1929

The meaning of experience in the thought of John Dewey

THE MEANING OF EXPERIENCE IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN DEWEY

by

Yü-Shan Han

(A.B., Peking University, 1924; B.D., Yenching University, 1926)

A Dissertation

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

GRADUATE SCHOOL

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

1929

PhD
1929
h
copy 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE MEANING OF EXPERIENCE IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN DEWEY

Introduction.

1. Life and Education of Dewey

John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, October 20, 1859. He attended the public schools there, and received his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Vermont in 1879. Five years later, he finished his work for the Doctorate of Philosophy in Johns Hopkins University (1884). Then "He took Greeley's counsel and went west, teaching philosophy."[1] He became instructor and assistant professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan in 1884 and remained in that institution until 1888. While there, he wrote his first publications, Psychology and Leibniz: A Critical Exposition. Next he taught philosophy in the University of Minnesota for a year. In 1889 he was invited back to the University of Michigan, where he remained as professor and the head of the department of philosophy until 1894. During this period, he finished his Outline of Ethics, 1891, and his Study of Ethics, 1893. In 1894 he was made the head of the Department of Philosophy and Pedagogy in the University of Chicago. It was there that John Dewey, by his excellent work "first caught the eyes of the world. It was in those years that he revealed the resolute experimental bent of his thought."[2] Also in 1894 he was the joint author of Psychology of Number. His School and Society was published in 1900. The signal for a new trend of thought,

known as the Chicago School became thoroughly established when his collective work Studies in Logical Theory was published in 1903. William James commented thus: "Chicago has a School of Thought! It deserves the title of a new system of philosophy."[3]

Dewey probably felt that he had done his part in Chicago, for he accepted a professorship in Columbia University in the following year (1904). The University of Wisconsin recognized his contribution and conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Laws. In 1908 in collaboration with Tufts, he published his Ethics. In the following year his How We Think was published. This year seemed to mark the beginning of his productive period of thought. In 1910 his The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy appeared. Three years later came "perhaps his greatest book.....Democracy and Education." Here he draws "the varied lines of his philosophy to a point, and centers them all on the task of developing a better generation."[4] In 1915 Dewey and his daughter, by cooperative work, expressed their ideals in education in Schools of To-morrow. In the same year he published German Philosophy and Politics. Then the changes and development of Dewey's thought came to a culmination, and were explicitly expressed in the epoch-making work Essays in Experimental Logic, which appeared in 1916. In the following year he proclaimed to the philosophical world "the need for a recovery of philosophy" in the cooperative volume, Creative Intelligence. Three years later he made his conviction known to Orientals through his lectures on Reconstruction in Philosophy.

He spent two years in China lecturing to teachers on educational reforms. "It is not too much to say that most students in China not only know the name of Dewey, but also accept his philosophy as 'workable' in China, especially in the educational field."[5] Next his report in 1924 to the Turkish Government on the reorganization of their national schools exerted great influence on the education of the people of that country.

In 1925, when his Experience and Nature appeared, the reviewer of the New York Herald Tribune said, "with monumental care, detail, and completeness professor Dewey has in this volume revealed the metaphysical heart that beats its unvarying, alert tempo through his writings, whatever their explicit themes".[6] Two years later, his social and political interest again came to the fore, and there appeared The Public and Its Problems. The Sixth International Congress of Philosophy was held at Harvard, where Dewey's frank and humble, yet stimulating address, "The Rôle of Philosophy in the History of Civilization", was a plea for speculative philosophy. In Whither Mankind--A Panorama of Modern Civilization--Dewey contributed a chapter on philosophy;[7] and in the October 1928 issue of The World To-morrow, Dewey's article "The Critique of American Civilization" manifests clearly his interest in civilization and his philosophical stand. In addition to this, the report of his trip to Russia was an actual investigation of social and cultural experiment of the Soviet principles.[8]

"The hour makes the man, and the man makes the hour", so says a Chinese proverb. Dewey lived his early life

in the hour of the great, powerful forthcoming of the industrial application of modern sciences. Generally speaking, his was an age of great promise for the coming of both social and intellectual emancipation. His Vermont environment, moreover, afforded him a spirit of "rustic simplicity" by which he is often characterized. At this time sociology began to receive its popularity; social service or social salvation was the cry in the wilderness. Social psychology, social evolution, and social theories of general education and of religious education--all came to the front. American philosophy since 1870 has been an "Ausgang des Intellectualismus in der Philosophie der Gegenwart"; the positive courses, as described by Dr. George C. Cell, are evolutionary, personalistic, pragmatic, and realistic. Emerson's address "The American Scholar" (1837) was a declaration of the intellectual independence of America. "In Emerson's Berühmtem Harvard-Vortrag 1837 über den "American Scholar" oder das Ideal des "Man Thinking", brachte er das bewusstsien einer neuen Kulturepoche für Amerika klar und kräftig zum Ausdruck: "Our day of dependence draws to a close". Das ist gewiss eine Idee, kein fait accompli, er sah aber glaubenstark der Vollendung entgegen, wo die Kulturabhängikeit von der alten Welt durch ein Verhältnis der Wechselwirkung abgelöst wird".[9] Just a few months before Dewey received his Bachelor's degree, Charles Peirce's article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" appeared in The Popular Science Monthly and in the Revue Philosophique (Jan. 1879). However, "The work commenced by Peirce", Dewey says, "was continued by William James.....The article which

Peirce wrote in 1878 commanded almost no attention from philosophical circles....". It was not until "1898 that James inaugurated the new pragmatic movement in an address entitled, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results".[10] Prior to the publication of the Principles of Psychology of William James in 1890, challenges and influences had come from the quarters of the critics of Hegel, especially from Andrew Seth. The greatest challenge of all was the appearance of Andrew Seth's Hegelianism and Personality in 1887. The title of the book clearly indicates some incompatibility between Hegelianism and personality. One of the problems which occupied the mind of Dewey was the problem of thought and reality; therefore we appreciate Dewey's new formulations. Dewey, writing on the development of American pragmatism reaffirmed the indebtedness of the authors of Studies in Logical Theory to William James for their "instruments". The Principles of Psychology of William James, then, made great contributions to the Chicago School!

From his writings and his activities, we have seen that his interests in life problems have been diverse. We have observed the practical effect of the West on Dewey and that the position he occupied as the head of the Department of Philsophy and Pedagogy gave the hour which shaped the man. From another angle of approach, we now see him making a new world of education. Following Peirce, he sees the importance of the instrumentality whereby ideas may be made clear, and the real and the ideal connected. After How We Think was written

he turned to the problem of education in a democracy. Dewey showed the close relation between education and democracy, making "personal culture" the foundation of "social efficiency". He believed that there cannot be "a society really worth serving unless it is constituted of individuals of significant qualities".[11] "Moreover, intelligence has descended from its lonely isolation at the remote edge of things, whence it operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, to take its seat in the moving affairs of men."[12] Human affairs or humanity, the whole of it, is his interest and the interest of philosophy as well. Adapting the Darwinian logic, he emphasized adaptation and control of environment through the instrumentalities of intelligence or ideas. Accepting the position of Comte, he said that neither epistemology nor metaphysics should dominate philosophy. The Bergsonian élan vital does not satisfy him as an explanation of reality; to him the life-process itself is reality.[13] Because of his wide interest in life, he lays great stress on the function and relation of philosophy to social and political problems. He says, "Philosophy clings like a timid spinster to the old-fashioned problems and ideas; 'direct pre-occupation with contemporary difficulties is left to literature and politics'".[14] He holds that the experimental method and attitudes are to be carried out in the solution of social problems. "Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without relevancy and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present."[15] Intellectual clarity is necessary only in a specific field, be-

cause mere theorizing or pre-experimental notions disappear since they become increasingly irrelevant to the situation discovered, and with this detected irrelevance they become meaningless and uninteresting.[16] "The aim of philosophy, then, is to become, as far as is humanly possible, an organ for dealing with these conflicts.....(It is to be catholic and far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of life."[17]

2. Preliminary Statement of the Problem

The problem for investigation in this dissertation is to find the meaning of experience in the thought of John Dewey, and to consider the relation between his enlarged conception of experience and the "persistent problems of philosophy". These questions will naturally follow: Has he solved the problems which he has set for himself? Is his experience-philosophy positivistic? Is his theory of experience consistent with his system as a whole?

The method of approach will be synoptic, since the investigation aims at a coherent interpretation of Dewey's meaning of experience, and its position in his system as a whole. This, consequently, involves an investigation of all the relevant writings of John Dewey. As to the procedure of this investigation, it is first empirical and objective, whereby a true exposition may be brought about--an exposition which is true to Dewey's own position in the meanings of definitions and terminologies. In other words, the method may be called analytical when restricted to the exposition of the problem under investigation. To judge the value of the new conception

of experience and its consistent position in the system as a whole demands a critical and synoptic method. This means that his position will be evaluated in the light of human experience in its wholeness, and that it will be compared with other interpretations of experience.

3. The Significance of the Problem under Investigation

Dewey starts the volume Creative Intelligence with an essay, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy", and asserts that the recovery will take place only when philosophy gives up the traditional view of experience for the new. This is not to say that Dewey did not conceive this before the appearance of this book. As early as 1903 he had set up his own position concerning experience in opposition to the German idealists in particular. This had already caught the eyes of contemporary philosophers before the Essays in Experimental Logic appeared in 1916. Dewey says, "The key to understanding the doctrines of the essays herewith reprinted, lies in the passages regarding the temporal development of experience".[18] This also forms an issue between the Chicago and Cambridge Schools, and the separation of them ought to arouse intellectual curiosity. Dewey, according to many, "rejects metaphysics as the echo and disguise of theology".[19] This gives us a very important question for reflection, "Is or is not Dewey thoroughly positivistic?".

The theory of experience, moreover, is crucial for the problems of behaviorism and self-psychology, for the conception of science and philosophy, and for the theory of value.

Thus Rogers points out that Dewey seemed to have begun a "flanking movement",[20] rendering the traditional problems of philosophy meaningless. Hence, there has been a growing interest in the theory of experience in the thought of John Dewey. Of course we do not intend to attribute every philosophical writing on experience to the influence of Dewey, for the modern tendency to study experience goes back to Kant, and is definitely expressed in Jacobi against Spinoza and Lotze against Hegel.

We may briefly name a few of the contemporary outstanding articles and books on the meaning of experience in general and those on Dewey's conception of experience in particular. S. H. Hodgson published his Metaphysics of Experience in 1899; Baillie, three years after the appearance of the Studies in Logical Theory wrote An Idealistic Construction of Experience. Bawden's Principles of Pragmatism attempts to give a philosophical interpretation of experience. G. P. Adams' Reason and Experience and Miss Mary P. Follett's Creative Experience appeared in the same year, 1924. Viscount Haldane's Human Experience is a criticism of Dewey's Experience and Nature, 1926. Hart, a follower of Dewey, wrote Inside Experience in 1927. For the sake of brevity I shall enumerate the important articles on experience:

Boodin, J. E.	"Is Experience Self-supporting?" Journal of Philosophy 5(1908), 365-375.
"	"Energy and Reality", ibid. 393-406.
Creighton, J. E.	"Experience and Thought", Philosophical Review 15(1906), 482-493.
"	"The Standpoint of Experience", Philosophical Review 12(1903), 593-610.

Fite, W. "The Associational Conception of Experience", Philosophical Review 9(1900), 268-292.

" "The Experience-Philosophy", Philosophical Review 15(1906), 1-16.

Frank, L. K. "The Locus of Experience", Journal of Philosophy 20(1923), 327-329.

Holland, E. H. "Relation of Science to Concrete Experience", Philosophical Review 15(1906), 614-626.

James, W. "A World of Pure Experience", Journal of Philosophy 1(1904), 533-543.

McGillvary, E.B. "Experience as Pure and Consciousness as Meaning", Journal of Philosophy 8(1911), 511-525.

Morgan, C. L. "The Natural History of Experience", British Journal of Psychology III, 1, 2, 1-20.

Rogers, A. K. "Epistemology and Experience", Philosophical Review 7(1899), 466-

Sellars, R. W. "The Nature of Experience", Journal of Philosophy 4(1907), 14-18.

Swabey, W. C. "Kant's Analogies of Experience", Philosophical Review 31(1922), 41-57.

" "The Phenomenology of Experience", Philosophical Review 33(1924), 51-66.

Weiman, H. N. "Experience, Mind, and the Concept", Journal of Philosophy 21(1924), 561-572.

Finally, Dewey has had great influence on the youth of China to-day. Since the one making the investigation is a Chinese, this fact arouses in him a personal interest in the philosophy of John Dewey. Having been trained primarily within an idealistic school of thought, he believes a study of the 'opposing' school will inevitably help to bring about a balanced view of philosophy. China to-day, so far as her intellec-

tual position is concerned, is in a new formative period; the future depends upon the thinking youth of to-day. Thus the problem under investigation seems to the writer of great significance.

4. Other Investigators of this Subject

Strictly speaking, our main task is to deal with the thought of John Dewey in his conception of experience; therefore, the theories of experience in the history of thought will not be touched upon unless they are relevant to the present investigation. The existing literature on Dewey may be well represented by such writers as Lovejoy, Howard, Schinz, Leroux, Haldane, and Hart.

Professor Lovejoy takes up three questions in his Essays in Critical Realism: Does pragmatism imply the truth of realism or of idealism, or of neither? If it is in any sense realistic, is it so in a monistic, or a dualistic, or in some third sense? Does it, expressly or by implication, affirm, or admit, or deny the existence of consciousness, of mental states, or of psychical entities?[21] As a result of the investigation Lovejoy found both realistic and idealistic elements in Dewey's writings. Lovejoy also points out that Dewey is at once in favor of "immediatism" and realism with a dualistic theory of knowledge;[22] and that, viewing Dewey's argument as a whole,[23] he is after all "epistemologically minded".[24] To the last question Lovejoy says that Dewey defines "mental" in his own sense as "exercise of intellectual function"[25] or as a "distinctive status of suggesting",[26] but knowing and

apprehending both are natural events.[27]

Lovejoy, possibly following William James, put a similar question as to whether Dewey deals with the problem of how two minds know the same thing and how they know each other. This problem is crucial for his pragmatism, because he has aimed at a logic of action and operation and a logic of social interaction and cooperation. In an article on "Pragmatism and Interactionism", Lovejoy discusses more thoroughly the question of interaction in the thought of Dewey. There Lovejoy tries to show that to Dewey philosophy can enter again into the realistic thought, conversation of common-sense, and science, where "dualisms are just dualities, distinctions having an instrumental and practical, but not ultimate metaphysical worth; or rather, having metaphysical worth in a practical and experimental sense, not in that of indicating a radical existential cleavage in the nature of things."[28]

D. T. Howard of Northwestern University has a book on John Dewey's Logical Theory, in which the early writings of Dewey were treated in a historical order. He tries to show that Dewey takes psychology as his philosophic method because he holds that the real esse of things is neither their percipi (philosophy of nature), nor their intelligi(logic), but the concrete reality of their experiri, the essence of which is psychology.[29] After Dewey received the influence of biological evolutionism, he began to eliminate the transcendental factors in the interpretation of experience. Logic, to Dewey, is not to be separated from biology and psychology, since the act of knowing and the ideas which it employs have a psychological basis.

Dewey labels his own metaphysics naturalistic, the best review of which is found in Santayana's article "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics".[30] Santayana deals with two questions: (1) In what sense is his system naturalistic? (2) In what sense is it metaphysical? Dewey has chosen "events" which have natural endings, culminations, and consummations as his metaphysical elements.[31] "On this material framework" then "hang all the immaterial objects such as words, feelings, and ideas, which may be eventually distinguished in human experience."[32] He attributes two motives to Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics; namely, first, he hopes to deal a death blow to "the habit of hypostatizing"; second, he hopes to interpret the spirit of the age, a philosophy of enterprise.

Another aspect of Dewey's thought is pointed out by Murphy; that is, "objective relativism". Objectivity and relativity seem to be incompatible; the incompatibility is well illustrated by the struggle between monistic and dualistic realists. When Dewey proposes a realism without monism or dualism, he is said to be not playing the game. However, the foundation of his proposition lies in the "inversion in the relation of objects and events".[33] "Every existence is an event"; and "an event is the very happening itself.....not what it becomes.....it is becoming."[34] Events depend upon relations, but they are not relations. Objects are characters of events, but not vice versa, because objects are events with meaning, which is again to be found in communication or interaction. We start then from mere existence or occurrence which is to be taken as substantive. Therefore, the world of 'objec-

tive relativism' is a mixture of finality and dependence, of immediacy and transcendence.[35] Murphy, at the end of the article, points out that Dewey has not freed himself from "the flesh-pots of bifurcation in a full and unambiguous way".[36] The criticism of a "separation between qualities barely occurring and those occurring as meanings" is re-made, after Murphy, by Hall in his article "Some Meanings of Meaning in Experience and Nature".[37]

In conversation with Professor Dewey I asked from what corners of the philosophical world he had received the harshest and worst attack upon his philosophical position, especially on the meaning of experience. The reply was Viscount Haldane's Human Experience. Therefore, an analysis of this work will be of great interest. The purpose of this book, as he tells us, is "a philosophical inquiry into the nature and meaning of human experience".....its implications, and the relation of mind to the objective world.[38] His analysis of Dewey's position is very precise and clear and mostly correct. He says, "Professor Dewey's principle is that there is no such difference in character, and no such line of logical demarcation, either in fact or in theory of knowledge, as are sometimes supposed to exist between intelligence and what is commonly called experience. Subject and object are inseparable and they fall within the same order of existence. What we call knowledge is simply meaning, and meaning itself is a stage in experience to which its natural evolution gives rise. Experience is thus, in the ultimate order of existence, prior to knowledge, and the latter is its product and not any condition preliminary to its reality. Knowledge is not

only no entity separate from nature, but it disappears excepting as a result arising casually from the interaction of events."[39]

Schinz, representing the French temperament, directed a 'vigorous' and 'passionate' attack against pragmatism when pragmatism was at the height of its glory around 1909. He opens his volume by defining pragmatism as "opportunism", which, as a doctrine, does not make good. "But pragmatism as revealing a certain state of mind in our present generation has a profound significance."[40] Schinz devoted a chapter to Dewey in his Anti-pragmatism. In this chapter he points out the main interest in Dewey's thought expressed in the title of one of Dewey's articles, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" (Chicago, 1903). In this article, according to Schinz, Dewey "has only reduced scientific judgments to moral judgments, thus the logic of science to the logic of ethics."[41] Schinz, who seems incapable of clearly grasping the motive of Dewey, loses the force of his arguments. It is quite true to Dewey's interest that ethics should be brought nearer to physical sciences, whereby "arbitrariness in definitions and concepts" or a priori principles may be removed.[42] In his criticism, Schinz shows another fundamental conception of a philosophical problem, namely "ultimate teleology", which Dewey denies. "The moral ideal itself is only a product of this combination(the reciprocal determination of the judger and the situation judged) and must vary from epoch to epoch...."[43] A moral ideal is as "natural" as any other event. Finally Schinz asserts that Dewey is "intellectualistic" and "the most philosophical mind among the pragmatists."[44]

Shortly after Schinz' Anti-pragmatism came out, Pratt's <u>What is Pragmatism</u> appeared. In exposition, Pratt says, "Pragmatism may be regarded as the result of two confluent, though not altogether consistent, streams of tendency. The first.... Kant's doctrine of practical reason.....revived and reformulated in 1896 by Professor James's "Will to Believe"...The second and probably the more important source of pragmatism is the modern scientific view of the meaning of hypothesis. Hypotheses..... are handy ways of telling us what has happened or what we may expect. They are....ways of summarizing and explaining our experience."[45]

Pratt traces two views concerning truth in the pragmatists' writings; the radical view and the modified. "The former holds that truth is the process of verification which goes on within experience; that it consists in the successful working of the idea, in the concrete steps within consciousness that lead from the unverified claim to the full and satisfying assurance of its 'goodness'."[46] Truth, to Dewey, then, falls wholly within our experiences or experienced relations.[47]

The fundamental postulates of "immediate empiricism" is just this; that things are what they are experienced as being; or that to give a just account of anything is to tell what that is experienced to be."[48] Everything is to be understood and explained within experience. In other words, meaning is to be found in experience. Knowledge, for instance, is "a doubt-inquiry-answer experience". Transcendence, to Dewey, if it is recognized, is to be viewed as any other natural process falling within individual experience.[49]

The significant criticism, as it seems to me, is Pratt's

comparison between James and Dewey, and his pointing out that the latter does not go far enough. James says that one's "subjective way of feeling things" does not exhaust all the demands of human nature, for we constantly try to establish the "objective truth" of all possible experiences.[50] Whereas Dewey takes the "social" and "natural" environment of man as the ultimate boundaries of human experience and denies any "objective truth" as such.

Thus far we have reviewed the criticisms directed against various phases of pragmatism. It remains to consider Moore's Pragmatism and Its Critics, a defense of pragmatism. In this book Moore tries to show, first of all, some of the important issues, one of which is the predilection of the pragmatists for "continuity" engendered and reinforced by the development of biology and sociology. "Suffice it to say, therefore, that concerning the place and function of thinking is experience (or in the world) the pragmatist became convinced that not only do will and purpose involve ideas, but that all ideas are volitional and purposive, and therefore ideas cannot be "true" or "false" entirely independent of their purposive and volitional character."[51]

Moore, in summarizing the issues, has well indicated the pragmatic position, psychologically, logically, ethically, politically, metaphysically, and theologically.[52] The whole pragmatic movement expresses its strength in a march toward the direction of a self-supporting, self-controlling, and self-propelling experience. Even this book was written fifteen years before the appearance of Dewey's Experience and Nature,

Moore seemed to have expressed Dewey's essential position: "Experience can stand and go upon its own legs;....it can find within itself the source and support of its values of truth and error, right and wrong."[53]

Among the critics, Moore seems to have taken up the challenge from Fite most appreciatively. In answer to the challenge of "subjectivism" Moore asserts that reality is co-extensive with experience but not necessarily subjective-experience, because "experience must be reduced (1) to mere thought experience, and (2) to my thought-experience before it becomes subjective."[54] This, we believe, manifests the "objectivism" in pragmatism.

M. Leroux devotes a whole chapter to "La Logique instrumentale de M. Dewey et l'école de Chicago" in his admirable work, Le Pragmatisme Américain et Anglais. M. Leroux starts immediately from Dewey's essential concept---L'expérience. "Le caractère organique et le caractère dynamique" in Dewey's thought may be traced to the Hegelian influence.[55] M. Leroux also points out that even when the problem "de la connaissance ait cessé d'occuper la première place dans la pensée de M. Dewey", et "Il paraît s'intéresser d'abord principalement aux questions morales, ici encore l'influence de Hegel est, du moins au debut, predominante. (L'auteur le déclare lui-même dans ses Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, 1891)."[56]

No true interpretation of Dewey has ever failed in pointing out that the notion of experience is essential in his system. Leroux says that M. Dewey "insiste sur la nécessité de recourir à l'expérience immediate pour définir le sens de

toutes les notions discutées en philosophie."[57] A M. Dewey, "la philosophie ne se distingue pas de la science par méthode, mais par le probleme auquel elle repond." "M. Dewey pourrait la définir avec M. Bawden comme une théorie générale de l'expérience."[58] Leroux concludes that "M. Dewey adopte sans doute un langage plus proche du naturalisme."[59]

Hart's Inside Experience is an interpretation of Dewey's spirit in that he deals with the same crucial problems of the structure of experience and its articulations, in the main true to Dewey's line of thought. The denotative method and the interpretation of experience are manifested in taking "every concept of experience" to "be experienced" and the understanding of which has its root in "actual experiences" (somewhere and somehow). In the "continuity of experience" one discovers himself and his world.

Hart classifies the interpretation of experience into four types: (1) the skeptical, (2) the intuitional, (3) the idealistic and the realistic, (4) the coherent.[60] Dewey's interpretation, by Hart, is classified under the coherent which accepts "all experiences as valid for whatever they may turn out to be", and leaves the door of possibility open for whatever may happen.[61] As to the kinds of experience, Hart follows Dewey.[62]

Experience and nature are one, but matter and mind are two characters of nature. The former is the sequential order; the latter, meaning and significance.[63] The modes may be dichotomous in critical judgment, but "the original wholeness of experience must not be ignored and denied."[64]

The foregoing summaries of the significant works on Dewey may be condensed and tabulated under the headings of exposition and criticism:

Exposition	Criticism
1. Dewey is after all "epistemologically minded"--with idealistic and realistic elements in his thought.	1. Dewey is not "clear" because his is not "simple" and "easy" in his "speculations".
2. "Immediate Empiricism" postulates that "things are what they are experienced as".	2. Subjectivism---Experience is almost identified with subjective experience.
3. Early Idealistic and Hegelian heritage continues in Dewey's thought.	3. Intellectualism--He is fond of using dialectics.
4. Naturalistic metaphysics--"events", "objects" "affairs", "situations",--metaphysical nerves.	4. Characterized as "half-hearted naturalist" by the "dogmatic naturalist".
5. While Moore expounded Dewey's thought and attempted to answer the critics, and Hart reproduced Dewey's naturalistic conception of experience, Ratner, oriented his thought, in The Philosophy of John Dewey.	5. Some charges are still unanswered: Is not the intellectual desire(knowledge for its own sake) to be satisfied, as it is a pragmatic issue? The common sense experience is the "explicandum" of philosophy. To find what experience is and means is to philosophize--experience, a magic circle.

The question of experience, then, remains a fundamental problem of philosophy, and a problem crucial in the system of John Dewey. This investigation aims at a systematic formulation of the meaning of experience as implied and expressed in Dewey's various philosophical writings.

