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BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

MANCHURIA IN WORLD POLITICS

by

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(A.B., University of Richmond, 1932)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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PREFACE

In writing this paper the author has attempted to give the reader a solid grounding in the political, economic, and diplomatic history of affairs at, or about, the opening of the recent crisis in Manchuria. He has endeavored to make certain statements which it is desirable to make in view of the highly misleading assertions which have been made by Japanese spokesmen in their attempts to place in less reprehensible light the acts of their country during the last twenty-three months. Throughout the paper the attempt has been made to interpret carefully and thoroughly, underlying causes, motives, and results.

In presenting this paper the author has been guided by the principle that truth speaks louder than propaganda. The following pages contain indisputable facts and statements, which, in my belief, should assist the reader in understanding the present crisis, so dramatically precipitated by Japan's invasion of Manchuria.

The author is personally greatly indebted to Professor James H. Sheldon of Boston University and to Miss Esther Coleman for their kindness in making valuable criticism and in reading the manuscript.

C.W.W.

OUTLINE

	Page
I. THE GEOGRAPHY OF MANCHURIA	
1. Area	1
2. Boundaries	1
3. Climate	1
4. Geological Characteristics	1
5. Population	2
6. Natural Resources	3
II. A SHORT CHAPTER ON THE HISTORY OF MANCHURIA	
1. Legendary History	4
2. The Beginning of Manchurian History	4
3. The Relations of Manchuria to Japan and Russia	5
III. ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN MANCHURIA	
1. Introduction	7
2. Food and Population Problems	8
3. The Mining Problem	10
4. The Iron Ore Problem	10
5. Gold and Copper	11
6. Foreign Markets	12
IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY	
1. Railway Diplomacy(1895 - 1931)	14
2. Russia's Position	14
3. Japan's Position	15
4. China's Position	16

	Page
V. THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS	
1. The Bomb of September 18	19
2. Self-defense	24
3. Banditry	26
4. The Necessity of Manchuria to Japan	27
5. The Violation of International Laws and Treaties	28
6. The Violation of Treaty Rights	30
7. Further Discussion	30
8. The Twenty-One Demands	31
9. Railway Disputes	33
10. The Open Door Doctrine	34
11. Disorder	37
12. Anti-Japanism	39
13. Loan Business Questions	40
14. The Japanese Monroe Doctrine	41
VI. THE SHANGHAI WAR	
1. Summary	43
2. The Turning Point	44
VII. MANCHUKUO	
1. Japan's Statement	47
2. China's Statement	47
3. The Facts	48
VIII. THE EMBARGO ON ARMS	50

	Page
IX. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND MANCHURIA	
1. Events of the Three Separate Sitzings	52
2. How the League Failed	54
X. THE AMERICAN NOTE ON MANCHURIA	
1. Principles of the Note	57
2. The Effect of the Note	57
XI. THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA	
1. Its Criticism of the Situation	59
2. Russia Takes No Action	60
XII. THE LYPTON REPORT	
1. The Document	62
2. Japan At the Bar	62
3. Recommendations of the Report	64
4. Conclusion	65
XIII. SUMMARY	67

I. THE GEOGRAPHY OF MANCHURIA

Manchuria is situated in the northeastern part of China. It is separated from Siberia on the north by the Amur River. On the west Eastern Inner Mongolia touches its borders and stretches, a vast level country, far to the westward. On the east, the Maritime Province of Russia forms the boundary of Manchuria, and southeast the Yalu River separates it from Korea. On the south it is washed by the waters of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pechile.

Manshuria covers the territory which is now known as the Three Eastern Provinces of China - Liao-Ning, Kirin, and Heilung, including the Kwantung Leased Territory, totaling about 380,000 square miles. In size, it is four and one half times that of Great Britain, and equal to America's five wheat-belt states combined - Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas.

The climate of Manchuria is included within the parallels of 39° and 53°30" north. In accordance with the Köppen system,(1) the climate of the southern two thirds of Manchuria is a cold, dry, winter type, with the summer sufficiently rainy to permit forest growth. The mean temperature of the coldest month is below 3°C, and that of the warmest month, over 22°C; it occurs in Heilunkiang and eastern Kirin. The southern part of the Barga district has the

(1) W. Köppen, "Die Klimate der Erde", 1923
Part 2, "Das Geographische System der Klimate".

cold steppe-dry winter climate. Here precipitation is very low, and the mean annual temperature is below 18°C, but the warmest month is over 18°C. Winter is the dry period. As a whole, the climate is healthful and well adapted to agriculture. Its great plains boast a rich soil, and the 27,000,000 acres of land now under cultivation produce huge crops of beans, wheat, millet, Indian corn, and other products.

Geologically, Manchuria is separated into three divisions: (1) the plain lands of alluvial, low-lying flats and higher gravelly terraces which are drained by the Zungari and the Liao Rivers and their tributary streams; (2) the mountainous lands of ancient rocks that surround the plain; and, (3) the continuation of the high Mongolian plateau which makes up the Barga District in the northwest. The plain of Manchuria is also divided into three main natural divisions: (1) the plain of the Liao River, (2) the plain of the Sungari River and its tributaries, and, (3) the western plain of interior drainage including Eastern Inner Mongolia.

The population of Manchuria at the present time can not be accurately estimated, because an accurate census of these provinces has never been taken. Approximately, however, the latest population count reached in the neighborhood of 30,000,000 people, including 1,180,000 aliens, made up of 800,000 Koreans, 280,000 Japanese, and 100,000 Russians. The density of population is about fifty-three people per

square mile. Those who have already established their homes in this area feel it more than ever their home land since the great railway system has brought modern enterprise, education, and civilization into these provinces. Every spring about 450,000 Chinese migrate from Shantung to work on the Manchurian farms; after the harvest about 330,000 return to their homes and the rest of them remain there and find permanent employment. (2)

Because of its natural resources, Manchuria has been called the "Garden of China". With its rich soil, most of the region is very productive. The principle^{al} crop in 1895 was the soya bean, large quantities of which were exported south into China. It was only after 1890 that China began to import Manchurian beans, the bean being used for food purposes, the oil for sauces, and the cake for fertilizer. Since that time China has become an increasingly important market for the bean. In addition, Manchuria produces millet, kialiang, wheat, and other cereals. By 1900 it was already evident that the country could be looked to as a granary for the future. In addition to its agricultural productivity, Manchuria possesses tremendous wealth in timber and is rich in minerals, including coal, iron, and gold. Such^a domain was well worth the struggle to gain or to retain.

(2) "Chinese Colonization and the Development of Manchuria,"
Kejoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations
Honolulu, 1929, p. 53.

A SHORT CHAPTER ON THE HISTORY OF MANCHURIA

The beginning of Manchurian history is lost in antiquity; much of the early history of the vast district is only an uncertain legend.⁽³⁾ It was said that thousands of years ago, the Koreans were the first settlers of the country, while the Manchus and the other peoples came later. Consequently in the tenth century, hostilities were carried on during the Chow dynasty (1133 - 255 B. C.), the Tang dynasty (618 - 907 A. D.), and the Sung dynasty (960 - 1280 A. D.). But the Manchus were the most powerful and persisted the longest.

In 1260, for the first time, Manchuria took its place in history. Genghis-Khan, the dreamer of the world empire, conquered the territory and established his empire there.

In 1644, the first Manchurian emperor of China removed his capital from Mukden to Peiping and established the Manchu dynasty in China. Because of the strong influence of the Chinese philosophy, literature, and civilization, the Manchus were assimilated with the Chinese. Through the process of intermarriage, the Manchus have united voluntarily with the Chinese race. Consequently in language, customs, traditions, and sentiment, China and Manchuria are one. In social and political thinking the Manchus and the Chinese can not be distinguished.

(3) Kwan, "History of Manchuria", Chap. I, Canton, 1928.

As the Manchus dynasty established itself on the throne of China in 1644, the historical claim of China to sovereignty over Manchuria is nearly three hundred years old. Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the administrative system of Manchuria has been reorganized by the imperial government, and shortly after the close of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Imperial government brought the administration of Manchuria into line with that of China proper by appointing a viceroy with full power over each of the provinces.

With recent years Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria has been recognized by the Great Powers. On July 13, 1928, in the House of Commons, Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that Great Britain considered Manchuria a part of China.(4) On May 21, 1928, Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State of the United States, stated to the press, "As far as the United States is concerned, Manchuria is essentially Chinese soil". (4)

While the Manchus were establishing their empire in Manchuria, Russia invaded their oriental neighbors in the Amur River. She defeated her opponent and acquired the Maritime Province with the port of Vladivastock. From that time on, Russia decided to gain a foothold in the Far East. After long years of struggle, in 1895 she secured the Railway concession in Manchuria and leased the Kwantang Province for a period of twenty-five years. Having got into Manchuria,

(4) Foreign Policy Report: "Basis Treaty Issues in Manchuria Between Japan and China." Foreign Policy Association Incorporated Vol VII No. 21 December 1931.

Russia appointed Admiral Aleksyiev as Russian governor in the Far East. Later Aleksyiev took up civil and military rñles from Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea, and constructed a great railway through Manchuria, across Asia, and straight into St. Petersburg.

