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Colonial policy as a major variable force shaping political change in Africa: a case study of Uganda, 1905-1945

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CHAPTER VII

THE PROTECTORATE'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

The second part of the thesis of the study as stated in the Introduction suggested that British native administration policies in Uganda, combined with economic and social development policies and policies toward the Protectorate's central institutions, operated as the most important of the five forces to shape the limited extent of political change in the central institutions.

The consideration of the central institutions, from the point of view of political change up to 1945 and the forces shaping it, is divided into four main sections. At the beginning, to provide perspective for the Uganda situation, is a review of relevant colonial policies in other parts of Africa, especially in British Africa. The Protectorate's central institutions are then described, with the aim of presenting a picture of their slow evolution as a consequence of British policy. Attention is subsequently directed to two other factors, largely deriving from divergent policies, which contributed to the limited extent of political change in this field. These were the politically dynamic issue of federation of East Africa, and the attitudes of the Protectorate's Africans toward the central institutions.

I. INTRODUCTION

The pre-World War II policies of the colonial powers in Africa concerning the development of central governmental institutions for the territories all followed a similar line in one respect. The participation of the indigenous population in these institutions was not viewed as a matter of urgency, since self-government for non-European majorities was considered only a remote possibility.¹ In other respects, policies varied widely.²

The Policies of Colonial Powers Other than Britain

In the African colonies belonging to France, up to 1944 there was a large measure of control from Paris. Little had taken place in the way of elaboration of central territorial institutions, which were in any event overshadowed by the powerful, highly centralized executive branch of the French colonial governments. As for African participation, the French preferred the idea of colonial peoples having a voice

¹Kenneth Robinson, "Colonial Issues and Policies with Special Reference to Tropical Africa," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 84, 87-89.

²The variations in the colonial powers' policies in the pre-1945 era may be largely explained in terms of the differing characters, histories, and philosophies of their respective (metropolitan) peoples. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 142, 542.

The summary treatment of colonial policies which follows in the text above is based in large measure on Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, Chapters V and VI; and Robinson, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII, 84-90.

in the legislature of France when they were ready, rather than through a colonial assembly.

Circumstances in the Belgian Congo were somewhat similar. The colony was administered by law and decree from Brussels through a Governor in Leopoldville. His power was unchallenged, for councils, where they existed, were only advisory. Belgium envisaged no further political development.

Affairs in Portuguese colonies were controlled by Lisbon's political institutions, and the latter's emphasis on executive as contrasted to legislative authority was reflected in the colonies. Policy on African political participation was along the same lines as that of France--a voice for acculturated Africans in metropolitan institutions. But prospects in this respect were quite remote.

As for the "colonial" policy of South Africa, central political institutions of the Union were well developed, and government of the African population was largely in the hands of the executive branch of the European-dominated state. African involvement in the national and provincial governmental institutions, far from growing after the Union's Constitution came into force in 1910, had actually diminished by 1945 as a consequence of successive actions taken by those exercising political power.

Policies in British Africa

Did British policy resemble that of the above powers in the extensive control and direction exercised from the "mother" country, and in the greater stress on the executive branch of government within the

colonial areas?¹ It did with regard to the latter, though perhaps not to the same extent. But British policy did not resemble that of the other powers in the former respect. In general, London granted a good measure of autonomy to its colonial governments once they were established. This meant more authority for its Governors than was the case with the non-British powers.

Yet the British colonial Governors in most territories had Legislative Councils by the 1920's, and in a few places these had evolved to serve as a real check on a Governor's actions.

British policy in Africa was, then, different from that of the other powers in its delegation of authority to the colonial governments. It was also dissimilar in that, although all-powerful in the beginning and even in 1945 in many colonies, the British colonial Governors by World War II could expect the future to bring a gradual lessening of their authority in favor of that of their Legislative Councils.

Colonial policy of Great Britain diverged from the policies of the rest of the powers in one more respect. While the non-British colonial powers applied their policies fairly consistently to all of their respective colonial areas in Africa south of the Sahara, British

¹In addition to the sources cited in the previous footnote, for the summary of British policy in Africa reference was made to a more specialized study: Martin Wight, The Development of the Legislative Council: 1606-1945, Vol. I of Studies in Colonial Legislatures, ed. Margery Perham (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1946), passim. Its coverage is somewhat broader than its title indicates. Also particularly useful was Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Northwestern University African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 19-30, 78-83.

policy varied more extensively from one territory to another within the general description given above. For example, Southern Rhodesia since 1923 has been a self-governing Colony, with its important, parliamentary-style Legislative Assembly completely dominated by the white settler community. On the other hand, in the Gold Coast Colony the Governor's control over the Legislative Council was full-fledged throughout the period under review, but the Council's membership for a number of years prior to 1945 included Africans--though in a minority. And, to cite Uganda as another illustration of difference, up to 1945 there were no Africans in the territory's Legislative Council. (As in the Gold Coast, the Governor of the Protectorate, through the official majority, exercised his power to direct the Council's activities as he wished.)

With respect to the absence of Africans in the Protectorate's central legislative body, of the eleven British territories in Africa which were subject to Colonial Office direction and which also at the beginning of 1945 had Legislative Councils, Uganda was one of seven having no African representation. Four did--Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast Colony, the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, and Kenya. As for the official majority in Uganda's Council, of the eleven territories, Uganda was one of six which had such a majority and a wholly nominated unofficial minority. The Legislative Councils of the other five--the four listed above, together with Northern Rhodesia--had official majorities with partly elected unofficial minorities. Only the Legislative Assembly of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, which was under the jurisdiction of the Dominions Office and not the Colonial Office,

had an elected membership to which the Government's Ministers were responsible.¹

In terms of the stage of constitutional progress of the central legislative body in Uganda at the end of 1944, compared to other

¹The Legislative Council of Sierra Leone was constituted in 1811 and provision was made for one unofficial member and two officials. Sierra Leone's Council probably had the first African member of such a council in Britain's African territories. The first African in the Gold Coast's Council was apparently appointed in 1889; and in Kenya this took place in 1944. It appears that elected--as opposed to nominated--African representation was introduced in Nigeria and perhaps also Sierra Leone in 1924, and in the Gold Coast the following year.

As for the general progress of the institutions of Executive and Legislative Councils in British territories in Africa subject to Colonial Office direction, the following data are available for the position as of January 1, 1945. The only British territories without an Executive Council were the Cameroons and Togoland under British mandate; and the Gambia and Somaliland Protectorates.

The dependencies without a Legislative Council were: Ashanti and the Gold Coast Northern Territories (as distinct from the Gold Coast Colony at that time); the mandated Cameroons and Togoland; the Somaliland Protectorate; and the Gambia and Kenya Protectorates, which were, however, legislated for by Legislative Councils constituted in the Gambia and Kenya Colony respectively.

The Legislative Councils which had an official majority and an unofficial minority wholly nominated numbered six: Gambia; Nyasaland; Seychelles (Islands); Tanganyika; Uganda; and Zanzibar.

There were five Councils with an official majority and an unofficial minority partly elected: the Gold Coast; Kenya; Nigeria (the Colony and Protectorate); Northern Rhodesia; and Sierra Leone (Colony and Protectorate). The Gold Coast, Kenya, and Northern Rhodesia each had a majority of elected members in the unofficial minority.

The number of Legislative Councils without an official majority but with instead an elected minority was nil. (There were ten such British dependencies outside of Africa.)

Not taken into account in the above enumeration were the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, under the Foreign Office as of January 1, 1945; and four territories under the Dominions Office. The latter were the three High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland, where legislative authority was vested in the High Commissioner; and the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia.

The source for the preceding material was Wight, The Development . . ., pp. 64, 73-75, 78, 85-86, 93-94, 170-172.

Colonial Office territories,¹ the Protectorate was ahead of a small number which had no Legislative Councils; it was behind some which had African representation; and it was behind some which had partially elected, as opposed to entirely nominated, unofficial minorities. On the whole, then, Uganda was one of a plurality of territories in an intermediate stage of constitutional development of this institution.

With such disparity in African participation in territorial political institutions of the British colonies, was there an official over-all policy on African political development? Although, according to authoritative sources, self-government had been for many years at least the inferred objective for all British colonies in Africa,² it was viewed as a quite remote possibility for many of them.³ The trusteeship policy envisaged a long period of tutelage by Britain of her wards.

The last official statement of the trusteeship policy prior to its gradual replacement during World War II was provided by Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald in a speech to the House of Commons on

¹In the years prior to 1945 the successive stages in the increases in a Legislative Council's responsibilities and proportion of non-official members came to be fairly clearly discernible from developments in British possessions in Africa and elsewhere. Martin Wight, British Colonial Constitutions, 1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 18.

²Lord Hailey's affirmation that this has been made clear in a series of consistently repeated authoritative statements would seem to be less than accurate. See Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 146-147; Hansard Society, Problems of Parliamentary Government in the Colonies (London: The Hansard Society, 1953), pp. 116-131; and Wight, British Colonial Constitutions, 1947, p. 18.

³Robinson, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII, 87; Cohen, p. 27.

December 7, 1938. It certainly represented no major departure from previous policy. Self-government was enunciated as the goal for the colonies, but in a manner as to question whether there was any real drive behind the goal. The Colonial Secretary, as quoted in a Hansard Society publication,¹ affirmed that the Empire's purpose was "'the gradual spread of freedom!" but that it was "'a slow, evolutionary process.'" Though the process might be more rapid in some places, in other territories it might "'take generations, or even centuries . . . to achieve self-government.'"

Not until the middle of the war was there any appreciable change in the trusteeship policy. In 1943 the Colonial Secretary declared that Great Britain should be regarded as a partner of the colonial territories as well as a trustee. He stated that the term trustee connoted too static a relationship in the Government's view.²

In addition to the sedative effects which the pre-World War II trusteeship policy had on British officialdom, African political participation in central institutions was further inhibited in certain territories where one of two conditions obtained. Where the Indirect Rule policy was the predominant approach to native administration, it was presupposed that Africans would develop politically along their own lines, but that the remoteness of self-government rendered it

¹Verbatim excerpts from the speech are provided in Hansard Society, Problems . . ., p. 130. This is the source for the quotations from the speech which follow in the text above.

²Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, p. 193.

unnecessary to worry about how the evolution was to take place.¹ In other territories, where there existed sizeable white settler communities, and where native administration policy was incidentally often one of direct rule, the entrenched position which the settler interests secured for themselves in the governments of the colonies greatly lessened the prospects for an increased African share in high-level official decisions.²

These, then, were the general outlines of the diversity of policy and practice in British Africa before 1945. How did the central political institutions of Uganda develop in this same era? Why was there no African representation in the Protectorate's central Executive and Legislative Councils? It is to such matters as these that the discussion now turns.

¹Robinson, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII, 88; Cohen, pp. 25-27.

²Cohen, pp. 21-22. The former Governor of Uganda has characterized the situation in the settler colonies as reflecting an inconsistency in two British policies--the dominion policy, which looked to the development of parliamentary institutions by white immigrant communities; and the trusteeship policy, which was enunciated in 1923 in one of its more categorical forms as the paramountcy of native interests. See also Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, p. 192.

The inconsistency was far from resolved by Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald's speech of 1938, which was at best evasive. He maintained, with what seems to have been markedly rose-colored glasses, that there was no fundamental conflict of interest between non-African immigrant and African indigenous communities. As quoted in a Hansard Society publication, he went on to say that "'the primary purpose of Colonial policy is the welfare and progress of all inhabitants of colonial territories. They have a common interest in the development of these territories. . . .'" Yet it was the British Government's "'first duty'" to see to the material well-being of the Africans, and that they obtained "'fair play'" in the economic system. Hansard Society, Problems . . ., p. 130, which quotes excerpts from the speech.

II. THE INSTITUTIONS AND PROTECTORATE POLICY

In the description and analysis of Uganda's central institutions, attention is directed particularly to two questions: the distribution of authority among the institutions; and the extent to which they provided for the resolution of conflicts between different groups and interests in the territory. Both are related to the degree of institutional change, which has increased in British colonies in Africa as the progress toward self-government has more definitely manifested itself. Just as progress was slow before World War II, so was there only a limited elaboration of the central institutions of the territories in that earlier era.

The central governmental institutions to be considered for Uganda are the Governor, the Administrative Organization, the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council. The first and last of these are given most attention--the post of Governor because it was of prime importance before 1945; and the Legislative Council because its role was potentially so significant.

The Governor

The Governor as an institution may be reviewed with reference to his relation to the Colonial Office, his relation to the other institutions in the territory, and the variations which inevitably resulted because of differences between the men occupying the office.

Relation to the Colonial Office. As can be surmised from the earlier, more general discussion of British policy in its African

territories, until World War II it was the traditional practice of the Colonial Office in London not to interfere with the actions of a Governor except in unusual circumstances. Additionally, the Colonial Office rarely formulated policy. Initiative in this and other respects was left to the Governor, who submitted his proposals for major changes to his superior in London. Proposals were almost invariably accepted and supported. The result was to leave a very wide scope of discretion to those Governors who wished to exercise such talents as they felt they had.

Although for practical purposes the above situation did not alter appreciably before 1945, during World War II there could be discerned a trend toward greater participation--not really control--of the British Government in colonial affairs. Increased public interest in Great Britain was one factor contributing to this development.¹

Relation to other Protectorate institutions. Not only was the Governor in the pre-1945 era almost free of London control, he was also the supreme authority within the colonial territory, in practice as well

¹Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Office (New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 1956), pp. 68, 201; Sir Charles Jeffries, "The Colonial Governor," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 26 (Second Quarter, 1957), 23; Cohen, pp. 80-82.

The remarks concerning the relation of the Governor to the Colonial Office, and those which follow immediately on the relation to other Protectorate institutions, are based on the cited sources, which deal with British colonial territories in general. Although the remarks are, therefore, not based on special study of these relationships in Uganda, other data collected on the Protectorate did not give any reason to doubt their validity for that territory. In addition, the fact that one of the writers cited--Sir Andrew Cohen--served in the Colonial Office and later as Governor of Uganda lends added weight to the assumption that the Protectorate was no exception to the general situation as described.

as in law. He combined the functions of Monarch, Prime Minister, Speaker, and head of the Civil Service. The Colonial Office considered the Governor as the sole channel for communications with the territory. The latter characteristic began to change but slightly during the war.¹

Variations in Governors' personality. Without question the extent of the authority of the Governor was very great. Depending upon the man, he could make of his office and of his tour of service practically whatever he wished. A Governor's personality--using the term broadly to mean his total individuality--largely conditioned the view he took about the exercise of his authority, the fields of policy which he chose to emphasize, and the specific policies he put into effect. Some examples of variations from one Uganda Governor to the next, drawn in part from material already presented, serve to highlight the importance of the personality of the holder of that office.

Hesketh Bell occupied the position of highest authority in the Protectorate in the years from 1905 to 1909. He was on the order of a benevolent despot. His views were strong, and he was a man of action. It was a source of considerable pleasure and relief to him that he had no Executive or Legislative Councils to consult. Bell used his authority and his powers of discretion to the full, sometimes exceeding them. His schemes were numerous and usually imaginative. He later

¹[Great Britain,] Naval Intelligence Division, A Handbook of the Uganda Protectorate, I. D. 1217 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), pp. 325-326 (cited hereafter as GB, NID, A Handbook . . .); Jeffries, "The Colonial Governor," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 26, 23; Cohen, pp. 77-80.

expressed his regret that his successors did not always follow them and deplored the bad effects of the shifting of emphases which a change in Governors brought.¹

Governor Coryndon (1917-1922) was singularly lacking in tact, antagonizing, for example, the members of the Indian community in Uganda to the point where they refused for several years to nominate a representative for Legislative Council. That he was not radical in political orientation was reflected in his decisions to limit the composition of the Executive Council to officials and to include no Africans in the Legislative Council, despite the absence of Colonial Office restriction on the membership of these newly-constituted bodies.

An illustration of particular emphasis in policy is provided by the bold approach which Governor Archer (1922-1924) took on increased government responsibility for African education.

Sir William F. Gowers (1925-1932) can be portrayed as a hesitant pragmatist having little regard for theory and interested primarily in seeing that things worked. He was able to conciliate the Indians so that they agreed to nominate a representative to Legislative Council. His approach to native administration was less concerned with the fine points of Indirect Rule and the mysteries of traditional political authority than with the efficient conduct of official business. (During his tour there was a decided trend toward direct rule.²) Yet he was not

¹Sir Hesketh Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., [1946]), pp. 92, 124, 132, 162-165.

²The impression is that Governor Gowers more than just permitted the trend toward direct rule, but this is not to say his views were the only factor. See Chapter VI.

prepared to act extensively on his own initiative and often referred matters to the Colonial Office for decision, a notable variation from accepted practice.¹

In the period just before the Second World War, Sir Philip Mitchell (1935-1940) left his mark as an exponent of Indirect Rule in the field of native administration. Education was another pet subject of his. Here he set about decreasing the influence of the missions. He also gave a strong impetus to the development of secondary and especially university education, as contrasted to primary schools. Lord Hailey has explained that Mitchell's views represented a combination of marked idealism and marked realism; that Mitchell was dedicated to the idea of the mission of the British as agents of civilization, but that he was aware of the harm which could be done in the event civilization was introduced with undue haste.²

Sir Charles Dundas was the last Governor to serve during the period under review. His native administration policy was to render Indirect Rule more indirect in practice as well as in spirit in the case of Buganda; and to recognize that rule in the other areas was in essence direct and should be approached as such. While in the later years of the war he was willing to support a deficit budget for economic development, Dundas' concurrent attitude toward political progress was a

¹Uganda Protectorate, Summary of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Uganda, Ninth Session, October 31, 1929, p. 58. Cited hereafter as UP, Summary of [Legislative Council] Proceedings . . ., October 31, 1929.

²See the Foreword by Lord Hailey in Sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts (London: Hutchinson, 1954), p. xii.

decidedly hesitant one.

The important points to stress concerning the above examples are that they reflect the particular, variant positions of the different Governors; and that the positions were distinctly related to the diversity of the personalities of the men who held the posts. The fact is especially underscored if the many courses of action other than those actually chosen by Governors are postulated.

Conclusions. In the years up to 1945 the Governor of Uganda was the vital figure in the Protectorate. He held the power and the authority. The Colonial Office generally rubber-stamped his decisions. Other institutions in the Protectorate detracted but little from his exalted position.

Some Governors luxuriated in the freeness of scope which they were given to display their talents. Some acted with the caution of civil servants. All used the opportunity to indulge their special interests in one or more fields. All left the impress of their own values on specific policies, even if in some cases this may have represented merely a passive or permissive response to initiative shown by subordinates.

The institution of Governor of Uganda in these years was the most important central political institution of the Protectorate in terms of the distribution of authority. It was also the ultimate mechanism for the resolution of group conflicts in the Protectorate. To a large extent it was the only such mechanism, as the later discussion of the other institutions reveals.

The Administrative Organization

The Protectorate Government had a dual administrative organization operating below the level of the Governor. It consisted of the one hand of a functional division of government into such fields as education, agriculture, and finance, each with a Department head, usually called a Director. There was, on the other hand, a territorial division of government by Provinces, each of which was made up of Districts; all of these units had Commissioners at their head. The activities of both the departmental administration and the Provincial Administration were coordinated administratively for the Governor by his Secretariat, at the head of which was the Chief Secretary.¹

The amount of authority exercised by officers and heads of Departments and by the District and Provincial Commissioners naturally depended on the attitude of their superiors. For example, a Governor's intense interest in Native Administration brought a control over Provincial Administration policy and action which might well have been previously absent.² The same applied to the Departments.

In both the territorial and the functional administrations the personality of the officers holding the posts also was a factor in the

¹GB, NID, A Handbook . . ., pp. 326-327; H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 68; [Great Britain,] Colonial Office, Report on Uganda for the Year 1953 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), p. 120. The above administrative organization remained basically unchanged until the mid-1950's, when the ministerial system was introduced.

²That there was variation is illustrated by two conflicting reports of the amount of control: [Sir Charles Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency the Governor [of Uganda] on Native Affairs in the Post-War Era" (unpublished official document; n.p.: n.n., n.d. [Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1944?]), p. 10; and Cohen, p. 77.

amount of authority exercised at these levels. For example, one Director of Agriculture (S. Simpson) served from 1912 to 1928 and exerted a signal influence personally on policies which were directly and also only indirectly related to his field.

Subject to the above exceptions, the administrative organization of the Protectorate Government was not a self-sustaining, insulated locus of central political authority.

However, the Provincial Administration did have another role. It served as a mechanism for the resolution of conflicts which arose between Native Administrations and the central government, as well as those between different African groups or tribes within the same Province. Matters affecting tribes from different provinces ordinarily had to go up to the Chief Secretary or the Governor for decision. So also did Department conflicts in the functional fields such as commerce and labor.

To what extent did the Protectorate Administration serve as a means for African participation and voice in the government of Uganda and for the training of the indigenous peoples for the assumption of greater responsibilities in the future? To use the term which became current only after World War II, to what extent was there "Africanization" of Uganda's provincial and departmental administrative organizations before 1945?¹

¹The fact that the term was not used earlier indicated in itself the consentient lack of urgency and even awareness of the implications of Great Britain's generally stated goal of self-government for the colonies.

At the local level of the District administrative establishments, the policy had perforce, because of the lack of sufficient Europeans, been to train men of the tribe to carry out the necessary functions. Most of the training was of the on-the-job variety, and there was no program to school Africans for the District Commissioner or Assistant District Commissioner posts, which were all filled by Europeans. For those lower administrative positions which increasingly required more technical or specialized knowledge (such as accounting), facilities for training Africans were established eventually at Makerere College and in Entebbe.

Yet there was also the question of the staffing of the central government's administration in Entebbe and Kampala, and at the Provincial headquarters. In the early years Asians had filled most of the subordinate positions in the Local Civil Service (as opposed to the tribal civil services, and the European--or expatriate--Civil Service). Prompted by a general Colonial Office declaration of policy for the colonies, the Protectorate's stand on Government's use of Africans first took form in 1927. It remained basically unchanged during the period under review. The aim was declared as being the gradual replacement of all other races in the subordinate civil service jobs, as suitable Africans became available.¹

Yet salaries for Africans were maintained at inadequate levels.²

¹UP, Summary of [Legislative Council] Proceedings . . ., October 31, 1929, p. 3; Uganda Protectorate, Summary of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Uganda, Tenth Session, November 27, 1930, pp. 6-7.

²Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), p. 202.

Up to 1939, by public admission little had been accomplished toward realizing the objective, and it was again necessary in that year to budget for additional posts to be filled by Asians.¹ Africanization made very little progress until after World War II. (It was not, for example, until 1951 that the first African Medical Officer and African Education Officer were appointed.) Training of Africans for more than lower level government posts with a view to their later assumption of full responsibilities was simply not a matter of serious concern during the period up to 1945. The trusteeship policy just had not progressed to that point or, if it had, its implementation had not been adequately or seriously planned in prior years.

The Executive Council

In 1906 Uganda's neighboring territory, later known as Kenya, was given both an Executive and a Legislative Council. The former was at first limited to official membership, but after World War I a few unofficials were added. As for the Legislative Council, during the war elections had been introduced for its small unofficial membership.

In Uganda it was apparently not until 1919 that there was a request, made by the Chamber of Commerce, for the establishment of these bodies in the Protectorate. The request was supported by the Governor on the advice of Justice Carter--a strong supporter of European commercial and planter interests²--and received prompt approval in

¹Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Nineteenth Session, December 7, 1939, p. 105.

²See the discussion of the non-alienation of land policy in Chapter V.

principle from London. The 1920 Order in Council provided the necessary enabling legislation and the Royal Instructions of June 20, 1920, defined the functions and powers of the two councils. Governor Coryndon was left to act at his own discretion as regards the composition of the councils.¹

The Executive Council held its first meeting in January 1921. It consisted of the Governor as President, plus four officials--the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General, the Treasurer (later called the Financial Secretary), and the Principal Medical Officer (later the Director of Medical Services). In 1925 the Director of Agriculture and the Director of Education were added, indications of the increased attention which these fields were receiving. Five years later another official was included, the Provincial Commissioner for Buganda--further evidence of Buganda's position relative to the other provinces, which lacked similar representation at this high level.

A December 1941 request by the unofficial Asian and European members of Legislative Council for representation on the Executive Council was turned down by Governor Dundas in December of 1942. He told the legislators that the time was not opportune to embark on political and constitutional ventures; that he did not want to upset things at that stage of the war.² Another request in May 1944 was met by a like response. It was not until the following year, subsequent to

¹Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 173.

²Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Second Session, December 9, 1942, p. 7. Cited hereafter as UP, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, December 9, 1942.

the period under review, that a non-African unofficial member was added to the Executive Council.

The Executive Council functioned, then, up to 1945 with an entirely official membership and was consequently as restricted or extensive in actual power as the Governor of the time so desired. Its purpose was to assist and advise the Governor. Undoubtedly it was instrumental in resolving conflicts of policy which arose between different Department heads, and in this way it served indirectly to facilitate decisions affecting diverse interests and groups within the Protectorate.

The Legislative Council

Some of the circumstances preceding the setting up of the Legislative Council have been described in the discussion of the Executive Council. As the following quotation indicates, the impetus for the addition of such a council to the Protectorate's central governmental institutions came without question from non-African (probably British) planter interests, which were in the fortunate position of having a highly placed official as a spokesman.

. . . By the second decade of this century, planters of rubber and coffee were establishing a position of influence, with the support of Judge Morris Carter, who was acting Governor and Land Commissioner from time to time. . . . 1920 . . . was the high water mark of planter influence, which had its fruition in the following year in the establishment of the Legislative Council.¹

¹The source, judged reliable, is the following article by The [London] Times "Kampala Correspondent": "Uganda's History: The Long Road to Self Government," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 7.

After a statement of the Legislative Council's initial composition and an account of the changes and pressures for change, there follows an analysis of the Council in terms of five criteria.

Establishment of the Council in 1921. The 1920 instructions from London gave Governor Corydon a free hand in determining the membership of the Legislative Council. Apparently he gave no consideration to the possibility of appointing Africans as unofficials. He first decided to appoint three unofficials as representatives of different interests, but these plans went awry and he settled on communal representation--two Europeans and one Indian. As the result mainly of his handling of the situation, the Indian community refused to nominate a representative. The first Legislative Council, which convened in March 1921, therefore met with the Governor as President and with four officials and two European unofficials. The officials were the same as those who sat on the newly-constituted Executive Council--the Chief Secretary, the Treasurer, the Attorney General, and the Principal Medical Officer.

Changes and pressures for change in Council composition. In 1926 the two new Executive Council Members--the Directors of Education and Agriculture--were also added to the Legislative Council. The same year the first nominee of the Indian community took his seat following the conciliatory efforts of Governor Gowers in 1925. A second Asian was added in 1933.¹

¹For some of the issues involved in Asian representation, see Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1959), p. 18. Cited hereafter as UP, Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959.

Except for the appointment commencing in 1939 of Extra-ordinary Members on a temporary basis, usually only for the budget sessions, the Legislative Council's composition did not change after 1933 until 1945. Presented in the table below is the history of the changes up to 1933, together with those in the 1945-1953 period to provide a comparison of pre- and post-1945 developments in this sphere.¹

The near-static character of the size of the Legislative Council from 1926 to 1945 did not go altogether unchallenged. In about 1930, Baganda representation in the council was mooted,

but they [the Baganda] were the first to oppose this, and Perryman, while acting Governor in that year, wrote that in his view "the more educated and progressive natives will be well advised to devote their energies, for some time to come, to improving . . . their own native administrations rather than . . . take part in proceedings designed for a European more than an African setting."²

An Asian unofficial member in a December 1941 motion asked the Governor to enlarge the unofficial representation on the Legislative Council and at the same time to add such members to the Executive Council. As for the former, the arguments advanced pointed to the increased burden of Council work on the small number of unofficial members and held that extra representation would permit them to specialize. Governor Dundas replied at that meeting that he would

¹The 1953 terminal date was chosen because it marked the end of changes restricted to only one kind, that is, those relating to proportion of racial representation on the unofficial side. Commencing in 1954 there were successive changes in the composition of the Government side to include non-officials.

²"Uganda's History . . .," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20, 8. The source cited no reference for its quotation, which included the ellipses as indicated above, but it is considered a reliable source.

TABLE 9. - Changes in composition of Uganda Legislative Council, 1921-1944, and 1945-1953^a

Type of Member	1921-1944			1945-1953			
	1921	1926	1933	1945	1947	1948	1950
Government Members:							
Ex-officio	4	6	6	6	6	6	6
Official				1	3	4	10
Total	4	6	6	7	9	10	16
Unofficial Members:							
European	2	2	2	2	3	3	4
Asian		1	2	2	3	3	4
African				3	3	4	8
Total	2	3	4	7	9	10	16
Grand Total	6	9	10	14	18	20	32

^aThe Governor, as President of the Council, is not included in the tabulations. He possessed both an original and a casting vote. (These probably dated from the establishment of the Council in 1921, although sources do not definitely confirm this.)

Sources for the figures included, among others: Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Reference Division, "Constitutional Progress in Uganda" (No. R. 316, November, 1955; London: Central Office of Information, 1955), p. 3 (mimeographed); East Africa and Rhodesia, February 4, 1954, p. 699; Uganda Protectorate, Blue Books for the Years Ending December 31st, 1921-1933 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, n.d.); Uganda Protectorate, Blue Books for the Years Ending December 31st, 1934-1938, 1945 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1935-1939, 1946).

Official sources often conflicted. One recent publication has indicated the above 1947 changes as having taken place in 1946. UP, Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959, p. 19.

consider the request not unsympathetically, but he did feel there was no great problem. He considered that the current system worked well and that collaboration with unofficial members was already very good.¹ In his definite reply a year later the Governor told the members it was not the opportune time for such political and constitutional changes.² The issue of specifically African representation in the Council did not arise in the 1941 and 1942 exchanges on the legislature's floor.

Yet when the senior unofficial European member raised the general question again in May of 1944, advancing the previous arguments and maintaining that it was no longer a valid justification to postpone action on grounds of wartime urgency, he also brought the question of African representation to the fore. He made two related points. The Council needed advice from unofficials on wider matters than the current members, who were drawn primarily from commercial life, could give; there were in the Council no non-official experts on education, medicine, and other fields of great importance to Africans. Further, there was a need for unofficial representation of African viewpoints directly in the Council, either by Africans or by others who could speak for them "in an unbiased manner and without fear of incurring Government's displeasure."³

¹Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-First Session, December 15, 1941, pp. 104-107. Cited hereafter as UP, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, December 15, 1941.

²UP, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, December 9, 1942, p. 7.

³Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Third Session, May 25, 1944, p. 25. Cited hereafter as UP, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, May 25, 1944. See also pp. 23-28 for the rest of the debate.

Fraser, the proposer of the motion, was supported by his colleagues, and there were specific suggestions that the missions provide representatives to express African views. Governor Dundas' immediate reaction was not, however, favorable. He said that to do this in the midst of the war would involve distinctly untimely complications. There was no machinery for selecting Africans or missionaries as representatives; that is, there were no organizations which could be used for the process. Increase of unofficials would require that more officials be added to the Council; these officers were needed for other work. Significantly, the Governor went on to declare that the officers' other work was much more essential than debate in Legislative Council.

At the November 1944 session of the Council, the Governor's last before he left the Protectorate, he indicated that he had changed his mind somewhat. He told the Council that he was sorry he couldn't increase its size and thus lighten the members' burden of work; he had been working toward a better arrangement but had been unable to see the plans through prior to leaving the territory. The implication was that he was now favorably disposed to adding some unofficials. But he made no reference to whether he favored African representation.¹

What accounted for the shift in Dundas' thinking about the size of unofficial representation, and how radical was it? An answer to this question could provide a clue to how far advanced the plans to include Africans in the Council were by the end of the year, information about

¹Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Third Session, November 14, 1944, p. 6.

which is otherwise lacking.¹

There is insufficient data to explain why the Governor's position on an increase in unofficial membership altered. The happy turn of the war, or any number of other developments, could have produced the change, which in any event did not result in the increased non-African unofficial representation in 1945 which Dundas evidently favored. However, there is a fairly detailed unpublished statement of his views prepared sometime between the May and November sessions, and it sheds light on the question of African representation.²

The Governor wrote that both the Buganda Government and the Native Administrations had intimated to him that they were unwilling to participate in the Legislative Council by providing African members. He expected that in time certain groups in the Protectorate--for example, the growing intelligentsia--would demand representation and the Government should be prepared for this. However, no request had been submitted as yet. These developments--Baganda opposition to participation and absence of any other African pressures for it--are dealt with in more detail later in the chapter.

The Governor went on in the official memorandum to say that although the Africans in the Protectorate did not want representation,

¹A knowledge of when the decision was taken to include Africans would be helpful, for example, in determining whether it was or was not largely a consequence of the 1945 disturbances.

²[Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency . . .," pp. 9-10. The document is undated, but internal evidence tends to place the date of writing between the June 1944 Normandy landings and October of that year, when the Buganda reorganization of the Resident's office was implemented. See also Sir Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1955), pp. 213-214.

it was necessary to provide for it. He indicated he considered it politically desirable to see that the Africans were consulted, for otherwise they would wake up and find their most vital interests affected without any reference to their views. Also, he was convinced of the aid to Government; the indigenous peoples were shrewd, and consultation would be fruitful.

Did the Governor have any specific ideas about how the representation was to be arranged? He did, but he apparently did not envisage membership in Legislative Council until some time had elapsed. He thought that consultation with the Africans should be carried out through the medium of the Buganda Lukiko and, in each of the other three provinces, through Provincial Councils which he wanted to establish. Dundas' further thoughts were less specific. He felt it might be possible to have one Territorial Council composed of delegates from the four provincial councils. Or, it might be possible to draw from the four councils some delegates to send to Legislative Council.¹

Up to 1945, then, the composition of the Protectorate's legislating body included no direct representative of the great majority of the population--the Africans--and only a small unofficial membership consisting of two Europeans and two Asians, in contrast to six Government officials. With the Governor acting as President of the Council and possessing voting powers also, the voice of officialdom was even

¹From these views of Governor Dundas it can be concluded that it was most unlikely he was personally instrumental in seeing that Africans were given representation in Legislative Council at the time they were in 1945, after his departure.

more powerful. In view of these facts, the development--or elaboration--of the Legislative Council as a potentially vital central political institution can be characterized up to 1945 as little else than limited. There were, however, indications that an increase in non-African unofficial representation was imminent; but African representation at the same time evidently was not envisaged and there were no concrete plans for the introduction of such a new measure. (As previously inferred, events contradicted these indications of future developments, for in 1945 the expected increase in non-African unofficial representation did not materialize while an unanticipated addition of African members did take place.)

The Council in terms of five criteria. A Legislative Council in a colonial territory proceeding toward a declared goal of self-government is in a position to fulfill a number of purposes which facilitate the attainment of the goal.¹ Perhaps most important, it can furnish the best possible forum for the expression of the opinions of all groups in

¹As indicated earlier in the chapter, in the discussion of British policy in Africa, the goal was a broad one vaguely enunciated by the Government of Great Britain at different times. In Uganda, as far as can be ascertained, up to 1945 there was no mention, in Legislative Council debates or in the official Annual Reports of the Territory, of how the country would develop politically. At the ground-breaking ceremonies for Makerere's new Higher College in November 1938, the Duke of Gloucester merely affirmed that it was the British tradition that "our wards grow in time to be our partners, sharing with us alike the benefits and responsibilities of the Commonwealth." [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Uganda Protectorate, 1938, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1903 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939), p. 54. (The quotation is from the text of the Duke's speech provided in Appendix III of the cited report, pp. 53-54.)

the territory, and by reason of this function it can give to political authority a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the population. A Council may also serve to train the leaders of the future; provide a place for the growth of political parties; function as part of the administrative machine of government; and operate to further the creation of the concept of nationhood.¹

Were all important groups in Uganda able to use the Legislative Council up to 1945 as a place to advance their opinions and ideas on Protectorate policy? The African groups--whether considered as tribes or as religious or class groups--were not. They had no representation, either direct or by persons especially appointed for this purpose. Government officials held that they themselves insured the protection of African interests in the legislative process. But even if they did, this was not the same as having impartial representatives to express African views.²

There is no evidence, however, that exclusion of Africans from the Council was a sign of the Government's lack of democratic

¹A position is not taken here on the desirability of furthering the concept of nationhood, in general in the world or in particular in Uganda. The five criteria are presented in the form of functions which, if carried out by the Council, might be expected to contribute to the attainment of the British goal as stated and inferred--a stable, democratic, self-governing, unified, territorial entity of Uganda. Given the goal, the five functions may be viewed as valued in the instrumental sense.

²Cohen, p. 40.

The effect of the absence of African representation was especially apparent in the case of cotton and labor legislative debates.

One cause of the 1945 disturbances has been generally accepted as the absence of channels for Africans to express their grievances. Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 217.

inclinations. Perhaps just the contrary in one sense. For reasons more fully indicated later in the chapter, not only had no demands for representation been made by Africans; the strongest source of indigenous authority had opposed participation in the Council. The Baganda were more concerned with improving their position under the 1900 Agreement than anything else.¹ It would not be inaccurate to state that the Government's policy on the question represented one of following the voiced wishes of the Africans.

Did the absence of Africans in Legislative Council mean that the central government's political authority lacked any measure of legitimacy? It meant that the Council did not contribute to legitimacy,² but it did not mean that there was none. The peoples of the four Kingdoms regarded the Protectorate Government's actions as legitimate--as based on a good claim to the exercise of political authority--because the rights of the parties were set forth in mutually acknowledged Agreements.³ There was no need for legitimizing institutions such as

¹Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa" (unpublished Report, 1940-42, prepared for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, [1944]), p. 49.

²In his report prepared for the British Government during the war, Lord Hailey, mentioning that there was as yet no African member of the Council, continued as follows: "It would not be possible to claim that the proceedings of the Council arouse the same interest or possess as much vitality as those of some of the Councils on the West Coast of Africa. While the Council has its value as a source of legislation, it has as yet in the African mind little interest as a forum of public discussion." Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . . .," p. 199.

³Actions violating the Agreements would not, of course, have been regarded as legitimate.

the Council. As for the other tribes, most of them were much less affected than Buganda during this period by the new economic, religious, and educational influences, that is, by alien contact and influence as a force. As a consequence they were still quite parochially oriented. What questions of legitimacy may have arisen in the minds of these peoples would have had reference not to the Legislative Council but to the District Commissioner, or on isolated occasions, to the Governor.¹

The Legislative Council did provide the European and Asian unofficial communities with the chance to present the views of the dominant groups within them--the commercial and planter interests. Yet there appears to have been little give and take with the Government in the Council's sessions during the early 1930's, if the retrospective description of one European old-timer, noted for his pungent and often vituperative language, can be accepted.

Legislative Council was merely a pretence and a facade behind which Government officials carried out preconceived ideas without paying the slightest attention to anything said by the three unofficial members. Sitzings of the Legislative Council took place at the Entebbe Secretariat.²

But although the Government often rode roughshod over the unofficial members, the latter were successful in altering Government policy by

¹Cohen, p. 64. Sir Andrew also has made the point that there is an African preference for personal, lower-level government.

²C. Handley Bird, "Uganda Twenty-five Years Ago," Uganda Journal, XX (March, 1956), 50. The fact that the meetings of the Council took place in the offices of the Chief Secretary is itself indicative of the Protectorate's official attitude toward its central legislative body. See also Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 194.

Bird became a Minister in the reorganized Protectorate Government of 1955, which included for the first time Ministers drawn from the ranks of the unofficials.

degree if not in its entirety. The Council undoubtedly served to give central political authority a greater measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the non-African communities. It was a mechanism for the resolution of conflicts between the non-African communities and the central government.

In training leaders for the future, the Council of course did not fulfill this function with respect to African leaders, where the need would later be greatest and most urgent. It did do the job for the other communities as far as it was able to in the absence of elections to ensure representative choice of men sent to the Council. There was even a decided policy of training unofficials during World War II, when the appointees to the Council were regularly changed to bring in new men.¹

With regard to the third of the five criteria, the Council did not act to furnish a place for the growth of the phenomenon of political parties in Uganda. Nor did any one regard this as one of the Council's purposes.²

Concerning the fourth criterion, especially in the few years before 1945 the Legislative Council did function as part of the administrative machine of the Government, largely through the medium of the Finance Committee. The committee, with goodly unofficial representation, worked extensively on the estimates; and the budget debate was a

¹The results of the pre-1945 experience of non-African unofficials in the Council were easy to perceive in the superior performances which such men rendered in the legislature when compared later to their less accomplished African colleagues.

²Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 215.

time for detailed discussions of Government policy and practice. Native administration policy and affairs were not, however, considered as appropriate subjects for Council comment.¹

The last of the criteria concerns the role of the Council in furthering the concept of nationhood in a territory inhabited by so many different cultural groups. The Council can be given no kudos on this score. Not only did it not promote the idea of a Uganda nation; it did not even pave the way by acting either as an institutional mechanism for the settlement of Protectorate-wide disputes between different major groups, or as a school where representatives of the groups could gain an appreciation of the methods and merits of compromise for the good of the whole.

Of the listed criteria, expressed as functions which the Legislative Council could have performed, the test was not passed at all as regards the third or fifth, and only to a limited extent with respect to the fourth. As for the first and second, these functions the Council carried out, but only for the two minority non-African communities. In sum, Uganda's pre-1945 Legislative Council failed markedly to meet certain criteria for such a body in a territory officially committed to self-government at some time in the future.

The failure was not, however, intentional in the sense that it was attributable to policies consciously designed to bring it about. It

¹The senior European unofficial member asked in 1944 if Government would postpone the reorganization of the Buganda Resident's office until the Council members had a chance to study the plans; the Chief Secretary said it was not Government's practice to consult the Council on such matters. UP, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, May 25, 1944, p. 6.

seems to have been more a result of the failure of the world at large to assign a particular urgency to the goal of ultimate self-government. There was a resulting lack of concern on the part of the colonial powers--even the most liberal--with the particular measures required adequately to prepare for the goal's achievement.¹

Summary and Conclusions

Developments affecting the Protectorate's central institutions may now be briefly reviewed.

During the pre-1945 period in Uganda, and especially after 1920, there was a signal lack of pressures on the British authorities to elaborate appreciably the central governmental institutions of the Protectorate. World events had not yet exerted their force for changes leading to a more foreseeable progress toward self-government; Britain and other colonial powers assumed they had an indefinite time ahead for preparation. The power drive of non-African unofficial elements in the country was politically weak--particularly after 1921--compared, for example, to that of corresponding groups in Kenya. One of the major

¹See Cohen, pp. 27, 29-30.

Governor Mitchell in 1939 felt the Protectorate had "'almost unlimited time in which to take our dispositions,'" according to one scholar, who has also inferred that the attitude carried through up to the late 1940's. R. C. Pratt, "The Evolution of Local Government: Promoting Efficiency and Democracy," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 13.

The lack of concern with planning for self-government contrasts to the almost ludicrously long-range detailed plans formulated in early years in such official fields of activity as township lay-outs. See H. B. Thomas, "Growth of the Towns: Social Problems Caused by Early Planners," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20 (Winter, 1955), 16.

forces in the political situation which might have brought pressure for elaboration by way of African participation acted in fact to check advances along that course. The contrary force was the African traditional political systems, specifically the system of the Baganda. As detailed later, its bent in these years was such as to cause its opposition to African participation in the Council, and its strength was a factor in forestalling participation.

The consequence of the interaction of the various factors was a limited extent of change in the central institutions over the period 1905-1945, the only change of major significance being the establishment of Executive and Legislative Councils in 1921. In light of the fact that these had been constituted some fifteen years earlier in the neighboring territory of Kenya, the innovation in Uganda, which was in any event not due to official initiative, cannot be considered as in any way impressive. In addition, although unofficial members were included in Kenya's Executive Council before 1921 and elections were introduced for its Legislative Council's unofficial minority, these more advanced features of institutional development were not incorporated in Uganda's Councils by the Governor who established them, despite his powers to do so, nor were they adopted even in the subsequent years up to 1945.¹ To

¹As for the more general comparison with other British territories in Africa, it was shown in the introduction to the chapter that Uganda was one of a plurality of territories in what might be termed an intermediate stage of constitutional development. Yet, this plurality was behind more territories in its intermediate stage than it was ahead of others. The Protectorate, therefore, could in no way be described as a forerunner in its institutional development up to 1945. If anything, it lagged in its advance rather more than it set the pace for others.

all appearances, none of the Protectorate's Governors took a particular interest in the Councils or the other central institutions--except the Governorship--much less in their considered evolution. The Protectorate practice was one of near-static elaboration of the central governmental institutions. Practice became policy.

To summarize the pre-1945 institutional context, which changed very little in the years before and after the establishment of the Executive and Legislative Councils in 1921, in terms of distribution of authority the Governor was the vital and supreme institution. The others were merely auxiliary. Since each Governor could and did vary in personality, each one in fact brought with him to Uganda new policy orientations. Political actions and political change were controlled by him and were also in turn directed along certain lines by him.

