organized for political action."[194] The case studies to be explored will examine how transnational religious actors framed their struggle and how they used ideology to create mobilization. The concept of "ideology" is relevant in all three levels of analysis: "as part of the environment in which agents operate, as part of their strategy to mobilize followers and as part of the individual

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191 Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, 5.

192 Ibid.

193 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures," 6.

194 Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia,* 12.

recruitment process."[195] Key research questions include: What are the theological concepts behind the political agenda of this transnational civil society? How are political aims articulated? With theological or political concepts? What is the view of the transnational social movement on the secular state? How does theology influence mobilization? How can we separate theological content from political content in the language of social revolution? How does theology influence the transnational community? How does it influence domestic politics, and ultimately international conceptions of state sovereignty?

TSM-Mobilizing Structures

The second characteristic of the transnational social movement is "mobilizing structures", a term used by McCarthy in the volume *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*. According to McCarthy, mobilizing structures "include the more or less formally organized everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action, ranging from religious groups and neighborhood associations to workplace cliques and friendship groups."[196] This concept also relates to literature on social movements, which can be defined as "an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups and organizations to promote or resist social change with the use of public protest activities."[197] "Mobilizing structures" are the societal structures that make collective action possible. Key questions to be asked in each case study include: Why can

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195 Ibid.

196 McCarthy and Wolfson, "Consensus Movements," 249.

197 Neidhardt and Rucht, "The Analysis of Social Movements," 450.

the collective action around the transnational religious leader be defined as a social movement? What made it a transnational social movement? How was public protest expressed? What social groups and networks made mobilization possible? Did the movement continue after the death of the transnational religious leader?

TSM-Political Opportunity Structures

The third characteristic of the transnational civil society is "political opportunity structures", also a term used by McCarthy to capture the relationship between the state and the social movement. He writes:

> The emergence, shape, and development of that movement is interpreted as a collective response to the development of the scope, resources, and penetration of the modern state-as national states aggregated power and resources, movements came more and more to target state authorities with demands for social change in existing societal arrangements.[198]

Dimensions of political opportunity structures include: 1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 2) the stability of elite arrangements 3) the presence of elite allies 4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression.[199] Mainstream opinion holds that as authority becomes increasingly invested in transnational bodies, social movements become more transnational in scope and target. However, McCarthy finds that the impact of national political opportunities should not be disregarded. Key

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198 McCarthy and Wolfson, "Consensus Movements", 255 references Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984) and Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

199 McCarthy and Wolfson, "Consensus Movements," 255, references McAdam et al., "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Process," 10.

questions will include: Was the rise of the social movement related to a rise in state aggregate power and resources? Did the social movement become transnational in scope and target as a response to the state authority becoming more invested in transnational bodies? Was the institutionalized political system open or closed? How did this impact political opportunities? What was the nature of elite arrangements and elite allies? How did they impact the transnational social movement? Finally, what was the state's capacity and propensity for repression, and how did that affect political opportunities for the movement?

TSM-Character of Activism

The fourth characteristic of transnational social movements is the character of the activism. Tarrow defines transnational activists as "individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies."[200] The case studies present very differently at face value – a nonviolent labor movement that democratized Poland with the backing of international nation state allies, versus a violent resistance, with the support of a diffuse transnational jihadist movement that repelled Soviet invasion. Key questions include: Was the transnational activism violent or non-violent in nature? How was it communicated? What language was used to create action? How did it cross state lines? What was the guiding philosophy of war and conflict? Has the character of the activism of the transnational social movement changed over its history or remained consistent?

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200 Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, 43.

The overall analysis of the characteristics of the two transnational social movement in each of these cases will be guided by a multi-level social movement framework, as used by Hegghammer and Della Porta. This framework of social movements distinguishes between macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level variables, making it easier "to capture both root causes and tactical variation."[201] In other words, the framework analyzes the system, the group, and the individual. The macro level will examine international political developments, the domestic political space for activism based in theological ideals, and ideological developments in the transnational community.[202] The meso level will examine "first movers and entrepreneurs, and on the strategies they employed to mobilize followers."[203] The micro level will examine the motivations of individual recruits.[204] This analysis will answer broad questions about context, agency, and individual conversion and mobilization.

2. Hypothesize Causal Relationships

The second research objective is to hypothesize a causal relationship between TRL, regime change goals and contributions to regime change, and conceptions of sovereignty.

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201 Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9–14.

202 Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, 11.

203 Ibid.

204 Ibid.

Figure 4 - Hypothesized Relationship of TRL to Challenges to Modern State Sovereignty



This hypothesized relationship proposes that certain characteristics of TRL and TSM influence a TRL's regime change goals and their relationship to Westphalian sovereignty as it exists in the modern world. The goals are broken down into 1) effect policy change or regime change within the existing political context 2) effect state dissolution or geo-political restructuring. The question is then posed as to if those goals are consistent with the Westphalian system. These goals are then translated into the regime change that was implemented, by the TRL and outside inputs. Finally, the TRL's contribution to regime change is analyzed in terms of its impact upon, and challenge to, modern state

sovereignty. These meanings of these categories and relationships will become apparent through the comparative historical analysis in the two case studies.

3. Identify Political Goals and Regime Change Contributions

In both cases a transnational religious leader and a transnational social movement caused a response from nation states, resulting in regime change. This third research objective, shaped by literature on both transnational social movements and regime change, is twofold. First, the paper will identify to the extent possible, what kind of regime change the TRL envisioned and what his relationship to the Westphalian order was. The TRL who aimed for policy change or regime change within the existing political context accommodated to the Westphalian system. The TRL who aimed to effect state dissolution or geopolitical restructuring did not accommodate to the Westphalian system. Second, this paper will establish a process-driven explanation of regime change in the context of two case studies of transnational religious leaders. The explanation will center on political choices, choices "caught up in a continuous redefinition of actors' perceptions of preferences and constraints."[205] Kitschelt delineates the central theoretical division in the field of political regimes as drawn between "structural" explanations versus "those who focus on the process of change itself-the sequence of events and the strategic moves of the actors."[206] This research project, falling in the latter category, will reconstruct two individual cases of regime transition to explain the impact of

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205 Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?" *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (December, 1992): 1028.

206 Ibid.

transnational religious leaders on conceptions of sovereignty and of the system of sovereign states. Process tracing will be used to explain the chain of events related to transnational religious leaders' and transnational social movements' impact on regime change broadly defined, through a non-violent social movement in one case and a violent uprising in response to invasion in another. It will also be used to determine whether the causal process hypothesized is evident.

The analysis of regime change in each case study will consider the three traditions that Krasner presents in his study of regime change as an intervening variable. He writes:

> In sum, conventional structural arguments do not take regimes seriously: if basic causal variables change, regimes will also change. Regimes have no independent impact on behavior. Modified structural arguments, represented here by number of adherent of a realist approach to international relations, see regimes as mattering only when independent decision making leads to undesired outcomes. Finally, Grotian perspectives accept regimes as a fundamental part of all patterned human interaction, including behavior in the international system.[207]

In evaluating the strength of regime change as an intervening variable, the cases can be placed within a structural, modified structural or Grotian perspective. Questions based on Krasner's article will include: Were the political regimes in these case studies impacted by the presence of a transnational religious leader, characteristics of the transnational religious leader, and/or characteristics of the transnational religious community? Could these independent variables have impacted sovereignty without effecting regime change? How did the regime change impact state sovereignty and the global system of sovereign

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207 Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," 194.

states? How important is regime change as an indicator of challenges to conceptions of sovereignty in these case studies?

In *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*, Owen uses a micro and macro level of analysis to explain how transnational ideological networks and their rules impact regime change. According to Owen, on the macro level a transnational regime contest causes events that polarize elites on the micro level. The polarization of elites contributes to rulers forcibly promoting regimes, ultimately causing the transnational regime contest on the macro level. Owen's hypotheses centers on transnational ideological polarization, which he defines as "the progressive segregation of elites and mass public across states along an ideological axis, so that political preferences among elites across states are simplified and intensified."[208] His micro-level hypotheses include regime instability and great-power war as causes of transnational ideological polarization.[209] His macro-level hypothesis revolves around long waves of regimes. A transnational ideological contest will always endure until one regime type suggest that vastly superior on terms all elites accept.[210] Parts of the framework of Owen's work on warring ideas in world politics can be applied to the cases of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Around the periphery of both cases, there were warring ideologies, broadly defined in terms such as the West versus Communism, or Islam versus secularism, among others. Questions include: What were the broader warring ideologies behind each social movement? Does

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208 Owen, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*, 37.

209 Ibid., 71.

210 Ibid., 72.

Owen's basic causal framework apply to these case studies? Do the concepts of transnational ideological polarization and transnational ideological contests apply? How did regime instability versus great power war contribute to regime change in each case? How does the transnational religious leader as individual contribute to Owen's paradigm?

4. Impact upon Conceptions of Sovereignty

The fourth research objective is to explore the impact of transnational religious leaders upon conceptions of state sovereignty and the system of sovereign states through explanatory description and theory creation. The analysis of the case studies will be guided by the following questions: As arbiters of religious regimes, did the transnational religious leaders accept, reject, or transform the Westphalian system? How did they impact conceptions of sovereignty through regime change? According to thinkers like Gross, Morgenthau, and Philpott, the primary legacy of Westphalia is that the sovereign state, with supreme authority within its bordered territory, became the dominant actor in the international system. How are classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty challenged, supported, or transformed by transnational religious leaders? By impacting the domestic politics and regime type of Poland and Afghanistan, did these TRLs weaken conceptions of the Westphalian state sovereignty, and in turn, of the world order of sovereign states?

In addition to classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty, contemporary definitions of state sovereignty will be considered as well. How do the case studies fit into Krasner's four categories of sovereignty- international legal sovereignty,

Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty? Do these cases relate to Krasner's claim that sovereignty is "organized hypocrisy"[211]? How does each case related to Krasner's updated definition, "shared sovereignty"[212] or Stacey's "relational sovereignty"[213]? How does each case study relate to Philpott's central claim that revolutions in sovereignty result from prior revolutions in ideas about justice and political authority?[214] Does the transnational religious leader embody Philpott's role of ideas as 1) ideas that shape identities across societies or 2) ideas that become a form of social power, influencing the interests of politics?[215] This paper will build upon these theories by proposing a process through which state sovereignty is challenged, namely through the contributions of transnational religious leaders to regime change.

This discussion of transnational religious leaders and sovereignty, and theory creation that results, will contribute to the literature on religion in international relations theory, religion and foreign policy, transnational religious actors and international relations, and religion and globalization. It will also introduce the transnational religious leader as a unit of analysis in international relations theory, which is traditionally based on units of nation states alone.

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211 Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.*

212 Ibid.

213 Stacey, "Relational Sovereignty."

214 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 4.

215 Ibid., 49.

SOURCES AND DATA ANALYSIS

As previously stated, the first research objective is to theorize the characteristics of transnational religious leaders and their associated transnational social movements. The eight characteristics hypothesized are based in social science literature. The second objective is to hypothesize a causal relationship between TRL holding certain characteristics, their goals for and impact upon regime change, and the resulting challenge to conceptions of state sovereignty. After the characteristics have been theorized and the causal relationship hypothesized, the questions posed can be answered by meeting the third and fourth research objectives. The following includes their sources and data analysis.

The third objective is to 1) explore the regime change goals and relationship to Westphalian world order of each TRL 2) to establish a process-driven explanation of regime change in the context of two case studies. To achieve the third objective, I will use intelligence documents and other archival resources to support a comparative case analysis. This will include archival research within the virtual archive of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, and the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. I will use the information collected from these sources to explain the historical context for revolution and domestic regime change in each case and to identify the process by which it happened. I will use small-n comparative analysis and process tracing as tools of data analysis. In the context of these historical accounts, the strength of the characteristics of

TRL and TSM will be tested. The paper will measure the strength of the variables in 1) demarking differences in two cases and 2) highlighting the unique nature of transnational religious leaders in relation to other transnational actors.

The fourth research objective is to explore the impact of transnational religious leaders upon sovereignty through explanatory description and theory creation. To address this research objective, I will rely on secondary resources (biographies, academic commentaries) and primary resources (texts, public speeches). For the case of Azzam, I reviewed the "Al-Qaeda Collection" at the Conflict Records Research Center at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, which contains Al Qaeda primary documents recovered by the US Army in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and translated into English for purposes of research. Documents reviewed, among other things, included fatwas, administrative Al Qaeda documents, jihadist poetry, internal letters between Al Qaeda leadership, and recruitment material. Although many of the documents in this collection are related to the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are also a number of documents either from the time of the Soviet Afghan war, and from modern authors commenting upon that time in Al Qaeda history. For the case of Pope John Paul II, I reviewed the "Soviet Flashpoints Collections" files relating to Poland in the 1970's and 1980's at the National Security Archive. Documents reviewed, among other things, included Solidarity Congress meeting notes, U.S. State Department cables, Soviet and European diplomatic cables, notes from phone conversations, letters written by U.S. presidents, CIA National Intelligence Estimates, and other intelligence documents.

Summary

I hypothesize that through the following relationships one can explain why some transnational religious leaders and their associated transnational social movements challenge state sovereignty by impacting regime change:

Figure 5 – Hypothesized Relationship of TRL to Challenges to Conceptions of Modern State Sovereignty



The modes of analysis as laid out in this section are as follows:

1. Characteristics of TRL = leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to secularism, and relationship to modernity

2. Characteristics of TSM = political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and the nature of the activism
3. Regime Change = 1) analyzing the nature of each TRL's regime change goals and its level of consistency with Westphalian sovereignty 2) comparative historical analysis of case studies, evaluating strength of regime change as an intervening variable in structural, modified structural or Grotian perspective, and application of Owen's micro and macro levels of analysis
4. Conceptions of Sovereignty = traditional definitions of Westphalia (Gross, Morgenthau) and modern definitions of state sovereignty (Krasner, Philpott, Strange)

In analyzing the characteristics of TRLs and their TSMs in two historical cases, I attempt to isolate factors that cause some TRLs to have regime change goals that do not work in common conceptions of the Westphalian system, while other TRLs' comfortably accommodate their goals to it. I will also analyze how the transnational religious leaders in these cases studies practically contributed to regime change, and how those contributions impact modern, evolving definitions of sovereignty. By isolating the variables of this equation in each case study, this dissertation builds a framework in which to analyze other transnational religious actors involved in transnational social movements and regime change. By testing the hypothesized causal relationship, a more detailed process is added to existing literature on evolving definitions of sovereignty. More broadly, this dissertation will contribute to the literature on sovereignty and towards the integration of religion and international relations theory.

CHAPTER THREE

Pope John Paul II - Son of Poland, Bishop of Rome

To Poland the Church brought Christ, the key to understanding that great and fundamental reality that is man. For man cannot be fully understood without Christ. Or rather, man is incapable of understanding himself fully without Christ. He cannot understand who he is, nor what his true dignity is, nor what his vocation is, nor what his final end is. He cannot understand any of this without Christ… It is therefore impossible without Christ to understand the history of the Polish nation—this great thousand-year-old community—that is so profoundly decisive for me and each one of us… Today, here in Victory Square, in the capital of Poland, I am asking with all of you, through the great Eucharistic prayer, that Christ will not cease to be for us an open book of life for the future, for our Polish future.

We are before the tomb of the Unknown Soldier… The history of the motherland written through the tomb of an Unknown Soldier! I wish to kneel before this tomb to venerate every seed that falls into the earth and dies and thus bears fruit. It may be the seed of the blood of a soldier shed on the battlefield, or the sacrifice of martyrdom in concentration camps or in prisons. It may be the seed of hard daily toil, with the sweat of one's brow, in the fields, the workshop, the mine, the foundries and the factories. It may be the seed of the love of parents who do not refuse to give life to a new human being and undertake the whole of the task of bringing him up. It may be the seed of creative work in the universities, the higher institutes, the libraries and the places where the national culture is built. It may be the seed of prayer, of service of the sick, the suffering, the abandoned—"all that of which Poland is made".

All that in the hands of the Mother of God—at the foot of the cross on Calvary and in the Upper Room of Pentecost! All that—the history of the motherland shaped for a thousand years by the succession of the generations (among them the present generation and the coming generation) and by each son and daughter of the motherland, even if they are anonymous and unknown like the Soldier before whose tomb we are now. All that— including the history of the peoples that have

> *lived with us and among us, such as those who died in their hundreds of thousands within the walls of the Warsaw ghetto. All that I embrace in thought and in my heart during this Eucharist and I include it in this unique most holy Sacrifice of Christ, on Victory Square.*
>
> *And I cry—I who am a Son of the land of Poland and who am also Pope John Paul II—I cry from all the depths of this Millennium, I cry on the vigil of Pentecost:*
>
> *Let your Spirit descend. Let your Spirit descend and renew the face of the earth, the face of this land. Amen.*
>
> *Homily in Victory Square, Warsaw on June 2, 1979*
>
> *-Pope John Paul II*

In his lifetime, Karol Wojtyla played many roles, including that of quarry worker, actor, poet, theologian, bishop, archbishop, and cardinal. But when he was elected pope in 1978, taking the name John Paul II, he took on the role of a transnational religious leader and wielded a geopolitical power that few achieve, based in a theology of peace, solidarity, and human dignity. He was the first Polish Pope and the first Slavic Pope. The international Catholic community largely responded positively to the fact that he had emerged from behind the Iron Curtain. Pope John Paul II exercised his international influence as a theological leader and made a political goal possible– Poland's freedom from Communist rule, although the details of his political intentions are a matter of debate. Pope John Paul II was meaningful as a transnational religious leader, and he contributed to regime change, in the sense of non-violent, internal regime replacement, in two senses. First, he was a pastor promulgating a transnational religious ideology and leading a transnational community. He transformed the psychology and thinking of millions of Poles through his spoken and written word. This role can perhaps best be

examined by his first pilgrimage as pope to his native Poland in 1979, when he became the first pope to visit a Communist country. Second, he was the leader of a powerful, sovereign, and international institution, and he acted as something akin to a head of state. This can be examined through his international statesmanship, reflected in speeches, encyclicals and US intelligence documents between the years 1980–1982. In this second role, he had a unique, close relationship with the militarily strong US president and governmental leadership, but this did not give him military power. His power in both roles was based on spiritual and transformational leadership, though the second role required an understanding of realist geopolitics. Although he rejected realism, the Pope was perhaps successful in defeating Communism in Poland because he was able to act as both a transformational pastor and global leader who understood diplomacy and secular politics. Both roles enabled him to promote a theological agenda, with political implications.

TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADER AS PASTOR

Pope John Paul II became a powerful transnational religious leader who contributed to regime change in the role of pastor in his pilgrimage to Poland in 1979. At an open air mass in Victory Square in Warsaw, John Paul II asked, “Why did God choose a Polish pope?” and he invoked God to, “Fill the earth, fill the land”. To his audience, this meant that Jesus and God could not be limited, a radical concept in the context of communism. Throughout the rest of the pilgrimage, he preached thirty-two sermons in nine days. Millions of Poles heard his message of human dignity, religious freedom and spiritual rebirth. George Weigel observed, “It was a lesson in dignity, a national

plebiscite, Poland's second baptism."[216] His pilgrimage was a moment in which the Poles understood their own strength as a nation that pre-existed Communist rule. Paczkowski and Byrn write that this pilgrimage was:

> …Seen almost universally as a turning point for the country as millions of Poles greeting the pontiff suddenly became aware of their own strength. At the same time, they understood the relative helplessness of the authorities, who put on a bold front during the visit but for all practical purposes, had already lost the battle for the people's soul.[217]

In his first homily in Victory Square in Warsaw near The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the pope offered to God the history of all the peoples who had lived on that land, saying: "…And I cry from all the depths of this millennium, I cry on the vigil of Pentecost: "Let your Spirit descend. Let your spirit descend, and renew the face of the earth, and the face of this land." Amen."[218] According to Garton Ash, the crowd responded rhythmically, chanting: "We want God, we want God, we want God in the family, we want God in the schools, we want God in books, we want God, we want God…"[219] George Weigel writes:

> Seven hours after he had arrived, a crucial truth had been clarified by a million Pole's response to John Paul's evangelism. Poland was not a

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216 Jane Barnes and Helen Whitney, "John Paul II and the Fall of Communism," PBS Frontline (2004)

217 Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcom Byrne (eds.) *From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980–1981: Documentary History* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), 5.

218 Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarnosc* (London: Granta Books, 1991), 29.

219 Ibid.

> Communist country; Poland was a Catholic nation saddled with a Communist state.[220]

This pilgrimage was perhaps "the most fantastic pilgrimage in the history of contemporary Europe."[221] The pope subtly opposed being identified simply by the political regime one lived under. At one stop he said, "The future of Poland will depend on how many people are mature enough to be nonconformists."[222] Garton Ash writes, "For nine days the state virtually ceased to exist, except as a censor doctoring the television coverage. Everyone saw that Poland is not a Communist country-just a Communist state."[223] Here country connotes Polish national identity based on shared history and shared values, as opposed to the state, which is defined by the current political regime.

From the pope's homilies and speeches during the pilgrimage, it can be interpreted that he was not a traditional international relations realist. He believed that culture drove history, not military power.[224] The pope believed that "the realists were wrong, not because military and economic power were unimportant, but because culture was more important. And the most powerful component of culture was cult, or

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220 George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 295.

221 Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 31.

222 Ibid., 32.

223 Ibid.

224 Weigel, 296.

religion."[225] In other words, the pope understood personal, spiritual, and social identities to drive human interaction. Man's relationship with God was the primary relationship, upon which man's relationship with others was built. The role of state was in part to allow for religious expression. Man's identity was too complex to be captured by one regime. The Pope did not agree that Polish identity could be reduced to that of atheist Communists. During Pope John Paul II's pilgrimage, Poles heard a message about the state not being an end unto itself. The pope believed the state had a right "to the formation of its own culture and civilization."[226] This commitment to culture was not just evidenced by the Pope's words, but by his heritage. In his Victory Square homily he said, "Was it not Christ's will…that this Polish Pope, this Slav Pope, should at this precise moment manifest the unity of Christian Europe?"[227] John Paul II and others saw Poland as a positive example for the rest of Europe. At the end of the twentieth century, faced with a crisis of modernity, "Poland had responded by intensifying its Christian faith. This was a lesson with resonance far beyond Poland's borders."[228] In decades to come, Poland was to face the crisis of faith that came along with the problems of democratic freedom. However, the moment of the Pope's pilgrimage in 1979 was a spiritual experience for many.

By reawakening the popular Polish consciousness to its roots as a Christian

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225 Ibid.

226 Weigel, 307.

227 Ibid., 309.

228 Ibid., 311.

nation, a nation defined by things older (and perhaps more profound) than the current government, Pope John Paul II empowered Poland to respond to communism in a new way. Political scientist Bogdan Szajkowski wrote that the country in nine days had lived through a "psychological earthquake, an opportunity for mass political catharsis."[229] Adam Michnik described it as a great "lesson in dignity."[230] But perhaps Ascherson framed it best, writing:

> Inescapably, the word for all this is love. (The Pope) receives it from the nation, as only liberators and dictators have taken it in history, but somehow he gives the dangerous gift back again, leaving on one side an intact man and on the other millions of people who go back home with a better respect for themselves.[231]

Through the revival of an old theological identity, a new political identity was born.

TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADER AS HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION

Although Pope John Paul II may always be remembered for transformative moments as a pastoral leader with rhetorical brilliance, exemplified by that first pilgrimage to Poland, he had another, perhaps more realist role to play in the fall of Communism in Poland. As both the head of the international church and a beloved Polish leader, he was able to productively dialogue with the US, enabling him to create a global community at least supportive of a more stable Poland, and at most supportive of the birth and nonviolent progression of Solidarity. The following analyzes US security

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229 Ibid., 320.

230 Michael Michnik, "A Lesson in Dignity," in Michael Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other* Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987: 160.

231 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 323.

documents from 1980–1982 to expose John Paul II's actions as both the head of the institutional church and an inspirational force behind Polish Catholic identity. His relationship with the US, in particular, gives insight into his contribution to the fall of Communism in Poland in his role as head of an international organization.

Before and during the birth of Solidarity, President Jimmy Carter hoped to use Pope John Paul II to keep stability in Poland, and he courted the Pope's opinion on the Polish situation. On August 27, 1980, President Carter wrote a letter to the allies about Poland. It was sent to Thatcher, Giscard, and Schmidt. Carter, in the midst of attempting to organize a unified response in the event of a Soviet military move, writes, "The best outcome from every standpoint would involve accommodation between the authorities and the Polish people, without violence… and I am heartened by the conciliatory approach adopted publicly by the Pope and Cardinal Wyszynski."[232] Carter's message appears to be more concerned with stability than it is with democratic transition. Just two days later on August 29, 1980 there was a State Department cable from Washington DC to Rome, outlining a personal message from the President to the Pope. Its subject is "Poland: Presidential Message to Pope", and it reads:

> Your Holiness: -Events in Poland are of such importance that I would like very much to have your personal assessment of them, and also to share mine with you… -I would particularly value your advice as to what approach Western governments should adopt in this complex situation; I would similarly by grateful for your analysis of the likely outcome in Poland. I assure you that my fellow countrymen and I share a deep concern for Poland and its people.[233]

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232 Paczkowski and Byrne, *From Solidarity to Martial Law.*

233 National Security Archive, Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 81114.

In this document the President of the United States asks for the "advice" of John Paul II. Carter had been interested in the state of affairs in Poland for a long time; in 1977 he visited Poland in his first trip abroad as president with his chief advisor on foreign policy, the Polish born Zbigniew Brzezinski. This cable bears witness to the weight the pope held in the international community, a weight he used to bring the Solidarity movement into favorable international opinion. Is also raises the question as to if Carter is looking for advice, or for a positive relationship to advance a predetermined agenda.