Chapter I

A SYNOPTIC PRESENTATION OF DEWEY'S POSITION

A. The Development of Dewey's Interests in Philosophy.

1. His early interest in establishing "continuity".

Dewey's life and education have been mentioned in the Introduction, as has also his environment. There is, nevertheless, still occasion to locate his position in the history of thought. William James speaks of philosophies as "just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push, and seeing the whole drift of life",[1] and they are, on the one hand, "forced on one by one's total character and experience", and on the other hand they are "on the whole preferred....as one's best working attitude".[2] Dewey has his "vision". He says that when the essays were published in 1903, idealism was in practical command of the philosophical field in both England and America, but that since then there has been an impressive revival of realism.[3] Dewey says, "This marked alteration of intellectual environment subjects the doctrine of the essays to a test not contemplated when they were written."[4] His "vision", however, of bringing a synthesis of the idealistic and sensualistic logics, as he felt, ought to be continued. Dewey's "motivation and direction" in the <u>Essays in Experimental Logic</u> aim at a synthesis of the idealistic and realistic elements, recognizing that "objects of knowledge in their capacity of distinctive objects of knowledge are determined by intelligence"[5] and "acknowledging that certain brute existences detected or laid bare by thinking, but in no way constituted out of

thought or any mental process, set every problem for reflection and hence serve to test its otherwise merely speculative results."[6] This quite consistently crresponds with his earlier expression that a synthesis is needed between the antinomy of Kantian reason or ideality and Humian empiricism.[7]

His own experience-philosophy is "reflective, voluntaristic, and experimental", which alone affords the connection and the continuity of the "given" and the ideal, because it "acknowledges the transitive character of experience" and the "possible control of the character of the transition by means of intelligent effort."[8] These are mere illustrations from his own "vision". Objectively, we have his able and critical contemporary, William James, who, in the review of the Studies in Logical Theory (1904), says, "Taking it en gros, what strikes me most in it is the great sense of concrete reality with which it is filled. It seems a promising via media between the empiricist and transcendentalist tendencies of our time."[9]

The term "continuity" in Dewey's philosophy, then, has two meanings: First, continuity is the connection of the "two insulated universes" made by historical dualisms. Experience is a continuous process instead of appearance on the one side and reality on the other. Second, the levels or fields of interaction is a continuous growth-process. The later does not exist without the earlier, and the later makes use of the earlier. It is, therefore, at once a metaphysical and genetic continuity. The continuity of thought process and its content is only one of the instances of this in experience.

2. The inner development of his interests.

The principle of interaction may be applied to various aspects of life. The reciprocality of interest and change is one of the application. The more intensely one's interest centers in a given situation, the greater the challenge and the problem. The challenge or problem changes with the direction of the interest; the interest, in turn, changes as the new demand or new problem emerges. Therefore, one is bound to change or shift his interest as life goes on. It is true in general as well as in particular, whether in a profession or in any research or study. Under four topics; namely, point of view, essential quality of life, ethics, and generalization of value, Professor Perry characterizes Dewey's position as follows: technology, intelligence, opportunism, and progressivism, respectively.[10] They characterize his interest in philosophy very well. As a teacher of philosophy and psychology, Dewey's first interest was in these two fields. Out of this interest he wrote the Psychology and the Critical Exposition of Leibniz and articles on the relation of these two fields. Later he showed that his interest turned to ethics before he was made the Head of the Department of Philosophy and Pedagogy of the University of Chicago. M. Leroux is of the same opinion, for he says, "Pendant une huitaine d'années, il semble que le problème de la connaissance ait cessé d'occuper la première place dans la pensée de M. Dewey. Il paraît s'intéresser d'abord principalement aux questions morales."[11] Dewey himself declared this in his Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (1891).

Even though there may not be a conscious effort in the shifting of his interest in his research, there is an internal demand for the transition from a psychological study of the individual to a study of the moral behavior of the individual, and thence to his "mental" activities; thinking and reasoning and grasping of meaning, which occur in social experience. Running the "risk" of encountering the conservative and theological power, Dewey gave more attention to the study of Darwin, and was more convinced by his logic. Hence, his reduction of the normative sciences and the physical sciences to biology. In other words, biological categories are applied to normative sciences---the fundamental principle of pragmatism. Finally his diverse interests came to a crystalization in his Democracy and Education.

3. The ideal of his interest---the recovery and reconstruction of philosophy.

Since the publication os this book Dewey has felt the demand for the practical functioning of philosophy in civilization and has set for himself a great task. First he claimed the need for a recovery of philosophy and then a reconstruction of it. The means for accomplishing this demands a new type of logic. Before the revision can procede, we must be "willing" to abandon most of the traditional problems of philosophy, since they have lost their relevancy. The most crucial problem is the revision of the conception of experience, for Dewey holds that the recovery of philosophy will take place only when the new conception of experience replaces the old. His new concep-

tion or formulation of experience has stimulated thought and challenged students of philosophy. However, his thought since 1904 has been developing in two directions; on the practical side he has stressed "social significance"; on the theoretical side, he has been laboring to fill the "gaps" in his system; namely, cosmology and the subjects of this sharable objective world. For example, take the title of his recent work, Experience and Nature. The synthesis of these two aspects is found in his philosophy of civilization.

4. Philosophy as a critique of civilization.

To maintain the moral values of civilization, according to Dewey, depends upon the insight and decision of the individual, who is provided with a definite and controllable tool. Dewey calls this tool, science in the general sense. Philosophy as a general logic of experience is to apply this tool, wrestling with the problem of life whereby a new technique to control inquiry may be engendered and a methodic control of experience may be realized.

In the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy Dewey showed "the rôle of philosophy in the history of civilization", and made "a plea for casting off of that intellectual timidity which hampers the wings of imagination, a plea for speculative audacity, for more faith in ideas, for sloughing off a cowardlt reliance upon those partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name of facts."[12] This increasing emphasis on the mission of philosophy in civilization may be seen in the chapter which he contributed to Charles Beard's Whither Mankind,

"A Critique of American Civilization" in The World Tomorrow (October 1928),[13] and in his report on Russia.

B. Outstanding Characteristics of Dewey's Thought.

The titles of Dewey's writings may be taken as a good manifestation of the outstanding characteristics of his thought. They may be classified under four heads: educational and psychological, social and political, ethical and logical, experience-philosophy. To give an adequate detailed analysis of them is not only out of place here but also impossible within the limited space. Therefore, we cannot expect more than a brief summary, pointing out the outstanding characteristics under the four categories just named.

1. Educational and psychological.

One of the ablest works of Dewey is his Democracy and Education, which is, as indicated by the subtitle, an introduction to the philosophy of education. One of the great tasks which Dewey has taken the responsibility to do is seen over and over again--the bridging over of the historical dualisms. He says, "At the outset, the rise of modern science prophesied a restoration of the ultimate connection of nature and humanity", and the educational scheme of studies based on an evolution of knowledge "are designed to overcome the separation and to secure recognition of the place occupied by the subject matter of natural sciences in human affairs."[14] The stage prior to this, possibly more important than this, is the intimacy of individual and society, for he says, "social ef-

ficiency as an education purpose should mean cultivation of power to join freely and fully in shared or common activities." The life of society, like that of the individual, procedes by constant renewals. When society is constituted of individuals of worth, when they freely and intelligently share activities, there is social efficiency and democracy. This may be said to be the culmination of his psychological and ethical interest.

2. Social and political.

In every subject to which Dewey turns he seems to confront a dualism; a dichotomy within continuous experience. In his examination of society and the state he finds this same situation, for he says, "If one wishes to realize the distance which may lie between "facts" and the meaning of facts, let one go to the field of social discussion."[16] "In any event, social philosophy exhibits an immence gap between facts and doctrines."[17] Dewey's political philosophy may be summarized under a few principles. First, the community and its interests are not to be identified with the state or the politically organized community. "And the differentiation may dispose us to look with more favor upon the proposition already advanced: namely, that the line between private and public is to be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or by promotion."[18] If there is any consistency in Dewey's thought, one of the examples is his functional theory of everything(in the true pragmatic fashion). He says, "The words 'government' and 'officers' are taken functionally, not in terms of some

particular structure which is so familiar to us that it leaps to our eyes when these words are used."[19] His conception of the State is pluralistic. Again in the pragmatic form, Dewey tried to find the condition of a Great Society to be transformed into a Great Community: a face-to-face, free and shared intercourse. This suggests Royce's ideal of the "Great Community".

3. Ethics and logic.

The close relation between ethics, psychology, and logic brought out by Dewey is a distinct contribution. The key to the understanding of the social psychology is the understanding of habit; the key to the understanding of individual psychology, the operation of impulse and intelligence. "Mind can be understood in the concrete only as a system of beliefs, desires, and purposes which are formed in the interaction of biological aptitudes with a social environment."[20] The process of this interaction is chiefly the process of thought, and the meaning of experience. Therefore, his logic is called 'experimental' in the sense that it is an empirical and psychological description of human activity in its concrete adaptation and control of the environment. "Personal culture" and "social efficiency" are possible because of the fact that man is not only highly adapted, but also adaptable and the 'objective world' has a certain form of crude organization like that of experience, which 'carries with it organization'. Lotze, the earliest forerunner of pragmatic tendency in central Europe, says that life is deeper than logic. Though Dewey is more influenced by Darwinian biology and evolutionary method, the fundamental pragmatic

principle is there. When life is interpreted in its highest expression, the person or personality, we have personalistic pragmatism, represented by James and Bowne; when it is interpreted merely in terms of biological organism, we have naturalistic pragmatism, Dewey's philosophy. "To make our ideas clear" is for "action", hence logic and ethics.

4. Experience-philosophy.

Dewey's philosophy may be called experience-philosophy for these reasons: First, the recovery and reconstruction of philosophy depends upon the new conception of experience; second, any theory of reflection must appeal to experience for its verification and judgment; third, the method of Dewey's philosophy is called (by himself) the "method of experience" or the "experience method"; fourth, it is in his theories of experience that Dewey has established a "new" system of thought.

C. Dewey's Philosophical System.

By the "system" of a philosophy or philosopher we mean the complete systematic treatment of the main philosophical problems. No matter what philosophical position or attitude one takes, he is bound to have "some" methodology, which includes logic and epistemology; "some" metaphysics, the analytical side of which is "the study of the basic categories of science"--ontology, and the synthetic side of which is the formulation of a unified picture of the world--cosmology; "some" theory of value, which includes ethics, "the study of the good and of the

means of realizing it in conduct", and esthetics, "the study of the beautiful and of the means of realizing it in art".[21] We believe it is safe to say that in one way or another a thinker will manifest these interests in his reflection if he professes to philosophize at all.

To philosophize is not merely to produce definitions of philosophy and catalogue philosophical problems, but "to seek to translate the implicit conviction of order into explicit insight, to show that the lesson of experience, taken comprehensively in range but with the best of each type as the clue to interpretation, yields and sustains this insight."[22] Dewey will certainly agree to this statement, for he himself has said that "philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a criticism of criticisms, as it were."[23] In the process of criticism, especially in its "generality", we are aiming at "instituting and perpetuating more enduring and extensive values."[24] The non-reflective experience gives the data or problems for philosophy, the discipline which provides a critique of experience. Dewey is right when he says that "philosophic discourse partakes both of scientific and literary discourse", for "it is a comment on nature and life in the interest of a more intense and just appreciation of the meanings present in experience."[25] In other words, it is a "translation" from "implicit order" into "explicit insight". Dewey sometimes calls this transformation "methodic control of experience."[26]

In presenting Dewey's thought in a concise system, we

shall follow Montague's division of philosophy: methodology, metaphysics, and the theory of value.

1. Methodology.

Dewey, in discussing philosophic method, says that there are two "avenues" of approach to the goal of philosophy. One of them is to begin with "experience in gross"; the other, from the "refined selective products". He adapts the former approach, which requires an empirical method. This method aims to find out the "when", the "where", and the "how" of the diverse interacting elements of the world. The logic of this, then, is "evolutionary" and "experimental".

Dewey caught the insight and "significance" of Lotze (his peculiar effort to combine a transcendental view of thought with certain obvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon specific empirical antecedents), and set to develop his "instrumentalism" whereby "logical terms and distinctions" may be viewed with respect to their "necessary function in the redintegration of experience".[27] Is there anything new thus far? The answer is negative, for all philosophies claim the same function and purpose of their methods. The uniqueness of Dewey's position lies in his "revision" of terminology, "limitation" of thought functions, and the elimination of obsolete notions in philosophy.

2. Metaphysics.

Logic, according to Dewey, must come to terms with psychology, for the latter affords a natural history of thinking as a life-process. This interpretation of logic in terms of psychology is in agreement with his naturalistic meta-

physics. Sellars points out that the weakness of empiricism has been the unwillingness to develop a systematic metaphysics but the instrumentalist pragmatism is a more broadly conceived naturalism.[28] Since the publication of Sellars' book (Evolutionary Naturalism, 1922) Dewey has made more of a plea for metaphysics and has given more attention to augmenting and developing his own metaphysical principles.[29]

The foundations of a naturalistic metaphysics may be summarized under six headings:

a. Nature of existence: "Contingency" is one of the predominant traits of the universe, for the world is a vital mixture of tight completeness and uncertain possibilities, order and indeterminateness. Therefore, the principle of relativity is significant for a naturalistic metaphysics. But since every existence is a natural event the relativism becomes objective.

b. Process and structure: Experience is history; reality is the growth-process. "To designate the slower and the regular rhythmic events structure, and more rapid and irregular ones process, is sound practical sense."[30] Order and structure are the intellectual constructions, which have a regulative and instrumental function.

c. Events and objects: Every existence is an event which is self-sufficient. Objects are precisely what we are aware of, i.e., events with meanings. Events are endings whether enjoyed or obnoxious; they are not rigid lumpy substance, but "ongoing" and as such, they are "unfinished, incomplete, and indeterminate".[31] "We do not name an immediate event" because "that is impossible."[32] But they "are present and operative any-

way....Events have effects and consequences anyway...."[33] When they have no attributed meanings, they are either accidents or catastrophes."[34] "Although talking is itself an event, we cannot talk events. We can only talk meanings."[35]

However, when characters are assigned, events or "mere occurrences" are converted into "implications".[36] They are converted "by means of inference as to their probable consequences", and"these are the meanings imputed to the events under consideration."[37] When events are turned into objects, "they may be referred to when they do not exist..." Objects imply at once the original existence and an inner experimentation.[38]

"Event" has become a crucial problem in contemporary philosophy, and has gained many followers. Whitehead and Dewey are the leading prophets. Dewey again generously acknowledges (in a private conversation) his indebtedness to Whitehead for his interest in the problem just mentioned; therefore it is beneficial to make a brief comparison between them:

Dewey: Whitehead:

Denial of the presupposition: Ultimate incompatibility of objectivity and ultimate relativity--39
Opposition to "hypostazation" and "bifurcation".

1. Nature: Reality and experience come to be the same thing. Experience affords justification for every happening in this relative world. "This human situation falls wholly within nature." 40	1. Nature: "Nature is thus a totality including individual experiences, so that we must reject the distinction between nature as it really is and experience of it which are purely psychological. Our experiences of the apparent world are nature itself." 41 "This common world is a complex of things, including all experiences." 42

2. Events: "Events, being events and not rigid lumpy substances, are ongoing..." 43 "Every existence is an event...The eventful character of all existences is no reason for consigning them 44 to the realm of mere appearance.." "Each successive event being a stage in a serial process is both expectant and commemorative." 45

"In every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate... irreducible, infinitely plural,48 undefinable, and indescribable."

"The same existential events are capable of an infinite number of meanings....since possibilities of conjunction are endless, and since the consequences of any of them may at some time be significant, its potential meanings are endless." 50

"Any act is petty in comparison with the totality of natural events.'..Yet "in a genuine sense every act is already possessed of infinite import...The little part of the scheme of affairs...is continu-52 ous with the rest of the world."

2. Events: "Every event extends over other events, and every event is extended over by other events." 46 Events are the very stuff of our experiences; they "are lived through ; they extend around us; they are the medium within which our physical experience develops." 47

"The salvation of reality is its obstinate, irreducible, matter-of-fact entities, which are limited to be no other than themselves...." 49

"Nothing in nature could be what it is except as an ingredient in nature as it is... An isolated event is not an event, because every event is a factor in a larger whole and is significant of that whole." 51

3. Objects: "Events turn into ojects, things with meaning." 53 When "events come to possess characters, they are demarcated and noted." 54

"Existence is not a character of objects, but objects are characters of existence, of events." 57

"Events acquire meanings" and meanings occur within nature." Meanings are acquired through communication. 59

3. Objects: "'Significance' is the relatedness of things." 55 "Each eternal object has its own proper connection with each....occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into that occasion." 56

"Knowledge issues from this reciprocal insistence between this event and the rest of nature, namely relations are perceived in the making and because of the making...." 58

"That <u>how</u> an actual entity <u>becomes</u> constitutes <u>what</u> that actual <u>is</u>; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its being is constituted by its becoming." 60

There are "modes of interaction through interaction, "events have communicable meanings...capable of connotation and denotation." 61 Meanings are objective because they are natural interaction. 62

4. Time and Space: "When it is a question of critical search for valid meaning..the genuine meaning of events...we are obliged to have recourse to antecedent conditions.. "total histories or immanental temporal wholes." 63

"Reality is growth-process itself;....The real existence is the history in its entirety,...." 65 "Experience is history...Anything denoted is found to have temporal quality and reference; it has movement from and towards within it; it is marked by waxings and wanings. The translation of temporal quality into an order of time is an intellectual arrangement..." 66

"To designate the slower and the regular rhthymic events structure, and more rapid and irregular one process, is sound practical sense. It expresses the function of one in respect of the other."

4. Time and Space: "Event(in a sense) are space and time, namely space and time are abstractions from events. But objects are only derivatively in space and time by reason of their relation to events." 64

It is "in our knowledge" that events "differentiate themselves into space-relations and time-relations....space and time are each partial expressions of one fundamental relation between events which is neither spatial nor temporal. This relation I call extension." 67

Serial time is the result of "an intellectual process of abstraction," not the very passage of nature itself." 69 "We observe nature as extended in an immediate present which is simultaneous but not instantaneous." 70

"That such agreement is possible between two major philosophers with such different antecedents and such widely separated fields of inquiry, is itself no small recommendation for the principles which both have been led to adopt." 71

d. Meanings and ends: Interaction and communication are essential to meanings. "The same existential events are capable of an infinite number of meanings." 72 Dewey holds that events acquire meanings and that meanings occur within nature. 73 Here

we see the need of both evolutionary naturalism and objective relativism.

e. Causality and teleology: Dewey seems to be in agreement with Hume that causality cannot be made intelligible except as it is defined as "another name for the sequential order of a history."[74] Ultimate teleology is openly denied by Dewey. Ends are either ends-in-view or fulfillments of natural events.

f. Mind and consciousness: Mind is one of the ends of nature, being the highest development of the levels of nature. "Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities."[75]

3. Theory of value:

a. Ethics: Philosophy in some sense is a branch of morals, in the thought of Dewey. Any criticism implies a theory of value and philosophy is inherently a "criticism of criticisms". Therefore philosophy is "transvaluation of values".[76]

In accordance with his interest in establishing the continuity of experience, Dewey refuses to make a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values. The possibility of the realization of values, according to Dewey, lies in the connection of the actual and the ideal, theory and practice. To establish this connection he seems to feel that one must keep his feet on the "solid" ground, so as not to be led away by the

moral judgment überhaupt. Only the "situation within which the categories emerge and function can furnish the basis for estimation of their value and import."[77] Any realization of value requires a social situation, the 'reciprocal determination' of the judger and the content judged. And this again leads us to the logical conclusion that "since the judger is personal, the content judged must be ultimately personal too---so that the moral judgment really institutes a relationship between persons, relationship between persons being what we mean by 'social'".[78]

"Morals means growth of conduct in meaning..."[79] The "ought" and the "is" are not to be separated, for the "ought" is the "is" of action.[80] Dewey never forgets his 'intelligence'! It is intelligence which opens up the possibilities and guides the activities toward the "ought to be". The "ought to be" is, moreover, the "larger and fuller" activity toward which the "is", carrying with it all the past deposits, strives.[81]

b. Esthetics: Dewey agrees with the Greek view that the fine arts and industrial technologies are affairs of practice. Science is an art; art is practice. This is also a modern tendency. Some modes of practice are not intelligent, and not inherently and immediately enjoyable while others are full of enjoyed meanings. In connection with this interpretation Dewey concludes that art is the complete culmination of nature while science is the "handmaiden" that leads natural events to this issue. If this is accepted, the principle of continuity is established: division of everything into nature and experience, of experience into practice and theory, art and science, of art into useful and fine, "mental and free" will be rendered superficial and disappear.[82]

A word more about experience and art. When the relation of these two is properly understood, the continuity of the artistic and the esthetic will be established. Nature is partial and incomplete; it becomes fully itself through what Dewey calls "operative art". Crude existence is meaningless until it is translated into meaningful objects. Translation is arrived at by intentional direction (will and intellect) operating upon the immediately given. When the objects of conscious experience are "reflectively chosen", there can be a union of the precarious, novel, irregular with the settled, assured, and uniform.[83] This union also defines the artistic and the esthetic.

c. Ethics and esthetics: In both ethics and esthetics Dewey denies the notion of ultimate teleology, but he cleverly formulates a postulate of sensing the "tendency", without which there is neither morality nor appreciation. Moral theory is action in idea, from the "idea" to the "ought". Art as an active process includes nor merely the esthetic perception but also the "social significance" of the esthetic object.[84] Ethics and esthetics then are intentional and directional processes functioning as criticisms of values!

Chapter II

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF HIS THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

It is almost a platitude to say that no philosophic system is independent and original in the absolute sense. A genius may make startling contributions and give unique expressions or articulations to the meaning of life and the view of the universe, but his position cannot in any sense be viewed as an isolated production. History of thought, like any other history, is a continuous process. This idea has been more clearly brought out in modern philosophy than in any earlier period.

A new formulation of any philosophical concept may be a development of the past, either immediate or remote, or a revolt from the past. But "we are the heir of all ages in our intellectual life, and so can utilize the results of those who have gone before us."[1] Even though we may understand different schools of thought without much difficulty and without acknowledging them, every point of view is at some period of history a hard-won acquisition. There also may be many schools of philosophy of history, but the continuity of historical processes is recognized by all. In other words, there seems to be an ternal dialectic movement in the history of thought. In the course of life and experience there may be shifting of attention, and interest, and transplantation of emphasis, and new discoveries and improvements; and thus we find progress. The philosophy of any thinker, therefore, may be said to be composed of "ingredients".

Dewey's thought is no exception. Before we take his unique position concerning experience, let us try to state his historical indebtedness or philosophical heritage.

In a private discussion Professor said that "very definitely" he owes a great deal to Hegel through G. S. Morris of Johns Hopkins University. It is by Hegel, according to Dewey, that the a priori and the a posteriori are connected. Idee is process, but the process of thought. Here is what Dewey has been laboring to improve. The Hegelian principle of the synthesis of the dialectic is a bridging over of the separation between thesis and antithesis. Idee is a process, to which Dewey applies the evolutionary concepts instead of intellectualistic formulations. Here again I may venture to interpret his statement made in a private discussion that he caught the spirit of the renaissance---going back to the classics. There Dewey saw the value of the Platonic Ideas not as "ideas in themselves" but as intrumentalities of "social dignificance." This, without doubt, is the origin of his intrumentalism. Social application of the Platonic ideas and the establishment of continuity in the "concrete universal" give the kernel of his whole system of thought. The industrial and social characteristics of the age, his training in pedagogical psychology under Stanley Hall,[2] and the opportunity of developing an experimental philosophy as the Head of the Department of Philosophy and Pedagogy at the University of Chiacgo all contribute to the development of Dewey's pragmatic trend of thought. The inner logical development of Dewey's thought necessarily culminates in a philosophy of experience.

Whenever the motive of an act or of a theory is detected, the meaning of the act or theory will be more clearly understood. Hence to trace Dewey's motive in the formulation of his theory of experience is essential to the understanding of its meaning.

A. Problems Which Dewey Intends to Solve.

The world may be "the best possible" world, but it is far from being a perfect one. This, then, at once seems to take the stand against the mechanistic conception of the world. There are always problems, and as soon as the problems are recognized or felt, there are attempted solutions. New solutions always in turn give rise to new problems. Hence, one can either be an optimist or a pessimist, for the situation may be at once viewed as progress and the very nature of life, or as meaning struggle. Whichever view one may take, the "eventful character of existence", to use Dewey's words, is "there". Let us take an optimistic view for the present. Needs sharpen our wits! Problems and demands give occasions for progress.

The place of the Christian Church in Western civilization is a good example. Under the Roman government the world was uniformly ruled by good protection, fine roads, prosperous trade, and well-defined law, but there emerged a crying need for emancipation from mere solidarity. When there is too rigid social solidarity, there follows a reactionary demand for the expression of individuality. Then the Christians through persecution taught individuality. After the sack of Rome in 310 A.D. by the Goths, who knew how to hunt and how to fight, but not how to work together, the imperative need was transferred to social solidarity

again. The Christian Church in turn became the social center, teaching agriculture and giving education and training in co-operation. After the Church finally gained supreme power and became highly institutionalized the Reformation came as the reply to a demand for the recognition of the individual. We are not in a position to say that this indicate an infinite alternation of individual and social emphasis, but that the problem-solution is one of the ways of viewing the continuity of history and experience.

Now, intellectualism and idealism were in command of the philosophical world both in England and in America before 1870. Since then there have been three movements in operation, with one predominant purpose; namely, revolution against intellectualism and absolutism. These three movements are pragmatism, realism, and personal idealism. Dewey joined the camp of the first, and established a school of thought known as the Chicago School.[3]

Dewey shows in the "Introduction" to Essays in Experimental Logic that whenever philosophy goes so far as to become 'vicious intellectualism' there is or should be a return to "appeal to experience" for emancipation. "It was an emphatic assertion that until men could see how things got into belief, and what they did when they got there, intellectual acceptance would be withheld."[4] This is the spirit true to the general tendencies of modern philosophy since Kant. The philosophy of history in Italy, the creative evolution in France, "personality" philosophy and realism in Scotland, the humanism of Schiller, the creative

experience of James, and the personal experience of Bowne; all of these are philosophies of experience. Dewey sees clearly that it is the duty of the empirical philosopher "to fix the import of mathematical and logical pretensions" by most vigorously "insisting upon the necessity of reference to experience."[5] By way of contrast and comparison, we may briefly indicate the motives of James and Bowne. The former, following Renouvier, endeavored to establish pluralism, i.e. the will to believe in the "each-form" of reality and to reach real possibilities of experience. In other words, he aims at freedom of will, democracy of beings, and rationality of all phases of human experience. "In the same footsteps", Bowne, following Lotze and Ulrici formulates, as the "first of the clan", personalism. In that there is room for the positivistic view of science and the metaphysical view of philosophy. For both James and Bowne experience is "unconditionally trustworthy", though its present form is not final and all. Defining theism, however, seems to be the major emphasis.

Dewey, on the one hand, follows the same Kantian trend of thought and carries out the principle of the primacy of the practical reason. On the other hand, he emphasizes the genetic method and maintains the naturalistic position, where he holds that the formal and the material, the theoretical and the practical, and the actual and the ideal become connected.

Dewey says, "Let me say that reference to experience seems at present to be the easiest way of realizing the continuities among subject-matters that are always getting split up into dualisms."[6] This manifests, then, one of the motives of

experience-philosophy; that is, it brings about continuity and fills the gap of dualism. Dewey, in looking over the outline of this investigation, said that the stress laid upon continuity was a good interpretation of his motive. The logical question will be what are the dualisms which he intends to bridge over.