The Protectorate's central institutions did not serve except to a limited extent as mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts between different groups and interests in the territory. The Legislative Council provided a forum for resolving differences only between different sectors of the numerically small non-African unofficial communities and between them and the central government. Though theoretically inadequate, the Council was in practice sufficient unto the needs of the time within this narrow field of conflicts. The sole institution for the settling of disagreements between many of the African groups and between African and non-African groups was the Governor himself, except as he might choose to use the Executive Council to some extent for the purpose. Even here just one Provincial Commissioner was included, the

Resident for Buganda. A burden seemingly impossible for one man to discharge effectively was thus placed upon the Governor. Fortunately the incidence and scope of conflicts involving African groups was restricted enough to prevent any breakdown in the existing mechanisms up to 1945.

It can be concluded that the central governmental institutions of the Protectorate were rudimentary yet adequate to the demands of the period. By their nature, as institutions and especially as non-representative colonial territorial institutions, they acted to impose controls on the political situation and political change. The controls varied widely from the tour of one Governor to that of another. As for the years ahead, because there was no sense of urgency, there had been no appreciable development, either in Africanization of the Protectorate's central administrative organizations or in African representation in the Legislative Council, to pave the way toward the achievement of responsible self-government sometime in the future.

III. THE ISSUE OF FEDERATION OF EAST AFRICA

From the beginning of the century the issue of whether Uganda should join with Kenya and possibly other territories in the region was, though at times dormant, ever-present. Often it rose to a high pitch. Certainly it was a significant influence on political developments in the Protectorate.

The account which follows, presented in the form of a chronological narrative of some of the more salient points in connection with

the issue's history, is directed primarily to determining the different positions taken on the matter by various groups in Uganda. The relation of the issue to the central political institutions is considered in the following section dealing with African attitudes toward the institutions.

The Early Uganda Objections

When Sir Harry Johnston went to Uganda, it was the idea of his superiors in the Foreign Office that the Protectorate might well be joined with the British territory to its east, known since 1920 as Kenya. This dream, supported by Johnston, was ended for a while at least by the cession to Kenya in 1902 of what was then Uganda's Eastern Province. With that act, official interest in federation evaporated,¹ although the way was left open for the future.²

Evidence of highly placed opposition to federation soon after has been provided by a June 1906 diary entry of Hesketh Bell, Uganda's dynamic chief executive. His dislike of the idea was based on two fundamental differences between the territories of Kenya and Uganda, as he saw them. On the one hand Kenya's climate was a good one for settlers, and Kenya's natives were unfit to administer the country; on the other hand Uganda's climate was not suited to protracted residence by Europeans, and the natives of the four Kingdoms in the Protectorate

¹A. T. Matson, "Uganda's Old Eastern Province and East Africa's Federal Capital," Uganda Journal, XXII (March, 1958), 43-53.

²[Great Britain, Foreign Office,] Instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Sadler on Appointment as His Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General in the Uganda Protectorate, Africa series, No. 2 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1902), p. 3.

were not only superior to their African neighbors in Kenya but also had a highly organized system of government of their own. Therefore, it was necessary to avoid alienation of land so that in time an essentially African state could be created. Bell's implication was that federation would result in land alienation, and the idea of an African state could not then be realized.¹

Up until the mid-1920's both African and non-African unofficial opinion was generally against various proposals for closer union which were being mooted about. The European planters in 1912 are reported as not wanting any political link with Kenya because the latter's economic prospects were not nearly so bright as the Protectorate's. A large body of opinion in Uganda also objected strenuously to the manner in which, it was felt, the Protectorate's interests were subordinated to Kenya's in both the customs' and railway administrations which served the two British East African territories.²

A Spate of Official Commissions

The Secretary of State for Colonies in 1921 pressed the idea that amalgamation would be very desirable on economic grounds. The Ormsby-Gore Commission of 1924 was set up to look into the question. Opinion in Uganda--particularly from Buganda--reacted swiftly to both

¹Bell, pp. 122, 178. The close correspondence between Bell's views and the issues some fifty years later in the Kabaka Crisis of 1953-1955 is notable.

²Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 102, 104, 178-179; E. H. M. Leggett, "The Economic Development of British East Africa and Uganda," Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, LXIII (February, 1915), 213, 217; Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1920), p. 12.

developments. The Kabaka and the Lukiko made clear and public their opposition, based on the argument that political union with other territories would jeopardize the special position which the 1900 Agreement had guaranteed to the Kingdom. Because of these and other antagonistic opinions, the Commission rejected the idea of amalgamation, and the British Government gave the Baganda assurances in this regard in 1922 and 1924.¹ The Commission did, however, recommend that there be established a Conference of Governors. Its first meeting was held in 1926.² Five East and Central African territories were represented.

In that year the transfer of the Rudolf Province to Kenya was effected because the region was so remote it was impossible for Uganda to administer it properly. The action was, however, viewed by some Baganda as proof of the British intention to place Uganda under the political control of its neighbor.³

The next investigating body to be constituted was the Hilton Young Commission. Appointed in 1927 as a result of the recommendations of the 1927 White Paper,⁴ it visited Uganda in January 1928 and its report was published some twelve months later. For a while before the

¹[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda, Cmd. 9028 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), pp. 31-33. Cited hereafter as GB, CO, Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal

²Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 180-181.

³Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 121.

⁴This watered down the British Government's 1923 statement of the paramountcy of native over settler interests. Both statements were directed primarily to Kenya. Philip Mitchell, pp. 108-112.

The 1927 White Paper endorsed the desirability of closer union for the East and Central African territories of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia, but especially for the first three.

Commission arrived it looked as though Uganda's non-African commercial community would support the idea of closer union, some of Uganda's economic differences with its neighbor having been negotiated satisfactorily. These chances were wiped out by a late 1927 memorandum released by an association of the European settlers in Kenya. The document made clear that the intention of the settlers was to dominate any federation. Even Governor Gowers of Uganda took umbrage at this, pointing out that while Uganda's exports equaled fifteen million pounds sterling, those of Kenya amounted to only nine million. African feeling against federation joined with the rest; and the Commission failed to reach agreement among its own members as to what course policy should take, the report including variant recommendations.¹

Sir Samuel Wilson was then instructed to see to what extent the diverse recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission were acceptable to local opinion in the colonies concerned. In his report published in October 1929, he said that opinion in the territories was in effect unanimously opposed to federation. The one exception was its support by the European settlers in the Northern Province of Tanganyika, the Kenya settlers having concluded for the present that federation might force Kenya's native policy in the direction of that of the other two territories, to the settlers' disadvantage. In November of 1929 the Kabaka addressed a letter to the Colonial Secretary reiterating the Lukiko's

¹Philip Mitchell, pp. 110-114; Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 179-184; [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1926, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1377 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), p. 7.

Around this time--at the end of the 1920's--the British Government dropped Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia from federative ideas for East Africa. Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 185.

strong views against any union with Kenya. The Uganda Government also stated its opposition to political federation about this time.¹

One of those especially disinclined to federation was Governor Cameron of Tanganyika. He recommended that the whole matter be referred to a joint committee of the British Houses of Parliament. The Secretary of State for the Colonies did this--even before Wilson's report was received. After another White Paper was published in 1930, long hearings were held in the spring and summer of 1931 in London. The Africans from Uganda who came to express their views in person were led by the Buganda Omuwanika (Treasurer), Kulubya. They greatly impressed the Parliamentary Committee and the public in general, the press saying that there were now African leaders who could speak for their own people. The Joint Committee's recommendation was that there should be no administrative union of East African territories.² But other of its pronouncements, together with the 1930 White Paper, served to allay the Kenya settlers' fears of a native-oriented policy within that Colony and henceforth its white community quite consistently favored federation.³

Further official bodies were not specially constituted to look into the question until after World War II. A request by non-African unofficial groups in Kenya and Tanganyika for reconsideration of the matter was turned down by the Colonial Secretary in 1935. He held that

¹Philip Mitchell, pp. 115-116; Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 185-186.

²Philip Mitchell, pp. 117-120; Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 187.

³Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 188, 191-192.

there had been no changes to warrant a reversal of the policy set forth in the Parliamentary Committee's report.¹

The Governors' Conference and Wartime Federation

Mention was made earlier of the Conference of Governors of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, set up in 1926.² The object of the Conference, which was said to have been a not very harmonious body,³ was to adjust differences between the territories and to discuss matters of common interest.⁴

In late October 1929 the Governor of Uganda, Sir William Gowers, appointed a Committee of six Protectorate officials, six other non-Africans (three of whom were unofficial members of the Legislative Council), and one African. The latter was the Buganda Omuwanika (Kulubya), by consent of the Kabaka. The Committee was enjoined to inform the Governor of the views of the public and to furnish him with a clear brief before he went to the Conference.⁵ Further information is not available on the functioning of this committee, but it is perhaps no coincidence that the following month the Kabaka, as indicated above,

¹Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 188.

²For a while--to little purpose according to one participant--the Conference was widened to include the chief executives of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 176.

³Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 143.

⁴[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda. Report for 1929, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1486 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), p. 9.

⁵UP, Summary of [Legislative Council] Proceedings . . ., October 31, 1929, p. 58 (Appendix A).

renewed official expressions opposing political links with other territories. The Baganda could hardly have gained much confidence either from the appointment of such a committee or from the fact there was only one African out of thirteen members.

Although it did coordinate certain legislation,¹ the Conference of Governors was a disappointment to one of the prime advocates of federation, Sir Philip Mitchell. It was not until the war broke out and the need for greater cooperation of services and efforts became apparent that Mitchell achieved appreciable progress in his dream--in fact, too much for some communities. For, at the meeting of Governors in June 1940, though Uganda's chief executive failed to obtain agreement for the appointment of one High Commissioner for the whole area north of the Zambesi, the Conference did recommend to the Secretary of State for Colonies that there be created the post of Deputy Chairman. He was to be in charge of the executive functions to be taken on by the Conference's wartime organization. It was additionally proposed that Mitchell fill the position, commuting as it were from Entebbe to Kenya's capital, Nairobi, where the headquarters were to be located. The Colonial Secretary, however, had other ideas and asked Mitchell to resign as Governor to assume the new duties. He did, and through the medium of various bodies such as the wartime Economic Council, considerable progress was made from Mitchell's point of view, despite what he

¹See, for example, [Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Uganda Protectorate, 1934, Colonial Reports--Annual, No. 1729 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1935), p. 54.

regarded as obstructionism on the part of some of the territories.¹

In January 1941 Sir Philip Mitchell left Kenya to take up another assignment outside the region, but the organization did not collapse without its chief proponent. Far from it, as is evidenced by the following statement made by Governor Dundas:

For a . . . common war-time purposes there had to be a central co-ordinating body for the whole region. It was furnished by the organisation of the East African Governors' Conference, which was now, so to speak, put on a war footing. But once set in motion this machinery did not stop at the operation of affairs solely of military consequence. In one way or another almost every activity and public service was affected by or had effect on the conduct of war. As one matter after another was drawn into the orbit of the Governors' Conference opportunity and advantage was seen to bring yet more under its aegis. In the end nearly all administrative affairs that were not political or of purely local concern were in this manner centralised and directed by the Governors in Conference aided by subsidiary bodies. Thus the Conference became virtually a combined East African Administration without political fusion and Closer Union was at long last an accomplished fact.²

Non-official opinion in Uganda was not pleased with the centralization of affairs in Nairobi. One European unofficial member of Legislative Council complained warmly that whereas the Government side of the Council had earlier been stressing that uniform legislation in all three territories was desirable, the argument had come to be that uniformity was essential.³ There was a real fear that the European

¹Philip Mitchell, pp. 70, 102-103, 186, 189-190, 195.

²Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 229.

³UP, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, December 15, 1941, pp. 112, 117. The validity of the complaint is borne out by many other records of debate. See, for example, Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Second Session, September 27, 1943, p. 17; also Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 223.

settlers in Kenya, generally regarded as dominating the Kenya Government, would misuse Uganda's resources. There was deep distrust of Kenya because of the settlers' desire for a closer political union which they could control, and because of the Kenya native policy which was so antithetical to Uganda's. Nevertheless, Governor Dundas did not hesitate to maintain in the Legislative Council late in 1943 that East Africa should be one economic unit, and that no limit should be set on how far collaboration should proceed.¹

Long discussions were undertaken in the Governors' Conference at the request of the Colonial Secretary on the question of the possibilities for complete political unification after the war. No agreement could, however, be reached. The conflicts between the policies of the three territories--"in the one European interest prevailed, in the other native, and the third was mandated territory in which international obligations had to be observed"--seemed to defy a solution to the problem of how even to maintain the wartime economic cooperation afterwards.²

It was presumably at about this point that Sir Philip Mitchell returned to the scene. While Governor of Fiji, he had been appointed as Governor of Kenya, and immediately his mind had started churning with thoughts of East African federation. In London in November 1944 en

¹Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 220-222; Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Third Session, December 15, 1943, p. 4; Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, Twenty-Third Session, December 20, 1943, pp. 39, 40, 67, 71.

²Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 230.

route to Kenya he submitted recommendations to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. These he discussed with officials in Kenya in December 1944 soon after his arrival, all the while fully aware of the profound mistrust with which the European settlers' political activities were viewed by the other groups.¹ And in the meantime, official support for closer grouping of British colonies was publicly expressed in London in the House of Lords by the Duke of Devonshire late in 1944.²

Conclusions

As of the end of 1944 there existed, then, a long history of unremitting opposition by the Baganda³ to any proposals for closer union with other territories, in particular with Kenya. The opposition was based on a very real and deep fear and mistrust of the Kenya European settlers, whose desire to dominate Uganda was public knowledge.⁴ The Baganda envisaged the loss of their land if there were any closer cooperation. Such a possibility touched them at a vital spot. The dangers were vividly portrayed in the pamphlet Buganda Nyafa, mentioned in Chapter V in the discussion of the land acquisition issue of 1944.

¹Philip Mitchell, pp. 213-219, 224.

²Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 221.

³For example, one source has written of Buganda's "long and successful campaign against East African federation" during the twenties. "Uganda's History . . .," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 20, 7-8.

⁴Mulira has written that it was believed the Kenya settlers "would turn East Africa into another South Africa." E. M. K. Mulira, Troubled Uganda (Colonial Controversy Series, No. 6; London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1950), pp. 38-39. See also GB, CO, Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal . . ., pp. 25-26, 31-33.

Given such a state of mind, what could be calculated to increase unrest more than statements by Governor Dundas that unification of East Africa was both necessary and desirable? What could better engender uncertainties and increase tensions than the knowledge that one of the prime advocates of political union was now back in the area as the new Governor of Kenya? There is little evidence at hand to document it, but the conclusion seems crystal-clear that the issue of federation had been mounting in intensity--probably much of it under the surface--throughout the war; and that the end of 1944 found it at a high pitch because of British policy, which had been made clear in the House of Lords by the Duke of Devonshire and in East Africa by the Governors of Uganda and Kenya.¹ Unquestionably the level of feeling would have been highest in Buganda, where the opposition had been most vocal in the past. In addition, it must have been conveyed in some measure to Africans in other areas of the Protectorate; but in the absence of any definite corroboration, it is assumed that anti-federation attitudes there were not nearly so widespread as they were in the largest of the tribal areas.²

As for the non-African unofficial communities, their representatives in Legislative Council had indicated their opposition to closer

¹Ingham has written that the changing official attitude--in favor of closer union--"aroused Uganda's alertness" in 1944. Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 221.

²The Kulubya-led African delegation to London in 1931 included men from only Bunyoro and Busoga. Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 187, and see pp. 224, 234, and 236 for evidence of concentration of African opposition in Buganda in the post-World War II period.

union. However, despite some references to Uganda's need to consider its African population, the non-African opposition seems to have been primarily one of protest against economic domination of the Protectorate by Kenya. The feeling was apparently like that of a weaker person toward a bully.

There was practically no identification--or unification--of non-African with African interests on the federation issue in the later years, as far as can be discerned.¹ One reason for this state of affairs most likely was to be found in the absence of any precedent for unofficial non-African and African coordination or cooperation leading to mutual support. The lack of institutions to facilitate these processes undoubtedly was in turn a factor inhibiting the growth of such precedents.

IV. AFRICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS

It is a matter of record that after World War II the Buganda Lukiko refused to select Baganda representatives for the Legislative Council, and that the Kabaka had to do this; that in the fall of 1953, because of the transcending fear at the time that Buganda might be included in a federation with Kenya by an act of the Legislative Council, the Kabaka refused to continue to nominate Baganda representatives; and that for primarily this reason the British Government in 1953 withdrew its recognition of the Kabaka and deported him.²

¹For an indication of a very limited exception, see Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 222.

²GB, CO, Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal . . ., pp. 9, 13, 27, 37.

Was the fear of federation one of the major reasons for the Baganda official and popular opposition to participation in Legislative Council prior to 1945? The following discussion deals with this question in the course of a more general consideration of African attitudes--inside and outside of Buganda--toward the Protectorate's central institutions for governing the indigenous population.

The Baganda View of the Institutions

For the Baganda, the Governor was the cardinal political institution in Uganda. The tribe's attitude derived first, both in time and in rank, from the 1900 Agreement. By 1944 the Agreement had become for them sacrosanct, a formidable buttress protecting their identity as a people who were uncommonly proud of their heritage and of their modern-day achievements as well. The Agreement specified a relationship between the Kabaka's Government and Her Majesty's Government, to be personified in Uganda by the persons of the Kabaka and Her Britannic Majesty's Representative in the Protectorate. It was in this way that the Baganda viewed the Governor--as Her Majesty's Representative, their direct link to the British Crown.

Anything that might jeopardize the special position with which Buganda was favored compared to the other tribes--anything of such a nature was opposed. For example, Kagwa fought bitterly, and to the end, the direct reporting of the Kingdom's chiefs to British administrators. The Lukiko objected to interference by British officials in decisions of the Kingdom's native courts. These were regarded by the Baganda as

violations of their rights as guaranteed by the Agreement,¹ tending to wipe out the distinctions between the Baganda and the other tribes. They were eventually corrected, and greater autonomy, more in keeping with the 1900 Agreement, was restored in 1944.

Thus the Baganda wanted to deal with the Protectorate Government at its apex--the Governor, or at the lowest his personal representative in Buganda, the Resident. Only through these channels did the Kingdom wish to conduct its business with the central institution characterized previously as the Administrative Organization.

As for the Executive Council, nothing is known of the Baganda's specific thoughts. Presumably it was viewed, if consideration was given to the matter at all, as merely a higher level of the Administrative Organization, or perhaps as an extension of the Governorship.

Of considerable interest is the reaction of the people of the Kingdom to the institution of the Legislative Council. They not only had no desire to participate, but additionally, at least as early as 1930 they were actively opposing any Baganda representation in the Council. As for their views during World War II, Governor Dundas has written, in a book published in 1955, that the Kabaka confirmed to him the Baganda opposition. The Governor added:

¹Writing of the jurisdictional dispute between the Buganda Government and the Protectorate's High Court, which led to Mitchell's creation of the post of Judicial Adviser for Buganda shortly before he left in 1940, the former Governor reported that the Kingdom's Government and people considered the 1900 Agreement (and its amending Agreements) "as having an almost scriptural authority and inviolability and any proposal to curtail the jurisdiction given under them would have aroused strong excitement and opposition." Philip Mitchell, p. 169.

there was apprehension that Buganda would lose its identity and that its indigenous government would be superseded. Lurking in the background there was, I knew, the suspicion that once there was participation in the central Government it would be contended that there was no further need for a full-scale tribal Government.¹

In a similar vein Lord Hailey had reported to the British Government in the early years of the war as follows:

Buganda has no direct representation in the Legislative Council of the Protectorate, and the ministers and the Lukiko would appear to be opposed to the acceptance of any such representation. They prefer to regard their relations with the Protectorate Government as being of a "political" character, and feel that their interests can be better secured by negotiation with the Protectorate Government.²

Was the federation fear responsible for the Baganda resistance to the idea of appointing some of their number to sit in the central Council? The preceding quotations indicate that the main reasons were much more general--participation in the Council would not secure their interests as well as if there were no Baganda representation, and in fact it probably would result in the loss of Buganda's identity.

But logic dictates the conclusion that the federation issue contributed materially to the formulation of the Buganda position.³

¹Dundas, African Crossroads, pp. 213-214. He had support from Lord Hailey, who wrote in a report for the Colonial Office during the war that the Buganda Government opposed representation on the Legislative Council and that pressure on Buganda to accede might "prejudice the development of the Lukiko as a local native parliament. It would be a matter of regret if in the process of building up the Protectorate Legislative Council, anything were done to impair the value of an indigenous institution of this character." Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . . .," p. 199.

²Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . . .," p. 189.

³Support for this view is provided by the Report of the Lukiko's Kintu Committee, written sometime in 1955. There the Lukiko's reasons

For, not only were the two matters complementary, since both representation in the Council and proposals for federation were viewed as constituting clear threats to Buganda's interests and identity, but participation in Legislative Council would also reduce Buganda's effectiveness in meeting all threats, including that of federation.

Much beyond this it is not possible to go with certainty. Perhaps it was also obvious to the politically seasoned Baganda that participation in the central Council would render the Agreement less effective specifically in preventing legislation disagreeable to the tribe, such as enactments approving federation. The ability of the official majority in the Council to disregard the wishes of the unofficial non-African Members had been demonstrated time and again. The unofficial Members had no recourse. Were the Baganda to send representatives, their views might be treated with equal impunity, while at the same time their special position would be weakened by participation. For it might be argued that since they had representation, they must abide by the decisions of the Council, and the Lukiko as a body expressive of Baganda opinion was no longer necessary.¹

for refusing to nominate Baganda to Legislative Council in 1945 are set forth. Kingdom of Buganda, The Report of the Sub-Committee of the Lukiko Which Was Set up to Examine the Recommendations Made by the Hancock Committee (n.p.: n.n., n.d. [printed by the White Fathers' Printing Press, P.O. Box 87, Kisubi-Entebbe, Uganda]), p. 40. (In Luganda and English.)

¹The British argument in October 1953 before the Kabaka was deported was, in fact, that unless Buganda had members on the Legislative Council, preferably selected by the Lukiko to link them with the people they represented, the full opportunity for the expression of Baganda views on federation would be lost. GB, CO, Uganda Protectorate: Withdrawal . . ., p. 37.

Federation of East Africa might in this way be forced on them through legislation by the Protectorate's Council.¹ (Or, additionally, a law might even be passed providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, a proposed measure fought by the Baganda so tenaciously through the Lukiko in 1944.²) These are speculations, but they appear not unreasonable in light of evidence such as the remarks quoted above from the book by Dundas.³

Of one thing a definite statement is possible. The Legislative Council was viewed as an institution alien to the Baganda. Moreover, since the relations with the British were governed by the 1900 Agreement as far as the Baganda were concerned, the Council was not accorded any appreciable amount of legitimacy by the Baganda.

Not only were the Baganda views and general policy position quite lucid and strongly based in reason and emotion, but the Baganda led from strength in their stand. Their political system--maintained and supported as it had been by indirect rule--constituted a significant force in relation to other tribal political systems. Those few characteristics of the 1944 Baganda system which, as explained in

¹Already, as a result of the decisions taken in the Conference of East African Governors, the Legislative Council had frequently been presented with a fait accompli concerning the numerous common services for the three territories. Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 223.

²See Chapter V.

³For example, even before the Kabaka Crisis in 1953, at which time fear of federation was quite directly responsible for Buganda's refusal to participate in the Legislative Council, Mulira pointed out that the East Africa High Commission was set up after an official majority had ensured Legislative Council approval despite widespread opposition in Buganda. Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 39.

Chapter VI, might ordinarily have been expected to detract from its political strength, did not so operate in the specific situation under review. The unity of the Baganda in opposition to Legislative Council participation was so complete that it precluded the institutional and membership conflict which otherwise was present. On this issue as on the question of federation (and to a lesser extent the 1944 land acquisition dispute with the Protectorate), the Baganda political system constituted a truly strong political force.

The Situation Outside of Buganda

What of the other tribes in the territory? Dundas wrote that in addition to Buganda, the "Native Administrations" had intimated to him that they did not wish to participate in the Legislative Council.¹ Whether he meant to refer to all or just some of the local administrations outside Buganda is not known. But because he mentioned no Native Administrations which asked for Council representation, it is reasonable to assume in his context that none did.

Those that opposed representation probably did so for reasons similar to Buganda's, perhaps even primarily out of imitation. The three smaller Kingdoms, with their Agreements, obviously were motivated in their attitudes by considerations quite identical with the grounds important to the larger Kingdom. Federation, and the fear of land being given to or taken by European Kenya-type settlers--these issues, which were both separate and related to each other, undoubtedly played a part

¹[Dundas,] "Notes by His Excellency . . .," pp. 9-10.

in any overt opposition to participation in Legislative Council.

However, if there was opposition it must not have been very great, for there is little evidence available to document it compared to that for the Baganda. Yet it does seem certain that there was no support for Legislative Council representation. The reasons for this are two, in addition to those advanced above in the nature of conjectures. British policy was responsible--directly and indirectly--for both.

In the previous chapter it was explained how the British policy of direct rule outside of Buganda resulted in the replacement of the essentials of the traditional political structures, except in the case of the three smaller Kingdoms and to a lesser extent Busoga. In lieu of the old systems, new forms of local institutions were established.¹ By 1944 these political institutions had not been functioning sufficiently long to have become accepted--legitimated, institutionalized--by the people of the areas of quite direct rule. Nor were they yet effectively representative institutions, the implementation of the new conciliar system having been only recently begun.² Therefore, even if the people had had views on the question of participation in the central legislative body of the Protectorate, there were no institutions in these areas of decidedly direct rule through which such views could have been

¹In Bugisu some of the lower level institutions were apparently revived. Jean Sackur, "Struggle for Power in Bugisu," The [London] Times British Colonies Review, No. 34 (Second Quarter, 1959), 23.

²It was explained at the end of Chapter VI that up to 1945 the broadened councils had not even been introduced in three of the eight areas of quite direct rule.

adequately expressed.

But, it is held, the people had no views to speak of, and this is explained by the second reason. It has to do with the variation within Uganda of the force of alien contact and influence, discussed in Chapters IV and V. Largely as the result of British policy, there was a generally lesser extent of alien contact and influence in all of the direct rule areas outside of Buganda than in that Kingdom, and this was particularly pronounced in the districts further from the center.¹ The lessened contact, manifested for example by a relative paucity of schools, greatly inhibited an understanding of the Legislative Council as an institution. In fact, its existence was hardly realized. Authority flowed down from the Governor to the District Commissioner. These were the important institutions. These controlled the fate of individuals who wanted to advance. The Legislative Council had "as yet in the African mind little interest";² it was a non-African body--or perhaps more accurately, an un-African institution. Alien contact and influence had not been sufficient to educate--in both the regular and the political sense--the peoples in most of the areas outside Buganda to the point where they would be able to weigh the advantages and the disadvantages of participation.³

¹Rule became more direct and alien contact and influence less extensive as the distance increased from the center--from Buganda--but not always for the same reasons.

²Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . . .," p. 199.

³The statements in the three preceding paragraphs are generalizations about a number of tribes and their applicability and reliability varies in different cases. They are considered quite reasonably

The Reaction of British Policy

Governor Dundas, as shown earlier, did not press the Baganda on the matter of participation in Legislative Council. Like a predecessor in 1930, he did not envisage any African representation, at least for some time in Dundas' view. Indirect rule had kept the Baganda political system in the main intact; on this issue it was a particularly unified, strong system. Its opposition to representation in the Council was deferred to by Dundas.

As for representation of remaining tribes, the Protectorate Government likewise heeded their apparent preferences to be left out of the Council. It seems hardly possible, however, that the central

substantiated for the Acholi; to be especially applicable also to the Karamojong, Lugbara, Lango, and Bakiga, although the evidence is not as well validated; and to hold with the same qualification for the Kingdom tribes of the Banyoro, Batoro, and Banyankole, subject to the amendment that these peoples had political institutions generally regarded as their own, but they also had an additional reason--their Agreement status--for not wanting Legislative Council representation.

The generalizations would have to be amended for the Basoga, Iteso, and Bagisu as well. In these three instances it would appear that by 1944 the tribes were regarding the non-traditional political institutions, especially their District Councils, as their own in some--though on the whole limited--measure. This may be explained by the earlier introduction of the new political system in these three areas, thus the longer period for the people to become accustomed to it; and by the greater extent of alien contact and influence, especially in Busoga.

In the case of the Basoga, it may also be explained by their familiarity with the principles of the new Buganda-type system; and by the use of traditionally-based Basoga chiefs for a long time, with the transition to selection on merit a gradual one. Yet despite the greater alien contact and influence in Busoga, and the tribe's probable greater acceptance of their new tribal political system than other tribes where rule was more direct, there was still a decided view that the central institutions of the Protectorate were alien institutions. Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., [1956]), p. 222.

government acquiesced because the other tribes' views carried with them appreciable political force. The analysis of these political systems has disclosed that, in addition to their relatively limited resources, they were not very favored in attributes of political solidarity; and there is no indication of collective action by the other tribes in presenting their views to the Protectorate authorities. Perhaps the answer lies in Lord Hailey's statement during the war that, if Buganda was not represented, the

extension of representation to the other areas in the Protectorate would, in these circumstances, put the people of the less advanced portion of the territory in possession of power to legislate for the area in which social conditions are most advanced, and which has developed a marked political consciousness of its own. It would undoubtedly be a source of friction and misunderstanding.¹

Conclusions

Africans in Uganda prior to 1945 generally looked to the Governor as the most important central political institution and regarded the Legislative Council as an alien body in which they desired no representation.

Although there was, thus, consensus--not as clearly articulated in some cases as in others--among the Protectorate's different African tribal groupings on the above viewpoints, the reasons for the correspondence of opinions were quite different.

The Baganda preferred to deal through their own traditional political institutions with the British authorities at the top. They were convinced that the surest means of preserving their identity as a

¹Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development . . .," p. 199.

people was by strict reliance on the 1900 Agreement. They were convinced that participation in Legislative Council would jeopardize their special position. Developments such as that of the explosive issue of federation of East Africa must have greatly reinforced the Baganda convictions.

Because of their Agreements, the three smaller Kingdoms similarly looked to the Governor as the major institution to which matters should be referred. But in some contrast to Buganda, in the smaller Kingdoms as well as in the more direct areas of rule the District Commissioners were nearly all-powerful. They derived their authority from the Governor, who was, therefore, regarded as the crucial source of power. The Legislative Council, on the other hand, was looked upon as an extraneous body, especially since no Africans were included on it. Moreover, as alien contact and influence was considerably less in its manifestations in the areas of quite direct rule, the social situations there had not evolved to the point where strong pressures for or against participation had arisen. Even had they materialized, there would have been no facilities for their ready expression, for British policy had resulted in the replacement of the traditional political institutions with new ones. There had been neither sufficient time nor extensive enough alien contact and influence in the decidedly direct rule areas for the new local, tribal institutions which had been introduced to be accepted by these peoples as their own, through which their views could be voiced.

The British reaction to the African attitudes was to leave the situation as it existed; that is, to introduce no African representation

in Legislative Council in view of the lack of desire for it, and more to the point, in view of Buganda's strong and united opposition to participation by Baganda.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It was proposed in the Introduction to the study, as the second part of the thesis, that various British policies collectively acted as the most important force shaping the limited extent of political change in the Protectorate's central institutions for governing the African population. The relevant findings of this and other chapters may now be summarized to substantiate the proposition.

An analysis of the territorial institutions indicated that the Governor was the vital and supreme institution in terms of the distribution and exercise of authority, the rest being merely auxiliary. It was the Governor who had to serve as the mechanism for resolving conflicts between most of the Protectorate's different groups. The Legislative Council, lacking Africans among its membership, failed to perform this function except for the very small non-African minority groups. It was the Governor who was the prime formulator of Protectorate policy if he wished to be, and many of the men who held the office did.

During the period up to 1945 no initiative had been shown by the various Governors either in the establishment of the central institutions of the Executive and Legislative Councils or in their subsequent elaboration. At the most, the Governors acceded to certain of the requests presented by non-African unofficial bodies, rejecting others. No Africans were included in the Councils, although the matter

was considered at least as early as 1930 and at somewhat greater length by Governor Dundas during the war years. In view of the considerable Baganda opposition, and the absence of pressures for representation in Legislative Council from other African areas, Dundas rejected the idea as had a predecessor. In these ways British policy toward the central institutions operated as a direct factor over the years to limit political change in these institutions.

Other policies also acted to limit such change, by the effects they had on certain of the rest of the major forces. Chapter VI showed how the policy of indirect rule permitted, and even encouraged, the adaptation of the Baganda traditional political system instead of its replacement. And it was because the Baganda viewed Legislative Council participation as a probable threat to just this system, and therefore preferred to work according to the 1900 Agreement (their Constitution of Indirect Rule, so to speak)--it was because of these two consequences of British native administration policy that Buganda cohesively opposed representation of the Kingdom in the central legislature of the Protectorate.

Likewise, opposition was undoubtedly strengthened by the fear of the Baganda in respect to the issue of East African federation. The fear may be assumed to have been heightened during the war by the increased cooperation of the three territorial Governments and the warm approval of these developments expressed by Dundas.

The political force which the Baganda could bring to bear on the matter of Legislative Council representation had been augmented by another set of British policies. Economic and social development of

Buganda had proceeded at a faster pace than in the rest of the country, and British policy was a major factor in the trend, as shown in Chapter V. Buganda's political system was stronger in natural and human resources than it would have been had policy resulted in a more even rate of progress for the diverse regions.

As for the non-Buganda areas of direct rule, the British policies which limited the extent of the impact of alien contact and influence in those areas and thus the development of their resources, at the same time limited the possibilities of social and political pressures arising there for political change in the central institutions. In addition, the direct rule policy itself had caused a replacement of traditional political institutions in many of the areas with new ones, or the introduction of new political systems where none had existed. In the areas of decidedly direct rule, these had not yet been accepted by the people, partly because of the lesser social and economic development of the outlying regions and partly because the measures to broaden conciliar representation had still been hardly implemented. The result was not only that the tribes in the more direct rule areas lacked certain crucial attributes of political solidarity which tended to render them weak as possible forces for shaping political change at the territorial level, including change in the central institutions. They also had no institutions, which they regarded as their own, for exerting such pressures as they might wish to bring to bear on the Uganda-wide political situation, or more specifically, on the Protectorate Government.

Therefore, British policy in Uganda toward the central institutions up to 1945 operated, especially through the agency of the Governor, to limit political change in these Protectorate institutions. Policies not directly related to the central institutions also acted with the same result--though apparently not by conscious design--through their effects on the other major forces. For, various aspects of native administration and social and economic policy constituted important factors in shaping certain of the other major forces--the Baganda traditional political system, alien contact and influence, and the federation issue among others. These major forces in turn contributed to the slowness of the elaboration of the central institutions, that is, to the limited extent of political change at the territorial level of governmental institutions.

The interrelation and interaction of the forces is described and analyzed in greater detail in the next chapter, which deals also with the force designated as the social situation and social change.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERACTION OF POLICY WITH THE OTHER FORCES--A REVIEW

The broad analytical framework for the study was outlined in the Introduction as one which viewed political change in a large part of Africa as being shaped during most of the colonial era by five major variable forces:¹ the traditional African political systems; the policies of the colonial powers; alien contact and influence; events and issues; and the social situation and social change. The primary objective of the inquiry has been to assess the role of (British) colonial policy as one of these major forces, interacting with the others to shape the extent of change in local and central governmental institutions in Uganda during the period 1905-1945.

Although the organization of the study has served to facilitate the logical development of that subject by first setting the stage and then following with the description and analysis of policy as the force singled out for special consideration, the presentation has not lent itself to the unified treatment of the closely related question next in importance--policy's interaction with the other forces. Treatment of this is also necessary to check the validity of certain aspects of the

¹It was stated that the emphasis was on human forces as contrasted to nonhuman conditioners of change, on social features of the environment as opposed to physical aspects of the environment.

thesis, namely, those which have posited conclusions about the importance of policy as a force relative to the other forces.

The intention now, therefore, is as follows: to draw together, in the manner of a summary review, material on three of the forces--the traditional African political systems, alien contact and influence, and events and issues; to offer a brief description of the social situation which had evolved by 1945 largely as a consequence of the operation of the other forces, together with comments on the extent and nature of the drives for social change inherent in the social situation; and, in the case of each of the above four forces, to discuss its interaction with some of the important aspects of British policy.

The aim is to show how and why British policy was a leading force shaping, directly through certain policies and indirectly through other policies' influence on the rest of the forces, the extent and nature of the drives for social and political change present in the 1944 situation. Although somewhat repetitive of material already presented, by shifting the focus of the analysis in this way it is possible to explore more fully the role of British policy as the foremost instrument of Uganda's particular record of change in 1905-1945.

I. THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The inquiry into the force termed the traditional African political systems was approached through a detailed consideration of two tribes--the Baganda and the Acholi--and less intensive study of ten others. These tribes were the twelve largest indigenous tribes in Uganda at the end of the period under review. Together they constituted

three quarters of the total African population according to the 1948 Census. Each of the twelve numbered more than 100,000. By major linguistic groupings and percentage of total African population, they were as follows: the Bantu tribes--the Baganda (17), the Banyoro (4), the Batoro (3), the Banyankole (8), the Basoga (9), the Bagisu (5), and the Bakiga (6); the Nilo-Hamitic tribes--the Iteso (10), and the Karamojong (2); the Nilotic tribes--the Lango (5), and the Acholi (4); and the Sudanic tribe--the Lugbara (4). The Bantu tribes have been located in the southern half of the Protectorate; the Nilo-Hamitic in the northeast; the Nilotic primarily in the north-central section; and the Sudanic in the northwest.

There were considerable differences in the traditional polities of the tribes, and the changes wrought in the years of British rule up to 1945 were varied in extent and in nature. Six of the tribes prior to British rule had no single political system which was applicable to the tribe as a whole; that is, there were no decisions in any sphere of activity which were authoritative for more than one component political unit of the tribe and were repetitive in incidence. In the case of each of these tribes--the Basoga, Bagisu, Bakiga, Iteso, Karamojong, and Lugbara--the British authorities introduced a new, non-traditional political system.

Each of the other six tribes at the advent of British rule had traditional political systems applicable to the tribe as a whole. In two cases--the Lango and the Acholi--these systems were displaced; and new, non-traditional systems for each of the tribes were introduced by

the British.¹ The traditional systems of the other four tribes were the only ones of the twelve which were Kingdoms (Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole), headed each by a native ruler. In the years of British rule up to 1945 these systems did not lose their identity as traditional systems. There was, rather, a process of adaptation and modification of the traditional political institutions to meet the varying pressures for change.

After a review of the way in which British policies operated to affect the traditional political systems of Uganda's main tribes,² attention is directed to the manner in which the traditional polities acted as factors influencing official policies.

The Effect of British Policies on Traditional Systems

In the course of Part II three important aspects of British policy in Uganda were considered--social and economic development policies, native administration policies, and policies toward the central governmental institutions of the Protectorate. The native administration policies are dealt with first below, the aim being to review how and why they were important factors in the limited political

¹Of the sources cited in Chapter VI to support the conclusion that in the non-Agreement areas the traditional polities were largely or completely displaced in essence and new systems introduced, the most general authoritative statement was that in Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part I: East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika ([Great Britain,] Colonial Office; London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 28.

²The subject relates so directly to the crucial section of the thesis dealing with the effect of policy on political change in the local, tribal institutions that it is given more consideration than that accorded to most of the other forces.

change in Buganda and the more extensive change in the contrasting areas of direct rule.¹

Methods of native administration. Although Protectorate officials conceived of their policy for the whole of the territory during most of the period as the classic one of Indirect Rule, in fact the policy could not be described as actually one of indirect rule except for the Kingdom of Buganda.² This was largely because the British officials used the Buganda traditional political system, with its tribal civil service responsible directly to one central native authority, as a model to be copied in the other areas. But in most of the latter conditions were sufficiently dissimilar as to militate against there resulting much indirectness of rule when the Buganda model was applied. Accentuating the situation was the British use of Baganda during the first couple of decades as Agents of the Protectorate Government in the case of a number of tribes.

To turn more specifically to Buganda, that Kingdom has been regarded as not only the example but the prototype of Indirect Rule, and the classic British concept was subscribed to throughout the four

¹For a more intensive and structured approach to the question of change in traditional African political systems, using the history of the Mende tribe in Sierra Leone to test the conceptual scheme, see David Keith Marvin, "A Conceptual Scheme for Use in Study of African Political Systems in Transition," Dissertation Abstracts, XIV (December, 1957), 3076-3077.

²To meet the analytical criteria established in the study for indirect rule, a native administration system would have to have used traditionally based Africans in positions of authority, the latter would have to have exercised appreciable functions, and there would have to have been only a limited measure of British interference in the exercise of such functions. Protectorate Government practice outside of Buganda on the whole did not include a preponderance of these characteristics.

decades covered by the study. There was also a real policy of indirect rule, except for an interim span of years from the early 1920's to the late 1930's during which rule was direct; though not extensively so. The return to an indirect form of rule, begun in 1938, had become substantial by the end of 1944.

What of the effects of the policies on the Buganda political system? In the first years of the 1900 Agreement, Buganda enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in the internal affairs of the Kingdom, and it may be described at that time as a semi-sovereign state. With the shift to what was in reality a form of direct rule, Buganda became more accurately a dependent political system. With the return after the late 1930's to indirect rule, Buganda regained its semi-sovereign quality. The British policies of native administration for the tribe were directly responsible for these changes.

Yet other changes occurred in the political system of the Baganda. Though none were sufficient to alter the basically traditional nature of the system nor otherwise to change the system as a whole in the fundamental sense, they were not without political significance.

The system remained a unitary one in the sense of continued territorial centralization of political authority in the Kingdom, but authority otherwise became less concentrated by 1945 as follows. The 1905 oligarchy under the active leadership of the Katikiwo (Prime Minister) evolved into more of a collective leadership by the senior chiefs under the near-titular Kabaka; there also developed a rather deep political schism in the form of two factions of chiefs. Further diffusion of authority resulted from the gradual accretion of power by

the Kingdom's legislative body (the Lukiko).

In other aspects, to prove especially important in events early in 1945, the 1944 system was different from that of 1905. There was increased conflict between the system's institutions. There was also increased conflict between the system's membership groups. Yet no effective mechanisms to resolve such differences had developed.

The institutional conflicts were the result of the three-way schism which materialized over the years between the institutions of the Kabaka (King), the Ministers, and the Lukiko. They became marked in degree on a number of occasions.

The other kind of unresolvable conflicts which increased were those perceived conflicts between membership groups. Just what the alignments were is not clear. It has been assumed, pending further evidence, that the major membership conflict building up in late 1944 was between the following two loose groupings: one, comprised of temporary have-nots created by wartime conditions, led by certain disgruntled young educated Baganda, and probably abetted and at least unopposed by an anti-British traditionalist faction of senior chiefs; and the other, consisting of a smaller core of the ruling group in Buganda, better entrenched in power because of the support of the British authorities, and resistant to the economic demands of elements of the first grouping.

What was the role of British policy in these changes which, compared to 1905, represented factors detracting from the political system's strength in the sense of its solidarity?

The British policy of indirect rule, constituting as it did a deliberate policy of the late 1930's of non-responsibility for settlement of internal Buganda political quarrels,¹ was a positively permissive force in the increase of institutional conflict. For, although it neither encouraged nor resolved the conflicts, it consciously allowed them to grow and to act themselves out.

As for the conflicts which developed between membership groups, these also were not the subject of decisive action by the British authorities to ameliorate them through native administration policy. In addition, some of the new groups owed their origin indirectly to other British policies. For they were largely the result of the impact of the force designated as alien contact and influence which, as shown in Chapter V, was for the most part shaped by economic and social development policies.

To recapitulate for the Baganda, there were politically significant changes in the tribe's traditional political system over the period 1905-1945, but the changes were not such as to change the system in its essentials nor to alter its basically traditional nature. Viewing the changes against the aspects of the system which did not change, differences in 1945 were not extensive, and they were more in the sense of modifications rather than substitutions. As is overwhelmingly supported by authorities in the field of study of Buganda, the political system of the Baganda adapted itself to the forces of change;

¹Sir Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts (London: Hutchinson, 1954), p. 171.

it absorbed changes, internalizing for the most part the varied new pressures instead of resisting them. Compared to the changes in traditional political institutions in the areas of decidedly direct rule, those in Buganda's institutions were relatively limited.