As the Russian expansion in Manchuria developed, Japan viewed the situation with alarm and decided to keep all the Russians out of Manchuria. In 1904 the crisis came, and the Russo-Japanese war was fought in South Manchuria. In one year of fierce struggle, Port Arthur was seized and Russia was defeated. In 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed and all of Russia's Kwantung Territory and the southern portion of the Manchuria Railway were transferred to Japan. That was the story of the coming of the Japanese. Since the war with Russia, Japan has looked upon Manchuria as a potential colony. Ultimate conquest on Manchuria has always been uppermost in the minds of all Japanese militarists and politicians. The only point upon which they seem to disagree is whether they should adopt a "moderate" or a "positive" policy. Unfortunately the Later Tanaka and his associates were strong advocates of the latter. Thus they authorized the dispatch of troops to Manchuria in the Autumn of 1931.

ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN MANCHURIA

Manchuria is one of the great pioneer belts of the world. It is considerably larger than the whole Japanese Empire. It is a very great geographical area in the agricultural stage of development for a population of 30,000,000, of which three-fourths are engaged in agriculture, and of which ninety per-cent are Chinese. As a pioneer area, the broad plains of central Manchuria, the fertile river valleys, the navigable rivers, and the mountains, highly mineralized and forest-covered, make this a section of present and potential food and mineral production. These facts are of vital importance in any economic interpretation of Manchurian politics. According to the report of the Kuowen Weekly, we can see that the economic characteristics of Manchuria not only give it importance in the food and population problems of China and Japan, but also form the chief source of conflict between these two nations. (5) During the last three decades, Manchuria's wealth has been the cause of many series of troubles with Russia and Japan. In recent years, the situation has become more complicated. It is not only a battle ground for Chinese, Japanese, and Russian competition, but it has also become a form of international interest. Political scientists have been predicting that the Manchurian conflict will be the cause of another world war.

(5) Kuowen Weekly, Vol. IV, No. 39, 1931.

Densely populated as Manchuria is, it is, however, capable of absorbing from two to three times its present thirty million.(6) In the northern part of Manchuria, although about twenty-seven million acres of land are now under cultivation, yet it has at least an equal amount of uncultivated land in this area. At the same time, because this area is a potential producer of great crops of cereals and beans, especially soya beans, Manchuria becomes a natural outlet for the surplus population of such provinces as Shantung, where the density of population is from seven to eight times that of Manchuria. In 1925 the Chinese at Mukden began to increase production and to create a new source of taxable wealth. Following that year, the Chinese government intended to cooperate with Japan for economic success in Manchuria. Fortunately the idea was sound. The broader-minded group of Japanese politicians and statesmen held the view that Japanese economic success in Manchuria would depend upon the principle of closer cooperation with the Chinese. They also believed that the increase of Chinese population in Manchuria would mean an improved market for the Japanese manufacturers. But on the other hand, another Japanese group felt that the principle of cooperation would be a final blow to the Japanese agricultural colonization in Manchuria. Thus they vision political danger in the future when Manchurian agriculture and industry become less dependant on Japan.

(6) "Problems of the Pacific," 1929, University of Chicago Press.

Of these two groups of opinion, most students of political science agree with the first group. In the first place, a highly industrialized country like Japan can really support many more people per square mile than an agricultural country like China. Japan may need a population outlet in the future, but at present, her problem of overpopulation is not so pressing as that of China.(7) As a matter of fact, about 500,000 Chinese have migrated to Manchuria each year for the last six years, and for years to come, China must depend on Manchuria for food and as a population outlet to solve her problem of famine and overpopulation. In the second place, Manchuria is now, and is destined to remain, a territory populated ninety per cent by Chinese, which suggests that ultimately only a Chinese political regime can survive in Manchuria. In the third place the Japanese are unable to compete with the Chinese who are presumed to have a much lower standard of living than the Japanese farmers in Manchuria. More fundamental factors are the refusal of the Japanese to migrate unless under artificial stimulus, and the obstacles to Japanese land acquisition. Japan may argue that her food problem is growing more serious, but this should not be confused with a population problem, because Japan has not so much to fear from lack of arable land for food production, as she contends.(8) Thus it is ^{not} necessary

(7) Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East"

(8) Nasu, professor of Tokyo Imperial University, drew a pessimistic conclusion that Japan's future food and population problems are based on land utilization alone, but these views should be tempered by the experience of Great Britain and Belgium.

for Japan to lease or purchase land in the interior of Manchuria for her people to get food-stuffs.

Another important factor in Manchuria is mining. The vast northeastern region of Manchuria has always been famous for its mineral resources. According to the estimates of mining experts, (9) the coal deposits for the whole of Manchuria are in the neighborhood of 2,925,000,000 tons, and the total output of all the active coal mines in this region is 10,040,652 tons. With the exception of the Fushun and Gentsi mines, managed by the Japanese, and the mines at Tenshi, Muling, Chalanner, and Soatookou, run by both Chinese and foreigners on a cooperative basis, the collieries are entirely under Chinese operation.

From a political point of view, no Manchurian mineral product is more important than coal. After the Japanese acquired the Russian-controlled mines at Fushun, and for more than thirty years, it has become more and more significant. From 1927 to 1928, 7000,000 tons of coal were taken out from this mine. Thus the South Manchuria Railway values its investments at over \$50,000,000. On account of this sole important colliery, Japan undertakes to protect her interests by means of force. But on the other hand, the Chinese government realizes that the Manchurian coal is more essential to the economic life of China than to that of Japan. China needs it because it is essential to support the industrial structure

(9) "China's Efforts in Developing Manchuria", p. 28,
The Northeastern Affairs Research Institute, May 1932.

in Manchuria, while Japan needs it only for revenue.

Japan may argue that the Japanese coal production is annually in excess of imports, but this excess of imports is frequently caused by artificial factors in the coal industry and not by a dearth of the home product or lack of reserves.

(10) Thus the Chinese suggest that if Japan had approached China with a genuine spirit of friendliness and cooperation, China would be willing to advance common welfare between the two nations. But Japan, instance after instance, uses force rather than reason against the Chinese mining interests.

That is the real cause of conflict between the two nations.

The Far East is especially poor in iron ore, having only 3.2 per cent of the known reserves of the world. Of these about one-fourth of this meagre supply is found in Manchuria, and the ore is very poor in net content. According to the expert opinion of Boris P. Torgasheff, the iron reserves in South Manchuria will be near exhaustion in ten years. (11) Considering the size of Manchuria and its increasing industrial needs, it not only has no iron to spare, but will soon have to import iron and steel from outside. Thus Manchuria remains, of course, primarily a buyer rather than

(10) Dr. Kinoshige, director of the Imperial Geological Survey of Japan, has placed the "actual reserve" at nearly 1,000 million tons.
Also C. Walter Young's statement in the Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Nov. 1930

(11) "China's Efforts in Developing Manchuria"
The Northwestern Affairs Research Institute, May 1932

a producer of iron and steel.(12) With probable future industrialization in China, there is apparently no more than enough iron for her own use. Unfortunately most of the iron ore is in the hands of the Japanese. For instance, the Anshan and Tenhsihu mines combined produce nine-tenths of all the iron ore obtained from Manchuria, but both of them are under Japanese control. When the Chinese government claims, with very good reason, that China has the first hand upon the natural resources of its own soil, Japan protests.(13) That is another cause of conflict between the two nations.

The gold deposits in Manchuria are the richest in the country. There are seven gold collecting bureaus established in Kirin, one gold mining corporation in Hsinchu, and a few small gold mines in the big cities. The total output of these gold mines is about 10,735 kilograms. Besides there are no less than thirty places where copper mines are to be found in Manchuria. The most important places are Taing-Shih-Chu-Shan, Tau-Shih district, Yeachih district, Fenahi district, and Liaoning. Its annual output totals about 170,700 tons. Most of these copper mines are under the control of the Chinese government. But Japan claims that she has special interests in Manchuria. She ought to share in the Chinese corporations, but China refuses. That is the third cause of the conflict between the two nations.

The world struggle for foreign markets, essential to

(12) Herhert File, Europe, "The World's Banker"

(13) W. W. Willoughby's statement in the North American Review of August, 1923.

the modern surplus of capital and manufacture, has its Manchurian phase. For a quarter of a century Japan has been trading with China. Since 1908 her trade has increased eight-fold, as against a fivefold increase for the United States and Russia.(14) Again China also had 90% of the foreign trade of Manchuria in the same year, and 56% in 1927. Down to 1928, the total foreign trade of Manchuria was about \$443,000,000. The chief items of Manchurian trade are agricultural products. In 1929 the exports of beans, bean oil, and bean cakes made up 70% of Manchuria's exports, millet constituted 4%, Kaaling, 2%, and timber and hides, 2%. In short, agricultural products made up 86% of Manchurian trade. In the same year the imports also show that cotton and textiles made up 25%, wool products, 4%, clothes, food, and other daily necessities, 28%, steel, iron, machinery, electrical materials, cars, and petroleum, 15%, and other miscellaneous articles, 28%. As Manchurian trade increased, Japan decided to take over Manchuria with the policy of economic penetration. In 1924 when the Chinese government found out the secret and entered into fair competition with Japan, Japan tried to keep all the Chinese merchants out of Manchurian commercial cities. While fighting for their rights, the Chinese people continued to do their business in Manchuria. That is the vital economic situation which is bound to affect diplomacy for years to come.