1. The historical problems of dualism.

Everywhere Dewey turns in the history of thought he seems to find the ghost of dualism staring at him; therefore in his Experimental Logic he says in effect that his motive in making a new formulation of experience is to show the fallacious grounds of historical dualisms and to establish their continuity.

a. The real and the ideal: The first and outstanding dualism is the separation of the actual from the ideal. It is with reference to this dualism that Dewey emphatically and repeatedly says, "God only knows how many of the sufferings of life are due to a belief that the natural scene and operations of our life are lacking in ideal import, and to the consequent tendency to flee, for the lack of ideal factors, to some other world inhabited exclusively by ideals."[7] This separation is naturally suicidal to experience. However, Dewey is conscious of the fact that this separation has a more fundamental ground than it appears to have. The separation of the "world of essences" from the "world of natural existences" is a technical matter. It is a discouraging practice because it generates "countless" problems rather than solves them.

Pragmatism is often criticized as being 'opportunistic'. When old ways of thinking lose their freshness and usefulness,

they are to be abandoned. The here and the now are the only imperative questions with which philosophy ought to deal. This certainly expresses Dewey's position, for he says "Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impecability, without relevancy and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present."[8]

He, therefore, holds that ideals are the possibilities of natural events and to effect this consummation is to point out the continuity and interaction of the various attitudes and interests in experience as the readiest way to-day.[9] Experience is the field, the fertile field where both real and ideal are produced and cultivated. It is in activity that the real and the ideal are connected. "When we take means for ends we indeed fall in moral materialism. But when we take ends without regard to means we degenerate into sentimentalism."[10] In discussing the connection of the real and the ideal, Dewey in a later passage points out very clearly the difference between the traditional view and the modern. When men undergo troubles they are forced to project pictures of a better state of things. The modern view is that the ideal must be shaped so that it may become an instrument for action, instead of being, as the traditional view would have it, a ready-made pattern in a noumenal world, for mere contemplation.[11] Here we must agree with Dewey that philosophy can no longer be merely contemplative, but must be operative. This emphasis is true to human experience, which is characterized by activity. Of course, activity, as Dewey elsewhere points out,

is not merely blind movements, but the clearing up of ideas, the suggesting of best possibilities, and the reaching of direction and control. One of the forms, possibly one of the hardest forms of activity is the negative form of it. Self-control is an example. Here is one of the significant occasions where Dewey is proposing to overthrow the "vain metaphysics" and "idle epistemology" and is turning his energy to a critique of civilization.[12]

b. Sensationalism and rationalism: As a result of the separation of the real and the ideal we find sensationalism on the one hand and rationalism on the other. In spite of his opposition to Kant, Dewey recognizes the contribution of Kant, for he says, "Students of philosophy will recognize what I mean when I say that this growing conviction of futility and consequent distaste are associated with the outcome of the famous dictum of Kant that perception without conception is blind, while conception without perception is empty.[13] The sensationalist has therefore worked out only the latter part of the phrase; the rationalist, the former part. Sensation and thought come to oppose each other more rigidly than ever before. The modern thinkers began to make experience the final court of appeal; hence sensationalism became dominant, to the neglect of accounting for the intrinsic sense, active, and emotional phases. On the other hand, both the continental rationalists and the British empiricistc make the same mistake; namely, they make experience purely cognitive, or a problem of knowledge. Dewey says, "It is the continual running up against this situation which accounts for the flagging of interest and the desire to direct energy where it will have more outcome."[14] His strenuous effort to get away from a rigid system

either of sensationalism or rationalism is clear. One of the characteristics with which Dewey labels himself is "active", for in action, sensation and thought are connected, as both factors are necessary in action; "one stands for stimulus, for initiative; the other for control, for direction."[15] His ideal, then, is to make experience primarily practical, a matter of doing and undergoing the consequences of doing and to make of reason, instead of a remote ideal faculty, the resources for the fruitful meanings of activity.[16]

Activity, to Dewey, means the vital and practical life-process. And "when experience is aligned with the life-process, and sensations are seen to be points of readjustment, the alleged atomism of sensations totally disappears. With this disappearance is abolished the need for a synthetic faculty of supra-empirical reason to connect them.....The true 'stuff' of experience is recognized to be adaptive course of actions, habits, active functions, connections of doings and undergoing; sensori-motor co-ordinations."[17] Knowledge gets its significance in relating knowing and doing, theorising and practising.[18] The significant factors brought out by both the sensationalist and the rationalist are not to be neglected for they constitute social and practical life. The former shows the demand for freedom for personal initiation into experience, for variety and progress; the latter, for general order, for continuous and organized unity, for the conservation of the dearly bought resources of the past.[19] This again indicates instrumentalistic pragmatism. Dewey says that Kantian epistemology is on the right track, but stops short when

it defines percept and elaborates the concept and fails to show their union in action.[20]

c. The a priori and the a posteriori: Next we have the problem of a priori and a posteriori. There are, according to Dewey, two inconsistent interpretations of a priori thought; first, that of taking the "a priori worth of thought in a regulative, directive, controlling sense, thought as consciously, intentionally making an experience different in a determinate sense and manner";[21] and second, that of taking the "a priori...as something which is already immanent in any experience, and which accordingly makes no determinate difference to any one experience as compared with any other, or with any past or future form of itself."[22] This contrast comes mainly as the result of the position of Kant, who holds to the former sense when he compares his philosophy with the introduction of construction into geometry and experimentation into physics and chemistry, but takes the latter sense when he answers Hume. Dewey says that this again is due to the misconception or "vibrating between" two definitions of concept: first, a concept is to be defined as a rule of constructive synthesis in a differential sense; second, it is to be defined as a static endowment lurking in 'mind', and giving automatically a hard and fixed law for the determination of every experienced object. Careful readers of Dewey will notice that he is not attacking Kant's position of the a priori, but that he is aiming at the emphasis of the regulative and preferential aspects of thought. To support this position, we have two statements from Dewey. In the first place he says that the first of the meanings of the a priori "is intelligible and marks a definite contribu-

tion to the logic of science."[23] In the second meaning Dewey agrees with Kant that "organization of some sort exists in every experience." It is also clear that "reference to some prior existential mode of organization" is necessary. "And it seems equally clear that reflection goes on with profit only because the materials with which it deals have always already some degree of organization, or exemplify various relationships."[24] Here our task is no more than to bring out the dualisms which Dewey aims to connect and to dissolve. We shall have occasion for a more extended evaluation and comparison of Dewey's thought with that of Kant.

d. Perceptual data and conceptual thought: In the same essay Dewey has shown another aspect of dualism, the separation of the conceptual thought from the perceptual data. In the first place, there is a fundamental ambiguity in the term perception as it is in a priority. Perception and conception cannot be made antithetical because the former "may itself be surcharged with any amount of imaginatively supplied and reflectively sustained ideal factors", and the latter has its content by "affectional and intentional contexts."[25] The intentional and emotional elements are excluded only when they are taken as "scientific observation", where abstraction comes in and observation is set over against thought "deliberately, purposely, and artfully."[26]

Dewey says that he is part indebted to Plato for his instrumentalism. Plato makes a distinction of perceptional and conceptional thought or idea in a "perceptive experience" and uses the latter as an instrument for logical control. Thus far

Dewey agrees heartily. But when Plato identifies the idea with all experience, he parts company.[27] The distinction of perceptual data and conceptual thought, then, is a practical one.

Some other dualisms which have been criticized by Dewey deserve mention. For instance, the dualism of appearance and reality, the dualism of body and mind, of phenomena and noumena; all these he definitely denies.

2. To bring about continuity.

In the last section we have seen more of the historical dualisms and the motives for bridging them over than of the positive formulation for establishing continuity. We believe it is in place to make a short review of the notion of continuity in the history of thought before turning directly to Dewey's contribution.

A. E. Taylor summarizes the notion of continuity in human history and divides it into three stages: First, the prescientific stage. The notion of continuity was nothing more than "a simple description of certain obvious facts of sense-experience". In Western thought, we go back to the Greeks. Συνεχές having nothing between, presenting no sensible gap, hanging together; ξυνεχῆ οἱ κύματα building without a gap; συνεχεῖς πυρετοί non-remitting fevers; ξυνεχὴ ἔῃσις uninterrupted address. All of these are simple and single experiences, without color from scientific reflection.

Then we have the Pythagorean mathematics and later the views of Plato and Aristotle. The interesting note is the criticism upon the Pythagoreans inflicted by the Eleatics, that

is, the sharp distinction between number ἀριθμός collection of units and μέγεθος continuous magnitude which has no unit or minumum. After Plato and Aristotle, there emerged a connection between the notion of number and that of series.

Third, the modern tendency. The only distinction from that of the Ancient Greeks is that the modern thought, after Leibniz, has made more out of the principle of continuity as fundamental not only for mathematics, but also for metaphysics. The characteristics of the notion as a whole are intellectualistic.[28]

In the history of the philosophy of the recent past, over against intellectualistic absolute realism and absolute idealism we have the pragmatic and the personalistic movements. These movements, having their root in Kant, establish the continuity of experience through a synthesis of the two critiques of reason. In the former critique we have the "regulative ideas of the reason, whose truth and worth is resolved into their scientific and experimental fruitfulness" and in the latter critique, "the postulates of the practical reason whose truth and worth is resolved into their actual and ethical fruitfulness in the domain of life and action."[29]

Dewey has seen the significance of this synthesis, and has applied it in the biological and evolutionary interpretation of experience, thus limiting a metaphysical interpretation of experience in its spiritualistic and theistic form to a somewhat naturalistic one, in a humanistic form. Following the empirical spirit of Dewey, we shall examine his actual statements concerning the problem and let the continuity of experience as expressed in his philosophy be denoted, instead of making logical deductions

from his position. Experience is the best and final appeal for the notion of continuity, for "experience carries principles of connection and organization within itself."[30] In other words, experience is the ever-active process of becoming, the on-going of continuity. It is true that Dewey is not fully satisfied with the "elan vital", but the dissatisfaction comes from other associations with Bergson's position rather than from this principle itself. A comparison of Dewey with Bergson at this point is out of place. Dewey says that the principles of connection and organization in experience are "vital and practical" rather "epistemological". Experience is vital and practical because life manifests itself in its spontaneity and impulses. Intelligence Dewey makes the instrument or medium for bringing about organization and continuity, for smoothing over rough junctures of the on-going of life, whereas Bergson holds that the intellectual arrest of reality is not reality in its spontaneous and continuous on-going. One may characterize Dewey's position, in opposition to Bergson's anti-intellectualism, as intellectualistic.

a. The continuity of diverse and interacting elements: Dewey says that he uses the word experience rather than world or environment because it suggests more than either of them...Experience "means just such an immence and objective world of diverse and interacting elements" and "suggests....an actual focusing of the world at one point of immediate shining apparency."[31] In connection with this allusion we find two problems; namely, the problem of interaction and that of "focusing". Interaction in the traditional sense is limited to the relation between body and mind, whereas Dewey uses it in a much wider sense. For him there

are "fields of interaction".[32] "While there is", says Dewey, "no isolated occurrence in nature, yet interaction and connection are not wholesale and homogeneous. Interacting events have tighter or looser ties, which qualify them with certain beginnings and endings, and which mark them off from other fields of interaction." Dewey holds that there are "relatively closed fields", the exposition of which is found in the idea of the "three plateaus." They are: (1) "the scene of narrower and more external interactions"... the physical; (2) the level of life or the psycho-physical; (3) the field of "association and communication and anticipation."[33] The interaction of these fields often brings about "rough junctures". However, these rough junctures are smoothed over by a "homogeneous medium" through "translation and substitution." "Translations and substitutions" are conscious directions and science, whereby "critical alteration" may be effected; "new energies....released"; and "new wualities...appertained."[34]

Both the mechanistic and the spiritualistic metaphysics have given only a description of the smoothing over of these junctures rather than an explanation and meaning.[35] Dewey takes it upon himself to bridge the gulfs between these three levels of interaction. His method of doing so is denotative and his position is a naturalistic metaphysics. Reality is the growth-process itself; early and later stages are only phases of a continuity. The later cannot exist until after the earlier. It can make use of what has been experienced and of the values already realized. This conbines both the germs of mechanism and teleology.[36] "An environment both extensive and enduring is immediately in present behavior. Objectively speaking, the remote and the past

are 'in' behavior making it what it is. The action called "organic" is not just that of internal structures; it is an integration of organic-environmental connections."[37] The mystery of thinking as a subject-object relation disappears if this relation is regarded as a relation of object to object. The only question remaining is that of the nature of the factors in the focalization of meanings.[38]

Before we leave the problem of interaction, let us consider the limits of interaction; in other words, what is the circumstance within which interaction occurs. Dewey says that the essential thing to be borne in mind is that "living as an empirical affair is not something which goes on below the skin-surface of an organism: IT IS ALWAYS AN INCLUSIVE AFFAIR INVOLVING CONNECTION, INTERACTION OF WHAT IS WITHIN THE ORGANIC BODY AND WHAT LIES OUTSIDE IN SPACE AND TIME, AND WITH HIGHER ORGANISMS FAR OUTSIDE."[39] Here we may contrast Dewey's general formula with that of James. The former labors to show, after the fashion of Aristotle, the inseparability of body and mind and organisms and meanings. There are possibilities and "levels" of existences to communicate and interact. But reflection must go on within the empirical environment. James, taking the invalidity of materialism and atheism for granted, argues from a synthetic view of experience. Experience is not to be interpreted as confined within organic behavior. His empiricism is for "real possibilities" of experience reaching out to a spiritualistic universe; his pluralistic universe postulates universes of experience. Dewey finds the meaning of religion chiefly in the "social life", a "life of shared experience"[40] James in the "will to believe"

or through the "faith-ladder" whereby the "outline of nature" is softened and the highest and the best part of human nature realized. Dewey stops short at the pragmatic test of truth, for he limits the field of interaction or experience to a naturalistic world whereas James goes beyond this and aims also at the establishment of objective truth. But they both come to the same point of view with regard to philosophy, namely, that its purpose is to find the middle way between science and religion. Dewey says that the problem of philosophy is the adjusting of the dry, thin, and meagre scientific standpoint with the "obstinately persisting body of warm and abounding imaginative beliefs."[41] Because of his revolt against traditional metaphysics, Dewey did not carry this out as fully as did James.

b. Immediate "focus": Now we are ready to come to the second phase of the problem of interaction, namely the "immedate focusing". In the first place, let us ask for a clear definition or description of focus as it is used here. Experience is a "continuum", but it is to be found in life-activity. "Wherever there is life, there is behavior, activity. In order that life may persist, this activity has to be both continuous and adapted to the environment."[42] Dewey sees the advantage of using biological categories as "the development of a psychology based upon biology makes possible a new scientific formulation of the nature of experience."[43]

Continuity implies direction and connection. "Direction", again, "involves a focusing and fixing of action in order that it may be truly a response, and this requires an elimination

of unnecessary and confusing movements."[44] In order that we may understand Dewey sympathetically and empirically we must not forget the biological interests; that is, the control of environment and the grasp of meanings for social significance. "Focusing", then, is one of the aspects of direction in activity. At a tensional situation there may be diverse potential possibilities of action that need selection and ordering. These are not separable in practice as they are in idea. Dewey summarizes thus: "Focusing and ordering are two aspects of direction, one spatial, the other temporal. The first insures hitting the mark; the second keeps the balance required for further action."[45] Space and time, then, are not realities, so to speak. They are "constructions", as Dewey calls them. The focusing at one point of shining apparency is both "simultaneous" and "successive."

In the summary of this chapter, Dewey discloses his purpose or position more clearly in traditional philosophical terminology. He says, "This common understanding of the means and ends of action is the essence of social control. It is indirect, or emotional and intellectual, not direct or personal."[46] Here Dewey discriminates the immediate from the mediate; the personal from the impersonal, making the personal direct, while the emotional and intellectual are indirect. What is the personal aside from the emotional and intellectual? At the surface, there seems to be a problem, but when we view his analysis more carefully, we shall find that it implies a privacy of conscious experience on the one hand, and on the other, that there must be a medium if two minds know the same thing. The unity of the multilicity of experience is found then in the self who owns a mind

to select and direct. Dewey does not stop at the epistemological problem as many "traditional" philosophers would, but he goes on to the practical reason, so to speak. This "common understanding of means and ends" is "intrinsic to the disposition of the person, not external and coersive" and "to achieve this internal control" is to bring about the "identity of interest and understanding."[47] Instrumentalism! The function of understanding and that of interest in whole of human experience, when connected, will render life more meaningful. In science there are the "pure" sciences and the "applied". But "the genuine interests of 'pure' science are served only by broadening the idea of application to include all phases of liberation and enrichment of human experience."[48] Therefore Dewey's emphasis is that understanding is for interest rather than that interest is for understanding.

c. Reconciliation of science and philosophy: Another motive in the thought of Dewey is to establish continuity between science and philosophy. When we find out Dewey's conception of science and philosophy, we shall naturally understand and appreciate the continuity of them in his thought. The present need for both science and philosophy, according to Dewey, is the "humanizing" of them. Within science, the so-called "pure" and "applied" should not be severed ultimately. What "makes a proposition scientific is its power to yield understanding, insight, intellectual at-homeness, in connection any existential state of affairs, by filling events with coherent and tested meanings."[49] Philosophy is a mode of criticism characterized by its generality.[50] Yet philosophy does not have a private access to reality, for it must start from the empirical situations of

life, characterized by "immediate qualities" of good and bad, and must perform its duty as a logic of experience. The relation between science and philosophy is found in 'action' or the "on-going of action".[51] In other words, the practical of modern life is to maintain the moral values of civilization through the medium of the insight and decision of the individual. The problem will be foredoomed to failure unless the individual performs his task with a definable and controllable tool. This tool is science. When science is truly a tool for civilization, the dignity of science is evident. The importance of philosophy will also be clear when it affords insight and direction of an "abundant life" and a growing civilization.

d. The continuity of the real and the ideal: There is a significant difference between putting out the finite hand to the infinite and pulling back the infinite to the finite. Dewey used to be characterized as the humanist, but his address to the International Congress of Philosophy, as we have seen, seems to mark a change, though not very radical, in his position. He seems to indicate that the "empirical situation" is necessary in the account of experience, but the present form, especially the 'factual' or 'partial' form is not the best possible that we are capable of. Dewey's thought in this address is more of a "philosophy of ideals" than of the "situations" either social or individual in the biological sense. But the connection of the real and the ideal must still be found in life activities, even though the emphasis has been shifted from the actual to the ideal.

3. Summary.

The "ingredients" of Dewey's thought, then,

are thus far seen: (1) social application of the Platonic ideas, (2) the Hegelian dialectic as a tool to establish the continuity of practical experience, (3) Peirce's making "ideas clear" and James' pluralistic universe in the belief of risk and possibilities, (4) Kant's practical reason. Experience, for Dewey, then, is the All-inclusive of truth and error, reality and appearance, imagination and dream, facts and fancies. To understand how these are brought into a coherent system requires an investigation of the underlying motive or motives of Dewey's thought.

The motives, as we have just investigated, may be summarized as follows: To point out that an ultimate separation of any phase of experience is fatal to philosophy; to establish continuity of experience by an evolutionary view of the universe, to make activity, creativity, interaction, and practicality as important categories for philosophy; to plead for speculative audacity and for more faith in ideas for richer and higher experience.

Important as is the motive in establishing the continuity of experience, the consistency and truthfulness of the formulation of experience which we shall investigate in the following sections are more important. From this summary we see the next step of the investigation is necessarily the definitions and implications of experience in Dewey's writings.

B. Definitions of Experience.

It is generally acknowledged that the procedure of any scientific formulation or criticism involves the following steps: definitions, analysis, comparison and contrast, and synthesis. To find the meaning of experience in the thought of

John Dewey, let us follow this procedure. However, we must constantly warn ourselves against taking any incidental definition or remark of Dewey as his best definition; nor should we judge his thought as a whole in the light of only one or two definitions. Moreover, the privilege of development of thought ought to be allowed to any thinker. Therefore we must watch against too free a use of the principle of contradiction.

1. Experience and life.

According to Dewey, experience is closely related to life. "Whenever there is experience, there is life. Experiencing means living."[52] It is "an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment."[53] Experience includes not only life and its environment but also the activity which connects them. These assertions are not aiming at a metaphysics, but rather at an attack on traditional philosophy. When experience is aligned with life-process, neither sensationalism nor idealism are of much use. If experience is properly understood all is well with the rest. But this tells us nothing more than that the interpretation of experience depends upon its being formulated in view of the life-process...If philosophy is a "logic of experience", we demand more than a mere statement of the problem.

When Dewey asserts experience as "an affair of intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment" he creates two problems: the explanation of interaction between nature and man, and between man and man. This is exactly the challenge which James made to the Chicago School in 1904. To meet this challenge there is need for a theory of the universe,

and of the sharable objective world, and of the individual. Concerning the problem of interaction, we have seen that Dewey denies the body-mind relation as a problem. He recognizes, however, the "rough junctures" in interaction, which need to be smoothed over. To do this smoothing over Dewey makes a distinction between the immediate and the mediate aspects of experience. The former is a manifestation of the on-going of life-process; the latter, the work of intentional direction or creative intelligence, which not only converts the "unique" events into meaningful relations, but also opens the road for further experience. The immediacy of existence is unknown and unknowable;[54] categories of time and space are constructions of the intellect, whereby the temporal and the organizational qualities of existence may be arrested and whereby we may have an objective world. The Kantian notion of "Begriff" is applied by Dewey but the origin of its function denied. More of Dewey's theory of the objective world and its sharability we shall see in the following.

2. Experience and the Objective World.

Dewey says that he chooses the notion of experience chiefly because of what it "suggests about itself". What it suggests about itself is a "genuinely objective world".[55] To postulate an "objective world", according to Dewey, is to destroy the close relation between experience and knowledge which he holds to be fallacious.[56] Experience is identified with whatever happens in the universe. Every existence is an event; every relation and meaning is an object. However, the latter is restricted while the former is not. Within this unfathomable, "in-

effable", and "unknowable" existence there are the spots of luminosity or focalization of meaning at points of immediate shining apparency. But as soon as Dewey asserts the interactions between the objective world and the sufferings and undergoings of men, he is making a subject-object distinction. Dewey may answer that this distinction is one between objects in the objective world. If this is the final resort, we may challenge the right as well as the significance of shifting meanings of acknowledged terms. We grant the truth that so many philosophies are just so many visions, but we demand that the visions be intelligible to all.

However, Dewey does acknowledge the necessity of a "medium" whereby events are converted into objects and meanings and progress are made possible. These points of focalization of meanings are capable of communication, as Boodin points out, only through "an indeterminate process".[57] The importance of making a distinction of subjective and objective elements of experience is important in any interpretation of experience. This leads us to the next question of the relation between experience and its datum.

3. Experience and its datum.

Dewey says that the datum of experience is "always the dubious; it is always a matter for subsequent events to determine, to assign character to". Against this Dewey seems to have made a contradictory statement when he says, "Wherever the influence of modern physics penetrated, the classic theory (doctrine of design) became remote, faded, factitious, with its assertion

that natural changes are inherent movements towards objects which are their fulfilments or perfections, so that the latter are true objects of knowledge, supplying the forms or characters under which alone changes may be known."[59]

This contradiction will become apparent when we bring in the statements concerning the unknowable character of immediate existence and objects as events with meanings, objects as fulfilments or culminations, the immanental character of organization, inference, connections, structure and order as intellectual constructions. What he objects to is the making of reality merely objects of knowledge and the limiting of real possibilities in the traditional theory of design.

With regard to experience and its datum, Dewey's motive in a realistic hypothesis is well expressed in Boodin's article "Is Experience Self-Supporting?". "The motive for inventing realistic substances was no doubt the need of accounting for the seemingly potential character of things....to meet the need of social expectancy."[60] This postulate is useful only in the problem of knowledge, especially in view of Dewey's distinction between knowing and being. To this problem we shall return in a later section.

4. Experience and connections:

We believe it is here in order to point out that in addition to the all-inclusive term experience, Dewey has a synonymous one; namely, the term "natural". The "natural" is whatever occurs. Therefore every phase and activity of experience according to Dewey is a "natural" event. "Meanings are objective because they

are modes of natural interaction."[61] This interaction includes not only the organic beings but also "things and energies" external to living creatures. The principle of connection is identical with that of meaning, for through social communication meanings first emerge. When one is aware of future consequences, he engenders meaning as he makes connections of his activities. "Whenever communication occurs all natural events are subject to revision and reconsideration; they are re-adapted to meet the requirement of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that preliminary discourse termed thinking."[62] Experience, or whatever happens and occurs, acquires meaning through connection, interaction, relation, and participation. This is similar to Whitehead's statement that "significance is the relatedness of things."[63]

Whether the realm of existence is different from the realm of observed and designated experience or whether this difference is one of emphasis in the nature of existence and in the nature of meaning, is an issue of significance in one's position. Dewey at times recognizes meaning and existence as the two aspects of every experience and of all reality, and at times runs into contradiction.[64] Meanings have their prerequisite in the "existential stuff", the organic and psycho-physical activities with their qualities. The latter supply the mind with its footing and connection in nature.[65]

"Experience is pregnant with connections", and "full of inference",[66] Moreover, "experience carries principles of connection and organization within itself."[67] Dewey does not doubt

that organization of some sort exists in every experience.[68] "Reflection goes on with profit only because the materials with which it deals have already some degree of organizaion or exemplify various relationships."[69] This sounds very much as if Dewey were committing himself to the idealistic interpretation of nature. Dewey could not escape this commitment even if he should try, for his definition of mind as a "system of meanings" and his conception of immanent organization of nature are arrived at by his assumption that mind and nature are continuous. This insight he says he owes to Kant!

5. Experience and mind and consciousness.

The "primary datum of every experience", Dewey holds, is the situation of a contrast of the "immediate, conspicuous and focal phase of things... with those indirect and hidden factors."[70] In the same breath, Dewey says that one of the many significations of consciousness is that it is identical with direct "apparitions", "obvious", and 'vivid" presence of qualities of meanings.[71]

He seems here to have been using the idealistic language and to have been taking the idealistic position. He is aware of it too, for he immediately turns away, saying that the immediate presence of meanings is not to be taken as more than the "emphatic" characters of natural events.[72]

Let us examine the situation where this "emphatic" character of natural events occurs. He says that "every situation or field of consciousness is marked by initiation, direction or intent and consequence or import."[73] Thinking is one of the in-

stances of communication where natural events undergo a revision and reconsideration. Revision and reconsideration are necessary either when thinking occurs or when a tentional situation is present. Consciousness not only initiates, directs, or intents, but also foresees consequences. If these are the "emphatic" characters of natural events, as he says, the identification of experience with conscious-experience is clear.

Consciousness is the "immediate shining apparency"; "focal", and "transitive". There is a larger and wider field; namely, that of mind. "Mind is contextual and persistent", it denotes the whole system of meanings, which are embodies in all the workings of organic life. The meaning of meaning we shall have occasion to examine later.