Except for the interim period of direct rule in Buganda, British native administration policy played a permissive rather than an active part in shaping the changes. But that it was a vital role must be underscored. Because, except for the interim period, far from undermining or displacing the traditional sources of political authority in Buganda, the British through the indirect rule policy and its very nature supported traditional authority. Despite the other British policies which operated through certain of the rest of the major forces to change limited aspects of the traditional system, notably by increasing conflicts, the broad effect of the native administration policy of indirect rule was to ensure the survival of the traditional political system as a composite, integral system. Buganda may have lost a measure of its former institutional concentration of political authority, and its attributes of solidarity may have been somewhat compromised in the period 1905-1945 by the new conflicts. But the Kingdom retained its full traditional identity despite its considerable social and political adaptation. From its continued oneness, as well as from other aspects of its political system, Buganda still represented a political factor in 1944 with appreciable sources of solidarity. Its pre-eminence as a political entity among the other tribal polities went unchallenged.

To turn from Buganda to the other areas of the Protectorate,

evidence substantiated the conclusion that British rule for the tribes other than the Baganda was direct and not indirect. It seemed clear from the limited evidence collected that in some areas the rule was much more direct than in others. It was concluded that the areas might be considered as being on a continuum of progressively more direct rule, with the three smaller Kingdoms coming first, followed by Busoga, and then the remaining areas constituting those with the most marked form of direct rule as practiced in Uganda.

Acholi was studied intensively as an example of political change over the years in an area where markedly direct rule was applied. It was found that as a consequence of British policy, there was a displacement of Acholi's traditional tribal political system.

The Acholi traditional system, in contrast to that of the Baganda, had been characterized by marked diffusion of political authority territorially and within the component units, by lesser legitimacy accorded to the holders of political authority, and by limited resources. By 1945 the traditional system had disappeared in every essential respect. It had been replaced by a new system which was largely a creation of British policies of native administration. The traditional chiefdoms were gone as recognizable component political units, and chiefs were chosen on merit instead of on the basis of traditional hereditary qualifications. In lieu of the traditional loose confederation of chiefdoms, political authority had become highly centralized at the Acholi District headquarters. There was a further institutional concentration of authority in the person of the District Commissioner. Of the other changes in the traditional Acholi polity,

perhaps the most important was the new sectional (east-west) division which had grown up as a result of the early British administration of the tribe as two Districts, and which continued in political evidence even after the amalgamation in the second half of the 1930's. The traditional system was carried over in only one respect--membership of some traditionally-based leaders in the recently constituted system of democratized councils, which had been introduced as advisory bodies to check the trend toward autocratic behavior on the part of the British-appointed chiefs.

These, then, were the consequences of the operation of the British policy of direct rule in Acholi up to 1945. In such ways the native administration policy acted to effect extensive change in the traditional Acholi political system.

It remains to note two things. By 1945, available evidence indicated that the new Acholi political system still had not been accepted by the people as their own; it still had not acquired legitimacy in Acholi eyes. It was decided that this was in part due to the relatively short period of incubation of essential features of the new system, and in part due to other factors to be reviewed later.

The second point is that additional changes were brought about in the transition from the old to the new system, but they were similarly due to other forces at work. The most significant of them was the religious-socio-political division occasioned by the rivalrous activities of the Protestant and Catholic missionaries.

In conclusion, it may be stated that with regard to Acholi, change in the traditional political institutions was extensive in the

period under review, amounting to their replacement by new institutions; and that the British native administration policy of direct rule was the foremost force responsible for this.

As regards the other areas of Uganda where British native administration policy was in reality also one of direct rule throughout the period, the traditional polities and the changes wrought by British rule have not been the subject of intensive study in the foregoing chapters. However, from the more limited evidence which has been collected some tentative conclusions may be formulated and presented in the form of reasonable assumptions pending evidence to the contrary.

With respect to the extent of change effected in the traditional political institutions, where British native administration policy was as notably direct as in Acholi, the change was the greatest. New systems were introduced, generally similar to that of the Acholi District.¹ The tribes affected were the Iteso, Lango, Bakiga, Lugbara, Karamojong, and Bagisu, in decreasing order of pervasiveness of change. The Iteso traditional political institutions, lacking any appreciable measure of organized political authority at all but the village levels, were quite completely obliterated by 1945. This was partly because of the ruthless disregard of them by the innovating Baganda Agents, who were used by the Protectorate Government in the area during the early years; and it was partly because of the longer period of British rule in

¹At the end of Chapter VI it was pointed out that up to 1945 the broadened councils had not yet been introduced in three of the seven tribal areas of decidedly direct rule--Kigezi, Lango, and the West Nile (the Lugbara area). But their newness in Acholi lessens this dissimilarity.

Teso, where a system of broadened popular councils was first introduced in 1937. The Lango, Bakiga, Lugbara, and Karamojong had all been under British rule for at least ten years less than the Iteso. The remoteness of the Karamojong had prevented--and still prevents--fully effective administration of that cluster of peoples, with consequent lesser change. The Bagisu, on the other hand, had been subject to British administration almost as long as the Iteso, but the kin group structures at the various levels of the traditional Bagisu society were more resistant to change. In the event, they carried over in several politically significant ways into the new system introduced by the Protectorate Government.

British native administration policy was somewhat less direct in Busoga than in the other areas just discussed, because there was early utilization of traditionally-based chiefs and a gradual transition to the system of selection on merit. Change in traditional Basoga political institutions, though involving a new tribal political system where there had been none before, was less extensive than in the tribes cited above despite an equally long period of rule in Busoga as in Teso.¹ The separate Basoga chiefdoms which existed in traditional times were fairly deeply rooted and were characterized by a greater degree of organization of political authority than in the case of the tribes where rule was more direct. The Basoga chiefdoms proved, therefore, more resistant to change. There was a tendency of the British authorities to

¹Also despite--and because of--the early introduction (in 1938) of a system of broadened councils, in which traditional elements were strongly represented.

attempt to incorporate in the new Basoga system certain features of traditional chiefdoms, though not to adapt the chiefdoms themselves as units for modern use, as was the policy in the Protectorate's four Kingdom states.

Three of Uganda's tribal Kingdoms--Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole--were also administered by what was in effect a policy of direct rule,¹ although it was less direct than in Busoga. British policy was consciously one of trying to rule through the political institutions existing in traditional times, yet adapting them--sometimes rigorously--to meet the modern requirements as the Protectorate authorities saw them. Change in political institutions in these three Agreements areas is, therefore, assumed to have been less extensive than in Busoga and all other areas, excepting Buganda,² largely because of British policy. To cite one example, in none of the three Kingdoms had the relatively recent innovation of democratized councils been introduced by 1945, whereas this had been done in the case of more than half of the other tribes in the direct rule areas.

The very existence of the Agreements was undoubtedly partially responsible for the lesser change in the smaller Kingdoms, as well as in

¹Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa" (unpublished Report, 1940-42, prepared for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, [1944]), p. 190.

²It could be argued that change in the political institutions of Buganda was greater than in those of the three smaller Kingdoms because of the greater incidence of alien contact and influence in Buganda. On the other hand, the direct rule policy in the three smaller Kingdoms brought about permanent changes not duplicated in Buganda.

Buganda, for the British had a respect for such documents which appears to have been greater than that of most colonial powers. But the importance of the mere fact of the Agreements should not be overstressed. More material were two elements in the changing situation--the British predilection for, and practice of, Indirect Rule; and the depth and strength of the particular tribe's support of its Agreement. In Chapter VI it was shown that these varied at times both with the years and from Kingdom to Kingdom.

Social and economic development policies. As indicated in Chapter V, most of the British policies with respect to economic and social development in Uganda were major factors conditioning the extent and the nature of the manifestations of the force designated as alien contact and influence. The latter in turn influenced the evolution of the parts and the whole of the Uganda social situation up to 1945, as well as the formulation of pressures for change in them. These developments are taken up in later sections, but it is appropriate to cite here the varying effects, circulatory though they were, of such policies on the traditional political institutions. The procedure also serves to highlight the multiple nature of the interactions of the five forces, although the analytical framework represented by the latter is being cut across at this point in the interests of brevity.

One of the most crucial British policies in this field was the non-alienation of land policy. As of 1915 it effectively inhibited the growth of a large-scale white settler community in Uganda. An important consequence was the removal of a threat of interference by such a vested interest in native affairs and therefore in traditional political

institutions. In addition, the land policy was accompanied by a policy of active encouragement of peasant-based cash crop production as the mainstay of the Protectorate's economy, and by measures to inhibit the incidence of oppressive native landlordism. These all worked to prevent the growth of a discontented landless proletariat. Had the latter evolved, there would have been a sharp change from conditions existing in traditional times in most of Uganda. There would have been inevitable modifications in various aspects of the traditional political institutions, or at the minimum, pressures for change which were not present up to 1945 to an appreciable extent.

The Government's policy of stimulating production of the cash crops of cotton and coffee was not, however, applied evenly throughout the country. Its earliest application, sustained intensively throughout the years, was in Buganda. Other areas receiving particular attention later were to the east: Busoga, Bugisu, and Teso especially, in that approximate order. Agricultural development--and therefore general economic prosperity--was much more advanced there; the rest of the Protectorate lagging behind and in most cases quite considerably.

The official labor policy intensified this trend of area variation, for until the mid-1930's the less developed regions were regarded and used by the Government as labor reservoirs to be tapped for wage-laborers. . . These were recruited as temporary workers for the productive areas. They were employed on the relatively extensive public works projects there and as laborers on both the few non-African plantations and the many small African holdings. They returned to their homes usually with enough to make the customary payment in connection

with a native marriage or to buy a bicycle, but rarely with sufficient capital to commence a new enterprise of their own.

The differences in the development of social services paralleled those of economic resources. In health and especially in education, Buganda--and to a lesser extent the other areas to the east--was far ahead of the outlying tribal regions. Since these services on the whole were initiated and operated by the Christian missions, though with increasing Government grants-in-aid, their territorial pattern of concentration presumably was the result of mission decisions. But there is no evidence available that the Government made any definite efforts to alter the unevenness of the pattern for the greater part of the period. And it was in the Government's power to have done so. Government policy was, therefore, at the least one of tacit sanction of the unequal distribution of social services and may have been one of positive support.

It should also be noted that the Government did little to expand education above the primary level. In addition, the Protectorate placed a definite low valuation on the academic type of curriculum while devoting its few direct efforts mostly to creating facilities for technical training of Africans.

None of the above statements of development policies and their consequences should be interpreted as absolutely precise or as subject to no qualifications. For example, in the very late 1930's the Governor of the time pushed forward vigorously a personal plan to establish facilities for a high level academic education for a small African elite-to-be. However, these plans bore little fruit until after their

more substantial implementation following World War II: As for the conclusions about the disparity in economic and social development, there was no clear-cut line between the many different tribal areas. There was instead a continuum of advancement in these fields. But the extremes were very pronounced between Buganda on the one hand and the much more remote areas of the Karamojong, Lugbara, and Bakiga peoples on the other hand.

How did this pattern of development, for which British policy was largely responsible directly, or in the case of education perhaps only tacitly--how did the pattern affect the traditional political systems? As might be expected, the effects were varied. There is no simple explanation of the variations, such as: the greater the development, the greater the pressures for change, and the greater the change.

For Buganda such a generalization certainly would not apply. Relatively few pressures for change resulted from the higher level of development in that Kingdom. Although there were some changes in the political system after 1905 attributable to development, the effect of the latter on the whole was much more one of reinforcing the traditional system. The reasons have been explained earlier in the study but may be briefly summarized.

The 1905 oligarchy of Baganda chiefs were the men who had previously revolted against the traditional order. However, following their success in gaining control of that order, they made themselves a part of its institutions and shared a deep and very sincere commitment to them. On the other hand, the new leaders were not only receptive to

new ideas and especially to Western education and economic progress; they were even active innovators, though subject to one condition. That was that the Baganda's cultural identity--their national self-consciousness--should not be compromised, and nothing new should be accepted which would destroy what they regarded as their best native traditions and customs. Among the most important of the latter were their traditional political institutions. For these reasons the society could retain its essential integrity as a whole and yet accommodate marked changes in certain respects. For these reasons the pressures for change generated by development were internalized. The traditional political system adapted, but it remained basically traditional.¹ It was in fact reinforced by the increase in its resources--both in the sense of economic production and productivity, and in general increments in the skills of its people.

One aspect of the traditional system should be singled out as greatly facilitating the adaptation. The traditional mode of selection of chiefs to serve under the Kabaka and his Katikiro was based not on hereditary criteria, as was frequently the case with other tribes, but rather on merit. That is, the men appointed were chosen because it was

¹These conclusions are based on several excellent analyses, and it is desired that indebtedness to them be reiterated. D. A. Low, Religion and Society in Buganda, 1875-1900 (East African Studies, No. 8; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, [1957]), p. 16; L. A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism" ([paper read at the] Southwestern Anthropological Association Meeting, April 25, 1959), pp. 2, 4-8 (duplicated); L. A. Fallers, "Despotism, Status Culture and Social Mobility in an African Kingdom," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (October, 1959), 27-29; C. C. Wrigley, "The Christian Revolution in Buganda," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (October, 1959), 33-34, 45-46.

considered they were qualified to perform their functions of office, which were largely administrative. Although the specific functions to be performed changed in the course of time under British rule, the generalized prerequisites of office did not. In addition, although wealth and status were, not unnaturally, helpful in obtaining appointments, recruitment was not restricted along these lines. Exceptional young men of peasant stock often rose in political office as had been the case in traditional times.

Two exceptions to Buganda's ease of adaptation to the new pressures should be noted, but in the context of the whole view they are not to be exaggerated.

The greater educational facilities available to Baganda produced a comparatively large number of Baganda for both Buganda Government and Protectorate Government jobs. Yet some of the post-primary, Western-educated Baganda either could not find employment satisfactory to them or had failed at what they tried. These constituted only a small number of discontents among the educated elite of the tribe, but, benefiting from hindsight, the group was to prove to be one of the several political factors contributing to the situation which abruptly degenerated into the 1945 riots in Buganda.

The other exception to Buganda's ability to adapt and internalize forces for change related more directly to Protectorate Government policy. Desiring to obtain certain land in Buganda for educational and cotton experimental facilities, the British authorities rather tactlessly proceeded with attempts to acquire it--compulsorily but with some compensation--from the land-loving Baganda holders of the titles. The

result was a split in the Buganda Government itself, with the people as a whole backing those who opposed compulsory acquisition, and the Buganda Lukiko overwhelmingly rejecting the idea as well.

What were the effects of the economic and social development policies in other areas of the country?

Considering Acholi, the tribal area given more intensive study, it was one of the outlying Districts where there was relatively little development. There is practically no direct evidence which would be of assistance in reaching a conclusion about the effects of development there. Yet there seems no reason to believe that the limited economic and social advances had much to do with the replacement of the traditional political system. Native administration policy was, it has been concluded, the major factor by far. It is, however, considered reasonable to assume that the limited development was an important factor inhibiting the tribe's understanding of the new Acholi political system and its acceptance by the people as their own.

With regard to the other tribes, comments must approach the nature of postulates, for they are based not upon intensive study in most cases but upon general impressions.

Proceeding for the moment down the scale of development from Buganda, in Busoga and Bugisu the traditional political institutions, which it may be recalled did not include any which were tribal-wide, apparently proved able to adapt in appreciable measure to the pressures for change deriving from cash crop production and mission schools. Further, the new tribal political system introduced by the British apparently was somewhat accepted by 1945. This is assumed for the

present to have been facilitated in part by the greater advance in the economic and social fields compared to that in the more distant areas.

It is not believed that the traditional political institutions of the three small Kingdoms were much changed as a consequence of developmental pressures. The latter were quite limited in the economic field. As for education, all three Kingdoms had mission schools from the early days, but expansion was very slow. Results of attempts to introduce new ideas and programs were disappointing to both missionaries and officials. Ankole was somewhat of an exception. Social and political pressures were building up there as a consequence of the missions'--especially the Roman Catholic--efforts to educate the Bairu, the traditionally serf caste forming the great majority of Ankole's population. The rule of the Bahima minority thus came to be open to later challenge.

In the case of all the other tribes there is no reason to believe development, limited or otherwise (as in Teso), played a large part in the demise of traditional political institutions. British native administration policy was the major factor. However, Teso's greater economic and educational advances presumably were responsible for the greater apparent acceptance by the Iteso of their new political system. The lesser developmental advances of the Lango, Bakiga, Lugbara, and Karamojong might be presumed to have inhibited their acceptance of the new tribal political systems.

It was, then, in the above varying ways that British social and economic policy operated, or in some cases is thought to have operated, to affect the traditional polities of the main tribes of Uganda.

There is an additional possibility. Elsewhere it was explained that the two Christian missions, through their proselytization and greatly aided by their school systems, introduced because of their rivalry a religious and social division into almost every part of Uganda. The division took on political significance in the case of all but possibly three or four of the twelve tribes. The role here of British policy has not been investigated for this study, but no evidence has turned up in the course of the work which would indicate that the Protectorate authorities condoned the rivalry during the period 1905-1945. The impression is that the official policy in the early years was one which attempted a division of Uganda into spheres of religious influence; that this was rejected by the missions; and that thereafter the British authorities took few or no positive steps to prevent the deepening and broadening of the division.

Policies toward the central governmental institutions. To the extent that actions reflected policy, official policy toward the central governmental institutions of the Protectorate amounted to one of slow, almost snail-pace elaboration of the institutions. The Governor remained the cardinal locus of power and authority to all effects throughout the forty year period. After pressure from the then politically influential non-Africans, an Executive Council and a Legislative Council were established in 1921, but the composition of the former was entirely official throughout the four decades. The Legislative Council's majority of British officials and its minority of British and Asian nominated unofficials stayed constant for many years prior to 1945.

The policy is held here to have had no effect on the traditional African political systems. It might be argued that because the policy did not provide for African representation in Legislative Council, it cancelled out a threat to the traditional systems of the four Kingdoms. This is regarded as too tenuous a supposition, for there is no evidence that the British or the Africans wanted such representation. In addition, although the Kingdoms' fears for their systems were real, it would be pure speculation to attempt to translate them into a statement of probable changes in the systems had African representation in Legislative Council been introduced before 1945.

The Effect of the Traditional Systems on Policy

At various points in the study the primary concern has been indicated as being the role of British policy in effecting change. Attention has been given only indirectly on occasion to the determinants of the various aspects of policy, for inquiry into these falls outside the scope of the subject as delimited. However, it is desirable to deal with this other side of the coin, even though briefly and in certain cases impressionistically, in order that some of the perspective inevitably lost in the preceding discussions may be restored. The purpose is to show, among other things, how the policy of rule was more indirect as the degree of traditional tribal political organization was greater.

Native administration policy. The British envisaged their policy of native administration in Uganda as one of Indirect Rule, and some of the reasons for the choice of this general concept were

explained previously.¹ Here the concern is directed to the question of why different methods were in fact used in Uganda in lieu of one uniform approach.

The answer fortunately is relatively simple and readily available and documented. The British preferred in Uganda to administer through established, centralized, African traditional political organizations. Where these existed and their recognized leaders were cooperative, it was an easier, more effective, and less costly method of rule. The interaction of the Buganda traditional system and the British policy can, therefore, be likened to a case of love at first sight.

The conditions with respect to the three smaller Kingdoms were less perfect and the match was less a matter of mutual satisfaction. Exceptions to the spirit of Indirect Rule had to be made for the British to accomplish their minimum administrative objectives in those areas-- law and order, collection of revenue. Rule was more properly described as direct. There was, however, sufficient political organization through which the British could work to render it a form of rule which was direct in a fairly limited sense compared to some other areas.

Busoga had no traditional tribal political system, so there was no central organization for the British to rule through. They had to create one, and they used for the most part the Buganda system as a model. Yet the British were able to rule to some extent indirectly, for there were traditional political organizations existing for the individual Basoga chiefdoms. Features of these were partially utilized.

¹See the first section of Chapter VI.

The rest of the cases follow along the same lines with few exceptions, with more direct rule as there existed less traditional political organization. For example, there was a greater extent of political organization within the Acholi chiefdoms than was the case in Lango. Although rule in Acholi ended up by 1944 to be as direct as that in Lango, the Protectorate Government attempted--and in the period from 1937 to 1943 re-attempted--to use the traditional Acholi institutions much more than in Lango.

There were, then, very important predisposing or "given" factors in the Uganda situation largely determining early British native administration practices which evolved into policies. These factors were the traditional African political systems--or the lack thereof.

However, they "determined" native administration policy for a tribe only insofar as it is "given" in turn that the general orientation of policy was as stated--toward the principle of Indirect Rule. It seems certain this was so in Uganda, but it was not the case in all other British territories nor in all territories of other colonial powers in Africa. Had British policy been one of direct rule, or had the Germans, for example, obtained Uganda as a sphere of influence, there would have been little determining on the part of the Kingdoms' systems, especially in the latter example. The point is further developed in the final Conclusions to the study.

Development policies. The nature of the traditional polities of the various tribes was only one of several factors influencing economic and social development policies. The over-all consideration was that the territory be made financially self-sufficient. Excess revenue could

then be spent on development.

Concentration of development in Buganda can be attributed to the longer period of British rule there; the several more favorable conditions for development--soil and rainfall were good, the people were more advanced already than their neighbors and were largely very cooperative,¹ communication was more readily available; and, as only one of the factors, the political system facilitated the effective implementation of the required new measures. Conversely, in Acholi all the opposite factors were in force. It can be assumed that the Protectorate Government, not unnaturally, preferred to make the efforts where the results would be most quickly and abundantly forthcoming--plant and nourish the seed where the yield would be greatest.

In the case of one specific policy--the non-alienation of land policy--it was shown in Chapter V that an important factor in the evolution of the policy was the Buganda traditional political system, represented in that situation by the Lukiko. There was not sufficient data to reach a judgment of how significant the Lukiko's opposition to alienation of land to non-Africans was, in relation to the other forces interacting to produce the decisions from London. But in reviewing the strong pressures which were at work in Uganda in the period from 1910 to 1921, bent on encouraging the considerable growth of European owned and

¹The presence or absence of this latter trait goes a long way to explain differences among some other tribes. Although Teso had no surviving political organization, development was fostered there by British officials who were impressed with the Iteso eagerness to adopt new ways and to "progress." In politically organized Toro and Bunyoro, however, the authorities were discouraged from making unusual efforts by the lethargic attitude of the people.

operated plantations, one conclusion is dictated. Without the Buganda political system, the few elements opposing an estates-based economy would have been very hard put to stem the tide in the latter direction. It is paradoxical but not unusual in the case of governmental policies, and especially those of pragmatic peoples such as the British, that the policy of indirect rule for Buganda reinforced a system which was therefore in a position to aid in the defeat of another official policy. For, greater land alienation was supported by the Uganda Government consensus during that second decade:

Central governmental institutions' policy. There was no pressure from the Africans in Uganda, either through traditional political systems or otherwise, for more rapid elaboration of the Protectorate's central governmental institutions. On the other hand, there was opposition from Buganda, voiced through the Kingdom's traditionally rooted institutions, to elaboration in the form of the tribe's representation in the Legislative Council. In addition, the opposition is officially given as a reason why such representation was not favorably considered. Therefore, the Buganda political system as it existed at those times did operate to influence this aspect of British policy. But it is not possible to assess the extent of its effect on the decisions taken by the Governor, for there is good reason to believe that the Governor was also not predisposed to such a change.

II. ALIEN CONTACT AND INFLUENCE

The force designated as alien contact and influence has been defined as referring to the direct manifestations of the impact which

all non-indigenous elements, excepting the colonial power's policies, have had on a colonial territory. The nature and the extent of the impact has varied according to the identity of the agents of contact and the latter's duration and intensity, as well, of course, according to the nature of the other major forces operating in the territory.

The main features of alien contact and influence in Uganda have been considered for the period 1905-1945 according to their content-- economic, sociological, religious, and psychological.

African production of cash crops was encouraged, and the former subsistence economy developed into a relatively prosperous money economy over the years, with the indigenous peoples sharing directly and appreciably in the profits despite their lack of participation in the processing and marketing phases of the industry. (These and other non-producing aspects of the new economy were the domain of the Asians and the Europeans.) For a variety of reasons, however, economic individualism had not followed to a very great extent, nor had a sizeable middle class or permanent wage labor class developed by 1945.

With regard to the sociological aspects of alien contact, Western education, introduced by the missionaries and later assisted by Government grants, acquired a very high position in the scale of African values. But even toward the end of the four decades less than half the school-age Africans were in school; and many of these obtained no more than two years of formal education. Secondary and higher facilities were successively minuscule; and in government institutions the emphasis tended to be on the technical type of education as opposed to the literary content predominant in the mission schools at all levels. The

two separate Protestant and Catholic school structures reinforced the parallel religious-social division throughout the Protectorate. No lingua franca had evolved as a common means of communication among the many diverse peoples. Although there were shifts in Africans' valued ends and means, there was apparently no marked change in the general degree of social mobility from earlier times. The process of urbanization was limited, and thus there was absent one familiar strain on traditional ties of kinship. The latter were apparently only slightly weakened by other developments. However, affected also by British native administration policy, the former bonds for traditional village or local communities did fall away, and the traditional judicial systems experienced alterations in content and implementation of customary law.

In the religious sphere the two Christian faiths assumed an exclusively dominant position compared to Mohammedanism and paganism by reason of the political and social pre-eminence which Christianity gained among the Africans in the early years. Ultimate control of the affairs of the two churches remained in the hands of non-Africans, and some dissatisfaction was expressed by indigenous Protestants. However, the potentially politically explosive Christian doctrine of human equality and equal rights appears to have had little general impact by 1945, judging from the limited consequences in terms of pressures for change in contrast to the possibilities. There were, for example, no indications that, except perhaps to some degree in Buganda, the psychological reaction to European presumptions of superiority was at all substantial. This was in part because racial discrimination in the Protectorate was less acutely a conscious element of the situation.

(On the other hand, there was a psychological superiority-inferiority relationship between the Baganda and the other tribes, certainly as far as the Baganda were concerned.)

All of the above kinds of alien contact and influence were characterized by wide variation in duration and intensity. The latter were as a rule greater in the case of the Baganda. They decreased as regards the neighboring Bantu tribes, and then declined very much further as the distance from Buganda's capital increased. An instance was Buganda's marked early lead in cash crop production. Another was its progressively prominent place as regards educational opportunities for its people compared to those for the other tribes.

The various manifestations of alien contact and influence, and their differing degrees of incidence throughout the Protectorate, played a limited though nevertheless significant role in shaping the political changes which occurred up to 1945. The manner in which this process took place is considered at other points in the study.¹

The Role of Policy

In the detailed consideration of the force of alien contact and influence in Chapter IV it was shown that the Protectorate's economic development and social development originally were initiated by other than official authorities; they were in different degrees predominantly manifestations of that force and not of British policy. However, with the years British policy operated in varying degrees to affect such development. The aim is to review the way in which policies contributed

¹See, for example, the concluding sections of Chapters IV and VII.

to the unevenness of the manifestations of alien contact and influence.

The general guides to policy in Uganda were the same for other British territories in Africa: subject to the pre-conditions of the maintenance of law and order and the territory's financial self-sufficiency, the Protectorate's productive resources were to be developed so that the welfare of the inhabitants could be advanced in accord with the concept of trusteeship.

Specific policies relating to economic and social development were examined in Chapter V. It was found that the policy of non-alienation of land, the agriculture and labor policies, and policies with respect to social services were the major factors conditioning the extent and the nature of most of the manifestations of the force of alien contact and influence. For, accepting the agents of contact and the African traditional political systems as given, many of the manifestations would have been quite different had the British adopted other, also feasible policies. Some possibilities are: alienation of Crown land inside or outside of Buganda; more even distribution of transport and educational facilities throughout the country to ensure a less disparate rate of over-all development; somewhat lesser expansion of primary schools to make possible additions to secondary and higher educational facilities; a lesser stress on technical, vocational education and more on academic curricula at the post-primary level; a reallocation of the Protectorate's revenues to permit a greater expansion of social services; or earlier abandonment of what amounted to a policy of financial self-sufficiency, with the provision instead of appreciable grants-in-aid for Uganda by the British Parliament.

Therefore, whatever the effects of the force of alien contact and influence on political change in Uganda up to 1945, it may be stated that they were indirectly largely the consequence of various British policies which significantly shaped that force.

One tentative qualification needs to be added to the above conclusion. Of the manifestations which were politically significant, it has not been possible to present clearly the role of policy in the religious division introduced throughout most of the Protectorate as a consequence of Protestant-Catholic missionary rivalry, passed on in turn to their respective African adherents. Abetted as it was by the parallel structure of mission schools, the division in all affected areas became a social division as well; and in a number of areas it took on direct political expression.

There is no evidence, and it seems unlikely, that the British authorities condoned the extent of the evolution of the division. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Protectorate Government acted effectively to inhibit the developments during the four decades under review. It may have attempted to do so in some ways behind the scenes, but without success. As for the duality of the structure of mission schools, which was primarily responsible for the politically significant growth of conflict originating from religious differences, efforts in the late 1930's to remove the schools from ecclesiastical authority did not lessen the sectarian religious content of instruction. Nor did the Government pursue another possible course--establishment of a wholly secular system, either at the expense of the expansion of mission schools or alongside the missions' systems. Support of the

latter systems educated more children at less cost than would have been possible had Government assumed a more direct initiative. The explanation of official policy very probably would be along such a line if the matter were studied further.

Other Protectorate Government policies also had an effect on the manifestations of alien contact and influence, but their effect was more indirect, and it has not been possible to include a discussion of them without undue expansion of the presentation. To provide an example, however, the native administration policy acted to preserve much of the structure of the traditional political organizations of the Buganda Kingdom. Therefore, when the missions' converts assumed control of the traditional political system just prior to 1900, the growth of the Christian Churches was a simple matter, and the missions understandably concentrated their religious and educational efforts there. In contrast, in the areas where there was little in the way of centralized traditional political authority, evangelistic efforts necessarily had to be more diffused, and more work produced less adherents. The fewer the converts, the less pressure for mission schools.

The Effect of Alien Contact and Influence on Policy

As the primary focus of the study has been on the role of British policy as a force molding the extent of political change in Uganda, little direct inquiry has been made into the reverse process--the factors affecting the course of policy. The comments which follow are, therefore, based largely on impressions gained from the sources which have been consulted in the pursuance of the major inquiry. They should

be regarded as tentative in character. They give some support to a conclusion that the effect of alien contact and influence on policy, as restricted here to the agents of contact, diminished after considerable earlier influence.

The influence of the European Christian missionaries on official policies, so extensive up through the time of the signing of the Agreement of 1900 with Buganda, apparently declined proportionately from that peak as the Protectorate Government grew in power and responsibilities. In a number of fields--education especially--the missionaries continued to have a major say. The attempt of the Governor around the late 1920's to have Swahili established as a lingua franca through its Protectorate-wide use in schools was, for example, unsuccessful largely because of mission support of Baganda objections. It is believed that the mission authorities in other cases also very likely exerted what influence they could bring to bear to protect the interests of the indigenous peoples against possible encroachments by outsiders. One such threat was posed by the possibility the Government might sanction large alienations of land to immigrant white settlers.

The other important agents of alien contact and influence were the rest of the non-official Europeans and the diverse elements making up the so-called Asian community. From the early years the processing and marketing phases of the cash crop industries and the trade and private finance of the Protectorate were the domain of these groups. The Government did take steps to control certain of their practices, but the policy was to leave the monopoly in the hands of these non-African interests. The policy was undoubtedly largely occasioned

by the fact that they were making a decided and necessary contribution to the country's economy. But there is also the impression that these commercial interests were fairly well organized and, for their numerical size, had an effective voice in policies concerning them. This seems to have been particularly true during the second and third decades.

For example, they favored more alienation of land to non-Africans, a policy seconded on high by the Protectorate for some ten years. In addition, it has been noted in connection with the discussion of the central governmental institutions that the non-African communities--probably mostly the European business interests--successfully brought pressure to bear for the establishment of Executive and Legislative Councils. Granted that other factors were favorable, but at the least the initiative can be attributed to these particular agents of contact. They also expressed vigorous preference for technical education for Africans--in contrast to the missions' greater literary emphasis--and the official view until the late 1930's was the same.

As for the effects which their representatives in Legislative Council exercised on the formulation of British policies, no study has been carried out on this facet of the Uganda scene, and it can only be said that their advice was often disregarded by the Governor. At the same time it is reasonable to assume that their mere presence in the Council would have tended to precondition policy, as it was reflected in draft bills, to meet if possible their likely objections. And the impression derived from reading the record of the Council's World War II sessions is that, whereas the case of the non-African commercial interests was invariably effectively argued, especially with regard to

labor codes and to prices in the cash crop industries, that of the Africans was not.

On the other hand, it would appear that the above Asian and European interests had little say in matters relating strictly to native administration policy. In the one instance where it was noted that the topic was broached by an unofficial member, who asked about the Dundas reorganization of administration in Buganda in 1944, the Council was informed that such matters were not its concern but rather that of the Administration.

III. EVENTS AND ISSUES

As a force shaping political change, events and issues have been defined as follows: historical occurrences, and such topics about which there has been a conflict of political views, as have been in and of themselves significant as factors of political change. The procedure used as the appropriate one for treating this force in the Uganda study has been to consider the different events and issues at the most relevant place in the course of the presentation of material on various of the other forces; then, at the present stage, to review the most significant of them.

The role of British policy in the 1905-1945 events and issues is considered below, on a chronological basis. Afterwards, the effects the events and issues had on British policy are summarized, policy being approached according to its several aspects. To limit the scope of the discussion the significance of each event and issue to political change, already set forth in preceding chapters, is not reviewed, although in

many cases it may be inferred from the presentation.

The Role of Policy

The following abstract of events and issues indicates that the role of policy in shaping this force may be assumed to have been a major one.

Shortly after 1900 there broke out along the shores of Lake Victoria an epidemic of sleeping sickness. By 1905 it had assumed alarming proportions. Almost entirely as a consequence of an imaginative and forceful policy devised by the Governor in 1907 and implemented by him without awaiting the outcome of the Colonial Office's long deliberations, the battle against the epidemic was won by 1920.

During the years 1907-1914 British civil administration was extended to Lango, Acholi, Kigezi, the West Nile, and Karamoja. In the cases of Kigezi and the West Nile, the territory was acquired as a result of boundary adjustments made with neighboring colonial powers.¹ In the other cases, however, a recurrent factor was the decision to send punitive expeditions because of the loss of lives of Indian and Swahili traders who had ventured into the regions, without, it should be added, any guarantee of protection from the British authorities.

In 1915 the Colonial Office suspended alienations of land in

¹As for the Bwamba area in western Toro, this was evidently included in that Kingdom by the 1900 Agreement with Toro. However, Bwamba's exact status was not certain, and it was only in 1912 that it was officially incorporated into the Protectorate as a consequence of the boundary settlement with the Belgian Congo. Edward H. Winter, Bwamba: A Structural-Functional Analysis of a Patrilineal Society (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Limited, [1956]), pp. 3, 227.

Uganda to non-Africans, and in 1921 they were permanently restricted by authority from London. Both events constituted decisive policy edicts, especially when viewed against the pro-alienation policy then current among Uganda's officialdom. However, although a number of factors in the situation are known and have been set forth in the detailed discussion of the matter in Chapter V, the weight assigned to these by the Colonial Office in reaching its decisions is still obscure.

The financial year of 1915-16 saw the first balancing of Uganda's budget and the termination of supporting grants from the Government in London. This was made possible by the growth of cotton production, in turn initiated in 1904 by non-official sources but very soon greatly stimulated by the Governor of the time.

Executive and Legislative Councils were constituted in 1921. The Colonial Office had given its prompt approval to a Protectorate request for the Councils. The initiative behind the request had come from non-African unofficial elements of Uganda's population. The idea had been approved by the Governor on the recommendation of a senior judicial officer notably predisposed toward those unofficial non-African elements. Pending evidence to the contrary, the role of policy in this event cannot be considered as more than permissive. For, such councils had been established already in 1906 in neighboring Kenya. Their elaboration was initially greater there than was the case in Uganda, and further elaboration had occurred even before 1921. Finally, the Governor of Uganda had been given wide discretionary powers in the determination of the councils' composition, but he failed to use them to any appreciable extent.

The Government did, however, in 1921 take the initiative in inaugurating a program encouraging the African production of coffee, a cash crop which was soon to rival cotton. In the same year a form of compulsory labor for Africans in Uganda was abolished by order from the Colonial Office. The latter had responded in turn to a public outcry in Great Britain against a worse situation in Kenya and also probably to the stand taken against the Uganda system by the Buganda legislature.

Significant educational advances were made in the Protectorate in 1922, 1925-1926, and 1939. Receiving stimulation from outside reports, the necessary momentum for the action was furnished by the individual Governors of the day.

A signal event affecting Buganda occurred in 1926, when the long-revered Katikiro (Prime Minister) was in effect forced to resign as a consequence of a dispute with the senior British administrative official posted to the Kingdom.

That year Rudolf Province in the Protectorate's northeast was transferred to Kenya for reasons purely of administrative facility. However, it was charged by some Africans that the transfer was an indication of the Government's intention to amalgamate Uganda with its neighbors, especially Kenya.

At this point attention must be given to the most important political issue of the four decades--federation of East Africa. The idea of a closer union between Britain's territories in East Africa, and at times including some in Central Africa, had lain fairly dormant since 1902. In 1921 the Secretary of State for Colonies pressed amalgamation on economic grounds. There followed through the twenties a spate of

official commissions, which resulted only in the 1926 constitution of an annual consultative Conference of Governors of the colonies concerned. African opinion in general was not in favor of the federation idea, and Baganda views were very vocal in opposition. Non-African opinion in the territories vacillated, the strongest proponents being the Kenya settlers. A Joint Committee of the British Parliament held important hearings in 1931 and recommended against an administrative union.

What was forestalled up to World War II became an accomplished fact in effect though not in legal name during the war. This came about as a consequence of the close coordination of the East African Governments in the war effort through the medium of temporary bodies located in Kenya's capital, Nairobi. In addition, in those latter years official British policy swung from its position of hesitancy to one of clear advocacy of a more permanent form of closer union, with the Governors of Uganda and Kenya both publicly supporting such a step. Opposition from Buganda, based on a very real and deep fear and mistrust of the Kenya European settlers whose desire to dominate Uganda was openly declared, intensified; and it contributed to a general rise in tension in the Kingdom. This, then, was the prime political issue of the era, molded by a series of events and other forces and cast into its more volatile shape by 1944 as a result of a shift in British policy.

In the meantime other significant events had taken place. In 1936 the new Governor launched a program stepping up social and economic development. The same Governor in 1938 instituted a change in Buganda-Protectorate relationships which gave back to the former some measure of its 1900 administrative autonomy. The following year

Buganda's Kabaka died, having been on the throne since his placement there by the British at the age of one in 1897. He was succeeded by a missionary-educated, fifteen year old son, Mutesa II, who was elected by the Buganda Lukiko and approved by the Governor.

The war years brought further political turmoil to Buganda. In 1941 the Kabaka's mother remarried against rigid traditional custom, and the majority of the Baganda were so incensed that the Katikiro was forced to resign. The Protectorate Government apparently did not interfere in the dispute. The following year Mutesa came of age.

1944 was marked by two major happenings. The first related to a cardinal issue in Buganda. The British authorities pressed the Buganda Government to see that a law providing for the compulsory acquisition of land was enacted, but the Katikiro opposed it with vigor. There was almost complete Baganda public support for his position. The measure was overwhelmingly defeated in the Lukiko in 1944.

The other development was the reorganization of Buganda administration in October to give Buganda greater autonomy so that Protectorate-Buganda relations would reflect more accurately the spirit of the 1900 Agreement.

World War II itself may be considered as an event with a major impact in Uganda, but up to the end of 1944 the impact was still limited to a small number of politically telling effects. For the latter the Protectorate Government was largely responsible. Handicapped by staff shortages, its wartime controls and its rationing of food staples were maladministered to the extent that a serious black market developed. The burden fell on those least able to bear it--low-income Africans,

mostly concentrated in the Kampala urban area in central Uganda. Discontent grew. But communication between the people on the one hand and the British and Baganda officials on the other had become stultified for various reasons, and there apparently was little realization or appreciation of the gravity of the situation.

It has not been possible to make a detailed composite assessment of the role of policy in bringing about the events and issues. But it may be pointed out that of those which have been listed, the majority of the events and issues are in fact expressions of one policy or another, and several of the others were notably conditioned by policy. Therefore, the assumption is made that policy was an important, and perhaps the most important, force shaping the force designated as events and issues.

Events and Issues as Factors in Policy

Events and issues as a distinctive force in fashioning British policy would appear on the whole to have been of minor and not major importance, as indicated by the following review.

Directly or indirectly relevant to practically all the British policies was World War I and the Allies' declarations which followed, because of the impetus they gave to the general, guiding concept of trusteeship. But Britain had some hand in the declarations; and the trusteeship concept was more of a shift in emphasis than an entirely new policy.

With regard to economic and social development policies, the crucial policy of non-alienation of land was a consequence of Colonial

Office decisions in 1915 and 1921. It was no doubt facilitated in its formulation and in its perpetuation by several events, in turn conditioned by policy. The balancing of the budget in 1915-1916 as a result of African production of cash crops lessened the need to attract alien settlers as a means of furthering production. The relatively vulnerable non-African plantation industry was dealt a series of crushing blows by the slumps in world prices of its products in 1915, and especially in 1921 and the early 1930's, as well as by the reduction in labor supply which accompanied the abolition of a form of compulsory labor in 1921. In the latter year the peasant-based orientation of the Protectorate's economy was further stimulated with the Government's program for African production of coffee. The federation issue throughout the years and the conflict over the compulsory acquisition of land during World War II both contributed indirectly to the official adherence to the non-alienation of land policy. For they served to elicit more and stronger expressions of the high value Africans placed on their land and of the firm opposition to measures which might result in the alienation of land to any outsiders.

Some of the events and issues bearing on the agricultural and labor policies can be inferred from the preceding paragraph. They helped to set the Protectorate on a peasant-based economic path, in contrast to production by a plantation industry supported by large cores of African wage labor.

Policy with regard to the social services was necessarily a restrictive one until the officially-directed battle against sleeping sickness was won in 1920. It became somewhat more liberal thereafter.

It was given a general though limited stimulus by the trusteeship doctrines after World War I, and more specific impetus in the mid-1920's and the late 1930's by the reports of outside commissions. In the interim there was a retrenchment occasioned by the world-wide depression.

The demands of World War II necessitated a policy of economic controls. These proved to be a major factor in the growth of justified discontent among a certain level of the African population, especially in Buganda.

In the field of native administration policy, the extension of rule to outlying areas brought a gradual official realization that the doctrine of Indirect Rule could not in reality be applied, and the bulk of Uganda came to be administered by what constituted varying forms of direct rule. In Buganda an interim period of direct rule was highlighted by the forced retirement of the long-serving Katikiro, an event which apparently cleared the way for the extensive British interference in Buganda's native affairs for the next decade. The 1938 and 1944 changes in Buganda-British administrative relationships, introduced by the Governors of the time, set the course of native administration policy in that Kingdom back into its original path of substantive indirect rule as well as conceptual Indirect Rule. What precise effect the succession of the new Kabaka in 1939 had on policy is not known, but it may be surmised that the favorable impression he made on the Governors of the time predisposed them to a further return to Indirect Rule in Buganda. As for the momentous conflict over the remarriage of the Kabaka's mother in 1941, this may have hardened the Protectorate's policy of non-interference in the Kingdom's internal disputes. If it

did, the practice was abandoned in the matter of the compulsory acquisition of land two and three years later, for the British authorities brought considerable pressure to bear--unsuccessfully for the time being--to have its objectives realized. (It was not until after the 1945 riots and the almost wholesale replacement of Buganda's official heirarchy at the senior levels that the law was enacted, and even then the following morning the British-selected Katikiro was assassinated.)

How did events and issues affect the policy toward the territory's central institutions? In most cases the effect was only quite indirect. For example, the events which were factors in policies restricting the growth of a large white settler community contributed in a roundabout way to the political fact that non-African unofficial elements in Uganda's Legislative Council did not have the position of entrenched power the Kenya settlers had in their Council. For had such a community been allowed to form in Uganda, it inevitably would have brought much stronger pressures to bear on the Protectorate Government for increased and elective representation. Further, it is very likely that the British authorities would have been unable or unwilling to resist such demands completely. (However, the official response might well have been less accommodating than it was in Kenya, owing to the existence in Uganda of the Kingdom of Buganda, a political entity such as was absent from the Kenya situation.)

As for more direct consequences for policy toward the central institutions, the federation issue, and the events contributing to it, are believed to have hardened Baganda opposition to participation in the Legislative Council. The opposition served to complement the policy

which, during the years under review and especially at the end of the period, viewed participation as undesirable. It also served as added justification for the policy.

From the above it would appear that since most of the events and issues were themselves expressions of policies or notably conditioned by them, events and issues as a force cannot reasonably be assumed to have been a major determinant of policy. This is, however, advanced quite tentatively in view of the lesser attention given to the analysis of events and issues in the study.