(14) C. F. Remer, "The Foreign Trade of China", p. 239 Shanghai, 1926.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

Manchurian diplomacy has been called railway diplomacy. In 1898 the building of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Port Arthur, combined with the lease of Liaotung to Russia, furnished the principal cause of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Again, from 1905 to 1912, the building of Chinese railways caused international diplomatic controversy. Furthermore, from the Washington Conference of 1921 to the present time, Manchurian railways have been the chief concern. Of these Manchurian railways, no railway in the world has caused so many and such a variety of international entanglements as has the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was born in an international secret plot, and from the day of its birth to the present time it has consistently lived up to its heritage. In 1880, Russia adopted a policy of colonization in the Far East. She organized a bureaucracy in St. Petersburg with the object of securing the right from China to establish a direct line of railway to Vladivostok and the Gulf of Pechile. After the war of 1895 her opportunity came. When Japan drafted the terms of peace on the basis of the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula, Russia, Germany, and France called for a joint intervention. They stated that "the possession of the peninsula of Liaotung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital

of China, would render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East."⁽¹⁵⁾ Finally Japan was forced to relinquish Liaotung in return for an additional indemnity. Having placed the Manchurian emperor and Li Hung Chang under obligation to Russia and convinced them of the necessity of Russian friendship in the face of a victorious and aggressive Japan, Russia proceeded to claim its compensation. Consequently in May, 1896, Li Hung Chang, Chinese minister of Foreign Affairs to Russia, signed a treaty in St. Petersburg in which both nations agreed to form a military alliance against Japan. Four months later, Russia obtained the right to construct and operate a railway from Manchouli, on the western border of Manchuria, to Pogradichnays, on the eastern border. In March, 1898, the Russian government leased the southern portion of the Liaotung Peninsula for twenty-five years; and in July, China granted to Russia the Chinese Eastern Railway Company.

When Russia was moving toward Manchuria and the Pacific Ocean, Japan viewed affairs with alarm. She realized that Russia was not only taking root in Manchuria, but reaching into Korea. Thus Japan decided to use force to prevent the Russian penetration. That was the chief cause of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. With the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, all Russia's rights in the railway south of Chang-

(15) Payson F. Treat, "The Far East", Chapter XXVII

chun and the Russian holdings in the Liaoting Peninsula were transferred to Japan.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan promptly strengthened her position in Manchuria. She organized the South Manchuria Railway Joint Stock Company on June 7, 1906, and started to work of reconstruction in April, 1907. The original Russian tracks were changed into the standard gauge, and double tracks were laid. And at the same time she also asked China not to construct any main line in the neighborhood parallel to the Southern Railway. Thus this South Manchuria Railway Stock Company played the most important part in carrying out Japan's program of exploitation in Manchuria. It does not only carry away the raw materials from Manchuria to Japan and the manufactured goods from Japan to Manchuria, but it also engages in coal and iron mining, navigation, wharves warehousing, public utilities, education, and other enterprises. The success or failure of this company means the success or failure of Japan's scheme of exploitation and colonization of Manchuria.

While the Japanese activities in Manchuria were in progress, China was not idle. She was conscious of the fact that she should be mistress in her own territory, that all of the disabilities imposed upon her by treaty should be eliminated, and that she should own and operate her railways.(16) Consequently in the autumn of 1924, Marshall Chang-

(16) C. Walter Young, "Economic Bases for New Railways in Manchuria", Chinese Economic Journal, Peiping, Apr. 1927

Tso-Sin adopted the plan for railway construction in Manchuria. But when the Chinese government constructed the new railways linking up the three principal cities of Manchuria, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar, the Japanese government realized that the new Chinese railways would check the activities of the South Manchuria Company. Thus Japan made every effort to prevent China from developing a Chinese railway system.(17) Whenever China tried to build railways, Japan made protests on the ground that China had taken traffic away from the South Manchuria Railway and had violated the Protocol of 1905. Therefore China's attempt to build a railway has had a most difficult and stormy history. In some cases, China has had to borrow money from Japan; in other cases, China has had to change the route; and in some cases, China has been compelled to abandon the projected line all together.

Yet the success of the Chinese railways in south Manchuria is beyond the expectations of the Japanese government.(18) In recent years China has constructed the Tachushan-Tungshiao line in southwest Manchuria, and the Kirin-Heilung line north of Harbin. And the Taanan-Solum railway in western Manchuria and the Tsitsihar-Koshan and its projection are also now under construction by the Chinese. Thus the Chinese railway system in Manchuria operates link by link, and will eventually have two independent port outlets, Newchwang, and Hulutao. It is putting up stiff compe-

(17) C. Walter Young, "Railway Politics in Manchuria", the China Weekly Review, Shanghai, April 18, and 23, 1927.

(18) "China's Efforts in Developing Manchuria", p. 35, The Northeastern Affairs Research Institute, May, 1932.

tition to the Japanese railways. In 1930 the freight charges were reduced by thirty per cent on the Anganchi-Taonan, Gsupinghai-Taonan line, and the Peiping-Mukden line. The result was that about half a million tons of cargo, which would have been exported at Dairen by the South Manchuria Railway, was shipped through Yinkow via the Chinese railway. Adding to the unprecedented decline of silver, the receipts of the South Manchuria Railway were decreased by 30,000,000 Yen. When the Japanese government viewed this situation, in alarm it decided to renew the "positive" policy in accordance with which it must use force to occupy Manchuria. When China was suffering the scourge of a ravaging flood, and when Europe was facing the world-wide depression, Japan invaded Manchuria without warning.

THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS

On September 18, the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese military was known to the whole world. Briefly summarized, the grave situation was said to have been created by the alleged blowing up of a section of the South Manchuria Railway at Huangkutun by the Chinese soldiers. Following the supposed event, the Japanese troops immediately started a surprise attack upon the Chinese soldiers and marched into Mukden. Soon Japanese soldiers also occupied Yingchow, Nauling, Tungtating Changchow, and Kwanchingtze. Furthermore the Japanese military forces landed in Tsingtao and Chinchow. Consequently the whole territory of Manchuria was entirely in the hands of Japan. With further aggression, Japan also moved to Jehol and took over that territory.

Immediately after the occupation of Manchuria, Mr. Shigeemitsee, the Japanese Minister to China, gave out an interview to the Chinese press of Peiping, and made a statement that the "unfortunate incident was entirely started by the Chinese soldiers, and as no war was expected by the Japanese troops, no special preparation had been made for the trouble". He also made sure that "the Japanese officials were trying to localize the incident". Later in spite of localizing the incident, the Japanese government claimed that, in order to forstall the possible effects of the inci-

dent upon the safety of Japanese nationals in Manchuria, especially in view of the tense atmosphere that already prevailed, it became necessary to take over Mukden and to disarm the Chinese military units both there and at other points in Manchuria.

It is not necessary at this point to recount in detail the incident of September 18, when a bomb is alleged to have exploded on the South Manchuria Railway line. Suffice it to say that foreign newspaper correspondents in Mukden have stated that no neutrals or Chinese in Mukden accept the Japanese version of what happened in connection with the incident. Whatever provocation Japan may have had for her activities in Manchuria, there is general agreement that the alleged occasion for the beginning of operations was a flimsy and transparent pretext.(19)

According to an official statement issued by the Tokyo Foreign Office, it alleged that it was necessary for Japan to take "self-protecting measures" since she could not "overlook such acts of the Chinese soldiers as destroying the Japanese railway".(20) But let us ask, if the South

(19) Eugene E. Barnett, "A Few Generalizations Regarding the Manchurian Crisis", 1932

(20) China Critic, Vol. IV, No. 39, Sept. 24, 1931, Shanghai. It points out that a United Press report came from Tokyo stating that today Mr. Morshima of the Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office left Tokyo for Mukden. He is carrying an important instruction to Mr. Hayashi, the Consul-general at Mukden, that Japan has taken action in Manchuria as a matter of self-defense.

Manchuria Railway is always carefully guarded and policed by the Japanese soldiers, how could the Chinese soldiers have had the opportunity to get near the line? If the tracks were really destroyed, how could the Japanese trains still run over that line after September 18? Even if the charge were true, why should not the Japanese guards have disarmed the Chinese soldiers and asked the Chinese authorities for whatever satisfaction they might deem proper? In other words, why should not Japan settle the case by diplomatic means, and why must they immediately resort to the occupation of Manchuria by military force without warning? Why must they seize the Chinese government buildings, imprison the important Chinese officials, and take possession of the Mukden arsenal and wireless station? Why should they send troops to Tsingtao? Is it, as Mr. Shigemitsu said, a purely local incident?