6. Experience and history.

The clearest statement concerning experience and history is found in Experience and Nature where Dewey says, "Experience is history."[74] His whole discussion seems to be in the spirit of Croce's philosophy of history. Every activity he takes to be an episode in history. Reality is the life-process. Experience in its vital form is characterized by the forward reaching activity. What has gone before has made deposits which flow in the whole stream of experience. We may call this interpretation of experience as history evolutionary and naturalistic. Consequently he adopts the genetic and denotative method in his philosophy.

In every experience or awareness of meaning, there is a union of the past, the present, and the "insistent" future.

This union will become a mystery when we make an ultimate division of nature and consciousness and when we deny the temporal and historic quality in nature.[75] Consciousness is one of the "ends" of nature. In other words, meanings are to be found in total "histories" and in immanent temporal wholes.[76] Can memory (in Dewey's term, habit) and intelligence and intention or volition be the expressions of any integral other than personalities? The answer to this question is crucial in Dewey's thought.

7. Experience and personality.

Philosophy in some sense is a branch of morals; that is to say, the theory of value is important for philosophical reflection. The history of ethics well indicates the continuous study of the problem of value. Since Lotze, Ritschl, and Nietzsche, we have Meinong's work followed by Ehrenfels, and then many of the contemporary thinkers such as Hoffding, Urban, Stern, Moore, Croce, Perry, Brightman. Dewey is one of the outstanding thinkers on values.[77]

His position is clearly defined as "voluntaristic" as against traditional hedonism and formalism. He seems to try to show that value is neither experienced in frustration of desires nor in the realization of them, but in the capability of insight and of criticism whereby the rough junctures of the continuity of experience may be redirected for more extensive and more enduring values or meanings. He prefers the term meaning to value, but uses them interchangeably. He does this in order that he may escape extreme individualism. It is necessary, then, to see the relation between meaning or experience and the individual.

Dewey holds that psychology is important for philosophy; therefore he is required to deal with the individual. He says, "Psychology, supplying us with knowledge of the behavior of experience, is a conception of democracy. Its postulate is that since experience fulfills itself in individuals, since it administers itself through their instrumentality, the account of the course and method of this achievement is a significant and indispensable affair."[78]

He points out that the dignity of human individuality, a realm of inner experience purely personal, is a modern discovery.[79] But we believe that any one conversant with the literature of early Christianity, above all, conversant with Augustine, "den ersten modernen Menschen",[80] would hesitate in crediting the "discovery of inner experience" to modern times. What Dewey contends here is that this "new worth and sense" of human individuality has not reeached a place of social direction. It is true quite true that "social" for Dewey is a supreme category, but the uniqueness of the individual is not entirely neglected by him. He regards the individual not as a mere property of nature, but as a "unique" being who adds something and marks a contribution to nature.

What is it that is contributed or added? In a technical language, it is a translation of the sequential or linear logic to a causal and implicatory. When things are involved in human associations, events become communicable meaning where con-notation and de-notation are possible.[81] The world of existence is not mere occurrences but also implications. "Hence, inference and reasoning are possible; these operations are read-

ing the message of things, which things utter because they are involved in human associations."[82] In other words, it is a transformation of the sequence and co-existence into participation through human intervention.[83] Experience, then, not only gains its meaning through the personal factors but also a principle whereby all experiences may be best interpreted. He says, "Human beings illustrate the same traits of both immediate uniqueness and connection, relationship, as do other things."[84] We heartily agree with him that everything that is known is in interaction and that it is in individual where the multiplicity of experience finds unity and continuity.

Since our task here is simply to show the relation of experience and personality, we shall not go into the metaphysical significance of Dewey's qualified pluralism and monadism. We shall make a concluding remark so as to give a clue to our later investigation and reflection. Dewey in answer to the question as to where in his writings he has dealt most adequately with the relation of experience and personality referred the investigator to his Democracy and Education. In this work Dewey attempts to establish a continuity between the personal and the social. "Personal culture" and "social efficiency" are two aspects of the whole of meaningful experience. He says, how can there be "a society really worth serving unless it is constituted of individuals of significant personal qualities".[85] This instantly reminds us of Kant's "kingdom of ends", Ward's "realm of ends", and the personal idealist's "society of persons."

C. Constituents of Experience and Their Relations.

We have seen how diversely experience has been defined by Dewey. Now we are ready to make a further analysis and exhibit

the primary and secondary elements of experience and their relations. This re-examination will afford us data for a formulation of Dewey's theory of experience, which, in turn, will serve as a basis for an evaluation of his position.

Before we go on with the formulation let us do some picture-thinking by making one or two charts to indicate Dewey's theory of experience. Charts are often very useful if they signify meaning for us.

EXPERIENCE

EXISTENCE ------- MEANING

(events without meaning, unknown and unknowable) (objects, events with meaning, known in interaction)

FOCALIZATION
or
SYSTEM OF MEANINGS

IMMEDIATE ---------- MEDIATE

(consciousness-narrower) (mind--wider)

Problem of continuity and unity requiring

ADJUSTMENT

TOOL OR INSTRUMENTALITY	MODUS OPERANDI
Ideas	Projection
Knowledge	Anticipation
Inference	Participation
Judgment	Risk
Intelligence (understanding and interest and intention)	Ends

From this diagram we notice that there are two aspects of experience which are simultaneous and succestive in that "objects" have their "footing" in events, but events as such would be unknown unless they become meanings. In any discourse we can deal with nothing but objects, that is, systems of meanings. In every meaning there is always a contrast of the immediate and the mediate, i.e., consciousness and mind. As soon as there is this contrast there is engendered the problem of the continuity and unity of the immediate and the mediate, which is essential if experience is to go on. The problems necessitate adjustments effected through the instrumentality of intelligence functioning in projection, anticipation, and participation.

What we have just shown is only an epitome of Dewey's theory of experience. Now, we shall turn to a more detailed explanation of the constituents of experience and their relations. The diagram shown on page seventy two may serve to elucidate the following exposition.

The primary realm of experience is in the contrast and adjustment of the immediate focal phase of things with those indirect and potential factors, which determine the origin and career of the present.[86] This shows that experience, or more strictly speaking, the interpretation of experience, must start from an immediate consciousness against the remote or indirect. Both of these are in the realm of meaning, which is a "restricted" phase of reality. There are two phases of reality or experience; potentiality and actuality, corresponding to existence and meaning respectively.

To satisfy the requirements of his denotative method,[87]

Existence



Events (no relations)



Meanings are restricted, falling within the realm of existence as ends of events.



Meanings

Objects (events in interactions and relations)



Consciousness--Immediate
Focal
Transitive

Mind
a system of meanings
a constant luminosity

Individual mind;immediate and focal
as compared to its
vast environment



Environment: physical and social, pregnant of organization and inference.

The individual gains significance by being and end of nature.

The common ground of individuals is the "shared situation" and "joint activity". The social category, therefore, is supreme.



1. Contrast of the immediate and the remote necessitates adjustment.



2. In the adjustment a "rough juncture" is engendered as a result of interaction.



3. The "rough juncture" needs to be smoothed over by the operation of creative intelligence in projection, revision, redirection, and participation.

4. In the process of experiencing events acquire meanings, the range of which becomes wider and wider. This is the life process identical with reality. To be an individual mind is to be capable of this experience.

Dewey attempts to go beyond this system of meanings to point their origin and career. He regards "event" as fundamental constituent of experience. Every existence is an event. Events becomes objects when interaction occurs and when characters are assigned.

Events and objects are not intermittent lights, appearing and disappearing, for once events become objects there are new energies released, new properties gained, and new systems of meaning created. Meanings will go on in those interacting elements or factors. These on-going of meaning in those interacting elements fo not have a straight path for there are infinite possibilities of activity which need translation, substitution, revision, and redirection. To accomplish these, we need a "controllable tool", which according to Dewey, is science and philosophy, the operation of which is the work of creative intelligence. In the operation of creative intelligence Dewey discriminates several primary factors; namely, intention, initiation, reconsideration, and participation. However, there is still risk in the process of realizing any particular end. Dewey, in his address to the Congress of Philosophy showed great faith in ideas as a means of social and intellectual progress.

To make this exposition of Dewey's formulation of experience more concrete, let us follow him in his own illustration, i.e., the experience of human beings. Where is the starting-point, then? Dewey points out that any interpretation of experience must start from the same datum in which conscious experience begins. This is a situation where the immediate consciousness is in contrast with the larger frontiers of mind. The individual goes through reflective experience in the interaction of consciousness and the

environment. In the process of interaction there are "rough junctures" to be smoothed over, "ambiguous and uncertain facts" to be made clear, "antipathies" and "tentional situations" to be released, and new courses of action to be adapted. In those activities the immediate data from which controlled inference proceeds are not objects but means of knowledge, things by which we know rather than things known.[87] The next step is to proceed from the simple datum to inference, which is the great business of life, and the only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged.[88] The complete process of thinking Dewey analyses into five steps, in his book How We Think. Thirdly, Dewey holds that activity is the chief characteristic of experience. Human beings in the game of life are "obligated" to struggle and to choose and to run a risk.[89]

Man acts anyway for he cannot help acting.[90] Some activity is higher than others for some activities make reference to incentive or motive while others do not. This again illustrates his distinction of levels of interaction and of life. In conscious activity we find not only the "analytic resolution", but also the "synthetic conspectus", whereby reorganization becomes possible.[91] Man may begin with a mere wish, an emotional reaction against the present state of things and a hope for something different. Ideals are thereby projected, which would afford satisfaction if realized. A mere ideal in itself is simply a fancy, a dream. Nevertheless, these are experiences.

D. Kinds of Experience.

1. Experience: non-reflective and reflective.

Dewey distinguishes in experience the non-reflective and the reflective. The following diagram may serve as an analysis of this distinction.

```
                          EXPERIENCE
 ------------------------------------------------------------
 :                        :                                 :
 NON-REFLECTIVE           :                                 :
 :                        :                                 :
 Focus and context        :                                 :
 (intrinsic content)      :                                 :
 :                        :                                 :
 Internal organization    :                                 :
   (non-logical)          :                                 :
 :                        :                                 :
 Tentional situation------ REFLECTIVE                       :
                          :                                 :
                          :                                 :
                        Purpose or task                     :
                      (extrinsic reference)                 :
                          :                                 :
                          :                                 :
                        Reorganization---------> CONSUMMATORY
                        (experimental)
```

A brief study of the traits of each of these types of experience may afford confirmation of Dewey's meaning of experience as we have interpreted it. The most evident trait of the non-reflective experience is the quality of "pervasive unity" or "internal organization" in any empirical situation. "Focus" and "context" are the other important traits of the non-reflective experience. Every focalized experience is momentary, but around it there are "immediate dynamic connections with portions of experience not at the time obvious.[93]

Reflection is dominant only when there is a tentional situation. Then it functions to propose a "task",[94] set by the

empirical and concrete situation. The task is to be performed by trying out in action its proposition for reorganization. Reflection ceases when this task is doen; otherwise, further inquiry continues; therefore all knowledge issuing from reflection is "experimental".[95] Thus, to Dewey the reflective experience is a later stage of experience, an "experimental act". It is an "intermediate" stage, because it has to"pass naturally into a more direct and more vital type of experience; whether technological or appreciative or social."[96] Reflection must be taken as an "extrinsic reference" instead of intrinsic content.[97]

2. Experience: instrumental and consummatory.

Another classification of experience is that of the instrumental and consummatory. Another diagram to our aid.



In attacking the traditonal dualisms, Dewey has made his own dualisms, though he attempts to connect them after they are made. For example, there are the "primarily natural ends" and the "secondarily natural ends." The former are natural ends; the latter, practical and moral ends. He emphatically urges philosophers not to confuse them. "A natural end which occurs

without human art is a terminus, a de facto boundary", but when we choose, we are obviously dealing with practical ends--"with objects and qualities that are deemed worthy of selection by reflective, deliberate choice."[98] Natural ends indicate "coersive necessity" while ends, indicate "useful labor". Here we find the root for the distinction of the instrumental experience and the consummatory.

3. Experience: Subjective and objective.

The distinctions between instrumental and consummatory, according to Dewey, are classifications made in judgment. Reality is a continuous experience and experiencing. These distinctions are only practical for human discourse, which necessitates a subjective-objective distinction. Dewey says that the subjective view of experience is chiefly "the human attitude and interest,.....record and interpretation."[99] However, subjective experience itself is a natural event within the objective world.[100]

The consummatory phase of experience is found in "direct appreciative enjoyment", and it is natural.[101] Whereas instrumental experience is "artificial" because it is a resultant of the work of intelligence in projecting, slecting, and producing. But means and ends are two names for the same reality. The distinction between the subjective and objective experience does not denote a division in reality itself, but only a distinction in judgment.[102]

E. Summary.

In this chapter we have made an excursion into the origin and growth of Dewey's theory of experience. In the first

place we enquired as to the leading motives in his theory, and there we find a tendency of all modern philosophy; namely, an emphatic appeal for return to experience. To return to experience is to do away with the habit of thinking "in two insulated universes of discourse".[103] In other words, it is to establish continuity. It is easy to make an appeal to experience and to ask what experience is, but to answer the question is not as easy as it seems.

The answer which Dewey gives us in effect is that experience includes all that has actually taken place or is now taking place and all that might possibly happen. The logic of experience must have its primary datum in the practical activities and attitudes grounded upon an empirical basis of concrete values and events. Bawden says, "But the word(experience) is coming to have a wider meaning when used to express the totality of things for a person's consciousness. Experience in this sense, is the whole web of life, the universe from an individual point of view."[104] Dewey is more cautious in his formulation of experience in relation to the personal factor. The reason for this is that he finds a less dangerous empirical ground in the social category, which implies: (1) "a universal characteristics of all existences"; (2) "knowledge..in terms of related objects"; (3) "the nerve of science", the correlation of "association among things"; (4) "an actualization of potentialities" "in interaction"; (5) "support" to the "hypothesis of continuity"; (6) A demarcation of the "metaphysical description and understanding" of "the widest and fullest range of associated activity"; (7) "a 'realm of mind' objective to an individual, by entering into which as a participating member organic activities are transformed into acts having a mental quality."[105]

For James as well as Dewey, reality and experience come to be the same thing; their distinction is a methodological or functional one. Reality in its becoming process gives us experience; experience examined and controlled by intelligence yields an insight into reality.

In order that he may escape the incompleteness of "abstracted" experience (experience in the conceptual form), Dewey resorts to the social category, which includes both the "intrinsic content" and "extrinsic reference". We may have an adequate "philosophical account of things"...."based upon taking things in the widest and most complex scale of associations (relationships) open to observation."[106]

Dewey's account of experience in the essay, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" may be summarized as follows:

1. Experience is not primarily knowledge, but intercourse of a living being with his physical and social environment.

2. Experience is not subjective, but objective.

3. Experience is not a "registration of what has taken place", but is experimental and forward-looking.

4. Experience is not atomistic, but "pregnant with connections".

5. Experience is not opposed to thought, but constantly and full of inference.[107]

Despite his empiricism and instrumentalism Dewey has not escaped rationalism, in the sense of a belief in the possibility pf a theoretical metaphysics. An examination of his metaphysics will be made in the following chapter.

Chapter III

THE METAPHYSICS OF DEWEY'S EXPERIENCE-PHILOSOPHY

Before we look for the presentation of the metaphysics of experience-philosophy, we must determine what type of experience-philosophy Dewey holds, as there are many versions of it. Let us take a few of his contemporaries for example. The philosophy of William James, especially as formulated in his Pluralistic Universe, is taken to be "la philosophie d'expérience" in France. James says, "Everything experienced must somewhere be real."[1] Reality and experience come to the same thing. In discussing knowledge and concepts, James shows the relativity of our present experience and our experience within the natural zones. "Sensible reality is too concrete to be entirely manageable.....look at the narrow range of it which is all that any animal, living in it exclusively as he does, is able to compass...What we do in fact is to harness up reality in our conceptual systems in order to drive it the better. This process is practical because all the termini to which we drive are particular termini, even when they are facts of the mental order."[2] James' experience-philosophy has been characterized as "creative experience" in that it is synthetic, voluntaristic, and spiritualistic. Experience to James is not only continuous, since "all the units...overlap", but also systematic since it is "successive as well as simultaneous",[3] Thus far he is at one with Dewey. But James holds that religious experience "softens nature's outlines and opens out the starngest possibilities and perspectives."[4] This philosophy is Fecherian in that it is spiritualistic. Dewey regards both materialism and

spiritualism as incomplete accounts of reality.

Bowne labels his system personalism, a theistic philosophy with transcendental empiricism as a methodology. He presents three basal facts for philosophy; namely, "the personal world, the common reason, and the world of experience". James in one way or another has made practically the same postulates or presuppositions. "All experience", Bowne says, "is real only through some given fact, and apart from such facts is empty", for "when experience is given we have no longer simple logical concepts, but we have something lived and realized."[5] Bowne also agrees with James in that the "true nature of experience" demands us to "keep open the door of possibility".[6] Bowne sums up his transcendental empiricism as follows: "a careful scrutiny of our terms and a resolute adherence to experience".[7] This is the germ of pragmatism. Both Bowne and James agree with Dewey that "experience is the first and basal in all living and thinking, and that all theorizing must go out from experience as its basis, and return to it for its verification".[8]

Even Royce! He says that to his mind, "the only demonstrable truths of an ultimate philosophy relate to the constitution of the actual realm of experience, and to so much only about the constitution of this realm as cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Whenever, in dealing with experience, we try to find what, on the whole, it is and means, we philosophize."[9]

James interprets experience in its present richness and future real possibilities; while Bowne, following Kantian and Lotean tradition, makes experience final and basal for philosophical enterprise and personality the chief category. Royce

says that he not only accepts but also insists upon Kant's statement, "Nur in der Erfahrung ist Wahreit" ("What is real is an experience presenting the fulfilment of the whole purpose of ideas").[10] But he questions further as to what kind of being has experience. Experience in general is again in the abstract, an appeal to the ideal authority.[11] He holds that "as a fact, only individual experience is real, be that the experience of man or God."[12] This is what Dr. Cell calls "ontological significance of personality" in the thought of Royce.

Shall we say with Durant then, "that on nearly all of the fundamental problems nearly all of the philosophers agree; their differences being due rather to the terminology of their time than to the hostility of their thoughts."[14]

Now we are ready to look into Dewey's experience-phi philosophy in relation to his methodology and metaphysics. Dewey calls his method "empirical" or "denotative", which he defines as pointing out "when, where, and how things of a designated description have been arrived at."[15] "To answer any question, to settle any discussion, and still any doubt, we must go to something pointed to, denoted, and find our answer in that thing."[16] Dewey also designates this method as "experience method". Does this mean anything more than the assertion that experience must be the starting-point as well as the final court of appeal in any philosophic reflection or enterprise.

A. Experience and Nature.

In relation with his description of the experience method, we find the entrance into the metaphysics of the experience-

philosophy. For example, Dewey says that "the notion of experience reminds us that, prior to philosophic reflection, objects have fallen into certain groupings, designated by the adjectives we already prefix to the word experience: adjectives like, moral, esthetic, intellectual, religious, personal, political". Then he says that "the final issue of empirical method is whether the guide and standard of beliefs and conduct lies within or without the sharable situations of life."[18] This logically and inevitably leads up to an inquiry into the nature of the groupings of objects and the sharable world.

When Dewey is formulating this problem, he is answering the great challenge of William James upon the Chicago School twenty-five years ago, a challenge for a cosmology (the nature of the existing world) and an ontology (the theory of being). Dewey quotes Spencer in his statement that every fact has two opposite sides: the near or visible side and the remote or invisible. These express a persistent trait of every object in experience. "The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is unseen decides what happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped."[19] These are traits of the primary data in any experience.[20]

1. The nature of the world as giving rise to metaphysics.

The predominant nature of the world Dewey characterizes as "a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable";[21] and "it is hazardous".[22] Here Dewey's concern is with metaphysics, the nature of the existential world in which we live, and not with morals. Dewey recognizes that this indeterminate

character of the nature of the world gives rise to philosophy. Therefore all philosophies attempt to interpret its meaning and to make man at home in the world. Traditonal philosophies suffer and have quarrels in the "acceptance of a common premise".[23] Therefore it is necessary to go afield or outdoors so as to find a larger perspective and see the whole picture. Here Dewey is applying the coherence criterion in determining for himself an adequate premise. Where is the fertile field, or such a premise? Dewey points to "experience in unsophisticated forms", which "gives evidence of a different world and points to a different metaphysics",[24] It is to deal with the "cognizance of the generic traits" of the world that Dewey says one may have a metaphysics, for he holds that this is a good definition and the primary function of metaphysics. But there are two sides to this problem: theoretically, it is a matter of relations of objects in the situations of life; practically, it is a question of the best use which can be made of each of them.[25]

2. The nature of the objective world.

"Objective relativism" is used to designate Dewey's epistemology, and may also be employed, we believe, to characterize his naturalistic metaphysics. He says, "If human experience is to express and reflect this world, it must be marked by needs; in becoming aware of the needful and needed quality of things it must project satisfactions or completions. For irrespective of whether a satisfaction or non-satisfaction is an <u>objective</u> thing with <u>objective</u> factors".[26] It is objective because it is conditioned by objective partialities and defections and made real by objective situations and completions.

To establish his objectivism Dewey distinguishes event from object. Every existence is an event. Thinking, for instance, is one of the natural events. Santayana says that "affairs" and "situations" represent the ethical nerve of Dewey's philosophy while "events" and "history" "point to the flux of matter".[27] Santayana also points out that "event is now a favorite word among philosophers who are addressed to the study of nature."[28] Dewey uses the concept of event synonymously with change. That the character of existence is eventful, however, is no reason for consigning it to the realm of mere appearance.[29]

Events are Dewey's metaphysical elements. He says that "in every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation nor an element in a relational whole, but terminal and exclusive."[30] Events become objects when they are in a context in which they acquire new ways of operation and new character. The immediacy of existence is ineffable and unknowable, but objects are events in interaction, forming a system of meanings. It is within the system of meanings that we have knowledge of things.

3. Time and space implicit in the growth process.

The problem of time andspace is as old as philosophy. The problem of time became more predominant in modern philosophy, especially after the evolutionary theories began to occupy important positions in philosophy and science. Dewey in formulating any philosophical theory begins with a description of the "insoluble problems" which traditonal philosophies have created. To make objects timeless is to create such a problem. "But in fact everything denoted", Dewey says, "is found to have temporal quality and reference; it has movements from and toward <u>within</u> it; it is marked

by waxings and wanings".[31] The temporal quality, then, is inherent in the object. Experience is history in that it is a growth process and the becoming itself. As we have seen under the discussion of human life, Dewey says that we are obligated to go on in the on-going of experience.

Time and space in an order or structure are intellectual arrangements. Events are the becomings themselves; the slower and the regular rhythmic events may be designated as structure and the more rapid and regular as process. Structure is a character of events. The immediacy of the temporal quality of events is unknown until it eventuates in "constructions".[32] "Construction" is the evident "order of changes". Strcuture is the intellectualization of temporal quality and is realized only in construction. What Dewey objects to is the separation of strcuture from the changes, which creates a "metaphysical ghost" of time. Temporal and spatial orders are non-existential. They are. They are instrumentalities which function to regulate the course of historical events.

4. Interaction of diverse elements in the objective world.

Dewey uses the principle of interaction in the widest sense of the word instead of limiting it to the body-mind relation. Communication and interacourse are often used synonymously with interaction. However, he distinguishes three fields of interaction: first, the field of physical interaction, which is narrow and external; second, the field of life interaction, in terms of psycho-physical; third, interaction by association, communication, and participation, in terms of mind and meanings.[33] We have seen Dewey holds that both the mechanistic and the spiritualistic

metaphysics have their contributions to the interpretation of experience, "but the notion of causal explanation involved in both of them implies a breach in the continuity of historic process...."[34] He takes it upon himself to bridge the gulf. The gulf is bridged when reality is recognized as "the growth-process" and when real existence is taken to be "history in its entirety". In this Dewey attempts to combine the insight of the mechanistic materialism (the later cannot exist until the earlier exists), and the interpretation of spiritualistic teleology (the later makes use of the registered and culminative outcome of the earlier). He denies the traditional notion of causality either in the mechanistic or the spiritualistic form, but holds to evolutionary naturalism, in which the denotative method may function as a good instrument to the interpretation of experience.

The following diagram may serve as a summary of the process of interaction and the evolution of life:

Cause ----->	effect	The field of physical order
Stimulus <--->	response	The field of life
Means <------>	consequence :	
	:	The field of consciousness
Direction ----	consummation:	

1. ----------
2. ---------- -------> Each level has its own distinct categories.
3. ----------

There is an increasing complexity of interaction in each succeeding level.



Dewey's position in this connection manifests two tendencies in recent science; namely, (1) the behavioristic tendency in bringing human conduct into the physical world; (2) the dissatisfaction with "speculative naturalism"[35] and the frank admission of creative synthesis in nature with accompanying critical points and new properties.[36] Through the hypothesis of interaction, Dewey seems to bring an evolutionary synthesis whereby striking differences are united under "genetic continuity". The phrase "intelligent behavior" or "conscious behavior" gives the clue to the interpretation of experience in the light of "genetic continuity", but it is not self-explanatory. An explanation of the "genetic continuity" in "creative synthesis " in nature will be given under the discussion of experience and consciousness in section B of this chapter.

5. Natural teleology

To venture upon the use of the word "ends" in connection with existential processes is a dangerous proposition.[37] In the first place there are two meanings of this word: one is the fulfilment of events; the other, ends-in-view. "Each is intelligible, grounded, and legitimate in itself. But their mixture is one of the Great Bads of philosophy."[38] Dewey points out that the problem of teleology lies in the problem of evil or dysteleology. To clear up the foreground, as usual Dewey starts by pointing out the bias of Greek metaphysics and Christian theology concerning ends.

a. Natural and moral ends: In our classification of experience we have seen the distinction made by Dewey between natural ends, inevitable beginning, process, and ending of natural events; and the moral ends, a matter of "reflective choice" or a

"deliberate construction",[39] The former is predominantly fulfilments of things; the latter, ends-in-view for further activities. It is one thing to assign temporal quality to events, characterized by beginning, process, and ending and another to control the course of events for further activities. One is metaphysical or existential and the other, practical or moral.