IV. THE SOCIAL SITUATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE--1944

The force which has not yet been given adequate attention in the study is that designated as the social situation and social change. To limit the scope of the analysis, it has been defined as relating to the social groups existing in a society, to their respective positions, and to trends and pressures for change resulting from the groups' interactions with each other, as these have been affected by the rest of the five forces.

Given sufficient data, a social situation may be analyzed for any given point in time; it provides the context and some of the limiting conditions for developments of the moment. As indicated in the definition, social situations may also be examined in an attempt to ascertain the extent and direction of the drives for social change then present in the situation.

With specific reference to the analytical assumptions underlying the study, the social situation at a particular moment has been viewed

as largely a consequence of the past operation of all of the five major forces, including itself. It was the original intention to make an analysis of the social situation in 1905 to set the stage for the later presentation of the operation of the other forces, and then to provide a description of the situation as it existed at the end of the period. It has not proved possible to carry out the first step, for Uganda's society at that early date was still undefined, and adequate data were also not available. Attention is directed below to the situation and the drives for change in it as they existed at the end of 1944. The aim is to show in part how they evolved from the effects of different aspects of the forces on one another. In this manner some of the many threads in the developing scene through the four decades can be drawn together, setting the political changes in the broader Uganda perspective. The material may also serve coincidentally as an aid in the understanding of the subsequent dynamic decade of political change, which was catalyzed initially by the 1945 disturbances shortly after the end of the period under review.

Following a brief and necessarily simplified description of the situation and the drives for change in it at the end of 1944,¹ there are provided comments on the role played by the various forces fashioning the elements of change, with special attention to British policy in its different aspects.

¹Whereas the discussions in the prior sections of the chapter are based on material documented in earlier chapters, the description of the social situation is based on additional data as well. Citations are therefore furnished as appropriate.

The Situation

At the end of the four decades there were in Uganda three politically significant racial groups--the Africans, the Europeans, and the Asians. The sub-groups within the first two of these were likewise of importance.

Using the 1948 Census figures as the most reliable indices relative to 1944, of the almost five millions living in Uganda, over ninety-nine per cent were Africans. The Europeans numbered 3,400 and the Asians 37,500.

The major racial divisions were paralleled, and reinforced, by corresponding social divisions. It is this fact which made the racial differences stand out, which increased their relevance to the social situation and to the political situation as a facet of it. For, although there were exceptions, there was a pronounced correlation between racial origin and social characteristics.

In wealth, the Europeans were rich, the Africans were almost all poor, and the Asians' income was in between. There was a like gradation in education. In addition, Europeans, and to a lesser extent Asians, were almost always in a position of authority over Africans, whereas the obverse was rare.

These social facts constituted in turn an "index of situation" because, associated as they were with the distinctive racial origins, they largely determined the relationships between individuals. It was assumed, for example, that an African entering a shop run by a non-African would be poor and would speak little or no English. The consequence of such a societal pattern was that the usual scheme of

social rank was "Europeans on top, Asians in the middle, and Africans below." The amount of "overlap" in the social class system was limited, and perhaps might be described as just sufficient to point up the major differentiations in the system. The latter were heightened by certain practices making for racial segregation--legal and quasi-legal discriminations, less marked in Uganda than in Kenya and Tanganyika though still pervasive; and separation in many activities of life, such as schools, hospitals, businesses, trade unions, and residential areas.¹

As has been set forth in earlier chapters,² the above racial divisions were to be found also in the economic system of the Protectorate. Africans were the primary producers of the cash crops on which the country's prosperity depended. The Asians were the artisans and they also dominated the retail trade. Along with a few Europeans, they in effect monopolized the main industry--cotton ginning and coffee curing--as well as the smaller industries, the marketing of primary produce, and the field of foreign commerce. There were practically no African entrepreneurs or managers.³

The importance of the Asian community in the territory's economy did not carry over proportionately into political affairs. They held no

¹With reference to the three preceding paragraphs, special indebtedness is acknowledged to J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 1958), pp. 249, 262-270. The quoted material in the third paragraph appeared on the last of the cited pages.

²Chapters IV and V.

³See, for example, Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Northwestern University African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 91-92.

senior positions in the Administration. As long as their economic interests were not threatened, they tended to defer to the European official and unofficial groups, generally restricting their role to one of support of these groups when requested. They regarded themselves and were regarded by the Europeans as loyal British subjects,¹ though the impression is that they were looked upon by the Europeans as second-class subjects. The restricted political role of the Asians may be attributed in part to their overriding concern with economic as contrasted to political interests. They wanted to live--and profit--and let live. Another factor undoubtedly was the great ethnic and linguistic diversity of the sub-groups making up the Asian racial group as a whole.²

With respect to the European community, their political role was the leading one of the three racial groups in terms of power and authority. Europeans--almost exclusively Britishers--occupied all the top posts in every department of Government. The largest single occupational sub-group among the Europeans according to the 1948 Census were those in Government service--over 700 in direct employment out of the total European population of 3,400. The next largest group was one of over 500 composed of missionaries, including their lay workers. Industry, trade and commerce, and the professions together accounted for

¹Governor Dundas has described a visit to Mbale in the Eastern Province during World War II, when, at a large reception following the award of a British Empire honor (the M.B.E.) to a prominent Indian businessman, a sizable collection for the Red Cross materialized. He added: "I felt it would be profitable to travel around the country with a sackful of M.B.E.'s." Sir Charles Dundas, African Crossroads (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1955), p. 223.

²These were set forth in Chapter II.

the bulk of the remainder, with almost ¹800.

The European community was not characterized by the ethnic and linguistic diversities of the Asian population, and at the local level particularly there tended to be a social cohesiveness uniting Europeans of different occupations and interests. This expressed itself "in a tradition of solidarity and political unity," which probably extended in some measure to the territorial level.² There were obviously conflicts between the three major European sub-groups--the officials, the missionaries, and the businessmen. Some of these have been mentioned throughout the study. However, the sub-groups were much more united in outlook than either the Asians or the Africans. The Europeans' superior social status and the authoritative political role of the official Europeans undoubtedly were factors in the greater unity, just as was their common cultural background.

The immense range of variations in the economic, cultural, and political facts of life of the numerous tribes making up the African population have been presented elsewhere in detail.³ Just as the Europeans were pre-eminent among the three racial divisions, so were the Baganda pre-eminent among the tribes. In addition, the Baganda were numerically the largest of the African tribal groups.

With few exceptions the different African ethnic groups were not

¹Not included in the figures for the sub-groups were children and unemployed housewives. For all Europeans, these totaled 1,072. Goldthorpe, Outlines . . ., p. 136. See also Chapter II.

²Goldthorpe, Outlines . . ., p. 144, and also p. 140.

³Chapters II, III, and IV.

intermingled. The three or four major linguistic-cultural groupings were located in territorially distinct regions of the country, and each indigenous tribe within the major groupings likewise occupied a separate geographical area, usually with its own local governmental institutions as part of the Protectorate's administrative organization.

With the withdrawal in the 1920's of most of the Baganda Agents of British administration from the tribal areas where they had been used, social interaction among the African population appreciably lessened. Links and ties between tribes were not much greater in 1944, if at all, than in the pre-1930 period of British rule. They were confined to those which resulted from the presence of a small number of Africans in the Protectorate's central administrative service who were transferred around the country; to the quite limited enrollment of Africans of other tribes in the schools located in Buganda, including Makerere College; and to the common religious affiliations built up by the territorial penetration of Protestant and Catholic missionaries.

In contrast, a number of factors tended to limit intercommunication. As mentioned above, the many Baganda Agents used in the early years in other areas by the British were mostly withdrawn by the 1930's. Baganda similarly used by missionaries were gradually replaced by local converts. In that decade the peoples in the non-Buganda areas were regarded by the Government less and less as a source of temporary migrant labor within Buganda. Some of them began to stay home to farm their own plots. The Baganda farmers themselves came to employ increasing numbers of immigrant workers from outside Uganda, notably the Banyarunda. Excepting the Protectorate Administration itself and the

Christian missions, there were no important common politico-social institutions cutting across the tribal boundaries; and the Europeans manning these two types of institutions tended to be concerned first and foremost with the interests and problems of the particular tribes to which they were assigned. The effect of service by Africans of different tribes in common military organizations during World War II had not been felt by the end of 1944 in the respective home areas.¹

In conclusion, the African population of Uganda viewed as a whole exhibited none of the characteristics which might have contributed to its unity, other than its inclusion within a common boundary. The European community and even the Asian community were much more cohesive. Even on issues which might have aroused a temporary measure of intertribal African solidarity, such as the land or the federation issues, the Baganda were the vocal spokesmen, and many areas of the country were hardly heard from, if at all.

What were the important group differentiations and relationships within the individual tribes? It is not possible to state these with any real accuracy except for the Baganda. The remarks which follow may well apply also to other tribes. No evidence to the contrary has come to light, and general impressions support a presumption of their applicability, though to a less extensive degree.

¹There is good reason to believe that the general impact even after the demobilization of African servicemen was limited, the men quietly slipping back into village life. Uganda Protectorate, Annual Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western Province, for the Period 1939-1946 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1949), pp. 35, 54, 70. Cited hereafter as UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946.

New social divisions manifested themselves in Buganda as a result of alien contact and influence. There came to be a general distinction between those who were Christians and those who were not, with the former in a position of greater social status. Since the Christians had better educational chances through mission schools, the division was accentuated. For there was also a wide social gap between the educated and the illiterate. Usually corresponding to this was a differentiation between richer and poorer. The four-decade period saw a widening of such gaps, for which traditional clan and other kin ties were unable to compensate. Together with the further split between Protestants and Catholics, the 1944 social divisions were considerably greater than in the more integrated Buganda society of the nineteenth century.¹

There was another, decidedly political division which, if not peculiar just to Buganda, was only readily evident there. A factional conflict had grown up between two sets of the Buganda Government's senior Western-educated chiefs. Although it may be maintained as some have that the division reflected in reality a purely personal struggle for power,² the fact remains that the larger faction, which had the support of the great majority of the people, represented a group which had become progressively disenchanted with certain features of British

¹E. M. K. Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African (Africa's Own Library, No. 14; London: United Society for Christian Literature, 1945), pp. 51-52, 63; John V. Taylor, The Growth of the Church in Buganda (World Mission Studies; London: SCM Press Ltd, 1958), p. 90.

²S. Joshua L. Zake, Reform in Uganda (n.p.: Sapoba Bookshop Press, [1954]), pp. 7-8; Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), pp. 223, 225.

overrule. The other smaller group of chiefs were widely regarded as British lackeys, somewhat unjustly it would seem. They were, however, less traditionally oriented and more ready to follow the lead of the Protectorate authorities, who not unnaturally supported them in their positions of authority.¹ The young, missionary-reared Kabaka was aligned with the latter group and as a consequence was not very popular with his people.²

The Pressures for Change

Inherent in any social situation at a given point in time are pressures for change. They may be many or few, deep-rooted or superficial, intense or languid, explicit or implicit. They may be more or less susceptible to satisfactory, nonviolent accommodation and resolution, to the extent that there are mechanisms within the social and political system adequate to deal with them. The concern here is with those marked trends and pressures for change which stemmed from the interaction of the five forces and from group interactions, and which the range of institutions at the time was ill-equipped to handle.

In Uganda at the end of 1944 such pressures were limited. They

¹A previously documented exception was the ultimate lack of support of the pro-British Katikiro, Nsibirwa, who was forced by the larger faction of chiefs to resign over the remarriage of the Kabaka's mother. He was replaced by Wamala, the anti-British leader of the opposing faction. Brought back into power by the British after the 1945 disturbances, Nsibirwa was assassinated the morning after he had pushed the land acquisition bill through a largely new Lukiko.

²See especially E. M. K. Mulira, Troubled Uganda (Colonial Controversy Series, No. 6; London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1950), p. 21; Colin Legum, Must We Lose Africa? (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1954), p. 61; Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 222-225.

were restricted in the first place territorially to one region--Buganda. They were further restricted to one racial group--the Africans of the Baganda tribe. The most important of them were generated by the following discontented groups: the majority faction of Baganda chiefs¹ who wanted a greater measure of personal power, less British direction of their Kingdom's affairs, and a slower rate of change from the traditional way of life; another numerically small group, also Western-educated, but without occupations sufficiently satisfying to them; and the larger but not proportionately great number of the tribe's population who were almost out of temper because of the grievous effects which the wartime controls were having on their struggle to live. The first group was receiving support in its anti-British stand from the generally antagonistic and distrustful attitude toward the Protectorate authorities which many of the mass of the Baganda shared.

The Role of the Five Forces

How were these pressures for change built up? How did the five forces, singled out for emphasis here, operate to produce the drives for change indicated above? And why were others not produced as well? The aim is to show, for the African groups, that the most important force was alien contact and influence which, by reason of its territorial variations, limited pressures for change outside of Buganda and built up what relatively few pressures existed in that Kingdom in 1944; but that

¹These were led by the Katikiro, Wamala, and by a core of fourteen of the twenty senior (county) chiefs. Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 23, 25, 35-36.

in the last analysis British policy in its different aspects was the major factor in the evolution of this general situation, operating directly and indirectly to fashion it; and that policy was also the main factor in the absence of institutional mechanisms adequate to deal with such pressures. For the non-African groups, the intention is to indicate more briefly that British policy was the most instrumental factor in the relative absence of pressures for change in the European and Asian communities.

The African groups. For the African groups the most direct and deep-rooted causal factor among the five forces analyzed was that of alien contact and influence, or more specifically, the varying impact of that force. But this conclusion oversimplifies the explanation, for alien contact and influence was in turn subjected to important conditioning by the other forces.

In the context of a discussion of pressures for change in social situations, the most significant features of alien contact and influence in Uganda were the following: the development of a peasant-based cash crop money economy to supplement and in part replace a subsistence economy; the non-African monopoly of the phases of the economy other than primary-production; the conversion of about one third of the African population from paganism to the rivalrous Catholic and Protestant versions of the Christian faith, with the former gaining the greater number of adherents; and the introduction of Western education by missionaries in contrast to the customary informal education in traditional history and beliefs assimilated by children primarily from their kin.

Two of these may be discounted as not very pertinent to the question of pressures for change in the situation as of the end of 1944. Up to that time the exclusive control by non-Africans of processing and marketing of cash crops and of trade and private finance had not, as far as can be determined, generated any appreciable discontent among the African population. What relatively little dissatisfaction had materialized was confined mostly to Buganda. It was not until after 1945 that it gradually grew in Buganda to moderate proportions. These later increased, to constitute one of the main factors in the 1949 disturbances.

The religious conversion of Africans to Christianity is also considered of lesser relevance. Its direct effects were limited to the intratribal conflicts between the Protestant-Catholic groups. Though not lacking in intensity in certain areas, these were for the most part susceptible of accommodation through the existing political institutions. There were other consequences of the change in religious beliefs but they were more indirect--for example, the reinforcement which the change provided to the increased emphasis on economic individualism.

Economic individualism was given impetus by the initiation and continued development of production of cash crops by African producers. The stress was on individual as opposed to collective efforts and rewards, and there was a consequent challenge to the traditional way of life and its institutional patterns of authority and kinship. A like threat to the old order, and thus a factor in pressures for social change, was the mission-operated school system. For it disseminated multiple Western ideas and values. Many of these were either new

concepts or considerable variations on the traditional beliefs about a desirable social order. Because Christianity and especially education were soon accepted by most Africans as automatically conferring superior social status and often also as prerequisites for attainment of superior political rank, the potential which these features of alien contact had for generating widespread pressures for social change was enormous.

But what in fact happened? The duration and intensity of alien contact varied throughout the country. It was marked in Buganda. It declined in various degrees in the rest of the Protectorate, until in some of the more distant (and traditionally less centralized) tribal areas such as Acholi it was relatively quite limited. Cash crop production was minimal and mission schools were few, compared to Buganda. Therefore, the pressures for social change in the outlying areas had not yet built up by 1944.

What of Buganda? It would seem to follow logically that the impact of alien contact and influence would have been very considerable by reason of its longer duration and greater intensity. However, it has been shown that the Baganda traditional social system and its political system generally adapted to the new forces of change, internalizing them.

There were exceptions to the generalization, and these were the pressures listed in the preceding section. The dissatisfaction of the majority of the Baganda senior chiefs was in part a reflection of their conviction that the traditional features of life should not give way to a blind, unquestioning acceptance of Westernization; that more of the old customs and ways should be preserved as better than some of the new,

seemingly civilized ways.¹ As for the small group of discontented Western-educated Baganda, the Kingdom's political system had been unable to absorb all the products of the more extensive mission schools in Buganda. Nor had sufficient places for them been found in the growing ranks of Africans in the lower echelons of the Protectorate's central or departmental administrative organizations. Lastly, although the wage labor force in Uganda was not large, what there was grouped itself mainly at the country's economic center in Buganda. It was this group which suffered most from the wartime black market, and which at the same time was newly cognizant of strike actions resorted to by laboring groups in other countries to redress grievances. (It was a strike of these workers in January 1945 which provided the immediate catalyst for the disturbances of that month.)

It may be concluded from the foregoing that the factor contributing most to the existence of strong African pressures for social change in Buganda and their relative absence elsewhere was the force of alien contact and influence; or, more specifically, the variation in the extent of economic² and social development in the different areas of the

¹One of the most educated Christians of the Baganda--perhaps their leading intellectual--wrote in a similar vein at about that time, and probably from a personally more disinterested position than that of the chiefs referred to above. Mulira, Thoughts of a Young African, p. 53. The pamphlet provides--pp. 41-64--an excellent analysis of the impact of alien forces on Baganda traditional values, all the more valuable because the writer grew up as a member of a leading Buganda family.

²In a special study of four tribal areas, the earliest available figures--for 1949--show the following disparities in Africans' estimated cash income from sales of their own produce and from employment by non-Africans or by Government, the figures representing totals for all Africans in the respective tribal areas and being expressed in thousands

Protectorate.

Yet earlier it was mentioned that the above force was subjected to important conditioning by the other forces. In a prior section of this chapter--and in more detail in Chapter V--it was explained how the Protectorate Government's economic and social development policies were the major factors determining the extent of the variations in alien contact and influence.

As for the traditional African political systems, existing as elements of the social situation at the advent of British rule in the areas, they also played a part in the force of alien contact and influence. As indicated before in the chapter, where there was a centralized structure of traditional political authority and cooperative native leaders, as in Buganda, both Government and mission economic and social development activity could be carried out with much more rewarding success than where these conditions did not obtain. Granted, the preservation or displacement of the Baganda traditional system was a

of pounds sterling: Buganda--6,183; Teso--1,516; Acholi--402; and Kigezi--222. Data for income per head, obtained by dividing the preceding figures by the population of the respective tribes in 1948, was provided for 1949 as follows, in shillings: Baganda--148; Iteso--66; Acholi--38; Bakiga--16. The data were qualified as rough approximations due to several limiting factors, but it was stated that adjustments would most likely increase the disparity between the Baganda and the other tribes. W. Elkan, "Regional Disparities in the Incidence of Taxation in Uganda," Review of Economic Studies, XXVI (No. 2 [February, 1959]), 136-137, 144-145. (Reprint.)

Other relevant though later data on the variations is provided by the same author in W. Elkan, An African Labour Force: Two Case Studies in East African Factory Employment (East African Studies, No. 7; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1956), pp. 2-3; and in Walter Elkan, "Central and Local Taxes on Africans in Uganda," Public Finance, XIII (No. 4, 1958), 318 (Off-print [reprint]).

discretionary matter of British native administration policy. But the latter elected to preserve the traditional system in essence, so that it lost little of its effectiveness in facilitating development.

With respect to the other tribes, the traditional polities or aspects of them were preserved where feasible. In certain cases, however, tribal authority was so diffused and uncentralized that for this and sometimes other reasons the traditional aspects of the polities were displaced, and new centralized systems were introduced in their stead. The latter often had not been accepted by the people as their own by 1944. The new systems therefore tended to render these tribes even in the later years less rewarding human material for development than the Baganda.

The conclusions with respect to the role of the traditional African political systems in the force of alien contact and influence, as it shaped pressures for change in the social situation, may be stated as follows. In the case of Buganda its system represented a significant factor; but also important as a major determinant was the British preference to preserve it. As for the tribes whose polities were at the other extreme of both traditional political organization and directness of rule in Uganda, on the whole the British authorities would seem to have had little practicable alternative than to introduce new systems of some sort. Therefore, in such instances--as, for example, the Acholi--the role of the traditional polities in determining the impact of the force of alien contact and influence was more pervasive than in Buganda, where native administration policy preference played a part. It should be noted that the above conclusions are tentative. They derive not from

an intensive study of these phenomena in Uganda but rather from brief surveys as well as from impressions gained in the course of the collection of more directly relevant data.

What was the role of the events and issues, reviewed earlier in the chapter, in conditioning the force of alien contact and influence? It does not seem to have been a major one for several reasons. Some of the events were of little significance directly or indirectly to the force; others were of significance, but represented either expressions of British policy or factors influencing the latter.¹

To summarize the preceding analysis of the role of the different forces in molding the limited pressures for change among the African groups, the most direct and deep-rooted causal factor for the existence of the relatively few drives for change in Buganda and the absence of others there and elsewhere was the force of alien contact and influence. Particularly pertinent were the variations in impact of certain of the economic and sociological features of the force--the new cash crop economy and Western education. However, the major factor directly determining the variations was British policy in the field of economic and social development. Indirectly, British native administration

¹Of little significance to the variations in extent and nature of alien contact and influence was the constitution of the Executive and Legislative Councils in 1921, for example. Of some significance but representing expressions of policy were the extensions of British administration to the outlying areas at dates appreciably later than the assumption of British rule over Buganda.

Also of significance but representing an event influencing British policy was the world-wide depression of the early 1930's. It caused the Protectorate to retrench development of social services. The impact of alien contact and influence and therefore the pressures for change in 1944 can be assumed to have been much less, especially in the outlying districts, than would have otherwise been the case had such retrenchment not occurred.

policy in Buganda, by preserving the organized traditional political system, contributed further to the variations. Working from more uncertain data, it was concluded on the other hand that the unorganized traditional polities in the outlying districts were primarily responsible for the endemic factors there which inhibited development. British native administration policy, which had no feasible alternative, was not an important factor in those areas in the context of the present discussion. As for events and issues, those which were relevant to the variations in alien contact and influence were considered to have represented mainly instances of British policies or factors occasioning them.

The conclusion, therefore, is that although alien contact and influence was the major force which acted to form the pressures for social change, it was in turn determined directly and indirectly in the largest measure by various British policies. An exception was the important role of the traditional polities in the outlying areas, judged however to have been outweighed by the more directly relevant British social and economic development policies.

It remains to note, with regard to pressures for change in Buganda, that certain of the other forces operated also directly--as contrasted to operating indirectly through the major force of alien contact and influence--to build up the pressures. These were British policy in other of its aspects; and the two principal issues, in which British policy again played the crucial role.

British policy toward Buganda after 1938 assumed a hands-off attitude toward the Kingdom's internal political affairs and, among

other developments, the factional rivalry between the Baganda chiefs was allowed to worsen. In 1944 the reorganization of Buganda-British relationships to accord more with the spirit of the 1900 Agreement effected a withdrawal of British administrative officers from close supervision of the Kingdom's affairs.¹

One of the consequences of the withdrawal was the loss of touch by the Protectorate Government with the pulse of popular opinion. More directly relevant was the greater freedom of action of the chiefs and thus the greater political power given to the majority, anti-British faction of chiefs. Therefore, at the same time that channels of communication were partially cut, rendering the Protectorate authorities less fully aware of the existence of discontented elements, the ease with which the British could deal with difficulties which might arise was compromised.² Also, it would appear that the Baganda chiefs--in

¹It should be noted that with World War II considerable additional burden was placed upon the Protectorate-wide British administration by reason of the great increase in wartime controls. But at the same time the staff to administer the country was depleted and there was much less continuity in the various posts. Of the consequences, development largely ground to a standstill, law and order were more frequently infringed, and there were severe administrative breakdowns at times. Yet apparently the Protectorate authorities were for the most part able to cope with the difficult conditions outside of Buganda. In Buganda, the consequences can be assumed to have intensified the discontent which stemmed from the other causes. An indication that the Baganda were not the loyal British subjects they have been sometimes made out to be is furnished by the hard job the Regents had in persuading the people to "volunteer" for military service; in the number of Baganda deserters (3,000); and in the problems British army officers experienced with these people because of the treatment of them as primitives in the early war years. Dundas, African Crossroads, p. 215; UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946, pp. 1-2, 5-6, 39, 65-66, 69; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 21-23.

²The official commissions appointed to investigate the 1945 and the 1949 disturbances placed the blame for the former very heavily on

office with British approval, it should be remembered--were not the most competent men who could have been selected. Further, that in their struggle for personal power they had lost both contact with their people and any real desire to improve the latter's well-being.¹ In these ways British policy set the stage for the difficulties which arose shortly after the end of 1944.

There is, however, evidence that the Protectorate Government was aware of discontent among some of the educated Baganda and perhaps also among the low-income group, and that preliminary steps were taken to induce the Buganda Government to give some of these elements representation in the Lukiko. The Governor announced to that body in the fall of 1944 that he had advised the Kabaka to consider seriously a broadened Lukiko composition to give representation to peasants and professional Baganda, and to see that the most capable men were appointed as ministers and chiefs without discrimination against the more highly educated.²

Yet the advice was not an instruction. It could not have been,

the above factors and on the 1944 reorganization, almost to the exclusion of the more basic causes. See Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Uganda during April, 1949 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1950), pp. 12-13. A later Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, has written that the 1945 disturbances "were caused by frustrated and discontented elements operating in an atmosphere of economic grievances." Cohen, p. 35. Another source stresses that the authorities were aware of the sufferings of the low-income groups. Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 216-217.

¹Ingham, The Making . . ., pp. 224-225; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, pp. 24, 31, 34.

²Ingham, The Making . . ., p. 224; Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 24.

given the tenor of British policy toward Buganda at the time. And while the Governor was on the one hand urging the Baganda to take steps to accommodate discontented elements, he and his Government were adding fuel to the fire, so to speak, with the policies on the two burning political issues. Official support had been markedly increasing for federation of East Africa, a virtual anathema to the Baganda; and the British authorities had pushed their policy of compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes to the point of further stimulating the general Baganda antagonism and distrust, on the rise since the mid-1920's.¹

With respect, then, to the causal factors for the pressures for change which had been built up in Buganda by 1944, the conclusion is that British policy in most of its aspects operated on the social situation indirectly through its determinative effect on the major force of alien contact and influence, directly through its native administration policy, and indirectly as fuel for the two principal issues; and that in these ways British policy was the most important single force of the five in casting the pressures in their 1944 form. For various reasons set forth in this chapter and in the analysis of the Protectorate's institutions in Chapter VII, largely because of British policies there were no satisfactory institutional mechanisms to resolve such conflicts as were reflected by the above pressures for change.

¹Mulira has written that the Apolo Kagwa affair in 1926 and the transfer of Rudolf Province the same year, with the accompanying fear of domination by the Kenya settlers, added considerably to the Baganda distrust of the British; and that confidence in the latter at that point "went and went for good. In its place was now substituted suspicion of whatever the British tried to do and fear of what might come next." Mulira, Troubled Uganda, p. 19.

The non-African groups. The preceding discussion has dealt with the presence and absence among the African population in 1944 of marked trends and pressures for change which the range of institutions of the time were ill-equipped to handle. What of the non-African groups? Why did no such drives for change exist in their case; how did the forces interact to produce this characteristic of the social situation?

The answer, deduced from a review of the forces, is quite simple. These groups were reasonably satisfied with their lot--with, it might be phrased, their relative share in the country's economic prosperity. They had representation in the Legislative Council. Although they wanted more, so the non-African unofficial members could lighten their increasingly heavy burden in that body, the existing situation gave them the opportunity to bring their point of view effectively to the Government's attention. Further, there is no reason to believe that they harbored any thought of acting other than along constitutional lines, for they were acculturated in the latter tradition.

Of the five forces contributing to this state of affairs, British policy was the most instrumental, for reasons explained previously.¹

A summary assessment. The general conclusion to be drawn from the above analyses is as follows--the weight of the evidence indicates that British policy in its various aspects was the most important of the forces in shaping the 1944 social situation and the extent and nature of the pressures for change which existed in it. Policy acted directly to

¹See Chapters V and VII.

fashion these, as well as indirectly through its effects on the other forces molding the 1944 situation and its drives for change.

It is not possible to assess in detail the 1944 relative importance of the remaining forces one to the other without extending the discussion unduly, for numerous different assumptions as to what was "given" would have to be posited to explore the diverse possible interpretations. But a distinction, suggested by James Coleman,¹ may be made between predisposing and precipitant factors leading to the evolution of the 1944 situation. If British policy is excluded, the most important of the former type may be considered to be the traditional African political systems and polities, with events and issues the most important of the precipitant type. Alien contact and influence would fall into both categories, but at a lesser level of importance.

The salient fact is not, however, the relative ranking of the non-policy forces. Rather it is the fact that in manifold ways these different forces in their various aspects have interacted with British policy and each other to the extent that little of what happened in Uganda in the 1905-1945 period could be described as independently determined. By showing this, the preceding discussion has served to provide a broader and more meaningful perspective for the conclusions and interpretations which follow. Additional depth can thus be given to the specific question of the role of British policy in shaping

¹James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 418.

political change in Uganda and to other related matters of interest and significance.

CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Political change, a widely varying phenomenon throughout the world, has been taking place in Africa since World War II to an extent often bewildering to outsiders as well as to the people there. The forces shaping the different scope, degree, and nature of the changes most frequently have varied from country to country and within each one, as well as from year to year. Many of the forces are new to the African scene but many stem from the past.

In the conviction that more recent changes cannot be adequately understood without reference to what has gone before, attention has been directed in this study to the period prior to the end of World War II. Five forces, considered significant in the shaping or molding of political change in the greater part of Africa during most of the colonial era, have been singled out for analysis. They are: the traditional African political systems; colonial policy; alien contact and influence; events and issues; and the social situation and social change. Taking Uganda as a case study and placing the emphasis on the second of the forces, the aim has been to explain the role of British policy, in its interactions with the other four forces, in shaping the extent of political change during the period 1905-1945. The investigation has been further focused on change in the local, tribal and the central, territorial governmental institutions of the Protectorate.

The study has been based almost entirely on source material

collected in the United States in 1957, together with special studies of Uganda which had become available through the end of 1959. The results are, therefore, subject to the qualification that later publications may reveal new evidence which would necessitate revisions. It is not expected, however, that this would prove to be the case with regard to the crucial analysis of the Baganda traditional political system, for which sources were authoritative; nor for the general outlines of British policy, which, despite the often inhibiting absence of detailed official documentation, are considered to be clear from the sources consulted.

Conclusions reached with regard to the validity of the thesis are summarized below. But the inquiry, by the very nature of the subject, brought to light other findings of both interest and significance. Often tentative because of their lesser documentation, they are presented in a number of cases in the form of hypotheses which may be tested for their applicability to other areas and times in Africa. A critique of policy in Uganda is added. It should inter alia facilitate independent appraisals of the degree of success in attaining the desired goal of objectivity throughout the presentation.

I. THE THESIS AND HYPOTHESES

As stated in the Introduction, the thesis was firstly, that British native administration policy was the most important force in shaping the extensive political change in the local, tribal institutions in the areas of decidedly direct rule; and that it was one of the two most important forces shaping the relatively limited change in the traditional political institutions in the area of indirect rule. And

secondly, that these native administration policies, together with economic and social development policies and policies toward the central institutions, all operated on the whole, as the most important of the five forces, to shape the limited extent of political change in the latter institutions.

Change in Local, Tribal Political Institutions

With regard to the first part of the thesis relating to native administration policy, it was found that although Protectorate officials viewed their policy for the entire territory as the application of the classic British concept of Indirect Rule, in fact the policy could not actually be described as substantively indirect except for one area--the Kingdom of Buganda. Even in that instance, it was concluded that there was in reality an interim period of direct rule in Buganda.

In other areas rule was direct throughout the four decades, but it was clear that in some places it was much more direct than in others, and that the areas could be considered as being on a continuum of direct rule. The Acholi, who along with the Baganda were given intensive study, were determined to have been ruled directly to a decided degree. The other ten main indigenous tribes of Uganda, accorded for the most part considerably less detailed attention, were judged probably to be on the continuum in the following approximate order of increasing directness of rule: the peoples of the three smaller Kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole to Buganda's west; followed by the Basoga to Buganda's east; with the remaining peoples (the Bagisu, Karamojong, Bakiga, Iteso, Lugbara, and Lango), largely to the north, administered like the Acholi

by the most pronounced form of direct rule in Uganda.

The areas of decidedly direct rule. It was ascertained that in Acholi, change in the traditional political system was extensive. In fact, an aspect by aspect analysis of the system showed that by 1945 it had disappeared in every essential respect and had been replaced by a new, non-traditional system which was largely a creation of British policies of native administration. A brief look at the other areas of direct rule lent support to the broader but more tentative conclusion that, pending further evidence to the contrary, the experience in Acholi was duplicated in the six tribal areas where there was also decidedly direct rule. Further, that as the rule became progressively less direct in Busoga and the three smaller Kingdoms, change in the traditional political institutions in turn became less extensive.

That British native administration policy was the foremost force bringing about the displacement of the Acholi traditional system, which had been characterized by marked diffusion of political authority in contrast to that of Buganda, was also confirmed. For, although alien contact and influence played a role, largely because of other British policies it was a limited one by reason of its later and more restricted incidence and impact in Acholi than in Buganda, to cite the other extreme. The same judgment appeared to apply for the other areas of pronounced direct rule, with the qualification that some of them-- notably Teso and Bugisu--had experienced a considerably greater impact from alien contact and influence than Acholi, though still much smaller than Buganda. Therefore, in such instances alien contact and influence probably played a role larger than in Acholi, though still less than the

role of native administration policy. In any event, since British social and economic development policies constituted the major factor conditioning the force of alien contact and influence, British policy considered as a whole remained indisputably the principal force behind the extensive changes in the traditional political institutions in the areas of decidedly direct rule.

The indirect rule area. In contrast to the above areas, assessments as of 1905 and 1944 of the local, tribal political institutions for governing the African population in Buganda revealed that change was relatively limited in extent compared, for example, to developments in Acholi.

The politically significant changes which did occur were not such as to change the system as a whole in its essentials nor to alter its basically traditional nature. Viewing the changes against the aspects of the system which did not change, differences in late 1944 were limited in extent, and they were more in the sense of modifications rather than substitutions. For, as is overwhelmingly supported by scholarly authorities in the field of study of Buganda, the political system of its people adapted itself to the forces of change; it absorbed changes, internalizing for the most part the varied new pressures instead of resisting them.

What was the role of British policy in shaping the relatively limited extent of change and in the evolution of those changes which differentiated the late 1944 system from that in 1905?

British native administration policy played a general, sustained role in keeping the differences between the 1905 and 1944 systems to a

low extent. It was a vital role. Except for an interim period of interference, far from undermining or displacing traditional political authority, the British policy of indirect rule in its very nature supported such authority. The broad effect was to ensure the survival of the traditional political system as a composite, integral system. It retained its full traditional identity despite its considerable adaptation. Not only that, but its pre-eminence among the other tribal polities continued unchallenged. In some ways it increased, for its resources in terms of material wealth and human skills had been augmented much more than those of the other tribes, largely as a consequence of British social and economic development policies.

If policy was an important element in restricting the extent of political change, what was its role in those changes which did occur? Constituting as it did a deliberate policy as of the late 1930's of non-responsibility for settlement of internal Buganda political quarrels, British native administration policy was a positively permissive factor in the increase of institutional conflict. For although it neither encouraged nor resolved the conflicts, it consciously allowed them to grow and act themselves out.

As for the conflicts which developed between membership groups, these also were not the subject of decisive British action to ameliorate them through native administration policy. Yet other policies, notably those affecting economic and social development and the federation and land-acquisition issues, had had a hand in forming the new membership groups and in intensifying the conflict between them and other groups.

As a partial answer to the role of British policy in shaping the

limited extent of change in Buganda it may, therefore, be stated that British native administration policy, and other British policies directly and indirectly, were very instrumental in fashioning both the extent of change and the particular changes which differentiated the late 1944 system from that of 1905.

However, that is not the whole answer. The salient point of the rest of the explanation is to be found in the consideration of why alien contact and influence did not produce more social and political strains in Buganda. The finding was that the traditional political system proved able to adapt itself to accommodate them.

The Baganda system may also be considered as having shaped the limited extent of change in other ways. To describe how this was so it is necessary to return to the question of British native administration policy for Uganda as a whole, and to relate it to the general British policy approach in Africa in this field.

It was stated that the British officials in the Protectorate viewed their policy for the entire territory as the application of the classic concept of Indirect Rule. This reflected a preference in Uganda to administer the tribal populations locally through established, centralized, traditional authorities. For where these existed and their recognized leaders were cooperative, it was an easier, more effective, and less costly method of rule. In Buganda the requisite conditions existed as of 1905,¹ and the traditional political system was preserved

¹They existed even some eight years previous, with the defeat of Kabaka Mwanga, the installation of his infant son as successor, and the assumption of power by a pro-British oligarchy of Christian chiefs.

by the British, who ruled through its structure.

In view of the above, can the Buganda traditional political system as it existed in late 1944 logically be considered as a force in and of itself shaping the limited extent of change in itself; or must it be viewed merely as a consequence, a product, of the policy which enabled it to survive? The answer is open to different interpretations, depending upon the assumptions made about what is "given" in the situation. If it is assumed that the British preference for Indirect Rule is given, then the Buganda political system may be regarded as a force in its own right, for its existence determined specific British policy toward it.

Is it reasonable to assume the British preference for Indirect Rule as given? Broadening the context to British policy in Africa, but excluding policies of other powers for the moment, the assumption is adjudged a reasonable one. For it was not until after World War II that the limitations of the philosophy of Indirect Rule were fully recognized and fundamental steps taken to proceed along different lines.¹ On this basis, the traditional political system of the Baganda may be viewed as one of the two important forces shaping the limited extent of political change in its traditional institutions, the other being British policy in its various aspects as set forth in preceding paragraphs.

Could the same be maintained if the context were widened to

¹Kenneth Robinson, "Colonial Issues and Policies with Special Reference to Tropical Africa," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 87-88, 90; and Lord Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 414-417.

include the policies of other colonial powers? The answer is in the negative, for some of those powers exhibited no preference for or attempt to apply concepts similar to Indirect Rule; and it would not, therefore, be reasonable to accept such a preference as "given."

Therefore, to recapitulate, that part of the thesis is considered as validated which stated that British native administration policy was one of the two most important forces shaping the relatively limited change in the traditional political institutions in the area of indirect rule, given the context of British policy in Africa. Given the broader context of colonial policy in Africa, the conclusion would be that British policy was the (one) most important force in that change.

The areas of less marked direct rule--some assumptions. In the discussion of the decidedly direct rule areas it was concluded that change was extensive in the Acholi traditional political system and that the British policy of direct rule was the most important force; and that it appeared from a more superficial look at source materials that the same was true for equally unorganized traditional political institutions in the other areas of such rule, despite the at times greater incidence of alien contact and influence. On the other hand, in the area of indirect rule the interaction of an organized and adaptable political system with a policy of indirect rule and a marked incidence of alien contact and influence resulted in limited change in the institutions for governing the tribe's population.

From the above it is evident that the content of the forces resulting in the widely different degrees of change was very disparate, and that no pattern can be discerned from which meaningful

generalizations might be drawn about cause and effect relationships. It is believed that had it been feasible to widen the scope and to study more intensively some of the tribes other than the polar examples of the Baganda and the Acholi, and especially those where British rule was less decidedly direct than in Acholi, then a somewhat more distinct pattern of the interaction of the forces might have emerged. A broader thesis could thus have been formulated and tested for its validity.

In lieu of such a procedure it must suffice to frame hypotheses based on assumptions about developments in the areas of less markedly direct rule--Busoga and the three smaller Kingdoms. It should be stressed that the assumptions are derived from impressions and not from detailed investigations.

In Busoga the traditional institutions were more organized than in the areas such as Acholi, and they proved somewhat adaptable. British rule was less decidedly direct than in Acholi. Alien contact and influence was more sustained and pervasive than anywhere but Buganda. Change in traditional institutions was less than in Acholi but more than in the three smaller Kingdoms.

In the three smaller Kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole, there were organized traditional political systems. They seemed less susceptible to adaptation on their own part than Buganda's. Rule was less direct than in Busoga but was nevertheless direct in contrast to rule in Buganda. Alien contact and influence was more limited than in Busoga and Buganda and even than in some of the decidedly direct rule areas such as Teso and Bugisu. Change in the traditional political institutions was more limited than anywhere but Buganda.

Hypotheses. From the foregoing assumptions, together with the validated conclusions for Buganda and Acholi and the assumptions for the other tribes in the areas of decidedly direct rule, the following hypotheses are posited:

1. That, as British rule ranged on a continuum from indirect to decidedly direct, political change in the traditional institutions became more extensive. And, that this correlation was paralleled by another apparent interdependence of factor variation: namely, that the traditional polities of the tribes ranged from those that were highly organized--centralized territorially, and authority otherwise concentrated--and whose leaders were cooperative;¹ to those with less organized tribal political systems,² or if highly organized, with less cooperative leaders;³ to those with progressively less organization characterizing their tribally uncentralized political institutions.⁴

Or conversely, as may reflect more accurately the cause and effect relationship; that, as the traditional polities of the tribes ranged from those that were highly organized and whose leaders were cooperative; to those with somewhat less organized tribal political systems, or if highly organized, with less cooperative leaders; to those with progressively less organization characterizing their tribally uncentralized political institutions--then British rule ranged on a

¹Buganda during most of the period.

²Toro and Ankole.

³Bunyoro up to the early 1930's.

⁴Busoga, followed by the rest of the direct rule areas.

parallel continuum from indirect to decidedly direct rule; and change in the traditional political institutions became progressively more extensive.

2. That, the force of alien contact and influence--especially mission education--correlated with the above hypotheses to the extent that as the traditional polities ranged from highly organized to the relatively unorganized, and rule from indirect to decidedly direct, there was progressively less initial contact. (The progression: Buganda, the three smaller Kingdoms, Busoga, Bugisu, and the rest.)

That, the increase in subsequent alien contact and influence was most dependent on the human and natural resources of the areas, with the extent of alien contact and influence decreasing as the resources became less. (The progression: Buganda, Busoga, Bugisu, Teso, and the rest, including the three smaller Kingdoms.) But that, as another factor, in those areas where rule ranged from indirect through to two of the decidedly direct rule tribes, and where traditional institutions had survived to a progressively lesser extent (Buganda, the three smaller Kingdoms, Busoga, Bugisu, Karamoja), as the receptivity and adaptability of the institutions and tribal leaders to alien contact and influence lessened, the increase in contact and influence lessened. (The progression: Buganda, Busoga, Ankole, Bugisu, Bunyoro and Toro, and Karamoja.)

And lastly, that, with regard to the general ability of a tribe to adapt itself to the impact of alien contact and influence and to internalize resulting pressures for social and political change, the findings are so heterogeneous for the cases where the contact has been

long or the impact fairly extensive as to preclude the formulation of hypotheses. The pronounced ability of the Baganda was a consequence both of historical factors which put into power a receptive leadership, and of aspects of its traditional political system which lent themselves to the process. The same appears to have been the case with the Basoga and Bagisu, though to a progressively lesser extent. The Iteso, on the other hand, experienced perhaps the most direct form of rule of all the tribes, with the most complete disappearance of their tribally unorganized traditional political institutions; their receptivity and adaptability to alien contact is perhaps attributable to personality traits, or perhaps even to the very thoroughness of the political changes. In Ankole there was for many years a single outstanding political leader who encouraged alien contact, but the socio-economic-political caste division of the traditional political system inhibited adaptability. In Toro failure to accept and adapt to and internalize new forces of change seems to have been a matter of lethargy; while in Bunyoro the historical factor of the Kingdom's crushing defeat and reduction in size after its early stand against European penetration probably was more material.

Change in the Central, Territorial Institutions

The second part of the thesis was that British native administration policies, together with economic and social development policies and policies toward the central institutions, all operated on the whole, as the most important of the five forces, to shape the limited extent of political change in the latter institutions.

That the change was in fact limited was confirmed--it was limited because the only significant change was the 1921 constitution of officially dominated Executive and Legislative Councils, lacking African representation.

With regard to the role of policy in shaping the limited extent of change, the findings of the study supported the validity of the thesis. For it may be concluded on grounds summarized below that, while policy exhibited no particular propensity for initiating changes in the institutions, it operated directly to resist some pressures for change. Also, policy acted indirectly to limit pressures for change and, with reference to segments of the African population, it even operated to facilitate--and in certain instances engender--opposition to specific changes.

Various policies and the response of African groups. To turn to the latter first, it was found that British policies, notably the native administration policy and the policies on the issues of federation of East Africa and compulsory land acquisition, were directly and indirectly responsible for molding Baganda opposition to mooted African representation in the Legislative Council. These, together with economic and social policies, likewise contributed greatly to the strength of the opposition as a political force to be seriously taken into account.