It is, I think, generally agreed that back of the present military occupation by Japan of strategic points in south Manchuria, is Japan's long-cherished ambition to establish an economic, if not a political hegemony in south Manchuria and inner Mongolia. One might go back to the Shimoseki Treaty of 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War, to the Portsmouth Treaty following the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and to the Peking Treaty between China and Japan of 1905, to the notorious Twenty-One Demands served on China in 1915,

and to the Tanaka Memorandum to the Emperor of Japan in 1927 for concrete evidence of Japan's deepseated conviction of her imperial destiny in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Having studied the Japanese foreign policy in relation to China, we can deduce that the present occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops was a premeditated and carefully planned act. In *Supporting this theory*, let us consider some facts. On September 15, General Honjo was sent to Manchuria as the commander of Japanese forces, and he immediately ordered a mobilization of his troops from Korea to Manchuria. Three days later, all the troops marched to Mukden.(21) This attack on the Chinese city at Mukden started at 10:30 on the evening of September 18, and the bombardment and occupation of the principle cities along the South Manchuria Railway was completed within forty-eight hours. Following that day, the Japanese military occupation has extended to Tsitsihar and Harbin on the north, the Great Wall on the south, Inner Mongolia and Jehol on the west, and the Korean border on the east - an area of over 200,00 square miles. In the occupied area, the Chinese standing army and police, who had been ordered not to resist, have been disarmed; Chinese officials and private citizens have been arrested and put to death; Chinese administrative organs have been destroyed; Chinese educational institutions, banks, and private businesses have been taken over or closed;

(21) "The Manchurian Situation", China's Society, New York, 1931.

and a great deal of Chinese property has been destroyed. And today Japan has already set up her own political administration and rules the territory through her own puppets, and Poyi, who are nominally the officials of the so-called independent government. She has also taken over private businesses and industries and has set up an economic structure of a permanent sort for the exclusive control of all the resources, industries, and trades. In other words, such swift occupation and control of Manchuria would have been impossible without advanced planning.

Aside from the above facts, the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese military was precipitated by the increased tension occasioned by two events of the past summer. One was the Wan Pao Shan incident; the other was the Tsinan incident. In the beginning of July, a group of Chinese farmers tried to oust some Koreans at Wan Pao Shan who were digging an irrigation ditch without the consent of the Chinese land owners. On July fourth, an anti-Chinese riot, which was instigated by the Japanese, began, and a considerable number of Chinese farmers were ruthlessly slaughtered by the Japanese soldiers. Not long after that, more than a hundred Chinese were killed. Before the incident could be settled, the alleged murder of Captain Nakamura, who had gone into Inner Mongolia on military duty, was magnified and capitalized by the Japanese military and

press, and the Chinese troops were being secretly mobilized and sent into Manchuria.(22)

Since the war with Russia in 1904, Manchuria has constantly been in the minds of Japanese militarists and politicians. The only point upon which they seem to disagree is whether they should adopt a "moderate" or a "positive" policy. Before 1928 Japan still held to the "moderate" policy, but after 1928 the policy was changed. When the Chinese national army marched to Peiping and united China as a whole, Japan was alarmed. Then Tanaka authorized the dispatch of troops to Tsinan during that summer, and tried to prevent the Chinese from organizing the National Government; but they failed.

Immediately after the occupation of Manchuria, Japan appealed to the world, saying that for her self-defense it was necessary to send troops to protect her nationals and interests in Manchuria. Thus on the twentieth, Mr. Morshima of the Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office left Tokyo for Mukden with the object of carrying the important instruction to Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, that Japan should take the position of self-defense.(23) How wonderful the Japanese Foreign Office must be, in order to be able to comprehend the situation in Manchuria from Tokyo even better than the Japanese Consul-general who is there in person and right in the midst of the trouble!

(22) Kuowan Weekly, Vol. IX, No. 1, Peiping, 1931.

(23) See Footnote 19.

What a wonderful Consul-general they have that needs to be informed from Tokyo!

It is, I think, generally agreed that the plea of self-defense by Japan is without justification. In the first place, Japan's population and investments outside the treaty area are very small. It is impossible for a large number of Chinese soldiers to attack. In the second place, except for outlying areas, Manchuria has been free from banditry and civil disturbances. There was no evidence of a charge which would threaten Japanese lives and property.(24) In the third place, if the Japanese had evidence of any plot of attack on them, they would have made it public long ago. They have not done so, but have talked only in vague and general terms. Japan might have made more sinful accusations of China, but she has failed to prove them. In the fourth place, the statistics show that the Japanese nationals in China have been much safer than have been the Chinese nationals in Japan. The total number of Japanese civilians killed in China during the last ten years, up to the recent invasion, is less than half the number of Chinese civilians killed in Korea, which is directly under the control of the Japanese military and political authorities. In the fifth place, foreign ob-

(24) Harry Hussey, "Manchukuo in Relation to World Peace - Things That Were Not Told in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry".

The author points out in his summary that "it is clear that Manchuria was not, up to the time of the Japanese invasion in September, 1931, the unhappy, bandit-infested, and disorganized country which the Japanese would have us believe; nor was its government the inefficient, corrupt, and backward organ which interested parties have tried to picture to the world".

servers would agree that the Japanese nationals and interests are always safe. Mrs. Slade, prominent American citizen and delegate to the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, said in a public address in New York city on March 10, 1932, "From September eighteenth to November twentieth when I left China, no Japanese subjects were disturbed in China."(25)

After the military occupation of Mukden, the Japanese promptly made plans to attack the remaining cities. To avoid the censure of world opinion, they first planned to entrust this work to Chinese bandits with the help of Japanese staff officers and amunitions.(26) The bandit chief to whom they entrusted the task was Sin Yin-Chin, who had long been under Japanese protection and was living in the Japanese section of Mukden during the incident of September 18, 1931. Consequently on October 19, definite terms of cooperation were arranged between Shigetaro Kuraoka, the Japanese chief representative, and Lin; and the so-called "Headquarters of the Northeastern People's Self-defence Army", with Lin as its chief, was formed. On the same day, Kuroak was appointed adviser to this "Army". On October 20, Lin was proceeding to attack Panshan City, but on November 4 he was killed by his own men who had joined him in the belief that he was really fighting for the people's cause, but realized later that he was only a tool of the Japanese.

Japan appeals to the world saying that it is necessary

(25) New York Times, March 11, 1932.

(26) "Japan and Banditry", The Northeastern Affairs Research Institute, 1932.

to suppress the Chinese bandits in order to maintain peace and order in Manchuria, but she does not tell the world that many of the bandits in Manchuria are of Japan's own making. In spite of carrying through the Japanese plan to attack the Chinese cities, these bandits, who receive supplies from Japan, make war on the Japanese. These bandits though so-called by the Japanese, are not the regular outlaws whose chief occupation is their depredations upon innocent people, but rather patriots who derive more joy from harassing the Japanese than their own country.

In order to affirm their position in Manchuria, the Japanese made a third appeal to the world, pleading that the control of possession of Manchuria is vital to the existence of Japan, on the grounds of historical, economic, and military necessity. (27) It is not necessary at this point to give more details for argument. The greatest difficulty with the Japanese is that they think only of the national existence and defence of Japan, while it never seems to occur to them that China has her needs too. What about the national existence of China, the national defense of China, the economic requirements of China, and the strategic necessity of Manchuria to China?

In appealing to the world opinion in connection with the Manchurian crisis, Japan makes her appeal on the basis of what she euphoniously calls the famous Treaty of 1915,

(27) K. K. Kawakami, "Japan Speaks", p. 9, The Macmillan Company, 1932.

The Lansing-Isgii Agreement, and the "Monroe Doctrine" of the Far East. China, on the other hand bases her case on such documents as the Open Door Policy, the League of Nations Pact, the Washington Conference pact, and the Kellogg Pact.

As a matter of facts, the military occupation of Manchuria is a flagrant violation of international laws and of specific treaty pledges by Japan.

1. By the treaty of Portsmouth(1905), Japan acquired from Russia what is now called the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway, together with all Russian privileges connected therewith. But in this treaty it does not provide that Japan has the right to operate her military in the territory. The Treaty of Portsmouth contains the following provisions:

"Article III- Japan and Russia mutually engage:

- (1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of additional Art. I annexed to Treaty.
- (2) To restore completely and entirely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above-mentioned."

"Article VII - Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes."

2. The Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 provides that:

"Article I - The contracting powers, other than China, agree:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states."

3. The Pact of Paris Provides that:

"Article II - The settlement or solution of all disputes

or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

4. The League of Nations Covenant provides that:

"Article XII - The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. "

5. Japan has violated treaty rights in Manchuria, even apart from the gross violation involved in the military occupation. Since Japan's rights in the leased territory rest on the original Russian lease which expired in 1923, and since ~~since~~ the Sino-Japanese agreement of December 12, 1925, under which Japan built the Mukden-Autung Railway specifically states that the term of the concession above-mentioned is to expire in 1923, Japan has absolutely no right to be in control of the Kwantung Leased Territory, including Dairen, Port Arthur, and part of the South Manchuria Railway between Mukden and Autung.