Dewey has thrown away ultimate teleology with the traditional doctrine of design. Traditonal teleology has lost its significance in our modern life since voluntaristic, temporalistic (evolutionary), and pluralistic theories have become the tendencies. The will to believe in possibilities, the finite God idea, the emergent theory of evolution, and the creative intelligence, all of these seem to have pushed "ultimate teleology" to the dark background. Dewey's position is an "immediate empiricism"; the immediacy of existence is ineffable, on the one hand; and an instrumental meliorism, to have intelligence direct the course of life as far as possible, on the other. To endeavor to dearch for the summum bonum is an otiose affair and to attempt the impossible is futile. Therefore, teleology, if discussed at all, is not to be taken in the metaphysical sense (ultimate teleology), but in the immediate and practical control of the course of events. Dewey's is a natural teleology because he holds that all ends are found within nature, and because the situation and the end-in-view are equally important. Our question here is expository, not critical; therefore the validity of the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical will be discussed later in the evaluation.

b. Evolution: Whether one holds a natural evolution or ultimate teleology, he must consider the evolution of life and the problem of value. In regard to the former, Dewey explains evolution in terms of "three levels of life", each being a higher development of the previous. The higher the being is the better he adapts the environment to himself and the more complex is his grasp of meaning and relations. But continuity is emphasized. In this continuity, production and consumption or means and ends are continuous and interdependent. But to emphasize the separation in order to exalt the consummation is to fail to define and interpret experience.

However, when the empirical data are changed, the categories are necessarily changed with them; cause and effect are the categories in the physical level, stimulus and response in the psycho-physical, menas-consequences and meanings in the third. The relation of means-consequences is one of the processes which is at once a temporal succession and a culminative and constitutive deposit at different points and different stages. This is what we have seen to be the "genetic continuity" of experience. Kant says, "An organized product of nature is one in which everything is an end and reciprocally also means; nothing in it is in vain, nothing purposeless, or to be described to a blind mechanism of nature."[40] Dewey agrees with this statement as far as it is limited in application within the empirical data, but if it is used as the ground for the formulation of an ultimate teleology, Dewey parts company. He shows his own interest in the following statement: "A disposition of virtue is a means to a certain quality of happiness because it is a constituent

of that good, while such happiness is means in turn to virtue, as the sustaining of good in being."[41] What Dewey has done is to substitute for the traditional teleology an evolutionary process of growth.

c. Value: When Dewey asserts that the level of life or meaning is the highest of the three, he is evaluating the process. When he says that reflection is the instrument through which "freer and more enduring good are secured", he is making "reflection...a unique intrinsic good"[42] Reflection is an activity "which constantly uncovers in the object new meanings to be perceived and enjoyed."[43] Therefore, in the process of new discoveries, value and the objects that possess value change. They change with the "contingencies" of existence, the environing medium, and with the changes in human beings in their power of grasping meaning.[44] What Dewey objects to is a "block universe."

To have a theory of value is to enter into the field of criticism.[45] Any brief course of experience enforces reflection,[46] for values are not as plentiful as huckleberries, nor is the huckleberry-patch always at hand. Man seems to have not only a great diversity of desires, but also a "dialectic" in the process of their realization; therefore desire or enjoyment constantly ceases to be a datum and beomes a <u>problem.</u>[47] "As a problem, it implies <u>intelligent inquiry</u> into the conditions and consequences of a value-object; that is, criticism."[48] Appreciation and criticism are the most obvious conscious experiences, closely related experiences. Our waking experiences are always in manners of taking attitudes, making inquiries and estimations, and exercising preferences and choices.[49] "<u>Memory and foresight</u>" are necessary

elements in the possession and enjoyment of value-objects. Otherwise, criticism would be the most wilful of undertakings. Is this not enough evidence for the assertion that only those beings who are capable of memory, foresight, and reflection are capable of "realizing" and "carrying" values? Dewey has told us that on the human plane, responses to things are made in their meanings, and that "to be conscious of meanings or to have an idea, marks a fruition, an enjoyed or suffered arrest of the flux of events."[50]

In order to make Dewey's theory of value more concise and clear, we shall give the following analysis in a diagram form:

i. Empirical situation

Conflicts

In good

The immediate The given The now(apparent)	Vs	The ulterior The reached and justified by The eventual (reflection

In morals

Immediate goods	Vs	The desired and reasonable goods

In esthetics

Goods of undeveloped and perverted taste	Vs	Goods of cultivated taste

In knowledge

Beliefs de facto	Vs	Beliefs de jure

Critical judgment

The false, specious, illussory, showy, le faux bon	The true, real, final or objective goods

ii. Table of values

Immediate values--possessed and enjoyed
"Critical" values--evaluation of the "real", the eventual.... instituting and perpetuating more enduring and extensive values.

The issue: value of reflection?

Value of reflection---discovery of condition, relation, consequence

iii. Philosophy and value

> Philosophy: a deliberate and systematic pursuit of this "critical operation and function" which becomes "aware of itself and its implications" in "all regions of values", giving "greater freedom and security in those acts of direct selection, appropriation, identification, and rejection, elimination, and destruction which enstate and which exclude objects of belief; conduct, and contemplation.
>
> The criterion: comprehensiveness and consistency
>
> The end: to convert causal natural values(whose cause and effect are unknown) into goods; valid for thought, right for conduct, and cultivated for appreciation. 51

Value is realized in the temporal process of growth. The intelligent the instrumentality or art is, the more enduring and extensive the values will be. The process in the conversion of the "natural" values into the intellectual, moral, and esthetic is found in nature,--hence a "natural teleology".

B. Experience and Meaning.

The idealist may be said to be the one who holds an identity of being and knowing; the pragmatist, identity of being and doing. Kant says that a being is known through its activities; Lotze, a thing is where it acts. The principle of activity and the notion of relation are modern discoveries; at least, they are brought to the foreground in philosophical discussion in the modern time. Pragmatism, especially in the Deweyan form, is a philosophy of activity, both natural and moral. In the last section, we have seen the nature of the objective world within which both good and evil are discriminated. Reality or the objective world, is a chang-

ing process, a becoming. This must be harnessed or arrested by reflection. In the process of beings events in interaction become objects or events with meaning. Some meanings are transitive; others more persistent. In Dewey's designation they are consciousness and mind respectively.

1. Consciousness and meaning.

In the previous section we have just seen that the method of intelligence and of science is to recreate the causal goods of nature into intentional and conclusive goods of art, with meanings in which knowledge and value are one. The realization of value or the unification of value and knowledge is only a "process" within nature. Experience is always dynamic, that is to say, the becoming is a series of events. Consciousness "is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing redirection, transitive transformation".[52] Since consciousness is the meaning of events in the course of remaking it is clear then that consciousness is not a separate realm of being, but the manifest quality of existence or the "emphatic character" of events.

What is meaning then? Dewey's meaning of meaning is brought out very clearly in a recent discussion.[53] Since our task for the present is expository, we shall then take up only what Dewey regards to be his own position. Dewey in this discussion emphatically asserts that he holds that "events acquire meanings" or "meanings occur within nature."[54] In the first place, we are to bear in mind the duality of existence and meanings. The denotative method accounts for both the "locus of origin" and "genesis" of further developments and functions of

meanings. "I certainly hold", says Dewey, "that there are natural 'pre-requisites' of the origin of meanings in communication. Among these indispensable preconditions are the immediate qualities called in psychological terminology, 'feelings'; these are the existential basis and 'stuff' of meanings."[55] They exist prior to and independent of any "sign-functions". Though they guide behavior in all kinds of subtle ways, they are not meanings. Recourse to antecedent conditions is always necessary in any critical search for the validity of meaning. Thus the right determination of meanings involves considerations of "total histories". The distinction of instrumental and final meanings is artificial and correlative if the total situation is reviewed.

Another phase of the problem of meaning is the distinction of referential and immanental meanings. Dewey explicitly says that "immanent meanings exist in consequence of the repeated successful outcome of referntial or evidential meanings."[56] The crucial issue lies in the hypothesis that "a thing signifies another thing in being employed as an evidential sign, and that in this RELATION both acquire meaning".[57] This agrees with Whitehead's position that the significance of a thing is its relatedness.

Dewey says that when the idealist asserts the certainty of the immediately and focally present as the data on which to build, he is making a transference from the substantial to the dialectical. "'This', whatever this may be, always implies a system of meanings focussed at a point of stress, uncertainty, and need of regulation. It sums up history, and at the same time opens up a new page; it is record and promise in one; a

fulfilment and an opportunity."[58] In consciousness (the "this") there is the union of the past and the future with the present. But consciousness is not a distinct entity. It is the momentary quality of "the operative interpretation in the nature of the efficient and the fulfillings."[59] Personality or selfhood is nothing but the "eventual functions that emerge with complexily organized interactions, organic and social, the system of meanings, or mind.

2. Meaning and mind.

Interaction in its natural form, communication, is the bridge where existence and essence "join" in a continuous activity.[60] As soon as events are "named" they immediately lead "an independent and double life".[61] They become at once existence and meaning or ideal experimentation, and consequently thought. In other words, events have communicable meanings in ideal experimentation or the realm of thought because they have implications capable of denotation and connotation.[62] Thus events acquire character cheifly within "human associations". It is the "assemblage of organic human beings" which transforms sequence and coexistence into participation".[63] Charcater is at once general and distinguished. Matter and mind are characters of natural events; the former expresses their sequential order, and the latter the order of their meanings in their logical connections and dependencies.[64] Mind as a system of meanings is quite consistent with Dewey's premises.

Dewey's definition of mind is similar to that of Dean Woodbridge in that both regard mind as contextual and persistent and consciousness as focal and transitive.[65] Although thinkers at Columbia have indicated that the thought of Dewey and that of

Woodbridge are similar, no definite investigations have been made. Therefore, it would be of interest and in place to make a brief comparison.

Dewey:	Woodbridge:
1. Mind:--"Mind is contextual and persistent...Mind is structural, substantial...Mind is a constant luminosity." (66) To denote the characteristic of mind....organization, order, coherence. (67) It is objective because it is conditioned by objective partialities and defections and made real by objective stituations and completions.(68)	1. Mind:--When we deal with the mind, we are dealing, not with a place or an event, but with a realm(72) The realm of being as known is thus characterized (74) by a certain unity and coherence. It is so because"experience is a matter of space and time, of objects, qualities and relations, it is also a matter of implications and inference."(75) "Mind as logical structure is objective. By affirming its objectivity we mean that it has to do with the make-ip of the world in which we think." (76)
2. Knowledge:--"Idle epistemology".	2. Knowledge:--"What is so often called epistemology is not legitimate." (77)
3. Consciousness:--Dewey, like Woodbridge takes consciousness as an idea. It is "that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing redirection, transitive transformation." (69)	3. Consciousness:--"Ideas are expressed in propositions..The variety of the forms of their expression and communication is innumerable." (78) "It is rather that through this interaction there are ideas and that they are expressed and that they are communicated." (79)
4. Ideas:-- "Or, we may be aware of meanings, may achieve ideas, that unite wide and enduring scope with richness of distinctions." (70) "Immediacy of existence is unknown and unknowable."	4. Ideas:--"Ideas are acquired." (80) "Getting knowledge, we repeat, is not getting existence at first hand or at second hand. It is "getting ideas". (81) (Dewey's "realism without monism or dualism".)
5. Body-mind:-- Experience testifies that "mind-body is an integral whole." (71)	5. Body-mind:-- So many bodies are so many minds.

Existence is not to be known at first hand. It is apprehended in ideas and in meanings. Both Dewey and Woodbridge

would say that ideas and meanings occur whenever there is "communication" and "translation" or "conversation". Interaction, communication, translation are terms which denote the process whereby we have knowledge and meaning. In a private converation Dewey said that his theory of meaning and mind may be summarized under the name of "social behaviorism".[82] He does not go all the way with nominalism. The conditions of organization must not be neglected if a "genuine community of action" is to be established. "This community of partaking is meaning."[83] This is what Dewey means by "social behaviorism". Meaning is universal and objective, capable of particular application. It is a "concrete universal" because things are seen in its connections with the rest of experience. This may be said to be what Robinson calls meaning as universal, through which the traits of being are defined.[84] Meaning "is a realm of mind" as mind is a system of meanings.

3. The individual.

Every system of philosophy attempts to avoid the charge of subjectivism. The personal factor, or personal experience ought to come in if philosophy is to give a comprehensive interpretation of all experience. Although he tries to dispose of the personal factor in experience casually, his use of "social category" and his experience philosophy make constant demand for the placing of the individual. Man is a part of nature; therefore all his activities fall within nature. He appears on the highest level of life thus far in the life-process. As he is part of the system capable of communication, he is one of the foci of the world-energies or events, and one of the participants in the reality of the whole. His being consists of what he persists

in doing.[85] As a functional unit, he shares the spontaneity and weal and woe of the whole. The consciousness attributed to him is not to be taken as distinct entity which belongs to a separate noumenal world. Consciousness is an apparent function of the individual in his adaptation to environment at a tentional situation. Dewey says that the modern history of thought finds its termination in "Royce's "Community of selves", an empirical fact, from which thought ought to start.[86] This assertion of Dewey is not new, as we find it expressed in Both James and Bowne. Bowne says, It is with "the person and social world in which we live...(that) all speculations must begin."[87]

After giving a genetic account of the individual, Dewey summarizes others points which he calls "evident", the substance of which follows:[88]

1. That an individual, possessed of some mode and degree of organized unity, participates in the genesis of every experienced situation, whether it be an object or an activity, is evident.

2. That this activity of participation affects the situation experienced is evident.

3. That this activity affects the environment, which in turn affects the active agent is also evident.

4. That every form of life in the higher organisms of life constantly conserves some consequences of its prior experiences is also evident.

5. That the constancy and pervasiveness of the operative presence of the self as a determining factor in all situations is also evident.

6. That this presence is more intimate and omnipresent in experience than the air we breathe, is also evident.

Until we understand the operations of the self as the tool of tools, the means in all use of means, specifying its differ-

ential activities in their distinctive consequences in varying qualities of what is experienced, science is incomplete and the use of it is at the mercy of an unknown factor.[89]

Dewey says that it is difficult to convey in speech "the nature of awareness of meaning", or consciousness, but that one may "evoke an actual experience of thing in question".[90] Descartes in interpreting experience said, "Cogito ergo sum". He was right. We may add, I think, therefore I am active, and therefore I am. This instantly takes us back to the principle common to both empirical idealism and pragmatism: A thing is when it is active. But in what sense is the individual a mind? In comparing consciousness with mind, Dewey says that different categories must be used to denote the characteristics of mind; "organization, order, and coherence". But there is a "continuum" between mind as a "containing system of meaning" and consciousness, momentary, focal, and urgent meanings. The individual, as we have seen, possesses organized unity, participates in the genesis of every experienced situation, determines the course of events, conserves values, and forms ideals. Meaning in both its focal and transitive form and its contextual and constant system finds its unity in the individual.

C. Summary

Dewey's conception of metaphysics, on the surface, seems to be a limited one. He says metaphysics "begins and ends with analysis and definition."[91] However, analysis and definition give not only the "ground-map" for "criticism", but lead also to the crucial problems of metaphysics.

As to the content of the metaphysics of his experience-philosophy, like Buchner's monism of matter,[92] Spencer's monism of force,[93] Haeckel's monism of substance,[94] Dewey's monism of "ineffable event" (natural) is fundamental. However, in spite of his strenuous effort to eradicate the historical dualisms, he seems to have a realm of meaning distinguished from the realm of existence. Existence itself has a duality of character: the precarious and the secure, and the contingent and the permanent. His naturalism is more comprehensive than the atomistic, the mechanistic, and even the energistic, for it is an attempt to interpret the process of creative evolution as a "natural synthesis."

His naturalism, we believe, is well termed evolutionary. It is at once metaphysical and positivistic. It is metaphsycal because he vigorously attempts to analyze and define the traits of existence. It is positivistic because the categories of science are taken as final in the interpretation of existence and teleology, and the spirituality of beings are denied.

Dewey's interests in life are so wide that when interpreting experience, he is metaphysical in his thinking; when thinking of remedying social ills, he is positivistic. But in both cases, he is quite intellectualistic in his approach. His naturalism may be called evolutionary in that a denotative method is used and in that a "genetic continuity" is to be established. To use the denotative method is to point out how, when, and where a thing has arrived. Description includes explanation. To describe the levels of matter, life, and mind is to explain the life-process. Nothing is ultimate except this process of growth.

Chpater IV

NEW CONCEPTIONS OF EXPERIENCE AND THEIR SUCCESS IN SOLVING OLD PROBLEMS

A. Experience and Dualisms.

Modern philosophy since Kant seems to have marched toward the "fertile valley of experience". Though there are divergent excursions, the "sure march" in the main has been "back to experience". We have reviewed the tendencies and general atmosphere of the philosophical situation of America since 1870 and have seen that during the last half century there was a period of creative productivity. "Life is deeper than logic" has been the slogan of practically all schools of thought. Let us refresh our memory by referring again to some of the contemporary systems; the "radical empiricism" and pragmatism of James and the "transcendental empiricism" and personalism of Bowne, the "ultimate empiricism"(Professor Hocking's term) and absolute idealism of Royce. All of them aim to interpret experience. Both James and Bowne are spiritualistic, "flirting" with realism, while Royce is idealistic with a "naturalistic and empirical flavor".[1] To find out what experience is and what it means is a common denominator of contemporary philosophies. Dewey says that it is a worthy aim to adhere to experience, but experience must not be viewed from the introspectice psychologist's standpoint.[2] Rather does experience denote whatever happens in this natural and social world in which we live.[3]

Dualism in the general sense indicates "toute doctrine qui, dans un domaine déterminé, dans une question donné,

quelle qu'elle soit, admet deux principes essentiellement irreducibles."[4] Our usage of the term is neither strictly psychological nor metaphysical in our interpretation of Dewey's thought. When Dewey uses the term, dualism, he seems to have in mind those partial "pretensions". For instance, the logicians and mathematicians, the sensationalists and the scientists all have their own pretensions. "Then is just the time to be most vigorous in insisting upon the necessity of reference to 'experience' in order to fix the import of mathematical and logical pretensions."[5] In Dewey's Introduction to the Essays in Experimental Logic we find a resolution that is similar to that of James and Bowne and Peirce; namely, to scrutinize terms and to be experiential. They are more crucial for Dewey, since they afford a "recovery of philosophy" whereby all "persistent problems of philosophy" may be solved or dissolved.

We have seen the dualisms which Dewey has brought forward and attempted to dissolve or to bridge over. Now it is our task to see whether these dualisms have really been disposed of or whether they are simply hidden away and may reappear in a new garment.

1. The real and the ideal.

In our exposition of the relation of the real and the ideal, we have seen that Dewey distinguishes the traditional view of the ideal and the modern view of it as a difference of taking the ideal to be an eternal pattern ready-made in the noumenal world and of using it as a created or projected instrument for action. The ideal is instrumental. The real affords the situation

upon which the ideal works. The actual is a dynamic situation of experience, a struggle, in Dewey's words. The actual is more than a static imperfection. Any problematic situation necessitates a revision and redirection of the course of activities. Ideals cannot be isolated from the actual. They are the possibilities of the actual, not existences of a separate realm. As a plan of action, an ideal implies the unity and continuity of the social situation. Facts, Dewey says, are only partial ideas. Ideals are their completions. The real and the ideal are in one continuous process, since both facts and ideals come within the realm of thought. In this process of initiation and intentional direction of experience the hedonistic, volitional, and intellectual factors are equally recognized. The real and the ideal are two aspects of one continuous experience.

In his emphasis upon the activity of the creative process in which the actual is dynamic and the ideal is the realization of the possibilities of the actual, Dewey has made a contribution to the attempt to relate and unify these two antithetical phases of experience. The real and the ideal are separated only when they are not viewed in action. They are connected and continuous only in a mind, as a system of meanings. His solution of the problem also affords due recognition to the feeling and intentional character of life. The ideal is not exclusively an intellectual concept, a ready-made pattern. It is a realization of the actual---of the feeling and intentional aspects of experience.

Dewey's interest in both these contributions is to bring about continuity of activity between the real and the ideal.

It is with regard to the nature of this activity that we may question Dewey's position. When he says that we are obligated to choose and to go on, he may be interpreting that obligation as either a natural determinism or as the "categorical imperative". He wavers between these two. He is interested in bringing about continuity of activity. The genetic account of the past and the instrumentalism for the future are not enough to establish continuity in the philosophical sense. By a "philosophical sense" we mean an explanation which is more than a psychological account of the close relation between feeling and idea or actual and ideal. The real or actual is nothing unless it is the present. Whatever is to be established in this world must be done in the idea-world. Dewey is right in saying that the idea is the guide of action, for thus he brings the theoretical idea into relation with the actual. But this is not all: "My world extends in time and not in space only: and as memory and prudence accompany the widening of my world in its time-extent, I interest myself in possible values, not alone in actual values."[6] But this theoretical "idea" or "ideal" is manifested fully through a rational control in the variety of possible action: "Yes, but not now; Yes, but not mine". Dewey elsewhere tells us that a being which can form reasonable expectations is capable of achieving ideas and possesses intelligence.[7] The actual is limited and arbitrary, while in the ideal world, there is freedom and new creation. It is not only in idea we forecast the future, but also in it we know our experience. Dewey has told us that a keen state of enjoyment is achieved by a state of high mental activity; the resources of memory and invention are loosened, and the mind becomes a free, extensive, yet

enduring field or system of meanings for quick and accurate connections powerfully focused. In other words, the real and the ideal are connected in activity, in the activity of a being capable of universalizing the particulars, or forming ideals.

2. Sensationalism and rationalism.

The syntheses whereby Dewey has established continuity of the dualisms of thought and sense, of a priori and a posteriori, and of percept and concept, which we have discussed briefly in our investigation of his motives in formulating a new philosophy of experience, we shall here evaluate in summary form. Has his interpretation of experience resolved the dualisms and solved the old problems they created?

a. Sense and intellect: To overcome the fallacious separation and the extreme emphasis of sensationalism and intellectualism we need a cautionary and directive word, "experience". Sensationalism points out only the ways of feeling or having things; intellectualism the ways of knowing them. Sensationalism reduces the intellect to sensations; intellectualism transforms reality into intellectual and logical forms. One may choose a "revised empiricism", which includes all the ways of having and knowing things, asserting "the finality and comprehensiveness of the method of pointing, finding, showing, and the necessity of seeing what is pointed to and accepting what is found in good faith and without discount."[8] Both matter and mind are characters of events. Neither alone is reality or is able to point to a world identical with it. Instrumentalism includes both the activity of thought and the tensional situation. The life process is a continuity within which sensation and thought are means and

ends reciprocally for the intitiation and control of the on-going experience.

It is true that instrumentalism includes both the activity of thought and the tensional situation. But the nature of the tensional situation is a primary question. By Dewey's own definition events are unknown. Objects are events with meanings. Meaning in its transitive or momentary form is consciousness, constant and organized mind. Volcanoes, wars, battles, hunger, thirst, may be taken as natural events. However, they are also objects in the experienced world and as such are "events with meanings", since all objects are in the realm of meanings. All tensional situations and the experiencing and directing of these situations must be in thought, in ideas. The situation is both fact and intellectual apprehension. But facts are partial ideas. Dewey's position is here idealistic in that he makes the situation pregnant with thought and recognizes the ideality of nature in stating that facts are partial ideas.

The continuity of sense and intellect which Dewey achieves in his formulation of experience-philosophy affords nothing more than an explanation of particular instances wherein sense is the origin of the stimulus to action and intellect the instrument of the response.

b. A priori and a posteriori: Dewey intends, as we have seen in the section on his motives, to emphasize the regulative and preferential aspects of thought. What he fears is that the notion of the a priori may be misinterpreted as "a static endowment lurking in the mind".[9] This traditional notion of "static endowment" contradicts modern science and the notion of activity

and evolution. This criticism is similar to the attack upon innate ideas. Mind is functional. Thinking occurs in a contextual situation. The starting-point of thought is the actually problematic specific situation, where tension, interaction, communication, and projection occur. Thought functions to transform confusion, ambiguity, and discrepancy into illumination, definiteness, and consistency. Rationality is an "achievment" through through observation and deliberation, and experimentation within the life process. Meaning, on the other hand, is objective, being a mode of natural interaction. Meaning is universal.[11] "It is spontaneous and self-moving; therefore to call it a priori is to express a fact; but to impute the a priori character of the generalizing force of meanings to reason is to invert the facts."[12] In "natural interaction" of events, in meanings, there is then a general order. Dewey has to postulate that "some sort of organization exists in experience" and that "experience is full of inference."[13] Not the mind, but the total objective experience possesses an apriori character in the "generalizing force of meanings." The mode of organization of the interacting events of experience also gives rise to the character of space and time. Space and time with Dewey, as with Kant, are the conditions of the possibility of experience. For Dewey they are a priori in that they are natural modes of interaction. Time as "an order" is chiefly an intellectual construction or arrangement. "Structure is a constancy of means, of things used for consequences, not of things taken by themselves or absolutely."[14]

Intelligence is creative not because it is a νοῦς or entelechy, but because it is a natural event which achieves

its function inseparably from a problematic situation. Nothing is a priori in the sense that it is the creation of mind or a form which mind imposes upon nature. Rather does the a priori character of experience appear in the objective, natural life-process, where natural modes of interaction may be termed a priori. Dating and placing are characteristics of the denotative method. Therefore the organization of experience is not a priori in the Kantian sense, but is a mode of natural interaction which Dewey recognizes as a priori, to be discovered a posteriori in experience. To be is "to be experienced as". The a priori organization of nature exists then only as it is experienced a posteriori. The dualism then disappears.

c. Percept and concept: Dewey tells us that "to perceive is to acknowledge unattained possibilities; it is to refer the present to consequences, apparition to issue, and thereby to behave in deference to the connections of events."[15] "As an attitude, perception or awareness is predicative expectancy, wariness."[16] He compares the relation between perception and conception with that of consciousness and mind.[17] The perceptual data afford distinctive properties of emotion, sensation, thought, or desire. The misunderstanding of perception, Dewey says, derives from the two meanings of perception. The one refers to perception as a relation between natural events; the other as a case of knowledge where we are concerned with the "difference between an object as a cause of knowledge and an object as known, and hence in relation to a mind."[18] More specifically, he tells us that the very things that, from the standpoint of perception as a natural event, are conditions that account for its happening are,

from the standpoint of perception as a case of knowledge, part of the object which, if knowledge is valid, ought to be known, but is not."[19] According to him, then, perceptions as natural events are not in any "intelligible or verifiable" sense known. They afford conditions for inference.[20] Once perception in this "natural" form enters into operative experience, it becomes "a case of knowledge", as it is intellectualized in the process of experiencing. Perceptions become intellectual habits or ideas. They may be called "automatic modes of cognition",[21] Here we find the inseparability of perception and conception.