Brzezinski's memoirs describe the positive relationship between the Pope and Carter. He writes:

> I never discussed the Pope in any detail with Carter, but in the course of several exchanges with Pope John Paul II… whom I came to admire enormously both for his conviction and for his extraordinary political grasp, His Holiness did make one very perceptive comment about my President. Recounting his Washington conversations, the Pope smiled and said, "You know, after a couple of hours with President Carter I had the feeling that two religious leaders were conversing." I told this to Carter, who was immensely pleased by that comment, and I thought that this, too, was in itself quite revealing.[234]

Beyond the congenial relationship between the two world leaders, this quote also perhaps alludes to the impact of Carter's Christian faith upon his conversations with the Pope. Carter visited the Vatican on June 21, 1980 on his was to an Economic Summit in Venice. Brzezinski writes:

> The stop in Rome gave me a unique personal opportunity to spend close to seven hours with Pope John Paul II. I was again struck in our

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234 Zbigniew Brzezinksi, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 27.

> conversations… by how political the Pope's thinking was… In his comments, the Pope reviewed carefully the political situation in the Middle East, which we feared might become stalemated; relations with China; and the internal situation in the Soviet bloc, with special attention to Poland. I wrote in my journal: "The most impressive personality of the trip was clearly the Pope. Having spent seven hours with him was the high point of the trip for me. He came across clearly as a man of extraordinary vision and political intelligence. In a sense, I think it is fair to say that today he is the outstanding Western leader. I particularly appreciate his sense of authority and his understanding that Western man does crave a sense of direction which is firmly and clearly defined."[235]

Brzezinski's earlier quote and this journal entry also reflect Brzezinski's opinion that the John Paul was politically aware and adept, supporting the theory that the pope had some awareness of the political impact of his theological leadership in regards to the situation in Poland.

In August of 1980, the Solidarity movement, a Polish trade union federation, began to assert itself more effectively against Communist party control. In Brzezinski's memoirs, he writes:

> On August 25 (1980), I urged the President to underline American interest in these developments through Presidential letters to Prime Minister Thatcher, President Giscard, and Chancellor Schmidt, as well as to the Pope, and to initiate an exchange of views on this subject so that a common Western policy would emerge.[236]

The pope, at this point, was already familiar with Solidarity. His theology and public sermons supported its break onto the international stage through demonstrations that

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235 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 461.

236 Ibid., 464.

month at the Gdansk Shipyard. It was the first non-Communist trade union movement in a Warsaw Pact country. Solidarity was "a broad anti-bureaucratic social movement, using the methods of civil resistance to advance the causes of worker's rights and social change."[237] The movement was comprised of a diverse membership, from those associated with the Catholic Church to members of the anti-Soviet Left. Solidarity had roots in a Polish national consciousness that predated 1980. Garton Ash writes:

> The fact that Wyszynski's Church succeeded in keeping the allegiance of most of the peasant families who flocked to find work in the new socialist industrial centres is of capital importance for an understanding of Solidarity. This stubborn allegiance of the young working class, at once pious and patriotic, was unique in Eastern Europe. So was the manner in which the Church and non-Communist intellectuals kept alive the Poles' autonomous and collective memory-the national conscience-against the Party's determined efforts to destroy it.[238]

Solidarity had roots in the KOR (the Workers' Defense Committee), founded after protests in June 1976 to give aid to prisoners and their families. It was a civil society group, the first major anti-Communist civic group in Eastern Europe. KOR protested the Communist government and organized legal and financial support for the families of political detainees. It collaborated with Warsaw intellectuals and sponsored a series of lectures on forbidden subjects. KOR was not religious and mobilized intellectuals from a variety of backgrounds. It achieved success when the Polish government declared

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237 A. Smolar, "Self-Limiting Revolution: Poland 1970–1989," in *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Ghandi to the Present*, edited by A. Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 127–43.

238 Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 11.

amnesty for jailed strikers in the spring of 1977. By 1979, as a result of the KOR, there was an alliance of workers, intellectuals and the Church, "unprecedented in Polish history, unique in the Soviet bloc, unseen in the West, which was to grow into Solidarity."[239]

There were major protests in Poland in December 1970 and June 1976 in response to the Soviet regime's 30–100% increase of prices on beef, pork, and chicken, but it was the protest in July 1980 that sparked the birth of the Solidarity movement. After Communist party leader Edward Gierek introduced new prices on meat while refusing to increase wages, a strike took place in the State Aviation Works PZL in Swidnik. This caused train operators in Lublin, on July 16, to block the railways connecting Poland to the Soviet Union. On August 14, 17,000 workers in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk went on strike. They were led by Lech Walesa, an unemployed electrician who had climbed a 12 foot high fence to present himself at work. The workers demanded an eight-point program of economic reform and the creation of a free trade-union movement. One of the first actions of the strike was to hold a mass, attended by 4,000 strikers, while 2,000 friends and family stood outside the gates. Shipyard carpenters made a cross adorned with the Black Madonna and other religious symbols. Weigel writes:

> The Madonna on the shipyard gates, the daily strike Mass, and those rows of strikers queued up to visit open-air confessionals also symbolized the different kind of political struggle in which they were engaged. This was going to be a nonviolent and self-regulating

239 Ibid., 27.

> revolution-one that proved Robespierre, Lenin, and the other violent men in the modern revolutionary pantheon wrong.[240]

Although the Solidarity movement was not explicitly religious and was in rooted in the secular KOR, it became steeped in Catholic symbols, supported by many Catholic officials, and inspired by Polish Catholic history and identity.

Pope John Paul immediately supported the movement in a message to Cardinal Wyszynski on August 20th. Cardinal Wyszynski was the Primate of Poland, and many consider him responsible for the survival of Christianity during Communist rule in Poland. Some even regard him as a national hero. The message read:

> I pray that, once again, the Episcopate with the Primate at its head… may be able to aid the nation in its struggle for daily bread, social justice, and the safeguarding of its inviolable right to its own way of life and achievement.[241]

After Cardinal Wyszynski preached a sermon mildly criticizing the movement, the pope again intervened. At his general audience on August 21, he "defended the strikers, arguing that the problems they were forcing onto the agenda were real and could only be resolved by bringing "peace and justice to our country.""[242] On August 31, an agreement was signed that allowed for independent self-governing trade unions, and for a form of power sharing that "meant the end of the totalitarian system."[243]

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240 Weigel, *Witness to Hope,* 401.

241 Ibid.

242 Ibid., 402.

243 Ibid.

Meanwhile the US government continued to consider the Pope as it responded to Soviet actions. In response to signs of a possible Soviet invasion of Poland, Zbigniew Brzezinski, now National Security Advisor, began convening meetings to decide what to do. Early in his tenure as president, Carter cut the staff of the National Security Council in half and reduced the eight standing committees to two, the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) and the Policy Review Committee (PRC). On September 23, 1980, an attachment to a Security Council document states: "The purpose of the SCC is to review the current intelligence on Soviet troop movements and the state of our contingency planning."[244] Under the section on "U.S. Policy: Contingency Planning", under "Key Questions" is listed the question: "Pope: Should we consult with the Pope? If so, how and when?"[245] The US National Security Advisor proposing a papal consultation suggest that the regard the US government had for Pope John Paul II as a powerful actor, in both a constructivist and realist sense, in the Polish space during the Cold War. The Pope's influence was constructivist in the sense that the Pope's ideas and theology shaped dialogue among US leaders. It was realist in the sense that he led the Catholic Church, an organization actively shaping relations between Solidarity and the Communist regime on the ground. The influence of the Polish born Brzezinski, and his support of Polish nationalism, may have come to bear on this request as well.

On October 22, Minister of Defense of the Polish People's Republic, General Wojciech Jaruzelski secretly launched a working group of military officers to prepare for

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244 Paczkowski and Byrne, *From Solidarity to Martial Law*, 90.

245 Ibid.

the imposition of martial law.[246] Their plans increasingly responded to pressure by Warsaw Pact allies for action. Moscow's relations were set by Soviet party general secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, who pushed his Polish counterpart, Stanislaw Kania to take a stance against Solidarity. Kania had replaced Edwark Gierek as General Secretary of the Polish Communist Party in September, 1980, and he would be replaced by Jaruzelski in 1981. Brezhnev came to believe that Soviet force might be necessary. The invasion of Poland by the Warsaw Pact armies was set for December 8, to be completed by December 21. Movement of troops, expected to take seven days, began after the December 1 visit to Moscow of the commander of East Germany's ground forces, Gen. Horst Stechbarth. General Secretary Kania, humiliated by the proposed role of the Polish army, and nervous about domestic resistance sought to persuade Brezhnev to take an alternate course.

The US was well informed of these developments due to satellite surveillance, on the ground intelligence, and information from Col. Ryszard Kukliski, a Polish officer working in the group preparing plans for martial law. In addition, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski "did all the right things to deter the invasion. These included public disclosure of the military build-up around Poland to deny the invaders the advantage of a surprise, and the dispatch of carefully calibrated warnings to impress upon Moscow the costs of aggression as well as the benefits of restraint."[247] Brzezinski sent an

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246 Ryszard J. Kukli ski, "The War against the Nation as Seen from the Center", Kultura (Paris) 475, no. 4 (April 1987): 3–57: 17–18.

247 Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/1981 and the End of the Cold

explicit message to that effect via the White House hot line on December 3.[248] Brzezinski writes that on that day:

> I convened a meeting with Brown, Muskie, and Turner in my office. We agreed that the President should issue a public statement reiterating for the record that any Soviet action would have far reaching consequences for East-West relations and that American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very adversely affected. In addition, we decided to send a message to Brezhnev repeating these points, while also underlining our established position that the United States had no intention of exploiting the developments within Poland itself to threaten legitimate Soviet security interests.[249]

This account of the day is significant in that it highlight's US intentions to halt Soviet aggression, but not to induce regime change. The concern was with stability, not democracy. The lack of interest in regime change is also supported by Brzezinski's reference to "legitimate Soviet security interests."

On December 5, Kania gave a presentation at a summit of Soviet leadership, in which he attempted to assure the attendees that the Communist party would recover and defeat the opposition by political means. He argued to Brezhnev that "if there were an intervention there would be a national uprising. Even if angels entered Poland, they would be treated as bloodthirsty vampires and the socialist ideas would be swimming in

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War" Working Paper No. 23. *Cold War International History Project.* Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington DC. September 1998: 13–14

248 Ibid., 14.

249 Brzeznski, *Power and Principle*, 465–466.

blood."[250] He successfully convinced Brezhnev to conditionally postpone his invasion. Vojtech Mastny writes, "The top Polish military, having begun on their own preparations forcibly to suppress the anti-Communist movement, therefore became indispensable for the attainment of Soviet goals."[251]

US Assistant for National Security Affairs Brzezinski called the pope at the Vatican on December 7 to share intelligence and brief him on the security situation in Poland. In his memoirs, he writes:

> Finally, with the President's approval, I phoned the Pope and briefed him on the situation. (I do not know if the Pope has ever been phoned from the United States before but I reached him late in the evening, Vatican time, and his secretary's first response, when I identified myself and asked to speak to the Pope, was to say, "I will see if I can find him." The Pope came on thirty seconds later, and in a way, the conversation was historically unique. Here was the Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President of the United States conferring with the Roman Pontiff in the Vatican in Polish about peace and Poland.)[252]

The very fact that Brzezinski made this call speaks to US foreign policy interest in including the Vatican in its actions towards Communist Poland, and the value US leadership placed on the relationship. Brzezinski himself seems aware of the "historically unique" value of the conversation and comments on it here. The Pope consequently wrote a letter to Brezhnev on December 16, 1980 in response to ongoing concern about a Soviet

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250 Jachranka Kania, November 9 1997; Jane Perlez, "Poland '80–'81: Players Do a Surprising Postmortem", *International Herald Tribune*, November 12, 1997.

251 Mastny, "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland," 15.

252 Brzeznski, *Power and Principle*, 466–467.

military invasion into Poland. He wrote:

> Having in mind, then, the various serious motivations of the preoccupation created by the tension over the actual situation in Poland, I ask you to do everything you can in order that all that constitutes the causes of this preoccupation, according to widespread opinion, be removed. This is indispensable for détente in Europe and in the world. I think that this can be obtained only by abiding faithfully to the solemn principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which proclaims criteria for regulating the relations between states, and in particular the principle of respect for the inherent rights of sovereignty as well as the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of each of the participating states.[253]

Here, the Pope, while speaking with moral authority, appeals to a tenant of international law- specifically the principle of nonintervention. On January 15, 1981, Walesa and a delegation of Solidarity leaders met at the Vatican with John Paul "for private conversation and public audience. The Pope's public remarks captured his distinctive view of the driving force of history, as he described Solidarity as a movement for, rather than against, something."[254] By meeting with the Solidarity leaders in the Vatican, Pope John Paul gave them legitimacy in the eyes of world leaders.

Although the Pope's public speeches and writings ultimately led to an increased international respect for Solidarity, intelligence documentation of the Church's actions on the ground showed a more complicated picture. Consider the following National Intelligence Estimate: National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 12.6-81) dated January 27, 1981, which reads:

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253 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 407.

254 Ibid., 409.

> The Church
>
> 25. Since the Communist takeover the Polish Catholic Church has fiercely and successfully defended its independence and retained the loyalty of the country's overwhelming Catholic population. With the election of a Polish Pope, John Paul II, and his triumphant visit in June 1979, the Church has significantly enhanced its effectiveness as a political force. But is has always used its influence cautiously-usually behind the scenes-and had extended its support to the government in times of national crisis.
>
> 26. In early December, sensing that Soviet military intervention was increasingly likely, both Cardinal Wyszynski, the Polish Primate, and Pope John Paul II ended a somewhat ambiguous period of silence to urge calm and to ease the pressure on the regime. This is a position to which the Church now appears committed and which could be a decisive factor in future confrontations. We can expect to see the Church play a more outspoken role in urging moderation in future confrontations. In the present situation, the Church hierarchy has lent its support both to Solidarity and to the Kania regime, but has avoided committing itself to an alliance with either.
>
> 27. But the regime can retain the support of the Church only so long as it eschews the use of force. In addition, the Church has particular interests and will pose demands of its own- greater access to the media, church construction, expanded clerical and religious education, etc.- and therefore has a natural interest in encouraging a progressive, if cautious, liberalization, and in exacting its own political price from the regime for its support.[255]

Some members of Solidarity, the general Polish population, and even younger members of the clergy had the opinion that Wyszynski extended too much support to the regime at the expense of Solidarity. However, a change in leadership was unlikely. This document finds that "the episcopate is likely to remain united under Wyszynski, who enjoys strong papal backing, and to continue to play a moderating role toward the regime, the workers,

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255 Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), *From Solidarity to Martial Law,* 203–204.

and the population at large."[256] This document highlights the complicated relationship between Church, regime, and Solidarity in 1981 Poland. The Church engaged in a multitude of behind-the-scenes efforts at peaceful dialogue with both the regime and Solidarity. The Church at times acted on behalf of the regime over Solidarity, suggesting that its interest in Poland was to prevent bloodshed and keep stability, not democratic regime change. Yet the Church also had an interest in "progressive, if cautious liberalization." The US sought to capitalize on the stabilizing, if somewhat paradoxical efforts of the Church, to achieve a peaceful end to the conflict. In the context of Pope John Paul II, this document questions the idea that he purposely worked towards the fall of Communism, or at least in all times and circumstances. There is also a clear lack of evidence on whether the pope and Wyszynski were unified at all points in the crisis.

Three months after backing down from a Soviet military solution, in March 1981, the Communist leadership decided that Solidarity must end and that the Polish regime should impose martial law. The Solidarity movement imposed a strike, but lifted it on March 30th after reaching a compromise with the government. On September 5, the first Solidarity Congress opened in Gdansk, and immediately called for free elections to the Polish Parliament. On October 18th, 1981, Stanislaw Kania was rejected by the party Central Committee, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski became First Secretary. The economic situation continued to erode and on November 28, the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party suggested that Communists in parliament give the government emergency powers, including the ability to ban strikes.

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256 Ibid.

On February 10, Jaruzelski assumed premiership while retaining the title of Minister of Defense and called for a ninety-day truce with Solidarity, all the while secretly accelerating plans for martial law. After completing his plans on February 20, Soviet leaders "insisted that the measure should be timed with the progress of the Warsaw Pact maneuvers and implemented without further delay."[257] They planned for joint action with forces under Jaruzelski's command. Just as in the previous year, the US learned of plans of Soviet invasion, which they expected to begin March 28–29. On March 27, Solidarity organized a four-hour warning strike, threatening to continue four days later with a strike of indefinite duration. The Defense Ministry began to seek a compromise. Brezhnev, angered at a Soviet politburo session asked, "But at what price? The price of a subsequent surrender to opposition."[258] Once intervention was abandoned, the Kremlin lost confidence in Kania. Jaruzelski "despised Solidarity, ruling any compromise with it as a prescription for anarchy." He succeeded Kania as PZPR First Secretary on October 18, while retaining both titles of Premier and Minister of Defense. Despite his pressing for Soviet troop support, on October 29, Andropov confirmed that troops would not be brought into Poland at a Politburo session, but the party supported a state of martial law.

Unlike the happenings the previous year, the US misjudged what was happening, focusing solely on the possibility of Soviet invasion and overlooking the possibility of

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257 Mastny, "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland," 19.

258 Mastny, "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland," 21, references Minutes of CPSU politburo session, April 2, 1981, copy, NSA.

martial law. Even Moscow was in the dark on the exact timing and definitiveness of plans for martial law. However, in advance of imposing martial law, Jaruzelski did request military support should the situation become critical – a request immediately denied by the CPSU Politburo. At the Politburo meeting, Suslov stated that the USSR's investment in détente made it "impossible for us to change our position. World public opinion will not allow us to do so."[259] This quote gives evidence to the theory that Soviet foreign policy and actions within Poland were indeed impacted by world opinion.

Martial law affected the state of US aid to Poland, which the Pope and Solidarity had played a role in securing. On December 1, 1981, before martial law was implemented, a memorandum for the president from Alexander Haig Jr. to President Reagan demonstrated US commitment to the cause on economic grounds, stating:

> As a result of Walesa's public call for U.S. aid and private messages from Pope John Paul II, I am confident that our assistance can be presented and implemented in a way that not only minimizes the risk of Soviet intervention or counteraction but enhances the already formidable power of Solidarity and the Church.[260]

Here Haig conflates the power of Solidarity and the Church as one, and mentions Walesa and Pope John Paul II in the same sentiment. This suggests that Haig viewed the two men and the two organizations as one, lending power to the Solidarity movement. A week before this message, Washington had authorized $30 million of food to be sent to the people of Poland. Here Haig is proposing an additional aid package of $100 million and a

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259 Mastny, "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland," references Minutes of CPSU politburo session, 10 December 1981, "Dokumenty 'Komissii Suslova'," 97–103.

260 Paczkowski and Byrne, *From Solidarity to Martial Law*, 409.

long-term multilateral program of up to $2.5 billion. After martial law was imposed, Reagan established an economic embargo on Poland, but with an exception for humanitarian aid. In January, his administration announced it would help Poland avoid defaulting on loans to the West.

On December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski shut down all the private phone lines in the country, declared a "state of war", and imposed martial law. The initiation of martial law surprised both Solidarity and the West, and there was no significant resistance. Roadblocks were set up, and Solidarity leaders, including Walesa, were arrested. In response, the Pope held a prayer vigil in St. Peter's Square. He alluded to Solidarity's informal motto "So that Poland shall be Poland."[261] The next day, when 1,300 coal miners barricaded themselves in the "Piast" mine in protest, violence ensued. An assault on December 16 resulted in the deaths of nine miners and four security personnel and more than forty injuries. A few days later on December 18, 1981, Pope John Paul II wrote to Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Chairman of the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), to appeal to him to remove martial law from Poland. The WRON was a military junta administering the People's Republic of Poland during the period of martial law from 1981 to 1983. Copies of the letter were also sent to Walesa and church leadership on the ground, including Cardinal Glemp and Cardinal Macharski. In the letter, John Paul II states that he will also inform the ambassadors to the Vatican, which included the American ambassador. The pope wrote to the General "with an urgent request and also a passionate invocation to cease operation, which carry with them the

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261 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 433.

shedding of Polish blood."[262] He continued:

> This right is being demanded by the entire nation. Also demanding it is the opinion of the entire world, all societies who correctly connect the matter of peace with respect for human rights and the right of nations. Universal desires for peace call for this, in order that martial law not be continued in Poland.[263]

Again, the Pope, a figure of spiritual authority, appealed to "human rights" and the "rights of nations". He was clearly comfortable in the post-Westphalian context. Also, by threatening to inform the ambassadors of the Vatican, he perhaps betrayed an awareness of his power as an international leader with strong allies. After the imposition of martial law, the US continued to operate on the mistaken assumption that Soviet invasion was still a real probability and that Jaruzelski was Moscow's puppet.

On December 20, 1981, a Discussion Paper From Executive Secretary, NSC to US Executive Office of the President, Signatory L. Paul Bremer III reads:

> US/Allied Responses to Developments in Poland
>
> In order to prevent further deterioration in Poland, establish the conditions for reconciliation which would preserve the gains and prospect of reform, and deter the Soviet Union from further interference, we are confronted with the necessity to begin to make difficult choices vis-à-vis both Warsaw and Moscow. These actions would be taken unilaterally as well as within NATO and with other key nations. Other actions which could be taken within a matter of days…
>
> 6) Seek Papal visit to Warsaw[264]

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262 Paczkowski and Byrne, *From Solidarity to Martial Law*, 80.

263 Ibid.

264 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 84991.

US leadership again sought a papal visit in order to deter aggression on the part of the Soviet Union. As much as the Pope benefited from his US alliance in that it conferred legitimacy upon Solidarity, the US benefited from the relationship because he represented the possibility of a peaceful path forward in a volatile Cold War front situation.

On December 21, 1981, there are two documents of note. The first is an "Internal Memorandum in the US International Communications Agency. Subject: US Response to Polish Crisis", which reads:

> The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the US position on the Polish crisis and identify ways of expressing that position internationally…. Thirty-three proposals for Presidential, diplomatic and private sector action were recommended…
>
> Proposals
>
> 32. That the President send Cardinal Krol on a special mission to the Vatican to consult on the crisis. [265]

John Joseph Krol was an American prelate of the Catholic Church, and at the time was archbishop of Philadelphia. US plans to seek the Pope's informal opinion, or at the least his willingness to go along with their position on the crisis again highlights the influence John Paul II held in the international community. The second document, a State Department cable, also on December 21, 1981, is addressed: "From Amembassy Vienna To Secstate WashDC" with the subject "Kreisky calls the world situation dangerous." The document reads:

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265 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 8137501.

> 1. Chancellor Bruno Kreisky asserted in a Vienna press conference Dec. 18th that the developments in Poland have played a major role in bringing about the most dangerous world situation since 1945…
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> 2. "…Adding that in considering the chances for a return to normalcy in Poland he (Kreisky) was placing hope in the moral significance of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland.[266]

This document demonstrates another Western leader seeking a political path forward in Poland through the "moral significance" of the Church, but it also raises the question of "normalcy." It seems to suggest that the Austrian Chancellor was in favor of stability in Poland, which did not necessarily translate into democratic regime change.

On December 22, 1981, an internal State Department document entitled "To: The Secretary… From: EUR - H. Allen Holmes, Acting" with the subject "Poland – Additional Bold Initiative for NSC"[267] reads:

> None of the steps we have taken so far vis-a-vis Poland have been at the level of boldness and drama which is required… The President could travel to Paris next week to meet with Mitterrand, Thatcher, Schmidt and Spadolini. The Big Five could in a single focus world attention on the moral and historical significance of developments in Poland. They could attend mass for the Polish people in Notre Dame Cathedral, issue a common statement directed to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski and in general dramatize the fact that the Western alliance is based on values as well as military might.[268]

This meaning of this letter can be interpreted in various ways. It could demonstrate that the Western world was willing to communicate a message based on values, even to the

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266 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 80254.

267 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 813712.

268 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 80254.

extent of planning for Western leaders to attend a mass at Notre Dame Cathedral. Such an event would support the Pope's vision of the role of Catholicism in supporting the Solidarity movement, and more broadly, Judeo-Christian values in supporting an end to Communism in Eastern Europe. Or this State Department document could be an attempt to use the moral authority of a Catholic mass to advance predetermined political ends, namely promotion of stability, prevention of further Soviet advancement in the region, and the avoidance of bloodshed.

On December 29, 1981, there is a State Department cable entitled, "To: Office of the Secretary of State; From: EUR- Lawrence S. Eagleburger, with the subject "Poland—Three Initiatives for You to Take" which reads:

> One of the greatest dangers we face over the next few months is that a possible lack of dramatic events in Poland could lead Europeans (and Americans) to lose interest…
>
> In addition to the measures we are already taking, there are three new initiatives we recommend:
>
> 1. Galvanizing the Churches in the U.S. and Europe. As you know we have a general problem with the churches both here and in Europe, i.e., El Salvador, anti-INF deployment, etc. The Polish situation provides an opportunity to launch a dialogue, to work together on Poland and gradually to try to bring them into a more realistic overall framework. As a first step, I recommend that you agree to see the leadership of the major American church organizations as soon as we can organize a meeting next week. You could urge them inter alia to use their extensive contacts with European churches to keep attention focused on Poland.
>
> (Note that this recommendation was marked "Approve" by the secretary.)[269]

269 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 80467.

This document can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, it could be an example of the US government encouraging Western society to use religion as a means of political expression and a demonstration of political strength. This varies from the example of a mass at Notre Dame, which was more focused on a moral message. The proposed meeting acknowledges the grassroots organizing power and soft power of churches internationally. In the Cold War, informal networks between churches presented a possible antidote to stalemate. On the other hand, the "more realistic overall framework" is likely a projected path for Pole to accept communism peacefully and to keep Europe stable as it is. This would be in keeping with the reference to the "problem" churches present in opposing Communist regimes in Latin America. They were creating trouble for the US in the region by pursuing democratic freedoms by threatening the status quo.