Further discussion of Japan's action in Manchuria has shown that she has no justification for her case. In the first place, if Japan had real grievances which China refus-

ed to take up in negotiation, her proper course would be to appeal to the League of Nations under provisions of the League Covenant to meet the case. Instead she launched sudden, unprovoked, and wide-spread military occupation in flat violation of her treaty not to use war as an instrument of national policy. In the second place, if Japan had a good case, she would have welcomed the impartial investigation when the League decided to appoint a neutral investigating commission. Instead, she did not only refuse the Commission, but also suppressed all the press in Manchuria which would bring the true facts to the outside world. In the third place, if Japan did want to seek peace, she would have to agree to any date provided by the League for the withdrawal of her troops from Manchuria. But when the Chinese authorities had announced repeatedly that they were ready to restore peace and order as soon as the Japanese troops should withdraw, the Japanese announced publicly that the Manchurian situation was purely a Sino-Japanese affair; neither the League of Nations nor the Kellogg Pact signatories had anything to do with it. Then she continued the bombing of the Chinese cities and advanced to Jehol outside of Manchuria.

With regard to the legal status of the Sino-Japanese Treaty and Note of 1915, the Twenty One Demands may affect Manchuria in two ways. First, the Treaty provided that the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the leases of the Mukden-

Antung Railway were all extended ninety-nine years. Secondly, in notes accompanying these demands, Japan may claim further mining rights and priority of investment in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Now whether the Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1915, resulting from the Twenty-One Demands, is valid or not is open to question. Appealing to the world, Japan claims that the treaty is made between Japan and China. It is impossible to abrogate on any legal basis; if so, how many treaties made between China and Japan can be abrogated? China, on the other hand, holds the Sino-Japanese Agreement invalid within its rights on a strictly legal basis.

1. In accordance with international law, a treaty must be made within the meaning of the constitution of the parties. (28) Without the consent and advice of the Chinese Parliament, President Yuan Shih-Kai exceeded his constitutional authority in signing these agreements. Thus the so-called Twenty-One Demands were never ratified by the Chinese legislative body, and on many occasions, successive governments have declared them to be fundamentally null and void.
2. The Twenty-One Demands contravene all principles of international law and especially those of the Open Door Policy and the Nine Power Treaty in which all the powers promise to respect the territorial integrity and admin-

(28) G. G. Wilson, "International^{Law}", P.211, Silver, Burdett, and Company, 1922.

- Administrative independence of China.
3. China's signature to the documents was secured by an ultimatum backed by the threat of force.(29) Therefore it is invalid.
 4. It is generally agreed that the foreign powers hold this treaty invalid. After the treaty was signed, the United States sent identical notes to China and Japan with the following comment on the implications of the Twenty-One Demands: (30) "The Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy".

With regard to the railway situation, Japan claims that China has failed to abide by the treaty agreement under which China is alleged to have bound herself not to build railroads paralleling the South Manchuria line.(31) On the other hand, China can explain that she was not ignoring conditions stipulated in an agreement. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Manchurian Railway system was practically controlled by Russia. It had a line running

(29) G. G. Wilson, "International Law", p.213.

(30) Meng, "China Speaks", The Macmillan Company, 1933

(31) Roy H. Agaki, T. Z. Koo, and Joseph P. Chamberlain
Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1932

horizontally from Manchuli to Vladivostok on one side, and a line running vertically from Harbin to Dalny. After the Russo-Japanese War, a part of the vertical line from Chung chun to Dalny was transferred to Japan and become known as the South Manchuria Railway. The horizontal line and the remaining part of the vertical line are still under the control of Russia. In 1924 when China began to develop her own railways in Manchuria, she built a railway linking up the three capital cities of Manchuria, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar. In shape the railway is somewhat like a small circle, and its system is neither a horizontal, nor a vertical paralleling the South Manchuria Railway.(32) Again, even if the Chinese railway system does parallel the South Manchuria Railway, China does not violate Japan's treaty right in Manchuria, because the agreement of 1905 between China and Japan is not a treaty but a protocol, which is used to explain the provisions of a treaty.

Before the occupation of Manchuria, Japan declared that she was going to maintain the Open Door doctrine in Manchuria, but after she entered south Manchuria, she closed the door to other nations in violating the Treaty of Portsmouth, which provides that Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria. As a matter of fact, "experience has

shown that in any region of China in which political control is exercised by the Japanese, the tendency is for foreign trade other than Japanese to diminish".(33) and that "the Japanese tariff of the South Manchuria Railway did and does discriminate against the Port of Newchang in favor of Dairen by inaugurating a system of rebates, of which, in the nature of things, Japan only can take advantage".(34) Again, when Knox's plan was formulated upon a preliminary agreement between the Chinese government, the British contractors, and an American banking group for the construction of a line to connect the Peiping-Mukden Railway at Chinchow and Aigun, with the object of neutralizing the Manchuria Railways to develop the unified and scientific management of railways, Japan induced Russia to take the leadership and responsibility in rejecting the proposal.

In the present case, more concrete details have shown that since the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese, all the foreign trade in Manchuria has been monopolized.(35) Foreign firms there, other than Japanese, are reported to be reducing their staffs or closing their offices. Thus the Chinese Engineering Company of Briton, which for many years has had merchants and agents in Mukden for the sale of glass, tile, and bricks has been closed; the Chinese Engineering

(33) George Bronson Rea, "Economic Effects of the Extension of Japanese Sphere of Influences in China", 1915.

(34) Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Contemporary Politics in the Far East", 1916.

(35) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, "Some Plain Speaking with Regard to the Chinese-Japanese Situation", J. H. Furst Co.

and Development Corporation of America has been forced to transfer its Mukden Assistant-manager to Hangkow; the Anderson Meyer and Company has been closed; and the rest of the foreign firms are remaining there only until they can settle their accounts.

It has been argued by Japanese spokesmen, and especially by Mr. Matsuoka, that, "because a certain amount of disorder has attended China's efforts to establish for herself a government of the people, she is not entitled to rights which the other nations should respect, and, therefore, Japan should not be held strictly bound by such agreements as she may have made with China or with the other powers concerning China".(36) In other words, China is an unorganized nation to which the Covenant of the League should not apply.

In reference to Mr. Matsuoka's statement, it is worthy of note that it was not until Japan found that she was unable to support her cause before the League of Nations and before the world upon ethical and judicial grounds, that, as a last resort, she turned this attack upon China. As late as September, 1931, and only a day or two before the Manchurian controversy was brought before the Council of the League, Japan cast her vote in favor of China's being represented upon the Council of the League, but during the progress of that controversy before the Council, Japan in-

(36) See note 35.

sisted that the League should not concern itself with the dispute, but should leave the whole situation to settlement by direct negotiations between herself and the government of China. If, as Japan now contends, China does not possess, and since 1912 has not possessed, a government that deserves to be recognized by other governments, what possible consistency was there in her insisting that only by dealing directly with that government could a satisfactory settlement be obtained?

Yes, Japan claims that China is not a well-organized nation, but let us ask what kind of a government Japan has to-day? Let us quote from the statement communicated by Dr. W. W. Yen to the Council of the League of Nations, for illustration. Dr. Yen said, "The Japanese delegate speaks of a well-organized state. I am wondering whether a state like Japan, with the army and navy running away and out of control of the government, is an organized state. When their diplomats come to the Council table and give promises one after another, violated by the very next day, does that represent a well-organized government? The Japanese gave solemn promises to the governments of two or three great powers not to go to Chinchow, but in a few days they were there. Does that represent a well-organized government?"(37)

Again, the Lytton Commission Report also treated the Japanese contention with the contempt which it deserved.

(37) League of Nations Official Journal, 1932.

It points out that no one has denied that in recent times China has been going through a long and difficult process to a state of modernization, that the authority of the central government is perfectly effective, and that the administration, military forces, and finance are acquiring an increasingly national character.

Furthermore, it is generally agreed that during recent years, there have been progressing in China three great revolutions - a political revolution to establish a national government on the popular basis of the Three Principles and Five Powers system; an economic revolution to modernize methods of production and distribution; and a cultural revolution, which amounts to a genuine renaissance, to bring about changes in all fields of spiritual thought and idealism. Of course, China will not assert that within a few years she will overcome all the difficulties, yet she can assert that she will make considerable progress. Take the judicial reform since 1905, for example. There are twenty-seven modern courts and twenty-one prisons in Manchuria today. The police system has been modernized, and western methods have been introduced into the civil administration.

Following the day of November sixteenth, the note of protest of the Japanese government against the anti-Japanese movement in China was handed by Mr. Shigemitsu, the

Chinese minister, to Mr. Frank Lee, the acting minister of foreign affairs of the Nationalist Government. Briefly summarized, the note asserts that all forms of anti-Japanism, including the boycott, should be called off permanently. It holds the Chinese government responsible for the Manchurian situation, because the outcome of the deep-rooted anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as an instrument of national policy under the direction of the Nationalist Party. This charge is, of course, groundless, and Japan has no right to say that blame for the Manchurian situation should be placed on China. In truth, the anti-Japanese movement is conducted by the Chinese people in a peaceful manner. Since the duty of the government is only to maintain peace and order and to see that no Japanese lives and property are molested, such spontaneous demonstrations against Japanese imperialism on the part of the people cannot be suppressed by the government.

Boycott is a civil right which can not be curtailed by law.(38) The Chinese government may be able to control anti-Japanism contrary to law, but it cannot force the people to buy something they do not want. Again, no one can hold that it has not been a measure of legitimate defense. Indeed, we can remember that in the United States an important group of highly responsible and distinguished citizens formally proposed to join China in boycott measures against

(38) G. G. Wilson, "international Law", p. 226.