Revision and redirection are necessary as soon as novel factors come in. In this revision, intelligence or ideas are necessary instruments. Memory as a fact of consciousness is important, but it is not a faculty. Of course in this process of transofrming the perceptual data into conceptual thought, intention, effort, and imagination are important as well as the instruments (ideas). They are, however, included in intelligence. Starting from the biological view of mind, Dewey, as other pragmatists, is concerned with the process of knowledge not as a relation of the idea and object, but as an act wherein idea is a significant instrument for conduct. To the problem of knowledge we shall return in the following section.

Perception is one of the most outstanding "persistent problems of philosophy". What we aim at here is Dewey's reflection on the relation of the perceptual data and the conceptual thought. If continuity is to be established, the notion of change must be made clear. Bergson holds that it is almost impossible to think change pour "habitude statique de notre intelligence."

Dewey holds that things in their immediacy, the beoming are unknown and unknowable for they have nothing to do with knowledge. The perceptual data in themselves are unknown. We agree with Dewey that the continuous changing character of events is something here found in the perceptual data of immediate experience, but that everything known is interaction where events have becomes objects, events with meanings. Change is grasped only by and in the mind. Dewey is more intellectualistic and less physical in his conception of idea than is M. Bergson. The former points out that experience is full of inference, whereby ideas find their connections. We also agree with him that reasoning or thinking is a form of communication and consequently a process. In this process the "situation" and its projection are continuous only in mind, for mind by definition is "contextual" and a system of meanings, a dynamic system.

We may turn against Dewey one of his criticisms of philosophy. He warns us against following a form or system simply because it is old and comforting. The emphasis upon the biological conception of mind has come to be such a form. Dewey fears to lose sight of the biological organism lest mind will lose its concreteness. However, since the biological conception of mind engenders so many problems and runs up against so many contradictions, why not run the risk of turning to a new road? Experience is the final court of appeal. Our daily experience is more conceptual than perceptual. It is more pertinent to ask for the origin of ideas than to try to connect concepts which are made distinct for practical reasons.

3. Summary and evaluation.

The motive of bringing about a synthesis of the dualisms of existing systems of thought for the sake of a better interpretation of experience is related to the general acceptance of the evolutionary point of view. The genetic method is prejudicial to the finding of continuity, not duality of the real. Dewey's interest in the practical application of philosophy and his instrumentalism tend toward the rejection of the historical dualisms.

a. Solutions of old dualisms: In the on-going of experience the real and the ideal, sense and intellect, the a priori and the a posteriori, percept and concept, are merely various foci of a continuous experience. The existential qualities and their meanings coincide in experience. Every meaning implies the actualization (in interaction) of natural events. Continuity is established by viewing reality as change, which in turn implies activity. But distinctions are necessary in any discourse, as duality is implicit in thinking. Reality is the entire history or growth process. The eventful character of existence reflects the doing-suffering-ongoing experience. Distinctions are "experienced distinctions"; they are reflective. Those historical dualisms are objectionable to Dewey only when they are taken to be ultimate. Dewey says that there is always a dual aspect in every experience, and it is a practical matter. "Our words", he says, "divide into names which are not (strictly speaking) terms at all, but which serve to remind us of the vast and vague continuum, select portions of which only are designated by words as terms."[22]

Dewey repeatedly uses the existence of language as an evidence of the nature of meaning and experience. Language, moreover, indicates the constituents and kinds of experience, political, social, moral, and religous. In this matter Bergson is more convincing than Dewey. "L'idée du changement est là, je le veux bien, mais elle se cache dans la pénombre. En pleine lumière il y a le dessin immobile de l'acte supposé accompli... Ajectifs et substantifs symbolisent donc des états. Mais le verbe lui-même, si l'on s'en tient à la partie éclairée de la représentation qu'il évoque, n'exprime guère autre chose."[23] Finally, he goes on to deal with the problem of idea-connections or continuity. Dewey tells us that terms are names or designated portions of the vague continuum. How are these ideas connected? Bergson, though not without hesitation, tells us that the connection is in the personal factor, which universalizes and particularizes the "specific" and the "general" processes of change. Thus we have continuity. Dewey goes a long way around to evade the individual factor. The immediacy of existence is unknown. Things known are in interaction, hence in activity or in meanings. Meanings have their origin in communication and continuity. How satisfactory this solution is we shall consider in the following paragraphs.

b. New problems generated: One may question whether Dewey has escaped a dualism of the two fundamental metaphysical concepts, events and objects. Every existence is an event. Events are unique. They have no relation with knowledge. Objects are events in interaction and have character and meaning. Are events and objects, then, two kinds of experience or two aspects of experience? As events have no relations, they must be independ-

ent. Objects are contextual with infinite relations and inferences and implications,--hence meaning. Can each event in the sense of a "pure" existence be said to be experience? Dewey would say no. He says, "No experience having a meaning is possible without some element of thought."[24] Thought, then, is constitutive in experience. Reality "had" and reality "known" constitute a dichotomy of "appreciation" and "reflection", which remains in Dewey's philosophy. The resolution of this dualism Dewey has suggested in his statement that every appreciation has a "judgmental" element and no experience has a meaning without some element of thought.[25] But on the other hand we are told that "appreciation" is "invaluable (reflection cannot be applied) emotional satisfaction" and "reflection" has nothing to do with the "ineffable immediacy of existence". This leads us to an examination of Dewey's theory of knowledge and of value, and their relation.

B. Experience and Knowledge.

The theory of knowledge in the experience-philosophy of the pragmatic type is generally known as the functional theory of knowledge. Truth is tested by its capability of satisfying needs and by its fruits. This theory may be summarized by the phrase of "intended agreement". That is to say: "An experience is a knowledge if in its quale there is an experienced distinction and connection of two elements of the following sort: one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become

so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or joke fellow is to be fulfilled through an operation it sets up."[26]

Similarly, the process of experience or of consciousness goes on the same way, as an organic relation of the real and the ideal, of perception and conception. The pragmatist's logic is experimental in that knowledge is inherent in the empirical and metaphysical connections in the process of growth or experience. Within this process the logical forms and structures are made distinct for practical manipulation. Consciousness is the meaning of events in the course of remaking, and so also is knowledge, which is not a matter of grasping reality. Continuity is best understood by a genetic account of the life process. Matter, life, and mind are to be viewed as a continuous process. "Personality, selfhood, subjectivity, are eventual functions that emerge with complexity organized interactions, organic and social."[27] Therefore knowledge is itself included in our world of objects.

1. Epistemology and instrumentalism.

Dewey attacks epistemology for two reasons: it is an "idle" pursuit and it brings us to "intellectual lock-jaw".[28] This may be said to be at once the "excuse" for the pragmatists' revolt and for their willingness to abandon the "persistent" problems of philosophy. One of Dewey's strategies is the "flanking movement" just mentioned. Generally speaking, it is a revolt against absolutism either in the realistic or idealistic form. He says that instrumentalism "was a critical reaction to the work of....post-Kantian logicians....The aim was to show that it is not necessary to assume a priori forms of thought to which

subject-matter is accomodated."[29]

What are some of the problems or inquiries which he regarded as idle?

1. How does one sort of existence purely mental or immaterial have valid reference to a totally different kind of existence, material or spatial?

2. How can the mental receive impressions from the physical? Generally speaking, how is knowledge possible?

3. What are the limits of knowledge?

4. How is the validity of knowledge established?

The following new concepts Dewey has substituted:

1. Knowledge is power, an instrument for control.

2. A change is to be made from contemplative to operative knowledge.

3. A theory of knowledge is to find the best way to know "economically, liberally, and effectively."

From the above analysis we find two diverse objectives. The objective of the historical epistemological interest is to make a "critical" study of the problems concerning knowledge itself; what other value it may cash in is a secondary question. But this question of the relation between man and his cosmos is to magnify "the work of intelligence in our actual physical and social world."[30] The instrumentalist says that a theory is not complete if it stops at a declaration of anything's being really and eternally and thoroughly ideal and rational. There is a law or demand of specification. We agree with him that every endeavor must be purposeful. A mere ideal is sterile.



Dewey has said time and again that an unexamined life is not worth living. "Criticism" is crucial for realizing and wid widening values. "How to make ideas clear" is the kernel of the pragmatic movement; therefore it is legitimate to scrutinize the terms, propositions, and judgments in their practical relations or applications, which may be termed epistemology. James is right when he says that pragmatism is a new name for old ways of thinking. The traditional epistemology does not pretend to solve all the problems of philosophy, but it is primary and fundamental. To supplement it there are other branches of philosophy. What differentiates instrumentalism from epistemology is its attempt to combine epistemology with ethics and axiology. Montague is right when he classifies epistemology with logic under methodology, the importance of which we need not repeat here. It would be interesting to see how far Dewey has kept away from traditional epistemology.

The best place to look for his exposition of instrumentalism, we believe, is in his Experimental Logic. "The thesis of the essays", he declared, "is that thinking is instrumental to a control of environment, a control effected through acts which would not be undertaken....without thinking."[31] It is not idealistic because it does not stop at "an otiose affair" of purely intellectual enquiry; it is idealistic in so far as objects of knowledge in their distinctive character as objects of knowledge are determined by intelligence. "Faith in the constructive, the creative, competency of intelligence was the redeeming element in historic idealisms."[32] Dewey also forewarns us that his position in these essays is "frankly realistic in acknowledging that

certain brute existences, detected and laid bare by thinking but in no way constituted out of thought or any mental process, set every problem for reflection and hence serve to test its otherwise merely speculative results."[33]

Knowledge is power in that it interprets the actual and projects the ideal. Furthermore, Dewey tells us that the data of knowledge, strictly speaking, are not objects but means, instrumentalities of knowledge. They are things through which we know rather than things known. "Dewey is after all espistemologically minded", as Lovejoy has told us![34]

Moreover, Dewey has himself said that a theory of knowledge is closely related with metaphysics, since instrumentalism recognizes the objectivity of meaning and of data. "Data in their fragmentary character pose a problem; they also define it. They suggest possible meanings. Whether they indicate them as well as suggest them is a question to be resolved. But the meanings suggested and the problem described by the data cannot be solved without their acknowledgement and use genuinely and existentially suggested...."[35] Formally and materially Dewey comes back to the traditional problems of epistemology.with whatever interest he may have. So much for the general review.

The traditional theory of knowledge fails because it is not synoptic nor empirical. A theory of knowledge in the sense of how to know most "economically, liberally, and effectively", demands a technique of instructive and rewarding inquiry.[36] To achieve this, the empirical situation is necessarily taken into account. Dewey says that contemporary idealism is close to his position because it treats thought or reason as constitu-

tive of experience by means of uniting and constructive functions.[37] In the course of our investigation, we have seen that inference is a ceaseless activity in life. Its supreme function is a mediation in the transformation of the blind, uncertain, and the problematic to the comparatively clear, safe, and smooth continuum, which is the process of life. The intervention of the organism is blind and at random, but intelligence in the form of thinking recognizes the complexity of the situation, inferring what is likely to happen, and projects ideals for efficient control. Knowledge, then, is a memorandum of the appearance of qualitative events, concerned with sequence, co-existences, and relations.[38] This is what Dewey calls, "logical problem of knowledge". This is legitimate. Then, the difference between Dewey's epistemology and the traditional one is this:



Dewey's theory of knowledge, then, is a relation between objects. It is a "realism without monism or dualism". Under whatever form it may appear, the problem of knowledge, including the main traditional problems and the new emphasis, is "there". "How to conduct doubt profitably" is the purpose rather than the technique which Dewey tells us is so important. Is it not a partial statement to say that the object of knowledge is cheifly its objective? We agree with the statement that pragmatism in the instrumentalistic form has made empirical idealism clear and we also agree that pragmatism has made it even more intensively experiential, but it is not inclusively so.

2. Experience and anti-intellectualism.

Since 1870, experience-philosophy has been winning marvelously. However much the conquerors have disagreed in their systems as a whole, in respect to their emphasis upon experience and their attack upon traditional intellectualism they agree. The intuitionism of Bergson, the radical empiricism of James, the "transcendental empiricism" of Bowne, Royce's "absolute" pragmatism, and Dewey's instrumentalism, are the labels which indicate their agreement.

Dewey makes rationalism synonymous with abstract intellectualism. The characteristics of this, as described by him, may be briefly stated thus: the first presupposition is a "faculty of reason" with which mind is endowed. It belongs to the noumenal world and has nothing to do with practical affairs of history. It gives a priori forms of thought. These forms are "ternal patterns" so to speak. When the action of different persons conform to these forms, their activities find formal accord and consistency.[39] He says he is anti-intellectualistic in the sense that he holds such a position to be groundless. The work of the intellect must be judged by its function in actual experience.

The platform of instrumentalism is clearly stated in Dewey's comments on Montague's discussion of "The Method of Pragmatism" in The Ways of Knowing. There he not only points out what is true of instrumentalism, but also what is not true. Instrumentalism holds that it is not necessary to assume a priori forms of thought and that logical forms and structures are distinctions within the process of reflective and experimental inquiry.

Instrumentalism regards action as the way to have

needs satisfied. The esthetic, moral and scientific needs are a continuous development of the practical needs, and thought is the means for non-practical consequences. Both the practical and the non-practical are simultaneous and successive in experience. Knowing and thinking do not constitute the whole of experience; therefore experience is not primarily knolwegde. Intellectualism would take all experiences as having their meanings in the intellectual sphere.

Instrumentalism takes knowledge to be connected with the empirical and the metaphysical, since knowledge has an intrinsic relation with the actual and the ideal in the achievement of consequences.[40] Knowing is only a mode of experience, intrinsic to it. It is not all of experience. Intellectualism starts with the premise of a faculty of reason endowed in mind and concludes that knowledge may be isolated from the empirical.

Let us take a synoptic view of the various factors in Dewey's methodology with respect to the notion of intellect. He definitely and repeatedly says that what he objects to is the isolation of knowledge from its empirical and metaphysical connections, which is a result of certain theories about intellect. What are these theories? They are panlogism, abstract intellectualism, and sensationalism. These theories make intellect as logical structures "nothing but" "eternal ideas", or various arrangements of atoms or sensations. Pragmatism regards sensation or sentiment as the initiation and sustaining situation for practical needs; ideas or ideals as their guide. They are continuous in the process of growth; therefore the contemplative is to be changed to operative; the ideal of truth for truth's sake

is to be supplanted by the Baconian ideal of knowledge as a means of practical control of material conditions.

What is the origin, then, of the opposition between intellectualism and pragmatism in general and Dewey's instrumentalism in particular? The conflict occurs in a struggle between "geneticism" and idealism. Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, William James' Reflex Action and Theism, and Hocking's Meaning of God in Human Experience indicate the fallacy of both intellectualism and the fallacious pretensions of geneticism. The interest in the genesis and in the functioning of the biological and psychological aspects of life is as empirical and practical as the interest in establishing objective truth. The former without the latter is incomplete; the latter without the former is groundless. Montague has passed a good criticism on the partiality and dogmatism of each of these pretensions: "This confusion of the genesis of a belief with its truth and of the genesis of a virtue with its value is morally dangerous as it is intellectually fallacious."[41]



3. Conclusion

The first thing for us to remember as a result of our investigation is the chief transference from the epistemological problem proper to a problem of conduct; that is, from the subject-idea-object relation to that of situation-idea-consequence. There we find at once a contribution and contradiction. The contribution is found in the emphasis of the function of knowledge and its implications in the continuity of life. The contradiction is evident in that Dewey declares the epistemology proper to be idle and yet he is constantly dealing with problems, as it seems to me, equally remote from "orginary" or "common" experience, if not more so than those of historical epistemology. Since reason has an historical affiliation with the abstract and static, Dewey substitutes for it "inference", which is a constant activity of life and of mind. Thus he has done much toward a more explicit analysis of the process of thinking in all experiences. As we have seen, he reverses the order of the notion of intrinsic and instrumental values in the history of thought. Knowledge is made a relation between and object. The necessity of a subject-object relation is avoided. Thus we have the form of "objective relativism", a new technique in epistemology. It is a difficult technique, which requires more "speculative audacity" and "more faith in ideas".

This is the stage upon which we have enetred and upon which he is philosophizing, the stage of "esthetic, scientific, and moral needs". Therefore, Dewey says, "How can instrumentalism which holds that intelligence is the only sure method of achieving the good in consequences be anti-intellectualistic...? It is anti-

intellectualistic only with reference to certain theories about intellect, theories which seem to me to isolate knowledge from its connections, empirical and metaphysical."[42] This indicates an attempt at coherency.

We agree with him that in formulating a theory of knowledge we must take into account the empirical situations and histories and the metaphysical world ground, a complete logic of experience. But the account of the connections must be a coherent one rather than a "genetic" one. In other words, the results of analysis and the continuity of the elements of experience no doubt afford better insight for the understanding of experience, but philosophy ought to go further to the meaning of the whole. This Dewey does not do, for he openly gives up the question of objective truth.

C. Experience and Value.

Axiology has been one of the great emphases in the "philosophy of the recent past", among divergent schools and systems of thought, one of which is pragmatism. The theory of value is the hub of Dewey's philosophy, a great contribution to current thought. But "no one can hope to understand Dewey's theory of value", T. V. Smith tells us, "who does not grasp rather fully the meaning that he attaches to the term 'experience'".[43]

1. The criterion of the theory of value.

While Aristotle points out that man by nature demands to know, Dewey lays stress on the end of knowledge: failure and success are great categories of life. "Our inalienable

concern is with good and bad, prosperity and failure, and hence choice. We are constructed to think in terms of value, bearing upon welfare. The ideal of welfare varies, but the influence of interest in it is pervasive and inescapable....Now this fact seems to be of great importance for philosophy; it indicates that in some sense all philosophy is a branch of morals."[44] Then, pragmatism goes back to Kant and Lotze is evident. This making morals fundamental is a common ingredient of empirical idealism and pragmatism. This is certainly true to the spirit of Bowne, Sorley, as well as James.

The process of ideas calling forth willed activities or conduct is moral experience. It is a part and an important part of experience as a whole, since there are constant and apparent contradictions and incompatibilities demanding reconciliation. We bring experience into the realm of value when we consider and evaluate the incompatible and discrepant ends. But it is in experience that we find "continuity" of the "mental" and the "overt" and in activity we find continuity of the "outer" and the "inner" and the "how" and the "what" of activity. One of these dualities can neither be real nor significant apart from the other. Hence a synoptic view of experience seems to be the criterion for pragmatism, and social the supreme category. Dewey says, "The social end is the rational end."[45] Where, when, and how has this insight arrived? His praise of the social implication in Kant's "maxim" is not of small significance. Dewey says, "he (Kant) insists especially that the social relations of an act bring out its general purport." He goes on to say that "a right end is one which can be projected harmoniously into the widest and braodest

survey of life which the individual can make."[47] What is the source of the "rational end"? He makes use of the principle of contradiction and asserts that goods or values are objective because they are interpenetrating and can be regarded as a "system of nature". But he says that this principle of contradiction is to point out a particular act, proposal, or suggestion as a portion of a connected whole of life, and to make real to us that no man, no act, and no satisfaction of any man falls or stands by itself. Idea is a process. Social is actual; the actual is the rational! What aims to emphasize is the logical outcome of true individualism. The social is the rational end; the rational end is also the social end. But the crucial point is the harmony and expansion of the "capacities and desires of the self", as he tells us, "in a cooperative whole".[48] It is a misunderstanding of Dewey's position to neglect his attempt at coherence. He himself has told us that "comprehensiveness and consistency" ought to be the criterion of value.[49]

2. The continuity of judgment and value.

The key to the understanding of Dewey's theory of value lies in the understanding of the meaning he gives to experience. The central point in Dewey's theory of experience, as we have seen, is to abolish dualisms and establish continuity. Let us study the continuity of judgment and value. The table of values in Dewey's formulation is very simple. The immediate values are possessed and enjoyed. These are "intrinsic values"; they "are not objects of judgment, and they cannot(as intrinsic) be compared, or regarded as greater and less, better or worse. They are invaluable."[50] But when choice is necessary, there is

an order of preferences. "Things judged or passed upon have to be estimated in relation to some third thing, some further end. With respect to that, they are means or instrumental values."[51] This seems a reversion of the historical meaning of intrinsic and instrumental. According to Dewey's usage, the intrinsic is converted into the instrumental upon its being evaluated. But when a consummation is reached, the instrumental returns "home" again to the intrinsic realm, which is immediately had and enjoyed.

The relation of judgment and value is of significance then. We have just been told that judgment is determinator in the occasion of choice or preference, and that it always refers to a "third thing", namely, the end. Judgment or reflective thought "is derivative and secondary" because it has a humble origin and it serves only as an instrument. "It comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of something."[52] Dewey is right when he says that "the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent truth, and the relation of truth to reality" consitutes "the heart of the logical problem".[53] But the relation of judgment and value is our immediate concern. Judgment is a practical affair; therefore it is not complete in itself, but always "for the sake of" determining what it is to be done. This also implies that value is to be given by future action, itself "conditioned upon (varying with) the judgment". It is action which will actualize the potential or immediate values. Action is to be determined by the judgment. Judgment or reflective thought, then, functions as a medium between the immediate and its further actualization.

Value, on the other hand, finds its realization

or transformation in human values. Unless there is "occasion" for desire, deliberation, decision, there is no value. Thinking is a "natural event"; therefore desire, deliberation and choice are not subjective phenomena. Reflection is a process wherein things get values.[54]

3. Value and teleology.

Values in the 'intrinsic" form are 'invaluable',[55] but upon judgment in the act of choice, there emerges differences of intrinsic and instrumental values, for judgment necessaitates a "third thing, some further end". Intrinsic values are integral "ingredients" of experience; each has an "irreplacable function in experience"; hence no "heirarchy of values" in this sense can be established. However, they may be treated as means for further ends.[56] The logical question would be as to the nature of the "third thing" or the end.

"The act", Dewey says, "passes away; but its significance abides in the increment of meaning given to further growth".[57] To live in the ideal is to live in meaning, in the recognition of the meaning of acts. In other words, to idealize experience is not in vain; for new qualities are given to it in consciousness, which it does not possess in actuality. In connection with this, he says that time and memory are true artists; reality is becoming more real to the person with "freer imagination" and "less controlled by concrete actualities".[58] An ideal is also recognition of the "final value" with its "unique and inexhaustible" meanings of the special situations of our experience. Life, then, carries with it intrinsic values; it has a great purpose to fulfill. Here, we see the great contribution

made by Dewey that after these are recognized, the task lies in the realization of the specific values. The specific empirical end is the social end, which is rational. The classical theories all set up an "ultimate good" or end, and make it "co-extensive" with all the rest of life's significant concerns. The conversion of the unavowed morals or wisdom into cosmology is one of the great philosophical fallacies.

What, then, are some of the specific ends? Is there any standard or categorical imperative? Dewey says, "So act as to increase the meaning of present experience."[60] But he warns us not look for a general formula of progress for we shall not know where to look for it until we give up the search for it.[61] The moral issue occurs within nature; therefore it is more reasonable to take the character of natural events as the basis for the interpretation of morals. This reverses the order of the traditional formulation: from morals to cosmology, and it contradicts the pragmatic stand: ethics precedes metaphysics. The world is both hazardous and stable; indicating neither sheer flux nor ultimate permanence. The union of them is the condition of all experienced satisfaction.[62] Experience classified under good or eveil are only functions and distinctions within a growing self in a changing world. But these differences have meaning only in judgment.[63]

In spite of the fact that Dewey warns us not to attempt to look for a general formula of progress, he postulates a "social category" which is "to incorporate the physical, organic, and psychological" and thereby the dualism of reducing the objectivity of moral distinctions and judgments to private preferences or to a transcendental entity will lose its meaning.[64] Dewey says

that it is historical claim of philosophy that it occupies itself with the ideal of wholes and the whole. The social may not be the whole, but it is the widest and richest manifestation accessible to our observation. "It is this ringing", T. V. Smith tells us, "for man to live in his own world and this jusfification for his so doing, that constitutes the essence of Dewey's philosophy. While other have cried 'lo, here; lo there!', Dewey has insisted that the kingdom of good is within human experience."[66] But "the meaning of God" is also to be found "in human experience". Dewey has openly disregarded a philosophy of religion, but when he does go into the problem, he is far less humanistic that his followers would wish him to be. Dewey says, "The consciousness of this encompassing infinity of connections is ideal....It is a significance to be felt, appreciated".[67] The life of the community affords a good symbol for the relation of the individual and the whole which claims him and dignifies him. In the presence of religion "we put off our mortality and live in the universal."[68] Though this consciousness cannot be intellectualized, the "emotional appreciation of it is won by those who are willing to think."[69] Smith's statement, then, is overenthusiastic!

Höffding, in his Philosophy of Religion, makes conservation of values the central axiom of religion. Moral values and the idea of God are inseparable. Faith in a Being as the creator and sustainer of values softens the outlines of nature and affords "joyful emancipation" for the individual. A few familiar lines may express the meaning of God in human ex-experience:

All day thy wings have fanned,
At that far height, the cold, thin atmosphere,
Yet stoop not, weary, to the welcome land,
Though the dark night is near.

.....

He who, from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone,
Will lead my steps aright. (70)

4. Dualism of valuation and evaluation.

Distinctions of values are brought about by judgment. Otherwise, values are intrinsic and invaluable. The issue, then, lies in the question whether the discriminated values are real values or not. He tells us that critical appreciation is the cradle of values. Even the 'religious' values are to be won by those who are willing to think. The intrinsic values, then, are immediately given in experience, and therefore they are objective. In our evaluation, we realize the values implicitly given in experience. The intrinsic value must be viewed as a quality, a potential quality; the perpetuated value is an "affair". Means and fulfilments have different qualities, but their difference has nothing to do with the immediacy or intrinsicalness of value-quality.[71] Hence, a dualism of valuation and evaluation or appreciation and reflection! Dewey thinks that he has solved this dualism either when it is viewed as a constant rhythm "of perchings and flights" or when it is included in the "infinite or zero" experience.

5. Conclusion.

Axiology is inherent in the modern philosophy of experience. This is more evident in pragmatism, especially in

Dewey's thought. Methodologically, he attempts a coherence criterion but applies it imperfectly. The imperfection lies in the over emphasis on the social at the expense of the personal, on the here and the now---the particular---at the expense of the future, and the more-than-human values--the universal. Metaphysically, he is devotedly naturalistic and intellectualistic. The genetic interest often leads him to positivistic or dogmatic a priori assumptions. He suffers from the "specialist fallacy". Experience for Dewey is like the Absolute for Royce; in experience, as in the Absolute, everything is found and explained. Axiologically, his general position is close to G. E. Moore's theory of value; i.e., systematic objectivity. It is a naturalistic objectivity. They are similar on the basis that they both hold to the inseparability of means and ends in a total value experience, that value, in the intrinsic sense, is "indefinable", and that Moore's "organic whole or unity" is similar to Dewey's "organic continuity".[72]

Chapter V

THE CRITIQUE OF JOHN DEWEY

A. General Evaluation.

To find what experience is and means is to philosophize; therefore the investigation into the meaning of experience is an imperative discipline for students of philosophy. This investigation is limited to the meaning of experience in the thought of John Dewey. The primary task is expository, to be followed imperatively and inevitably by a critical estimation. The former, therefore, necessarily has involved research into all of Dewey's writings, and decision upon the most relevant passages from his important works. As to the latter, we have three sources: the history of thought, the critics of Dewey, and actual experiences--- all consituting a court of appeal.