As indicated earlier in the conclusions concerning British native administration policy as a force shaping change in Buganda's traditional political institutions, a judgment of the role of the Buganda traditional political system itself in shaping these

developments is open to different interpretations, depending on whether the context is that of British policy in Africa or that of the policies of all colonial powers on the continent. If the context is the former, then the conclusion about the importance of policy in generating the appreciable Baganda opposition to such Legislative Council elaboration would have to be amended to include the Baganda traditional political system as a force perhaps equally important as British policy.

With regard to the other tribes, there was no evidence of requests to the Protectorate Government for African representation on the Legislative Council nor even of a desire for it; and there was some evidence of opposition expressed by unspecified Native Administrations. It was concluded that the lack of desire for participation was a consequence of British policies in several respects. Economic and social policies, by operating to limit the extent of alien contact and influence in non-Buganda areas and especially in outlying districts, not only limited the chances that pressures for participation would build up but also inhibited the understanding and possible acceptance by those peoples of the alien central institutions--the Executive Council, and more particularly, the Legislative Council. Further, with special reference to the peoples in almost all of the decidedly direct rule areas, even had they developed a desire for Council representation, as a consequence of native administration policy they had new tribal political systems which they did not yet consider as their own; thus, they had no legitimated political institutions through which they could exert pressures to obtain Legislative Council representation even if the peoples of the tribes had favored this kind of central institutional

elaboration. As for the three smaller Kingdoms, the native administration policy acknowledging the existence of the Agreements gave those peoples one of the same reasons as the Baganda had for opposing representation--fear of loss of their jealously guarded privileged "treaty" status, which enhanced their political position in this regard compared to that of the non-Agreement peoples.

In the course of the inquiry no very explicit evidence came to light on just which, and to what extent, non-Baganda tribes opposed Legislative Council representation. Therefore, it is not possible to formulate a set of hypotheses about the differing degrees of opposition of all the tribes, and the relation of these variations to the other variable factors such as: British native administration policy; alien contact and influence; and the traditional political systems or polities, or, in the case of their displacement, the measure of legitimization of the new systems. For the time being, and on the basis of partially inferred evidence, a postulate can be framed only with reference to Buganda, the three smaller Kingdoms, and Busoga. It is: that the opposition to Legislative Council participation decreased (a) as the rule of a tribe was more direct, and (b) as surviving traditional political institutions were less highly organized (Busoga) or as alien contact and influence was more limited (the smaller Kingdoms).

Other aspects of policy. Several conclusions were reached with regard to other British policies affecting the development of the Protectorate's central institutions.

First, direct Protectorate policy toward the central governmental institutions clearly acted over the years to inhibit change in

them.

Secondly, it was complemented and reinforced by the theoretical native administration policy of Indirect Rule for Uganda during most of the period, and more particularly by the policy of actual indirect rule in Buganda after 1938; there was an official predisposition to defer to the Baganda opposition to Legislative Council participation.

And thirdly, British policies operated also in other, indirect ways to determine the particular extent of the change. For example, it was British policy in Uganda in the second decade of the century which facilitated and actively encouraged the growth of the non-African commercial and planter interests, which led in turn to the establishment of the Executive and Legislative Councils in 1921. It was British policy which, through the non-alienation of land policy as confirmed in 1921, then restricted the expansion of these vested non-African interests so that they never assumed the size and political power that they did in Kenya. Yet it was also British policy which indirectly gave them what power they did have by assuring the non-African interests which did exist in Uganda a monopoly of the territory's industry, trade, and private finance.

Summary. From the above it is considered reasonable to conclude that the second part of the thesis has been confirmed. To recapitulate, British policy as a whole did in fact constitute the most important force shaping the limited extent of change in the Protectorate's central governmental institutions. It operated directly through its generally restrictive policies toward these institutions. It acted indirectly through the effects which its native administration and social and

economic development policies had on other forces, especially the traditional African political system of Buganda and the force designated as alien contact and influence. These effects were such as to facilitate and engender strong opposition on the part of the Baganda to a specific and crucial type of change and to limit pressures for change in general from other African tribes and from non-African groups.

The above conclusions are set in the context of the policies of all colonial powers in Africa during the period. If the context is restricted to just British policy, then, for reasons explained previously, the traditional political system of the Baganda would assume a role second to, but still not as important as, that of British policy.

Some Further Conclusions and Hypotheses

The study brought to light findings of interest and significance other than those directly related to the thesis. They provide material for additional conclusions and hypotheses. Discussion of these is limited below to two topics--the general role of colonial policy in Africa; and the nature and determinants of British policy.

The role of colonial policy in Africa. It was stated in the Introduction that the general analytical assumption or hypothesis for the study was as follows: that political change in the dependent territories in Africa during most of the colonial era has been shaped by the nature and dynamics of the social situation, as the latter has been affected by the policies of the colonial powers and by events and issues. The approach reflected by the assumption was derived from

concepts advanced by Professors James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, except that these were altered to replace by "affected" their word "controlled," and to add events and issues as a force affecting the social situation along with colonial policies.¹ Has this study rendered these concepts more meaningful or useful by throwing light on their validity?

It is considered that the hypothesis, as phrased for this study, did prove meaningful and useful as a general framework, and that its validity was substantiated. Although at points in the presentation it proved cumbersome and it was necessary for purposes of brevity and clarity to bypass the more inclusive force of the social situation, dealing directly with the interaction of the other four forces, the use of the full analytical framework in the previous review chapter gave the presentation a depth which would otherwise have been lacking.

As for the validity of the hypothesis for Uganda, it was shown how in 1905 the elements of the subsequently evolving social situation were all already present and interacting to some extent. The traditional African political systems or polities were either still functioning unchanged or, in the case of seven of the twelve main tribes studied, had already interacted with British policy. In addition, these patterns of interaction, though different for the seven tribes, were for the most part set by that time; they were to remain basically unchanged throughout the four decades. Likewise, alien contact and influence, though still largely embryonic, had made itself felt in all the principal ways it was to operate up to 1945. For example, the Christian missions had

¹See the first part of the discussion of the selection of the major variables in Appendix III.

effected appreciable conversions, and the first mission schools had been established by 1905. Cash crop production had been initiated, and the commercial role of the Asian and European immigrant communities had been staked out.

The above three forces were, then, present in a number of their major aspects in 1905. But the two remaining forces--colonial policy, and events and issues--were relatively less set in their patterns. They introduced into the situation new elements. For example, after 1905 there were major shifts in certain fields of British policy such as native administration. There were events such as the two World Wars and issues such as that of the compulsory acquisition of land in Buganda. These injected fresh ingredients into the social and political brew. The manner in which the 1944 situation--the product of the interaction of all forces--was particularly affected by the more recent developments in the two less endemic forces (policy, and events and issues) was described in the Chapter VIII analysis of the 1944 social situation and the pressures for change in it.

If the broad conceptual framework as phrased for this study proved validated, thereby fulfilling its purpose as one which might well facilitate comparative analyses for other areas of Africa during a corresponding time-span, what of the approach which posited that change was shaped by the nature and dynamics of the social situation¹ as the

¹The Coleman and Rosberg approaches also viewed the social situation as in turn shaped by the nature of the indigenous political systems, Western contact, and earlier policies. The stress was actually placed by Coleman and Rosberg more precisely on these elements as factors variously affecting the development of nationalism and political

latter was "controlled" by the policies of the colonial powers? Would it have been better to use the more forceful term "control"? And would it have been better to omit events and issues as a separate force, completely subsuming it under the other forces as appropriate?

Employing the verb "control" in its ordinary sense of to check or regulate, to keep within limits (as speed), to exercise directing, guiding, or restraining power over--the conclusion is that the alternate hypothesis would also be substantiated by the evidence furnished by the study. For British policy did in fact act, though in a number of cases not as far as can be ascertained by conscious design, to control a number of features of the social situation which would have taken on more dynamic qualities had policy followed other feasible courses. This would be the case even if the context were just British policies throughout Africa. It would be even more the case if the context were the colonial policies of all powers, for then the traditional political system of the Baganda, in some ways a force "controlling" the situation and change in it, would be interpreted more accurately as a consequence of British policy, and its character as a force operating largely independently would be nullified.

British policy also operated to create pressure for change, although again probably not intentionally. Yet, viewing the whole

integration in the different colonial territories. See James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 412-423.

For reasons explained in the second section of Appendix III, the less limiting concept of factors affecting significant political change --regardless of what kind of change--has been preferred in this study to one concentrating on a more specific kind of change such as integration,

spectrum of official actions throughout the forty year period, the judgment that the total effect of policy was a checking, limiting, restricting one is considered reasonable.

As to actual change, specifically in political institutions, the role of policy with regard to the less organized traditional polities was, admittedly, more one of control in the sense of the exercise of a "directing" power, which propelled change in those polities as the only practical solution. Yet the effects of this policy, together with that checking change in the more organized traditional political systems, were to limit change in the central institutions. Since policies directly relevant to the latter were also restrictive of change, the sum effect is judged to have been a controlling one in the restrictive sense, since change was limited by policy in more of the fields of political institutional change dealt with than it was propelled.

As for the desirability of excluding events and issues as one of the major forces affecting the situation, the judgment is less sure because the analysis of this force has not been given major attention. It would seem, however, from the discussion of events and issues in Chapter VIII that its omission would be justified. The more impressionistic findings about this force indicated that the main events and issues represented in essence mostly expressions of British policy or factors influencing the latter.

In concluding that the 1905-1945 Uganda analysis substantiated the use of the alternate hypothesis, which omitted events and issues as a major force and which posited that policies acted to "control" the social situation and change, it should be stressed that it and the more

cautious, less prescriptive hypothesis used for the study were phrased to relate to most of the colonial era. Whether either would prove satisfactory as a framework for analysis of political change in more recent years would depend, it is believed, upon the particular territory and time-span chosen for study. For example, the alternate hypothesis would probably prove valuable for the Belgian Congo up to 1958, but serious thought would have to be given to its use there for subsequent years. Its applicability to the Gold Coast in the decade after World War II would be open to question, and another framework, providing for a shift in emphasis to recognize the importance of Nkrumah as a political leader and of particular events and issues, would most likely be dictated. As for Uganda, in a study of the postwar decade, the 1945 and 1949 disturbances and the 1953-1955 Kabaka Crisis would give the force of events and issues an importance unto itself. This no doubt would demand its treatment as a major force propelling change, on a par with British policy as a force controlling and then later--during Sir Andrew Cohen's tour as Governor--also propelling change.

The nature and determinants of British policy. While the policies of the other colonial powers in Africa south of the Sahara up to 1945 have been relatively uniform, in that each power had a broad policy which it applied to its different territories with relatively little variation in time and space, one of the outstanding characteristics of British policy was its great diversity.¹ For example, the

¹As reasons for the absence of clear and consistent British policies, Lord Hailey has given the following at various points in his Survey: the British tradition of elasticity; the widely different circumstances in the territories, for example, settler versus

implementation of the general concept of trusteeship in British territories with large immigrant communities was distinctly variant from the specific expression of the concept in colonies where such interests were smaller. Another instance was the considerable deviation from the policy of Indirect Rule, especially evident in Uganda.

The diversity of British policy has generally been attributed to the predisposition of British officialdom for a pragmatic, empirical approach in Africa. The study of policy in Uganda during 1905-1945 has served to lend support to that assessment. Circumstances, in the form of unorganized traditional political systems, caused the authorities in the Protectorate to diverge from the policy of Indirect Rule in certain areas rather than persisting in attempts to rule through traditionally-based native authorities. Even after some of the disadvantages of an educational system based on the early efforts of the two Christian missions were recognized, action to change the system was slow and indecisive up to 1945, for far-reaching changes were not considered practicable.

Just as other long-term disadvantages of the dualistic mission school systems were not anticipated and steps taken to counter the situation, so also was the case with the pattern of economic development. For many years the Protectorate's resources were devoted to encouraging cash crop production where the efforts would produce the

non-settler colonies, and the varied stages of their general development; and, despite the British officials' attachment to their own culture and institutions, their conviction that these may not be equally suited to other peoples. Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, pp. 147, 150, 540, 543.

most results, even though this was to the detriment of the development of the other parts of the country. Such a policy was the most feasible one, but it certainly was not the only feasible one. It was assuredly the most practical short-term one in that it worked best to get the quickest results. But among the longer-term consequences of uneven development were political liabilities which later seriously compromised the benefits accruing from the development policy. These consequences were unforeseen due largely, it is believed, to a British lack of concern with the long view, which lack went hand in hand with the pragmatic, empirical approach.

There were other policies which may have been based on less pragmatic considerations, such as the non-alienation of land policy. But the tentative conclusion to be drawn from the review in Chapter VIII is that courses of action adopted by the authorities in Uganda were for the most part those which, after reference to other experience if such was available, were expected to work best to achieve the more immediate ends without obviously jeopardizing the attainment of the broader objectives. These latter were, in the apparent order of priority, the maintenance of law and order, and the progressive elimination of indigenous customs repugnant to British values; the financial self-sufficiency of the territory; the improvement of the welfare of the African population; and, at some remote time, the evolution of the territory toward self-government in a manner as yet undefined up to 1945.

Given the confines of the pragmatic character of policy as its expression was limited by broader goals as indicated above, was there any other pattern discernible for policy decisions? What brought

officials to the point where they felt a new, workable approach was needed in a certain field of policy; what influenced them to decide that one alternative was more practical than another?

Sir Andrew Cohen has recently advanced the theory that political change in the form of constitutional progress in British territories has been the result of interrelated pressures brought to bear on the one hand by the policies of the British and Territorial Governments, together with public opinion in Great Britain, and on the other hand by non-official opinion and groups within the territories. He has clearly inferred certain minor postulates.¹ One was that policy regarding constitutional advance has often represented a response to those local or territorial pressures which have brought the greatest force to bear on the situation at a given point in time. Yet, another was that progress (implying constitutional advance for Africans), during the early stages when African nationalist pressures were not yet strong, was slow or nonexistent if at the same time there was a rigid or negative official attitude.

Do Sir Andrew's theoretical inferences stand up for Uganda during the pre-1945 era? They do. For African nationalist pressures were weak, policy was on the whole rigid and negative, and African constitutional progress was practically nonexistent at the territorial institutional level with which Cohen was dealing in his remarks. In addition, what constitutional advance there was resulted, according to

¹Sir Andrew's views as discussed here and subsequently have been set forth in Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (North-western University African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 37-40.

all evidence available, primarily from the pressures which the commercial and planter interests exerted at the time of their most pronounced and considerable political influence in the Protectorate. Further, the possibility of progress during the war years was decidedly diminished on the one hand by the increased pressures brought to bear against Legislative Council participation by the Baganda, and on the other hand by the relative decline in the political force which the non-African unofficial communities could exert in favor of an expanded Council.

The above two minor postulates, implicitly advanced by the man who was Governor of Uganda in the eventful years of 1952-1956, can, therefore, be regarded as valid for Uganda in the 1905-1945 period. As for the major proposition about constitutional advance being the result of interrelated pressures, this does not represent as significant a thesis as might first seem to be the case. For, it does not posit that policy is in essence primarily a response to other pressures. Rather it maintains that policy regarding constitutional advance at the territorial level is a response to pressures which include policies, both of the British Government in London and of the Governments in the colonies. By stating, in fact, that such Governments have sometimes slowed advance through rigid policies and at other times have needed to take the initiative to move the process ahead faster than it would have moved in response to non-official pressures, Sir Andrew has pointed up the varying role which policy can play. As a consequence, the most that may be proposed in generalizing about policy in this respect is the rephrasing as follows of an assumption, made in the Preface to the

present study, about all of the five major forces throughout the continent: that British policy has acted in its African colonies as a major variable force, because at different points in time and space it has operated to slow down, to permit, or to propel political change; and that on occasion it has operated simultaneously in all three ways with respect to political change at different institutional levels.

II. A CRITIQUE OF POLICY IN UGANDA

The preceding comments and the presentation as a whole have dealt with policy as a force in the existential sense--what policy was, what its effects were, and, in a more tentative fashion, what its nature and determinants were. A conscious attempt has been made to restrict the analyses to an objective consideration of these matters, calling attention to different possible normative interpretations in a few instances where this seemed particularly necessary. Judgments of the right or the wrong of the various aspects of policy have been eschewed as inappropriate; the aim has been to let the facts and analytical conclusions speak for themselves.

Yet the perception and interpretation of the material in the study--and this is true for almost any single "fact" of history--are bound to vary from person to person according to individual preconceptions of what is desirable in life and what is not. For example, one person might interpret in a favorable light the fact that policy preserved the Baganda traditional political system and in an unfavorable light the fact that policy permitted conflicts to arise within the system after 1939. Another might disvalue both interpretations in the

general conviction that change as a social phenomenon was a good thing.

On the premise that judgments deriving from a broader knowledge of the material than is possible to include in such a presentation might be of interest, and on the further premise that there is in any case an obligation to state such judgments to facilitate independent appraisals of the objectivity of the whole, an evaluation of British policy in Uganda follows. First, specific policies and results are looked at in terms of their consistency and suitability in relation to the broader British goals. Attention is then directed to an appraisal of policy in the light of certain more fundamental values.

Policies in Relation to Objectives

The British have characteristically not provided clear and structured official statements of their goals in Africa. Nor have any been uncovered for Uganda. In their absence it has been necessary to piece together what appears to have represented the objectives pertinent to this study. Because the latter's focus has been directed elsewhere, an extensive investigation into the underlying aims of policy has not been carried out. As listed in their apparent order of priority in the preceding section dealing with the nature and determinants of British policy, the objectives must therefore be presented in the form of reasonable assumptions.

The maintenance of law and order. With regard to the cardinal objective of the maintenance of law and order, it may be inferred that the native administration policies in Uganda were largely determined by such considerations. A number of the successive extensions of British

rule to the areas further from the Protectorate's center were undertaken primarily to bring the rule of law to peoples showing little regard for the lives of itinerant traders. In addition, unable to control conditions by themselves, the small number of British officials operated in many tribal areas through corps of Baganda Agents. These, coming from an authoritarian society, were effective in reducing infringements of the peace until incidents of their harshness became in turn an important factor in their later withdrawal by the British. Yet the local Africans who were appointed by the Protectorate authorities to assume the Agents' duties also in time often became autocratic. Presumably it was in part to allay the resulting discontent and consequent threat to orderly government that the Uganda Government in the direct rule areas began very gradually in 1937 to introduce a system of popular councils.

A specific example of the paramountcy of law and order in the early years was the official action in 1905 following the murder of the British Sub-Commissioner in Ankole. Certain chiefs were implicated, but judicial action was long drawn out and indecisive. Executive action was not, however. The Ankole Agreement of 1901 was suspended (until 1912). An even more drastic measure was the levying of a heavy collective fine on the people of that Kingdom.

In Buganda, the use of the traditional political structure facilitated the rule of law, and it can be reasonably assumed that Indirect Rule was chosen as the system of native administration in good part because of this. On the other hand the policy after 1939 allowed conflicts within Buganda to grow, though up to 1945 not beyond the point where law and order was seriously jeopardized. A case in point was the

failure of the British to support their protégé, Katikiro Nsibirwa, in his most unpopular stand favoring the remarriage of the Kabaka's mother. The British allowed the chiefs who opposed him to force his resignation in 1941 and permitted them to select one of their number, who was not pro-British, to replace Nsibirwa. It may be assumed that tension was so great in Buganda that no other pragmatic or feasible course was open to the Protectorate.

Tension and discontent had again mounted for various reasons by the end of 1944, and it is appropriate to ask why the authorities did little to reduce the threat to law and order which matured with the January 1945 disturbances. It would appear that in the first place they did not fully appreciate its seriousness, for their channels of communication had been cut to a great extent by the administrative reorganization in the fall of 1944.

In the second place, the disturbances, which are touched on here although they are outside the scope of the study, were precipitated by two successive developments which occurred after the end of 1944. A false rumor circulated that Uganda was to receive a mammoth Colonial Welfare and Development Fund grant, and that from it the low-income wage group living around Kampala and having real economic grievances were to be given a wage increase. When this was officially denied, a relatively unorganized strike reflected the extreme disappointment and anger of the people who would have benefited. Abetted apparently by a small number of dissatisfied, Western-educated elite, and by certain anti-British Baganda chiefs including their Katikiro leader, the strike led to riots.

It might be added that this unheard of infringement of law and

order was responsible for the temporary jettisoning of the cherished policy of indirect rule in Buganda. The suspected Katikiro was forced to resign and was later exiled to another part of the territory. The popularly-hated, pro-British Nsibirwa was put into office. Backed by the Protectorate, he made a clean sweep of implicated chiefs, who were designated as disloyal to the Kabaka. And, when he was assassinated following the newly-constituted Lukiko's approval of the loathed compulsory land acquisition act, he was replaced by an authoritarian, Western-educated, pro-British Katikiro. Indirect rule was resumed in a sense, but it lacked the general popular backing which it enjoyed through most of the previous four decades. This was pointed up by the agreement of the Katikiro to sit as a member of the Legislative Council, despite the Lukiko's and people's strong objections. Equally unpopular was his decision to represent Buganda in the legislative body of the East Africa High Commission, which was established in 1948. The 1949 disturbances were a reflection of these and other causes of unrest, and were dealt with by the British with more banishments, but also later with some constructive steps to redress economic grievances. It was not until the 1953-1955 Kabaka Crisis that the Buganda Government began to reflect again the views of its people. Ever since the return of the Kabaka from exile in 1955 this state of affairs has been quite complete, and, it might be added, a source of difficulty for the British because of the avenues which the views of the people and their legitimated leaders have taken.

It may be concluded that British native administration policies up to the end of 1944, except as the Buganda reorganization that year

made it difficult for the Protectorate Government to perceive unrest, operated to preserve generally the maintenance of law and order. For, prior to 1945, perceived conflicts in Buganda were not allowed to grow beyond the point where order was jeopardized, the British authorities acceding to pressures.

Certain other policies, however, tended to compromise the maintenance of order by furthering tensions in Buganda. Among these were the compulsory land acquisition policy, the federation of East Africa policy, and the social and economic policies which created the dissatisfied groups. But policies in the non-Buganda areas on the whole did not have the same result. For reasons detailed earlier, they tended to limit social and political pressures and to inhibit the expression of those which might have existed.

A complementary aim to the maintenance of law and order was the progressive elimination of indigenous customs repugnant to British values. Through the native administration structure of authority from the Governor on down, those features viewed as most repugnant were quickly dealt with. For others, considerable of the effort came from the Christian missions. One on which the authorities have been ambivalent, and therefore permissive, is the practice of polygamy, too deeply engrained in certain areas to be tackled head-on.

Financial self-sufficiency. It was with the objective of financial self-sufficiency that the Protectorate Government had the most clear-cut success. Its economic policies were notable for the prosperity they brought to the territory.

Increased welfare. Did the economic progress lead to the

increased welfare of the people? J. S. Furnivall has maintained that British colonial policy assumed it would, but that with reference to his study of Burma, it did not. There a landless proletariat was created and the benefactors were not the indigenous peoples but rather the foreign communities exploiting them.¹

Furnivall's thesis does not, however, hold except to a small extent for Uganda. Economic progress in fact led to an increase in the welfare of the African population throughout the Protectorate, subject to two important qualifying explanations. Welfare was enhanced only to a minimal degree in large areas of the territory where, because of policies, economic and social development was limited, preference being given to regions where the returns from efforts would be maximal. Secondly, unquestionably the benefits derived by the foreign communities were appreciably greater than those of the Africans. But this is as far as one part of Furnivall's thesis may be accepted for the Protectorate. For, British policy consciously limited the role and the size of the non-African communities through the non-alienation of land policy, and in this way preserved for the Africans who produced the cash crops a rewarding share of the economic pie. In addition, without most of the Asian and European non-officials in the country, the prosperity would have been retarded; in the absence of official or private training facilities, there were not sufficient Africans qualified to carry out the necessary commercial functions.

¹Furnivall has discussed the relation between economic progress and welfare in Burma in J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), Chapter IV.

British policies did result, then, as they were intended to, in increased social welfare. But at the same time they had the consequence of a very marked unevenness of benefits, the Baganda and other tribes to the east benefiting much more, relative to the minimal advances in most of the other areas. The non-African share was disproportionately high, but not perhaps in relation to their special skills; and certainly nowhere near the same situation existed as in neighboring Kenya, which paralleled to a much greater extent the conditions posited by Furnivall.

Self-government. The other goal of the British was that of self-government. As the last part of his theory, Furnivall has maintained that although British colonial policy assumed that social welfare would lay the foundations for autonomy, in fact in Burma it made this even more difficult of realization as a consequence of the creation of a plural society.¹

In Uganda the circumstances were paradoxical. While other British policies--notably that regarding non-alienation of land--inhibited the growth of a politically full-fledged, racially plural society, the marked disparities in economic and social development throughout the country resulted in another kind of plural society as indicated below.

Buganda's social and economic pre-eminence grew. With the exception of the period in the 1920's and 1930's, that Kingdom's autonomy was also considerable, rising to its peak at the end of 1944.

¹See the discussion in Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, Chapter VI. The author has given the matter more general consideration in Chapter VIII, including his special attention to the concept of a plural society on p. 308, and in Chapter XI.

Unquestionably these complementary trends in Buganda must have been linked in the minds of the Protectorate's administrators. Increased social welfare can be said to have led to increased autonomy in Buganda, although other factors were also responsible. The converse can be advanced for the other areas--the limited increase in social welfare was a factor in the lesser autonomy up to 1945.

The differences between the two general areas, and especially between Buganda and those decidedly direct rule areas where development was least, accentuated the ethnic and cultural divisions characterizing the African population. They furthered the feelings of superiority of the more developed and politically organized Baganda toward all other tribes and particularly toward the least developed, who for the most part provided the indigenous low-wage laborers for the Baganda as well as for non-African employers.

If such was the situation with respect to the relation between welfare and autonomy as it varied for different tribes in Uganda, to what extent did welfare in fact lay the foundations for autonomy of the whole of Uganda? Events subsequent to 1944 have made it clear that the unevenness of the increase in welfare, accentuating tribal antipathy for the reasons indicated above, has been one of the prime factors in the slower progress of Uganda toward independence. For, the disunity of the African population has been the salient feature of the 1955-1960 political scene.

Yet this was not the case up to the end of 1944. The Baganda did regard themselves as endowed with a superiority which was no doubt infuriating to some of the other peoples. But it was much more a case

of the Baganda being acknowledged as the leaders than it was a case of challenges to their leadership by the other Africans in the country. Only in the postwar years did the antagonism and distrust of the Baganda by non-Baganda, especially by the Nilotics in the north, come perhaps to equal the similar feelings the Baganda held for the British in 1944.

If this were so in 1944, why did the Protectorate not advance more rapidly along the road to political autonomy? There are two reasons, one relating to British objectives for its African colonies in general and one to Uganda in particular. Britain had a vaguely stated goal of self-government for its African territories, but along with the other colonial powers and the world in general, it was regarded as a remote goal up to World War II. That there was any urgency in preparing for it by training Africans and planning institutional changes was not perceived by the British, who may be ranked as liberal among the colonial powers.

The specific case of Uganda was especially exemplary. As of the end of the period the Governor, although envisaging African intelligentsia in the Legislative Council some time hence, was thinking more in terms of a separate structure of African institutions. He was planning to start with Provincial Councils, which might lead to a single central, territorial council composed of Africans. African opinion would be expressed through these, as yet hardly defined, institutional channels. Further, the failure of the Governor to include African representatives in the Legislative Council as requested by the non-African unofficials can scarcely be described as undemocratic, in light of the opposition of the Baganda and others to it and the lack of demands for representation

from the remaining African tribal areas.

Summary. In conclusion, British policies in Uganda are here adjudged as on the whole not inconsistent with their objectives, and as suitable and effective in achieving many of them.

There were a few exceptions, and a notable one was the policy on social and economic development which, although increasing indigenous welfare and restricting the growth of non-African interests at African expense, also facilitated a decided disparity in development from tribe to tribe. By the end of 1944 the resulting accentuated differences between the tribes were not yet, however, manifested in intertribal political conflict in any appreciable measure. They cannot, therefore, as of that time be adjudged as necessarily inconsistent with or detrimental to the goal of self-government. It was only in the decade after the war that another new British policy--that of constituting in the non-Kingdom areas distinctive, popularly-based local governments along tribal lines--gave those tribes which were less well off the means of expressing their newly increased tribal consciousness. In such a way tribalism, dormant in much of the Protectorate in 1944, was activated; and in the process one British policy prejudiced the realization of another, longer range policy or goal--that of self-government.

A Broader Evaluation

Having discussed the various official policies in terms of general British objectives in Africa, it remains to appraise policy in relation to more fundamental values.

In the context of the Western norms before World War II, British

policies in Africa and especially in Uganda are viewed as generally enlightened compared to those of the other colonial powers. For example, rule of the African peoples was rarely unjustly harsh, as it was in Portuguese territories and the Union of South Africa. In British--and also French--colonies, there were greater facilities for education provided than elsewhere. In this context, therefore, British policy with few exceptions cannot be criticized. For, although it was not ahead of the normative standards of the times, it was in the first ranks of those powers exercising responsibility on the continent.

The value assumptions. What is the judgment when the context is shifted from the less exacting normative standards to Western values? This, of course, would depend upon which combination of values was chosen and their relationship one to the other in terms of structure and priority. For the purposes of the following discussion, an assumption is advanced concerning an ultimate value--that it is the fullest possible development of all human personalities. Development of one personality should not disproportionately prejudice that of another.

Also assumed is that the conditions necessary for the attainment of the ultimate value dictate some of the more important subsidiary values--liberty of thought and expression; a minimum economic standard of living; educational opportunities for all, and at the higher levels to include those generally regarded as most gifted; and democratic forms of government which, though de-emphasizing nationalism, provide sufficient political organization to guarantee equality of rights and human dignity and to ensure order in the process of responding effectively to social change.

None of the four main goals of British policy, as these were previously listed, conflict with the above values except perhaps in emphasis. What of the different aspects of British policy in Uganda, designed in varying degrees to attain the official goals?

Native administration policy. British native administration policy, excepting the period of interference in Buganda's affairs in the middle years of the four decades, is viewed generally with favor. Indirect rule in Buganda enabled that people to retain the institutions which they cherished, which gave them their feeling of human dignity. In the event, the policy was also a happy choice because the traditional system was characterized by social and political mobility. This and other qualities facilitated the system's and the people's adaptation to new and beneficial forces of change in the form of economic progress and educational opportunities. Indirect rule in Buganda permitted the gradual adaptation of the social and political institutions, thereby minimizing the social disintegration and disruption which in other African situations was more frequently occasioned by extensive alien contact and influence. The harmful effects of the transition on individual personalities were appreciably lessened, and fuller personality development was furthered by the widespread preservation of the people's societal roots, often quite destroyed elsewhere. The effects of the policy in relation to the ultimate and other values stated above were, therefore, on the whole good for the Baganda, the advantages outweighing the disadvantages as of 1944.

With respect to the other tribes, in the case of the decidedly direct rule areas there was little practical alternative to the native

administration policy there, if British responsibility in the region is premised, which it is here. The Protectorate might, however, have acted with greater despatch to limit the autocratic behavior of the Baganda Agents and of some of their local successors.

Sufficiently intensive study of areas where rule was less direct has not been made to warrant a judgment of the rightness or wrongness of British policy in those regions, although the impression is that nowhere but in Ankole--where the collective fine was imposed--is there cause for realistic criticism.

Social and economic development policies. As for the social and economic development policies, had the land policy continued to follow the course it was taking during the second decade, there would have been good reason for censure. The fact that it did not, and that the country's main economic resource was preserved for the indigenous peoples, is regarded as warranting high praise of the Colonial Office decisions drastically limiting alienation of land. The praise is particularly in order since the decisions were taken, contrary to precedent, in opposition to the predominant official position held in the Protectorate at the time.

The other land policy considered was that seeking to bring about enactment of the law permitting compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes. In the special circumstances of the case the land was desired for the extension of Makerere College and a cotton experimental station. Despite the desirability of the projects for which the land was sought, in view of the high tangible but also intangible value placed on land by the Baganda, the crude British efforts to push the acquisitions through

were not only politically disingenuous but, it is held here, also morally wrong. In brief, the view is that ends rarely justify the use of means inconsistent with other valued standards.

The policy stimulating peasant-based cash crop production was an admirable one. However, although practical difficulties, especially related to the cost of roads and railroads, precluded anything approaching a truly even development over the country, more than was done could have been done to prevent the disparity which occurred. The necessary inference is a lack of positive regard for the concept of human equality on the part of the policy makers. Because nothing more was done in the early years to equalize the development, it later became increasingly difficult politically to take steps to compensate for the different treatment in the first decades. It also became increasingly disputable morally. In the early years it would not have been so palpably unjust to have retarded Buganda development somewhat to permit more equal and self-sustaining development elsewhere. Open to greater question was the justice of later taking from the Baganda an appreciably larger measure of the fruits of their labor to raise up peoples not only with whom they had no common culture but whom they also disdained. Equalizing wealth in a country is one thing where there is a commonly acknowledged cultural or political identity and the process is democratically engineered. It is another matter where neither of these two conditions obtain, as they have not in Uganda up to 1960.

The comments with regard to economic development may be made also for the education and other social services' policies. But it is considered that the paucity of facilities in the less developed areas is

even less justifiable. Government could have pursued a much different policy. Either the rate of Baganda expansion could have been reduced to provide increased facilities elsewhere through the policy control of mission grants; or greater equalization could have been effected by augmenting the budgetary allotment for education, with the additional sums earmarked for the non-Buganda areas. Educational policy calls for criticism on other counts as well. The priority given to technical-artisan education by the Government is viewed as shortsighted and as morally wrong in the context of the values set forth as assumed. This is deemed to be especially the case when the official bias against the academic, literary type of curricula is coupled with the minuscule attention given to creation of facilities for secondary and higher education. There was no apparent attempt to develop African mental capacities beyond a certain relatively low level.

Labor policies in Uganda likewise left a great deal to be desired. The policy promoting the less developed regions as labor recruiting areas for the center of the territory, together with the low wages accruing to such migrant labor, acted at least up to the mid-1930's to the inequitable detriment of those peoples just as did the economic and educational policies cited above. The use of a compulsory form of labor in Uganda until it was abolished as a consequence of the forced-labor scandal in Kenya is similarly without any credit to the Protectorate authorities. Further, the Government was slow to raise the low wages of the unorganized labor force. It also lagged notably behind in the enactment of legislation to bring working conditions of Africans up from the old master-servant indenture circumstances to the standard

set by international conventions.¹ These facts cannot be condoned.

Policies toward central and East African governmental institutions. With regard to the policies toward Uganda's central governmental institutions, the judgment is that there is nothing to criticize except the failure to train more Africans for posts of greater responsibility in the Administration. Had social and economic development been stepped up and more done for the non-Buganda areas, the appraisal might be different. But as it was, in 1944 the Africans in most of the areas outside of Buganda were not ready to accept much political responsibility, either in the form of more than token representation in Legislative Council or through the creation of a separate Territorial Council composed just of Africans. Further, the Governor's action in deferring to African opposition to participation in the Legislative Council is viewed as the morally right one.

Some may argue that the Governors of Uganda, by not effecting African representation in the Council, seriously compromised the possibility of future political integration and therefore the chances

¹It has not been feasible to describe and document this aspect of labor policy, but one example of the situation in the earlier years--which did not change appreciably up to 1945--may be provided at this stage. Discussing the Masters and Servants Ordinance, 1913, a 1920 source stated as follows: "Magistrates are empowered to . . . inflict fines, award damages, annul contracts, enforce unfinished contracts, and in event of a refusal to comply with their decision, they can order imprisonment. Their powers over the servant are considerable. Disobedience, insolence, unsatisfactory performance of work, and desertion can be punished." [Great Britain,] Naval Intelligence Division, A Handbook of the Uganda Protectorate, I. D. 1217 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), p. 272. Cited hereafter as GB, NID, A Handbook See also P. G. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labour, ed. W. Elkan (East African Studies, No. 10; Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1957), pp. 56, 65-66, 75-76, 78.

for the emergence of Uganda as a nation-state. This line of argument is not shared for several reasons. Imposition of unpopular measures often does not prove feasible, merely rendering matters worse. Further, it is open to the general objection that the ends do not necessarily justify the means. The ends themselves are questionable in light of the value assumptions, which include the de-emphasis of nationalism. And lastly, it is not considered outside the realm of possibilities that, with different postwar British policies, the 1944 situation could have provided the basis for a much greater measure of cooperation and a much less marked degree of disunity among the tribes than proved to be the case. Earlier African participation in the Council was not necessarily a prerequisite in 1944 to the evolution later of a stable democratic government run by Africans.

As for the policy, during the last years of the four decades, which gave official support to the idea of federation of East Africa in the face of African--especially Baganda--opposition, there can be no criticism of the basic fact that policy shifted to this line. The view is that colonial governments have an obligation to consider seriously what in their opinion is best for the people, and to advance these ideas in an effort to gain acceptance of them. As long as they are not imposed against the wishes of the people, there is no harm. In Uganda, as of the end of 1944 they had not yet been imposed.

A general qualification. In this connection it is appropriate to note certain points dictating a qualification affecting most of the judgments which have been made in the preceding discussion.

A loose form of administrative federation of certain common

services was effected for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika through the establishment in 1948 of the East Africa High Commission. The step was taken with the support or acquiescence of the British-appointed Buganda Government then in power, but with the intense opposition of the Baganda people as a whole. (The Lukiko was even prevented from discussing the question, presumably because that body's opposition would have been clearly expressed.) The Colonial Secretary's speech in 1953 favoring an increased measure of federation touched off such strong Baganda reactions that the Kabaka Crisis resulted, and the British Government was obliged to back down, giving explicit assurances that further amalgamation would not occur without popular Baganda approval. It is absolutely certain that Baganda opposition throughout the years prevented a greater measure of federation taking place than did. And this conclusion leads to the qualification referred to above.

It is considered reasonable to hold that although the policy of indirect rule for Buganda preserved the identity of the people and facilitated the expression of their opposition to federation, crucial increments of the strength behind the opposition may be attributed to just the fact that there was extensive economic and social development in Buganda. The Baganda opposition thus was rendered an effective one. Had the policy been one which limited development in Buganda in favor of the other areas, the people of the Kingdom might not have been able to exert pressures sufficient to inhibit further or earlier federation. In addition, in the absence of a considerable increase in budgetary allocations sufficient to implement an early "crash" program of development in the non-Buganda areas, the mere diversion of resources from Buganda to those areas would probably not have resulted in

extensive enough advances there to have brought forth African opposition in a strength compensating for that lost in Buganda. It may be speculated, therefore, that the very policies which have been criticized above on other grounds may in fact have operated to prevent the possible imposition, despite weaker but still clear African objections, of a pre-1945 federation or a post-1944 greater amalgamation of East African territories.

It might be argued that African fears of domination by Kenya settlers and Uganda non-African communities were groundless, and that increased federation would have worked to their advantage. The history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, though not analagous in several respects, is still sufficiently similar to justify doubt about such a thesis. For in Nyasaland, where prior to 1953 settler interests had been minor and the territory was recognized as destined to evolve as a primarily African state, the imposition of federation--against almost total African objections--led to an assumption of political power by the European unofficals to an extent even they had not dreamed of before federation. The goal of a primarily African state was to all effects abandoned, and it was replaced by that of a multi-racial state. The subsequent political consequences were untoward, to state it mildly. That a like situation might have developed in Uganda is not at all impossible, given weaker African opposition than existed.

Conclusions. To summarize, in the context of the value assumptions stated at the beginning of the section, the following policies have been viewed as right or good: the native administration policies; the crucial non-alienation of land policy; the policies toward

the central governmental institutions. The policies regarded as open to criticism were: the labor policies; and those aspects of the economic and social development policies which resulted in the markedly uneven incidence of development, except as this may have prevented the imposition of an earlier federation of East Africa or a later increased amalgamation.

It is the view also that the determination by the British of the several different policies was too largely governed by the pragmatic and short-term approach. This meant that relatively little attention was paid to clarification of long-term goals, to considerations of what policies would best serve to achieve these goals, and to examination of the relation of all policies to each other and to all primary goals. As a consequence, not only were policies open to question on humane grounds, but some of them operated actually to jeopardize the realization of the official goals.

The main responsibility for such a state of affairs rested ultimately, of course, with the voters in Great Britain. Had they perceived the failings and wished sufficiently to correct them, they could have exerted the necessary pressure through the elective process. The more direct responsibility, especially given the British political values relating to their parliamentary form of government, rested with the Governments in power and more particularly with the Colonial Office.¹

¹The major responsibility of the Colonial Office for colonial policy, as well as for selection of Governors and Judges of territorial High Courts, was affirmed at an early date in GB, NID, A Handbook . . ., p. 325.

It is not considered correct to place the responsibility instead on the Governors of the colonies.

The argument could be advanced that the cardinal mistake was the devolution of authority to colonial Governors. Such a thesis does not, however, get at the heart of the matter. Devolution in and of itself is not necessarily inadvisable; in fact, its opposite could have had detrimental consequences.

The faults of the British devolution could have been corrected in one or both of two ways, providing the Colonial Office first made available well-defined policy guidelines which were harmonious with each other and with those goals appraised searchingly as most paramount. As one of the alternatives, the role of the Office could have been to formulate for each territory broad policies to attain the goals, thereafter restricting itself to checking the policies and their probable consequences as these could be rationally foreseen, and to directing changes when the desirability was clear-cut.

Another way, probably more efficacious, would have been to leave the formulation and implementation of specific territorial policies to the Governors, but to select for appointments only those men who were in general accord with and fully understood the guidelines, the goals, and their relationship to each other. The advantages of pragmatism, of adapting the particular territorial policies to the special circumstances in a colony, would have been preserved. On the other hand, the disadvantages of the unnecessary and inconsistent variations in policy from one Governor's tour to another's would have been minimized.

The facts seem to insist on the conclusion that the Colonial

Office abdicated a great deal of its responsibility to the Governors, whose actions therefore in many cases cannot be described otherwise than as irresponsible. A very great deal of good was in reality accomplished in Uganda, due to the admirable values and efforts of individual Governors. In only a few instances can the Colonial Office take real credit for the benefits brought to the Protectorate by colonial rule in 1905-1945. Yet because of its practice of non-interference with Governors, and because of what is considered its insufficient care in selecting the men who were to serve in that exalted position, the Office must bear the responsibility for those unworthy actions and policies which marked the era. For political responsibility of a government rests not with subordinates but with those who have the power and the authority to direct them. In immediate relation to the colonial Governors, this singles out in the hierarchy of the British system the staff and the head of the Colonial Office.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE AFRICAN POPULATION OF UGANDA

The indigenous population of the Uganda Protectorate was officially estimated in 1905 to be four millions; the first professionally organized census in 1948 showed a total of almost five millions. In the interim there were three counts carried out in 1911, 1921, and 1931 through the agency of county chiefs. These showed populations respectively of 2.84, 3.06, and 3.54 millions. The first is regarded as a considerable underestimate, the second less so, and the third perhaps fairly near the true total. However, even when the underestimates of the earlier counts are compensated for, it is still apparent that, as a result of epidemic diseases especially, the African population declined after the turn of the century until some point in the 1920's.¹

There follows a detailed breakdown of Uganda's population by tribal composition and major linguistic groupings for the first fairly reliable census year of 1931.² Likewise provided are 1948 figures, and these include data relating tribal populations to areas of concentration within the Protectorate.

¹J. E. Goldthorpe, "The African Population of East Africa: A Summary of Past and Present Trends," Appendix VII of East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, [Great Britain, Colonial Office], Cmd. 9475 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), pp. 467-468.

²By that time the territory's boundaries were also established.