On January 22, 1981, a State Department Memo, entitled "A Positive U.S. Initiative for a Free Poland", reads:

> … II Recommended Policy
>
> It will obviously be difficult to attempt any significant policy initiatives so long as martial law is in effect. However, it is recommended that a well-conceived strategy be developed, which can be implemented once martial law is relaxed or terminated.
>
> The Policy recommendation can be stated as follows:
>
> ..the Administration should develop a sound plan… aimed at subtly strengthening free market forces, private ownership of land, worker ownership and self- management of industry, decentralized economic (and ultimately political) decision- making, agricultural productivity, and ultimate integration of Poland into the relatively free market economies of the OECD…

III Supporting Arguments

> d) The program is strongly rooted in Catholic social thought, notably the principles of personalism, subsidiary and pluralism set forth in Quadregesimo Anno (1941) and Laborem Exercens (1981). The 1981 Encyclical, for example, states "A way toward that goal (of helping workers to share in ownership) could be found by associating labor with the ownership of capital, as far as possible, and by producing a wide range of intermediate bodies with economic, social and cultural purposes; they would be bodies enjoying real autonomy with regard to the public powers, pursuing their specific aims in honest collaboration with each other and in subordination to the demands of the common good, and they would be living communities both in form and in substance in the sense that the members of each body would be looked upon and treated as persons and encouraged to take an active part in the life of the body." (Paragraph 14.)[270]

This document can also hold different interpretations. It could be notable because the US State Department is supporting an economic recovery plan for Poland rooted in Catholic social thought, or at least written in the language of Catholic social thought to create political buy in. There seems to be an acknowledgement that using Catholic principles will empower Polish workers, much the same way the Pope employed Catholic language to spur mobilization. However, this is not necessarily an acknowledgement of the importance of Catholic social teaching in lessening communism. It could rather be interpreted as an acknowledgement of Roman Catholicism and the pope as a valuable tool in promoting US foreign policy of status quo and stability in Poland.

John Paul II delivered a World Day of Peace speech on New Year's Day 1982, when he denounced the "false peace of totalitarian regimes." At the Angelus that day he thanked all those who were praying for Poland because what was at stake as

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270 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 81438.

"important… not only for a single country, but for the history of man."[271] Pope John Paul II again alludes to the right of nations to self-determination and the good of democracy, but he places it in a broader theological context of what is good for man. Another theme runs through his homilies and writings, which is that Poland will lead the way spiritually for the rest of Europe. In John Paul II's worldview, Poland's self-determination as a nation state was critical to her ability to evangelize the rest of the continent.

The year 1982 is analyzed in two National Intelligence Documents. The Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 12.6-82) dated March 25, 1982, entitled "Poland's Prospects over the Next 12 to 18 Months", read:

> 16. With Solidarity suspended, the Polish Roman Catholic Church once again becomes the primary defender of the population against the regime. But it too is on the defensive. Despite its vast moral authority, its political power is limited. The Church is most concerned about preventing bloodshed and a Soviet military intervention; consequently it has avoided becoming the focal point of active resistance to martial law. The regime counts on this self-limitation and thus believes it can ignore many of the demands of the Church, although it is also apprehensive of Church influence-especially at lower levels…
>
> 18. A key event in Church-state relations this year and perhaps an important sign of how the regime intends to structure its relations with the Polish people will be the projected visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland in August to commemorate the 600th anniversary of Poland's holiest shrine, that of Our Lady of Czestochowa. The Pope probably has reservations about coming to Poland out of fear of bestowing legitimacy on the martial law regime or of being blamed for incidents or provocations during his trip. The regime also undoubtedly has serious doubts about letting the visit take place. While a papal visit could marginally enhance the regime's image, it could more

271 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, references (OR (EWE), January 11, 1982: 1.

> importantly boost public morale and strengthen resistance. The Soviets, who blame the rise of Solidarity partly on the Pope's 1979 visit, reportedly oppose his returning this year.[272]

This document reflects the continued complicated relationship between Church, regime, and Solidarity. It clearly observes that the Church, in its avoidance of unnecessary bloodshed, "has avoided becoming the focal point of active resistance to martial law." This is just another piece of evidence that the Church gave support to both Solidarity and the regime at separate times during the 1980–1981. It notes the detrimental effect upon the regime of the Pope's 1979 visit and their reluctance to relive that experience in a celebration of the 600th anniversary of the shrine of Our Lady of Czestochowa. It also mentions a potential fear on the part of the Pope of bestowing legitimacy on a martial law regime through a papal visit. Even a decision to celebrate the anniversary of Our Lady of Czestochowa was complicated for John Paul II as the head of an international organization with a transnational message within a Communist context. Even when his theological aim (to strengthen the Catholic identity of Poles) and political aim (to strengthen Solidarity while avoiding bloodshed) were clear, the means to achieve them were both enabled and complicated by his geopolitical significance.

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272 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. Record Number 71421.

The Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 12.6-82) dated August 30, 1982, entitled, "Poland's Prospects over the Next 12 to 18 Months", reads:

> The Catholic Church
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> 30. Under martial law the Church has retained its traditional role as broker between the regime and society. Its official position has been largely determined by the view, as articulated by Archbishop Primate Glemp, that the Jaruzelski regime is preferable to any likely alternative and that violence therefore should be avoided to protect society and the country from greater peril. The Church's behavior has also been motivated by its desire to preserve the concessions won for it largely by Solidarity in the past two years.
>
> 31. The Catholic Church occupies a special place in Jaruzelski's designs, and his attitude toward it probably illustrates his willingness to compromise. Recognizing the Church's moral authority as well as its enhanced political influence now that Solidarity has been forced underground. Jaruzelski has not only exempted the Church from the strictures of martial law but also left intact most of the gains it made after August 1980…
>
> 34. Pope John Paul II has also reportedly been less than satisfied with Glemp's inability to stand up to the regime more forcefully. But for the sake of Church unity, the Pope, too, has acquiesced in the role the Church has played under Glemp in trying to calm passions. Apparently similar considerations also made him agree to postpone his planned trip to Poland until sometime next year. We do not anticipate a significant change in church-state relations in the coming months. Despite signs of growing apprehension about Glemp's ineffectual leadership, the Church officials will continue to use their periodic contacts with the regime to press for the release of internees, amnesty for those arrested and imprisoned, and for lifting martial law. In fact, these contacts, which have taken place largely behind the scenes, will probably constitute the only dialogue that can be expected between the Jaruzelski regime and society in the foreseeable future.[273]

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273 National Security Archive. Soviet Flashpoints Collection. No record number. "SNIE 12.6-82 Poland's Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months." CIA internal document.

The degree to which this NIE analyzes church actors and internal dynamic speaks to the importance the US intelligence community placed upon the role of the Church in mediating Communism in Poland. This document identifies the behind the scenes dialogue between the Church and the regime as the "only dialogue" occurring. It highlights John Paul II's two roles. As head of an international organization, his decision to visit or not visit Poland impacted the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. As head of a transnational organization operating in a national context, his decision to visit or not visit would impact nationalist sentiment and potentially cause unrest. This document also clearly states that at this point, the Church preferred the Jaruzelski regime to "any likely alternative" and that violence "should be avoided to protect society." This highlights one of many moments when the Church actually supported the regime in order to avoid bloodshed and preserve even moderate amounts of concessions won by Solidarity over the past two years.

The Fall of Communism in Poland

In the summer of 1989, Gorbachev wrote to the pope and requested a visit.[274] On December 1, 1989, he visited the Vatican, the first time a Russian leader had visited the pope in over a century and the first visit by a Soviet head of state. Gorbachev recounts the conversation in his memoirs. He writes:

> …I noted that there were many identical terms in my statements and his. 'This means that we must also have something in common "at the

274 James Heft, "John Paul II and the 'Just War' Doctrine: 'Make Peace through Justice and Forgiveness, Not War.'" In P. James *Religion, Identity, and Global Governances: Ideas, Evidence, and* Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 209.

> source" – in our ideas,' I said. As if in reply to my thoughts, John Paul II referred to perestroika as a process that 'allows us to search jointly for a new dimension of co-existence between people that will be better adapted to the needs of the individual, of different people, to the rights of individuals and nations. 'The efforts you undertake,' he continued, 'are not merely of great interest for us. We share them.' He pointed out another important idea: 'No-one should claim that the changes in Europe and the world happen according to the Western model. This is contrary to my profound convictions. Europe must breathe with both its lungs.' 'This is a very precise image,' I replied.[275]

The two leaders also address the topic of freedom of conscience and freedom of worship, topics on which Pope John Paul II was concerned with the status of Catholics in the USSR. On this, Gorbachev writes:

> I explained my approach to these issues. 'We intend to realize our plans by democratic means,' I said. 'However, I have been thinking about the developments of the past years and have come to the conclusion that democracy alone is not enough. We also need morality. Democracy can bring both good and evil – there is not denying it. You have what you have. For us, it is essential that morality should become firmly established in society – such universal, eternal values as goodness, mercy, mutual aid. We start from the principle that the faith of believers must be respected. This applies both to Orthodox believers and to representatives of other religions, including Catholics.' We agreed in principle to establish official ties, and to exchange permanent representatives between the Vatican and Moscow.[276]

Weigel recounts the meeting in his biography of Pope John Paul II as well. According to Weigel, the Soviet President and the Pope talked for an hour and a half, a half-hour longer than expected. When the meeting concluded, they came out of the papal library to

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275 Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 508–509.

276 Ibid., 509.

make final statements to the press. "John Paul's hands were trembling with emotion when he came to the podium to deliver his formal address of greeting."[277] The Pope made a formal appeal for improved religious freedom in the USSR, and referenced the Helsinki Final Act as support for its necessity. He said that he expected "the law on freedom of conscience soon to be discussed by the Supreme Soviet will help to guarantee to all believers the full exercise of the right to religious freedom."[278] The Pope also "looked forward to the birth of a new humanism, a new 'concern for man,' that would in turn give birth to a 'universal solidarity.'"[279] In an unexpected move at the end of his statement, Gorbachev invited the Pope to visit the Soviet Union, one of many dramatic moments during the historic meeting. Weigel called the meeting "an act of surrender" on Gorbachev's part, and claimed that "the curtain has been run down on the drama of atheistic humanism."[280]

Ultimately the Communist government was forced to negotiate. The Round Table Talks led to semi-free elections in 1989 and a Solidarity-led coalition government. In December, 1990, Walesa was elected President. From the very beginning of the Gdansk strike, "the imagery of the Church was everywhere."[281] Although the Church had a rich symbolic presence in the movement, the Solidarity union itself, as a social movement, is

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277 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 602.

278 John Paul II, referenced in Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 603.

279 Ibid.

280 Ibid., 605.

281 Denis MacShane, *Solidarity: Poland's Independent Trade Union* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2010), 95.

secular and politically unrelated to the Church. However, there is "evidence for arguing that without the Church, and, in particular, without the example set by the Church in how to resist incorporation by a one-party State, Solidarity could not have come into existence."[282] The movement had some philosophical roots in the Catholic tradition. For example, the 1987 encyclical *Solicitudo Rei Socialis*, John Paul II identifies the concept of solidarity with the poor as a constitutive element of the Gospel. The Church kept Polish national culture and identity alive when Poland was divided and ruled by the German, Hapsburg, and Russian empires. According to MacShane, the Church offered a spiritual national identity that provided solace to a people whose political self-expression was denied by the foreign occupier."[283] Through the 1979 trip and subsequent trips in 1983 and 1987, the pope made two contributions to the defeat of Communism in Poland: 1) he offered people a safe place to meet, which led to the creation of a new civil society and 2) he offered them an alternate intellectual worldview.[284]

Solidarity ultimately led to the upheaval of Communism in Poland, and it contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union. Solidarity intensified the spread of non-Communist ideals and movements throughout the countries of the Eastern Bloc, weakening their Communist governments. The Polish roundtable talks were held February 6 to April 5, 1989, during which the government initiated talks with Solidarity and other opposition groups in order to calm social unrest. The result was a dramatic

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282 Ibid., 96.

283 Ibid., 97.

284 Anne Applebaum, "How the Pope 'Defeated Communism," *The Washington Post*, April 6, 2005.

redefinition of Polish government. Political power was vested in a bicameral legislature and in a president. Solidarity became a legal political party. Free elections to 35% of the seats in the Sejm and 100% of the seats in the newly created Senate was assured. The Polish legislative elections of 1989 took place on June 4 and June 18. The elections brought major, unexpected victory to Solidarity. Solidarity won 99% of the seats in the Senate and the Sejm, taking 160 of the 161 seats eligible. Despite the resounding success, 65% of the seats remained divided between the Communist party and its satellite parties. This election enabled democratically elected representative to gain real power. It made possible Tadeusz Mazowiecki's cabinet and a peaceful transition to democracy. The full democratic transition happened after the Polish parliamentary elections of 1991. These elections in Poland, in which non-Communist candidates won significantly, inspired a series of peaceful anti-Communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Aspects of Solidarity were copied by groups opposing Communism throughout the Eastern Bloc, eventually leading to the downfall of the Soviet Union.

But Solidarity may not have happened without the pope. Lech Walesa confirmed the Pope's influence, saying, "The Holy Father, through his meetings, demonstrated how numerous we were. He told us not to be afraid."[285] Garton Ash put it this way, "Without the Pope, no Solidarity. Without Solidarity, no Gorbachev. Without Gorbachev, no fall of Communism."[286] Regarding the fall of Communism, Gorbachev has also stated: "It would

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285 Repa, "Analysis: Solidarity's Legacy."

286 Jane Barnes and Helen Whitney, "John Paul II and the Fall of Communism," *PBS Frontline,* 2004.

have been impossible without the Pope."[287] Solidarity's rise to political power ultimately led to the upheaval of Communism in Poland, and arguably to the fall of the Soviet Union. Solidarity intensified the spread of anti-Communist ideals and movements throughout the countries of the Eastern Bloc, weakening their Communist governments. These elections in June 1989 elections in Poland inspired a series of peaceful anti-Communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Aspects of Solidarity were copied by groups opposing Communism throughout the Eastern Bloc, eventually leading to the downfall of the Soviet Union.

Meaning to Hypothesized Causal Relationship

Pope John Paul II's challenge to the existing political order in Poland can be parsed into the variables of the central hypothesized causal relationships. The characteristics to be tested of the transnational religious leader are broken into four categories: leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to the secularized state, and relationship to modernity. The characteristics to be tested of the transnational social movement related to Pope John Paul II, Solidarity, can also be broken into four categories: political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and nature of activism.

John Paul II had a transformational leadership style, putting Poles in touch with an identity that transcended the Communist state. He also voiced the ideals of the Solidarity movement and the Polish people on the world stage, and he inspired people

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287 Ibid.

around the world to feel as though they too were part of the Solidarity movement. Both the activity and dialogical approach to leadership are present in this case. John Paul II clearly exercised public leadership through his diplomatic actions, public speeches and written statements, and world travels. But his success is best measured in people's responses to him. Within Poland, Lech Walesa, Cardinal Wyszynski, and other local actors coordinated the logistics of the movement. On the world stage, leaders like President Carter, President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher, and even ultimately Gorbachev responded through diplomatic visits, public statements, and private correspondence. John Paul's leadership inspired people in the Solidarity movement to achieve things even beyond his own vision. After his death, John Paul II was remembered fondly by many. His legacy and written works still impact Catholic theology worldwide and Polish Catholic identity. He is still lionized for his role in democratizing Poland.

The Polish pope wielded soft power. His ability to make individuals, groups, and states "want" to act in accordance with his agenda was evident on many levels. World leaders sought to leverage their relationship with him, as chief of the Vatican and pastor to the Polish Catholic community, to advance their own agenda. Yet in their correspondence with him, there also a sense of respect and openness. The Solidarity movement, though rooted in a non-Catholic intellectual movement, was inspired by his spoken and written word. Masses of Poles came to be near him during his pilgrimages. He spread theological ideas, values and norms that had political consequences. Although he did not hold hard power, he had a political sense of the how leaders operated in a realist world. He knew that the United States and other militarily strong Western

countries needed to be behind the agenda of democratization in Poland. He seemed to be aware of the importance of cultivating allies among great powers, especially in the West, and yet he rejected a purely realist view of world politics. The Pope's "soft power" was his dominant hand. It gave him the ability to share a vision of man, God, society, and state that shaped world history.

Pope John Paul II does not fit into Juergensmeyer's category of "religious nationalists" who "appear… to be responding in a religious way to a political situation".[288] Although he was a religious nationalist in the sense of believing that God's relationship with man drives human history, he was not against the secular state. He stood for religious freedom, but was not advocating for a Polish theocracy or a government founded on strict religious principles. He clearly accepted the post-Westphalian world order of secular states, but he rejected the Communist interpretation of the secular state. Denomination may have played a role in this, as many argue that the Roman Catholic Church has adapted to the modern world order of secular states more readily after Westphalia than did the global Islamic community. Although John Paul II saw man's dignity and associated rights as rooted in his relationship with God, he accepted the legitimacy and authority of the state to protect and respect that dignity.

The Pope's relationship with modernity was equally complex. He accepted modernity in the world order of sovereign nation states. However, he clearly rejected the modernization of public morality as it relates to a secularized society. For example, his

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288 Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?,* 6.

acceptance of the secular state and the modern society did not change his traditional stances on Catholic moral issues, such as homosexuality, contraception, or abortion. In other words, to Pope John Paul II, a secular state could be supported, so long as it protected the freedom of religious expression and rejected a dominant "modern" secularization agenda. He led a worldwide institution that promoted religious expression, religious belief, church attendance and even a strong role of religion in public life. He did not believe that a secular state necessarily made a secular society necessary. John Paul II, in his extensive travels and leadership of the global Catholic Church, was in touch with different cultural programs of modernity, and operated in the world described by Eisenstadt's "multiple modernities." He was well known for his deep respect for cultures around the globe, which, evocative of his young days in theater, he displayed by kissing the ground of each country he visited. Religion, modernity, and the secular state could coexist for John Paul.

The first characteristic of Solidarity, the social movement related to Pope John Paul II, is political theology. Toft, Philpott and Shah refer to political theology as "the set of ideas that a religious community holds about political authority and justice."[289] These ideas can be purely political in nature, yet communicated and used to mobilize people through religious terms. Or they can be theologically rooted. In Pope John Paul II's case, his vision for man and his relationship with society was rooted in the Bible and Roman Catholic tradition. However, he found a way to reconcile the primacy of man's relationship with God with the secular, democratic state. For him the role of the state was

289 Toft, Philpott, Shah, *God's Century*, 9–10.

to protect freedom of religion and promote human dignity through opportunity. This view could be held concurrent with the spread of Western democracy and the aim of defeating Communism, very political ideas. Thus, while John Paul's view of man may have been biblical, ultimately his theology was used to promote a very specific political message in Poland and to impact regime change.

The second characteristic of the transnational social movement is "mobilizing structures", which include "everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action." The Solidarity movement is a clear example of a social movement, according to Neidhart and Rucht's definition of a social movement as "an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups, and organizations to promote or resist social change with the use of public protest activities."[290] It began with a collection of economically and culturally dissatisfied shipyard workers in Gdansk and grew into a popular labor movement in Poland supported by citizens and world leaders internationally. Solidarity used strikes and public protest activities to impact regime change over the course of several years. As the movement grew in Poland, it gained an increasingly transnational support base. This support across state lines ultimately translated into legitimacy for Solidarity as a movement and for a newly democratic Poland. The Church also played an important role on the ground in creating meeting spaces and other logistical support for the Solidarity movement. Church leaders often acted as in a diplomatic capacity in meetings between Soviet authorities and Solidarity leadership.

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290 Neidhardt and Rucht, "The Analysis of Social Movements," 450.

A social movement's political opportunity structures capture the relationship between the state and the social movement, in this case between the Communist Poland and Solidarity. The institutionalized political system was closed and elites were rewarded for buy-in to the Soviet system. Elite allies internationally provided the largest political opportunity for the social movement. The state had a high capacity and propensity for repression. The rise of Solidarity at first benefited from international political opportunity structures, in part created by the pope, as international opinion surged in their favor. Ultimately however, regime change had to be achieved through domestic political opportunities. The worker's strikes in May and August of 1988, coupled with worldwide pressure, led the Communist regime to recognize Solidarity. This led to the Round Table Agreement in 1989, which recognized Solidarity as a legal political party and guaranteed free elections for 35% of seats in in Sejm and 100% of seats in the newly formed Senate. The June 4, 1989 elections inspired the "Revolutions of 1989" in other parts of Eastern Europe. As domestic political opportunities were created, the democratization process was reinforced on the international level, exemplified by Pope John Paul II receiving Lech Walesa in Rome after the Roundtable Agreement was signed.

The fourth characteristic of a transnational social movement is the character of activism. Tarrow defines transnational activists as "individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with

transnational allies."[291] The Solidarity movement was comprised of Polish members, but also international supporters, ranging from people associated with the Catholic Church to the anti-Soviet left and the anti-Soviet right. But on all levels of activism, Solidarity was nonviolent in nature. It was a nonviolent social movement with the backing of international nation state allies that democratized Poland. It was communicated in nonviolent terms, and sometimes couched in theological language. Meetings were held secretly in churches, and the clergy often participated. Religious symbolism was a part of public gatherings and protests. The ideology behind the transnational aspect of the Solidarity movement incorporated both Catholic theology and a support for democracy. Solidarity as a labor movement survives today. Though its influence has been lessened, it will always be well known for its role in bringing down Communism in Poland.

Meaning to Regime Change

Meaning to regime change can be examined through 1) Pope John Paul II's goals for the Polish regime and their relation to Westphalian principles 2) the impact he had upon regime change and its strength as an indicator of challenged conceptions of state sovereignty. In terms of the first meaning, regime change goals, the actual intention behind and definition of Pope John Paul II's political goals is difficult to pin point. Perhaps his political goals are best understood through his theological goals. Weigel writes:

> Realism in international relations theory read history as a realm of amorality. History was a butcher's block, Hegel had argued. Wojtyla,

291 Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, 43.

> again, disagreed. In his Christian-Polish view, history was best read through the prism of moral analysis, and viewed through that prism, the subjugation of the nations within Stalin's external and internal empires was a moral catastrophe.[292]

The Communist state was understood as amoral by John Paul II, and he perceived its weaknesses. Weigel continues:

> This Pope, however, had measured communism's weaknesses as well as its apparent strengths. And he knew that cultural resistance could be an effective antidote to the seemingly impregnable position of a criminal state.[293]

It is clear from the US intelligence documents reviewed thus far from 1980–1982 that the Church on the ground in Poland alternatively and sometime simultaneously supported Solidarity and the Communist regime, often with the motivation of avoiding bloodshed and preserving the modest achievements the Solidarity movement had already gained. However, the Pope's public statements and private correspondences seem to suggest that he favored the replacement of the Communist regime with a form of government that respected religious freedoms. He certainly was in support of a post-Westphalian world, and he believed in the principle of non-intervention and a state's authority within its own borders. But it is not clear that he accepted the Communist regime in Poland as legitimate, and in fact, worked what public channels that were available to him to subtly promote Solidarity, so long as it did not entail further bloodshed. Perhaps his aims were solely theological, but the writings and speeches in support of those aims spelled out a

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292 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 296.

293 Ibid., 297.

particular political consequence – moderate steps towards nonviolent regime replacement or internal political reform in Poland. This was not inconsistent with his understanding of Westphalia. Because his vision of the nation of Poland and the Polish people predated communism, he reforms were aimed at the nation, from which reforms to the state would follow.

This case study offers a process driven narrative of regime change through the use of primary sources, including US intelligence documents, papal correspondence to world leaders, memoirs of the pope's contemporary world leaders, and papal statements. Pope John Paul II and his transnational Solidarity movement caused a response from nation states, contributing to regime change. In the relationships hypothesized, regime change is an indicator, standing between the transnational religious leader and challenged conceptions of state sovereignty. The strength of regime change as an indicator can be related to Krasner's delineation between structural, modified structural or Grotian perspectives on regime change as an intervening variable. The Communist political regime was clearly impacted by the presence of Pope John Paul II as a transnational religious leader and as a leader of a transnational Solidarity movement. The regime was impacted on the ground as clergy participated in and offered church space for Solidarity meetings. Church officials often played the role of negotiator between the Communist leadership and Solidarity members. Although the prominent role of John Paul II as a world leader and diplomat threatened basic models of international relations as consisting of a world of sovereign states with control over their own territory, the transnational support for the Solidarity movement resulted in the establishment of a democratic,

internationally respected sovereign state. Because the Pope did not seek to overhaul the Westphalian system, his contributions to specific regime change in Poland are an important component to analyzing how he impacted sovereignty. The regime change, although weakening the Communist state's control over movement within its borders, actually strengthened state sovereignty in Poland by creating a reformed state whose power had legitimacy in the eyes of the world. Regime change was critical as an intervening variable in this case, and the steps taken towards democratization through non-violent means, actually reaffirmed the modern system of sovereign states.

Owen's theories on the clash of ideas in world politics offer a useful framework to further study the role of regime change in impacting sovereignty. His micro-level hypothesis includes regime instability and great-power war as causes of transnational ideological polarization, which he defines as a process in which "the progressive segregation of elites across states are simplified and intensified."[294] This transnational ideological polarization, in turn causes on the macro level, a transnational regime contest, which according to Owen, will always endure until one regime type suggest that vastly superior on terms all elites accept.[295] On the macro-level, there were warring ideologies in this case study, including the West versus Communism, and religious freedoms versus the strict forms of the secular state, among others. Owen's basic causal framework applies readily to this case study in that as the ideological axis became weightier and transnational, political preferences on the ground became simplified and intensified. The

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294 Owen, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics,* 37.

295 Ibid., 72.

course of contention followed an expected pattern, as the great power players diversified internationally, the movement on the ground also become increasingly transnational. The Communist Polish regime became increasingly unstable due to the protest politics of Solidarity on the ground and the shift of international opinion in its support around the world. This instability was exacerbated by the increased buy-in of Western countries, particularly the US, a process that was significantly aided by the efforts of Pope John Paul II.