Japan. Furthermore, the League of Nations has approved of economic boycott as a measure of sanction against a recalcitrant state.(39) If Japan would ask China to accept this principle, she would have to urge the League to renounce and denounce boycott first.

On the other hand, Japan contends for the payment for railroads built with Japanese money, and for the recognition of existing agreements for railway construction in Manchuria. Of course, the claim is absolutely unjustified. The so-called railway agreement which resulted from the series of Nishihara loans in 1918 was intended for industrial purposes and the construction of railways. The money was never so used, however, but only appropriated for military need. On June 18, 1918, for instance, a contract was obtained by the Bank of Chosen and two other Japanese banks to construct a line between Kirin and Huining, but this contract lacks such details as the total amount of the loan and the manner of service on the bond. Yet an advance of 10,000,000 yen was made to Peking without restriction. Thus a loan of this nature, secretly obtained and privately dissipated for a false purpose, can hardly be recognized as binding on China. If Japan claims that such nefarious transactions can be upheld, then all the Chinese corrupt officials at any time can pledge the nation's future in exchange for Japanese support.

(39) Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations

The Japanese government has made official announcements of the Japanese Monroe Doctrine.(40) She holds that she is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East, and that other powers have taken similar actions in the past. In other words, Japan draws a parallel between its actions in Manchuria and those of the United States in Mexico and South America. Certainly this is an unjustified doctrine. In the first place, the actions of Japan must be judged on their own merits according to the specific background and circumstances. In the second place, times have changed and much progress has been made in international law and ethics. In accordance with the Nine Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is impossible for a foreign power to enforce peace by military occupation.

The American Monroe Doctrine, as officially defined, is solely a policy of self-defense. It is limited to expressing the opposition of the United States to any non-American state seizing territory or political control in the hemisphere. Unlike the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, it does not claim special interests, hegemony, or economic privileges. It does not use military force to induce the Caribbean republics to permit American capital to find profitable investment. The doors are voluntarily wide open. It does not possess or seek an exclusive economic concession in any Latin American

(40) K. K. Kawakami, "Japan Speaks", The Macmillan Co. 1932

Republic. The United States, at least, violated no international treaties. She acts only in accordance with the desires of the local population. When it has seemed necessary to intervene in some revolution-tossed land, she has effected the necessary reorganization and has then withdrawn. The Japanese Monroe Doctrine is different. If it is judged by the action of the Japanese government and the statement of many Japanese leaders, it has aimed to overthrow the status quo in Manchuria to Japan's own advantage.

THE SHANGHAI WAR

While the attention of the world was centered on Manchuria, Japan charged that the Chinese National Government had induced the Anti-Japanese Society to attack the Japanese subjects in Shanghai. Following the supposed event, on January 27, Admiral Shiozawa issued a declaration, apparently on his own responsibility, announcing his decision to take necessary military action to preserve peace and order in the Chapei district.(41) Shortly after midnight, Japanese marines issued from the International Settlement and invaded Chapei. Meeting with unexpected and stiff resistance from the veteran Cantonese force commanded by General Tsai Ting-Chai, the Japanese marines made no progress in the night hours. Thus, on January 29, Japan massed over four warships, 60,000 men, and over 200 military planes to invade Shanghai. Bombs dropped into Chapei by Japanese airplanes throughout January 31 set the area on fire. The Chinese civilians in Chapei were forced to choose between the bullet-swept street and the spreading fire; the total number of deaths will never be accurately known.

On February 2, the United States and Great Britain submitted a comprehensive peace proposal to Japan and China. The principles ~~points~~ of this proposal are as follows: cessation of all acts of violence; withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual

(41) Shanghai Time, Shanghai, China, January 27, 1932.

contact in Shanghai; protection of the Shanghai settlement by establishment of a neutral zone to be policed by neutrals under consular authority; and prompt advances toward negotiation to settle outstanding Sino-Japanese controversies.(42) The proposal of peace by neutrals was accepted by China but was rejected by Japan. As the situation went from bad to worse, the twelve members on the Council made an appeal to the Japanese government to acknowledge the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, but this appeal also fell upon deaf ears. Finally, as the result of the checking of the Chinese Route Army, the truce was signed between China and Japan, but the case was still unsettled.

The destruction of Chapei on January 29, 1932, was the turning point in the Sino-Japanese conflict. In the first place, before the Shanghai War, all the powers still held the attitude that Japan's claims might be justified and its military operation in China might not be an aggressive action. After the outbreak of the Shanghai War, all the powers realized that Japan had committed a similar act in Manchuria. Shanghai was an international port and an important shipping center for the war, yet Japan had unlawfully brought the war to the front door of the International Settlement and threatened the trade of all nations there. Manchuria is not an international port and is of less importance to America and European powers. What could Japan do

(42) Shanghai Time, Shanghai, China, February 3, 1932

there? Thus it would not be surprising that through eye-witnesses in Shanghai the world could be able to get a more vivid and truthful picture of the situation than in Manchuria.

In the second place, before the War, the whole world believed that the Japanese government was under the civil authority. After the Shanghai War, the world realized that the Japanese government is under the control of military authority. When they went about their task so ruthlessly and with such difficulty,^{that} even the Japanese foreign office and the Japanese delegates to the League have had considerable difficulty in following the Japanese military operation for which they have been called upon to offer post-mortem pretexts and explanations.

In the third place, the whole world realizes that the invasion of Shanghai by the Japanese military is a shattering shock to world opinion. For more than ten years people believed that international conflicts could be adjusted through^{the} democratic principles of the League. Japan, at the day of the Disarmament Conference, sent troops to Shanghai and made the political machinery of the League almost stop functioning. The invasion of Shanghai did not only disclose the bankruptcy of the restricted system of international law and agreement, but also destroyed all faith in the complicated system of pacts, protocols, and

renunciation of war as an instrument of ^{Notional} policy. Thus Japan ~~did~~ not only bring about moral disaster in the world, but also shattered the restricted group of the League supporters and the mass of mankind, which has been brought back from post-war dreams to pre-war realities.

MANCHUKUO

While the attention of the world was concentrated on Shanghai, Japan was consolidating her position in Manchuria. On March 9, 1932, the Japanese military authority put Henry Pu Yi on the throne of Manchukuo, and confronted the world with an alleged "fait accompli" in Manchuria. Consequently this illegal government may, under the iron hand of Japan, claim the right to transfer rights and conclude treaties with Japan, if not eventually to incorporate itself as part of the Japanese Empire.

After the proclamation of an independent Manchuria at Mukden, General Araki, Japan's Minister of the Army, announced that the independence of Manchuria is the desire of 30,000,000 who wish to be saved from China's war lords and given their freedom. It is the duty of Japan to support this new independent nation directly or indirectly in the early days. If one studies the history of the independence of Cuba or the formation of the Republic of Panama, he will not be surprised to find that Japan supports the progress of a government in Manchuria which is prepared to recognize and protect Japan's rights and interests and maintain friendly relations.(43)

On the other hand, China has a very good reason to believe that the movement can by no means be regarded as an active and spontaneous expression on the part of the

(43) In answer to a question on the Independent Government from the Tokyo correspondent of the New York Times, General Araki made this statement recently.

Manchurian people. Since the population of Manchuria is made up mostly of emigrants or the descendants of emigrants from China, we can believe that these people will always consider themselves sons and daughters of China. Since ninety per cent of the Manchurian population is Chinese, then, the so-called independence movement can not be looked upon as an attempt to assert the principle of self-determination on the part of the minority. Conclusively, it is altogether clear that, since it has always been the aim of the militarists to create an independent but Japanese-controlled Manchuria as the first step toward annexation, the puppet government is entirely instigated by the Japanese.

Now let have the facts only.

After Yuan Chin-Kai, under the control of Japan, was installed with ceremony by the Japanese as head of an independent provincial government in Mukden on Tuesday, a correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune quoted a conversation with Yuan Chin-Kai, the essential parts of which are as follows: "They would have imprisoned me and installed persons who have no regard for Manchuria's welfare, if I had refused," he said, explaining why he had accepted the post. "I am trying to do my best for the Chinese and to avert more serious trouble. I know the Japanese are trying their hardest to restore a Manchu emperor, but I have nothing to do with it. When I assumed office, I had no idea that things

would go so far. The Japanese immediately pressed me to negotiate a Manchurian settlement, but I refused and still refuse. I would like Chang Hsueh-Liang's return, but that is now impossible.

'The Japanese compelled me to do many things contrary to my wishes, including the ceremony of installation and the proclamation severing relations with the regular Manchurian government, but others might have done worse.'"(44)

On October 22, 1931, "The China Critic" also issued a statement proving that there was no such movement until the Japanese occupied Manchuria. It was reported that Pao Shen Yi, a leader of the Mongolian tribes, was supported by Japan to create an independent movement in his tribe. Several train loads of arms and munitions were handed over to Mongolian troops headed by the Japanese returned students at Sankusu on the night of October 2, at a small station near Taonan on the night of the third, and at Ikusu on the night of the fifth. It was also reported that Prince Erl Han, who is at present living at Paiping, accused the Japanese in Mukden of offering him arms and amunitions on condition that he declare Inner Mongolia independant of China, and of forcing him to call a conference of the forty-eight princes in Mukden.