The common claim of all philosophies is that their office is the interpretation of experience. Therefore to estimate the entire system of thought is to find the meaning of experience in any philosophy. This is especially true with Dewey for the reason that pragmatism is supposedly an experience-philosophy and that Dewey's interpretation of experience is known to be more "novel" than any of his contemporaries. We have made our excursion and we have seen the "novelties", and we are ready to take a synoptic view.

1. His contributions.

It is true that there are few new ideas, but there are new emphases, whereby new meanings are created and discovered. Dewey's meaning of experience implies, first of all, some new

emphases. First, we find the emphasis upon an inclusive view of experience; i.e., all phases of experience must be accounted for. True to the spirit of his age----science is absolute----Dewey adheres to the denotative method so that everything may be genetically accounted for. Everything is suspected except that which goes under the name of sciences. Under the law of denotation, many facts which refuse to obey, are thrown away (exiled). It is, however, a radical reform; philosophy is made to obey the same common law. The methods of science and philosophy are one.

Then, we find the emphasis on continuity and activity. Life is an active process; reality is history in its entirety. Where there is life, there is experience. Living means experiencing. Experience suggests the whole diverse interacting elements of the objective world. Continuity and activity are inseparable. This "objective world" is ever becoming. In the growth-process, Dewey shows us three plateaus of interaction or three levels of life: Matter, life, and mind. This is no other than the natural world in which we live. Man is one of the natural objects; whatever he does is one of the natural events. He is obligated to undergo with the rest of the world. Therefore, adaptation and adjustment are the dominant activities of man. The higher the being is the more he controls the environment. This natural world is wide enough for him to live in both the actual and the ideal. This emphasis brings home the pessimistic touch, the meliroistic ideal, and the humanistic tendency. Function thereby becomes one of the chief categories. This has afforded a great dynamic to the docial service cry during the last two decades.

The consequences of the emphasis on activity and con-

tinuity is to connect the historical dualisms; if they cannot be connected, they are to be abandoned. Dewey has done both. This coup d'état of the persistent problems of philosophy has made philosophy more popular than heretofore. President Butler of Columbia has described pragmatism as the common-sense philosophy, "which, when unfolded to the man in the street, causes him to howl with great delight, because he at last understands things."[1] This experience of "delightful emancipation" has been shared even by philosophers! But one needs to be reminded that this is only a promise and a bait! No doubt, philosophy is brought much closer to humanity than ever before. Philosophy serves as a critique of civilization; the philosopher as a social servant. The notion that every experience has intrinsic worth, supplies added force for the argument of pluralism,---social, moral, political, and metaphysical.

The functional interpretation of experience goes hand in hand with biological categories such as adaptation, adjustment, control of environment, and meaning of life. These problems constitute the corner stones of functionalism. This is a consequence of the attempt to make use of scientific data as a basis for philosophy. This, as Dewey has told us, constitutes the origin of the new conception of experience, based upon psychology and biology. One of the outstanding forms which holds this method of interpreting experience is behaviorism. Behaviorism, of course, is of several varieties. Dewey takes it chiefly as a methodology rather than a metaphysical principle. He prefers to call his position "social behaviorism", which is a combination of energism and associationism. It is true that Dewey holds naturalism in the

evolutionary form, but it is a philosophy of ideas, psychological idealism or instrumentalism; a philosophy of activity, functionalism and axiology.

Things are held to be true because they are workable. But mere workability is not all. How does it work and for what end does it work? Let us point out the significance of this position as a branch of morals shows us that everything is a moral one, in that it is an attitude, a preference, and a choice. These moral activities are manifested upon critical judgment. The latter, in turn, has its significance in an actual or experimental situation. The relation of experience and intellect falls within one continuous process.

"Appearance" have intrinsic worth; they are to be saved. To do this one must abolish the dualism of appearance and reality. This will not brought about if "reality" has "degrees", as in the idealistic position. Therefore there is a dire necessity for the notion of immanence in the interpretation of experience. This Dewey asserts very definitely, though at times with great hesitation and precaution. When he does assert it, as he does most of the time, he certainly makes it more "concrete" in that he is manifesting his speculative or technical interest, and labors to establish a coherent metaphysics. This aspect of Dewey's thought ceratinly has helped to make idealism more empirical and clear. This also justifies the constant warning given to Dewey not to let the camel's nose (idealism) come into his tent. Dewey holds the hypothesis that immanent meanings exist in consequence of the repeated successful outcome of referential or evidential meanings. This is stated in the light of his genetic interest.

But existentially or metaphysically speaking, experience is the World Ground, and values are intrinsic, that is, immanental. Dewey, in place of teleology, lays stress upon "tendency" and "organization". To realize them is to "sense" the "tendency". and to articulate the organization, and to formulate delicate technicality in order to control and to adapt human experience to a far and wide environment of meanings. This environment makes it possible to live in the ideal and in the universal, where we find the intrinsic value of each individual and the significance of each experience in the infinite whole, a community of equally metaphysical beings.

The intrinsic character of Dewey's thought, then, is willingness to abandon insoluble problems and willingness to think through problems relevant to human affairs. Dewey always begins---though not without the prejudice inherent in the finite mind---his philosophizing with a historical criticism, and quite often he attempts to bring about a synthesis of the seemingly contradictory hypotheses. Reflection gives the meaning of the thing; meanings are values. Perpetuated values are to be won by hard work. In other words, the intelligibility of experience is the problem of life and the problem of philosophy. Dewey's conception of art is very intellectualistic in that it is a "criticism". Religion, an emotional appreciation, is also meaningful only to those who are "willing to think". What he objects to is abstract view of life. The most inclusive end is the one which is valid for thought, right for conduct, and cultivated for appreciation.

Pragmatism, as a whole, then, has been more interested in a philosophy of life and in philosophy as a critique of

civilization than in anything else. This interest, as we have seen in the course of our investigation, is expressed by Dewey in his effort to combine empiricism (in the traditional sense) and idealism. Moreover, his "immediatism" often affords insight to his social and ethical mysticism. If we view it sympathetically, we may find a "philosophy of play" or "moral holidays". This encourages a culture of leisure instead of idleness; affords a place for the feelings, values, and ends (consummation) as well as conduct, ideas, and the means of livings. Class superiority has no place in a democratic philosophy. Dewey emphasizes meaning rather than mechanistic conventionality. The appreciation of the "flower in the crannied wall" has its meaning only in relation to other phases of experience.

2. New problems generated.

The value of most of the contributions of new systems of thought often lies in the new emphases. The new emphasis may be at once a contribution in that it implies discovery through insight and reorganization and creative activity in its uniqueness, and a generation of new problems because emphasis often travels with bias and prejudice and shifts the center of interest. Dewey's new emphases are no exception; they give rise to many new problems which are to be recognized, at least.

The great emphasis on continuity, in opposition to dualisms and degrees of values and realities, necessitates an inclusive category, experience. Experience must also be viewed in its immediacy for duality or dichotomy is implicit in reflection. Immediate experience is a natural evolution where reality is in its on-going. But reflective experience is a well establish-

ed fact! Then, a dichotomy within experience! Dewey, then, eludes very skillfully the trap in the front, but he falls into the very same trap from behind. This has to be answered by Dewey or his able followers. Experience, in the inclusive sense, has am implicit duality, at least qualitative: immediate and reflective in Dewey's fashion, or "enjoyed" and "contemplated", in Alexander's formulation.

Dewey refuses to project moral experiences into cosmological metaphysics. On the contrary, he advises us to look for the traits of the cosmos wherein we find a clue to the meaning of our life-problems. The characters of nature are at once secure and hazardous. Objects prior to reflections have already fallen into certain groupings; but the predominant trait of nature is its uncanny uncertainty. It is a scene of risk and demands control. Dewey, following the empirical denotation, sees that objects have already fallen into certain groupings. If the world is one of absolute risk and chaos, there is no risk at all, for risk implies faith in the possibility of secureness. While pragmatism emphasizes the necessity of examining life if it is to be lived worthily, and of realizing the possible ideals implicit in every empirical situation, nevertheless, it refuses to make any hypothesis as to the meaning and the end of the whole. The failure lies in the neglect of the empirical demand for a teleological explanation of life. If life is worth living, and the values of living are to be conserved, we need faith in an ultimate prupose. Dewey has given us a description of nature but fails to tell us its meaning. Values are planted and cultivated in nature. Where are they conserved? They are created in shared

experiences. Will they be conserved in society or in nature? The challenge of William James has been answered only partially.

Experience is made an "absolute", which demands "respect" and "intellectual piety". Respect for experience affords faith in its possibilities, where values are planted and cultivated and intellectual piety toward experience commands the direction of life and of toleration and cooperation among men, the "centers of experience". Patronage, domination, and imposition will disappear, giving place to a society of free persons. This is a great moral and intellectual, and social idealism, has considerable affinity with theistic idealism, but experience in its present form alone does not seem to be able to serve as the supreme category for reality. If the present form in its "common sense" is the whole of reality, are we not in a vicious circle when philosophy professes to interpret experience? The countenance of the Great Centre of experience has been blurred by the traditional apologetics and intellectualistic speculation; the appeal to experience certainly has served as a great challenge to find the meaning of God and that of life in experience. Dewey says that we must conceive the world in terms which make it possible for devotion, piety, love, beauty, and mystery; and that this needs evidence, which implies objective reference for it is intrinsic.

Dewey makes a distinction between the social and physical environment of human experience; therefore the social as a category implies an objective reference of some sort. He holds a numerical metaphysical pluralism, whose significance is destroyed by the absolute experience genetically accounted for.

We agree with him that the starting point of philosophy is the here and the now, but we consider it unempirical to assert that these forms of experience are final and all. Dewey clearly points out the mergence of duality and plurality in reflection; but he fails to establish or to find the center of unity and plurality. He did assert the central position of the self in all experienced contexts, and like Woodbridge, he says this is so evident that we need not say much about it. Dewey made only once the appeal to direct self-experience. It is significant that he failed to return to it in later reflection. Santayana points out the "quasi-Hegelian tendency" in Dewey in that the individual is dissolved into social functions and the actual made transitional. Dewey says when you find yourself in a dilemma concerning a problem, evoke an actual experience and then look for the meaning of the problem and its implications. This agrees with Hodgson's position that philosophy is to be based upon a "subjective analysis of experience". This also necessitates, at least in reflection, the subject-object distinction. Finally, Dewey is driven to make matter, life, and mind a uniform realization of the one single principle, Experience. Other teleologies are denied, but we have a teleology of experience.

Reality has a content aside from the activities of the organism. On the plane of mind there is the realm of meanings. One of the criticisms which Rogers made upon Dewey before the appearance of Experience and Nature was that activities of the organism in Dewey's thought seems to be identical with reality. Since then Dewey's thought shows a shift of interest and a change of position. Positivism and metaphysics are often

the "perchings and flights" in Dewey's thought.

We agree with Dewey most heartily that we are of the same nature with reality, yet we are distinct objects in nature. He seems to be coming to recognize more the subject-object relation, for he says that we must have distinctions in practice. An act of resolve without a subject, as Laird asserts, is a contradiction in terms. Dewey grants that experience may be viewed objectively and subjectively. The subjective view of experience is chiefly the "human attitude and interest.....record and interpretation". This may be an event in nature, but the fact that it manifests human attitude and interest and the fact that it is both a record and interpretation suffice to emphasize the distinction.

To sum up, then, we have the crucial problems which have been generated from Dewey's new formulation of experience:

1. Dualism of experience:

   The dualism of---mediate and immediate experience,
   appreciation and cognition,
   the directly had and the indirect,
   non-reflective and reflective.

2. The problem of value:

   Dichotomy of instrumental and intrinsic,
   Meaningless events and meaningful objects,
   Conservation of value and objectivity of value.

3. Problem of the function of the individual in unifying experience.

4. Can the description of the traits of nature be an intelligent explanation of the cosmos, and the clue to human and moral experience?

5. The subject-object relation is a problem which Dewey has thrown away too casually.

6. The universal question of the ultimate prupose of life is neglected. Causality is neglected.

7. The problem of the new "Absolute", Experience, is left.

B. Conclusion.

The meaning of experience in the thought of John Dewey is fundamental and is the hub of his whole system of thought. His interpretation of experience is highly speculative in that it includes methodology, metaphysics (which is cosmology for him), and axiology. Experience is inclusive because it means whatever happens in the universe. Every happening has its intrinsic worth, but in the on-going of life preference is imperative, for there are rough junctures resulting from interaction, which must be smoothed over; hence his instrumentalism. Judgment among the preferences is necessary. The intrinsic values are converted into instrumental values brcause judgment always implies a third thing, an end. This is experience on the plane of meaning. Meanings occur when natural events are in interaction. But there is a non-reflective plane or stage of experience where values are immediately had or enjoyed. The immediacy of existence is ineffable yet unknown and unknowable. Reality or experience is Becoming, the life-growth-process. Qualities of values are "invaluable" for they are "intrinsic". The principle of continuity is imperative and evident because it is a practical affair to have distinctions and generalities and because in activity the distinctions and generalities are seen to be phases of the same continuous process of life.

Experience, then, as a methodology cautions us that everything experienced must be found somewhere and sometime. The synonym for this method is the empirical or denotative method, which points out where, when, and how a designated description

has arrived. When it denotes something specific and differential, it is a principle of criticism and estimation. Dewey attempts a coherence criterion, for both rational and empirical are one in the life-process. Denotation, in other words, in this sense implies connotation; the descriptive side and the normative side are combined. But a limit is set to the most inclusive experience or experience method; that is, experience is the here and the now, which has the deposit of the past and the potentiality for the future. The carriers of the values from the past are not specifically endowed entities. Every activity, physical or mental, is a natural event. Each can be denotatively found.

Experience as a metaphysics affords an "infinite" term which signifies both the potential and the actual qualities of experience. Experience "suggests about itself", that is, experience is identified with nature, the diverse interacting elements of the objective world. To find the traits of nature or this objective world is the problem of metaphysics. The predominant trait of nature is its hazardousness in the process of becoming. This is fundamental to our moral and practical problem, the problem of control, of adaptation, and of adjustment. Contrary to the pragmatic tradition, that ethics precedes metaphysics and to his own assertion that all philosophy is a branch of morals, Dewey has made metaphysics prior to ethics. But his metaphysics is limited by the practical or functional interest and suffers from abstraction. Moreover, he regards choice and judgment as having nothing to do with existential and metaphysical nature of of experience. He separates the moral and axiological questions from the metaphysical so that the problem of ultimate teleology

has no footing in his system.

The emphasis on the "situation" is one of the outstanding characteristics of Dewey's thought. Ideals are the possibilities of natural events. They are continuous with the natural, the problematic situation. Meliorism and opportunism, and nothing more, is the resultant theory. However, Dewey has set up a criterion which is applicable to every situation. The individual with his implicit critical judgment ought to go through a more formal discipline whereby he may convert the immediate values into those which would be valid for thought, right for conduct, and cultivated for appreciation. Respect for experience and intellectual piety and fidelity toward experience are the foundation for a "great community of free persons". Dewey's interpretation of experience, then, is a philosophy of life. Aspiration for the whole meaning of experience engenders a "joyful emancipation".

Dewey's experience-philosophy began as a protest against any isolated and self-contained reality but has ended by setting up just such an entity, namely, Event. A paradox! "For the total occurrence in all its changing complexity has been substituted for one aspect of itself which is now held to possess that concrete reality which has been claimed for Event."[2] G. P. Adams points out that more crucial and primary than the question of what the immediately given is, is the "possibility of any self-contained entity of whatever sort of being thus given."[3] The essential objective of the new formulation of experience, as we have seen, aims at "continuity" over against dualism. The protest against dichotomy and bifurcation has paved the way for

new dichotomies and bifurcations.' Another paradox!

The culmination of a curious combination of voluntarism, hedonism, and modern psychology is found in the much-discussed theory, "immediate empiricism" or "immediate experience", which is more treasured by pragmatism and realism than by any other systems of thought. Dewey tells us that "the realism of immediate qualities contains everything of worth and significance"[4]; "immediacy of existence is ineffable".[5] With this thesis, Dewey speaks of "the conspicuous and vivid presence of immediate qualities and of meanings."[6] Piatt shows that Dewey has on several occasions admitted elements of thought and some degree of meaning in immediate experience.[7] But Hall, Murphy, and others have also pointed out that Event is often set up as the "unknown god"[8], and as such it is a characterless or meaningless content. It commits what Adams calls, "the fallacy of detached and self-contained immediacy". Dewey tells us that the immediately given is not the good, the desirable. The ulterior, the reached-and-justified-by-reflection, the desired and the reasonable goods, the cultivated, and the beliefs de jure are of wider contexts and structures. But the latter are the continuations of the former.

His overemphasis on "genetic continuity" strengthens his naturalism, but misses the dictations of experience---more faith in ideas and ideals. His undue wholesale castigation of historical attempts of philosophy compels him to fight a straw man of diversified concreteness and suffers from the "fallacy of mis-placed concreteness", as Whitehead puts it. Dreams and fancies have a place in Dewey's experience, but the problem of

the conservation of values, the problem of immortality, and the interest in "whither mankind" are omitted from his interpretation of experience. In his "flanking movement" and his pre-occupation with clearing the tub, the baby is poured out with the bath. However, Dewey has made a new path by his new emphases and new formulations, and has stimulated more thought. In view of the fact that he is still living and vigorous in thinking and that his followers are interpreting and developing his thought, one may say that the neglected problems and the generated problems may come to solution.

C. Summary in Propositions.

The result of this investigation is summarized in ten propositions, which include statements of Dewey's interpretation of experience, the significant contributions in his theory of experience, and new difficulties in his formulation of the experience-philosophy.

1. Experience is the whole of life-process which is immediately given and ineffable.

2. Experience is absolute in the sense that it is identical with reality, "suggests about itself", and is conceived through itself.

3. Experience is an "infinite" term, including events (the metaphysical elements, existence, explicandum) and objects (events with meanings, explanatio).

4. Experience is of intrinsic worth, and contains specific values, which require critical judgment in their realization.

5. The emphasis upon continuity and activity has reconciled humanism and intellectualism.

6. The emphasis upon empirical method affords a reconciliation of science and philosophy, and encourages freedom and plasticity of thought.

7. His protest against dichotomy and bifurcation has paved the way for new dichotomies and bifurcations such as events and objects, existence and meaning, moral and metaphysical, or natural and practical.

8. Dewey's experience-philosophy began as a protest against any isolated and self-contained reality but has ended by setting up just such an entity, namely, Event.

9. Contrary to the pragmatic tradition that ethics precedes metaphysics and to his own assertion that all philosophy is a branch of morals, Dewey has made metaphysics prior to ethics.

10. Contrary to the empirical spirit and the all-inclusive experience, certain manifestations of experience find no recognition, such as the problem of conservation of values, the problem of immortality, and the interest in "whither mankind".

REFERENCES

Introduction

1. Durant, Will, The Story of Philosophy, p. 566.
2. Ibid., p. 566.
3. James, William, Collected Essays and Reviews, pp. 445, 446.
4. Durant, Will, loc. cit., p. 567.
5. Han, Yu-Shan, "Some Tendencies of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy", J. Phil. 25(1928), p. 508.
6. Quotation cited on the paper cover of the book, published by the Open Court Publishing Co.
7. Beard, Charles, Whither Mankind, Chapter 13.
8. Dewey, John, "Impressions of Russia", The New Republic 57(1928), November and December issues.
9. Cell, George, Die Philosophie in Nordamerika, Ueberweg, Grundriss V, p. 374.
10. Studies in the History of Ideas, Vol. II, p. 357.
11. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 142.
12. " " The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 55.
13. Cf. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 74; Experience and Nature, p. 275.
14. Durant, Will, loc. cit., p. 574; Dewey, John, Creative Intelligence, p. 4.
15. Dewey, John, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?". in Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James, pp. 79-80.
16. " " "Experiment in Education", The New Republic Vol. x, No. 118(1917), pp. 15-16.
17. " " Creative Intelligence, p. 5; Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 26; Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 45.
18. " " Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 1.
19. Durant, Will, loc. cit., p. 569.
20. Rogers, A. K., English and American Philosophy since 1800, p. 388.
21. Lovejoy, A.O., "Pragmatism against Pragmatists", in Essays in Critical Realism, p. 35.
22. " " loc. cit., p. 52. Cf. Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 88, 103.
23. Dewey, John, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 254-255.
24. Lovejoy, A.O., loc. cit., p. 57.
25. Dewey, John, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 104.
26. " " Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 50.
27. Lovejoy, A.O., loc. cit., p. 49.
28. " " "Pragmatism and Interactionism", J. Phil. 17 (1920), pp. 591, 594-595.
29. Howard, D.T., Dewey's Logical Theory, p. 6.
30. Santayana, G., "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics", J. Phil. 22(1925), pp. 673-688.
31. " " Ibid., p. 677.
32. " " " p. 674.

33. Murphy, A. E., "Objective Relativism", Phil. Rev. 36(1927), p. 125.
34. " " Ibid., p. 129.
35. " " " p. 131.
36. " " " p. 141.
37. Hall, E. W., "Some Meanings of Meaning in Experience and Nature", J. Phil. 35(1928), pp. 169-181.
38. Haldane,(Viscount), Human Experience, p. v.
39. " " loc. cit., p. 11.
40. Schinz, Albert, Anti-pragmatism, p. xv.
41. " " loc. cit., p. 93.
42. " " " " p. 100.
43. " " " " p. 104.
44. " " " " p. 108.
45. Pratt, James,B., What is Pragmatism, pp. 12-14.
46. " " Ibid., p. 98.
47. Dewey, John, "Reality and the Criterion of Truth for Ideas", Mind 16(1907), pp. 335-357.
48. " " "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism", J. Phil. 2(1905), pp. 397-399.
49. Pratt, James, B., loc. cit., p. 150.
50. James, Wlliam, Varieties of Religious Experience, last chapter.
51. Moore, A.W., Pragmatism and Its Critics, p. 15.
52. " " Ibid,, pp. 21-22.
53. " " " p. 70.
54. " " " p. 234.
55. Leroux, E., Le Pragmatisme Américain et Anglais, p. 146.
56. " " Ibid., p. 147.
57. " " " pp. 189-190.
58. " " " p. 223.
59. " " " p. 264.
60. Hart, Joseph, Inside Experience, pp. 26-28.
61. " " Ibid., p. 97.
62. " " " p. 64.
63. " " " p. 69.
64. " " " p. 120.

Chapter I

1. James, William, Pluralistic Universe, p. 20.
2. " " Ibid., p. 21.
3. Dewey, John, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 25.
4. " " Ibid., p. 26.
5. " " " p. 50.
6. " " " p. 35.
7. " " Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, pp. 199, 204.
8. " " Ibid., p. 225.
9. James, William, Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 446. Reprinted from the Psychological Bulletin 1904, 1, pp. 1-5.
10. Perry, R. B., Present Philosophical Tendencies, (Class Notes)
11. Leroux, E., loc. cit., p. 147.
12. Dewey, John, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 542.
13. " " The New Republic, Dec. 12, 1928.
14. " " Democracy and Education, pp. 338-339.
15. " " Ibid., p. 144.
16. " " The Public and Its Probelms, pp. 185-186; 192-194; 3-7.
17. Ratner, Joseph, The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 438.
18. Dewey, John, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 12-16.
19. " " Ibid., pp. 12-16.
20. " " Human Nature and Conduct, preface.
21. Montague, W.P., The Ways of Knowing, pp. 31-35.
22. Brightman, E.S., An Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 212-213.
Hoernlé, R.F.A., Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, pp. 9-10.
23. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 398.
24. " " Ibid., p. 403.
25. " " " p. 407.
26. " " Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 101.
27. " " Ibid., p. 135.
28. Sellars, R. W., Evolutionary Naturalism, p. 12.
29. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, paper cover.
30. Ratner, Joseph, loc. cit., p. 25.
31. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 159.
32. " " Ibid., p. 191.
33. " " " p. 324.
34. " " The New Republic 32(1922), p. 10.
35. " " Ibid., p. 9.
36. " " Experience and Nature, p. 174.
37. " " Ibid., p. 325.
38. " " " p. 166.
39. Murphy, A. E., "Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead", Phil. Rev. 36(1927), p. 123.
40. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 421.
41. Whitehead, A.N., Principles of Relativity, p. 62.
42. " " Science and Modern World, p. 124.
43. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 159.

44. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 71.
45. " " Ibid., p. 101.
46. Whitehead, A.N., The Concept of Nature, p. 59.
47. " " Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, p. 63.
48. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 85.
49. Whitehead, A.N., Science and Modern World, p. 132.
50. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 319; J. Phil. 23 (1928), p. 256.
51. Whitehead, A.N., Concept of Nature, p. 141.
52. Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 262.
53. " " Experience and Nature, p. 166.
54. " " Ibid., p. 174.
55. Whitehead, A.N., Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 136.
56. " " Science and Modern World, p. 221.
57. Murphy, A. E., "Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead", Phil. Rev. 26(1927), p. 131.
58. Whitehead, A.N., Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 14.
59. Dewey, John, "Meaning and Existence", J. Phil. 25(1928), p.347
60. Whitehead, A.N., Class-notes of Seminar in Metaphysics.
61. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 174.
62. " " Ibid., 190.
63. " " "Meaning and Existence", J. Phil. 25(1928), p.348
64. Whitehead, A.N., Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 63.
65. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 275.
66. " " Ibid., 29.
67. Whitehead, A.N., Concept of Nature, p. 185.
68. Dewey, John, loc. cit. p. 72.
69. Whitehead, A.N., Concept of Nature, p. 65; cf. 66.
70. " " Ibid., p. 186.
71. Cf. ref. 50.
72. Dewey, John, "Meanings and Existence", J. Phil. 25(1928), p. 347.
73. Ratner, Joseph, loc. cit., p. 35.
74. " " " " p. 82.
75. Nietzsche, F., Thus Spake Zarathustra.
76. Dewey, John, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality", The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, First series, III, 2.
77. " " Ibid., pp. 135-136.
78. " " Human Nature and Conduct, p. 280.
79. " " "Moral Theory and Practice", Int. J. Eth 1 (1891), pp. 199-202.
80. " " Ibid., p. 203.
81. " " Experience and Nature, p. 358.
82. " " Ibid., p. 358.
83. " " " p. 375.