Solidarity initially claimed to be non-political, campaigning for the reform of government, not its displacement. There were of course, other factors at play in the fall of Communism and the establishment of a democratic regime in Poland. Some argue that Solidarity was a convenient vehicle for grievances against the Communist regime that had already been in existence, and that any resistance movement arising at that time would have benefited from these preexisting tensions. Alternate reasons for the fall of Communism in Poland can be divided into long-term, short-term, and immediate reasons. Two long-term reasons included long standing hatred of Russia and antagonism between church and state.[296] Anti-Russian sentiment existed long before the Cold War. The Church symbolized national identity so government abuse of the church mobilized people towards reform. Short-term reasons included problems with Russian authority created by the Cold War and economic grievances.[297] The Cold War context intensified Russian

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296 "To What Extent did Solidarity contribute to undermining Communism in Poland?" eduessays.com. Accessed November 12, 2014. http://www.eduessays.com/Essays-y80111.htm

297 Ibid.

authority in Poland. The state's inability to provide for its people was an important short-term factor. The standard of living in Poland declined dramatically during the Cold War. The system was elite, not egalitarian in practice. Finally, the immediate reasons for the fall of Communism in Poland were Solidarity and a change in Russia's foreign policy.[298] Russian policies beginning in the early 1980s undermined Communism in Poland. When Brezhnev died in '82, the Soviets cracked down on corruption in satellite states. Gorbachev's "glasnost" and "perestroika" exposed Communist corruption.

These variables do not obscure Pope John Paul II's impact, but merely contextualize his actions. These long term, short term, and immediate causes made the fall of Communism possible, but only in conjunction with the actions of the pope. Pope John Paul II made two essential contributions to regime change. First, as a pastor of a transnational community, he tapped into an older Polish identity that viewed Catholicism as a basis for nationhood, based on the history of oppression of the Catholic Church in Poland. He then used this identity to mobilize people toward political reform. Second, as leader of the international Catholic Church, he was an effective diplomat in representing not only the Church's, but also Poland's, interests on the world stage. The Pope's contributions to the fall of Communism and the birth of a democracy in Poland were substantive enough that regime change would not have been possible, at least in the form that it took, without him. Regime change is a strong variable in analyzing how the pope challenged traditional and modern notions of state sovereignty.

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298 Ibid.

Meaning to Sovereignty

In analyzing the Pope's contribution to sovereignty, one can apply his two roles- pastor and head of international organization. In his role as pastor, Pope John Paul II used his personality and moral authority to develop a soft power. He mobilized millions of Poles to create a new national consciousness and identity that was not reliant upon communism. His teachings and public messages indirectly encouraged their participation in Solidarity. In this sense, he gave moral legitimacy to the Solidarity movement, thus ultimately contributing to the fall of Communism in Poland. In his role of head of the institution of the church, his positive relationship with US leadership engendered a positive world opinion for his interventions in Poland, even though John Paul himself may not have viewed it this way. In this sense, the Pope directed the approval of the international community and the Western world towards the Solidarity movement. He comfortably operated within a Westphalian international order with respect for state sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention by working for non-violent, internal political reform in Communist Poland. He worked toward a more peaceful world system.

In both roles, the pope was balancing his transnational role as head of the church, as both a pastoral and institutional leader, with the need to implement his vision in a specifically national, i.e. Polish, context. Byrnes writes of a trend relevant both to Soviet times and to the Pope's later papacy: "Central components of the political role of the Pope's transnational church have to be carried out within very specific national settings by elements of the Catholic Church over which he has something less than total

control."[299] This raises a question about John Paul's two roles. How cohesively could "the Church" as an international organization, act within the confines of a specific nation?

Byrne writes that the Catholic Church's prominent role in Polish society is the result of three historical developments:

> …the baptism of Duke Mieszko I in 966; the close identification of the church with Polish nationalism during the partitions, occupations, and externally imposed governments of the past two centuries; and the creation of a nearly homogeneous Catholic nation through the murder and expulsion of Jews and through the ethnic migrations resulting from Stalin's movement of the Polish state westward in the late 1940s.[300]

Ewa Morawska brands the church the "traditional carrier of Polish civil religion" and the "major public spokesman for Polish civil society."[301] Both writers believe the Catholic Church, within the context of the Polish Catholic church, was a protector and carrier of Polish nationalism during difficult times in Polish history. Byrne also points specifically to the experiences of suffering of Catholic clergy in Poland during the Second World War, which created a strong relationship between the clergy and the people, a relationship that became important when it was time to oppose communism.[302] Garton Ash writes, "The Church, the insurrectionary tradition, the cultural work of the

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299 Timothy Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 29.

300 Scott Paltrow, "Poland and the Pope: the Vatican's Relations with Poland, 1978 to the Present," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 15, 1986: 3.

301 Ewa Morawska, "Civil religion versus State Power in Poland," in Thomas RobBins and Roland Robertson (eds.) *Church-State Relations: Tensions and Transitions* (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), 228.

302 Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe*, 31

intelligentsia and romantic Messianism forged what can best be described as the Polish national conscience."[303]

This national conscience was also preserved by the Church during the Soviet era in Poland. The role of the church in opposing communism, though inconsistent, was both symbolic and concrete. It was concrete in that the church offered space for meetings for political organizing. The actions of the clergy were symbolically patriotic and nationalistic. The autonomy the church provided "came to form the basic frame of political opposition, picked up with much more fervor and purpose by Solidarity in the late 1970's and throughout the 1980s."[304] Jan Kubik emphasized how John Paul II's visit in spring 1979 reinforced and made visible the church's "counterhegemonic subculture," referring to its status as a kind of alternative Polish authority structure.[305] When the pope made his pilgrimage to Poland, he tapped into this older, profound theological identity. Garton Ash describes the Poles as "an old European people with an unquenchable thirst for freedom; freedom in Polish means, in the first place, national independence; the Polish national identity is historically defined in opposition to Russia."[306]

After the fall of Communism, in the case of Poland and Eastern Europe, the Church no longer could play the complicated role of appeasing both Solidarity and the Communist regime, and it was searching for a new identity. Regardless of the Pope's

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303 Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 5.

304 Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe*, 32.

305 Ibid., 4

306 Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 5.

level of commitment to the fall of Communism, when victory was achieved, the Church had to reorient itself to the new political realities of post-Communist Poland. The Church found it difficult to successfully negotiate issues like public education, abortion, and church-state relations in a new political context in the early 1990s. Although there was tension with some Poles who did not want to accept political direction from the Church, the church strongly defended what it believed should be its prominent role in Polish society. Pope John Paul II continued the same vision throughout the 1990s that he had under communism- a vision of Poland as a spiritual leader and heart of Europe. Byrnes explores the role national identity played among Polish bishops in the 1990's, writing, "…as Poles themselves, the Polish bishops have reflexively shared the Pope's vision, not only of Europe as a Christian civilization, but also of Poland the indispensable heart of that continental identity."[307] Byrnes expounds upon the Pope's vision of Europe's future, writing:

> "One can hear in the Pope's speeches and statements on this question strong echoes of Cardinal Wyszynski's notion of Poland as the "Christ of nations" that is determined to play a special, redemptive role in European history. Polish mythology holds that the Polish nation, repeatedly crucified on the cross of partition and occupation, will one day rise again at the center of Europe to serve as an example to, and a redeemer of, the rest of the continent."[308]

This kind of nationalist thinking was behind John Paul II's declaration during his first visit to Poland in 1979 that it is "Christ's will" that "this Polish Pope, this Slav Pope,

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307 Timothy Byrnes, "The Catholic Church and Poland's Return to Europe," *East European Quarterly* (30) (1997): 433–48.

308 Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe*, 34.

should at this precise moment manifest the spiritual unity of Christian Europe."[309] This kind of thinking is also "the basis for the Pope's enduring conception of his church, and particularly his church in his Polish nation, as the essential foundation of Europe's true and authentic unity."[310] John Paul II viewed Poland's identity as fundamentally Christian, but he also understood the importance of nationalism and culture. The nationalist tendencies of Polish bishops and their interest in Polish matters is advantageous to the implementation of the Pope's vision of a newly evangelized Christian Europe. Byrnes writes, "Transnationalism, in that sense, continues to operate through, and to be mediated by, the social and political structures of the new Republic of Poland."[311]

The paradox of the pope was that even as he successfully upheld Polish sovereignty in his efforts to liberate the nation from Communism, he threatened traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty by holding the power that he did as a transnational actor. This power took two forms. The first power resided in a cult of personality and even more so, the ability to transform how Polish people perceived themselves, as Poles and as humans. Garton Ash writes: "It is impossible to place an exact value on the transformation of consciousness wrought by the Polish Pope."[312] The second power resided in his close relationship with US leadership, which in a realist

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309 John Paul II, Homily in Victory Square, June 2, 1979. Accessed November 20, 2014. Vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul-ii/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19790602_polonia-varsavia_en.html.

310 Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe*, 35.

311 Ibid., 53.

312 Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, 35.

sense, lent the power of global opinion to his actions. The United States sought to capitalize on the transformative power of the Pope, and the Pope's messages to the Soviet Union had more weight behind them because of his international relationships. Yet, the Pope was no realist at heart. He believed that human spirituality and culture drove human history, and he advocated for a peaceful resolution to conflict, based in forgiveness. Speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1982, JPII described himself in these words: "This is the voice of one who has no interests nor political power, nor, even less, military force."[313] Although John Paul did not perceive his influence in political terms, he did wield political power. His theological principles were translated into political aims. His cult of personality in Poland was mobilized toward Solidarity and the political end of democracy. He was held in high regard by world leaders including in the Western world, including Carter and Reagan, a regard which could be translated into political influence.

John Paul's commitment to peace was rooted in a vision of Solidarity, "the unswerving and persevering commitment to the common good."[314] He attributes the fall of the Soviet Union to a moral victory, writing:

> The events of 1989 are an example of the success of willingness to negotiate and of the Gospel spirit in the face of an adversary determined not to be bound by moral principles. These events are a

313 W. Portier, "Are we really serious when we ask god to deliver us from evil? The Catechism and the challenge of Pope John Paul II," *Communio* 23 (1996): 62.

314 John Paul II, *Solicitudo rei Socialis*.

> warning to those who, in the name of political realism, wish to banish law and morality from the political arena.[315]

During the Cold War, John Paul II practiced nonviolent strategies in the Polish confrontation with the Soviet Union. He believed the lessons he learned applied to international order:

> Many people learn to fight for justice without violence, renouncing class struggle in their internal disputes, and was in international ones… Just as the time has finally come when in individual states a system of private vendetta and reprisal has given way to the rule of law, so too a similar step forward is now urgently needed in the international system.[316]

In the 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus*, John Paul contributes to the development of the just war doctrine by "recasting (it)… within a more comprehensive theology of peace and reconciliation."[317] Traditional just war theory distinguished *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, describing moral conditions for entering war and how to fight war justly. John Paul contributed to a third condition*, jus post bellum*, or "the consideration of the consequences of a war and obligations all participants in a war have for rebuilding and for forgiveness."[318] He represents "his own Christ-centered spirituality as an alternative to the so-called realist approach that has typified his thinking about international affairs."[319] He contributed to a new framework for a host of practical decisions about the use of

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315 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, Paragraph 35.

316 Ibid., Paragraph 23, 52.

317 Heft, "John Paul II", 216.

318 Ibid.

319 Ibid, 210.

force, and he writes that the person who unites his own suffering to the suffering of Christ on the cross "is in a position to discern the often narrow path between the cowardice which gives in to evil and the violence, which, under the illusion of fighting evil, only makes it worse."[320]

The two-fold power to inspire Poles and to leverage the international community towards nonviolent internal political reform in Poland was much for one man to wield. According to classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty, Pope John Paul II both accepted and challenged the Westphalian system. He contributed to the development of a democratic Poland. He easily accepted and operated within the Westphalian world order of secular states. A sustainable, democratic Poland, accountable to the Polish people and respected by states internationally, only served to strengthen the Westphalian system as a whole. He clearly believed in the nation-state system and in the principle of non-intervention and sought to have it upheld on the Polish stage. However, he transformed Westphalian sovereignty as well. The weight of his individual influence upon Polish domestic politics posed a challenge to the Westphalian world in which states control the affairs within their own borders.

Pope John Paul II took actions to support the birth of a democratic Poland with all four of Krasner's categories of sovereignty – international legal, Westphalian, domestic, and interdependence. He wanted Poland to have the full benefits of a modern, secular state, including control over its territorial boundaries and recognition from other countries

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320 John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, Paragraph 25.

with juridical independence. Yet, in his achievement of such a Poland, he built a strong, transnational network in support of the Solidarity movement and he mobilized people based on Catholic principles, thus making interdependence sovereignty impossible, even in the newly democratic Poland. Krasner's "shared sovereignty" captures the Western economic assistance the Pope and Solidarity garnered for the fledgling democracy in Poland. Stacey's "relational sovereignty" is relevant to in that the democracy built in Poland was inspired by the standards of care provided by the US and other western democracies for their citizens.

But perhaps the pope's transnational following and the multiple transnational civil societies that contributed to Solidarity need not threaten Krasner's Westphalian sovereignty. Instead, Rudolph finds that "transnational activity is guided by imaginary maps whose boundaries do not approximate the spaces depicted on political maps."[321] She imagines transnational civil societies as "transparent plastic overlays, alternative meaning systems superimposed upon the meaning system of political maps. They do not replace state-defined space; they provide alternatives to it…"[322] In the case of the pope, who theoretically supported the Westphalian order of secular, sovereign states, yet who gave meaning to communities with amorphous boundaries (such as the Roman Catholic community) unrelated to the territorial boundaries of nation-states, perhaps Rudolph's description of "transparent plastic overlays" captures his profound impact as both international institution leader and pastor.

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321 Rudolph and Piscatori, *Transnational Religion and Fading States,* 12.

322 Ibid.

This case study adds something unique to the body of literature on sovereignty by posing a process of regime change through which sovereignty was simultaneously challenged and strengthened, and though the teachings and writings of Pope John Paul II, by proposing a vision for a strong Westphalian system that supports religious freedoms. In this case sovereignty was challenged by the strength of Pope John Paul II as a transnational religious leader in a system in which only states should be the dominant actors. It was strengthened because his vision for and contributions to non-violent internal regime change in Poland could occur without trampling Westphalian sovereignty. Through his leadership of the Roman Catholic Church and contributions to the Solidarity movement, he demonstrated that sovereignty is foundational to the secular, Westphalian world, but that world is strongest when it protects religious freedom and allows for nationalist identities based in religion.

According to Philpott, "tumult yields novel orthodoxy." Revolutions that have led to a change in sovereignty in the past have been based upon transnational ideas adopted by domestic social movements and their leaders. Philpott finds that "norms of sovereignty are… (matters of) basic authority. They are not solely matters of power but also of legitimate authority. Revolutions in these norms are rare, but they are revolutions of the most basic sort."[323] The Solidarity movement was a revolution about legitimate authority in Poland, but for Pope John Paul II, Poland's liberation was part of a meta-narrative about the spiritual redemption of Europe. He believed Europe to be a Christian

323 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 9–10.

civilization, and Poland to be "the indispensable heart of that continental identity."[324] The Polish church was "the essential foundation of Europe's true and authentic unity."[325] Philpott holds that the ideas cause revolution by creating identity and social power. In his pilgrimages and role as pastor to the people of Poland, he presented them with an identity rooted in Christianity and old Polish nationalism that transcended their everyday reality in Communist Poland. This identity, in turn, gave structure to the social movement of Solidarity. This process of revolution and social movement based in old, powerful, forms of religious identity is what makes John Paul II unique as a transnational religious actor, as opposed to other kinds of transnational actors. Although he was specifically concerned with political reform in Poland, the pope's vision was also theological. His life was dedicated to the Christian evangelization of the world. Poland, as a strong Catholic country with a believing population, was a means to influence the spirituality of the rest of Europe. This is to say that big ideas, even theological ideas, do inspire revolutions in sovereignty, as suggested by Philpott.

This chapter has analyzed the impact of Pope John Paul II upon Polish sovereignty over the period of a few years. Over the course of his life, the pope impacted people on a global scale and was beloved by many. On April 27, 2014, Pope Francis I canonized John Paul II in a ceremony marked by unprecedented crowds in St. Peter's Square, Vatican City. Twenty-four heads of state and one hundred delegates from

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324 Brynes, "The Catholic Church," 433–48.

325 Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism*, 35.

countries around the world were present.[326] The young man from Krakow who lived under the Nazis and the Communists, who grew to inspire his Polish brethren and the transnational Catholic Church community to spiritual revolution, is much lionized in his death. His contribution, for better or for ill, to Westphalian sovereignty is only one of many that he made to the global community.

326 Laura Smith-Spark, Dellia Gallagher, and Ben Wedeman, "Sainthood for John Paul II and John XXIII, as crowds pack St. Peter's Square," *CNN,* April 28, 2014. Accessed November 11, 2014. www.cnn.com/2014/04/27/world/pope-cnnonization/index.html.

CHAPTER FOUR

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the "Hurricane of Virtue"[327]

The Coming Hurricane

By: 'Azzam Ahmad' Abdallah

I swear by God that I shall not be silent; no I shall not go back a step. Oh, all of the world, look out as I have set the despair free and there is no regress. I have set free all repentance and regret; and I have taken up the sword, and shall not leave it behind. And I shall continue to fight injustice in a way it shall not come back. And I shall choke all of the unbelief. I shall fill the womb of the world to give birth to the glory without a cry. I shall not allow tyranny or despotism to remain on the face of the earth. I shall not allow the smile to show on the tempter's face. I shall not leave an opportunity for the unjust to take one dirham or one penny.

There will be no banner carried for vice and I shall lay vice in the coffin. I shall not depend on the world for one day so goodbye oh passing world. I shall not give up my sword, for truth without a sword is dead. The anger in my chest has cried; it has erupted like a volcano in this world. Hoist a banner for the sword and hoist it over every spear. Light a blazing fire, cast the tyranny into it. Capture all the unjust, drown them, you are the deluge. Oh Compassionate One (TC: one of the names of god), move the phalanxes for virtue and obliterate vice. I am the coming hurricane of virtue and I will not spare one devil in the world.[328]

The second case study will consider Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, Islamism, and defensive jihad in the Soviet-Afghan war, contributing to Soviet withdrawal and the outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan. Azzam, a Palestinian cleric who has been called

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327 CRRC, AQM-MISC-D-001-062, 1.

328 Ibid.

"the godfather of jihad"[329] and "the fighting cleric" authored a religious ideological framework to justify and motivate war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This chapter will investigate Azzam's contributions to the Soviet-Afghan war and regime change in Afghanistan, his creation of a theology that has changed the global jihadist movement to this day, and his challenge as an individual transnational religious leader to Westphalian sovereignty. It will analyze Azzam, the Afghan Arabs, and the global jihadist movement, in light of the hypothesized TRL enabling characteristics and relationships proposed in the research design section. I use a collection of original Al Qaeda documents from the Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University (recently captured and translated by the US military from strategic sites in Iraq and Afghanistan), combined with contemporary scholarly reflections on the war and Azzam, and his own primary writings, to achieve these goals.

Meaning to the "Land of Lions"

Through the Saur Revolution on April 27–28, 1978, the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took over the Afghan government. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was then established from 1978–1987. It was then renamed the Republic of Afghanistan and existed until 1992. After the PDPA came to power, there was a power struggle between the Khalquists and the Parchamites, resulting in Nur Muhammed Taraki assuming power on April 30, 1978. Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, the organizer of the Saur Revolution, made unpopular reforms which modernized Islamic society. Large populations went into open rebellion, and the government

329 Chris Suellentrop, "Abdullah Azzam: The Godfather of Jihad," *Slate* (April 16, 2002).

requested Soviet troops several times during the spring and summer of 1979, justified by a December 1978 treaty allowing them to request Soviet military assistance.

The Soviets deployed the 40th Army, under Leonid Brezhnev, in Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. Although the Soviets quickly occupied major cities, almost 80 percent of the country was not under government control.[330] The Soviets expected it to be a straightforward government take-over. It proved to be anything but straightforward. Dibb writes:

> The Soviet plan was to stabilize the situation, strengthen the Afghan army, and then withdraw the bulk of Soviet forces within three years. But that was not to be the case: instead, the Soviet army was cast into a bloody war that would last for 9 years, 1 month, and 18 days. Over 525,500 officers, sergeants, soldiers and support staff of the Soviet armed forces served in Afghanistan. At the time of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the official statistics from the Soviet government were than 13,833 had been killed or died of wounds, and there were 50,296 wounded or missing in action. Thus one in every eight who served was killed or wounded or was missing. More important, in many ways, was the corrosive impact of this failed war on Soviet society and the huge humiliation geopolitically of the defeat on the reputation of the USSR.[331]

This historic defeat, which made the USSR appear vulnerable, was in part orchestrated by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian cleric with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood who rejected the secularity of the Palestinian movement.

The resistance to the Soviets was comprised of the Afghan Mujahedeen and

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330 Bruce J. Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington DC: NDU Press, 1986), 127.

331 Paul Dibb, "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons to be Learned?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs.* Vol. 64, No. 5 (2010): 496–497.

"Afghan Arabs", Muslim jihadists from other countries who contributed to the struggle, fighting alongside the Afghans. Azzam recruited the Afghan Arabs and provided them with logistical support at the *Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahedeen* (MAK) (Special Services Office for Arab Afghans), which greeted and organized Arab militants entering Afghanistan. The MAK "created a global network of financiers and recruiters to bring fighters from around the world, especially Arabs from the Middle East, to Pakistan and Afghanistan."[332] Azzam believed in rigorous military training of the Mujahedeen before sending them to battle. The Office of Mujahedeen Services was founded to make the Arab presence more organized and to have an active role in jihad and combat training. Aub Muhammed al-Sun, one of the early Mujahedeen leaders in Afghanistan, writes: "Despite many negatives, the office did its part because it was a new experience. In reality, its positives outweigh its negatives because it brought the Arabs to the point where their numbers increased and their contribution to the fight was effective."[333] Although it faced bureaucratic problems, the MAK was an important step in the implementation of Azzam's radical theology, which inspired the Mujahedeen to fight.

Perhaps more important than laying the operational blueprints for an international network of Islamist fighters, Azzam authored a theological framework justifying violence in the defense of an Islamic territory. He taught that any land once ruled by the Islamic Caliphate should be recaptured from the infidels, and that Islamic rule should be

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332 D.R. Springer, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 13.

333 CRRC, AQ-MCOP-D-001-457, 16.

established globally. Azzam's motto was "Jihad and rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogue."[334] He argued that "the age of air travel and an Islam-wide state of siege made *jihad fard ayn*, an individual duty incumbent upon all Muslims, and not *fard kifaya*, a collective obligation limited to those under direct assault only."[335] This individual duty was to be carried out by every Muslim as a requirement of Islam, in addition to daily prayer and pilgrimage to Mecca.[336] This revolutionary ideology was the very foundation for Afghan Arab resistance in the Soviet Afghan war. It was the heart of the Mujahedeen internationally, and Azzam's greatest contribution to the war. He offered a transnational vision to motivate violent action and regime change in a localized, nation-state context. Azzam's "desire to seek out the true spirit of jihad led him to Afghanistan… but Azzam's chief role was that of ideologue. His message which was preached worldwide, drew upon the Sharia-mindedness and will to action that were the ideological features of the Afghan jihad."[337] Azzam was instrumental in promoting the Afghan cause to the rest of the world. He not only recruited foreign fighters, but he made the struggle honorable and one's duty to fight weighty. Afghanistan itself also made this possible. It was a unique venue where violent jihadist philosophy and an Islamic nation in danger called Mujahedeen to action internationally.

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334 Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, *Join the Caravan* (London, UK: Azzam Publications, 2001).

335 Yousef H. Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 136–137.

336 Springer, *Islamic Radicalism*, 43.

337 John C.M. Calvert, "The Striving Shaykh: Abdullah Azzam and the Revival of Jihad," *Journal of Religion and Society, Supplementary Series* (Supplement 2) (2007): 345.

Azzam's partner and protégée in this project was Osama Bin Laden. Azzam laid the organizational infrastructure of an international network that his pupil, Bin Laden, would later use to create Al Qaeda. Isam Dai Taz writes a biographical account of Osama Bin Laden which explains the early days of the Afghan Arabs and Mujahedeen movement in Afghanistan, including interviews with Bin Laden himself. Dai Taz spent years pursuing these interviews. The account refers to the "Land of Lions", which was the first area in Afghanistan settled by the Mujahedeen, near Jaji. According to Dai Taz, Bin Laden said:

> We discussed what the place should be called, the brothers chose several names, and I was delighted with the Land of Lions. It was taken from poetry written by one of the Prophet's companions, may God be pleased with them, praising the Prophet. It reads:
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> 'Those pleased with the sounds of fierce battle
> Like the sounds of great burnings
> Should join a Land of Lions where swords
> Are sharpened between the market and the trenches.'[338]

Of the Afghani-Arab relationship, Bin Laden said:

> I noticed that the Afghans paid attention to- and were happy to have- the Arabs among them. The Arab presence gave the Afghans strength and commitment, and it increased their morale significantly. The Afghans loved the Arabs so much that they treated them like guest and would not assign them any military or combat duties.[339]

Of the low number of Arabs who joined, he said:

> The number was small because the young Arab men at the time were reared in their home countries in a life far from the true glory of jihad and protecting one's faith. Many of them regarded jihad as a choice- something that could be

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338 CRRC, AQ-MCOP-D-001-457, 22.

339 CRRC, AQ-MCOP-D-001-457,19.

delegated.[340]

The Mujahedeen were anxious to fight as they built military fortifications in preparation for their first military objective. The author claims that Bin Laden calmed their fervor, writing: "It was truly a time of purity and great spiritual commitment."[341]

Perhaps the flipside of these accounts of pure spiritual growth in the "Land of Lions" are the accounts of life in the camps and training centers around Peshawar where three million Afghan refugees lived. Here, Arabs, Muslims, and international Islamists from around the globe interacted with one another. Kepel writes:

> Arab funds, abundant American weaponry, and trade in heroin were the mainstays of camp life, which was heavily infiltrated by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) and the American CIA, as well as by the leading organizations of Pakistani Islamism, notably Mawdudi's Jamaat-e-Islami and the Deobandi madrassas.[342]

As these organizations went beyond the boundaries of their localized contexts, "many unexpected ideological cross-fertilizations and grafts emerged."[343] He continues:

> In general, that network answered the purposes of the states that had underwritten it (the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Pakistan) by playing a key role in the discomfiture of the Soviets and creating a focus of attention for the jihadists of the world as well as an alternative to the Iranian revolution… At the same time, however, the network developed its own logic, which before long began to work against its original patrons.[344]

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340 Ibid.