(44) Victor Keen, New York Herald Tribune, November 15, 1931.

THE ARMS EMBARGO

While the development of the grave situation in Manchuria was in progress, the United States of America adopted a resolution that she would bind herself to prevent persons under her jurisdiction from exporting munitions to any country or countries in which this action might promote or encourage the employment of force in the course of a dispute or conflict between nations. (45) The object of this resolution was to promote world peace by depriving the militarists of arms and amunitions in the Far East, but it did not secure that effect. In the first place, since Japan's ambition is the conquest of the whole of Asia as well as the subjugation of Europe and America, as outlined in the Tanaka Memorial, (46) whether the United States exports any arms or munitions of war to her or not, Japan has a good preparation to carry out her scheme. Again, even if the Japanese do need the arms and munitions, they can get them from Europe without any trouble, because neither the Near Eastern nations nor the European nations have taken the same action as the United States.

In the second place, if we do recognize that Japan has violated the three peace pacts and the Covenant of the League of Nations, our only duty is to stop Japan, or to protect China from the ruthless aggressor and from ultimate destruction. It is impossible to adopt a resolution to place

(45) 72d Congress, 2d Session, Calendar No. S.J.Res. 229
January, 1933.

(46) This memorial was submitted by Tanak, the Premier of Japan to the Emperor, 1927.

an embargo on both the aggressor and the defendor, or on just the aggressor. If we place an embargo on both, we are not only unable to check the aggressor, but we also weaken the defendor, who has less munitions, and encourage the aggressor to employ force in the course of the conflict. If we place an embargo on the aggressor onky, it would mean a possible war with the aggressor, and it is to cowardly for us to support the defendor only with a little munition.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND MANCHURIA

After China presented the case before the League of Nations, efforts on the part of the League Council to restrict the possible consequences of the Manchurian outbreak were made at three separate sittings. Briefly summarized, they were as follows. On September 21, 1931, Dr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese representative, appealed to the League of Nations and invoked Article XI of the Covenant.(47) Thus the Council of the League was asked to take an immediate step to prevent the further development of a situation which might endanger world peace; to reestablish the "status quo ante"; and to determine the amount and the character of such reparations as might be found due to the Republic of China caused by the Japanese military operations. Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese representative, on the contrary, held that the Manchurian situation was purely a Sino-Japanese affair.(48) Neither the

(47) League of Nations Official Journal, September 21, 1931. China invokes Article XII of the League Covenant to "bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace or good understanding between the nations upon which peace depends".

(48) League of Nations Official Journal, September 22, 1931. China agrees to the League inquiry but demands that the "status quo ante" be restored, while Japan insists on direct negotiations.

League of Nations nor the Kellogg Pact signatories had any thing to do with it. Hence he insisted on direct negotiation between China and Japan, and defended Japan's action in Manchuria on the ground of the necessity of protecting the Japanese nationals and their property.

On September 30, the Council of the League adopted a resolution in which Japan promised to withdraw her troops from Manchuria by October 14, and China promised to assure the safety of the Japanese nationals and interests. At the same time the Council appointed an international commission to look into the cause of the clash. In the interval, China kept her promise, while in spite of it, Japan continued to extend her military occupation. On October 14, the Japanese troops were still in Manchuria.

On October 13, the League Council proposed to invite the United States to participate with the Council in considering the Manchurian dispute, but Japan rejected this plan and argued that the invitation was illegal, because the United States is not a member of the League. Finally by a thirteen to one vote, the United States was invited, and the Council took an immediate step to invoke the Kellogg Pact.(49) On October 17, the League issued a warning calling upon Japan to immediately begin the withdrawal of troops and to complete it by November 16. At the same time the League arranged a permanent conciliation committee to aid negotiations

(49) League of Nations Official Journal, October 16, 1931. The League Council invites the United States to its meetings. Japan objects and casts the only dissenting vote.
October 17, The Pact of Paris is invoked.

between the two nations. But on November 16, the situation grew worse rather than better. It was found that the Japanese troops were not only still there, but that they had also advanced to the rest of the Manchurian territory.

Since China believed that the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact would assure her protection from ruthless aggression and ultimate destruction, she carried out every instruction of the Council. Thus throughout twenty-two months of conflict all the Japanese nationals have lived unmolested and unharmed in the midst of Chinese territory. On the contrary, the Japanese troops are still in Manchuria, and the Council is making vain attempts to settle the case. How is this condition of affairs to be explained? Why has the League of Nations failed?

In the first place, to those who know the corridor politics and the mechanism of the League, the failure of the League to solve the Sino-Japanese conflict in a speedy and satisfactory way could not be surprising, because the political organization of the League is not only too young and too weak for such a task, but also too far away from Manchuria.

In the second place, the most amazing thing about the present crisis is its very clarity, which has made it difficult. When the League found that the judicial position of China was far too strong and that her judicial right in

her differences with Japan was far too clear, it was morally impossible to condemn China. On the other hand, the League feared that Japan would withdraw from the League, and from the Council, and was therefore unwilling to condemn Japan.

In the third place, if we observe international politics very closely, we realize that the great powers are paralysed by their own interests. Whether this is true or not we can not tell. But there was a rumor that Japan and France had a secret agreement in 1928 in which France gave Japan a free hand in Manchuria. Since France is anxious to take Indo-China she advises the Japanese to turn their eyes toward Manchuria and assures them that there would be no obstacles placed in their way. (50)

In the fourth place, it is generally contended that the Manchurian crisis is a part of a French plot. (51) Brief summarized, the plan which has staggered some of the European statesmen has three stages as follows: (a) After the forceful occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese military, China places her case before the League; (b) the long adjournment of the League gives Japan an opportunity to consolidate her position; and (c) an invasion of the Russian boundary is made by asking Poland to unite against Russia.

(50) The China Critic, Vol. V, No. 3, page 66

(51) The China Critic, Vol. V, No. 1 January 7, 1932

If there is a war, France would be on the Japanese side.

In the fifth place, one aspect of the difficulty may be due to the great economic depression of the world in general, and to the absence of the United States in particular. Since Japan's position in the Council was very strong, it was impossible for the League to act without the United States. Unhappily the United States did not cooperate with the League as well as she might have. When the League proposed to use its powerful weapons of the withdrawal of ambassadors and of the economic boycott, the United States thought that these actions would mean a possible war with Japan. Thus, Japan was given the courage to take a free hand in Manchuria.

THE AMERICAN NOTE ON MANCHURIA

After Japan had set up the illegal government in Manchuria, the whole world awakened to the grim truth and refused to be hoodwinked by the Japanese. As the sponsor of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, the United States realized that she had the moral obligation to assume the leadership in settling the Manchurian dispute. On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson took the noble action of invoking the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. In the note the government announced that the United States will not recognize any treaty or agreement between China and Japan which would impair the treaty rights of the United States, including these relating to the so-called Open Door doctrine and to the sovereign independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, nor recognize any situation or agreement brought about contrary to the Pact of Paris.

If the dispatch of the note had taken place at the beginning of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Japanese military operations would have been checked. Since world opinion at the beginning of the crisis was solidly against Japan, and since the League council had passed the resolution to ask Japan for the withdrawal of her troops, if to these had been added Stimson's note, the

Japanese military operation in Manchuria could not have been justified as for defensive purposes, and a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian embroglio might have been reached. The chief reason why the United States government did not act earlier was the fact that a sufficient delay was necessary to enable the American investors, who had an immense interest in Japan, to liquidate their holdings. Whatever might be the reason for it, the Chinese government does appreciate the American attitude toward the solution.

From another aspect, if all the leading powers would be willing to take the same stand as the American government, the Japanese actions in Manchuria would likewise be checked and the foundations of world peace would be maintained. When the American note reached Tokyo, Japan had not yet taken Chinchow nor moved toward Jehol. If more nations had associated themselves with the United States in the same action, it would have established a peaceful solution. For instance, if all the Associated Powers had taken the same action, and the Japanese military action had stopped then, the question of Manchuria would be confined to Manchuria alone. Unfortunately, Great Britain, France, and the others were unwilling to associate and cooperate with the United States. Thus they left the note ineffective.

THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA

It is generally agreed that from the very start, the Russian government and the Russian people were deeply interested in the situation. Following the day of September 18, "The Izvestia," an official organ of the Soviet Government, criticized the situation, saying that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria has failed to meet even a semblance of protest either from the League of Nations or from Washington. It pointed out that Geneva was satisfied with the statement of the Japanese representative in telling of the entry of Japanese troops into Manchuria, and that the United States had made it clear to the world that she did not find in the operation of the Japanese troops anything contradictory to the Anti-War Pact. It also pointed out that the Japanese action must have been agreed upon by the other imperialist powers. And finally it concluded, saying that the Soviet Government will closely watch the further development of events in this Far Eastern hotbed of war, which is threatening new anti-Soviet provocations under which the imperialists may hide for the purpose of covering up their real intentions.

"Provdá", another official organ of the Central Committee and the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, also made a comment that the Japanese imperialists had decided by fire and sword to get what does not belong to

them in a foreign country, with the object of completing their program of colonization. It pointed out that Japan made no reference to lawfulness or self-defense in justifying her action, and that the League of Nations, by its decision, had revealed itself as a weapon and organizer of wars of plunder for the suppression of weak and oppressed nations.