TABLE 10. - The African population of Uganda by tribal composition, 1931 and 1948, and by area and extent of concentration, 1948^a

Type and Name of Tribe ^b	Number		Percentage of Total African Population		Area and Extent of Tribal Concentration, 1948			
					Area of Tribal Concentration ^c	Population of Area ^d	Percentage of Tribe in Area to All Africans in Area	Percentage of Tribe in Area to All of Tribe in Uganda ^e
	1931	1948	1931	1948				
Bantu:								
Baganda ^f	678,000	836,000	19	17	Buganda (P)	1,302,000	60	94
Banyaruanda ^g	77,000	289,000	2	6	Buganda (P)	1,302,000	11	52
Rundi		57,000	-	1	Buganda (P)	1,302,000	4	97
Basoga	353,000	427,000	10	9	Busoga (D-EP)	506,000	80	95
Bagisu	172,000	244,000	5	5	Mbale (D-EP) ^h	600,000	37	83
Bagwere	79,000	83,000	2	2	Mbale (D-EP) ^h	600,000	12	89
Banyuli	47,000	57,000	1	1	Mbale (D-EP) ^h	600,000	7	77
Banyankole	278,000	388,000	8	8	Ankole (D-WP)	401,000	83	86
Bakiga	139,000	272,000	4	6	Kigezi (D-WP)	396,000	63	92
Batoro	148,000	163,000	4	3	Toro (D-WP)	259,000	57	90
Bakonjo	20,000	74,000	1	1	Toro (D-WP)	259,000	28	99
Banyoro ⁱ	239,000	181,000	7	4	Bunyoro (D-WP) ^j	108,000	74	45
Other tribes ^k	79,000	105,000	2	2	-	-	-	-
Total	2,309,000	3,176,000	65	65	-	-	-	-

TABLE 10. - Continued

Type and Name of Tribe ^b	Number		Percentage of Total African Population		Area and Extent of Tribal Concentration, 1948			
					Area of Tribal Concentration ^c	Population of Area ^d	Percentage of Tribe in Area to All Africans in Area	Percentage of Tribe in Area to All of Tribe in Uganda ^e
	1931	1948	1931	1948				
Nilo-Hamitic:								
Iteso	392,000	463,000	11	10	Teso (D-EP)	403,000	77	67
Kumam ^l	44,000	56,000	1	1	Teso (D-EP)	403,000	12	88
Karamojong ^m	64,000	108,000	2	2	Karamoja (D-EP)	126,000	-	99
Other tribes ⁿ	30,000	60,000	1	1	-	-	-	-
Total	530,000	687,000	15	14	-	-	-	-
Nilotic:								
Lango ^l	176,000	265,000	5	5	Lango (D-NP)	266,000	92	92
Acholi	138,000	209,000	4	4	Acholi (D-NP) ^o	216,000	94	97
Alur ^p	81,000	81,000	2	2	West Nile (D-NP)	298,000	21	77
Badama ^q	50,000	73,000	1	2	Mbale (D-EP) ^h	600,000	10	78
Other tribes ^r	-	16,000	-	0	-	-	-	-
Total	445,000	644,000	12	13	-	-	-	-

TABLE 10. - Continued

Type and Name of Tribe ^b	Number		Percentage of Total African Population		Area and Extent of Tribal Concentration, 1948			
					Area of Tribal Concentration ^c	Population of Area ^d	Percentage of Tribe in Area to All Africans in Area	Percentage of Tribe in Area to All of Tribe in Uganda ^e
	1931	1948	1931	1948				
Sudanic:								
Lugbara ^s	139,000	183,000	4	4	West Nile (D-NP)	298,000	54	87
Madi ^s	40,000	63,000	1	1	Madi (SD-NP) ^o	38,000	88	52
Total	179,000	246,000	5	5	-	-	-	-
Others: ^t	73,300	165,000	3	3	-	-	-	-
Totals:								
Bantu	2,309,000	3,176,000	65	65	Buganda (P); Busoga and Mbale (D-EP); Ankole, Kigezi, Toro and Bunyoro (D-WP)			
Nilo-Hamitic	530,000	687,000	15	14	Teso and Karamoja (D-EP)			
Nilotic	445,000	644,000	12	13	Mbale (D-EP); Lango, Acholi and West Nile (D-NP)			
Sudanic	179,000	246,000	5	5	West Nile and Madi (D-, SD-EP)			
Others	73,300	165,000	3	3	-	-	-	-
Grand Total	3,536,300	4,918,000	100	100	-	-	-	-

TABLE 10. - Continued

^aThe source for the 1931 figures was H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 86-89. The main source for the 1948 figures was East African Statistical Department, African Population of Uganda: Geographical and Tribal Studies (revised; Nairobi, Kenya: East African Statistical Department, 1953), pp. 1-59. Cited hereafter as EASD, African Population . . . (Of the four columns of percentages, the figures in the second and third come direct from the source cited; percentages in the first and fourth columns were computed.)

The division of tribes into the general groups followed that used by J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 1958), p. 36.

Figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest one per cent. With the division of the tribes by type, minor adjustments have had to be made in the 1948 column of "Percentages of Total African Population" in two cases--a 1.5 per cent for the Bakonjo has been rounded off as 1; and the Iteso figure of 9.4 per cent has been rounded off to 10 per cent.

^bThe tribal designations are the same as those used in the 1948 Census, cited above, except that Bagisu has been preferred to the older spelling of Bagishu.

It is also accepted practice among anthropologists and others in related fields to use only the stems of the tribal names, dropping the "Banya" or the "Ba" where it appears.

For Banyankole and Acholi the linguistically more correct spellings are Banyankore and Acoli (or Acooli), but they are not common and are phonetically misleading. Bakiga often appears as Bachiga, which is phonetically more accurate in English speech; Lango is sometimes written as Langi when referring to more than one member of the tribe; and the Badama refer to themselves as the Padhola or Jopadola.

^cThe meaning of the symbols is as follows: P--Province; E, W, and N--Eastern, Western, and Northern respectively; D--District; and SD--Sub-District.

TABLE 10. - Continued

^dPopulation by provinces is as follows: That for Buganda, which includes the Mengo, Masaka, and Mubende Districts, is furnished in the table; it was 1,302,000 in 1948. The number of Africans in the Eastern Province, consisting of Busoga, Teso, and Mbale Districts, was 1,506,000. In the Western Province, consisting of Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and Kigezi, the population was 1,164,000. Africans in the Northern Province, consisting of Acholi, Lango, Karamoja, West Nile, and Madi, totalled 943,000 in 1948. The total for the entire Protectorate was, then, 4,918,000.

^eThe figures used to calculate the percentages were rounded off to the nearest thousand, and the percentages are therefore approximations within one or two percentage points of the exact figures.

^fIncluded in the 1931 Baganda figure are Luganda-speaking Baganda of 650,000, together with the following Baganda groups speaking dialects more closely related to Lunyoro, according to Thomas and Scott (p. 87): Bakoki of 13,000; Basese of 5,000; Bakunta of 4,000; Bavuma of 4,000; and Banabwera of 2,000. The total of Luganda- and Lunyoro-speaking Baganda in 1931 was, then, 678,000.

^gWith respect to the 1931 figure for the Banyaruanda, it includes Rundi also. See Appendix A in Audrey I. Richards (ed.), Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., [1954]), p. 257.

As for the 1948 Banyaruanda population and percentage figures, most of these people have been farm or estate workers who have immigrated to Buganda from Ruanda, especially for temporary employment; but Kigezi District's population includes some 92,000 Banyaruanda, the bulk of whom are believed to have settled permanently in Kigezi, which lies just across the border from their country of origin.

^hThe Mbale District, known also as the Central District for some time, has had a checkered history. Before 1941 it was constituted variously as two or three separate districts. Even when made into one district early in the war it was administered most of the time as two separate areas--one for the Bagisu and the Sebei; and the other for the Bagwere, Banyuli, Samia, Bagwe, and

TABLE 10. - Continued

Badama (Padola), plus numbers of Iteso in the area. In 1954 these two areas were constituted as two full-fledged districts and were called the Bugisu and Bukedi Districts respectively. See Appendix V.

ⁱThe 1948 figure includes Banyoro numbering over 59,000 living in the Mubende District of Buganda, an area which formerly belonged to Bunyoro and is commonly referred to by the Banyoro as their "lost counties." The total population of the Mubende District is stated as slightly over 85,000, the Banyoro in Mubende comprising just over seventy per cent of the total. These figures relate to 1950, when a special recount was taken because the 1948 figures showed "an unbelievably high proportion of Baganda and too few Banyoro." See the 1948 Census publication cited in (a) above, EASD, African Population . . ., p. 19.

The 1931 figures also include Banyoro living in Buganda, but more precise data are not provided in Thomas and Scott, pp. 87, 433.

^jBunyoro was shifted more than other districts from one province to another--from the Northern to the expanded Western Province in 1939, staying with the Western Province when a new Northern Province was split off in 1947. See Appendix V.

^kThe 1931 figure consists of Bagwe and Samia of 22,000; Baamba of 24,000; and Bahororo of 33,000.

The 1948 figure includes 21,000 Bagwe and 13,000 Samia in the Mbale District of the Eastern Province--see footnote (h); 44,000 Bahororo in the Kigezi District of the Western Province; and 27,000 Baamba in the Toro District of the same Province.

In contrast to the data in the table, which relates to total tribal population within Uganda, the supplementary figures for 1948 provided in this footnote--and footnotes (n) and (r)--relate only to the numbers of these tribes residing in the specified Districts. Members of these tribes residing elsewhere in Uganda are included under the last, general "Others" heading in the table.

^lThere is some controversy about the proper classification of the Kumam and the Lango, and especially as regards the Kumam. The Lango are designated as Nilotic, as opposed to a

TABLE 10. - Continued

possible description as Nilo-Hamitic, because of their use of the Luo language. The Kumam, however, are designated Nilo-Hamitic in spite of their Nilotic language and because of their otherwise close cultural affinity with the Nilo-Hamitics. (Thomas and Scott, on pp. 86 and 88, included the Kumam with the Nilotic group.) These designations appear to be the ones now commonly used. Audrey Butt, The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda, Part IV of East Central Africa, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. Daryll Forde (London: International African Institute, 1952), pp. 42, 92; Goldthorpe, Outlines . . ., p. 38; J. C. D. Lawrance, The Iteso: Fifty Years of Change in a Nilo-Hamitic Tribe of Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 15.

^mThe figures for the Karamojong are more exactly those for the closely related tribes deriving from the original Karamojong. This group is called the Karamojong Cluster. Various sources provide different descriptions of the tribal composition of the Cluster. See, for example, Pamela Gulliver and P. H. Gulliver, The Central Nilo-Hamites, Part VII of East Central Africa, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. Daryll Forde (London: International African Institute, 1953), pp. 9-13, 28-29, 95-97.

The 1931 figure from Thomas and Scott presumably includes the closely allied Dodoth and Jie tribal groups as well as the Karamojong proper. Thomas and Scott, pp. 86, 96.

The 1948 Census figure includes the Karamojong proper (56,000), the Dodoth (20,000), the Jie (18,000), and some three or more smaller groups. 1948 Census, as cited above, EASD, African Population . . ., pp. 40-41.

ⁿThe 1931 figure consists of: Kakwa of 17,000; and Sebei of 13,000. In accordance with the more modern practice, the Kakwa are included with the Nilo-Hamitic group instead of with the Nilotics as was done by Thomas and Scott, pp. 95, 476. Goldthorpe, Outlines . . ., p. 36.

The 1948 figure includes 17,000 Suk West in Karamoja District of the Eastern Province; 24,000 Sebei in the Mbale District of the Eastern Province--see footnote (h); and 19,000 Kakwa in the West Nile District of the Northern Province.

See also paragraph 3 of footnote (k).

^oFor a long while--up to about 1937 probably--Acholi was administered as two distinct districts, the Chua District in the east and the Gulu District in the west. It was presumably at the time of the amalgamation that Madi Sub-District was transferred from the jurisdiction of

TABLE 10. - Continued

the District Commissioner at Gulu to that of the officer in charge of the West Nile District. See Appendix V.

^pThe Jonam presumably are included in the 1931 figure. They are not included in the 1948 figure. See footnote (r).

^qAlso known as the Padhola or Jopadola. See footnote (b).

^rThe Jonam is the West Nile (Northern Province) tribe included in the 1948 figure for "Other tribes" of the Nilotic group. As for the 1931 figure, Thomas and Scott designated no people such as the Jonam; they apparently included them with the Alur in the 1931 figure. Thomas and Scott, pp. 88, 476-477.

See also paragraph 3 of footnote (k).

^sThomas and Scott called the Lugbara and Madi Sudanic peoples but lumped them in a larger grouping of Nilotics. Thomas and Scott, pp. 95, 476. The more recent practice has been to consider them as a separate group--the Sudanic group. Goldthorpe, Outlines . . ., p. 36.

^tFor 1931 this figure includes the following, plus 42,000 others: Nubi of 6,000; Chopi [Paluo] of 5,000; Kenyi of 8,000; Baligenyi of 3,000; Kuku of 1,000; Lendu of 3,000; Bahunde of 1,000; and Babumbiro and Baziba of 4,000.

For 1948 this figure includes the few Bagwe, Samia, Bahororo, Baamba, Suk West, Kakwa, and Jonam who are not included in the "Other tribes" subtotals because of residence outside the area where most of the tribe was concentrated. See footnotes (k), (n), and (r).

The 1948 figure also includes other tribes of less than 50,000 population. Goldthorpe, for example, lists the following additional tribal representation in Uganda: the Bantu Kenyi numbering 9,000 in the Eastern Province; some Congo Bantu totalling 17,000, presumably in the Western Province; the Nilotic Paluo living in the northeast of Bunyoro, amounting to approximately 10,000, a more exact figure being unavailable because the majority of the Bunyoro 1948 census returns were lost in transit; and the Sudanic Lendu of about 2,000 in the West Nile District. Goldthorpe, Outlines . . ., p. 36; EASD, African Population . . ., p. 47.

APPENDIX II

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Some of the terms used throughout the study are defined below.¹

Authority. Authority is the power or right to command other persons in certain circumstances, such power or right necessarily by definition deriving from the belief by those to whom the commands apply that they must or ought to obey.²

Charisma. Charisma is that quality of extraordinary power which derives from the belief that particular individuals, who may or may not be holders of certain offices, have been vested by grace with exemplary superhuman qualities and talents and therefore with exceptional sanctity. A charismatic leader is one who derives his authority from the personal allegiance of his followers; the extent of this allegiance, as contrasted to primary allegiance to institutions ordained or upheld by the leader, is an indication of the degree to which a leader may be characterized as a charismatic leader.³

¹A number of other key words are used in their ordinary sense, as indicated in the Introduction. Certain terms, with more restricted or technical meanings and used only occasionally in the study, are defined in the footnotes at the first appropriate opportunity.

²Rejected here is the view that authority is legitimate power, as suggested by Sebastian De Grazia, "What Authority Is Not," American Political Science Review, LIII (June, 1959), 321. See the definition of legitimacy.

³The definitions of charisma and charismatic leadership draw heavily on Max Weber's work. The primary point to be emphasized is the inclusion of holders of certain offices. Max Weber's discussion of hereditary charisma is especially relevant. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. with introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 328, 358-396; Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed., and with introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (A Galaxy Book; New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 245-253, 262-264.

Colonial. In the African context, colonial refers to a recognized relation of dependence and subordination between an African territory and a non-African power; the term as defined can be used to modify all such dependent territories in Africa, whether their legal statuses be colonies, protectorates, or trust territories.

A colonial power is defined as a state which enjoys effective political control over a dependent African territory through some kind of constitutional arrangements.

A colonial people is a non-alien people, or group of peoples, inhabiting a colonial territory.¹

Colonial policy is defined simply as the settled course or courses adopted and followed by a colonial power which guide and characterize its relations with the colonial people of the dependent territory; the term is meant to include both general statements of objectives and actual settled practices.

Legitimacy. Legitimacy is defined simply as the state or quality of being legitimate, that is, of conforming to recognized principles or accepted standards.²

Nation-state. Any aggregate of people which is a nation by reason of its having a sense of social homogeneity and strong mutual interest; and which is also a sovereign state by reason of its occupying a definite territory, being politically organized and united under a single government, and enjoying recognition as independent by the international society of nations--such is a nation-state.

A nation-state need not be secularized to fulfill the requirements of the definition. Nor, of course, need a state be secularized to be a state. There is nothing in this definition which in theory precludes the emergence of tribal societies, for example, as

¹These definitions have been derived almost directly from Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: Frederick Muller Ltd, 1956), p. 20.

²The term becomes less simple when used to modify. For political authority to be legitimate, the members of the political unit must not only accept the decisions of those exercising the authority but they must also recognize that the holders of the authority have a good claim--traditional, legal, or charismatic, as the case may be--to authority; they need not be convinced, however, that the holders of authority have the most rightful claim to authority, nor that their political system is the most desirable.

states or nation-states in the modern world.¹

Nationalism. In the general sense, nationalism is first and foremost and minimally a condition of mind, a feeling, a sentiment of a group of people, which causes the group's members to identify themselves with each other on the basis of some common values and interests, on the basis of an awareness of likeness stemming from a measure of common cultural tradition.²

In specific relation to colonial situations, nationalism is such a sentiment, expressed by any organization or group which has the declared aim of self-government or independence of a stated political unit; the latter may or may not have a tribal basis.³

Political. Political is defined in the very general sense as that which pertains to politics, that is, that which pertains to the science, art, or conduct of government or of the public affairs of a society.

¹Others might, and have, set up additional prerequisites for a nation-state; these are considered to be too restrictive. See James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 405-407.

²See Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1954), especially p. 196. A number of definitions have likewise been discussed by Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), pp. 1-14. See also Weber, From Max Weber . . ., pp. 172-179.

³This differs from Hodgkin's definition, which includes any organization or group which explicitly asserts its opposition to European authority, whatever the organization's institutional form or objectives. See Hodgkin, p. 23.

It differs also from that offered earlier in a publication by Coleman, who confined nationalist movements to those led by a Westernized elite activated by Western ideas. Coleman excluded those tribally-based movements for self-government which are syncretistic; that is, where a Westernized elite and the traditionalists seek to reconcile and fuse tribal and Western institutions and beliefs. See Coleman, American Political Science Review, XLVIII, 406-407. For some of his later distinctions of types of nationalism, see James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 425-426.

Political refers more specifically to all those kinds of activities or mechanisms, however crude or inchoate, within a political unit, which are prominently related to the making and implementing of authoritative decisions, where custom fails to create other patterns for private resolution of differences.¹

Such activities and mechanisms constitute a political system, which can also be viewed as an aspect, a part, and a subsystem of the whole social system of the particular society.²

A political unit is a territorial entity,³ vague and shifting though its boundaries and jurisdiction may be, characterized by its own political system, which may be related in a subordinate position to other political systems and which may include subordinate political

¹Authoritative decisions are those which are accepted as binding for the whole of the society of the political unit; that is, the people to whom the decisions are intended to apply or who are affected by them consider that they must or ought to obey.

²This, and the immediately preceding definition of political, have been derived largely from the discussion of political systems by David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 96-148.

The definitions differ from Easton's concepts, however, in two important respects. First, Easton apparently intended to restrict the term political system to societies, by which he meant nations, tribes, and other large social groupings; whereas the above definition is intended to convey the idea that villages, towns, counties, provinces, nations, confederacies, and all such territorially delineated areas have political systems. Second, Easton has held that the term political refers to those activities and mechanisms by which "values are authoritatively allocated for the whole society," by which the society arrives at "authoritative social decisions about how goods, both spiritual and material, are to be distributed, where custom fails to create other patterns." Easton, pp. 134-135.

With respect to the second point, the definition provided in the text above for this study uses simply the term "authoritative decisions" and does not inject the idea that such decisions relate primarily to, or only to, the allocation of values by social policy.

See the discussion under the definition of society for the relation of political and social systems; the former are always accompanied by the latter, but the reverse is not always the case--there may be no measure of political authority in a particular society.

³Whereas a political unit and political authority must relate to a territorially defined entity, a social unit or social authority need not.

systems. (Subordinate is defined simply as placed in a lower class or rank.)

Political institutions are established, structured mechanisms for making and implementing authoritative decisions in a political unit.¹ They may take varied forms, the variations differing in membership, function, or other ways. Examples of political institutions are: chieftainship, president, or party leader; councils of elders, legislative assemblies, town meetings, party congresses; established devices to determine succession to leadership, such as the caucus, or the mechanism of popular elections.²

Power. Power is the capacity to act directly, or indirectly through other persons, groups, or things, to produce an effect. Although it is often reinforced by the capacity to impose sanctions, power is not necessarily accompanied by this quality. Power, as here defined, may therefore include some instances of what has elsewhere been considered as influence, that is, those cases where the capacity to influence is reasonably definite and decisive.³

¹Although Easton does not clearly define political institutions, the above definition is generally derived from his use of the term. See Easton, pp. 113, 115, 119, 135, 137, 139-142, 147, 151, 153, 183-184, 187, 190-191, 195, 198, 210, 212.

²Because they are institutions, political institutions must be established and structured. They must be established, in that the particular mechanisms must have existed long enough to have exhibited a regularized pattern of operation. They must be structured, with respect to membership and to organization, although neither of these need be clearly defined. To obviate confusion with other definitions of institutions, an additional point should be made. Institutions are characterized by rules, ranging from rudimentary to those which are formal and legal; the rules prescribe the way in which the institution operates, or should operate; but the rules are not, in this study, the institutions; the mechanisms are the institutions.

To be classified as a political institution, the institution must be related prominently to the making and implementing of authoritative decisions. For example, a tribal chief often functions in several capacities--ritual leader, organizer and regulator of economic activity, judicial authority. In all of these capacities the chief's decisions are often authoritative for a territorially defined entity, in which case they are political just as a modern legislature's regulation of economic activity is political. However, if the religious function in a society is fulfilled by one or more separate institutions, the latter are not political unless their activities are prominently related to making and implementing the decisions accepted as binding for the whole membership of the political unit.

³The view regarding power was reached after consulting numerous

Political power is the power to affect the political system, either to propel or retard changes in it, or to maintain it in the face of forces exerting pressure for change.

Society. A society is any reasonably geographically distinctive grouping of human beings, which is, at any given point in time, existing in such a manner as to maintain itself and perpetuate its species, without more than incidental and limited recourse to force and violence. Human, world, or international society ceases to be a society with the outbreak of major armed conflict or disorder; similarly with national, territorial, or local societies.¹ A society will be more cohesive and more durable to the extent that its members share common interests, institutions, values, historical experience, and language.

A social system comprises all those kinds of activities and mechanisms of a society which permit it to exist as a society.²

Social change is change in the social system of a society.

Traditional. Traditional is defined simply as that which has been handed down from the past.³

sources, including Friedrich, Easton, Lasswell, Morgenthau, and MacIver.

¹The common sociological definition of a society, which characterizes it as an enduring, cooperating social group, is rejected as too restrictive and as especially inapplicable to the study of larger groupings in Africa, such as territorial groupings of different peoples. Society, as defined in this study, is given a much broader and popular connotation, with the exception that it does not apply to the concept of a distinctive social class where such exists along with other classes in the same geographic area.

²If some of these activities and mechanisms are political, that is, if there is some measure of political authority for the whole society, geographically defined--then, and only then, the society and its social system can be said to have a political system. Political systems always have corresponding societies and social systems (the United Nations, the British Commonwealth, the Baganda tribe of Buganda in Uganda); but the obverse is not necessarily the case (the world of all nations, the nations of Europe, the Bakiga tribe in Kigezi in Uganda in pre-British times).

³Unless specifically noted, traditional is not used in the sense developed by Max Weber in his comparisons of traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority. See Weber, The Theory . . ., pp. 328, 341-348. See also the discussion of tradition-source political systems in Appendix IV of this study, where it is pointed out that "traditional"

Combining several definitions, a "traditional African political system" refers to those activities and mechanisms for making and implementing authoritative decisions, which are characteristic of a particular, geographically distinguished (indigenous) African group, and the essential features of which system have been handed down to that group in appreciable measure from its predecessors.¹ A traditional African political system may, according to the context, refer to the traditional political system encompassing more or less than one tribe.

Tribe. A tribe is a social group comprising a series of families, clans, or generations, together with slaves and adopted strangers; a tribe is usually also a society, and it frequently has a political system, which is a subsystem of its whole social system.²

Tribalism refers to the tribal membership's feeling or sentiment of community which expresses itself in the assertion of the desire to maintain the tribe as a social group and often also as a political group. Tribalism does not by definition automatically preclude cooperation with other tribes in a larger political unit, nor does it necessarily presuppose opposition to an alien power. However, in the African context, if both of these conditions exist, and if expressed in a claim for self-government as a separate political entity, then such a form of tribalism would constitute tribal nationalism.

is used in this study in an existential and not necessarily normative sense.

¹The meaning of "traditional" in reference to African political systems corresponds closely to the historical connotation given to the term by anthropologists who have published field studies on Uganda peoples. They define the term only by inference through use, and it most frequently refers to routinized--though not necessarily static--systems which existed at the time of British contact. Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., [1956]), p. 12; Aidan W. Southall, Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Limited, [1956]), p. 8.

The phrase traditional African political systems is not intended to refer in this study to model systems with particular characteristics distinguishing them from Western or modern systems, such as lesser differentiation of political roles and institutions, or a greater influence of kinship in the system, or even the nonparticipation in international affairs. David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 9, 13, 80, 83; Coleman, Nigeria . . ., p. 422.

²The term tribe is more precisely defined in Appendix IV in the section dealing with the common membership ties' aspect of political systems.

APPENDIX III

FIVE MAJOR FORCES SHAPING POLITICAL CHANGE IN AFRICA: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In the summer of 1957 following some two years' study of African affairs, and after a specific review of a good deal of the literature which treated African political matters from a comparative, continent-wide approach, certain major variable forces shaping political change in Africa were isolated. They formed the basis for the conceptual framework which has been used for the Uganda study of British policy up to 1945.

It is the intention here to present the reasons for the choice of the general theoretical position and to explain in more detail the delineation of the five major forces. But before proceeding, certain points must be made by way of introduction.

I. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORCES

The forces have in common two general characteristics--they are societal, human forces; and they have been generally influential in shaping political change in Africa during most of the colonial era.

Societal, Human Forces

The dominant concern is with societal forces--forces which reflect or which stem from the social environment, from social interaction, from human activity. Although a good case can be made for the ranking of certain aspects of the physical environment as major forces, these are nonhuman conditioners of the situation, to be dealt with only to the extent that their understanding is necessary to the particular problem.¹

¹The distinction between societal and physical forces owes much to Easton, who has written as follows: "We must identify at least two generically different kinds of data in every political situation: first,

The emphasis on the human forces is a predominantly societal or group emphasis, in contrast to a research orientation to individual behavior. Also, although certain possible and probable psychological factors are to be noted, a lack of sufficient familiarity with the concepts and findings of the discipline of psychology precludes more than an occasional cautious mention of the operation of such factors.¹

Politically Significant Forces in Africa

The major variable forces analyzed in the study are additionally limited to those societal forces which are politically significant; that is, those forces which have been more generally influential in shaping political change in Africa during most of the colonial era.

The forces are considered to be of major significance with respect to the greatest bulk of Africa in the past; to be more precise, all the dependencies up to World War II, most of them up to 1955, and some of them up to 1960.² The five forces would not be appropriate to a

what for want of a more expressive term, I have called the situational; and, second, the psychological. The situational refers to those determinants which shape activity in spite of the kind of personalities and motivations in the participants. There are at least three separate categories of situational data to be identified: (1) the physical environment; (2) the non-human organic environment; and (3) the social environment or patterns of human activity flowing from social interaction." David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 194. In a footnote to this passage Easton acknowledged a debt to Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, with the assistance of James Olds, "Values, Motives, and Systems of Action," Part II of Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 47-278. He also cited Max Weber as the source of much thinking about the social situation.

¹For the relation of psychological to situational research data, see Easton, pp. 206-207.

²In a number of dependent territories the forces singled out could still serve as a helpful framework for analyzing political change. In others, however, with more recent times changes in the variables would be in order.

A widespread and persistent clamor for independence would no longer be appropriately subsumed as an issue under events and issues; it probably would be sufficiently significant in and of itself to warrant its treatment as a separate force--nationalism. See Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Northwestern University African

study of political change in some of the newly independent African territories.¹ They might or might not be appropriate to a study of the older independent states in Africa.² But they are deemed to be appropriate to the largest bulk of Africa, area-wise and population-wise, during the greater part of the colonial era.³

However, even where deemed appropriate for analyses of certain territories, all of the five forces are not held to be major forces shaping political change in each of the territories. Some of the forces are major in certain territories and minor in others. Yet their major importance in some territories is sufficient in intensity or incidence to call for their consideration in any broad approach to the whole group; and their primary role in specific territories serves to highlight the significance of their absence as major forces in others.

The remainder of the discussion is divided into two parts. The first explains the bases for the choice of the general theoretical position, which recognizes, in a total view, the value-possibilities of social conflict, of variation from existing norms, and of cultural pluralism. The second part deals with the selection of the particular variables as the forces of political change.

Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. vii. Likewise the presence or absence of leadership, and the incidence and nature of political parties--these are elements which have assumed increasing importance in political change in some territories and which perhaps in such cases could not logically be considered as just features, expressions, or consequences of alien contact and influence, or of the social situation and social change.

On the other hand, in certain territories with the passage of time one or more of the five forces listed as major for the Uganda study may have become internalized; that is, it may have ceased to exist as a force worthy of separate consideration, having been incorporated into one of the other forces. For example, this process might well be expected to take place on occasion with respect to the traditional African political systems, and with regard to alien contact and influence, both becoming part and parcel of the force designated as the social situation and social change.

¹For the newly independent African states one would have to substitute, for example, such forces as political leadership and political parties in place of the variable of colonial policy.

²The forces-analysis might be applicable to the Union of South Africa, with what would perhaps be only a technical adaptation--the substitution of the Nationalist Government's policy as a variable in place of that of colonial policy.

³It was noted in the Introduction that the primary concern was with Africa south of the Sahara.

II. THE GENERAL THEORETICAL POSITION

The underlying approach for the five-forces framework has been developed as an alternative to a certain conceptual orientation expressed in the work of Talcott Parsons and others, an orientation referred to here as "integrationist." Since exception is taken to the latter, it is desirable first to indicate agreement with other of Parsons' concepts.

Support is given to his position that behavior can advantageously be analyzed in terms of a theory of action, the conceptualization of which provides that behavior is motivated by goals, that it takes place in situations, and that it is normatively regulated.¹ Agreement can also be stated with his view of a social system as a process of interdependent interaction between two or more individuals, each with his own conceptions of goals, of the situation, and of social norms, and each taking the actions of others into account.² Likewise, concurrence can be expressed with Parsons' idea that the values of individuals, social systems, and subsystems are characterized by a certain pattern of choices; although it is doubtful that his restriction of choices to two, in each of the five categories he presents, provides sufficient latitude for the analysis of value differences.³

It is at this point in Parsons' theory that disagreement must be registered, and the disagreement is primarily with the emphasis which Parsons has placed on integration. It is more a question of disagreement with what he has implied by omission than with what he has expressly stated.

¹Parsons, Shils, and Olds, in Toward . . ., p. 53.

²This is a very simplified version of the theory presented in Parsons, Shils, and Olds, in Toward . . ., pp. 54-55. The authors have used the phrase actors in lieu of the phrase individuals in the text above.

³Parsons has labelled the five categories as pattern variables; as an example, one of these is self-orientation--collectivity-orientation, which represents the choice between personal and group goals. See Parsons, Shils, and Olds, in Toward . . ., pp. 76-92. Florence Kluckhohn has suggested a three-way choice, the corresponding example being individualistic--lineal--collateral; this is believed to be a better analytical tool than Parsons' two-way choice. See Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Variant Value Orientations," Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, ed. Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray (second edition; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 346.

Parsons has singled out values as the most crucial cultural elements in the organization of social systems; he has also held that integration of values is a process fundamental for the maintenance of a given state of equilibrium of a social system in the face of variability.¹ The disagreement is generally with Parsons' preoccupation with the maintenance of the social system, and specifically with his characterization of individual and group behavior as disintegrative and dysfunctional, where it is in conflict with the values of the next higher social unit. He has not related such conflicting behavior to the successful functioning of the entire social system or with the possibility of improvements in the functioning through changes in individual and group norms. He has appeared to be primarily concerned with the analysis of social systems with respect to their integration. His theory has largely bypassed the crucial question of social change, both its actuality and its desirability.²

The concentration on integration has led to setting up the norms of a social system as the ideal and, by employing value-loaded terms such as disintegrative, dysfunctional, and deviant, characterizing nonconforming behavior as of negative value, although closer investigation might prove it to be of positive value. In other words, the original "ideal" norms have not been questioned but have been accepted at face value.

Why are these particular theories of Parsons' especially significant to political research on Africa? In the first place, if their use is justifiable at all it is in the analysis of social systems which are characterized by a fairly widespread consensus with respect to values. Such consensus does not exist in African colonial territories, and rarely even in other African states. In a dependency such as Uganda, there exist diverse total value-systems--those of the distinctive African ethnic groups, and that of the British, for example.³ If a researcher sets up the value-system of the Baganda--or of the British--as an ideal-type, and in his findings states that a certain form of conflicting behavior is disintegrative, then the researcher bears both a

¹Parsons, Shils, and Olds, in Toward . . ., pp. 108, 159, 173-179.

²The views of Parsons' position are based on those portions of his works which have been cited. Perhaps other of Parsons' writings meet these objections. But Coser's 1956 study expressed similar criticisms. See Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 16-29.

³The value-systems of the different ethnic groups may be as distinct one from the other as they are divergent from the British value-system. The latter is, of course, also marked by variations, for example, the British civil service, missionaries, entrepreneurs.

moral and scholarly responsibility to go further and to attempt answers to certain questions. Disintegrative for what and for whom? What would be the consequences of resolution of the conflict by forcing the non-conformists on the one hand or the structure on the other hand into conformity, or by employing adaptive mechanisms such as rationalization, tolerance, withdrawal, or isolation?¹ In other words, what are the alternative courses of action and what would their varied consequences be for the members of the social system in relation to one or more ultimate values? If the researcher finds this too large a task, his minimum responsibility is to provide at least a brief explicit statement of his own value-premises, and also of his agreement or disagreement with the values set forth as ideal-types. This is necessary to clarify whether the terms disintegrative, dysfunctional, and deviant carry with them a value connotation, and if so, whether it is limited or broad.

The discussion of the integrationist approach to research problems is important to the context of African studies, not only because its use in analyzing territorial societies with widely variant value-systems is theoretically open to the questions posed above, but also because it actually has been used. For example, David Apter in his Gold Coast study and James Coleman in his work on Nigeria have both leaned in a value sense toward political integration and the nation-state. Although Parsons' influence on Apter is noticeable, Coleman's position apparently has derived from other sources.²

¹The possibilities for resolving value conflicts are taken from Parsons, Shils, and Olds, in Toward . . ., pp. 173-179.

²See David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955). Apter was most objective in his handling of conflicts of norms in the two ideal-type models he set up (pp. 127, 327-329). However, he favored Western parliamentary government and national integration of the society despite an anticipated drastic set of social consequences, which he apparently accepted as inevitable without exploring or even citing other alternative methods to achieve the same general ends (pp. viii-ix, 3, 7-8, 16-17, 20, 329-330, 334).

On pages 325 and 327 respectively, Apter has acknowledged his debt to Parsons, Shils, and Olds, in Toward . . .; and to Levy's The Structure of Society. It may be noted here that Levy has also placed a stress on control of "disruptive" forms of behavior, and on "coordination" and direction of effort as functional requisite bases for the structural requisite of political allocation, the latter term referring to the distribution of power and responsibility in a social system. See Marion J. Levy, The Structure of Society (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 468-471.

See also James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Nigeria" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1953). It is perhaps misleading

To summarize the discussion so far of the objections to the integrationist theories, use of the Parsonian approach represents a bias which in fact favors the status quo; it also reflects a lack of recognition of the problem of and need for social and political change, for adaptability of institutions to meet new conditions and new values generated by new situations. The more specific political integration (nation-state) approach assumes by implication the desirability of bringing about, by one technique or another, at the minimum the supremacy of one set of values to replace those of divergent ethnic groups located within one territory, and at the maximum the specific replacement of all indigenous value-systems with that of the secular West.

All of these variations of the integrationist approach are rejected as representing positions which are both indefensible in their dogmatism, and more important, seriously impede the attainment of the primary goal of research--to increase understanding of what is, in order that men may better judge what is desirable.

For these reasons, the general theoretical approach here is one of cultural pluralism,¹ one which does not prejudge conflicting norms and values, one which recognizes that social conflict and variation from

to cite Coleman so soon after consideration of Parsons' concepts. As far as can be determined, Parsonian theory has not measurably influenced Coleman. Coleman's approach was a different type of integrationism than the somewhat more devious Parsonian concept, which disguises itself behind complex terminology and therefore is more difficult to ferret out. Coleman's was a bias, inferred and not expressed but nevertheless straightforward, for political integration of the diverse ethnic groups in an African territory. Throughout his dissertation there was the implied value assumption that political integration of Nigeria was a desirable aim. Yet nowhere was this stated clearly, or related to other valued ends as was done by Deutsch, to whom Coleman in his dissertation acknowledged his considerable debt (pp. vi, 425-426, 501). (There has not been the opportunity to check whether this is also true of the revised, published version of the dissertation. James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism [Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1958].)

Deutsch, although also not isolating his values in an explicit statement, did at points throughout his study make them and their bases clear. He favored political integration but only under certain conditions and only to a limited intensity; and he was clear as to what he meant. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), pp. 14, 49, 51-52, 56-58, 61-94, 153, 164-165.

¹See Deutsch, p. 49.

social norms may have a positive value in certain situations. Where value judgments are stated, the attempt had been made to clarify their bases.

III. THE SELECTION OF THE MAJOR VARIABLES

The remaining topic to be considered is the selection of particular variables as the major forces of political change. The questions which will direct the course of the discussion are as follows. What is the general process by which change takes place, with specific reference to political change in Africa? What are the major variable forces which have operated in most of Africa during the colonial era to shape the different political changes which have occurred?

The Processes of Change and the Forces

What is change, and how does it take place? Change may range from the complete substitution of something new in place of something old to only a slight alteration of the old. But change in the institutions, roles, values, and other aspects of the societies and political systems of the world has rarely if ever represented a complete substitution of the new for the old.

For the purposes of this study, change is viewed as the result of one or both of the following processes: (1) the interaction of existing elements of a situation in such a way as to produce a dynamic drive which must be given expression; (2) the injection of one or more new elements into a situation, thereby precipitating change.

During the past century both general and political change in Africa has usually taken place according to the following sequence of processes: the injection of new elements into the situation, with their incorporation as constantly interacting and reacting elements, to the extent that the relatively static situation is converted to a more dynamic situation;¹ the subsequent injection, at sporadic intervals, of additional new elements into the existing dynamic situation.

In line with this analysis of the processes of change, a study devoted to political change in Africa must be concerned, first, with the situation and the elements which constitute it, and second, with the new

¹It is not meant to infer that during the past century a generally static Africa has become dynamic; what is meant is that the degree and tempo of change has accelerated with the introduction of new elements into the situations.

elements which precipitate change when injected into the situation. The elements are called forces in this study, a force being that which has the power significantly to affect situations, either in terms of constraint or acceleration.

The general analytical framework of the study follows from the two preceding paragraphs. It is this: political change in Africa is shaped by the nature and dynamics of the social situation, as the latter is affected (or controlled) by the policies of the colonial power, and by events and issues.¹

Here are three of the forces: the existing social situation; and the two more independently variable forces--the colonial policies; and events and issues. What are the other forces? They are those which shape the social situation, and they include the past operation of the other two forces just mentioned. A complete listing of the major variable forces, singled out for this study as significant in shaping political change in Africa, is as follows:

1. The traditional African political systems.
2. The policies of the colonial powers.
3. Alien contact and influence.
4. Events and issues.
5. The social situation and social change.

The order of the listing is designed to emphasize the relationship of the forces. The first four, often in that order most logically, shape the fifth at any given point in time. In making a study of political change over a certain period, the first, third, and fifth forces are viewed as relatively less susceptible to independently rapid change, once colonial rule is established, unless affected by the other two potentially more autonomous forces. The policy of a colonial power--the second force--is regarded as more susceptible to rapid change independent of the other forces, yet markedly affecting them. Events

¹The framework reflects some of the ideas of James Coleman and of Carl Rosberg. Coleman stressed the importance of the following variable factors: the scale, structure, and values of the indigenous political systems; differing colonial policies; and variations in duration and intensity of European contact. James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (June, 1954), 412-413; James S. Coleman, "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa," *Western Political Quarterly*, VIII (March, 1955), 51-52. Rosberg, in lectures at Boston University in the fall of 1955, suggested reviewing African political developments in terms of the nature and dynamics of the social situation as controlled by the policy of the particular colonial power.

Events and issues has been added as a force.

and issues--the fourth force--are considered in many instances to be like policies in this respect. Therefore, the relatively less autonomous forces may be treated first and the two more independent forces then introduced better to present their interaction with the situation and the forces shaping it.¹

The Five Major Variable Forces

Why have the five particular forces been singled out for major consideration? The question has been answered in part in the first section of the Appendix. There the reasons were given for limiting the forces to those which were societal, both in the human as opposed to the nonhuman sense, and in the larger-unit sense as opposed to the individual-being sense. The reasons were also stated for considering the forces as major for the bulk of Africa during most of the colonial era, despite the occasional lack of positive significance of one or more of the forces in certain territories. The remainder of the answer to the above question can best be provided by a brief description of each of the forces, with illustrative references to the problem dealt with in the 1905-1945 Uganda study.

The traditional African political systems. This force refers to the political authority systems of the diverse African tribal or ethnic groups. Since the analysis is directed to an understanding of how and why political change takes place, the interest in this force is in characteristics of the traditional political systems which have operated to affect political change.

The first concern is with the traditional systems as they functioned around 1905, at the beginning of the period to be reviewed. But to understand their functioning then and to assess the rate and

¹Ideally, in a study of political change during a certain period, one should commence at the beginning of the period with an analysis of the social situation and of any current social change, as these are shaped by the first four forces. Then, for the period to be covered by the study, the more autonomous forces--the second and the fourth--would be introduced into the given situation, and their interaction with the situation and with the forces which shaped the situation would be analyzed.

However, in the particular Uganda study it has been found preferable in practice to dispense with a structured analysis of the fifth force at the beginning of the period--such an exercise would border on the unreal, there being no Uganda social situation to speak of in 1905. The nature of the Uganda material also called for the treatment of the force of alien contact and influence up to 1945 in the introductory background sections, rather than toward the end.

direction of changes in their functioning, it is in some cases desirable to indicate their recent historical evolution.

To be in a position to describe the operation of this force, which is variable even within a single dependent territory since different African ethnic groups with varied political systems existed, answers need to be found to the following types of questions. What were the sources of the traditional authority of the diverse tribal groups? Was political authority centralized or dispersed? What was the extent of institutional and membership conflict? Particularly important, to what extent did the nature of the authority system permit the achievement within the system of new goal aspirations, as these evolved from alien contact and social change? Determination of these answers would, among other things, furnish an indication of the extent of the loyalty ties of the group's members to their traditional authority structure.

To form the basis for an understanding of how and why the different political systems operated to shape subsequent political change, other factors must be also considered, such as the strength of the tribal groups, as indicated by their relative size and their resources, both material and in terms of leadership. These questions are dealt with at greater length in Appendix IV.

The policies of the colonial powers. The second force--the colonial policies--refers simply to the settled courses adopted and followed by colonial governments in Africa.

In the Uganda study the focus is of course on British policy, although limited reference is made to British policy in other African territories and to the policies of other colonial powers in Africa. Also, colonial policy as a force has been singled out as that one of the five forces to be accorded primary treatment. The choice is particularly appropriate, in that policy is the one force closest in subject matter to traditional concepts of political science as a discipline. For the most competent handling of the other four forces, extensive training in diverse disciplines would be desirable. For example, for the force of alien contact and influence in Uganda during the period covered, the skills of an economist, a sociologist, a theologian, and a psychologist would be in order. An historian could best present the events and issues. A sociologist would be ideally equipped to work on the analyses of the social situation and social change. And for the study of the traditional African political systems, it would be most rewarding to have the services of a social anthropologist with specialization in political science, or the obverse.

The analysis of the policy variable may be carried out in any number of ways. In the Uganda study it has been approached by a comparison of the policies of direct and indirect rule in the different areas of Uganda, and of the effects which their application had on the other forces and on the shaping of political change. Somewhat lesser

attention has been accorded economic and social policies of political import. The greater emphasis has been placed on British policy with respect first, to the local governmental institutions, and secondly, to the Protectorate's central political institutions.

In the summary analysis toward the end of the study, British policy is reviewed in terms of its interaction with the other forces.

Alien contact and influence.¹ The third force refers to the direct manifestations of the impact which all non-indigenous elements, excepting the colonial power's policies, have had on a colonial territory.²

That it is very much a variable force, both from territory to territory and within each territory, is clear when it is considered that the impact of alien contact and influence varies according to the following factors:³ the duration of the particular instances of contact and influence; the intensity of the contacts and influences--their level and their depth of penetration; the content of the contacts and influences, which are largely determined by the identity (nationality and vocation) of the agents of contact and influence--for example, French Catholic missionaries, British immigrant settlers, Indian merchants, American editors; and the forcefulness of the individuals and societies in the contact and influence relationships.

¹There may be contact with no influence. There may be contact with very little, or a great deal, of influence. There may be influence with no contact; that is, influence such as might be exerted in Africa by Pravda editorials.

²Although (British) colonial policy might well have been included under alien contact and influence, it has been deemed sufficiently significant to have been isolated as a separate major variable shaping political change.

³The factors follow the general lines of those suggested in Coleman, American Political Science Review, XLVIII, 412; and Coleman, Western Political Quarterly, VIII, 51.