341 Ibid., 26.

342 Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam* (London: IB Tauris Publishers, 2002), 11.

343 Ibid., 31.

344 Ibid., 137–138.

Jihad in Afghanistan was not implemented by Muslim states but by transnational Islamic religious networks. These networks "were assembled around *ulemas* and institutions that were already in place, such as the Muslim World League, or created ad hoc by the conservative Salafists, whose ideology fell somewhere between Saudi Wahhabism and the Muslim Brothers."[345] The Afghan jihad was "the ideological axis around which the Islamist movement revolved in the final quarter of the twentieth century."[346] The camps around Peshawar, visited by thousands of militants through the 1980s and 1990s "offered training that combined ultra-religious ideological brain-washing and fascination with violence."[347]

The Mujahedeen were ultimately successful in defending Afghanistan against the Soviets. The Politburo decided on withdrawal 1988 after the Geneva Accords were signed in April between the USSR, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the US. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989. Dibb writes of the controversial accounts of the source of withdrawal:

> In December of that year, the Soviet Parliament condemned the invasion retrospectively, declaring the decision to invade had been taken by a narrow circle in the former leadership, namely Politburo members Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov and Gromyko. Dobrynin's (1995: 443) conclusion was that 'the decade of tragedy had left a deep scar in the hearts of our people, ended in ignominious failure, and shook the whole Soviet regime.'[348]

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345 Ibid., 139.

346 Ibid., 18.

347 Ibid.

348 Dibb, "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan," 499.

The loss was a blow to the Soviet Union, and attempts to understand the failed effort within a Marxist-Leninist framework were unsuccessful. Attempts to understand how the superior Soviet military failed was equally perplexing. Dibb writes:

> The Soviets came prepared to fight the war they had been trained for: high-speed mechanized warfare. They had to rearm and develop new tactics and new training while fighting the war. Despite overwhelming Soviet combat power, the Mujahedeen learned to dodge Soviet attacks, work around Soviet technology, and live to fight another day. In the end, the Mujahedeen national will was stronger than that of the Soviet leadership (Mataxis 2002: xv).[349]

While the Mujahedeen's strength fluctuated between 40,000 and 60,000 men during the war, they were arguably successful in recruitment and organization due to ideology.[350] Azzam and the leadership imbued in each Mujahedeen "the spirit of Islam, nationalism, and personal responsibility for the outcome of battle."[351] Furthermore, "The normal life of the Afghan people allowed the Mujahedeen to easily withstand burdens and deprivations, participate in guerrilla actions, and show an indifference to death."[352] Afghanistan was the first post- World War II failure of the Soviet Army. The Soviets had underestimated the strength of Islam, which they had viewed as a vehicle for expressing socio-economic aspirations. According to Dibb, "the Soviets simply did not understand who they were fighting."[353] As a result of the war, Soviets came to recognize Islam as a "global force

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349 Ibid.

350 Dibb, "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan," 501.

351 Ibid.

352 Ibid.

353 Dibb, "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan," 502.

and not a mere disguise for socio-economic aspirations."[354] Afghanistan proved the strength of political Islam.

After Soviet withdrawal, the 1989 to 1992 phase of the Afghan Civil War began. Najibullah remained in power from 1987–1992, but in 1990, the constitution made Afghanistan an Islamic state, and all references to communism were removed from the document. The Mujahedeen's failure to obtain decisive military victory over the Communist regime after Soviet withdrawal:

> Proved that Islamic militancy had been incapable of overcoming long-standing ethnic and national rivalries… instead of producing an internationally coordinated political movement, the Islamic wave lent ideological legitimacy and a political dimension to the rivalry between Persian Iran and the Arab states, to Pakistan's military ambitions and to the ethnic strife within Afghanistan.[355]

Although the country was left in instability, the departure of the Soviet troops did increase the political legitimacy of the Mujahedeen. A piece of Azzam's vision had been achieved, a piece that might be replicated in other countries.

Azzam did not see the civil war. He and his two sons were killed in November, 1989 by a vehicle-borne explosive. The list of possible assassins is extensive, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Israeli Mossad, the KGB, Saudi Intelligence, militant Islamic factions, and even his pupil Osama Bin Laden. Azzam cofounded HAMAS with Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, and an unknown Al Qaeda author comments on Azzam's mysterious

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354 Olivier Roy, *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War* (Pennington, NJ: Darwin Press Inc., 1995), 45.

355 Ibid., 4.

assassination and its possible relevance to that relationship:

> The Airport 1990... It was a painful strike in the back... It became evident that after the assassination of Dr. Abd-Allah Azzam the Pakistani authorities had acted in collusion. Saudi intelligence were clearly involved...Arab masses lost their (legitimate) leadership represented in Dr. Azzam who was assassinated in Peshawar, as well as in Osama Bin Laden who was detained by the Saudi authorities and prevented from departure. Perhaps this protected him-in my belief-from facing the destiny of Dr. Azzam... By turning jihad towards Israel, Dr. Azzam revolted against "the rules of the game" so he had to pay the price for it: his life.[356]

In document by a different unnamed jihadist, the author speaks to Azzam's assassination and its possible relation to HAMAS:

> One of those close to Dr. Azzam says; a stormy meeting took place among the man and two representatives from HAMAS and the international brothers then, even the shouting of those attending the meeting were heard in the adjacent street. Dr. 'Azzam shouted saying: "he will not nominate HAMAS from now on." This meeting was a short period before his assassination.[357]

The identity of Azzam's assassin remains a mystery.

Azzam's assassination highlights the importance of perceived legitimacy when evaluating transnational religious actors and their role in regime change. Azzam may or may not have had a sophisticated political worldview. He may or may not have been skilled at the politics between factions like HAMAS and the Mossad. However, it is clear that he was viewed as "legitimate" by a Muslims internationally who donated money and aided in recruiting Mujahedeen through their networks. It was a legitimacy based in

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356 CRRC, AQ-SHPD-D-000-284.

357 CRRC AQ-SHPD-D-000-291, 45.

religious fervor and religious intelligence. The legitimacy of the transnational religious individual can impact the legitimacy of the regime for which he or she is advocating. Azzam had theological legitimacy among the Afghan Arabs and a certain international Islamic community, but did not know how to create a political regime in Afghanistan respected by the broader international community through international diplomacy or otherwise. Nor did he have the political capital to build domestic consensus for the establishment of a theocratic state, though this was in part due to his untimely death months after Soviet withdrawal.

Meaning in Jihadist Theology and Global Movements

Azzam's theological justification for jihad as an individual duty did not come out of a vacuum; it can be placed in the context of a long history of Islamic literature**.** Perhaps Azzam's beliefs are best understood as an important chapter in a longer narrative on the rise of global jihadist ideology. Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) an Egyptian theorist and Muslim Brotherhood leader, understood Islam as a "social ideology that was directly competitive with secularism and a basis for political order that challenged the Western notion of the secular nation-state."[358] In a sense, global jihadi ideology seeks to establish a new world order, constructed along territorial lines, but defined by pre-Westphalian conceptions of the nation-state (the presence of Islamic rule).

In books such as *Milestones* and *This Religion of Islam*, Qutb envisioned Islam as

358 Mark Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 196.

a global political community, and his ideology influenced Azzam. Qutb "faulted the European creation of nation-states such as Pakistan, Egypt, and the Arab states out of the old Indian Raj and Ottoman Empire, thus attacking the very premises of secular nationalism in the Muslim world."[359] When young Islamic activists in Egypt in the 1970's came into contact with these ideas and theological scholars teaching at Al-Azhar University, the contemporary jihadi movement was born.[360] According to Juergensmeyer, the jihadi movement spread internationally from Egypt as a result of 1) students of Al-Azhar bringing ideas to their home countries and 2) the exile of Egyptian Islamic radicals after the trial of the Anwar al-Sadat's assassins, many of whom joined the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.[361] The theoretical basis for the Islamist movement was rooted in 1960s Mawdudi in Pakistan, Qutb in Egypt, and Khomeini in Iran. It became a powerful political force after the Israeli-Arab war of 1973. Kepel writes:

> The Afghan jihad against the Soviets became the great cause with which Islamists worldwide identified, moderates and radicals alike. In the minds of many Arabs, jihad supplanted the Palestinian cause and symbolized the shift from nationalism to Islamism…
>
> In addition to the local Mujahedeen, or holy warriors, the international brigades in Afghanistan hailed from all over the Muslim world: Egypt, Algeria, the Arabian Peninsula, and Southeast Asia. They lived in close communities, where they received intensive training in guerilla warfare techniques and built up a variant of Islamist ideology based on armed struggle and extreme religious rigor.[362]

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359 Qtub, quoted by Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion*, 196.

360 Ibid.

361 Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion*, 197.

362 Kepel, *Jihad*, 8.

Afghanistan provided a cause, as did Palestine, for jihadist around the world to rally around.

A fatwa from an unnamed Al Qaeda source references other older Islamist thinkers who lay the groundwork for Azzam and ultimately Al Qaeda's genre of thinking. This source references scholars such as Imam Ibn 'Abd-al-Birr, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn 'Abidin. Imam Ibn 'Abd-al-Birr, a famous Sunni scholar who died in 1071, writes:

> The duty of Jihad is also divided into two parts, one of them is a public duty to be incumbent upon every one of those free and matured who can defend, fight and carry arms; that is when the enemy arrives and fighting against the Islam home; in that case, it is the duty of everybody in that home to mobilize and go to war against the enemy including the heavy and skinny as well as the youths and the elders; and no one from the fighters and the wealthy, who is capable to go to war, ought to stay behind.[363]

Ibn Taymiyyah, a notable scholar and logician who lived until 1328, writes:

> As far as the elimination battle, it is the most serious types of driving the assailer away from sacredness and from the religion; so it is a unanimous duty. Nothing is more obligated than driving away the assaulting enemy who spoils the religion and the world; it is unconditional that the enemy must be driven away as possible.[364]

According to Ibn 'Abidin, an Islamic scholar who lived in Syria from 1783–1836:

> It is an individual duty if the enemy is assailed on a fort of the Islamic ones, so it is the individual duty for someone who is near the enemy; and it is the collective duty for those who are behind them and at a distance from the enemy if they were not needed. But if they were

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363 Ibn 'Abd-al-Birr, quoted in CRRC, AQ-THEO-D-068.

364 Ibn Taymiyyah, quoted in CRRC, AQ-THEO-D-001-068.

> needed… then it becomes an individual duty just like prayers and fasting which they cannot neglect.[365]

These scholars laid the groundwork for Azzam's individual call to defensive jihad.

Hegghammer distinguishes between "socio-revolutionary Islamism", "classical jihadism", and "global jihadism."[366] Classical jihadism, first articulated by Azzam, holds that the non-Muslim infringement of Muslim territory demands the immediate military involvement of all able Muslim men in defense of the said territory, wherever its location. Hegghammer views this iteration of pan-Islamism as a "macro-nationalism centered on the imagined community of the ummah, which is defined by religion."[367] Although the Muslim nation and community is a-territorial, pan-Islamists have a territorial vision of Muslim community – "all lands once ruled by Muslims, from Andalucía in the West to Indonesia in the East."[368] For Azzam, Afghanistan was a productive theater to give voice to his pan-Islamist ideas.[369] Azzam envisioned the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan as the first step in an international Islamist movement, towards an ultimate war against international communism, what he called "a war between the *Ummahs* (collective peoples of Islam) versus Communism."[370] This is evocative of the cosmic

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365 Ibn Abidin, quoted in CRRC, AQ-THEO-D-068.

366 Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia,* 7.

367 Ibid., 8

368 Ibid.

369 William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars: Second Edition* (Twentieth Century Wars) (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 68.

370 Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, referenced by Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamist Ideology*, 153.

images conjured by other religious terrorist groups – the war is larger than life, relates to a metaphysical conflict between good and evil, and transcends human experience.[371]

Azzam's pan-Islamist vision directly contributed to Bin Laden's thinking and the principles of Al Qaeda. Although Azzam was not involved in the birth of Al Qaeda, the organization was in part built upon his philosophy, though important ideological differences exist to today. An unknown Al Qaeda member connects Azzam's philosophy of defensive jihad with Al Qaeda's philosophy of individual obligation to jihad. He also echoes Azzam's concern with protecting Muslim lands, regardless of one's place of origin, and he references the ultimate scope of jihad. He writes:

> It is the duty and obligation of every Muslim to struggle (Jihad) against the alliance of the Jews and Crusaders led by Israel and American who are occupying the consecrates of the Muslims: the Honored Kaaba (in Mecca), the Prophet's Mosque (in Medina) and the al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) the ascension place of the Prophet (M). And to liberate every Islamic land occupied by the infidels through sacrificing lives and money in fighting for the sake of God and desiring His satisfaction, Whom be ascribed all perfection and majesty; be He exalted said "And fight with them until there is no more persecution and religion should be only for Allah" (The Spoils of War, verse 8.39).[372]

Azzam also formulated theories of *Al Qaeda al-Sulba* (the Firm Foundation) that became the spiritual foundation for Al Qaeda. Azzam viewed Afghanistan as the beginning battle in a perpetual jihad. In *Ayyat al- Rahman fee Jihad al-Afghan* (God's Signs in the Afghan Jihad), he writes, "The Afghan (-Soviet War) issue is the story of Islam wounded in every

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371 Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion*, 149.

372 CRRC, AQ-THEO-D-001-068.

part of the globe. Where nation-states have ripped it (Islamic nations) apart..."[373] He viewed the Soviet-Afghan War as similar to situations in Chad, Philippines, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, and most importantly, Palestine. Azzam believed the situation in Palestine, like the Afghan jihad, was *fard ayn.* He believed that Palestine and Afghanistan were the "central issues in the Muslim world" in the 1980's.[374]

Azzam's philosophy of defensive jihad shaped the later philosophy of Al Qaeda towards Christians and Westerners in Islamic lands. An undated fatwa, "Fatwa Calling for Ejection of Foreign Forces from Saudi Peninsula", used Qur'anic and Sharia quotes to call for military operations against foreign and Christian forces in Saudi Arabia. At the end of the document there are spaces for names and signatures. The unknown author echoes Azzam's philosophy of individual duty to jihad. He similarly references Ibn 'Abidin:

> As for the scholar's opinions: The past and succeeding imam scholars during all Islamic periods agreed that if the disbelievers enter a city to occupy it, it becomes an obligation upon all those who belong to it to fight. The son will come out without his parents' permission, and the indebted without his creditor's permission. If they were insufficient, or fell short or were sluggish, or remained seated, then the individual obligation (on each Muslim) will fall upon the closest (neighboring), and the closest (to the neighboring). If they were insufficient or fell behind, then the individual obligation will include the whole territory, until the enemy is defeated and is pushed away from the territory of Islam.[375]

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373 Azzam, referenced by Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamist Ideology*, 140–141.

374 Ibid., 147.

375 CRRC, AQ-THEO-D-000-455, 3.

And later in the document:

> Ibn ‘Abidin said, “If the enemy attacks one of the Muslim border guards, the individual obligation falls upon those who are close to it, but those who are behind, distant from the enemy then it is an obligation of sufficiency if there was no need for them; but, if there was a need for them, if those close to the enemy were unable to resist the enemy, or if they were not unable but became sluggish and have not fought, it falls upon those who are next to them and becomes an obligation like prayer and fasting that they cannot abandon, and so forth in this sequence until it gradually falls upon the who nation of Islam, East and West (Hashiyat Ibn ‘Abidin: 3/238).[376]

This document reiterates the notion of a developing jihadist narrative. The path of ideological growth can be traced from Ibn’ Abidin and early philosophers, to Azzam’s transnational defensive jihad, to Al Qaida’s call for the withdrawal of all foreign and Christian forces from Islamic lands.

The jihad in Afghanistan and later the jihad of Al Qaeda can be compared to the “foreign fighter doctrine.” When it was introduced in the mid-1980s, the foreign fighter doctrine had two distinct differences from existing jihad doctrines:

> First, it offered a diagnosis focusing on an outside enemy, whereas Islamist revolutionary doctrine focused on the enemy within… Second, Azzam’s doctrine differed from orthodox Islamic views on jihad by offering a rationale for privatized warfare, for example, divesting national governments of the power to prevent individuals to go abroad for war.[377]

Hegghammer writes:

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376 Ibid.

377 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2010), 74.

> … the foreign fighter phenomenon represents a violent offshoot off a qualitatively new sub current of Islamism- populist pan-Islamism- which emerged in the 1970s as a result of strategic action by marginalized elites employed in nonviolent international Islamic organizations… these activists-who were mostly based in the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia- propagated an alarmist discourse emphasizing external threats to the Muslim nation. … The norms and networks established by the Hijazi pan-Islamists then enabled Arab activists in 1980s Afghanistan to recruit foreign fighters in the name of inter-Muslim solidarity. The "Arab Afghan" mobilization, in turn, produced a foreign fighter movement that still exists today, as a phenomenon partly distinct from Al Qaeda.[378]

In other words, Afghan Arabs in the Soviet Afghan war were recruited internationally and supported by non-state actors, though they fought in a specific territorial context. They were regionally focused, specifically on Afghanistan and Palestine, until Azzam's death.

An Al Qaeda author writes about modern justification for jihad and references a book called *Paths of Paradise*. His account of circumstances around the individual obligation to jihad is directly related to Azzam's earlier ideology, which changed the direction of jihadist thinking and weightily impacted Al Qaeda doctrine in later years. He writes:

> The jihad is a collective duty, it becomes an individual duty in three circumstances:
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> If two enemies meet, and they lined up facing each other, it is forbidden for those who came to go away. "When you meet force, take firm stand against them." Also "When you meet those who disbelieve in a battle-field, never turn your back to them." (Al-Anfal).
>
> If the enemy invades a country then refer to the previous verses.

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378 Ibid., 56–57.

> If an Imam "Religious Leader" called upon the people to fight "If you were called upon to fight, then go to fight." (Al-Maghanni and the Great Illustration 10/364, 365). [379]

This shift from collective to individual duty was fundamental to both the Afghan Arab movement and later iterations of global jihadism.

The victory of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan has stood as a bright moment for the jihadist movement, and is regularly referred to by Al Qaeda leaders as an example of victory for Islam that should be repeated and universalized. An unidentified Al Qaeda document references the victory and describes how it was difficult for the Islamist movement to move forward afterwards. He writes:

> Muslims have been able to conquer Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, by the grace of Allah, after fourteen years of fighting against the Communists, and after having suffered great sacrifices and pain. The people had been unable to do so, yet the Afghan Mujahedeen were able to destroy the Soviet Empire; and, three years later, they took down the Afghan Communist regime. It has been thought that an Islamic system would have been established automatically. The hopes of the Muslims, who had been involved and who had backed the Afghan jihad, were dashed. It was seen as a power struggle between the various Afghan organizations allied with the remnants of the structural fall of Communism…
>
> Having achieved the greatest accomplishment, over the course of the past fourteen years, through the blood of Mujahedeen, the march of Jihad has not been completed until the specified goal that was initiated is completed. This is the word of Allah, and it is supreme. It is, however, still relatively far away. There will still need to be several battles in various fields, but we think it may require an all-out war that may take roughly a decade, more or less.
>
> Even if we are to assume that we as Muslims are in need of a new phase, similar to the phase in which we engaged in the past, it will end up taking time and

379 CRRC, AQ-THEO-D-000-022, 1.

> sacrifice. We consider the main goals, and the sole focus of human existence to be the establishment of the sharia of Allah upon the earth. We say that this goal is right around the corner, or even closer than that, due to the previous periods of Afghani jihad, as well as interim periods, endured in order to achieve higher goals, which have only been flashes of lighting in the history of nations and mankind.[380]

He also references the "current" (document written prior to 2003) struggle to control Afghanistan: "We cannot hope to establish an Islamic government in Kabul without complete and continuous war."[381] This is reminiscent of Juergensmeyer and Azzam's cosmic, ongoing war and alludes to a continued philosophy of global jihad.

After the fall of Kabul in April 1992, the Mujahedeen dispersed internationally, but primarily to Bosnia, Algeria, and Egypt. Their attempts at jihad in these countries were ultimately unsuccessful, with failure evident by 1995. Kepel writes, "A gulf had opened between the aims of the 1990s jihad extremists and the social, political, and cultural aspirations of Muslims during the 1980s, and it brought the Islamist movement to a standstill."[382] After the failure of the Salafist-jihadist militants in Bosnia, Algeria, and Egypt, many Islamists thinkers advocated ending armed struggle and embracing the integration of Muslim culture with democratic values. Kepel writes:

> The extreme wing of the movement found itself facing a political impasse. It rejected the democratic references invoked by the moderates; and as a result, raw terrorism in its most spectacular and

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380 CRRC, AQ-SHPD-D-001-176, 1.

381 CRRC, AQ-SHPD-D-001-176.

382 Kepel, *Jihad,* 11.

> destructive form became its main option for reviving armed struggle in the new millennium.[383]

Examples of this movement include the election of President Mohammed Khatami in Iran, the new Algerian government formed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and the overthrow of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

On May 18, 1996, Bin Laden left the Sudan for Afghanistan and on August 23, 1996, he published the "Declaration of Jihad on the American Occupiers of the Holy Places." Like Azzam, Bin Laden had a leadership style that did not fit easily into traditional international relations literature. Kepel says that by refusing to acknowledge responsibility directly, Osama "deprives himself of any capacity to structure and unite behind him a mass movement capable of winning power in the Muslim world. He remains merely a symbol, an icon, whose only real contacts are with the activists belonging to his secret organization."[384] While it is true that Bin Laden could not win power in the traditional sense of ruling a country, that was not what he sought. His power was not in the ability to control the region, but to inspire other actors and individuals to transform the region. In other words, being a TRL can inspire movement transnationally with implications for the traditional nation state. That he did successfully, achieving his aims. He did not aim to rule a sovereign state, but rather to create and inspire a global movement, like his mentor, Azzam.

According to Kepel, although a terrorist act provokes extreme reactions, it "does

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383 Ibid., 14.

384 Ibid., 16.

not necessarily express the true strength of the movement to which it claims to belong. Despite the devastation it can cause… desperate terrorist acts do not translate easily into political victory and legitimate power."[385] Yet perhaps Kepel does not consider nontraditional sources of legitimate power. Azzam's legitimacy was rooted in his theological purism and fanaticism, but he also wielded legitimate power in a traditional sense. Azzam changed the internal politics of Afghanistan by contributing to Soviet withdrawal and the onset of civil war. He may never have wielded the power of a politician, but he forced the hand of and controlled the future of a nation state.

Azzam and Bin Laden were both strategic in their goals of a new international world order. Al Qaeda and its associated movements cannot always be characterized by disassociated actions inspired by leaders with irregular communication methods and naiveté to world politics, as they often are. A letter written by Osama Bin Laden to Mullah Omar prior to 2002 reads:

> …Jihad continuation in the Islamic Republics will keep the enemies busy and divert them away from the Afghani issue and ease the pressure off. The enemies of Islam problem will become how to stop the spreading of Islam into the Islamic Republics and not the Afghani issue. Consequently, the efforts of the Russians and their American allies will be scattered.[386]

The victory in the "Land of Lions" ultimately led to victory in striking a fatal blow to the United States on 9/11. Kepel comments: "Thus, barely a generation after many Muslim nations won their independence, the Islamic world entered a religious era that largely

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385 Ibid., 19.

386 CRRC, AQ-SHPD-D-000-055, 2.

canceled out the nationalist period which preceded it."[387]

Meaning to Hypothesized Causal Structure

In revisiting the hypothesized causal structure, we can analyze the variables as they relate to the case of Azzam in Afghanistan. A transnational religious leader can again be defined as an individual actor, who, as guided by a religious ideology, acts towards political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and immaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across state lines in the achievement of those ends. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the transnational religious leader in this case, can be analyzed according to eight characteristics, which enabled him to effect regime change, and ultimately to challenge state sovereignty, to varying degrees. The characteristics of a transnational religious leader include: leadership style, hard versus soft power, relationship to the secularized state, and relationship to modernity. The characteristics of a transnational social movement include: political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and character of the activism.

The first characteristic of a TRL is leadership style. Within Burn's paradigm, Azzam had a transformational leadership style. Through his theological writings and public speeches, he reshaped the identity of Muslims both within Afghanistan and throughout the Middle East. He offered a new vision for jihad that both rejected the importance of state boundaries in determining individual responsibility, and upheld pre-

387 Kepel*, Jihad,* 5.

Westphalian territorial boundaries of Islamic territory as worth defending. It can be stated that his leadership motivated followers to accomplish goals that even Azzam might not have fully realized. Surely after his death, his teachings on defensive jihad shaped the jihadist movement going forward. Azzam's transformational texts and speeches, however, framed his practical work on the ground organizing the Afghan Arabs. Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette's analysis of leadership as an activity and a dialogical relationship is relevant here too. Azzam's actions, both offering theological inspiration and materially organizing the armed Afghan Arabs, were responded to positively by his followers. Osama Bin Laden looked up to him as a wise mentor for years, until their opinions of the tactics of jihad dramatically diverged. Recruits and volunteers traveled from all over the region – Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt – to join the forces in Afghanistan, inspired by the mission as defined by Azzam. This band of jihadists ultimately contributed to the formation of Al Qaeda.

The second characteristic of a transnational religious leader is whether or not he wields hard or soft power, both, or none at all. In the case of Azzam, he used both hard and soft power in the achievement of his aims. "Hard power" refers to coercing a state, group, or individual to do something, often by force or by threat of force. "Soft power" is defined by Joseph Nye as the ability to make an individual, group, or state "want" to do something.[388] "Religious soft power", developed by Jeff Haynes, refers to how transnational religious actors spread ideas, values, and norms. Azzam certainly wielded hard power in that he gathered money and arms from international sources (in part from

388 Nye, *Soft Power*, 12.

the US) to supply his transnational force of Afghan Arabs. He recruited, funded, organized, and even led in battle an armed force that aided the broader effort in Afghanistan to repel the Soviets. He also, however, wielded soft power in that he offered the source of inspiration for people to join the Afghan Arabs and to donate money and arms. More fundamentally, he offered theological inspiration for every able Muslim to be invested in the fate of Afghanistan, regardless of his or her home country.