Chapter II

1.	Rogers, A. K.,	A Student's History of Philosophy, p. 2.
2.	Leroux, E.,	loc. cit., p. 141.
3.	Cell, G. C.,	Die Philosophie in Nordamerika, Ueberweg, Grundriss V; Class-notes on American Thought.
4.	Dewey, John,	Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 62.
5.	" "	Ibid., p. 64.
6.	" "	" p. 71.
7.	" "	" p. 72.
8.	Ratner, J.,	loc. cit., p. 552.
9.	Dewey, John,	Experimental Logic, p. 72.
10.	" "	Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 73.
11.	" "	Ibid., p. 118.
12.	" "	" p. 124.
13.	Kant, E.,	Kritik der reinen Vernienft, 2nd ed. p. 75.
14.	Dewey, John,	Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 272.
15.	" "	Ibid.
16.	" "	Democracy and Education, p. 323.
17.	" "	Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 90-91.
18.	" "	Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 273.
19.	" "	Ibid,, pp. 293-4.
20.	" "	" p. 299.
21.	" "	" p. 206.
22.	" "	" p. 207.
23.	" "	" p. 208.
24.	" "	" "
25.	" "	" "
26.	" "	" p. 217.
27.	" "	" p. 219n.
28.	Taylor, A.E.,	"Continuity" in Hastings Encyclopedia of Religions and Ethics, Vol. 4, p. 90(1912).
29.	Cell, G. C.,	Class-notes in "History of American Thought".
30.	Dewey, John,	Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 5; Creative Intelligence, p. 8.
31.	" "	Experimental Logic, p. 7.
32.	" "	Experience and Nature, p. 272.
33.	" "	Ibid., pp. 271-272.
34.	" "	" p. 272.
35.	" "	" p. 273.
36.	" "	" p. 275.
37.	" "	" p. 279.
38.	" "	" pp. 279-280.
39.	" "	" pp 282.
40.	" "	Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 262-264; RP 210f.
41.	" "	Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 211.
42.	" "	Ibid., pp. 83-84.
43.	" "	" p. 83.
44.	" "	Democracy and Education, p. 30.
45.	" "	Ibid., p. 30.
46.	" "	" p. 47.
47.	" "	" pp. 47-48.
48.	" "	Experience and Nature, p. 165.
49.	" "	Ibid., p. 163.
50.	" "	" p. 398.

Chapter II cont.

51. Dewey, John, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 297.
52. " " Creative Intelligence, pp. 7-8.
53. " " Ibid., p. 8.
54. " " Experience and Nature, pp. 85-86.
55. " " Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 90-91.
56. " " Creative Intelligence, p. 7.
57. Boodin, J.E., "Energy and Reality", J. Phil. 12(1908), pp. 365-366.
58. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 349.
59. " " Ibid., p. 95.
60. Boodin, J.E., "Is Experience Self-supporting?" J. Phil. Ibid.
61. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 190.
62. " " Ibid., p. 166.
63. Whitehead, A.N., Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 12.
64. Cf. Journal of Philosophy 25 (1928), p. 178.
65. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 290.
66. " " Creative Intelligence, p. 8.
67. " " Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 91.
68. " " The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 208.
69. " " Ibid.
70. " " Experience and Nature, p. 44.
71. " " Ibid., p. 113.
72. " " "
73. " " "
74. " " " p. 29.
75. " " " pp. 252-253.
76. " " "Meaning and Existence", J. Phil. 25 (1928), p. 348.
77. Brightman, E.S., An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 139.
78. Dewey, John, Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, pp. 266-267.
79. " " Experience and Nature, p. 172.
80. Harnack, A., History of Dogma, s. 43 (1884).

81. Cf. Bosanquet, B., Implication and Linear Inference and
Palmer, G., Field of Ethics.
82. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 174.
83. " " Ibid., p. 175.
84. " " " p. 17.
85. " " Democracy and Education, p. 142.
86. " " Experience and Nature, p. 44.
87. " " Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 43.
88. " " Ibid., pp. 36-37.
89. " " Creative Intelligence, p. 9.
90. " " Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 118-119.
91. " " Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 11.
92. " " Ibid., pp. 5-6.
93. " " " p. 6.
94. " " " p. 12.
95. " " " p. 13.
96. " " " p. 20.
97. " " " p. 17.
98. " " Experience and Nature, pp. 102-103.
99. " " Ibid., p. 23.
100. " " "

Chapter II cont.

101. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 84.
102. " " Human Nature and Conduct, p. 36.
103. " " Experience and Nature, p. 1.
104. Bawden, H.H., Principles of Pragmatism, p. 52.
105. Dewey, John, "Social as a Category", Monist 38 (1928), pp. 161, 162, 166, 173.
106. " " Ibid., p. 162.
107. " " Creative Intelligence, pp. 7-8; cf. Gilbert, K.E., review of CI, J. Phil. 28(1919), pp. 200-8.

Chapter III

1.	James, William,	Pluralistic Universe, p. 372.
2.	" "	Ibid.,pp. 247-248.
3.	" "	" pp. 287, 288.
4.	" "	" p. 306.
5.	Bowne, B.P.,	Personalism, pp. 100, 101.
6.	" "	Ibid., p. 157.
7.	" "	" p. 280.
8.	" "	" p. 303.
9.	Royce, Josiah,	The World and the Individual, I, xi.
10.	" "	Ibid., I, p. 362.
11.	" "	" p. 363.
12.	" "	" "
13.	Cell, G. C.,	Class-notes in "Seminar in American Thought"
14.	Robinson, D.S.,	Anthology of Recent Philosophy, p. 12.
15.	Dewey, John,	Experience and Nature, p. 35.
16.	" "	Ibid., p. 10.
17.	" "	" p. 31.
18.	" "	" p. 38.
19.	" "	" pp. 43-44.
20.	" "	" p. 44.
21.	" "	" p. 42.
22.	" "	" p. 44.
23.	" "	" p. 46.
24.	" "	" p. 47.
25.	" "	" p. 51.
26.	" "	" p. 64.
27.	Santayana, G.,	"Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics", J. Phil. 22 (1925), p. 681.
28.	" "	Ibid., p. 681.
29.	Dewey, John,	Experience and Nature, p. 71.
30.	" "	Ibid., p. 85.
31.	" "	" p. 29.
32.	" "	" p. 72.
33.	" "	" p. 29.
34.	" "	" p. 273.
35.	Cf. Lodge's	Life and Matter
36.	" Sellars'	Evolutionary Naturalism, p. 296.
37.	Dewey, John,	Experience and Nature, p. 97.
38.	" "	Ibid., p. 104.
39.	" "	" p. 107.
40.	Kant, E.,	Kritik der Urteilkraft, p. 296 2nd and erd ed., cited by E.S.Brightman in Introduction to Philosophy, p. 281.
41.	Dewey, John,	Experience and Nature, p. 38.
42.	" "	Ibid., p. 406.
43.	" "	" p. 400.
44.	" "	" p. 399.
45.	" "	" p. 398.
46.	" "	" p. 398.
47.	" "	" p. 398.
48.	" "	" p. 399.
49.	" "	" p. 400.
50.	" "	" p. 371.

Chapter III cont.

51. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, pp. 402-407.
52. " " Ibid., p. 308.
53. " " "Meaning and Existence", J. Phil. 25 (1928), pp. 345-353; Hall, E.W., "Some Meanings of Meaning in Dewey's Experience and Nature", J. Phil. 25 (1928), pp. 169-181.
54. " " Experience and Nature, p. 347.
55. " " Ibid., p. 348.
56. " " " p. 349.
57. " " " p. 352.
58. " " " "
59. " " " p. 353.
60. " " " p. 167.
61. " " " p. 166.
62. " " " p. 175.
63. " " " "
64. " " " p. 74.
65. " " " p. 303.
66. " " " p. 303.
67. " " " p. 304.
68. " " " pp. 67-68.
69. " " " p. 308.
70. " " " p. 371.
71. " " "Body and Mind", Bulletin of the N.Y. Academy of Medicine, Second Series, 4 (1928), p. 6.
72. Woodbridge, F.J.E., The Realm of Mind, p. 29.
73. " " Ibid., p. 37.
74. " " " p. 41.
75. " " " pp. 40-41.
76. " " " p. 49.
77. " " " p. 55.
78. " " " p. 62.
79. " " " p. 63.
80. " " " p. 62.
81. " " " p. 67.
82. Dewey, John, "Impressions of Soviet Russia", The New Republic V. LVII, N. 731, (1928), p. 66.
83. " " Experience and Nature, p. 185.
84. Robinson, D.S., Principles of Reasoning, p. 20; cited by E.S.Brightman in Introduction to Philosophy, p.125
85. Compare Lotze, James , and Ward.
86. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 225.
87. Bowne, B. P., Personalism, p. 27.
88. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, pp. 242-247; esp. 246-7.
89. " " Ibid., pp. 246-247.
90. " " " p. 304.
91. " " " p. 413.
92. Büchner, F.C.L., Kraft und Stoff,
93. Spencer, H., First Principles, (1862) 6th ed. p. 175.
94. Haeckel, E. H., The Riddle of the Universe, tr. by J. McCabe, pp. 211ff.

Chapter IV

1. Weber-Perry, History of Philosophy, p. 547.
2. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 2.
3. " " Ibid,, p. 9.
4. Lalande, A., Vocabulaire de Philosophie, Vol. I, pp.180,181.
5. Dewey, John, Experimental Logic, p. 64.
6. Hocking, W. E., The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 115.
7. Dewey. John, Creative Intelligence, p. 21.
8. " " Experience and Nature, p. 11.
9. " " The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 207.
10. " " Experience and Nature, p. 67.
11. " " Ibid., p. 187.
12. " " " p. 188.
13. Cf. Chapter II, 66, 67.
14. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 29.
15. " " Ibid., p. 182.
16. " " " p. 182.
17. " " " p. 305.
18. " " Experimental Logic, p. 256.
19. " " Ibid., p. 257.
20. " " Experience and Nature, pp. 259-260.
21. Bawden, H. H., The Principles of Pragmatism, p. 172.
22. Dewey, John, Experimental Logic, p. 8n.
23. Bergson, Henri, L'evolution créatrice, p. 328.(3me ed.)
24. Dewey, John, Experimental Logic, pp. 169, 394.
25. " " Ibid.; Democracy and Education, p. 169.
26. " " "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge", Mind 15 (1906), p. 301.
27. Haldane, Viscount, Human Experience, p. 20.
28. Dewey, John, "Does the Practical Possess Reality?", Essays ...in honor of William James, pp. 72-77.
29. Montague, W., The Ways of Knowing, p. 135n.
30. Dewey, John, Experimental Logic, p. 22.
31. " " Ibid., p. 30.
32. " " " p. 31.
33. " " " p. 35.
34. Lovejoy, A. O., Critical Realism, p. 35.
35. Dewey, John, Experimental Logic, p. 46.
36. " " Experience and Nature, p. 19.
37. " " Creative Intelligence, p. 27.
38. " " Experience and Nature, p. 86.
39 " " Democracy and Education, pp. 347-353.
40. Montague, W., The Ways of Knowing, p. 135.
41. " " Ibid., p. 172.
42. " " " p. 135.
43. Smith, T. V., "Dewey's Theory of Value", Monist, 32(1922), p. 339.
44. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 33.
45. " " Ethics, p. 314.
46. " " Ibid., p. 314.
47. " " "
48. " " "
49. See Chapter III, ref. 51.

Chapter IV cont.

50. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 279.
51. " " Ibid., p. 280.
52. " " Experimental Logic, p. 75.
53. " " Ibid.
54. " " " p. 368.
55. " " Democracy and Education, p. 280.
56. " " Ibid., p. 281.
57. " " Ethics, p. 421.
58. " " Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 104.
59. " " Experience and Nature, p. 52.
60. " " Human Nature and Conduct, p. 283.
61. " " Ibid., p. 283.
62. " " Experience and Nature, p. 62.
63. " " Ibid., pp. 402-403.
64. " " "Social as a Category", Monist 38 (1928), p. 175.
65. " " Ibid., p. 77.
66. Smith, T. V., "Dewey's theory of Value", Monist 32 (1922), p. 347.
67. Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 263.
68. " " Ibid., p. 332.
69. " " " p. 263.
70. Bryant, W. C., "To a Waterfowl".
71. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, pp. 396-397.
72. Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, pp. 28-30.

Chapter V.

1. Butler, N. M., Philosophy, p. 24, cited in E. S. Brightman's Introduction to Philosophy, p. 54.
2. Murphy, A. E., "What is An Event?", Phil. Rev. 37 (1928), p.576.
3. Adams, G. P., "Immediacy and Meaning", Phil. Rev. 37 (1928), pp. 119.
4. Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, p. 114.
5. " " Ibid., p. 85.
6. " " " p. 116.
7. Piatt, D. A., "Immediate Experience", J. Phil. 25 (1928), pp. 477-492; Cf. 479-480 with Democracy and Education, p. 169; Experimental Logic, pp. 394, 3 and 4.
8. Murphy, A. E., "What is An Event?", Phil. Rev. 37 (1928), p.547.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Contemporary Discussions on Experience

Baillie, J. B., An Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience, London: The Macmillan and Co., 1906.

Bode, B. H., "On E.H.Hollands's Relation of Science to Concrete Experience", Phil. Rev. 15 (1906), pp. 614-626.

Boodin, J. E., "Is Experience Self-supporting?", J. Phil. 5 (1908), pp. 365-375.

Creighton, J. E., "The Standpoint of Experience", Phil. Rev. 12 (1903), pp. 593-610.

" "Experience and Thought", Phil. Rev. 15 (1906), pp. 482-493.

Dashiell, J. F., "Values and Experience", J. Phil. 11 (1914), pp. 491-497.

Edman, I., "From Experience to Nature", J. Phil. 25 (1928), pp. 85-96.

Fite, W., "The Associational Conception of Experience", Phil. Rev. 9 (1900), pp. 268-292.

" "The Experience-philosophy", Phil. Rev. 15 (1906), pp. 1-16.

Follett, M. P., Creative Experience, N.Y.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1924.

Frank, L. K., "The Locus of Experience", J. Phil. 20 (1923), pp. 327-329.

Hodgson, S. H., The Metaphysics of Experience, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898.

James, W., "A World of Pure Experience", J. Phil. 1 (1904), pp. 533-543.

McGilvary, E. B., "Experience as Pure Consciousness as Meaning", J. Phil. 8 (1911), pp. 511-525.

Morgan, C. L., "The Natural History of Experience", British J. of Psy. III, 1, 2, pp. 1-20.

Rogers, A. K., "Epistemology and Experience", Phil. Rev. 7 (1898), pp. 466ff.

Russell, R. W., "Professor Hocking's Argument from Experience", J. Phil. 13 (1915), pp. 68-71.

Sellars, R. W., "The Nature of Experience", J. Phil. 4 (1907), pp. 14-18.

Swabey, W. C., "Kant's Analogies of Experience", Phil. Rev. 31 (1922), pp. 41-57.

" "The Phenomenalogy of Experience and Psychologism", Phil. Rev. 33 (1924), pp. 51-66.

Wieman, H. N., "Experience, Mind, and the Concept", J. Phil. 21 (1924), pp. 561-572.

B. On Dewey's Position as a Whole

Costello, H. T., "Professor Dewey's Judgments of Practice", J. Phil. 17 (1920), pp. 449-455.

Durant, W., The Story of Philosophy, N. Y.: Simon and and Schuster, 1926.

Fite, W., "Pragmatism and Truth", Phil. Rev. 23 (1914), pp. 506-524.

" "Pragmatism and Science", Phil. Rev. 23 (1914), pp. 410-429.

Howard, D. T., John Dewey's Logical Theory, N.Y.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1918.

Hook, S., The Metaphysics of Pragmatism, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1927.

Laski, E., "Concerning Alleged Immediate Knowledge of Mind", J. Phil. 15 (1918), pp. 29-35.

Leroux, E., Le Pragmatisme Américain et Anglais, Paris: Libraire Felix Alcan, 1923.

Lewis, L. I., "Pragmatic Conception of the A priori", J. Phil. 20 (1923), pp. 169-177.

Lovejoy, A. O., "Pragmatism and Interactionism", J. Phil. 17 (1920), pp. 622-632.

" Essays in Critical Realism, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1921.

Moore, A. W., "Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism", J. Phil. 17 (1920), pp. 514-519.

Murphy, A. E., "Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead", Phil. Rev. 36 (1927), pp. 121-144.

Moore, A. W., Pragmatism and Its Critics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910.

Murray, E., "The Postulates of Immediate Empiricism", J. Phil. 2 (1905), pp. 393-399.

Otto, M. C., "Pragmatism and the Conception of the Wholeness", J. Phil. 20 (1923), pp. 309-311.

Pratt, J. B., What is Pragmatism, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1909.

Randall, J. H., "Instrumentalism and Mythology", J. Phil. 16 (1919), pp. 309-324.

Ratner, J., The Philosophy of John Dewey, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1928.

Santayana, G., "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics", J. Phil. 22 (1925), pp. 673-688.

Schinz, A., "Professor Dewey's Pragmatism", J. Phil. 5 (1908), pp. 617-628.

" Anti-pragmatism, Boston: Small, Maynard and Co., 1909.

Sellars, R. W., "Professor Dewey's View of Agreement", J. Phil. 4 (1907), pp. 432-435.

" Evolutionary Naturalism, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1922.

Sheldon, W. H., Studies in Logical Theory, reviewed; J. Phil. 1 (1904), pp. 100-105.

Shepherd, Q.L., "Pragmatism and the Irrelevant", J. Phil. 16 (1919), pp. 72-74.

C. On Dewey's Theory of Experience

Bawden, H. H., The Principles of Pragmatism, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910.

Buermyer, L., "Professor Dewey's Analysis of Thought", J. Phil. 18 (1921), pp. 673-681.

Bush, W. T., Creative Intelligence(Book Review), J. Phil. 14 (1917), pp. 505-520.

Carr, H. W., Experience and Nature(Book Review), Phil. Rev. 35 (1926), pp. 64-68.

Gilbert, K. E., Creative Intelligence(Book Review), Phil. Rev. 28 (1919), pp. 200-208.

Haldane, Viscount, Human Experience, N.Y.: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1926.

Hall, E. W., "Some Meanings of Meaning in Dewey's Experience and Nature", J. Phil. 25 (1928), pp. 169-181.

Hart, J., Inside Experience, N.Y.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927.

Hoernlé, R.F.A., Essays in Experimental Logic(Book Review), Phil. Rev. 26 (1917), pp. 421-430.

Lamprecht, S. P., "A Note on Professor Dewey's Theory of Knowledge", J. Phil. 20 (1923), pp. 488-494.

Montague, W. P., The Ways of Knowing, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1925.

Piatt, D. A., "Immediate Experience", J. Phil. 25 (1928), pp. 477-492.

Russell, B., "Professor Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic", J. Phil. 16 (1919), pp. 5-26.

Tuttle, J. R., "Valid Knowledge and the Subjectivity of Experience", J. Phil. 7 (1910), pp. 169-174.

Williams, C. H., "The Control of Ideas by Facts", J. Phil. 4 (1907), pp. 197-203.

D. General

Beard, Charles, Whither Mankind, N.Y.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928.

Bowne, B. P., Personalism, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1908.

Brightman, E.S., An Introduction to Philosophy, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1925.

Durant, Will, See Section B.

Cell, G. C., "Die Philosophie in Nordamerika" in Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. V. Ueberweg, Berlin: E. S. Mittler and Sohn, 1927.

James, W., Collected Essays and Reviews, N.Y.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920.

" A Pluralistic Universe, N.Y.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909.

" Varieties of Religious Experience, N.Y.: Longmands, Green, and Co., 1902.

Haldane, Viscount, See Section C.

Hocking, W.E., The Meaning of God in Human Experience, N.Y.: New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912.

Hoernlé, R.F.A., Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1920.

Lovejoy, A.O., et al. Essays in Critical Realism, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1921.

Moore, A. W., See Section B.

Ratner, J., See Section A.

Robinson, D.S., An Anthology of Recent Philosophy, N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1929.

Rogers, A.K., English and American Philosophy since 1800, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1923.

Royce, J., The World and Individual, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1904.

Schinz, A., See Section B.

Sellars, R. W., See Section B.

Whitehead, A.N., An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Natural Knowledge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1919.

" Concept of Nature, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1919.

" The Principles of Relativity, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1922.

" Science and Modern World, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1925.

Woodbridge, F.J.E., The Realm of Mind, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1926.

E. Works of John Dewey

Psychology, N.Y.: Harpers and Brothers, 1886.

The Ethics of Democracy, Philosophical papers of the University of Michigan, Series 2 No. 1, 1887.

Leibniz: A Critical Exposition, Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1888.

Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, Ann Arbor: 1891.

The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus, Ann Arbor: Register Publishing Co., 1894.

The Psychology of Number and its Application to Methods of Teaching Aristhematic, (in Collaboration with McLennan) N.Y.: D. Appleton and Co., 1895.

The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge, University of Chicago contributions to Philosophy, 1897.

The School and Society, Chicago: 1899.

Psychology and Philosophic Method, University Chronice, Berkeley: University Press, 1899.

Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality, The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1903. (1st series, Vol. III, part 2).

Studies in Logical Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903.

"Does Reality Possess a Practical Character?" in Essays Philosophical and Psychological in honor of William James, N.Y.: Longmands, Green, and Co., 1908.

Ethics(in collaboration with H. Tufts), N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1908.

How We Think, Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1910.

The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1910.

Schools of To-morrow,(in collaboration with Miss Evelyn Dewey), N.Y.: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1915.

Essays in Experimental Logic, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916.

Democracy and Education, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1916.

Creative Intelligence, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1917.
(Symposium)

Reconstruction in Philosophy, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1920.

Human Nature and Conduct, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1922.

German Philosophy and Politics, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1915.

Experience and Nature, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925.

The Public and Its Problems, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1927.

"Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling", J. Spec. Phil. 17 (1883), pp. 56ff.

"The Psychological Standpoint", Mind 11 (1886), no. 41, pp. 1ff.

"Psychology as Philosophic Method", Mind 11 (1886), no. 42, pp. 153ff.

"On Some Current Conceptions of the Term Self", Mind 15 (1890), pp. 58-74.

"Moral Theory and Practice", Inter. J. Eth. 1 (1891), pp. 386ff.

"The Present Position of Logical Theory", Monist 2 (1891), pp. 1ff.

"Self Realization as the Moral Ideal", Phil. Rev. 2 (1893), pp. 651-664.

"The Psychology of Effort", Phil. Rev. 6 (1897), pp. 42-56.

"Evolution and Ethics", Monist 8 (1898), pp. 321-341.

"The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality", Phil. Rev. 11 (1902), pp. 107ff; pp. 353ff.

"Humanism", Psych. Bulletin, 1 (1904), no. 1o.

"The Realism of Pragmatism", J. Phil. 2 (1905), pp. 393-399.

"The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism", J. Phil. 2 (1905), pp. 393-399.

"Immediate Empiricism", Ibid., pp. 597-599.

"The Knowledge-experience and its Relationships", Ibid., pp. 652-657.

"The Knowledge Experience Again", Ibid., pp. 703-713.

"The Terms 'Conscious' and 'Consciousness'", J. Phil. 3 (1906),

"Reality as Experience", J. Phil. 3 (1906), pp. 253-257.

"The Experimental Theory of Knowledge", Mind 15 (1906), pp. 293-307.

"Objects, Data and Existences: A Reply to Prof. McGilvary", J. Phil. 6 (1909), pp. 13-21.

"Science as Subject-matter and as Method", Science, N.S., 31 (1910), pp. 121ff.

"Valid Knowledge and the Subjectivity of Experience", J. Phil. 8 (1910), pp. 169-174.

"Some Implications of Anti-intellectualism", Ibid., pp. 477-481.

"Perception and Organic Action", Ibid., pp. 645-668. (1912).

"The Problem of Values", J. Phil. 10 (1913), pp. 268-269.

"The Subject-matter of Metaphysical Inquiry", J. Phil. 12 (1915), pp. 337-345.

"The Concept of the Neutral in Recent Epistemology", J. Phil. 14 (1917), pp. 161-163.

"Duality and Dualism", J. Phil. 14 (1917), pp. 491-493.

"Concerning Alleged Immediate Knowledge of Mind", J. Phil. 15 (1918), pp. 29-35.

"The Objects of Valuation", J. Phil. 15 (1918), pp. 253-258.

"An Analysis of Reflective Thought", J. Phil. 14 (1922), pp. 29-38.

"Valuation and Experimental Knowledge", Phil. Rev. 31 (1922), pp. 325-351.

"Knowledge and Speech Reaction", J. Phil. 19 (1922), pp. 561-570.

"Realism Without Monism or Dualism", J. Phil. 19 (1922), pp. 309-317; 351-361.

"Values, Liking, and Thought", J. Phil. 20 (1923), pp. 617-622.

"Logical Method and Law", Phil. Rev. 33 (1924), pp. 560-572.

"Substance, Power and Quality in Locke", Phil. Rev. 35 (1926), pp. 22-38.

"The Role of Philosophy in the History of Civilization", Phil. Rev. 36 (1927), pp. 1-9.

"Half-hearted Naturalism", J. Phil. 24 (1927), pp. 57-64.

"Social as a Category", Monist 38 (1928), pp. 161-177.

"Meanings and Existence", J. Phil. 25 (1928), pp. 345-353.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

The writer, the son of Tai-Cheng Han and Jui-Lan Han, was born in a Buddhist home in Peking, China, in 1900. His education has been, therefore, in both the Buddhist and Christian cultures. He had the privilege of three years' training in the old-fashioned school where classics and poetry were taught. There followed seven years in the government school before the ten years of study in Christian schools.

In 1920 he was a delegate to the National Y.M.C.A. Convention. He attended the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy in 1926 as an associate member.

While a student in Peking Academy the writer received the first prize in Chinese Literature (1919). The first prize in English Literature was awarded to him by the Junior College of Peking Academy in 1921. He was awarded the Ogilvy Prize in 1926 by the School of Religion of Yenching (Peking) University.

In 1924 the writer was graduated from Peking University, receiving the B.A. degree. Two years later he was granted the degree of Bachelor of Divinity from Yenching (Peking) University. Since 1926 he has given his time to advanced study in the graduate schools of Boston University and Harvard.

He has had publications in Zion's Herald, The Methodist Review, The World To-morrow, The Christian Century, the Journal of Philosophy, and the Personalist.

The writer has taught in both China and the United States. The positions he has held are as follows: Teacher of

English, Summer Session, Peking Academy, 1922; Instructor in Sociology, Peking Seminary, 1923-1924; Instructor in Philosophy, Summer Session, Boston University, 1928; Lecturer in Philosophy, College and Extension, Boston University, 1928-1929.

As all other requirements for the Ph. D. degree have been met, this dissertation is submitted as the final work of the candidate for the doctorate.