Also especially helpful were the concepts for analyzing "contact situations," advanced by Professor William O. Brown in lectures at Boston University in the spring of 1956.

Lucy Mair, writing in the 1930's of the sociological problems related to colonial policies of native administration, listed three types of alien contacts: religious--missionary; political--administrative; and economic--settlers. Each had the avowed object of the development of native life, yet each, according to Mair, had resulted mainly in the destruction of native institutions. L. P. Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1934), pp. 2-3.

With these factors as guides, alien contact and influence has been analyzed as a force which operated to shape political change in Uganda from 1905 to 1945. The procedure employed was as follows: to present the data according to the content (or nature) of the contact and influence, that is, classified as to economic, sociological, religious and psychological, and political content;¹ within each content category, to indicate where appropriate the agents, duration, and intensity of the contacts and influences, and, in summary fashion, to indicate the differences in total alien contacts and influences with respect to the various African tribal groups.

Events and issues. The fourth major variable force refers to such historical occurrences, and to such topics about which there is a conflict of political views, as have been in and of themselves significant as forces of political change either in the total context of Africa or in the more restricted context of an area under special study. An event or issue significant to a particular territory and worthy of distinct treatment is one which has exhibited a marked effect on political change; and which either is a consequence of more than one of the major forces or, if primarily a consequence of one force, has affected one or more other forces to a marked extent.

In addition to their significance, why have events and issues been singled out as a distinct and major force, especially when this study is primarily a forces' analysis and not a narrative historical study?² There are two further reasons. First, events and issues are viewed as differing from other forces in character, the other forces being in general more gradual, steady, and predictable, while events and issues are regarded as more chanceful, more erratic, more emotional, irrational, or volatile--and for such reasons, more unpredictable. And second, the analysis of a significant event or issue affords good opportunities in some cases to illustrate the interaction of all forces in the shaping of political change.

The procedure for handling the presentation must be worked out for each problem. Sometimes a particular issue or event would warrant

¹Coleman, American Political Science Review, XLVIII, 411-412.

The discussion of the political content of alien contact and influence was for the most part reserved for consideration in later sections of the study.

²Isolation of events and issues as a separate force would appear to be a somewhat unorthodox procedure. An exception is the listing of issues as a significant factor in the shaping of political processes in non-Western countries in George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucien W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," American Political Science Review, XLIX (December, 1955), 1033-1034.

quite a distinctive treatment and position in a study. In other cases the different events and issues might best be taken up in the course of the consideration of the various other forces, according to the force to which each was particularly related. In the Uganda study, the latter procedure has proved the most sensible, with all events and issues then later reviewed as constituting one force at an advanced stage in the presentation.

The social situation and social change. This fifth major variable is shaped by the operation and interaction of the four preceding variables. It also sets the stage for further interaction.

It is within the context of the analysis of the fifth variable force that certain crucial politically significant aspects of the situation can be understood--for example, the distribution of political strength among ethnic groups and, within them, according to class; the extent and nature of general consensus and conflict; and the extent to which existing institutions serve to ameliorate, channel, or exacerbate political differences.

In the Uganda study, to delimit its scope the force has been defined more specifically as relating to the social groups existing in a society, to their respective positions, and to trends and pressures for change resulting from the groups' interactions with each other, as these have been affected by the rest of the five forces.

Summary

The analytical framework detailed in the preceding pages has been tailored to fit the problem of the why and the how of political change in the dependent territories of Africa during most of the colonial era. It is believed also applicable to the analysis of particular, momentarily static situations in such territories. Additionally, it provides a broad conceptual outline within which to set more intensive analyses of any one of the first four major forces, or any single component of those forces.

APPENDIX IV

AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AS A FORCE SHAPING POLITICAL CHANGE¹

Methodology is a tool, no more. An analytical tool. Worthless --many would say worse than worthless--in and of itself, its purpose is to reduce an unwieldy store of miscellaneous facts and knowledge to manageable proportions and to render them more meaningful. In this way knowledge may be more readily translated into insight and wisdom.

But just as there are different kinds of machine tools designed for different materials and with different end-products in mind, so are there research methods intended for dissimilar purposes. Choose the wrong tool and the job is a botch. Use a research method for an analysis other than the kind for which it was devised and the result is wasted effort, at the least. An appreciation of the origins and of the defined possibilities of an analytical tool is indispensable to its full utilization.

The first part of the succeeding discussion of an experimental approach to the analysis of traditional African political systems is introductory. It includes an explanation of how the need for the approach arose, of the way certain factors have inhibited understanding of traditional African political systems, and of the criteria which governed the choice of categories.

The second part provides a description of the twelve aspects, with their categories, relating to strength of political systems in the sense of solidarity. It also deals with the problem of a comparative basis for strength.

The third and fourth parts proceed similarly, with respect to the resources and adaptability of political systems.

¹The approach was originally formulated in the summer of 1957. It was revised and read as a paper on June 25, 1958, at a conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, Makerere College, Kampala, Uganda, under the title of "An Experimental Classification of Political Systems." It has undergone three basic revisions since that date.

The fifth part provides a brief summary. The sixth furnishes a detailed list of categories and a table showing results of the Uganda analyses. The last section presents illustrative material about the Lango tribe.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before setting forth the experimental approach itself, consideration of certain other matters may be helpful. These are concerned with the origination of the analytical method and with two inhibiting factors. The criteria for the approach are then stated.

The Need for an Analytical Tool

The genesis of the approach to traditional African political systems was occasioned indirectly. A broad framework for the analysis of political change in Africa was being drafted preparatory to the collection of further research data for a study of political change in Uganda. The framework which evolved was of five major variable forces shaping political change in Africa, each operating as a force propelling, modifying, or retarding change, each interacting one with the other to condition the others, and each varying from territory to territory and often within the same territory.

One of the five forces was the traditional African political systems.

From generalized knowledge of Africa it was evident that the indigenous political systems in some cases acted as a brake on political change, in others served to facilitate political evolution. It also seemed likely that whereas a certain political system would prove adaptable or amenable to one type or stage of political change, the same system might effectively bar another type. Additionally, it was obvious that two identical but geographically separated political systems would operate differently--as one of five major forces--to the extent that the other forces varied in the two distinct situations. And it was clear that some systems led from strength as a force and others did not.

But knowing this was not enough. What was wanted was the why to the tentative conclusions. For this it was necessary to delve deeper and to consider two broad aspects of each system: its general nature and strength; and its adaptability to change, particularly to those kinds of change which are in some measure an inevitable accompaniment of Western contact and influence.

The simplest way to determine the strength of the various political systems and the manner in which they operated as forces shaping

certain political change would have been to make an assessment of this on the basis of historical evidence. The procedure would have been to ascertain how a system--or, more accurately, the holders of political authority in the system--acted in a series of actual situations to shape a political change. Unfortunately, lack of source material precluded such an approach. Records of conversations between African and British officials would have been required. If these existed in any quantity--and this is doubted--they were not as yet available.

The first task then was to describe the various political systems of the tribal groups. Yet comparison with other systems in the same territory and in other territories was necessary and desirable, and systematic categories were clearly called for to facilitate a comparative approach.

Was there a suitable typology available? None appeared to be. Categorization of political systems by political scientists related almost exclusively to systems experienced in Western civilization. So-called primitive societies had been lumped together in one class, usually with the declaration that they had no political systems. Typologies by anthropologists were more helpful, but even here they could scarcely be said to be inclusive. What is more, none appeared to bridge the so far seemingly unbridgeable gap between Western political systems and primitive political systems. The latter are as political in essence as the Western systems.

The absence of a suitable systematic approach imposed an obligation to attempt one, in full recognition of the complexities involved and of the desirability of subsequent revisions. The approach presented below is in the nature of an experiment; it has not been widely applied; no claim is made regarding its definitiveness. It has aided in the analysis of the data collected for the study of political change in Uganda and may prove to be helpful in other research projects;¹ for both purposes there is no doubt that the approach could be improved upon, given greater knowledge and the opportunity to devote to the subject more intensive study.

Before going further it is advantageous to consider in more detail some of the factors which have inhibited advances in comparative knowledge of traditional African political systems.

Factors Inhibiting Understanding of Traditional African Political Systems

The concept of political systems has been advanced as a comprehensive framework for the study of that field of the social

¹Whether it would prove applicable to other than traditional African political systems is not known, although its categories have been chosen to facilitate such comparisons.

sciences concerned with the political aspect of human society. However, both knowledge and understanding of political systems is lacking. Knowledge is lacking primarily by reason of the ignorance of the nature and operation of the political systems in certain parts of the world. Africa is one of these parts. Until greater knowledge of non-Western political systems is available, understanding of even those political systems for which abundant information exists will suffer.

Even where knowledge of African political systems exists, the understanding of them is hindered by the restrictive definition usually given to the word political.

Both of these factors, the definition of the crucial term political and the restricted scope of studies of African political systems, are considered below with reference to the manner in which they have operated to impede insights.

The common definition of political. Prior to discussing other definitions of the term political, its meaning as used here in the approach to political systems must be stated as a base point for what follows.

The concept draws heavily on the ideas of David Easton. Political refers to all those kinds of activities or mechanisms, however crude and inchoate, within a political unit, which are prominently related to the making and implementing of authoritative decisions where custom fails to create other patterns for private resolution of differences. Authoritative decisions are those which are accepted as binding for the whole society of the political unit; that is, the people to whom the decisions are intended to apply or who are affected by them consider that they must or ought to obey.¹ A political system consists of the activities and mechanisms referred to above; it is an aspect, a part, and a subsystem of the whole social system of the particular society. A political unit is a territorial entity, vague and shifting though its boundaries may be, characterized by its own political system.

Political has been otherwise defined in numerous ways, but most of the definitions proposed by Western political scientists have directly or indirectly excluded from their discipline the consideration

¹David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 129-134. The definition differs from Easton's in two main respects: (1) whereas Easton apparently intended to restrict the term political system, and thus political, to larger societies such as nations and tribes, the definition above is meant to apply to all political units irrespective of size; and (2) whereas Easton held that the authoritative decisions related to the allocation of values by social policy, the above definition does not impose that limitation.

of the political aspect of non-literate, primitive societies. The basis for such exclusion has variously rested on the assumptions that the political is that which concerns the state, and that primitive societies are stateless; or that there must be formal political institutions and legal bases for them; or that the political aspects of a society must be consciously distinguishable from other aspects, both by political scientists and by the members of the society.

The definitions of political provided by African specialists have helped to widen the concept of what is political but have also imposed certain restrictions which are felt to be unrealistic.¹

The first significant attempt to analyze the political aspect of primitive African societies was made in African Political Systems, published in 1940 and edited by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard.² The book consists of eight papers dealing with the political aspects of different African societies, preceded by an Introduction written by the editors, and a Preface contributed by Professor Radcliffe-Brown. All three men are British social anthropologists of considerable stature.

In his Preface, Radcliffe-Brown performed a service in explaining how every human society has some sort of territorial structure which provides the framework for the society's political organization and other forms of social organization. The writer's clear implication was that every such society had a political organization, rudimentary though it might be. However, Radcliffe-Brown limited the political organization of a society to "that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force." At another point he stated that political organization was concerned with "the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized use of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force."³

There are two objections to Radcliffe-Brown's concept of the political--one that it is too broad because of the too inclusive definition he has given to organization, and the other that it is too narrow by reason of his limitation of the political function to the control and regulation of force. Radcliffe-Brown's definition of organization in political organization is too broad, because it includes the settlement

¹The discussion of the definitions is limited to those works available as of 1957.

²M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 1-301.

³A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Preface to African Political Systems, ed. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. xxiii and xiv respectively.

of differences by mechanisms which are in fact private, not public or authoritative in the political sense. He is justified in his view that political organizations, to be called political, need not include permanent, specialized judicial and enforcement institutions. He is deemed right in his statement that decisions may rest with the entire body of the community. His example of the gathering of a number of local, independent hordes or clans for religious rites is instructive in this connection. In such a gathering, he wrote, if a member of one horde is wronged by a member of another, the former appeals to the whole assembly, which may compel the offender--by the expression of public sentiment--to submit to punishment by the offended.¹ This is clearly in the nature of an authoritative decision.

But an objection is in order when Radcliffe-Brown includes as political those instances where, by custom, public sentiment allows an individual to seek self-redress for an injury.² Where is the authoritative decision? Can it be said to rest in the permissive attitude of the community; or in the personal decision of the individual seeking redress? Certainly an affirmative answer would result in the necessary logical interpretation of so many actions as political that one would be led to very ludicrous conclusions, such as classifying as political all marriages which the community made no effort to prohibit, or all decisions of the individual to scratch his head in societies where there existed no taboos on this type of action.

Customs permitting self-help are not political, except as a particular society may desire to limit self-help and may take authoritative decisions--as a collective body or through representatives with authority--to aim at compliance with the limitations. For example, where a society permits the relatives of a murdered man to take any form of forcible action against the murderer or his family, this is not an aspect of the political organization or structure. However, should the customs of the society provide that the relatives of the murdered man may take revenge only to the extent of the life of the murderer, and should the relatives take the life of the murderer and also his cattle, then an authoritative decision by the community to impose sanctions on the relatives of the murdered man would represent an aspect of the political system. It would not matter whether the sanctions were deprivation of property, fining, or only social ostracism. It would not matter whether the decision were taken by representatives of the community in the latter's behalf, or by an informally assembled body of those (in a simple community) exercising political rights.

There are only two prerequisites for calling societal actions political--there must be some kind of a decision, and it must be

¹Radcliffe-Brown, in African Political Systems, pp. xvii-xxi.

²Radcliffe-Brown, in African Political Systems, p. xvii.

considered authoritative by the members of a territorially delineated community. If certain activities and actions of a society are not the subject of such decisions, then they are not political, but rather private. By including non-political activities and actions in his discussion of political organization, Radcliffe-Brown's concept is too broad.

The second objection to Radcliffe-Brown's concept of the political is that, by limiting it to the control and regulation of physical force, he excluded those political functions which are in reality much more important in certain societies than the control of force. The writer who has presented the best evidence in opposition to this aspect of Radcliffe-Brown's concept is Professor Schapera, whose book Government and Politics in Tribal Societies was published in 1956.¹

Schapera examined the political systems of four different groups of African peoples in South Africa, as the systems operated prior to contact with Europeans. He defined "political community" as a group of people "claiming exclusive rights to a given territory and managing its affairs independently of external control."² He showed that the four peoples studied were all themselves divided into separate political communities. Yet in the various political communities of two of the peoples, there were no courts, and the chiefs were unable to punish offenders in other ways.³ Among these two peoples "violation of accepted norms may be dealt with solely or largely by institutions such as self-help, which although publicly approved are exercised at the discretion, and according to the ability, of the persons injured."⁴

Schapera then in effect posed the question: if communities which are obviously political communities by reason of their not being subject to the overriding authority of someone outside their geographical boundaries--if such political communities have little or no organization or institutional mechanisms for controlling and regulating physical force within the community, then how can this type of control be posited as the distinctive criterion of political organization? He concluded that community-organized force was only one of the mechanisms making for orderly life in a political community, as evidenced by the fact that two of the peoples he studied were able to lead orderly lives

¹I. Schapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London: Watts, 1956), pp. 1-238.

²Schapera, pp. 8 and 203.

³Schapera, p. 217.

⁴Schapera, p. 218.

even lacking such organized force.¹ Therefore, he held, political organization was "that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of internal cooperation and external independence."²

Political organization might or might not include control over internal force. But, according to Schapera, it had to include any organization, direction, or cooperation with respect to domestic affairs of the whole community, or any coordination of the people's activities by those in authority, since such coordination bound together the members of the community as a community.³

The pertinent feature of Schapera's book is the evidence which it presented to show that political should not be restricted to the control over the use of force.

As has been stated previously, for this approach political is considered as relating to authoritative decisions; this is preferred to Schapera's "establishment and maintenance of internal cooperation." Also, Schapera's view that political organization must be necessarily concerned with the maintenance of external independence is here rejected as excluding non-sovereign political units such as local governments, which certainly have political organizations.

The views of two other writers regarding the meaning of political must be given brief consideration, since these scholars--both social anthropologists--have published studies of the political systems of two African peoples in Uganda.

Aidan Southall, in his book on the Alur political system, indicated that the essential political functions are the maintenance of internal order and external defense, or as he variously phrased it, the control and exercise of legitimate force.⁴ Yet he showed that the extent of internal force which political authority may legitimately exercise over private disputes or private warfare may in fact be very limited.⁵

If this lack of control of force is characteristic of so many political systems, then is it desirable to base a definition of political only on force? It seems preferable to base it on authority which is

¹Schapera, pp. 217-218.

²Schapera, p. 218.

³Schapera, pp. 217-218.

⁴Aidan W. Southall, Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Limited, [1956]), p. 28.

⁵Southall, Alur Society, pp. 254-260.

accepted as binding by the members of the system, whether the authority relates to settlement of disputes only or also to decisions concerning cooperative activities.

Lloyd Fallers in his study of the Basoga inferred that it was his view that political related to "the legitimate use of the ultimate sanction of force for the maintenance of social order." On the following page he defined political institutions "simply as the rules governing the legitimate use of power."¹ For reasons given above, the first definition is rejected because of its emphasis on force. In the second definition, the phrase "the legitimate use of power" in effect is the equivalent of "the exercise of legitimate authority" since power which is legitimate is based on legitimate authority. But if this were posited as a definition of political, it would go too far. Political should properly relate to decisions which are authoritative, that is, which are accepted as binding, whether the members of a political unit believe that the decisions stem from political authority which is legitimate or from authority lacking in legitimacy.²

To summarize the discussion of the inhibiting nature of the more common definitions of political, it has been shown that certain African specialists have performed a service by providing evidence that the political is not limited to that which is just Western, formal, legal, or well-defined. Yet even these specialists--excepting one--appear to have subscribed to the notion that the political is limited to that which concerns force. And the one writer who has given the term a broader and more realistic meaning, to include other political functions, has imposed an unnecessary restriction by stating that one of the functions of political organization is the maintenance of external independence.

¹Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., [1956]), pp. 4, 5. It was stated that Fallers "inferred" the first definition. Fallers wrote that this was the usual view, particularly among students of Western political systems. He did not contradict it, although later on the same page in discussing the allocation of authority to special sub-units he described authority as "the legitimate use of power backed by sanctions."

²Easton in effect equated authority and legitimacy by stating that the test of authoritative decisions and legitimate actions was whether they were popularly so accepted in a psychological sense. Acceptance was the criterion, and not the grounds--moral or otherwise--for acceptance, according to Easton. See Easton, pp. 131-133, 159.

Easton's view is not supported, this study subscribing to the view that legitimacy differs from authority in that the former necessarily infers the recognition of at least a relative "rightness" of the grounds on which the claim for legitimacy is based.

The various difficulties and inconsistencies discussed above are surmounted by the concept of political as relating to those decisions which are accepted as binding on (authoritative for) all the members of a political system, it being clear that the mechanisms for such decisions may be advanced or rudimentary, and that political does not encompass those activities which are regulated by custom without recourse to authoritative decisions.

The restricted scope of African political studies. The second factor inhibiting an increase in understanding of political systems in general and African political systems in particular is the restricted scope of studies of the latter systems. This situation has limited the general fund of comparative knowledge, and it has slowed the evolution of the systematic approaches to political systems which are needed. Illustrations of the manner in which this factor has operated are provided in the following review of some of the studies.¹

In the introduction to their collected papers on African political systems, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard posited three possible types of African political systems. The first possibility consisted of those small societies where the members of the political unit were all united by ties of kinship, and where the kinship organization and the political structure were completely fused. None of this type was described in the book.² The second type, labelled as Group B, comprised those political systems where the lineage and political structures were each distinct and autonomous in their own spheres but were coordinated and consistent with each other, and where the lineage structure provided the framework for the political system.³ The third type, labelled as Group A, referred to those societies where an administrative organization was the framework of the political structure.⁴

¹There was no coverage of work which became available after mid-1957.

²M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Introduction to African Political Systems, ed. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 6-7.

³Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, p. 7. Group B "consists of those societies which lack centralized authority, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial institutions--in short which lack government--and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status, or wealth." Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, p. 5.

⁴Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, p. 7. Group A "consists of those societies which have centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions--in short, a government--and in which cleavages of wealth, privilege, and status

The editors discussed Group A and Group B types in terms of the influence of demography and mode of livelihood, the social composition, territoriality, the kinds of balance of forces, the incidence and function of organized force, the differences in responses to European rule, and the mystical or ritual warranty associated with political office in such African societies.¹ However, the discussion of the above elements was descriptive; no typology was proposed other than the basic division of the three types. The eight essays dealt with only the two types.

Although African Political Systems represented an advance over previous works, there are three principal objections to it. First, the categorization did not go far enough--it did not break down even the two types under general headings--and this was acknowledged by the editors.² Second, it is doubtful whether the two types dealt with brought out "all the major principles of African political organization."³ Third, the editors' classification and descriptive discussion related to the political systems of non-literate African societies; rarely were comparisons made with political systems elsewhere, and when they were, they were never made in a classificatory sense.

As regards the second objection, so little work, relatively speaking, had been done with respect to African political systems by 1940 that it would seem inevitable that other major principles of political organization would be discovered. One writer did, in fact, present an excellent case for the existence of a major principle not stated by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, and it is likely that other scholars may do likewise. Southall showed that the Alur political system in Uganda was a composite of Group A and Group B, in that, among other facts, a lineage structure provided the framework for the political system (Group B characteristic), and yet there existed specialized administrative institutions (Group A characteristic).⁴ He termed his additional major principle of political organization "the segmentary state," and he

correspond to the distribution of power and authority. . . . Those who consider that a state should be defined by the presence of governmental institutions will regard . . . [Group A] as primitive states and . . . [Group B] as stateless societies." Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, p. 5.

¹Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, pp. 7-22.

²In their introduction, the editors stated that they were attempting no further classification, but that they recognized that one was needed before a "satisfactory comparative study of African political systems" could be undertaken. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, p. 3.

³Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, p. 1.

⁴Southall, Alur Society, pp. 243, 252.

maintained, citing other examples, that it "is undoubtedly one of the most important political forms in its temporal and spatial range."¹

Southall provided an interesting analysis of the segmentary state vis-a-vis the unitary state, and of the factors in the transition of the former to the latter.² In this respect his work was more incisive than that of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, for it was related to other than just African political systems. However, he did not go further; he did not provide more detailed category headings of different types of political systems which could be used to classify systems found in different parts of the world.³

An additional example of the restricted scope of existing studies of African political systems--one of the reasons for the absence of a useful systematic approach--is Schapera's study of tribal systems in South Africa. Schapera's book advanced a more realistic concept of the political and in this respect made a distinct contribution. Within

¹The examples are cited in Southall, Alur Society, pp. 252-260. The quotation has been taken from page 243, and his views were also expressed on page 247 as follows: "any empirical form which has a certain frequency, stability, and structural consistency must receive due consideration. The morphologically transitional is not necessarily the empirically transitional form." [Or, in other words, the segmentary state type is perhaps as permanent as the other types.]

The Alur political system was "segmentary" for the following reasons. The greater Alur chiefs, at the request of groups of Alur commoners or non-Alur ethnic groups, provided their sons (chieflets) as rulers over these "segments" of the population. But political authority was vested in the segments; it was not hierarchical, in that it was not delegated downward, and no distinctive powers were reserved by the greater chief. (The latter could enlist the support of one segment to crush recalcitrance in another segment only by calling on the self-interest of the former.) The powers exercised at the different levels of the pyramidal--as opposed to hierarchical--structure were virtually of the same type; and the administrative staff at the top of the pyramidal structure was duplicated by a similar if lesser development at the lower levels. See Southall, Alur Society, pp. 229-240, 246-252, especially 251.

²Southall, Alur Society, pp. 247-249, 260-263.

³Another source later incorporated Southall's type into a classification but added no new types. R. J. Apthorpe, Introduction to From Tribal Rule to Modern Government, Thirteenth Conference Proceedings of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for Social Research, ed. Raymond Apthorpe (Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1959), pp. xii-xiii.

the scope of his data, he also provided a useful categorization of the different political systems dealt with, as well as an excellent analysis of the relation of social structure and economic pursuits to the different major types.¹

However, all the political systems--forms of government, to use his term--which he examined, shared certain basic features which, he stated, "are by no means universally characteristic of primitive society."² Some of these were as follows: Every political community he dealt with had one official head--a chief. In every community the chief was in charge of all government activities, whatever they may have been--there was no separation of powers. In every community chieftainship was hereditary in senior line of descent. Because his data were restricted to primitive societies with these features, his typology was restricted. Also, Schapera did not relate his study to political systems in non-primitive societies in the sense of comparisons of categories.

In conclusion, the following points may be made about the inhibiting factor of the restricted scope of existing African studies. First, the existing studies of African political systems have been carried out by anthropologists, and not by political scientists. Second, the admirably intensive research methods of the anthropologists have limited the scope of their coverage, both in number and kind of political systems. Third, systematic approaches, where proposed, have included only one or two major types of political systems and have been constructed with little relation to non-primitive political systems.

The Criteria for the Experimental Approach

The preceding section advanced what is regarded as a realistic, working definition of political, and it also pointed up some of the limitations of the work carried out on political systems in Africa. It is now in order to state the criteria which have determined the formulation of the analytical approach advanced here. Some have already been indicated directly or by inference.

The approach should deal with those aspects of each political system which are significant to the strength of the system. With reference to the latter, the focus should be on the system's actual or potential operation as a force shaping political change. Stress should also be placed on the system's adaptability to certain inevitable demands for change resulting from Western contact.

Two other criteria must be noted, for they were important considerations. The approach should facilitate comparison between different African political systems of very diverse scope and structure. In

¹Schapera, pp. 211-216.

²Schapera, p. 208.

addition, it should make a decided effort to bridge the gap between non-literate African systems and modern Western systems.¹ All political systems have in common the political, and an effort must be made to distinguish the similarities and dissimilarities within this broad field irrespective of geographical location, apparent complexity, or stage in historical evolution.

The experimental method for the analysis of African traditional political systems is presented below. The presentation is divided into several parts. First considered is the question of the strength of political systems in the sense of their solidarity. Categories are defined under major aspects of political systems which are felt to be pertinent to this kind of strength. Next, attention is given to the matter of the natural and human resources of the political system. Following that, the subject of the adaptability of a political system to certain kinds of change is treated. The presentation is concluded with a listing of the various aspects and categories, a table showing the application of the method to data for certain tribes in Uganda, and a description of the changing political systems of one tribe--the Lango--as an illustration of the use of the approach.

II. STRENGTH OF SYSTEMS IN THE SENSE OF SOLIDARITY

A primary aim of the analytical approach has been to facilitate an assessment of the strength or weakness of traditional African political systems as elements or forces shaping political change. One crucial general constituent of strength seemed to be lodged in characteristics such as cohesiveness, coordination, presence or absence of political organization, ability to act as a unit effectively and quickly and decisively.

Twelve aspects of political systems have been chosen as significant to this general kind of strength, which has been labelled

¹Indications of other efforts to bridge the gap were contained in Gabriel A. Almond, Research Note, "Comparative Study of Interest Groups," American Political Science Review, LII (March, 1958), 270, 275-276, 281-282. The concern there was, however, with the states of the Middle and Far East and not with traditional African political systems.

Since this was drafted there has appeared the following, which deals with Africa as well, and which treats at some length traditional and modern systems: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), passim.

solidarity for the time being in the lack of a better term.¹ Solidarity is defined as that unity which enables a system (in this case) to express its opinions, manifest its strength, or exert its influence as one.

The first six aspects relate especially to political authority, the next three to membership of the political unit, the succeeding two to conflict in the system, and the last one to the incidence of leadership. Under each aspect some of the various possibilities are categorized and defined. The categories are ordered starting with those which under ordinary circumstances could be expected to add most to a system's strength and proceeding to those which as a general rule would contribute to a system's weakness.² The propositions inherent in the ordering are common sense ones, all having their exceptions of course. They relate to strength in the limited sense of solidarity.³

The different aspects are not intended to be equal in importance. One may be extremely important to one system, another to a second system.

Further, the labels which have been used to designate the different categories are not regarded as exhaustive. Nor do the categories meet the stylistic and terminological prerequisites of a model classification. They do not hang together in a neat and coordinated pattern. For example, it would have been more uniform to have categorized degree of territorial centralization as extensive,

¹It should be emphasized that it is the aspects which are of importance in the approach and not the label of solidarity, which the aspects antedate considerably.

²Although perhaps it is obvious and need not be especially noted, the discussion of these aspects is value-neutral.

It is certainly not intended that the impression be conveyed that unitary, sovereign, authority-concentrated, and extensive-activity political systems, for example, are better than the other alternative types because they increase the possibilities for a stronger and perhaps more stable system. Strength and stability are values which must be weighed in each situation against other values which may or may not be accorded a higher priority.

³They do not constitute collectively an assessment of total strength. For example, a political system whose members were all of the same lineage would ordinarily be stronger in the sense of solidarity than a political system whose members included different lineages and clans but where everyone was of the same tribe. But, obviously, a tribe's resources are usually far superior to a lineage's, and this fact would work to outweigh the superior strength of the lineage system in terms of solidarity.

moderate, or limited; these are the possibilities posited for some of the other aspects. However, the designations unitary, federal, and confederate are preferred as being more substantive, more meaningful. No effort was made to force on to the typologies of the diverse aspects headings which were identical or equivalent.

Following the presentation of the twelve aspects and their respective categories, a statement is made setting forth as propositions the two polar models, in terms of the characteristics the strongest possible system would have in the sense of solidarity, and those which the weakest system would have.

Territorial Centralization

Political authority may be territorially centralized in varying degrees. The approximate degree of centralization may be indicated by describing the systems as unitary, federal, or confederate.

Unitary political systems. In a unitary system there is at least one political unit, and there are almost always two or more political units. In the latter case units are formed into a more permanent association, which is in the nature of a union. Whatever political authority the constituent political units exercise is delegated down to them by the central political institutions.

Federal political systems. In a federal system there are two or more political units. The cooperation of the political units is more or less permanent. The cooperation of the political units for common action always includes relations with other political units outside the federation as well as mechanisms for the settlement of inter-unit disputes. Authority in the spheres of common action is delegated upward and the delegation is more or less permanent in those spheres allocated to the federal system.

Confederate political systems. In a confederate system there are two or more political units. The political units cooperate sporadically, or more or less permanently. The spheres in which the political units cooperate for purposes of common action usually include relations with units outside the confederate system (for example, common defense or aggression) and mechanisms for the settlement of inter-unit differences. Authority in the limited spheres of common action is delegated upward. Each instance of cooperative action is the subject of a separate decision, reached and concurred in by the holders of authority of all the political units which are concerned with the decision for common action. One or more permanent institutions may or may not exist for the confederate political system as a whole, but if they do, they have no initiating authority other than to call a meeting. Except in the limited spheres of usual cooperation, each political unit

is sovereign and independent in internal affairs in relation to the confederate political unit as a whole.

Degree of Sovereignty

Political authority in political units may be characterized by varying degrees of sovereignty. These may be approximately indicated by the use of the following terms: sovereign, semi-sovereign, and dependent.

Sovereign political systems. A system which is sovereign is one in which a claim to independence (of any other political system) is exercised or is recognized in international law or diplomacy as entitled to be exercised.

Semi-sovereign political systems. A system which is semi-sovereign is one in which a claim to independence in some consequential matters is exercised but where the political system is subordinate in other consequential respects to a territorially more inclusive political system.

Dependent political systems. A system which is dependent is one in which, if there are any claims to independent action, they are not in respect to any consequential matters.¹

Authority Concentration

Depending upon the degree of concentration of political authority in its recognized spheres of activity, a political system can be designated as authority-concentrated or authority-diffused.

Before discussing the two types it may be helpful to explain the phrase "recognized spheres of activity." The common characteristic of all political systems is their concern with decisions which are authoritative for their respective units. In some political systems the spheres of activity in which such authoritative decisions operate are limited; in other political systems they are extensive. However, this is a question of the scope of political authority and that aspect is dealt with separately later.

But whatever the scope in a particular unit, political authority in its recognized spheres of activity can be diffused among several

¹The definition of these categories have been phrased in the above way to distinguish as two separate concepts the one of sovereignty and the one of independence. The former must carry with it the idea of a claim.

political institutions (in varying ways) or concentrated in one institution. The concern here is with this aspect of political authority.¹

Authority-concentrated political systems. In such systems, of those spheres of activity recognized as subject to political authority, authority over the most important is concentrated in one institution. Or, if authority over the spheres is shared by several institutions, the largest sum of authority over the important spheres of activity rests with one institution.

Authority-diffused political systems. In such systems, political authority is spread out among several institutions in one of two ways or in a combination of both. Several institutions may individually have complete jurisdiction over specified spheres of activity; or several institutions may share authority over all those spheres recognized as subject to political authority.

The important difference is not in the form but in the degree. With the diffused systems political authority must be somehow spread out among several differently constituted political institutions no one of which is in a markedly dominant position. In the authority-concentrated systems one institution is dominant. If authority in the dominant institution is held by a single individual instead of by several, the degree of concentration will of course be higher. If held by several and the recruitment is open, the concentration will be less than if it were closed.

The distinctions set forth in the above two categories are based on the following assumptions: (1) that individual personalities differ constitutionally regardless of similar life experiences and training,

¹Some writers would refer to this aspect as the functional concentration (or centralization) of powers. This might mean the separation versus centralization of executive, legislative, judicial, and possibly administrative powers. Or it could mean the separation versus concentration of the functions of government, such as the maintenance of law and order, social welfare, and the like.

The use of the idea of spheres of activity is preferred to others for three reasons. First, the analysis here is oriented to the concept of authority rather than power, and the "spheres of activity" idea is more appropriate to this approach.

Second, the traditional three-way separation of powers' theory has been subjected to so much criticism that its use would entail an extensive preliminary discussion of doubtful value. As an example of the complexities, in addition to its primary administrative functions a modern bureaucracy performs executive, legislative, and judicial functions.

Further, the general idea that government must by nature perform certain functions can lead and has led to what are considered here to be inaccurate judgments of what is political.

and that the differences produce conflicting interests between such personalities which normally exceed, in expression, the conflicts within a single personality; and (2) that the differences and conflicts between personalities with varied life experiences and training exceed those of personalities with similar life experiences and training. Since differences and conflicts tend to inhibit coordination of views and action, they lessen the possibilities for concentration of political authority.

Scope of Activity

In some political systems the spheres of activity recognized as subject to authoritative decisions--to political authority--are extensive in scope. These are termed extensive-activity political systems. As the scope of such spheres decreases, political systems can be classified as moderate-activity or limited-activity.

Exact measurements of the scope of activity in a political system are not possible and in any case unnecessary. But the following can be used as guides in making judgments about the appropriate category for a particular system: (1) the number of spheres of activity in the life of the members of the political unit which are subject to political authority; (2) the extent to which each sphere is subject to political authority; and (3) the importance--to the members of the particular political unit, in their eyes--of that portion of their life which is subject to political authority as compared to that which is not.

Extensive-activity political systems. In these systems, a great part of the activities which the members of the political unit consider important is subject to political authority. An example would be the so-called totalitarian political systems.

Moderate-activity political systems.¹ In these systems, of the life-activities which the members of the political unit consider important, those which are subject to political authority comprise neither a large nor a small proportion. An example would be the political system of the United States, which provides for the exercise of considerable political authority over the important spheres of activity relating to bodily security and the fruits of personal labor (through income and estate taxes), yet exercises only a limited authority over other important spheres such as intellectual and religious convictions and the rearing of children by parents.

Limited-activity political systems. Where political authority

¹Moderate is used here and elsewhere in later categories in a neutral sense to indicate the middle ground between two fairly polar positions. It is not used in a value or moral sense.

touches to a relatively small extent the life-activities deemed important by the members of the political unit, then the political system may be classified as a limited-activity system. An example would be an African political system where political authority operated in certain collective activities, but where all the important personal disputes between members were settled privately. In such systems there has been reliance on self-help to redress personal injuries and no political authority of a judicial nature has existed.

A word of caution is required here to avoid imparting the impression that limited-activity political systems closely approach a state of anarchy, whereas the other types are further removed. Nothing could be less true as a hard and fast generalization. All three types--as types--can equally approach anarchic conditions.¹

Source of Legitimacy

Before considering the aspects of the source and extent of legitimacy of political authority in this and the following sections, the concept of legitimacy must itself be clear.

Legitimacy is the state or quality of being legitimate, that is, of conforming to recognized principles or accepted standards. The principles or standards may or may not be embodied in formalized written law.²

When is political authority legitimate? By the terms of the definition of political authority the members of the political unit already accept the standards in that they believe that they must or ought to obey authoritative decisions. But whereas political authority may be accepted for numerous varied reasons such as threat of force, legitimate political authority presupposes that the members of the political unit accept the authority because they are convinced that it rests on a good claim.

The source or basis of legitimacy of political authority--the grounds for considering that a good claim is a good claim--may vary from system to system and even within a system. The variation can be expressed by the designation of three types: charisma-source, tradition-source, reason-source.

¹Schapera, p. 119.

²De Gaulle is reported to have said: "Legitimacy does not depend upon legality, and legality is not necessarily a proof of legitimacy." David Schoenbrun, "De Gaulle Faces an Anguished Army," The New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1960, p. 13.

The classificatory distinction owes much to Max Weber's formulation but the terms as used do not necessarily correspond to his.¹ Some of the differences will be mentioned later. At this point one can be noted--the use of the noun form instead of the adjectival. For example, charisma-source is used in lieu of charismatic-source. The noun is preferred because it places more emphasis on the actual source as contrasted to kind of source and this strengthens the classification. It is also preferred because it lessens any confusion with Weber's adjectival classification.

Charisma-source political systems. Charisma is that quality of extraordinary power which derives from the belief that particular individuals have been vested by grace with exemplary superhuman qualities and talents and therefore with exceptional sanctity. A charismatic leader is one who derives his authority from the personal allegiance of his followers. The extent of the personal allegiance, as contrasted to allegiance primarily to institutions ordained or upheld by the leader, is an indication of the degree to which a leader may be characterized as a charismatic leader.²

For a political system to be charisma-source there must be a belief in the exemplary superhuman qualities and exceptional character of a particular individual or individuals and in the sanctity of whatever order has been or may be ordained or revealed by such individuals. The belief of the members of the political unit must be that the sanctity of the charismatic leader represents a good claim to legitimacy. The belief must be the dominant belief in relation to the other two possibilities.

It is the belief in the sanctity of the leader which is of primary importance. The belief in the sanctity of the order ordained by him is secondary and dependent. The charismatic leader must be able to change the order by reason of the strength of his claim to sanctity. If the order ordained by him were to assume a position of primary sanctity, displacing the sanctity of the leader to a secondary position, then the political system would no longer be charisma-source. It would have been routinized, in which case it would have been transformed, or be in the

¹For Weber's formulation see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. with introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 324-392. For a discussion of Weber's concepts of legitimate authority see the Introduction by Parsons, pp. 56-77.

²The definitions of charisma and charismatic leader have drawn heavily on a number of standard definitional sources and on Weber. For Weber's treatment see Weber, The Theory . . ., pp. 328, 358-392, and especially pp. 365-366 for his description of hereditary charisma.

process of being transformed, into a tradition-source or a reason-source political system.¹

Tradition-source political systems. In a tradition-source system there is a belief in the sanctity of the order which has been handed down from the past and in the legitimacy of those exercising authority under and interpreting the traditional order.

The term tradition-source has been deliberately chosen in preference to traditional-source to emphasize a distinction in meaning. Traditional is defined simply as that which has been handed down from the past. As applied in the context of this field of study--traditional African political systems--its meaning is existential, not normative.

On the other hand the term tradition-source, bound up as it is with the concept of legitimacy to which it relates in the classification, has a meaning which is normative. To say that a political system is tradition-source is to say that the dominant belief of its members is in three things--first, that the political system conforms to tradition; second, that tradition is inviolable; and third, that these are the grounds for the system's good claim to legitimacy. However, the normative element need not go further. The belief of the members need not be, for example, that such a claim is good because tradition is good in and of itself, although a belief in inviolability usually carries with it a belief in goodness. The belief must not in fact go so far as to hold that the claim is good because tradition serves certain more ultimate ends. If it goes this far it is no longer a tradition-source political system but rather a reason-source political system.

A key word in the definition of a tradition-source political system is sanctity. Its use means that the traditional order is believed to be inherently sacred and inviolable. Again it must be emphasized that the latter terms are not necessarily synonymous with good although they usually are. In most cases the goodness or rightness of the traditional order would not be in question. The view would be that no reasons were required to justify these qualities of the traditional order. Some members might however doubt the goodness or rightness of the traditional order but nevertheless accept it because they held it to be inviolable. Still others might accept its inviolability merely as a good claim in relation to other claims.

Reason-source political systems. A reason-source political system is one where the belief in the legitimacy of political authority is based on reason or reasoning, in that the belief is deduced from another or others which are given and which relate to one or more ends.

¹See Weber's discussion of the routinization of charisma in Weber, The Theory . . ., pp. 363-373.

Legitimacy in a reason-source system is derived from the belief that political authority is operating or has operated to serve fairly well the more important ends of the members of the political unit. This is the basis of the authority's good claim to legitimacy.

In reason-source political systems neither the institutions nor the leaders exercising political authority are recognized as possessing primary sanctity. Whatever sanctity exists rests first and foremost in the ends--the ultimate situational values--subscribed to by the members. The particular form of political authority and the particular leaders represent the means to the achievement of the ends. To the members the means are reasonable; that is, they are logical. The belief in the appropriateness of the means is deducible from the other given beliefs regarding ends.

It might be said that tradition-source and charisma-source systems are also based on reason, since the former is a belief in the goodness of the claim because it has been handed down from the past, and the latter because the leader is vested with exceptional sanctity. True, these are reasons. But they are unrelated to other given ends, or if they are related, the ends are a secondary and not primary consideration.

Examples can clarify the distinction between the three types. Assume that the existing order of a system has been handed down from the past; also, that the legitimacy of the political authority is based on the belief that the existing order can best achieve or maintain stability and that stability is the most important end or value in life. In such a case the system is a reason-source system and not a tradition-source system, despite the fact that it has been handed down from the past.

In another example it may be assumed that the existing order has been ordained by a leader with charismatic qualities; also, that the consensus of the members of the society is that economic development must be given first priority. The legitimacy of the political authority in such an instance would be reason-source and not charisma-source, providing the members believed the particular leader could best further the goal of economic development, and provided they desired a change in leaders if they became convinced another leader--or another form of political authority--could better serve the given end.¹

¹From the above discussion, it is evident that the reason-source political system need not exhibit the characteristics of Weber's rational-legal type of political institutional authority, which he has described as follows: (1) rules are universalistic and impersonal in that they apply equally to all; (2) the spheres of political office and private affairs are separated; (3) there is an administrative staff which is bureaucratic, heirarchical, and recruited by fitness and not on the basis of ascribed status; and (4) rules or laws derive legitimacy

The order of presentation of the three types indicates the nature of the generalized propositions advanced regarding their respective strength as characteristics of political systems. Something more must be said of the bases for these propositions.

Two assumptions are made with regard to the following dichotomies: emotion versus intellect; and the personal versus the impersonal. It is assumed that in no society can intellect be certain to reign supreme since emotion is always present to be appealed to. As a source of the drive behind human activities the power of emotion is superior to intellect in three ways. It may be marshalled more quickly, more spontaneously; it may operate more blindly, with fewer inhibitions and restrictions; and it may summon to an activity a greater intensity of energy.

The second assumption is that the personal has greater meaning for human beings than the impersonal. Actions based on personal knowledge, or on personal relationships--real or imagined--are stronger actions than those based on the impersonal.¹

A charisma-source political system rests on emotion; it also derives its support from the members' usual personal identification with the leader. Of the three types, it is therefore the strongest. It is also the most dirigible; that is, it may be propelled most easily in a number of directions.

A tradition-source political system also rests on emotion but the emotion is not dirigible except within certain limits. The limits are set by the ideas of the members concerning what is traditional and what is not, which is to say the ideas of the members concerning which actions can satisfy their emotions and which cannot. In this respect a tradition-source system is not as strong as a charisma-source system.

from having been enacted or imposed by a legitimate agency or procedure. Weber, The Theory . . ., pp. 328-336.

Why has the definition of the reason-source political system been phrased as it has? Why has Weber's concept of rational-legal institutional authority not been used? The answer lies in the purpose of the classification. It is concerned with change. To determine susceptibility to change it is more relevant to ask whether the legitimacy of the political authority of a unit is based on beliefs in tradition and charisma for their own sakes, or whether it is based on reason. If the legitimacy is based on reason the system is more susceptible to change. It is both more relevant and more basic to ask such questions than it is to ask whether political authority exhibits the specific characteristics of Weber's rational-legal type.

¹For the importance of personal relations in Africa, see Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Northwestern University African Studies, No. 2; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 64.