The third characteristic of a transnational religious leader is his or her relationship to the secularized state. Azzam would fit more easily into Juergensmeyer's definition of a religious nationalist than John Paul II. Azzam not only responded "in a religious way to a political situation"[389], but he also aimed for the establishment of a theocratic state. Azzam rejected both the secular state and the world system of secular states. However, he promoted gradual change, one country at a time, placing a primacy on Palestine and Afghanistan. It is possible that his religious denomination, Islam, made the confrontation with the secular state more difficult, but it is clear that the leader himself rejected the secular state and the Western influence in places holy to Islam. Because of his pre-Westphalian vision, Azzam was not successful at international diplomacy with world leaders, a failing that contributed to the political void that arose after Soviet withdrawal. Azzam's vision of state authority and state legitimacy was shaped by his rejection of the secular state.

The fourth characteristic of the transnational religious leader is his relationship to

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389 Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion,* 6.

modernity or programs of modernization. If modernization spelled the height of secularization, then Azzam rejected it. He did not accept the privatization of religion, its decreased relevance to public life, or a decline in religious belief and participation. If the modern world included a world order of secularized states pitted in opposition to each other by an anarchic system, in that sense Azzam also rejected modernity. He did view the world in terms of warring ideologies, for example, Islam versus secularism, Islam versus the West, etc. But these ideologies were driven by culture, man's relationship with God, and religion. They were meta-level conflicts, unrelated to a realist world in which secular states are the dominant actors.

The first characteristic through which to analyze the "Afghan Arab" transnational social movement is that of political theology. The Afghan Arabs can be analyzed as part of a broader jihadist movement that was developing at the time. The people who participated in the Afghan Arab movement extended beyond the recruits on the ground, and included those who donated arms and money, those who circulated Azzam's theological ideas, and those who believed in the cause of a theocracy for Afghanistan. Often the theological language used by transnational religious leaders has a political content that shapes transnational social movements. In the case of Azzam, theological discourse, particularly around the justification for defensive jihad, was closely related to political and military mobilization. Political theology is not just about content, but about the framing of the message, for the ultimate purpose of mobilization. Azzam called on individual Muslims everywhere to take part in armed struggle in Afghanistan. He made it their religious duty to participate and dissipated the significance of nation state

boundaries. Political aims were articulated with theological concepts, because the goal was a theocracy in Afghanistan, ultimately under a global Islamic Caliphate. These theological concepts and the language around them influenced world politics through transnational mobilization, domestic regime change, and Afghanistan's evolving sovereignty status.

The second characteristic of the "Afghan Arab" TSM is "mobilizing structures" as defined by McCarthy to include "the more or less formally organized everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action, ranging from religious groups and neighborhood association to workplace cliques and friendship groups."[390] It can be defined as a social movement if it is "an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups and organizations to promote or resist social change with the use of public protest activities."[391] The Afghan Arabs constituted a social movement in that it was a sustained over a number of years and an effort of a collective of individuals from around the region, who worked toward the collective goal of regime change in Afghanistan. Public protest was expressed through military action, in conjunction with the Afghan forces. Non-recruits also participated transnationally by donating money and arms. The existence of a loose network of Islamic churches and social groups enabled Azzam's message to spread easily and to be translated into the operationalization of a jihadist resistance to Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

The third characteristic of the transnational social movement is political

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390 McCarthy and Wolfson, "Consensus Movements," 249.

391 Neidhardt and Rucht, "The Analysis of Social Movements," 450.

opportunity structures, which capture the relationship between the state and the social movement. In April, 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan seized power in the Saur revolution. Within months, the Mujahedeen had launched an uprising. The political opportunity structures can be measured according to McCarthy's four categories. The institutionalized political system was closed, and the elite arrangements were unstable. Friction between the Khalq and Parcham groups in government led to the dismissal of the Parcham Cabinet members. There was a series of assassinations and a period of unstable government during early PDPA rule. In September 1979, Taraki was assassinated by Amin, and in December, 1979, Amin was assassinated by the Soviets. The Soviets then organized a government led by Babrak Karmal. Najibullah took over as president in 1987 and in 1989, the Soviets withdrew, leaving the country in a state of civil war. Although direct Soviet assistance ended, the USSR continued to support Najibullah with economic and military aid until his fall in 1992. During the time of the Soviet Afghan war, there was a strong presence of elite allies. Mujahedeen were supported covertly by the United States starting in mid-1979 under CIA Operation Cyclone, which provided billions of dollars of cash and weapons over the course of the war.[392] Under the Soviet government, which ruled during the Soviet-Afghan war, the state had a great capacity and propensity for repression. The pattern of escalation of transnational activity during the Soviet Afghan war seems to give evidence for the mainstream opinion that as authority becomes increasingly invested in transnational bodies, social movements become more transnational in scope and target. The more heavily the Soviets invested,

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392 *Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York, NY: Free Press Publishing, 2002), 68.

the more Afghan Arab forces swelled. Likewise, the more the US donated to the Mujahedeen, and the more the scope of the conflict became transnational.

The fourth characteristic of the transnational social movement is the character of the activism. Tarrow defines transnational activists as "individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies."[393] Azzam's social movement could be defined in terms of the Afghan Arabs he recruited and the network of Islamists supporting them, or more broadly in terms of the jihadist movement, which became increasingly transnational and international in nature as a result of his life and his writings. The nature of both the movement of Afghan Arabs and the global jihadist movement was violent. Theological and philosophical language was used to promote violence as a means to serve Allah. It was used to mobilize young men from around the Middle East region, and even around the globe, to travel to Afghanistan, and take up arms to defend a holy land against the Soviets. In addition to recruits, money, arms, and other material goods crossed state lines to support the violence on the ground. The guiding philosophy was that every man and woman, regardless of his or her location, was religiously obliged to take violent action to defend Afghanistan, and ultimately all once Islamic lands, against infidel invaders or occupiers. The character of activism of the global jihadist movement, although still shaped by Azzam's life and writings, has changed since his death. It has become increasingly transnational, in that the violent action is not necessarily linked to a

393 Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism,* 43.

leadership structure, and tactically, Al Qaeda and associated movements now focus on the "far enemy", the United States, instead of the "near enemy", regional players against Islamic theocracies in the Middle East.

Meaning to Regime Change

The second research objective is twofold: 1) to analyze the TRL's political goals, particularly as they relate to regime change, and the level of accommodation those goals did or did not make to Westphalia and 2) to establish a process-driven explanation of regime change in the context of the influence of Azzam as a transnational religious leader. As previously investigated, Azzam's long term goal was the restoration of all once Muslim lands to Islamic rule under a global Caliphate. His short-term goal was to establish theocracies one country at a time in the Middle East, with a particular focus on Palestine and Afghanistan. Because these goals involved state dissolution and ultimately, geopolitical restructuring, they in no way accommodated to Westphalian principles of sovereignty. Furthermore, his preferred method of achieving these goals, through a transnational fighting force, disregarded the Westphalian principle of non-intervention.

In analyzing his pragmatic contributions to regime change, this paper considers "regime change" in this case to refer to 1) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and 2) the descent of the country into ongoing civil war until the establishment of the Taliban in 1996. The Soviet Politburo reached the decision to withdrawal from Afghanistan on principle on October 17, 1985. According to the 1988 Geneva Accords, Afghanistan and Pakistan agree to non-interference and non-

intervention. Foreign troops were to begin to exit on May 15, 1988. The US and USSR signed a declaration agreeing to refrain from interference and intervention. Soviet withdrawal was complete February 15, 1989, and Soviet Commander Boris Gromov was the last to cross the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan. According to Gorbachev, withdrawal was slow for two reasons: 1) fear of international embarrassment in admitting defeat 2) desire to establish a stable, friendly Afghanistan and to being the national reconciliation process.[394] 15,000 Soviets were killed in the decade long war and billions were spent. Westerner's called it "Russia's Vietnam", and Mikhail Gorbachev called it "the bleeding wound." The Mujahedeen took credit for Soviet withdrawal. Osama Bin Laden claimed that the credit for "the dissolution of the Soviet Union… goes to God and the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan". However, other forces which contributed, perhaps even more so, to this Soviet defeat include 1) US funding and support (particularly on the shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles in 1987) and 2) the broader context of the Cold War. Would the US not have funded any credible resistance group to the Soviets, or did Azzam and the Mujahedeen provide a unique opportunity? Perhaps, but Azzam's ability to appeal to a profound, traditional religious identity in mobilizing a transnational force to political and military action was a unique and invaluable contribution to Soviet withdrawal.

The second meaning of "regime change" in this case is the dissolution of the country into civil war. Although the Najibullah government won no popular support,

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394 Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Malcom Byrne, "Afghanistan and the Soviet Withdrawal 1989 20 Years Later." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 272. Posted February 15, 2009.

territory, or international recognition, it survived beyond the departure of Soviet troops until 1992. This was primarily due to the fact that the Afghan Army had grown strong under Soviet direction, and they were successful in thwarting Mujahedeen attacks. However, from 1989 to 1992, the country, led by Najibullah, experienced ongoing civil war. It suffered in 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved and foreign aid dried up. Najibulla was ousted from power in April, 1992. That same year the post-Communist "Islamic state of Afghanistan" was established by the Peshawar Accord, and a new phase of civil war started, with opposing militias being supported by Saudi Arabia and Iran. Under Massoud, the Islamic State made gains in maintaining order, but on September 27, 1996, the Taliban seized Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. About 400,000 Afghan civilians died in the civil wars of the 1990s. Although the Mujahedeen took credit for the overthrow of Najibullah, there were other outside forces responsible, two in particular. First, in 1992, Russia refused to sell oil products to Afghanistan, triggering an embargo. Second, General Abdul Rashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia defected in March, 1992.

The Taliban is a predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group that was in power in Afghanistan from 1996–2001, when the US took down the regime because it was harboring Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. During its reign, the Taliban received diplomatic recognition from only three countries- Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Taliban jurisprudence was drawn from the Pashtun's pre-Islamic tribal code and interpretations of sharia informed by the Wahhabi doctrines of Saudi

benefactors.[395] Strict rules on un-Islamic behavior was established. Women were required to wear the burqa or chadri, and men were required to wear beards at least the length of a fist. Women were banned from school and work; they could not leave the house without a male escort. Music, television, kite flying, pig, pork, statues of live things, alcohol, masks, chess, and wine, among other things, were banned. For these reasons, the regime was internationally isolated from its birth. Mullah Omar led Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as "commander of the faithful" from 1996–2001. He harbored Al Qaeda, and after 9/11, rejected US demands that he give up Bin Laden. The US, assisted by the Northern Alliance, toppled the Taliban in December 2001. The new government was led by Hamid Karzai and supported by the International Security Assistance Force. The Taliban has regrouped across the border in Pakistan, where its leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, leads an insurgency against the US-backed government in Kabul. In 2004, it changed its name to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The current president is Ashraf Ghani.

Again, in analyzing Azzam's impact on "regime change" in Afghanistan, we are specifically studying 1) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and 2) the devolution of the country into 7 years of civil war (during 1989–1996, government control switched multiple times due to assassinations and violent uprisings). Azzam's Afghan Arabs contributed to the broader Afghan forces in repelling the Soviet invasion in 1989, though the extent of that contribution is a subject of dispute. However, the resistance to Soviet invasion would have been comprised of only Afghans had it not been

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395 Zachary Laub. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. July 4, 2014. Accessed November 3, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

for Azzam. His theology and work on the ground made a transnational force possible, a force that would provide the basis for Al Qaeda and other global jihadist groups after his death. Though the Soviets withdrew, the government was not replaced. Rather the country was left in a state of civil war from 1989–1992 and 1992–1996. Azzam's Afghan Arabs did make up the basis of Al Qaeda, which was harbored by the Taliban beginning in 1996. Though Osama Bin Laden framed the fight in different terms than Azzam, Azzam's philosophy still guided the jihadist group, particularly the notion of defensive jihad an individual duty to jihad across state lines. Thus, although Azzam contributed strategically to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the ensuing rise of civil war and Najibullah's defeat, his greater contribution was philosophical. He authored the terms for Al Qaeda's mandate and for disparate jihadist movements around the globe. In this way, he created a challenge to state sovereignty through the global impact of these groups and their exportation of terror to the West.

Similar to Krasner's study of regime change as intervening variable, in this case, the regime change is measured by its strength as an indicator of challenges to conceptions of sovereignty. The political regime, in this case a recently installed Soviet government, was impacted by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, in the sense that his Afghan Arabs contributed to the military defeat of the Soviet Army, which was invading in support of the young government. Azzam's writings and contributions to the Afghan Arabs, accomplished something even greater, however. They made Afghanistan the premier location for a showdown between secularism and Islam, thus elevating the significance of the country's destiny in the eyes of Muslims around the world. He created a narrative that ultimately

stated that success would not be achieved in Afghanistan until it was ruled as an Islamic theocracy. In this sense, the specific kind of regime change aimed for, theocracy, made regime change as an intervening variable important in the contribution to conversations of state sovereignty. However, Azzam and his associated movements challenged state sovereignty and the Westphalian system most profoundly by aiming to create a world based on pre-Westphalian, religiously defined boundaries. In this case study, Azzam and his associated social movement impacted conceptions of sovereignty without definitively impacting regime change, placing the case within a conventional structural perspective. The larger contribution Azzam makes to the global jihadist movement is not dependent on what kind of government resulted from the Soviet Afghan war in Afghanistan. Thus, regime change in this case, is a weak indicator of the challenge to conceptions of sovereignty.

The transition from young Soviet government to civil war can also be analyzed within Owen's work on ideas in world politics. On the micro-level he finds that regime instability and great power war (both of which were present in Afghanistan) cause transnational ideological polarization, defined as "the progressive segregation of elites and mass public across state lines along an ideological axis, so that political preferences among elites across states are simplified and intensified."[396] Polarized elites then cause rulers to promote regimes, and on the macro-level, a transnational regime contest. This transnational regime contest continues indefinitely until one regime type suggest that

396 Owen, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*, 37.

vastly superior on terms all elites accept.[397] The complex story of governance and regime change in Afghanistan in the Soviet context can be told in terms of Owen's warring ideologies. There were multiple struggles going on - Islam versus secularism, Islam versus the West, Communism versus the West, and Islam versus Communism. These transnational ideologies created polarization on the micro-level and a transnational regime contest on the macro-level. It is difficult to imagine this period of regime change in Afghanistan without great power contributions and the impact of international elite allies. Azzam was an author of how the struggle in Afghanistan was framed both domestically and internationally. However, he was also used as a player in great power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union. His theology universalized the Afghan story and he contributed to the transnational ideological contest. However important his vision of regime change in Afghanistan, it was secondary to the greater, long-term challenge to the Westphalian system posed by his theological writings and ideology.

Meaning to State Sovereignty

The final meaning of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam is his contribution to Westphalian sovereignty and modern definitions of state sovereignty. As an individual, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam played an unlikely role in creating regime change in Afghanistan. He was a religious actor that became transnational. He recruited Afghan Arab fighters internationally to fight in Afghanistan. He propagated an ideology that not only justified violence in defense of Islamic territory, but made it a religious obligation for the Muslim

397 Ibid., 72.

individual to fight, regardless of his home of origin. Through both his pragmatic efforts in establishing the MAK and recruiting fighters, and his incendiary, powerful theology, Azzam inspired revolution against the Soviet Union. The war he started ended in regime change, more specifically, the fall of the Soviet government and the rise of years of civil war and political instability. Azzam's successful revolution and enduring ideology laid the groundwork for the modern jihadist movement, and perhaps even more significantly, for Al Qaeda. But there is an even greater significance to the life and efforts of this man in the Soviet Afghan war – he challenged one of the greatest principles in international relations theory – Westphalian sovereignty.

A lengthy intelligence document, part of a series entitled, "Chat from the Top of the World," the unnamed author gives an unusually personal account of Azzam and the consciousness of the Afghan people during the war. He writes that the Afghans believed, "that any battle is determined by the results achieved on the ground and that whoever controls the land is a winner irrespective of the number of people or equipment lost in the process."[398] Due to the fact that the Communists gained no new land during the war, they were considered defeated by the Afghans throughout the war. This is significant in the sense that the aims of the Mujahedeen were territorial in nature, not just to defend Afghanistan from Communism, but ultimately to defend all territories that were once Islamic from foreign forces. This is also significant because the basis for the territorial value was theologically imbued.

According to this source, religious conviction drove the Mujahedeen, but there

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[398]CRRC, AQ-SHPD-D-000-291, 1.

was little understanding of the larger politics at play or the geopolitical significance of the war. He writes: "The Muslims offered their blood under a strong religious faith but did not know the reality of who was leading them and did not operate with understanding and knowledge."[399] Regime change was achieved solely through religious, not political, conviction on the part of the people fighting. This unknown author describes an interaction with Azzam in Ghowr:

> Haqqani didn't call me at the agreed upon time and the reason was the arrival of Dr. 'Abdullah 'Azzam long with thirty five Arab young men came from Peshawar to liberate Ghowr. I have compared them to "People's Resistance" at the time which we know in Egypt; which are that type of forces that our government forms along with every defeat in its wars with Israel… The contribution of these People's Resistance Forces at its best is represented in the famous phrase they send out loudly at night; that is: "Turn off the light". The Arab young men who came here were unfamiliar with the area, most of them have not been completely or even partially trained, and have no idea about what is going on around her except that Ghowr has fallen and that Dr. 'Abdullah had called upon them to fight and brought them here.[400]

The Mujahedeen were as much inspired by Azzam as a leader as they were by the theology he espoused. The unknown author also comments on the religious, political and organizational ideology of the Arab Mujahedeen in 1986. He writes:

> It is out of the question that Dr. 'Abdullah 'Azzam is the greatest ideology pioneer of the Arab jihad rally in Afghanistan, and continued to be so until his martyr in November of 1989; although his standing had tangibly declined in that year.

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399 Ibid., 14.

400 Ibid., 74–75.

> Dr. Azzam is the legitimate founder of Jihad in Afghanistan; rather the Jihad burst which followed it, he was the political speculator of the Arab rally and what succeeded it from and Islamic depth in the Arab world and the crowds of the immigrants in Europe and American in particular…
>
> After that, Dr. 'Abdullah' was the only architect of the Arab activity on Afghani soil; which is the role he quickly lost with the emergence of Osama Bin Laden as a military Jihadist motivator with enormous push forward. Also, many had lost, with the multiplication of the Arab Jihadist break out on the Afghani surface and their financial, ideological, and organizational independence. Dr. 'Abdullah' did not bring anything new in his legitimate origin or his political vision; but his great advantage was his credibility, and his simmering emotion; which he confirmed in his complete field involvement without reservation in the Afghani crowd.
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> The man rode the highest Jihad podium in the world of this century, gave his effective religious speech, defended jihad as a religious obligation and it has one path to defend the nation existence before the threats that destroyed it. Undoubtedly, Dr. 'Abdullah's' writings and his taped speeches are regarded a witness to their time and a history for the ideology of the Arab jihad rally in Afghanistan.[401]

This text is an example of the lionization common among jihadists when they speak of Azzam and the Mujahedeen success in the Afghan Soviet war. Yet, the source also notes Azzam's lack of political skill and specific political vision.

Azzam was a theological force and inspiration to jihadists internationally. He also provided pragmatic organizational support for the Afghan Arabs. Yet his vision for an ongoing, broader war may have been unrealistic and paradoxically defined. He aimed to recapture all lands that were once ruled by Islam from the infidels. It is paradoxical that he envisioned recapturing lands once ruled by Islam, but that he needed to do so through

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401 Ibid., 222–223.

regime change of nation-states, territorially defined. This sentiment relates to another document from an unknown source written in 2002, discussing Afghanistan and the author's criticism of the West's desired world order, based on territory. He writes:

> World order is a term coined by European politicians during their war with the Ottoman Caliphates… It is a system of regulating the relations of the world to achieve political objectives, which are:
>
> To ensure control of the Christian European countries over the rest of the world.
>
> To organize the relationships within Christian Europe to avoid fighting among themselves for control over poor and weak countries, or divide the Islamic countries to European colonies.
>
> To exclude Islam from the international arena; this mean elimination of the Ottoman Empire and preventing Muslims from establishing big countries to carry out jihad against the Christians.
>
> This is exactly what they are doing currently with any country that attempts to implement Islam, like what is happening with Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iran.[402]

This sums up how Al Qaeda viewed the Western agenda in 2003. Bin Laden, based on Azzam's philosophy, envisioned a very different world order, in which foreign and Christian forces would exit all Islamic lands and in which the US, or the "far enemy"[403], was the primary enemy. Both the perceived Western agenda and Bin Laden's agenda were based on territorial gains, though boundaries were drawn along Westphalian lines in the one, and pre-Westphalian religiously defined lines in the other.

Support from US military aid allowed the Mujahedeen to give Afghan religious

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402 CCRC, AQ-SHPD-D-001-433, 1.

403 Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.*

leaders power in the conduct of war. Dibb writes, "It gave the Mujahedeen confidence that they could beat a superpower. This applies to their attitude to the Soviet Union then and to America now."[404] Calvert comments that the skills learned by the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan were always envisioned to be used in an extended global battle. He writes:

> For the fighters in Afghanistan, the war was a source of heroism, solidarity, and total devotion to Islam as defined in terms of adherence to Sharia. Many were already aware that the war against the Soviet army was a school in which they might learn the violent techniques needed to topple their governments at home.[405]

The end of the Soviet Afghan war brought a dichotomy in visions of world order that was intimately related to Westphalian sovereignty. It was the ummah versus nation state system.

According to Philpott, Westphalian sovereignty has "three faces". First, Westphalia made the sovereign state the most powerful and legitimate form of political unity. Second, it found a government with control over its territory to be the criterion for statehood. Third, Westphalia removed previously legitimate restrictions on a state's activities within its territory.[406] Philpott defines sovereignty along the lines of legitimacy, supremacy and territoriality. He writes, "Legitimate authority is crucially different from power... Legitimacy, evoking allegiance and respect, can itself lend force to sovereign

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404 Dibb, "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan," 507.

405 Calvert, "The Striving Shaykh," 345.

406 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 7.

claims."[407] Overall, "Sovereignty is supreme legitimate authority within a territory."[408] Azzam's own individual legitimacy as a transnational religious actor and the legitimacy of a fundamentalist Islamic state that he advocated for challenged the legitimacy of the Communist state. However, this is significant beyond the context of the Soviet-Afghan war. First, the case suggests that religion and a religious ideology can be translated into a political legitimacy. Second, the case suggests that that an individual can mobilize forces across nation-state lines and harness and transnational ideology in questioning existing political legitimacy. Azzam viewed Afghanistan as the first in a series of holy wars to recapture Islamic lands. There was a vision for world order, a vision for the supremacy of an ideology, and a vision for the supreme power in Islamic lands, power unchallenged by Christian and foreign forces. His vision for world order was pan-Islamic, with supreme power based in an amorphous theological transnational community.

Azzam's challenge to sovereignty based on the notion of territoriality is more complicated. According to Philpott, "the Treaty removed all legitimate restrictions on a state's activities within its territory."[409] Perhaps the most fundamental principle of Westphalian sovereignty is the right of a nation state to have supreme power and legitimacy within the boundaries of its own territory. While Azzam may have held an ultimate pan-Islamic vision, the steps to achieve that involved working within the nation state system. Although he was mobilizing Afghan Arabs internationally and

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407 Ibid., 2

408 Ibid.

409 Ibid., 7.

promulgating a theology of an individual obligation to jihad regardless of country of origin, he was still confined to aim to change the regime in Afghanistan, within the territorial boundaries of a sovereign state. As a powerful, transnational religious actor, Azzam fundamentally rejected the Westphalian nation state, yet he was also forced to work within the system of nation-states in his first steps to achieve his pan-Islamic world order.

In his rejection of Westphalian sovereignty, Azzam's quest harkens back to the medieval jihad. Hegghammer finds that:

> Azzam's ruling that jihad is an individual duty for all in case of outside invasion was arguably more similar to the classical medieval jihad conception than was the twentieth-century orthodoxy, which conceded veto power on the matter to the nation-state, a modern innovation.[410]

Azzam rejected the sovereign state and system of sovereign states as classically defined by Westphalia. His aimed to establish an Islamic theocracy in Afghanistan and ultimately a universal Caliphate. It was a vision of a world with territorial boundaries drawn upon religiously based, pre-Westphalian lines. He offered a theological framework for transnational violent action. His "defensive jihad" called on every Muslim to defend Muslim lands for infidel invaders or to oust infidel occupiers. This created a global jihadist movement that to this day threatens states' ability to control movement over their borders and to be free from outside intervention. In addition to offering the theological framework, Azzam's work in the MAK made the Afghan Arabs possible pragmatically.

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410 Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters," 76.

He was involved in international recruitment of Mujahedeen, soliciting of international funds and arms, and the training and everyday life of the Afghan Arabs. The Afghan Arabs and the international network that supported them became the backbone of the Al Qaeda movement shortly after Azzam's death. Thus Azzam rejected the classic Westphalian state sovereignty in his geo-political vision, his theology, and his work on the ground in Afghanistan.

Krasner's four types of sovereignty – international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty – can be applied to this case study. Azzam partially undermined the domestic sovereignty of Communist Afghanistan, by repelling Soviet forces acting in its defense with foreign fighters. He sought to topple the public authority of the state, and to do it with transnational, non-state actors. Azzam's vision beyond Afghanistan was to use this transnational force to aid other Muslim lands in the defense against foreign forces. In some of those cases, the "Afghan Arabs" would have been used to defend the domestic sovereignty of a nation state. At least as an initial step toward reform, Azzam envisioned restoring Islamic rule within the boundaries of each nation-state. Azzam violated interdependence sovereignty by making it the duty of every Muslim to defend other Muslims in countries rules by infidels or under threat of infidel invasion. The transnational ummah was called to jihad with global terms. He further undermined interdependence sovereignty by organizing the Afghan Arabs on the ground. By contributing to the retreat of the Soviets and the fall of the country into civil war, Azzam and his Afghan Arabs weakened the international legal sovereignty of the nation state, and they did not replace it with a strong, stable,

internationally respected regime. Afghanistan was left in a state of war. The intelligence documents reviewed seem to suggest that Azzam lacked the political ability to build the domestic consensus necessary to form a new government, and much less the international legitimacy to produce positive international opinion in its favor. However, his untimely death months after withdrawal leave many of these opinions as mere speculations and unanswered questions. The next stable regime to rule in Afghanistan would be the Taliban in 1996.