In accordance with the above criticism, we can realize that Russia has not been very sympathetic toward China so far as the present crisis is concerned, because her sharp protest against the imperialist powers was not for the benefit of China, but in her own defense. Since the War of 1904, Russia has been planning to recover her special interests in Manchuria. If Manchuria is in the hands of Japan, it means a new triumph for imperialism, and she will have no chance to get it back; but if Manchuria is still in the hands of China, she will have more chance to extend her power in the Far East. That is the chief reason why Russia tries to keep the Japanese out of Manchuria.

When the Japanese troops invaded Heilunghian and took by force the provincial capital, Tsitsihar, many people expressed the fear that by entering the area of Russian interests the Japanese military authorities would come into conflict with the Communist forces. But for nearly two years Russia has taken no action. Why? Does this

mean that the Russians are in sympathy with Japanese imperialistic schemes, or does it indicate that Japan has succeeded in winning over her Communist neighbors? No, Russia refuses to do anything about the Manchurian embroglio, not because she does not know that the extension of Japanese activities north of the Chinese Eastern Railway is detrimental to her interests, but because she is now too much absorbed in the first and second five year plans. Thus it is necessary for Russia to be patient and watchful for the opportune moment in the future to avenge.

THE LYTTON REPORT

The Lytton Report on Manchuria is a remarkable document, extremely well written, well tempered, wise and just, and it completely upholds the Chinese case. As to the outcome, there can be no doubt in the minds of impartial observers, but it is refreshing to have a League Commission lay down ten principles essential to a permanent peace between China and Japan, and elucidate these in a clear-cut, straight-forward, and eminently practical manner. Thus the Commission, besides starting with the position that a settlement by the League must be just to both sides, declares that it must also have due regard for the interests of the Soviet Union, and must conform to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, and the Kellogg Pact.

Deny everything! Confess nothing! Blame all on your opponents! Bluster and threaten! In this fashion Japan responded to the Lytton Report. In addressing the Council of the League, Mr. Matsuoka unblushingly asserted, "We have violated neither the Covenant of the League, nor the Nine Power Treaty, nor the Pact of Paris.....We acted spontaneously in self-defense.....China and the independent government of Chang-Hsiao-Liang are themselves responsible. It was their doing, not ours, and it was done against our repeated and persistent warning." (52)

In other words, all Japan's actions in Manchuria are defended as legitimate and imperative measures of self-defense. On the other hand, the League Commission, in describing the fateful events of September, 18, 1931, when the Japanese armed forces seized Mukden, says unequivocally that the bomb explosion of the night on September 18 "was not in itself sufficient to justify military action", and that the seizure of Mukden and the occupation of the surrounding territory by Japanese military authorities "can not be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defense".(53)

Concerning the manner in which the "independent" state was formed, the Japanese reply says, "Coming to the actual establishment of the new state of Manchukuo, neither the Japanese government nor the Japanese Headquarters Staff gave these wider ideas any encouragement. Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Minami, Minister of War, both issued instructions on September 26, strictly forbidding participation by the Japanese in the various attempts to establish a new political authority in Manchuria, and in conformity with these instructions, the Japanese authorities, civil as well as military, uniformly abstained from interference".(54) On the other hand, the League Commission points out that the Japanese should be given full credit for establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo, a procedure which "is opposed to the interests of China. It

(53) Lytton Report, p.77.

(54) League of Nations Official Journal, October 1932.

disregards the wishes of the people of Manchuria, and it is at least questionable whether it will ultimately be to the best interests of Japan".(55)

The Report strongly recommends the calling of an advisory conference, to be composed of representatives from China and Japan, and of two groups of delegates from Manchuria selected respectively by China and Japan with neutral observers. Points upon which the conference is unable to reach an agreement should be referred to the Council of the League for further consideration. The suggestion is made that the results of the conference should be embodied in three separate instruments:

1. (a) A declaration should be made by the Nanking Government which would distinguish between the power of the central government and that of the local government in Manchuria. (b) A considerable measure of local autonomy should be granted, but the central government should reserve complete sovereignty over the region; the net income of the region should be equitably divided between the two administrations. (c) The chief executive of Manchuria and his foreign adviser should be appointed by the Chinese government from a panel of names submitted by the Council of the League. (d) The Chinese police system should be well organized and the Japanese troops should be withdrawn.

In accordance with these suggestions, the important points with which the Chinese government disagrees are the second and the third points. Since China is a sovereign state, she has full legal right to do as she chooses about her government and her territory. Thus, the League ought not to ask for the local autonomy of Manchuria, or for the power to submit a panel of names for Governor of foreign advisors. If this were done, Manchuria would not be a Chinese territory, but a semi-mandate of the League.

2. (a) The issue of the economic aspect of the Sino-Japanese treaty and the extent of the right of Japan to settle and lease land to the whole of Manchuria should be settled. (b) Two foreigners, one of which is Japanese, should be attached as advisers to the Supreme Court. (c) China should recognize all the definite grants made to Japan by the Treaty of 1915.

Concerning these suggestions, it would seem that while Manchuria may need some advisers in the Supreme Court, it is not necessary for her to employ them from Japan or from any other nations. Again, without the Twenty-One Demands, Japan may have her special interests in Manchuria according to the treaties and agreements between the two nations, but the rights of Japan ought not to be extended without further agreement.

3. (a) A Sino-Japanese Treaty of Conciliation, arbitration,

non-aggression, and mutual assistance, and a commercial treaty ought to be drawn up. (b) Economic Boycott is an international matter and not a subject of our inquiry.

These suggestions are wise and just. China will accept them unconditionally. Since for the purpose of better understanding, mutual respect, and friendly cooperation, China always seeks for peace, sincerity, and humanity.

In conclusion, I would say that the Report in its entirety constitutes a vigorous condemnation of the Japanese policy in seizing Manchuria by armed force and establishing a smoke-screen government. All the Commissioners are agreed that pacific means are available through which Japan may safeguard her legitimate right and interest in Manchuria. If the League of Nations, supported by the United States will continue to use moral and diplomatic actions in settling this case, there will still be a good chance of securing peace in the Far East and the peace of the world.

SUMMARY

The complicated nature of the conflicting Sino-Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria is sufficiently indicated in the discussion of the foregoing pages. In the final analysis, however, the conflict narrows down to a single paramount issue. Over a period of thirty years, on a basis of special political privileges, Japanese enterprise has built up an economic structure in Manchuria of vital importance to Japan. In view of the weakness of Chinese governmental administration, it is claimed that a continuance of Japan's political rights is essential to guarantee the unhampered pursuit of its economic activities. China, on the other hand, claims that she is willing and able to guarantee legitimate Japanese business enterprise in Manchuria. But, if Japan blindly pursues her own interests in utter disregard of China's vital interests, and if Japan is bent on imperialistic conquest without any consideration for China's needs and aspirations, China must resist for the sake of her self-respect and self-preservation.

The forceful occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese militarists on the night of September 18, 1931, was an unprecedented outbreak of international lawlessness. China, always abiding by the general principles of international law, and conscious of her obligations under international agreements to which she is a party, has earnestly and

continuously demonstrated to the world her unshaking faith in the League of Nations as an agency to uphold the cause of peace. She believes, also, that the international conflict will be readjusted through the democratic principles of the Nine Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Unfortunately both the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact Association suffer from certain disadvantages. One of these is that the guarantee of peace under the Covenant of the League is incomplete, and the security which it offers is correspondingly imperfect. Another disadvantage, which is more serious from the standpoint of the Chinese, is the non-participation of the United States. The Kellogg-Briand Pact Association does not suffer from these disadvantages, but it is gravely embarrassed by the ~~league~~^{lack} of organized institutions through which its authority may be exerted, and by the lack of a settled rule of action by which it may be known in advance what may be expected of its members in case of need. Consequently, when China presented the case before the League, all the powers did not take any active step, but employed the political machinery of the League in a half-hearted and futile manner in the present crisis.

A solution to the problem, if it is to be at all permanent, must include three fundamental principles:

1. Japan must recognize that Manchuria is an integral part

of China.

2. Japan must respect China's sovereignty.

3. All the powers must not only refuse to recognize the Manchukuo administration as the "de jure", but also as the "de facto" government of Manchuria.

Hence besides the immediate withdrawal of Japanese forces, the Japanese government must indemnify the losses on the part of China, arising from the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. If Japan is willing to do that, China will guarantee legitimate business enterprise in Manchuria, (but not admit the necessity of such enterprise continuing on the basis of special political privileges wrung from China by force). At the same ^{time} one of the leading nations may assume the responsibility of leadership in the League or the Briand-Kellogg Pact Association, with an appropriate understanding with the other nations which are specially interested in Far Eastern affairs. Then they may deal directly with the Chinese government in Nanking in all matters relating to Manchuria, no matter what kind of authority the Japanese may try to assume on the spot. If they are willing to do so, it would not amount to a severance of diplomatic relations with Japan on their part. But it would be to their own interests and for the cause of justice and world peace, for Manchuria to remain a part of Chinese territory. Whether they are willing to take such a step, will show whether, after all, there is justice and righteousness in this world.

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