Azzam was a pioneer in creating a transnational network of fighters and a revolutionary jihadist ideology that threatened Krasner's Westphalian sovereignty on several levels. First, he violated separation of church and state by proving that religion and religious ideology can be translated into political legitimacy. Second, Azzam violated the territorial nature of the state by creating the MAK and organizing men from around the globe to fight to overturn the Communist government in Afghanistan. Third, he violated the nation state system by accomplishing this as a transnational Islamic leader, as an individual who could mobilize forces across nation-state lines and harness a transnational ideology to question existing legitimacy. Finally, his vision for a pan-Islamic world order posed problems for the Westphalian system. He proposed to restore Islamic rule to Muslim nations, defined by modern territorial boundaries, but the legitimacy of world order would be based in the ummah, an amorphous theological transnational community.

Krasner holds that the norms of sovereignty were never strong, that they have always been challenged. His later notion of "shared sovereignty" can be applied to the

contemporary situation in Afghanistan, where stability is contributed to by the presence of foreign military forces and the acceptance of foreign aid. But during his time, Azzam was not involved in diplomatic efforts to involve foreign governments in governing Afghanistan. Stacey's "relational sovereignty" does not apply to this case as the situation after Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan and Azzam's death was too unstable to allow opportunity for it. Rudolph argues that transnational activity does not replace or superseded political maps of territorial defined states. She imagines them as "transparent overlays, alternative meaning systems superimposed upon the meaning system of political maps."[411] There were multiple transnational civil societies that overlaid the political map of the Soviet Afghan war, and Rudolph's theory allows them to coexist. Yet Azzam himself would not have accepted such a vision. He combined transnational movement with a political theology that sought a world based on religiously defined boundaries with complete disregard for the borders established after Westphalia. Azzam's actions as theological and military leader did not respect the system of sovereign states. Azzam used a mix of hard and soft power to galvanize a transnational military force to push back Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. His ability to lay the theological and pragmatic groundwork for the modern day jihadist movement challenges modern definitions of state sovereignty.

However there are multiple broader contributions of this case study to the body of literature on sovereignty. First, the proposed causal relationships between TRL (enabled by TRL and TSM characteristics), regime change goals and contributions, and challenges

411 Rudolph and Piscatori, *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, 12.

to conceptions of state sovereignty offer a detailed process of how TRLs impact conceptions of sovereignty. Second, in this case, the characteristics of transformational leadership, religious soft power, and high levels of mobilization enable him to challenge conceptions of state sovereignty more profoundly than other transnational actors. He was able to capture a deep, traditional religious identity, revive it and combine it with political content, and ultimately to be wildly successful at mobilizing political and military action with the aim of reviving a pre-Westphalian world, in which territorial lines are based on religion, not a secular treaty.

Philpott claims that "tumult yields novel orthodoxy in international relations." The unique tumult caused by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam – tumult in the Soviet Afghan war, tumult in the philosophy and direction of the global jihadist movement, and the tumult of transformed conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty – indeed yields orthodoxy. The role of transnational religious actors can no longer be ignored in international relations theory. Whether their actions are of good or evil, they exist, and they are changing the rules of the game, changing the rules of Westphalia. Perhaps Azzam's hurricane of virtue has indeed come with the tumultuous implications of "jihad and rifle alone" and a newly defined, passionately preached jihad *fard ayn* (individual obligation). It calls for a new orthodoxy, a new recognition that the transnational religious actor is transforming conceptions of Westphalian and modern state sovereignty.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

The presence of transnational religious leaders, their characteristics and the characteristics of their associated transnational social movements influence political revolution and regime change. In both the cases of Pope John Paul II in Poland and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam in Afghanistan, a TRL used soft power, based in a transnational religious identity and civil society, to contribute to a TSM that altered the domestic authority structures in Poland and Afghanistan, respectively, and ultimately challenged conceptions of state sovereignty. The cases alter in that Pope John Paul II appealed to sovereign states internationally and nonviolently mobilized people domestically to peacefully delegitimize the Communist regime in Poland, while Azzam appealed to sub state actors in the Muslim world to violently deter Soviet invasion and to drive Afghanistan into a prolonged state of civil war.

In both cases a transnational religious leader was present. A TRL has been defined as an individual actor who, as guided by a religious ideology, acts towards political ends, benefiting from both material (people, weapons, capital) and immaterial (theology, inspirational rhetoric, respect of world leaders) resources across state lines in the achievement of those ends. Pope John Paul II and Azzam were analyzed according to four characteristics of the transnational religious leaders (TRL): leadership style, use of hard versus soft power, relationship to the secular state, and relationship to modernity. The politics of protest associated with each actor was analyzed according to four characteristics of the transnational social movements (TSM): political theology,

mobilization structures, political opportunity structures, and character of transnational activism. These characteristics were tested in each case to find differences and similarities in the two historical cases. Differences enable the paper to explore new meanings of state sovereignty resulting from TRLs and regime change. Similarities enable a discussion of what makes TRL unique and how they pose a distinct challenge to sovereignty when compared to other transnational actors. Consequently two aspects of regime change were analyzed. With varying amounts of information in each case available, the TRL's goal for regime change was reconstructed and analyzed in terms of its compatibility with the Westphalian system. Then, the regime change caused was described, and the factors of influence of each individual were identified and placed within the context of larger forces at work. Finally, in analyzing the relationship between transnational religious leaders and evolving conceptions of sovereignty, traditional and modern scholarly definitions of sovereignty were considered.

Enabling Characteristics of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam

The following chart presents the findings of the most significant characteristics representative of similarities and differences in the two case studies.

Figure 6 - Enabling Characteristics of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam



After analyzing the case studies, this paper finds that Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam share a transformational leadership style, effective religious soft power, and highly mobilized social movements. They most differ in terms of their relationship to modernity, their political theologies, and the nature of their transnational activism.

Personal Attributes of TRL

The first characteristic is leadership style, and it suggests that to be the first similarity in the cases. Both individuals were transformational leaders. In both cases their theological writing and inspirational speeches gave people a vision of an identity that transcended nation state boundaries. In the case of the pope, that vision presented individuals with an identity as a Pole and as a child of God that transcended the Communist state, and gave a framework to justify nonviolent political protest. In the case of Azzam, that vision was one of an individual identity as a Muslim and member of the transnational ummah, with a deep responsibility to participate in jihad. Both cases exemplify Burn's ideal leadership which enables followers to accomplish goals that even the leader might not have fully realized, pushing both the leader and followers to greatness. Both the democratization movement in Eastern Europe and global jihadism lived on as movements after the death of Pope John Paul II and Azzam. However the Solidarity movement and the Afghan Arab movement still have specific historical and domestic contexts.

The TRLs both held soft power, but Azzam also held traditional hard power. The use of religious soft power by both Pope John Paul II and Azzam is the second similarity within the enabling characteristics. In the case of Pope John Paul II, his "religious soft power"[412] was evident in his ability to make states, groups, and individuals want to do what he wanted them to do. His strong hold on the popular imagination and the "spirit" of the Polish nation was evident in popular response to him during pilgrimages and in their

412 Haynes, *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power.*

reliance on his diplomacy when Solidarity's progress was stalled. He offered Solidarity as a group a religious language and context through which to justify their goals. He met with and corresponded with world leaders, influencing their opinion and shaping the discourse on Solidarity and democracy in Poland. Even in relationships with militarily powerful world leaders, particularly with US leadership, Pope John Paul II wielded soft power in that he was respected and included in US foreign policy discussions. The pope did not support violence, except in rare cases of just war, and did not achieve his ends transactionally. However, he understood the worth of his allies and leveraged their existence in his conversations and relations with Soviet leadership. Although he did not fully accept the realist world, in which hard power drove world events, he knew how to operate within in it.

In the case of Azzam, his soft power is what enabled him to be influential in the global jihadist movement, even to this day, but he also clearly used hard power in the achievement of his goals. He successfully exercised soft power in using his religious writings and public statements to inspire Muslims internationally to come to Afghanistan to fight for the preservation of Islamic land. He managed to alter the fundamental responsibilities of Muslim men and women, among those who accepted his vision, to include the duty to defensive jihad on behalf of any Muslim land occupied by infidels. However, Azzam managed to not only successfully inspire jihadists with religious soft power, but to also provide the pragmatic opportunity to wage jihad in Afghanistan. His work with the MAK on the ground was coupled with efforts internationally to recruit money, arms, and other materials in support of the war. By effectively leading the

Afghan Arabs and coordinating with the existing Afghan forces, Azzam wielded hard power, in the most basic sense of military power. Despite his holding both soft and hard power, the case study revealed that Azzam was not effective at international diplomacy, with non-Muslim or Muslim nations. This absence made it difficult to confer legitimacy on the struggle of the Afghan Arabs through support from world powers internationally. The US materially supported the effort, supplying weapons and capital through Pakistan, but only in the short-term effort to eradicate Soviet influence from the area. There was no international consensus built around Azzam's vision for an Islamic theocracy in Afghanistan, nor for an international Caliphate, except amongst a limited, fundamentalist transnational Islamic community.

Thus, both Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam were transformational leaders who primarily used religious soft power to achieve their goals of regime change. Azzam also held hard power in his leadership of a military force. John Paul did not have hard power but understood how to operate in a realist world, leveraging his relationship to militarily powerful allies in his messages to the Soviets. They both offered ideological and theological language to justify the social movements associated with them, and they both worked on the ground (Azzam directly through the MAK, the Pope indirectly through Polish church leadership and Vatican diplomats) to create the opportunity for political change. The Pope was perhaps more skilled at diplomacy with world leaders; though diplomatic efforts, he was able to lend legitimacy to the Solidarity movement and eventually to democratic governance in Poland. Azzam may have been less successful at a clean transition to a sustainable form of government respected internationally, but he

was profoundly successful at changing the language of jihadist literature on the individual's responsibility to jihad. The shift the focus of jihadism as a result of Azzam's life is still evident in global jihadist movements to this day.

The third and fourth characteristics of the transnational religious leader are his relationship to secularization and his relationship to modernity. Their relationships to modernity in particular are the first point of significant difference between the leaders. Pope John Paul II's perspective was somewhat paradoxical. He rejected secularism, in the sense of the declining significance of religion in the modern world, as often measured by a decline in religious belief, a decline in religious participation, and the privatization of religion and religious institutions from world affairs. Along with prominent social science theories of how the world is secularized, there is also an attached normative statement that secularization is a positive effect of modernization. On the most individual level, he believed that God's relationship with man, and the Christian significance of man and woman, drove world history and world events. On the institutional level, he led a Roman Catholic Church that was very involved in all matters of public life, and in Poland, ultimately very vocal even on specific matters of public policy. Although he rejected secularism as a movement, he did not reject the secular state. Unlike Azzam, he did not advocate for a theocracy, but rather a form of government that would protect religious freedom and give man and woman the opportunity to work with dignity. This comfort with a secular state, so long as it protects religious freedoms, perhaps harkens back to the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the treaty of Westphalia. One of the tenets of the Peace of Westphalia was that all parties would recognize the Peace of

Augsburg of 1555, in which each prince would determine the religion of his own state under *cuis region, eius religio*. Other provisions in the treaty included the right of religious minorities to religious practice and the right of each nation to exclusive sovereignty over its own lands. The Roman Catholic Church accommodated to this treaty, and to this day, its vision for the Christian life and even Christian evangelization does not involve the establishment of Christian theocracies. Although there is a strong transnational Roman Catholic community, it does not seek to have a formalized, and certainly not, universalized territory to enable productive Christian life. Thus, Pope John Paul rejected the thesis that modern man should evolve into a secular man, but he did recognize the usefulness of the secular state and an international system of secular states in protecting man ability to worship and to live with dignity.

Azzam's relationship to secularization and modernization was very different. He ultimately envisioned a return to a pre-Westphalian world order in which all lands that were once Muslim would return to Muslim rule. He adopted a slow strategy towards the ultimate establishment of a universal Caliphate. Deeming Palestine and Afghanistan the most important territories for regime change, Azzam focused on the "near enemy,"[413] any regional or international player preventing the establishment of Islamic rule in those territories. He rejected secularism as a positive process and sought the establishment of Islamic theocracies, in which religion would rule all aspects of private and public life. On a broader level, he seemed to reject the Westphalian system of secular states, seeking instead for territorial lines and boundaries of authority to be determined by religious

413 Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*.

affiliation. Like the case of Pope John Paul II, this brings into question the fundamental relationship between Azzam's denomination, Islam, and the Treaty of Westphalia. One could argue that his rejection of the secular state is mostly a factor of his religious denomination, yet that would deny examples of modern, democratic Islamic states. His vision of world order was almost medieval in nature. Hegghammer views this iteration of pan-Islamism as a "macro-nationalism centered on the imagined community of the ummah, which is defined by religion."[414] Although the Muslim nation and community is a-territorial, pan-Islamists have a territorial vision of Muslim community – "all lands once ruled by Muslims, from Andalucía in the West to Indonesia in the East."[415] For Azzam, Afghanistan was a productive theater to give voice to his pan-Islamist ideas.[416] Azzam envisioned the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan as the first step in an international Islamist movement, towards an ultimate war against international Communism, what he called "a war between the *Ummahs* (collective peoples of Islam) versus Communism."[417] This is evocative of the cosmic images conjured by other religious terrorist groups – the war is larger than life, relates to a metaphysical conflict between good and evil, and transcends human experience.[418] Azzam sought for the transnational Islamic community to be represented on the world stage by an Islamic Caliphate. In that sense, secularity and religion could not coexist for Azzam. He also

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414 Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, 8.

415 Ibid.

416 Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 68.

417 Azzam, referenced by Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamist Ideology,* 153.

418 Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion*, 149.

sought for Muslim culture to be dominant globally and for sharia law to order Muslim societies. In that sense, modernity and religion could not co-exist for him either.

Thus, both men rejected secularization as a process necessary to modernity and did not acknowledge it as a something positive. For both men, human history and world history were driven by man's relationship with God and by cultural identity. They both wanted their communities to practice religion faithfully, to demonstrate their beliefs in the public square, and to follow the teachings of the denomination. Yet John Paul believed this was possible within the system of modern, sovereign states, while Azzam sought to gradually overhaul world order, replacing it with a pre-Westphalian order of territories drawn along religious lines. Herein lies the important difference exposed by this category.

Community Characteristics of TSM

Pope John Paul II and Azzam's transnational social movements were analyzed through the categories of political theology, mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and the character of activism. The second point of difference between the leaders is political theology. Political theology refers to how transnational religious leaders frame their struggle and what concepts they use to create mobilization. Pope John Paul II's message was one of human dignity and of a theological purpose for man that transcended the state. He believed that there was a central purpose, rooted in Jesus Christ, for all human activity. Yet these lofty words translated into very pragmatic political goals. Namely, he sought an end to Communism in his native Poland and elsewhere, and

the rise of secular, stable governments that protected religious freedom. Azzam's message was less clearly delineated along line of theology versus politics. His central message was also theological, that man's life is defined by how he fulfills his duties to Allah. He slightly changed a fundamental precept of Islam, duty to jihad, to make it a duty incumbent on all Muslims to defend Islamic lands threatened anywhere in the world. His goal- the establishment of a Caliphate- was both political and theological. Thus, the theological messages of both men were used to define and mobilize people towards political ends.

The second characteristic of the transnational social movement, "mobilizing structures", presents differently in the two case studies. The high levels of mobilization in both cases poses the third point of similarity. Pope John Paul II's social movement, the "Solidarity" movement, includes both the network of activists on the ground in Poland, and the broad base of support for the movement that existed internationally and transnationally. Solidarity had both domestic and international mobilizing structures. On the ground it used strikes and public protest activities to change the policies of the Communist regime. Individual churches in Poland provided varying levels of support to the movement, including the use of church property for meetings and the participation of clergy in planning events. On a higher level, Church leadership led negotiations between the Solidarity and PZPR regime. As the ideological polarization on the ground heightened, Solidarity gained an increasingly transnational support base, creating new mobilizing opportunities within the state. In other words, Solidarity became both a domestic power struggle and a subject of world power conflict.

Azzam's social movement can be defined both in terms of the struggle of the Afghan Arabs in Afghanistan and as the beginning of a refined global jihadist movement to liberate Islamic lands from non-Islamic rulers. The mobilizing structures existed on several levels. Consider coordination with Afghan freedom fighters on the ground, the establishment of the MAK and training of international recruits, the international recruitment process, and the coordination with individuals, groups, and states who donated arms and money to the cause internationally. Unlike the case of Poland, Islamic leadership did not provide channels to negotiate with the Soviets. Armed conflict was quickly escalated on the domestic level, which translated to the polarization of great powers on the international level.

Thus both Solidarity and the Afghan Arab jihadist movement had mobilizing structures within the context of their domestic regimes, Poland and Afghanistan. A formalized church played a peace-keeping role in Poland; this was absent in Afghanistan. Recruitment was enabled through church structures in Poland and through the MAK in Afghanistan. Domestic protest activities in Poland drew primarily from domestic recruits. In Afghanistan, the recruits were primarily drawn from other countries, within the transnational fundamentalist Islamic community. In both cases, the domestic conflict escalated into an international contest between great powers and galvanized individuals along transnational ideological lines around the globe.

The third characteristic of the transnational social movement is "political opportunity structures", a term used to capture the relationship between the state and the social movement. In the case of Poland, the Soviet institutional political system was

closed and elite arrangements within the system difficult to impact. The state had a great capacity and propensity for repression. However there was a strong presence of international elite allies external to the state, namely in the leaders of Western world powers. The case in Poland follows Owen's causal path. As the state gained more aggregate power and resources, the social movement became stronger. As the state authority and state meaning became more internationally significant, the social movement became more transnational in scope. The more repressive the state became on the ground, the more international sympathy went to the Solidarity movement. Domestic political opportunities for Solidarity were often the result of the international struggle for the fate of Poland.

In the case of Afghanistan, the institutionalized political system of the young Soviet government was closed and elite allies were not easily accessed. As the future of Afghanistan's political future became an increasingly international topic, with great powers invested on either side, the opportunity of the Afghan Arabs to achieve regime change increased. As the conflict gained more international attention, the Afghan Arabs received transnational support in the form of arms, money, and supportive political dialogue from around the Middle East, and even from individuals in the West. Soviet support, however, was still centralized in the Soviet Union and did not take on this transnational character. The Soviets were surprised by the strength and transnational nature of the resistance in Afghanistan. Domestic political opportunities for the Mujahedeen did not open up until the Soviets withdrew from the territory.

In both cases the international ideological struggle played an important role in the

outcome of the contested regime. In Poland, political opportunities resulted from nonviolent resistance and the mediation of church officials on the ground, but were mostly enhanced when the struggle for Poland's nationhood became a subject of international debate. As a result of the internationalization of the conflict, the Solidarity movement took on an air of legitimacy, much rooted in the strength of its allies. Diplomatic discourse impacted the Communist regime's reactions to nonviolent resistance on the ground. In Afghanistan, the Afghan Arabs did not enjoy such a cloak of international legitimacy, but the movement was internationalized. Transnational support for the Afghan Arabs took the pragmatic form of arms, recruits, and money, which contributed to the moment of Soviet defeat, and subsequent opening of the political system to change.

The fourth category through which to analyze each social movement is the character of activism. This characteristic comprises the third difference in the two case studies. The Solidarity movement was a labor movement that used nonviolent strikes and political protest to attain peaceful regime change in Poland. Pope John Paul II's activism was also nonviolent in nature. His contribution was both inspirational and practical. His encyclicals, public homilies and speeches, and pilgrimages to Poland gave a theological justification and lent theological symbolism to the Solidarity movement, thus contributing to its success. Practically, he exchanged written correspondence with and held private meetings with leaders on both sides of the iron curtain, and he was involved through his ambassadors and the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland in negotiations between Solidarity and the Communist state.

In stark contrast, Azzam led the Afghan Arabs in a violent uprising against Soviet invasion. He not only extolled the virtues and necessity of violence in his theological tracts, he also accompanied his recruits to the battlefield. One of his most famous lines encapsulated the high regard for violence: "Jihad and rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogue."[419] For Azzam, violent jihad was the responsibility of every able-bodied Muslim man and woman until all lands formerly Islamic had been returned to Islamic rule. Azzam was effective at mobilizing recruits and mobilizing financial support for them internationally, however, he was not a diplomat like John Paul. He did not correspond with world leaders or seek the approval of world opinion. He was primarily focused on the short-term goal of eradicating Afghanistan of the Soviets, and not his long-term goal of the establishment of a functioning state.

Pope John Paul II persuaded the international community to identify with the Poles in their protest of the Communist regime. He sought for his fellow Poles to have national self-determination and to enter the world as a modern state with religious freedoms and sovereign borders. Azzam's activism was perhaps more revolutionary. He called on Muslims internationally to identify with the plight of the Afghans and to fight on their behalf, but he framed it as part of a broader war, which if won, would recreate world order to be based on religiously defined territorial lines, abandoning the current system as defined by Westphalia. John Paul II acted on behalf of Poles seeking political liberation by allowing church officials on the ground to negotiate with the regime, allying

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419 Azzam, *Join the Caravan.*

with the United States, and inspiring non-violent protest through Solidarity in Poland. In his mind, Azzam acted on behalf of Muslims everywhere by organizing jihad in what was to be the first of many states to be turned into a theocracy and liberated from secularism. He was less successful than the pope at high-level diplomacy, but perhaps more successful at inspiring ongoing, transnational political activism towards a common cause based on theological identity.

Identified Relationship of TRL to Challenges to Modern Sovereignty

The investigation of these eight characteristics depicts two very different men. John Paul II accommodated to modernity, supported a secular state that provided religious freedom, and mobilized through non-violent activism. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam rejected modernity, supported theocracy as the best form of state, and worked through violent activism. And yet both men were transformational leaders who successfully wielded soft power to mobilize their communities at high levels. What implications can we draw from these findings about the TRL's impact upon regime change and conceptions of sovereignty?

After applying the hypothesized relationship of TRL to challenges to conceptions of sovereignty to the case studies, the following relationships were identified:

Figure 7 - Identified Relationships of Case Subjects to Challenges to Conceptions of Modern State Sovereignty



This relationship extends from TRLs moved by different combinations of enabling characteristics, to TRL goals, and based on these goals, their level of accommodating with Westphalian sovereignty. Each TRL then contributes to regime change, and ultimately challenges to conceptions of modern state sovereignty in different ways. They both offer a challenge to the dominance of the sovereign state as the most important actor in the world system. However, Azzam offers a further challenge, in that his theological writings and operations in Afghanistan built the basis for modern

iterations of jihad around the world, a movement which rejects the system of sovereign states as we know it today.

Political Goals and Contributions to Regime Change

Despite their similarities, Pope John Paul II and Azzam had different political goals, reflecting different levels of accommodation to Westphalian sovereignty. It is difficult to assess to what extent the pope intended regime change. But his goals can be understood through his theological ones. Weigel writes: "In his (Wojtyla's) Christian-Polish view, history was best read through the prism of moral analysis, and viewed through that prism, the subjugation of the nations within Stalin's external and internal empires was a moral catastrophe."[420] And though the evidence shows that the church on the ground alternately supported Solidarity and the Communist regime at different times, it is clear that John Paul's public statements and public and private correspondence with world leaders shows his support of the Solidarity movement. He supported this non-violent movement, which originally aimed to reform the government, not to replace it (though it eventually come to power under a newly democratic state.) Thus, though it is difficult to ascribe political calculation to a figure with as much theological gravitas as Pope John Paul II, it is safe to say that he supported a change in Communist Poland, a change which would give Poles back their religious freedom, a change which would happen nonviolently and not threaten the Westphalian system.

The case of Azzam presents different difficulties. His goal for political order was

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420 Weigel, 296

in some ways more clear than Pope John Paul II's. He aimed for Afghanistan to be a roadmap for other formerly-Muslim controlled countries to be freed from infidels, and ultimately, he supported a global Islamic Caliphate. That being said, he only lived to see the withdrawal of the Soviets, and his life's work was based in the context of a violent revolution to repel their invasion of Afghanistan. After Azzam died and the Soviets withdrew, the Communist government survived another, albeit unstable year, before the country fell into a prolonged period of civil war. The intelligence documents gathered from Afghanistan relating to the Soviet Afghan war question Azzam's diplomatic and political abilities. In other words, he was a brilliant theologian and charismatic leader, but his goals were based in ideology, not political reality. His goal was initially the transformation of Afghanistan to a theocracy, and ultimately, state dissolution and geopolitical restructuring when the Caliphate was established. These goals did not respect the system of sovereign states as established by Westphalia.

Analyzing the goals of these TRLs and the level of accommodation of their goals with Westphalia lays the groundwork for understanding the actual regime change that occurs in each case. In both cases a transnational religious leader and a transnational social movement caused a response from nation states, resulting in regime change. Krasner argues that the strength of regime change as an intervening variable can be evaluated in terms of a structural, modified structural or Grotian perspective. Conventional structural arguments do not view regimes as very significant, holding that if basic causal variables change, regimes will also change with not independent impact on

behavior.[421] Modified structural arguments find regimes to be important only when "independent decision making leads to undesired outcomes."[422] Grotian perspectives find regimes to be very important, and fundamental to all human behavior in the international system.[423] A critical question to understanding the strength of the regime change as an indicator of challenged conceptions of sovereignty in these cases poses: Could the independent variables (presence of transnational religious leader, characteristics of transnational religious leader, and characteristics of social movement) could have impacted sovereignty without effecting regime change? If so, to what extent?

In the case of Pope John Paul II and the democratization of Poland, regime change was important to his impact on state sovereignty. John Paul II's speeches, writings, and meetings did not undermine conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty, and he operated comfortably in a system of secular states. He primarily changed the dependent variable of conceptions of sovereignty through specific regime change in Poland, strengthening it through the birth of an internationally respected, internally robust democracy. Also, his strength as an individual leader of multiple transnational communities (ex. Roman Catholic community, the democratization movement), his ability to influence heads of state internationally, and his cult of personality in Poland, contributed to the instigation of political protest and mobilization of a social movement in Poland. The ability of a transnational religious leader to contribute to any form of regime

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421 Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," 194.

422 Ibid.

423 Ibid.

change is threatening to traditional state sovereignty, and speaks to the import of regime change as an intervening variable. Considering these factors, the variable of regime change in this case study falls within a Grotian perspective. John Paul may not have viewed political regimes or hard power as the major driver of human history, but he did aim to enable man's religious freedoms and dignity through a specific political objective, namely the reform of or nonviolent fall of the Communist regime in Poland.

Of course, Pope John Paul II presents only one factor in the fall of Communism in Poland. There were many long-standing factors that contributed to the moment. Long-term reasons included a generalized hatred of Russia that existed long before the Cold War and an antagonism between the Catholic Church and the regime.[424] The Church symbolized national identity so government abuse of the Church antagonized people. Short-term reasons included problems with Russian authority created by the Cold War and economic grievances.[425] The state was unable to provide for the people, and the standard of living declined dramatically in Poland during the Cold War. They system was elite, not egalitarian, in practice. Immediate reasons for the call of Communism in Poland were Solidarity and a change in Russia's foreign policy.[426] When Brezhnev died in 1982, the Soviets cracked down on corruption in satellite states. Gorbachev's "glasnost" and "perestroika" exposed Communist corruption. It is within this context that the pope's contributions can be understood. He contributed to regime change through two roles. As

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424 "To What Extent did Solidarity contribute to undermining Communism in Poland?" eduessays.com.

425 Ibid.

426 Ibid.

someone who was simultaneously pastor of a transnational religious community (the Roman Catholic Church) and a native to Poland, a land under Communism, he was able to reach into Poland's history and provide Poles with a new way of viewing themselves, with an identity older, and perhaps more profound, than that of communism. As a leader of an international organization (the Roman Catholic Church) and a natural consensus builder, the pope was able to present the plight of the Polish people and their desire for democracy to world leaders, thus mobilizing international opinion in support of Solidarity.

In the case of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the importance of regime change as an intervening variable is more mixed. Azzam was perhaps most influential in his revolutionary worldview, not his specific contribution to regime change in Afghanistan. His speeches and writings redefine "defensive jihad" and call for Muslims everywhere to rise up in the violent defense of Muslim lands. He aimed to establish an Islamic theocracy in Afghanistan, and ultimately, a universal Caliphate and world order based on pre-Westphalian, religiously defined, territorial boundaries. Though the efforts of the Afghan Arabs contributed to the withdrawal of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the "regime change" in this case refers to the change from a short-lived Soviet supported Communist government to a long period of civil war, during which the government changed control multiple times, due to assassinations and violent uprisings. In Azzam's case, the actual regime change was less impactful upon sovereignty than the worldview and vision that created it. The presence of Azzam, characteristics of Azzam, and characteristics of the global jihadist movement impacted sovereignty regardless of the regime change in

Afghanistan, thus placing the regime change as an indicator of challenged conceptions of state sovereignty.

There are other major factors that contributed to "regime change" in this case besides Azzam. Soviet withdrawal would have perhaps been impossible, for example, had the US not given the Mujahedeen funding and weapons, particularly the shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles in 1987. The context of the Cold War was also at play, driving the USSR's need to control an embarrassing situation. When Najibullah finally fell in 1992, the Mujahedeen's role (and Azzam's postmortem role) are complicated by other factors. In 1992, Russia refused to sell oil products to Afghanistan, triggering an embargo. Furthermore, General Abdul Rashid Dostam and his Uzbek militia defected in March, 1992, weakening the army. But Azzam did something that made Soviet withdrawal, the fall of Najibullah, and the harboring of Al Qaeda by the Taliban in 1996 possible indirectly. He most impacted sovereignty not through the dissolution of the state (although he contributed to that), but by creating a new Muslim identity, based in old theological texts and interpreted in a new way. His vision of defensive jihad made Al Qaeda and a new class of global jihadists possible. In this way he exported terror and a new vision of state identity to the West postmortem.

In sum, regime change is a stronger intervening variable in the Pope John Paul II case than in the Azzam case. In both cases, the individual's strengths as transnational religious leaders pose a challenge to a system in which states are the only variable of analysis. Though the pope's vision was less extreme than Azzam's, its actualization was more successful domestically. Azzam was more successful in inspiring an international

movement. In comparing the two, one impacted sovereignty through regime change, the other, though a vision that influences global jihadism to this day. The Pope's overall vision did not threaten the traditional system of Westphalian states, but the regime change in Poland left a profound impact upon the modern international system. Azzam's vision of a world based on pre-Westphalian, religiously based borders, gave birth to a newly defined global jihadist movement, while his impact upon regime change in Afghanistan was short-lived. The regime change variable hypothesized is not equally strong in both cases as an indicator of challenged conceptions of state sovereignty.

Both TRLs acted on a stage in which other factors impacting the fall of Communism were at play. Though the macro-level, mainstream explanations of regime change in Poland and Afghanistan have validity, Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam were uniquely important, and surprisingly similar, in their contributions. They both looked to an older, profound theological identity to answer the challenge of a secular, Communist one. The Pope looked to the Gospel and to a time when being Catholic meant being Polish. He leveraged that historical identity and used theological rhetoric to inspire people to action. Azzam looked to older Islamic theological texts and reinterpreted them to create a new individual duty to jihad in a modern context. Both TRLs used old theological identities to shape a new political reality, ultimately creating a unique challenge to state sovereignty.

Another lens through which the regime change in each case can be analyzed is provided by Owen, in *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*. According to Owen, a macro-level transnational regime contest causes micro-level events that polarize elites, which in

turn causes a macro-level, transnational regime contest. Owen's hypotheses center on transnational ideological polarization, which he defines as "the progressive segregation of elites and mass public across states along an ideological axis, so that political preferences among elites across states are simplified and intensified."[427] His micro-level hypotheses include regime instability and great-power war as causes of transnational ideological polarization.[428] His macro-level hypothesis revolves around long waves of regimes. A transnational ideological contest will always endure until one regime type suggest that vastly superior on terms all elites accept.[429] These concepts and terms are applicable to both cases of regime change.

In the case of John Paul II, there were arguably multiple levels of international and transnational contributions to the Solidarity movement, including the Roman Catholic community and the global community who supported democratic transition in Eastern Europe. These communities were reflections of a macro-level warring ideologies, including the West versus Communism, and religious freedom versus the secular, Communist state. As the macro-level ideological axis became weightier and transnational, political preferences on the ground in Poland became more simplified and intensified. The on-the-ground burgeoning Solidarity movement in turn became increasingly transnational. Transnational support, coupled with protest activities on the ground, opened up political opportunities, as exemplified by 1989 Round Table talks and

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427 Owen, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*, 37.

428 Ibid., 71.

429 Ibid., 72.

the 1989 elections. The efforts of the US and of Pope John Paul II exacerbated the instability of the Soviet regime. Poland was a microcosm of the Cold War. The Pope was successful in contributing to democratization in part because his role as pope enabled him to reach behind the iron curtain (both in appeals to the public and in systemic support of Solidarity) while simultaneously pleading the case of the Polish nation to the rest of the world.

The complex story of governance and regime change in Soviet Afghanistan can in a sense be simplified by examining the transnational warring ideologies at play. There were multiple, macro-level struggles going on: Islam versus secularism, Islam versus West, Communism versus the West, Islam versus Communism. On the micro-level, ideological polarization occurred, and on the macro level, there was a transnational regime contest. Like in Poland, Afghanistan was a small theater in which the broader Cold War was played out. Azzam was an author how the struggle in Afghanistan was framed for the transnational Islamic community both domestically and internationally. His theology universalized the Afghan story and he contributed to the transnational ideological contest. However, he was also used by the United States as a player on the ground to advance its game of great power politics. Regime instability and great power politics contributed to transnational ideological polarization on the ground in Afghanistan, placing this case study squarely within Owen's framework.

In comparing the cases in terms of the interplay between state and social movement, they pose many similarities. Both Communist Poland and Communist Afghanistan were small theaters for larger, ideological and transnational wars. In both

cases, the transnational religious leader's theology universalized the story on the ground and contributed to the transnational ideological contest on the macro level. The escalating conflict on the macro level contributed to polarization on the micro-level. Parts of the framework of Owen's work on warring ideas in world politics can be applied to the cases of Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Around the periphery of both cases, there were warring ideologies. In Azzam's case, a transnational Islamic army, partially funded by the US, gathered in Afghanistan to fight Soviet invaders. It involved a strange convergence of warring ideologies. On the one hand, there was the classic Cold War conflict between Western democracy and Soviet Communism. On the other hand, Azzam led an ideological war between fundamentalist Islam and the secularized state. In the second case, Pope John Paul II, leader of an international organization and overlapping transnational communities, supported a Polish labor organization in nonviolently bringing giving birth to democracy. In this case as well, there were multiple fronts of transnational ideological contests. On the one hand, again, was the classic Cold War confrontation of the West and the Communists, in their different visions for the ideal state. On the other hand, Pope John Paul II stood for a society which allowed for the expression of faith and religious belief, versus the more secularized Communist state. Both conflicts involved overlapping social movements and transnational civil societies with boundaries drawn along lines of both theological and political identities. These meta-narratives give context to the regime change taking place on the domestic level.

Sovereignty

The third research objective was to explore the impact of transnational religious leaders upon state sovereignty and the Westphalian system of sovereign states through explanatory description and theory creation. According to thinkers like Gross, Morgenthau, and Philpott, the primary legacy of Westphalia is that the sovereign state, with supreme authority within its bordered territory, became the dominant actor in the international system. How have Azzam and Pope John Paul II, as arbiters of religious regimes, accepted, rejected or transformed the Westphalian system? By impacting the domestic politics and regime type of Poland and Afghanistan, how did these individuals impact the sovereignty of the nation state, and in turn, of the world order of sovereign states? More contemporary definitions of sovereignty also give context to these case studies. Consider Krasner's four categories of sovereignty- international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty – and his claim that sovereignty is "organized hypocrisy". The cases can also be measured by Krasner's "shared sovereignty", Stacey's "relational sovereignty", and Rudolph's work on sovereignty and transnational civil society. Each case study can relate to Philpott's central claim about the role of ideas in sparking revolution, and about understanding ideas as identities and social power.[430]

Ultimately, however, this paper suggest that that TRLs with transformational leadership, religious soft power, and highly mobilized communities can challenge conceptions of modern state sovereignty in a unique way, particularly the notion that

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430 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 49.

states are the only dominant actor in the international system. The paper contributes to sovereignty literature by proposing a process through which TRLs impact conceptions of sovereignty, namely through their political goals and contributions to regime change. It finds that both TRLs studied were transformational leaders with religious soft power and a highly mobilized community. However, the TRLs had different relationships with modernity, political theology, and transnational activism, which qualified their challenges to conceptions of state sovereignty. Finally, on a deeper level it finds that the challenge of the TRL to sovereignty is more profound than that of other transnational actors in that TRLs appeal to deep theological identities in order to mobilize people to political ends. It is the strength of these transnational identities that predate states, that of Roman Catholicism in Poland and Islam in Afghanistan, that compels successful mobilization of people to impact regimes, and ultimately challenge traditional and modern conceptions of state sovereignty. The TRLs in this study both called upon these theological identities, older than the state, to mobilize people towards political ends. With brilliant prose and rhetoric, Azzam filled the battlefields of Afghanistan and John Paul II, the shipyards of Gdansk. But more importantly, they changed how a generation understood God, state, and world – a question unanswered today by many, a question that haunts the Muslim and the Catholic alike.

According to classic definitions of Westphalian sovereignty, Pope John Paul II both accepted and challenged the Westphalian system. He contributed to the development of a democratic Poland through nonviolent, internal regime change. He accepted and operated within the Westphalian world order of secular states. A sustainable, democratic

Poland, accountable to the Polish people and respected by states internationally, only served to strengthen the Westphalian system as a whole. However, as a transnational religious leader, the weight of his individual influence and his ability to impact the domestic politics of Poland posed a challenge to the classic Westphalian world in which states control the affairs within their borders and are the dominant actors in international affairs.

The pope offered his dual acceptance of and challenge to the Westphalian system through two roles – pastor and head of an international organization. In his role as pastor, Pope John Paul used his personality and moral authority to develop a soft power. He mobilized millions of Poles to create a new national consciousness and identity that was not reliant upon communism. His teachings and public messages indirectly encouraged their participation in Solidarity. In this sense, he gave moral legitimacy to the Solidarity movement, thus ultimately contributing to the fall of Communism in Poland. In his role of head of the institution of the church, he had a positive, close relationship with US leaders. He was useful to their goals, and they, to his. These relationships created international opinion in Solidarity's favor. In this sense, the Pope directed the approval of the international community and the Western world towards the Solidarity movement. He comfortably operated within a Westphalian international order with respect for state sovereignty, and he worked toward a more peaceful system.

Azzam rejected the sovereign state and system of sovereign states as classically defined by Westphalia. He aimed to establish an Islamic theocracy in Afghanistan and ultimately a universal Caliphate. It was a vision of a world with territorial boundaries

drawn upon religiously based, pre-Westphalian lines. He offered a theological framework for transnational violent action. His "defensive jihad" called on every Muslim to defend Muslim lands from infidel invaders or to oust infidel occupiers. This created a global jihadist movement that to this day threatens states' ability to control movement over their borders and to be free from outside intervention. In addition to offering the theological framework, Azzam's work in the MAK made the Afghan Arabs possible pragmatically. He was involved in the international recruitment of Mujahedeen, the soliciting of international funds and arms, and the training and everyday life of the Afghan Arabs. The Afghan Arabs and the international network that supported them became the backbone of the Al Qaeda movement shortly after Azzam's death. Thus Azzam rejected the classic Westphalian state sovereignty in his geo-political vision, his theology, and his work on the ground in Afghanistan.

If one considers the primary legacy of Westphalia to be that the sovereign state, with supreme authority within its bordered territory, became the dominant actor in the international system, then the transnational religious leaders studied here both challenge it. Pope John Paul II's actions as pastor and his creation of a strong transnational community that impacted the political outcomes of a nation state challenged the dominance of states as international actors in the Westphalian system. Azzam's use of hard and soft power to galvanize a transnational military force to push back Soviet invasion, and his ability to lay the theological and pragmatic groundwork for the modern day jihadist movement, challenged traditional notions of state dominance as well.

Yet, there are further complexities to the legacy of Westphalia and the modern sovereignty state, and the two leaders differ in their response. Pope John Paul II's theological worldview was compatible with the Westphalian system. He contributed to the creation of a stable, democratic Poland with authority within its borders and full sovereignty. The Pope's actions as head of the institutional church respected the system of sovereign states. Pope used primarily soft power to gain international support for the Solidarity movement and to lend it legitimacy, thus contributing to the birth of democracy in Poland. Azzam's theological worldview was incompatible with the Westphalian system, and he envisioned an alternate world order altogether. Azzam's actions as theological and military leader did not respect the system of sovereign states.

Krasner's four types of sovereignty – international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty – can be applied to this case study. The pope did not accept Communist authority in Poland as legitimate. He viewed the Polish nation as something that predated communism, and the role of the Church was to protect and preserve Polish nationhood during the Communist era. He took actions to support a democratic Poland with all four types of sovereignty. We wanted Poland to have the full benefits of a modern, secular state, including control over its territorial borders and recognition from other countries with juridical independence. The international recognition of Poland's juridical independence would give it international legal sovereignty. A strong, democratic government with supreme authority within its borders would give it domestic and Westphalian sovereignty. A measure of control over what flowed over its borders would give Poland interdependence

sovereignty. Yet, in his achievement of this sovereign Poland, he built a strong, transnational network in support of the Solidarity movement and he mobilized people based on Catholic principles, thus making interdependence sovereignty impossible, even in the newly democratic state. Perhaps the impossibility of interdependence sovereignty for Poland simply reflects Krasner's belief that these four categories rarely occur together, and his willingness to go so far as to call sovereignty "organized hypocrisy."[431]

Azzam's case fits these categories differently. He partially undermined the domestic sovereignty of Communist Afghanistan, by contributing to a civil war with foreign fighters. He sought to topple the public authority of the state, and to do it with transnational, non-state actors. Azzam's vision beyond Afghanistan was to use this transnational force to aid other Muslim lands in the defense against foreign forces. In some of those cases, the Afghan Arabs (many of which went on to join Al Qaeda), would have been used to defend the domestic sovereignty of a nation state. At least as an initial step toward reform, Azzam envisioned restoring Islamic rule within the boundaries of each nation state. Azzam violated interdependence sovereignty by making it the duty of every Muslim to defend other Muslims in countries rules by infidels or under threat of infidel invasion. The transnational ummah was called to jihad according to global terms. He further undermined interdependence sovereignty by organizing the Afghan Arabs on the ground. By contributing to the retreat of the Soviets and by not preventing the fall of the country into civil war, Azzam and his Afghan Arabs weakened the international legal sovereignty of the nation state. The international community could not recognize

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431 Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.*

Afghanistan as a stable, sovereign state while it underwent civil war.

Azzam was a pioneer in creating a transnational network of fighters and a revolutionary jihadist ideology that threatened Krasner's Westphalian sovereignty on several levels. First, he violated separation of church and state by proving that religion and religious ideology can be translated into political legitimacy. Second, Azzam violated the territorial nature of the state by creating the MAK and organizing men from around the globe to fight to overturn the Communist government in Afghanistan. Third, he violated the nation state system by accomplishing this as a transnational Islamic leader, as an individual who could mobilize forces across nation-state lines and harness a transnational ideology to question existing legitimacy. Finally, his vision for a pan-Islamic world order posed problems for the Westphalian system. He proposed to restore Islamic rule to Muslim nations, defined by modern territorial boundaries, but the legitimacy of world order would be based in the ummah, an amorphous theological transnational community.

Krasner's "shared sovereignty" refers to developed countries promoting better governance in "failed, failing, and post conflict countries."[432] This principle is similar to Pope John Paul II's work in mobilizing Western leadership to support the creation of a stable democracy in Poland. The US also supported the fledgling democracy through foreign aid. This concept could apply to the contemporary situation in Afghanistan, where stability is contributed to by the presence of foreign military forces and the

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432 Stephen Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty," 1.

acceptance of foreign aid. But during his time, Azzam was not involved in diplomatic efforts to involve foreign governments in governing Afghanistan. Stacey argues for "relational sovereignty" as a "measure of care by government for its citizens whereby external actors ascribe the level of the standard that another government must reach in servicing the needs of that government's citizens."[433] This concept relates to the interaction between the Solidarity movement on the ground in Poland and the international community's expectations of what a stable, democratic Poland would look like. Poles and members of Solidarity pushed for a government that would serve its citizens according to the same standard provided by the US and other Western democracies. Yet the situation after Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan and Azzam's death was so unstable that there was little opportunity for relational sovereignty.

Even with his updated definitions, Krasner still presents a world in which certain types of sovereignty infringe upon others. In the case of John Paul II, did the transnational communities supporting Solidarity really make interdependence sovereignty, or any form of sovereignty, impossible for the newly democratic Poland? What conceptions of sovereignty were plausible, if any, in the Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew? Perhaps Rudolph captures sovereignty best in describing the space for transnational civil in global politics, finding that "transnational activity is guided by imaginary maps whose boundaries do not approximate the spaces depicted on political maps." Such arenas do not replace or supersede political maps showing territorially defined states. She writes:

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433 Stacey, "Relational Sovereignty," 399–400.

> "We can imagine them as transparent plastic overlays, alternative meaning systems superimposed upon the meaning system of political maps. They do not replace state-defined space; they provide alternatives to it… What this suggests is less a waning of states than a more complex set of interrelations in which rival identities and structures jostle the state. New alliances and goals become possible as domestic civil society joins up with transnational civil society to challenge states and as states in concert employ elements in transnational civil society to limit particular states' sovereignty."[434]

The transnational civil societies associated with the social movement Solidarity could be described as such transparent overlays. The Roman Catholic community compelled by the theological principles behind Solidarity overlaid the pro-democracy in Eastern Europe movement, which overlaid Solidarity itself. These did not infringe upon the possibility of a democratic, sovereign state, but nor did any of these identity borders line up perfectly. Similarly, there were multiple transnational civil societies that overlaid the political map of the Soviet Afghan war. In the case of Azzam, the threat to sovereignty was in the political theology that motivated the Afghan Arabs, which sought a world based on religiously defined boundaries with complete disregard for the borders established after Westphalia. This theology partially formed the basis for Al Qaeda, as it inspired his pupil, Osama Bin Laden, and many others to a new global jihad.

Though Pope John Paul II and Abdullah Azzam differed in their response to modernity, their political theologies, and the nature of their transnational activism, they held three characteristics in common: transformational leadership, religious soft power, and high levels of mobilization. These characteristics give insight into what makes the

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434 Rudolph and Piscatori, *Transnational Religion*, 12.

TRL challenge to state sovereignty through regime change unique from the challenge of transnational actors. The value of this paper is to not only lay out a casual process which can contribute to literature on sovereignty, but also to expose the what was so profound about these TRLs challenge – they were concerned with the relationship between God and man. They tapped into traditional theological identities that existed long before Westphalia. They revived profound, ancient theological ideas to mobilize their followers transnationally to achieve political goals. The ideas they used had cultural, theological, and historical power over the psyche of the Poles and the Afghans. This is what transnational religious leaders are able to do that secular transnational actors cannot.

Sovereignty evolves through revolution. According to Philpott, "tumult yields novel orthodoxy."[435] Revolutions which have led to a change in sovereignty in the past have been based upon transnational ideas adopted by domestic social movements and their leaders, including Napoleon's failed attempt at empire, 19th century minority rights and national self-determination, the end of colonialism, and the creation of the European Community, now the European Union. Because of these revolutions, "the Westphalian paradigm is being weakened and (the sovereignty of) the state is again… problematic."[436] These revolutions laid the foundation for modern day social movements based on transnational religious ideals. Philpott finds that "norms of sovereignty are… (matters of) basic authority."[437] They are not solely matters of power but also of legitimate authority.

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435 Philpott, "Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History," 353

436 Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, 9.

437 Ibid., 9–10

Revolutions in these norms are rare, but they are revolutions of the most basic sort."[438]

The Solidarity movement was certainly a revolution about legitimate authority in Poland. However, for Pope John Paul II, Poland's liberation was part of a meta-narrative about the spiritual redemption of Europe. He believed Europe to be a Christian civilization, and Poland to be "the indispensable heart of that continental identity."[439] The Polish Church was "the essential foundation of Europe's true and authentic unity."[440] Philpott says that the ideas that cause revolution create identity and social power. In his pilgrimages and role as pastor to the people of Poland, the pope presented them with an identity rooted in Christianity and old Polish nationalism that transcended their everyday reality in Communist Poland. This identity, in turn, gave structure to the social movement of Solidarity. Although he was specifically concerned with the establishment of a democracy in Poland, the pope's vision was also theological. His life was dedicated to the Christian evangelization of the world. He viewed Poland, a strong Catholic country with a believing population, as a means to influence the spirituality of the rest of Europe. This case gives evidence to the notion that big ideas, even theological in nature, do inspire revolutions in sovereignty, as suggested by Philpott.

Azzam also created a revolution in sovereignty based on theological ideas. He envisioned a world with pre-Westphalian religiously defined boundaries. His ideas created a new Muslim identity, in that he made it an individual duty for every Muslim to

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438 Ibid.

439 Brynes, "The Catholic Church," 433–48.

440 Ibid., 35.

participate in jihad, across state lines. This identity caused a social movement, or in this case, a violent uprising against Soviet invaders. The Soviet Afghan war was about legitimate authority in Afghanistan. But for Azzam the Soviet Afghan war was only one battlefield in the global war for the reestablishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Azzam believed that the non-Muslim infringement of Muslim territory demands the immediate military involvement of all able Muslim men in defense of the said territory, wherever its location. Azzam's ultimate aim was that political boundaries reflect the boundaries of the ummah, the transnational community of Islam, and the territorial lines of all countries that were once Islamic, "From Andalucía in the West to Indonesia in the East."[441] For Azzam, Afghanistan was a productive theater to give voice to his pan-Islamist ideas.[442] Azzam envisioned the jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan as the first step in an international Islamist movement, towards an ultimate war against international communism, what he called "a war between the *Ummahs* (collective peoples of Islam) versus Communism."[443] Azzam's theological and operational work laid the groundwork for Al Qaeda and other strands of global jihadism. Al Qaeda's war is also framed in terms of a macro-level was between the ummah and the United States. In their transnationally organized acts of terror, Al Qaeda and associated jihadist networks to this day disregard state sovereignty. The US and other Western democracies have had to adjust foreign policy to deal with threats from non-state actors whose vision of world order pre-dates

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441 Ibid.

442 Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 68.

443 Azzam, referenced by Aboul-Enein, *Militant Islamist Ideology*, 153.

the treaty of Westphalia.

We are living in a world in which sovereignty is no longer wholly defined by the ideals of Westphalia. Transnational religious leaders and their transnational social movements pose a challenge to conceptions of traditional Westphalian sovereignty and modern sovereignty that is systemic and weighty. As policymakers encounter contemporary transnational religious leaders in global politics, they can choose to remain in the mainstream secularization narrative, which claims that religious identity and religious actors are no longer relevant to global politics. Or they can acknowledge that religion is once again driving major world events. They can harness opportunities to partner with transnational religious leaders in making world order more stable and state sovereignty more secure. They can develop strategies for dealing with leaders who fundamentally reject the Westphalian system, based on an understanding of the theological worldview motivating that rejection. Acknowledgement of the real power of religion in shaping geopolitics, whether for good or for ill, serves world leaders in crafting sound foreign policy and political scientists in dissecting the dynamics of international relations and religion in the twenty first century.

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