Of the tradition-source systems some may be stronger than others depending upon the degree to which they incorporate personal as contrasted to impersonal characteristics. A universalistic, bureaucratic tradition-source system will be less strong than one in which the members expect to be and are treated as whole persons, in contrast to being treated as taxpayers at one time and as members of a labour union at another.¹

A reason-source political system is the weakest of the three types.² Since in this kind of system action is limited to certain goals, it is weaker than the charisma-source system where action is dirigible. In relation to the tradition-source type it might in some cases be stronger. It would be stronger if the limitations of the traditional order of the tradition-source system were greater than those imposed on action in the reason-source system by the dominance of one or more goals. However, assuming that such limitations in the two systems are equivalent, the tradition-source system would be the stronger since it rests on emotional attachment deriving from long habit and instilled through training. By appeal to cherished symbols it could summon the active support of its members more quickly and in greater intensity.

Reason-source systems may be predominantly personal-oriented or impersonal-oriented, just as tradition-source systems. Those which are characterized by impersonality are weaker than their opposites. It should be mentioned that a personal-oriented, reason-source system could be stronger than an impersonal-oriented, tradition-source system. But the reverse would be the case if both types were similarly oriented.³

¹The fact that a tradition-source system may be bureaucratic and impersonal serves to highlight the difference between the three types defined in this classification and the types used by Weber. However, a debt is owed in this section to Parsons, who analyzes in a somewhat sharper focus Weber's references to the human preference for the personal as contrasted to the impersonal. Parsons, in the Introduction to Weber's The Theory . . ., pp. 68-70.

²All of these generalizations are, of course, made in a value-neutral sense. Strength may be valued or disvalued, depending on the circumstances and the individual.

³The previous discussion has dealt with the three types as ideal types. But such ideal types rarely occur and most political systems are combinations of two or three of the types. For the view that the relative absence of the ideal types in historical cases is not a valid objection to attempting their conceptual formulation, see Weber, The Theory . . ., pp. 328-329, 383.

The possible combinations are too numerous to cover in detail. However, it logically follows that the strongest combination would be a

To summarize the comments on the three different believed-sources of legitimacy of political authority, the charisma-source, tradition-source, and reason-source types may be ranked in that fashion in the order of decreasing strength. The ranking is based on the assumption that emotion is a more powerful force in general than intellect, and that emotion plays a lessening role as the consideration passes from the first to the third types. The ranking is also based on the assumption that personal attachments are stronger forces than impersonal attachments, and that the charisma-source type carries with it the personal element whereas the other two types may be characterized by either a personal or an impersonal orientation of the system.

Extent of Legitimacy

Political systems may vary according to the extent of legitimacy accorded to the holders of political authority by the members of the political unit. Differences in extent may be differentiated as follows: marked-legitimacy, moderate-legitimacy, and minimum-legitimacy.

In line with the discussion of legitimacy under the previous section it follows that the extent of legitimacy means in fact the extent of a belief, the belief by members of the political unit that political authority as exercised in the system conforms to recognized principles and accepted standards, and that the claim of the holders of authority to their authority is a good claim.

It is not possible of course to measure the extent of legitimacy exactly for any system. Nor is a precise determination required by the problem. In making a common sense estimate of extent of legitimacy any number of criteria can be applied. Some, which may be used as guides, are as follows: (1) the number of members of the political unit who hold

system where there was a long-established--and thus in part traditional--charismatic leader who was pursuing one or more goals which were highly valued by the members of the community. Such a system would possess the strength derivable both from emotion and intellect as well as that derivable from personal attachment to the leader. Of course it would be less dirigible than a pure charisma-source system, but this would be of little moment if there were no conflict regarding the direction, that is, the goal. For a discussion of the combined tradition-charisma source of legitimacy for chiefs in Africa, see Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed., and with introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (A Galaxy Book; New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 251-252.

The usefulness of a three-way categorization of believed sources of legitimacy lies in the knowledge gained as to which is the dominant type in a system and why a particular combination of types is strong or weak.

the belief; (2) the intensity of their conviction; that is, the extent to which they consider that the claim is the best claim, or conversely, only one of several good claims; (3) the extent to which they consider that all, some, or only a few of the holders of authority have a good or rightful claim to political authority; (4) the extent to which the good claim to authority rests on successful performance, and the possibilities of failure resulting in rapid loss of legitimacy; and (5) the degree of permanency of the exercise of political authority by those holding it, and the variations in those exercising it and those acknowledging it.¹

Marked-legitimacy political systems. In such systems the great majority of the members of the unit share an intense conviction that all of the holders of authority have a good claim to political authority.

Moderate-legitimacy political systems. In such systems the characteristics of a marked-legitimacy system are reduced to what amounts collectively to a moderate but not limited level.²

Minimum-legitimacy political systems. In such systems only a few members of the political unit share a belief that the holders of authority have a good claim to political authority; or, a majority of the members have such a belief but it borders on the ambivalent; or, the belief is that only a few of the holders of authority have a good claim to political authority.

Common Membership Ties

Political systems may vary in the nature of the common ties of the total membership. The variation may be expressed in terms of extent and of closeness of common ties. Closeness refers to the degree of intimacy of the ties. Extent refers to the number of different kinds of common ties which bind the membership together. Both can be expressed simultaneously by the following categories of political systems:

¹The above guides are only suggestions. They have been derived from the application of the approach to the main tribes of Uganda. They were not, however, all consistently applied for each tribe in the estimates of extent of legitimacy characterizing the different political systems.

²For example, a system would be a moderate-legitimacy political system if most of the members of the political unit considered that most of the holders of authority had a good claim to political authority, but that another claim might be just as good or valid; the claim of the holders of authority would be accepted as good and valid, but the possibility of other claims would not be ruled out.

lineage-membership, clan-membership, tribe-membership, culture-membership, and residence-membership.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the individual types, it is necessary to provide some preliminary explanations to answer the following questions: What is meant by total membership? How is it that extent and closeness can be expressed simultaneously? What other considerations are relevant to these categorizations as a whole?

Political system and political unit are terms which refer to territorial entities. Therefore, total membership refers to all those persons concerning whom a political system operates, that is, primarily to all those persons residing within the territorially defined political unit who are subject to the political authority of the political system.¹ For most practical purposes membership can be said to include only adults since children are subject primarily to parental authority, not political authority.² (The definition of adult would vary according to the culture.) The term membership will, then, be used in this qualified sense. Although total of course means all such adult persons, it will not be interpreted so rigidly as to require, for example, that a lineage-membership system be categorized as a residence-membership just because it includes an occasional adult resident of dissimilar lineage. However, the proportion of such adults must be very small and insignificant indeed.

Simultaneous expression of extent and closeness of common ties is possible in the typology because with each successive type both the extent and the closeness diminish. As regards the closeness, the statement of any particular type of common ties as the basis for categorization precludes the existence of those types of common ties in previously listed categories. For example, to say that a system is a residence-membership system is to say that the members of such a system are not all also bound together by lineage, clan, tribe, or cultural ties. That is, in such a system, there exist diverse lineages, clans, possibly tribes, and cultures. The intimacy or closeness of common ties is limited to that degree which might derive from residence in a common territorial area.

As regards the extent of ties, this also diminishes with each successive type. For example, lineage-membership systems have the most extensive common ties in that their members share the same lineage,

¹Also included are persons residing outside the unit but subject to the political authority of the unit's political system. Excluded are residents of the unit not subject to its system's authority.

²Women would be excluded in many cases. They are in the Uganda study.

clan, tribe, culture, and residence. At the other extreme residence-membership systems are the least extensive as their members share only the ties of residence and do not all share any of the other types of ties.

Three other considerations are relevant. The first is that although each type is considered below in terms of its independent existence, it must be remembered that political systems and units may differ in scalar level; that is, they may exist as subordinate or superior to another political system.

Secondly, at least four possible additional types have been omitted. One is that based on the family, either elementary or extended.¹ Territorially defined family political systems are rare or insignificant in the consideration of political units. They are therefore excluded to limit the scope of the analysis. Two other omitted types, both based on social groupings larger in the scalar sense than the clan and yet smaller than the tribe, are the tribal section and the ethnic group. In a more intensive approach they should be included, for analysis of the Uganda data revealed the existence of such additional social units.² Although of some importance in the local and tribal sense, they were not of major significance in the broader view.

The other category which has not been included as a separate type is that of nation-membership. A nation does not necessarily have to consist of members of the same tribe or culture, but empirically it may and does on occasion. In these circumstances it is impossible to place nation-membership at any one point along the scale as a distinctive type between two others. Therefore, if the concept of nation is to be used, it is necessary to introduce this type of tie within each category to which it is appropriate. In the Uganda study it has not

¹The former is composed of man and wife and children; the latter, of these plus the families of married sons in patrilineal systems or married daughters in matrilineal systems. See Southall, Alur Society, pp. 36-37.

²The designation tribal section was coined and applied in the case of several tribes. Among these were the traditional Bagisu, Bakiga, Lugbara, and Iteso. The traditional Acholi chiefdoms under British rule became tribal sections, and the same could be said about the Basoga chiefdoms. In most instances the tribal section had its own, though vague, territorial boundaries; it was often distinguished from other tribal sections by differences in dialect, or history.

The principal intratribal ethnic division noted in Uganda was that between the Bairu and the Bahima in the three smaller Kingdoms. However, the two groups were not sharply distinguished territorially, although in Ankole the Bairu were settled mostly in the west and the Bahima as pastoralists largely preferred the eastern region.

been used. It is believed that where the phenomenon existed, its presence was amply taken into account in the analysis of other aspects, notably that dealing with the extent of legitimacy.

The third relevant consideration requiring emphasis is that, despite the stress placed on the political system and the political unit, the categories relate to the common ties of total membership and are not intended to describe the type of political authority. A lineage-membership political system often has, but need not have, a political system in which the political authority is held according to lineage rankings. A lineage-membership system could also be a universalistic, bureaucratic, impersonal political system.

The variation in the extent and closeness of common ties of total membership may take the following forms: lineage-, clan-, tribe-, culture-, and residence-membership political systems.

Lineage-membership political systems. The total membership of these systems claims lineal descent from a common ancestor, and the genealogical links relating each member to all other members and to the common ancestor can be rather exactly traced.¹

¹The definition of a lineage becomes clearer when compared to that of a clan, which is discussed under the next category. But a number of points may be clarified before further discussion of the lineage-membership type.

For most practical purposes, and especially in the case of African societies, the requirement that the lineage links be traceable limits the common ancestor to a more recent one than the common ancestor of a clan. Schapera, p. 30.

Evans-Pritchard has written with the implication that in the case of a lineage it must be possible to state the relationships exactly. In E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan," African Political Systems, ed. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 284. Fallers has held the view that the links need be only more or less exactly traceable. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, p. 90. The first view is perhaps too rigid; the second too vague. The insertion of the word rather in the definition above is intended to strike a mean.

An important word in the definition is claims. The concern in determining lineage membership is not the biological relationship but the socially recognized relationship. Fallers has used the word "putative." Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, p. 66. An obvious example would be an adopted child. For a discussion of the social rather than physical basis of kinship in general, see A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Introduction to African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde, editors (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 4, 10, 13.

Another instance of the socially recognized relationship would

The common ties of the lineage-membership systems are the closest and most intimate, being based as they are on actual or putative biological relationships and on the more personal social relationships which customarily stem from the former. The ties of the members of this type of system are also the most extensive. In addition to common lineage ties the members are also members of the same clan, of the same tribe (if such exists), of the same culture, and of the same residential unit.

The remainder of the types diminish in closeness because the nature of the tie in each successive category is less intimate. They also diminish in extent of common ties because each successive category fails to include as ties common to the total membership those kinds in all of the preceding categories.¹

be where an individual falsified his genealogy in order to change his social position by joining a lineage other than his actual biological one. In such cases the falsification must be accepted unwittingly or otherwise by the lineage acquiring the new member. For an example of the rather widespread incidence of this practice, see Edward H. Winter, Bwamba: A Structural-Functional Analysis of a Patrilineal Society (Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons Limited, [1956]), pp. 213-218.

Certain other types of falsification may be practiced and the group still be classifiable as a lineage. For example, in tracing links to a common ancestor insignificant intermediary ancestors may be left out, thereby telescoping the genealogy. This is another case of a social genealogy as contrasted to an actual genealogy. Winter, p. 211. But in the case of such telescoping the members must still be able to trace rather exactly their mutual links. Otherwise the group becomes a clan.

The final point to clarify the definition of lineage used here is that married women residing with their husbands are considered as members of their husband's lineage. Unmarried girls, and widows who have returned to their natal lineages, are considered as members of their natal lineages, since they reside with the latter. Southall, Alur Society, p. 37. The preceding comment applies to cases of male (agnatic) descent. But since lineal descent may be traced in different lineage systems either through males or females, it could be phrased to apply also to female descent.

¹The result would be diminishing strength in the sense of solidarity. However, resources ordinarily would increase simultaneously, usually sufficiently to balance out the lessening of solidarity, other things being equal. The facts of each case would be required to make a particular determination.

An example of how a clan-membership political system would not have resources in excess of a lineage-membership political system can be provided using Southall's concepts of corporate lineage and clan

Clan-membership political systems. In these systems three conditions obtain. The members all claim lineal descent from a common ancestor, but the genealogical links relating each clan member to all other members and to the common ancestor cannot be traced with any degree of exactitude and are merely assumed to exist. The members

section. Southall, Alur Society, pp. 37-39.

Southall has defined corporate lineages as lineages which are localized territorial units and the members of which regard themselves collectively as a permanently constituted group in terms of either property-holding or constituted authority. He has defined clan sections as corporate groups--that is, with the characteristics of corporate lineages except that instead of the members all belonging to one lineage, the group is composed of members of several lineages of the same clan. (In the example, these lineages have other members who form localized corporate groups elsewhere.) For the purposes of this discussion Southall's corporate lineages and clan sections can be considered as political units, as the term has been used here. They would be classified respectively as lineage-membership political systems and clan-membership political systems.

It is readily evident that a corporate lineage which included almost all of the members of the lineage might well be equal to or even larger than a clan-section in terms of population and area and thus in terms of resources.

A similar analogy could be drawn in the case of the other types --tribe, culture, and residence. For these reasons, whether the factors of common ties and resources balance each other out must be determined in each individual case.

The above illustration also helps to show that there may be variations in size and level within each of the types in the classification. For example, lineage-membership political systems may exist side by side with clan-membership systems of the clan section type. Yet both may be subordinate to a political system which includes all the members of the clan. In such a case there would be two levels of clan-membership political systems.

Another point requires clarification. The general proposition is that the lineage-membership political system would be more cohesive than the tribe-membership system, and so forth. However, an exception to this order of cohesiveness might have to be made where the political system is characterized by the additional tie of nationalism. A residence-membership system whose members shared a strong feeling of common identification as a nation might well be more cohesive than a tribal system not exhibiting this characteristic, even if they were equal in resources. However, it is considered that this difference in common identification would show up under other aspects analyzed, especially that of the extent of legitimacy.

consider that they are an exogamous group; that is, that they marry only outside the clan. And lastly, the members share a common name or symbol of identification as a group.¹

Tribe-membership political systems. A tribe-membership system is delimited by four characteristics. The members do not consider that they are an exogamous group, that is, they do not consider that they may marry only outside the tribe. The bulk of the members claim a common ethnic origin. All of the members, including adopted strangers, share or subscribe to a culture which is common in many respects and which includes common customs and language as well as the broader aspects of culture. And finally, the common identification of the members is symbolized by a distinctive tribal name which the members and nonmembers use to distinguish their two groups.²

¹The definition has been derived from the consideration of clans and their characteristics in a number of works including those of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, Fallers, Southall, and Schapera. See M. Fortes, "The Political System of the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast," African Political Systems, ed. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 243; Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, p. 284; Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, pp. 64-66; Southall, Alur Society, pp. 63-69; Schapera, p. 30.

Southall's discussion of the difficulties of defining a clan is perhaps the best. He has pointed out how the limits of clanship can be only vaguely and negatively defined and how the logical difference between a large lineage, a clan, and a tribe is hard to draw absolutely since these social groups are impermanent, fluid, and relative. He has shown how in time a lineage divides into two or more lineages, which may form a new clan. A clan may split into two or more clans, which together may or may not form a new tribe. Such fission and redesignation depends on time and circumstances. Fusion is also possible.

For the purpose of this typology, a clan is distinguished from a lineage in that the genealogical links of the former cannot be traced with exactitude. It is distinguished from a tribe in that those who claim clan membership consider they may marry only outside the clan. A clan consists of related lineages. A tribe consists of related clans, together with other members.

Just as the concern in the determination of lineage membership was with the socially recognized relationship and not the biological, this is also the important criterion in clan membership. The members of the clan are those who claim lineal descent from a common ancestor. They would include those who had falsified their genealogy, providing the falsification was accepted by the clan.

²This definition is the least satisfactory of those advanced in the total-membership classification. It has been phrased as it has

Culture-membership political systems. In these systems all the members share or subscribe to a culture which is common in its broad outlines but not in its specific customs, or even necessarily in language.

No attempt is made to define the term culture more precisely. But as an example of the general concept, it is held that although the customs and speech of the Scots, Welsh, and English differ, these peoples of the United Kingdom share a common culture in the sense used here.

Residence-membership political systems. The only feature characteristic of the total membership of these systems is in the nature of a residential status which defines those persons residing within the unit who are subject to the political authority of the system and thus are members of the political unit.¹

partly because of the following considerations.

Evans-Pritchard has written that the Nuer tribe was characterized by several features: territorial unity and exclusiveness; economic self-sufficiency; name distinction; patriotism; and as being the largest unit which considered that disputes within it should be settled by arbitration, disputes with units of the same kind being settled by warfare. Evans-Pritchard, in African Political Systems, pp. 278-279. But clearly these cannot all be used as prerequisites, especially in colonial situations.

Schapera apparently has equated tribe with all those persons who pay allegiance to the same chief, where such a group is independent of outside control. Schapera, pp. 10, 28-29, 34, 207. But he has included within the tribe even those larger groups immigrating to or conquered by the tribe, despite the fact that their culture may be quite different.

One characteristic of many tribes is that the bulk of the members claim descent from a remote common founder; but since this is not true of all tribes, it cannot be stated as a prerequisite.

The difficulties encountered in formulating a working definition of tribes are perhaps sufficiently illustrated by the above comments. See also J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 1958), pp. 24, 27.

¹It might be asked why the terms nationality, citizenship, or native-born have not been used instead of the concept of residential status. The answer is that they are obviously not appropriate, since they usually refer to political rights, not to the duties and obligations of those subject to political authority. Some of those subject to political authority may have no, or only limited, political rights. In any event, the first two terms carry with them a formal, legal sense which is not applicable to political systems where such a sense is not developed. And nationality also connotes the concept of nationhood, which is a separate question.

The previous discussion of total membership under the major classification of common ties is relevant.¹

Largest Dominant Group

In most political units, one or more groups may be politically dominant to a significant degree by reason of the uneven distribution of political rights among the total membership, or the existence of a group or groups, smaller than the total membership, with unequal influence as regards authoritative decisions.² Some of the groups which may be distinguished by type, and which are defined below, are as follows: dominant-lineage, dominant-clan, dominant-tribe, dominant-class, dominant-race, dominant-political-party, and plural-dominant-groups. Others, which have not been included but certain of which are relevant to localized situations in Uganda's past, are dominant-caste, dominant-age-grade, dominant-tribal-section, dominant-[intratribal]-ethnic-group, dominant-religion, and with regard to Uganda as a whole, dominant-culture.³

¹The definition of residence-membership systems ordinarily includes the great majority of those residing within the unit, even temporarily. But there may be specific exceptions of classes of individuals, and these may vary from system to system. For example, exceptions to the definition of residential status may take one or more of the following three forms, among others. There may be provision for immunity for foreign diplomatic representatives as has been the custom in the international society of nations. There may be an exemption of nearly all foreigners, as existed in the earlier recognition of extraterritoriality in China, or as it has existed in modified form in most African colonial territories. Or there may be a restriction of political authority to only certain fields where a particular class of residents is concerned, as has been the case with American troops stationed in some foreign countries.

²The concern of this category is with the largest of such groups in each political unit. Definitely excluded from consideration are groups, the members of which are the actual holders of authority. These are considered under a previous aspect dealing with the degree of authority concentration.

For example, if an appreciable proportion of the total membership of the political unit lacked the privilege of voting, those who were accorded the privilege would constitute the largest politically dominant membership group, providing the privilege was politically significant and not a matter of form. Or, if the total membership enjoyed equal political rights with respect to individual voice in decisions or in selecting representatives, one large group--united on the basis of common ties or common interests--might exert a dominant political influence.

³Some of the foregoing groups have been mentioned under the

Dominant-lineage political systems. In these systems, of two or more lineages existing in a political unit, one is dominant politically.

Dominant-clan political systems. In these systems, of two or more clans existing in a political unit, one is politically dominant.

Dominant-tribe political systems. In these systems, the members of one tribe are politically dominant.

Dominant-race political systems. In these systems, the members of one racial group are politically dominant.¹

Dominant-class political systems. In these systems, the members of one class constitute the largest politically dominant group.

Dominant-political-party political systems. In these systems, a political party is the largest politically dominant group. To be classified as such a system, the political party must be more significant as a party than any one large group of its members or than any one characteristic feature of the party.²

Plural-dominant-groups political systems. In these systems there is no one largest group which could be clearly designated as politically dominant; rather, there are two or more groups which continually or alternately share political dominance.

As an example of the manner in which the categorizations would be made, assume a village as the political unit under study. The total membership is composed of individuals who are members of several different lineages, some of which are of different clans. But there is one lineage in the village around which the social system is structured and

previous aspect dealing with common membership ties. In Ankole the dominant-caste and dominant-[intratribal]-ethnic-group were synonymous for the traditional system. The dominant-religion category could perhaps be applied to both the local systems and the wider territorial system in more recent times. The dominant-culture type is included with specific reference to the major tribal groupings such as Bantu and non-Bantu, the latter divisible into further general types.

¹The term race is used loosely in this study, and in a popular sense, to refer to those several different divisions of mankind which differ physiologically sufficiently to characterize them as distinctive human types.

²For example, where political parties are formed on racial lines and take racial stands on issues, the system is more properly a dominant-race system; similarly where parties are formed on distinctively class lines.

the elders of which exercise a large proportion of the total limited political authority. This lineage, which may be called the maximal lineage, would in effect be the largest politically-dominant membership group in the village.¹ The political system of the village could thus be classified as dominant-lineage. At the same time, since lineages of different clans were also represented in the total membership of the political unit, the classification of the system by extent and closeness of common ties would be that of tribe-membership and not clan-membership.²

Special mention must be made of the last type mentioned in the scale under this heading--that of plural-dominant-groups. In these systems there is no one largest group which could be clearly designated as politically dominant; rather there are two or more groups which continually or alternately share political dominance. An example would be the two-party system of the United States and to a lesser extent of Great Britain. But the plural groups need not be two or more groups of the same type. A political party group might share political dominance with a class group from which it was distinguished. The class group, for example, might be based on appointed nobility, or on specialized education in the field of management or other expertise. As an illustration, in the Soviet Union the Communist Party is considered by some to have shared political dominance at times with a privileged elite. The latter has not always coincided with party membership.³

Political Mobility

Political systems may vary according to the degree to which all members of the political unit can rise to positions of political influence and authority. The variations may be classified in terms of political systems which are closed, mixed-closed-open, and open.⁴

¹It would be the dominant membership group because (1) only from this group could those holding political authority--the elders--be drawn; (2) the members of the lineage have some say in the designation of which of the older men are to become elders whereas non-maximal-lineage members do not; and (3) in view of the greater strength of lineage ties the lineage members presumably have greater influence with the elders in the latter's authoritative decisions than do non-maximal-lineage members.

²The example has been constructed largely from Winter, pp. 17, 85-110, 249-250.

³See the writings of Fainsod, Kulski, Moore, and Brzezinski.

⁴The usual generalized propositions about relative strength of the different types of systems are restricted in this case primarily to stable situations. In situations of stability a closed system is more cohesive than an open system and the possibilities for strength are

Closed political systems. In these systems, positions of political influence and authority are limited to the members of a small group whose status has been acquired by birth or by some other rigidly ascribed means.¹

Mixed-open-closed political systems. These systems are a mixture of the closed and the open. Some of the situations which may serve as guides for categorizing systems in this type are: the open system's standards (see below) are set so high that they may be met only by unusual personal effort; or, a sizeable minority of the members are excluded from rising in political influence and authority by reason of one or more ascribed qualities, but the remainder of the members are not; or, some positions are open and some are closed.²

Open political systems. In these systems, members can move upward in political influence and authority, subject only to the limits imposed by moderate standards of achievement and performance, standards which are universally applicable to all members.

Institutional Conflict

Political systems may vary according to the degree of institutional conflict within the social system. Institutional conflict here is not restricted to conflict inherent in a particular pattern of political institutions. It refers to conflict in any of the social institutions, as long as such conflict is significant to the political system and to the functioning of political authority. In this sense, political systems may be distinguished as follows: minimum-institutional conflict, moderate-institutional-conflict, and

greater than in an open system. The latter cannot, by its nature, be as one-minded as the former. However, in a situation of social change a closed system may be weaker by reason of its leaders' lesser ability to perceive the situation and deal with it.

¹An example of another rigidly ascribed means would be the case of a dominant political party whose relatively small membership was closed.

²An example of the first possibility is a system where wealth is the passport to influence and authority, but in which the distribution of wealth is so firmly stabilized that it can rarely be achieved except through lineal inheritance. An example of the second possibility would be a political system where a sizeable foreign-born community was excluded by reason of foreign birth from political influence or office, but where all native-born could compete according to moderate universal standards. An example of the third possibility is where some posts are hereditary and others are not.

marked-institutional-conflict.¹

Minimum-institutional-conflict political systems. In these systems, there is no basic conflict--within one or between two or more social institutions--which is especially significant to the operation of the political system.

Moderate-institutional-conflict political systems. In these systems, the basic institutional conflict is either limited, or if extensive, there exist nonviolent mechanisms which effectively resolve or reduce the conflict so that, although it is reflected in political situations to a significant degree and conditions them, the conflict is kept within moderate bounds.

Marked-institutional-conflict political systems. In these systems, there are one or more basic institutional conflicts which seriously disturb the operation of the political system, and for the resolution of which there exist no effective mechanisms.

An example of institutional conflict which is present in most societies in varying degrees is that which stems from the differences between the kinship system of relationships and the merit system based on personal qualities.² Examples of other possible conflicts are those between religious and political institutions (Church versus State) and between specific political institutions (legislature versus executive).

¹The hypothetical order of strength relates especially to a static situation. If the social and political situation is subjected to the pressures of dynamic change, a minimum-institutional-conflict system may be less strong. It may be less able to adapt to change, if its institutions are more rigid. Where some degree of institutional conflict is inherent in the system, and especially where mechanisms have operated in the past to resolve or reduce this conflict, the society may be both temperamentally and structurally better equipped to meet the demands of change through adaptation. See Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 79, 85, 126, 128, 157, 177; Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), pp. 49, 52, 56-58.

²In a society where the kinship system provided the framework for the political system, political authority was allocated according to kin rank and status, and such authority was considered legitimate, there would be a minimum of conflict of the kin-merit nature between institutions. Nepotism would be valued. H. Cory, The Indigenous Political Systems of the Sukuma and Proposals for Political Reform (East African Studies, No. 2, East African Institute of Social Research; Kampala, Uganda: The Eagle Press, 1954), p. 29.

Similarly, there would be minimum conflict in a society where the merit system was the legitimate basis for the political organization

Membership Conflict

The previous aspect of political systems concerned the degree of conflict within one, or between two or more, social institutions, the term social including specifically political institutions. The aspect now to be considered is the degree of membership conflict for the resolution of which no nonviolent institutional mechanisms exist. Membership conflict, in the sense of the term used here, refers not only to unresolvable conflict, but also to conflict of which the members are aware and which is politically significant.¹ Political systems may be designated as minimum-membership-conflict, moderate-membership-conflict, and marked-membership-conflict.

Minimum-membership-conflict political systems. In these systems, there are no politically significant conflicts between members or groups of members which are institutionally unresolved or unresolvable.

Moderate-membership-conflict political systems. In these systems, there are either a limited number of significant membership conflicts which are unresolvable, or the mechanisms for resolving existing significant membership conflicts are only moderately effective.

Marked-membership-conflict political systems. In these systems, there are important membership conflicts, and the mechanisms for resolving them are nonexistent or ineffective.

Incidence of Leadership

The past and current histories of different political units show a different incidence of leadership, and this variation may be expressed in the following classification: persistent-leadership political systems, occasional-leadership-political systems, and weak-leadership

and nepotism was disvalued except in restricted, immediate-family, private affairs.

However, if both the kinship and merit systems were recognized as legitimate bases for important social institutions, then institutional conflict would result. Whether it would be moderate or marked would depend upon such considerations as the degree to which both systems were valued, their incidence as the basis for the various social institutions, and the relative importance of the social institutions.

¹The prerequisite of awareness has been discussed by, among others: Coser, p. 37; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework For Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 59-60, 264-265; and James A. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 414.

political systems.

Persistent-leadership political systems. In the past and possibly the current history of these systems, the incidence of leaders who have served to unify the political system--in terms of the members' values, the institutions, and political authority in general--is high.

Occasional-leadership political systems. In these systems, the incidence of leadership has been only occasional.

Weak-leadership political systems. In these systems, leadership in the past and present can be described as weak, that is, lacking in strength to unify.

With the conclusion of the presentation of the twelve aspects of political systems significant to a system's strength in the sense of solidarity, attention can be given to the question of the variations in such strength between different systems.

The Varied Possibilities for Strength in the Solidarity Sense

It is obvious that the possible combinations of the categories which have been set forth above are manifold. But can some assessment of a traditional African political system's general strength in the sense of solidarity be made on the basis of the twelve categories? And if so, can assessments be made which are comparable, preferably on some sort of absolute scale, so that the strength which one system possessed in the sense of solidarity might be related to that which was inherent in another system? Can assessments be formulated in a way permitting comparisons of this kind of strength between any two systems, irregardless of the sizes of their respective units?

It is believed that a start can be made by explaining what characteristics the strongest kind of system would have had and which ones the weakest kind of system would have had. Actual political systems might then be judged as falling somewhere between the two extremes, with perhaps a scale of possibilities for this type of strength of political systems ranging from very strong, to moderately strong, to slightly strong, and then on to slightly weak, moderately weak, and very weak.¹

¹Another approach would be to classify by kinds of political systems and list them in order of strength, as for example, segmentary, chiefdom, monarchy. See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis," American Anthropologist, LXI (April, 1959), 202-214.

Model of a very strong system. A very strong political system would have been one with the following characteristics. It would have been unitary¹ and political authority would have been otherwise concentrated. It would have been a sovereign political system. The activities in life which were subject to political authority would have been extensive in scope. The source of legitimacy for political authority would have been charisma. The members of the political unit would have had a strong conviction that the holders of authority had a good claim to its exercise--that is, the extent of legitimacy of political authority would have been marked. As regards membership, the members would all have been of the same clan, and the largest, politically dominant group would have been a lineage.² (In terms of this particular study, however, most of the members of the systems studied were in each case of the same tribe, so the largest, politically dominant group for a strong system would have been the clan.) It would have been a closed system in terms of political mobility. With respect to conflict, there would have been a minimum of institutional conflict as well as of conflict between different sections of the membership. Lastly, the incidence of leadership in the past would have been persistent.

Using the category headings employed in the typologies, the model of the very strong system would be unitary, sovereign, authority-concentrated, extensive-activity, charisma-source, marked-legitimacy, tribe-membership (in this study), dominant-clan, closed, minimum-institutional-conflict, minimum-membership-conflict, and persistent-leadership.

Model of a very weak system. At the other end of the continuum of systems would be the weakest. It would have been a confederate political system, with political authority also otherwise diffused. The system would have been dependent. Scope of activity of political authority would have been limited. Members would have based their belief in political authority's legitimacy on the system's value as a

¹This characteristic would be a factor for inherent strength, for example, because centralization ordinarily brings increased political organization, coordination, and cohesiveness which adds to the potentiality of a system to act as a force shaping political change. If in a particular case the unitary system did not bring these benefits, the fault would lie elsewhere and answers to other questions would in all likelihood bring it to notice. Such answers at the same time would constitute weaknesses of the system which would more than compensate for any automatic strength assigned to the system by reason of its unitary character.

²If the members had all been of the same lineage, then it would of course not have been possible to have had a lineage also as the "largest group." It would have been necessary to use the next lower level social-kin group--the extended family.

means to other goals. Legitimacy accorded to political authority would have been minimum in extent. As for membership, common ties of all members would have been no closer than mere residence in the same area. There would have been a plurality of larger groups which were politically dominant. The system would have been an open one in respect to political mobility. Both institutional conflict and conflict between sections of the membership would have been marked. Leadership would have been weak.

The characteristics of the model of the very weak system, in terms of category labels, would have been confederate, dependent, authority-diffused, limited-activity, reason-source, minimum-legitimacy, residence-membership, plural-dominant-groups, open, marked-institutional-conflict, marked-membership-conflict, and weak-leadership.

Assessments of strength of actual systems. Judgments about systems which possessed all of the characteristics of either of the two models would be fairly easy, assuming the availability of the necessary data to describe the systems accurately and given the correctness of the propositions contained in the statement of the models. If one or both of these prerequisites were absent, judgments would be correspondingly tentative and difficult to substantiate.

Can generalized appraisals be made of the strength of actual systems falling between the two polar extremes, as suggested just prior to the presentation of the models? Such appraisals would be fraught with a number of imponderables, and to attempt them for a system's strength in relation to the possibilities would not seem advisable pending clarification of the several questions involved. For, even if it were feasible to reach reliable judgments of whether a system's individual characteristics contributed to its strength or to its weakness, the problem of how important each aspect was to the whole is not readily susceptible to weighting, and no clearly valid summation could therefore be calculated. Further, it is questionable whether generalized estimates are in themselves meaningful, because is not strength of a political system exclusively particularistic in that it is relational only to specific situations?

For the present, assessments of strength of political systems using the twelve sets of categories are to be confined to concrete judgments involving both of two things: the strength of a system as related to a specific situation; and, the system's strength in relation to another system's, or that of the same system at another point in time. And even in such instances no quantitative assessment of strength, in the sense of gradations of solidarity from very strong through to very weak, would seem to be advisable. Therefore, until the resolution of existing difficulties, assessments of strength of systems are best phrased in the simple dichotomous terms of strong and weak or in the comparative phrases of stronger and weaker.

III. STRENGTH OF SYSTEMS IN THE SENSE OF RESOURCES

The previous discussion concerned aspects of strength in the sense of solidarity, and variations which systems might exhibit in resources were excluded from consideration.

However, to obtain a more realistic estimate of strength the additional factor of extent of natural and human resources must be introduced as the next phase, for obviously tiny cohesive Monaco is not as strong as the huge though much less coordinated British Commonwealth. In comparing the resources of one system to another, unless all systems in the world are being considered at once it is best not to set a single universal absolute standard by which to measure. It is preferable to make judgments of whether a system was or was not favored in resources in light of the resources' position of the other systems in the group under study. Therefore, the solution is to let the system most favored as regards resources and that most unfavored serve as the polar positions on a scale of measurement for all systems in the group selected for attention.

In making the estimates the nature and requirements of the study should govern the number of variations on the scale, the extent of the data used, and the precision of the analyses. In the Uganda study dealing with twelve main tribes, it was found desirable to classify the systems according to their possession of extensive, moderate, or limited resources.¹ Data available for the analyses were restricted in scope and direct relevance. On the other hand, only a rough estimate was needed. A political system's size and population in relation to those of the other systems were the primary yardsticks.² Some secondary consideration was given to resources in terms of the skills of the population as well as the soil fertility and other natural endowments;

¹An original distinction restricted to favored and unfavored did not work in application and had to be discarded.

²As for relative size, a vertical scale was set up for the twelve tribes, starting at the bottom with the smallest area and ending at the top with the largest area. Figures were for the end of 1957 and were taken from Uganda Protectorate, East African Statistical Department--Uganda Unit, 1958 Statistical Abstract (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, [1959]), p. 1. Rounded off and expressed in thousands of square miles of land and swamp but excluding open water, the areas were as follows: Bugisu--2; Kigezi--2; Busoga--4; Teso--5; Bunyoro--5; Lango--5; Toro--5; West Nile (Lugbara)--6; Ankole--6; Acholi--11; Karamoja--11; and Buganda--17. Adjustments were made for the three fairly minor variations in these figures shown by data for 1935 in H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 503.

The same procedure was followed for population, which was

these were inevitably much less accurate, based as they were only on generalized, descriptive information.¹ The final judgments² were, however, deemed sufficient to the needs, with the qualification that where the resource position of a system assumed special importance, assessments should be re-examined with particular reference to the specific situation under consideration. For in certain cases some of the factors contributing to a composite judgment of a system's resource position might be much more important relative to the other factors than they would be in different situations.

IV. ADAPTABILITY TO CERTAIN DEMANDS FOR CHANGE

The third phase of analysis concerns the judgment of whether a particular traditional system possessed qualities of adaptability to certain inevitable Western-type demands for change.³ The demands postulated are three; individual economic opportunity; political equality for all adult members of the political unit; and an increase in the general welfare and political prestige of the political unit.

plotted for the years 1931 and 1948 using the census data provided elsewhere in the study (in detail in Appendix I).

¹The twelve tribes were entered on a vertical scale starting at the bottom with very unfavored and proceeding through gradations to very favored. The judgments, relating primarily to soil fertility and human skills, were as follows: very unfavored--Karamojong, Lugbara, and Bakiga; moderately unfavored--Lango, Toro, Acholi, Bagisu, Banyankole, Banyoro; slightly unfavored--none; slightly favored--Iteso and Basoga; moderately favored--none; very favored--Baganda.

²These were reached after study of the position of the individual tribes on the appropriate scales. Estimates of relative resources' positions of the twelve tribes in the early years of the 1905-1945 period were as follows, starting with the Karamojong at the bottom: limited resources--Karamojong, Lugbara, Bakiga, Bagisu, Lango, Batoro, Acholi, Banyankole, Banyoro; moderate resources--Iteso and Basoga; extensive resources--Baganda.

³This step in the analysis would not be taken if the study were restricted merely to a moment in time, that is, to an inquiry into a single event or situation.

Individual Economic Opportunity

One of the results of contact of non-Western with Western civilization has usually been a demand for a certain type and measure of individual economic opportunity,¹ if it did not already exist. The demand tended to arise when the desire of the members of a non-Western political unit for Western-type personal possessions--tangible and intangible--was stimulated intentionally, or unintentionally by example.² But in some societies, individuals so stimulated met with greater obstacles than in other societies.³ This type of variation in political systems can be approximately indicated by the following categories: adapted-economy-nonrestrictive, adaptable-economy-restrictive, and unadaptable-economy-restrictive political systems.

Adapted-economy-nonrestrictive political systems. In these systems, the range and character of political authority does not appreciably inhibit economic individualism.

For example, land would be individually owned in freehold, and

¹Because there was, practically-speaking, no contact between Africa and the Soviet Union prior to 1945, the question of qualifications to the statement need not arise.

²In many pre-European-contact societies, wealth could not be accumulated indefinitely, since it took the form of perishables or of items for which storage facilities were not available. However, wealth was even then desirable as an indication of status; but since it could not be accumulated, it was distributed, and distribution was the manner by which higher status was confirmed for all to see. See, for example, Elizabeth Colson, "Native Cultural and Social Patterns in Contemporary Africa," Africa Today, ed. C. Grove Haines (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 69-84.

With the introduction of currency and other features of the Western economic system, the accumulation of wealth was possible. It was no longer necessary to distribute the fruits of one's labor, and in fact the forces influencing the individual to acquire and retain wealth for personal or immediate-family use--as opposed to distribution to more distant kin, or in the case of a chief, to his subjects--increased considerably. Status became gradually a question more of what an immediate family consumed or permanently possessed, and less a matter of how much one gave away.

All these factors tended to inject a measure and type of economic individualism into those non-Western societies where it was previously lacking.

³The political system--remembering that this term refers to all types of decisions which are authoritative for the members as a whole--of some political units were so structured, and operated in such a manner, that opportunities for individuals to acquire additional wealth

an individual could mortgage it for the capital needed to produce a particular cash crop. Or, if cash crops requiring no initial capital were producible in the region, communal holding of land would not appreciably inhibit such production.

Adaptable-economy-restrictive political systems. In these systems, individual economic opportunity is subject to appreciable restrictions, which are upheld by the political system, but which are susceptible to adaptation to meet the demands for individual enterprise. That is, there would be mechanisms inherent in the political or other social institutions by which changes in the restrictions could be effected.

Unadaptable-economy-restrictive political systems. In these systems, individuals are prevented from stepping up the utilization of resources because of restrictions placed on the means of production, restrictions which are upheld by the political system and which are not susceptible to adaptation.

Members' Political Equality

With Western contact comes the idea of the political equality of all men.¹ To some non-Western societies of an egalitarian nature, the Western idea of political equality is not new except in its form of theoretical presentation. But to others it is new. Of these, some have political systems which can adapt to the idea and some do not. The three variations can be distinguished as follows: adapted-political-equality, adaptable-political-inequality, and unadaptable-political-inequality systems.

Adapted-political-equality political systems. In these systems, there is already a fairly equal distribution of political rights among the total membership.

This type of system is not uncommon in Africa, especially in the smaller communities where important decisions are often reached only

through additional effort were more restricted than in other systems.

¹Its frequent interpretation by Western agents of contact to mean equality for all civilized men has hardly lessened the impact of the idea.

The idea has reached colonial peoples through two avenues, each of which represents a different agent of contact.

The administrators of the colonial powers, with few exceptions, have represented governments which themselves practiced the doctrine in the form of universal manhood suffrage. This fact has been assimilated by numbers of the colonial peoples.

The other avenue along which the idea has travelled is that of

after discussion among all the men of the political unit.

Adaptable-political-inequality political systems. In these systems, there is an appreciably unequal distribution of political rights among the total membership, but there exist mechanisms by which the political system can be adapted to meet the demand for equal political rights.

Unadaptable-political-inequality political systems. In these systems, there is an appreciably unequal distribution of political rights among the total membership of the political unit, and the distribution is not susceptible to adaptation to meet the challenge posed by the new idea of political equality.

For example, in a tribal political system, a feature of which was the institution of slavery, there would ordinarily be no institutionalized mechanism whereby equal political rights could be extended to slaves.

Increase in Unit's Welfare and Prestige

For various reasons both of the goals of general welfare and political prestige of a unit are a concomitant of Western contact. But both can be achieved only by organization. An improvement in general welfare requires planning, coordination, and execution--in other words, organization. The same is true though to a lesser extent with respect to the achievement of political prestige of the unit.

Since organization to meet these two demands is the first prerequisite to their realization, political systems are classified for this purpose as follows: organized, organizable, and unorganizable.

Organized political systems. These systems are already organized to fulfill the function of general welfare through the exercise of political authority; they are also already organized for the conduct of external relations, although the sphere of contacts may be restricted to neighboring political units. In both fields, there is no need for adaptation as such; there is only need to extend the sphere and extent of the activities.

Christianity, brought to colonial peoples by the missionary agents of Western contact. In general, Christian doctrine has held that all men are equal in the sight of God. The doctrine forms one of the bases for the Western concept of political equality. That colonial peoples educated in mission schools have also deduced the connection is not strange.

Organizable political systems. In these systems, seeds of organization exist which may be cultivated to achieve the goals cited above, without a basic change in the nature of political authority; or, if a political system is already organized, but for purposes other than general welfare and political prestige, the political organization can be directed to the attainment of these additional goals. In both cases, the political systems are adaptable to the new demands placed upon them as a result of Western contact.

Unorganizable political systems. In these systems, organization to achieve the two stated goals is not possible; it can be brought about only as a result of the displacement of the political system by another, or by such fundamental revisions in the political system that it becomes basically a different system, as contrasted to an adapted system.

Within the last category would fall those small societies where political authority is diffused in many respects--diffused among all members of the community, with no one institutional head speaking with authority; diffused as regards spheres of activity, with no concept of the division of functions; diffused territorially, with only restricted authority at the center. In such cases, organization of the system is not possible. The system must be replaced if the demands are to be met.

Variations in Adaptability

It has not been considered necessary--perhaps it is not desirable --to attempt systematic assessments of a system's general adaptability, taking all three demands together. However, if this were to be attempted, such an assessment could be categorized in terms of extensive, moderate, and limited adaptability.

The above suggestion concludes the detailed presentation of the experimental approach for the analysis of traditional African political systems.¹

¹A traditional African political system is simply one which has been handed down from the past. To be traditional, the system need not have been handed down completely intact from the far distant past. The term is used more loosely, in a generally descriptive and nondefinitive sense, to convey the idea of a system which has exhibited an appreciable measure of consistency with that which existed a generation ago, the latter being recognized in its day as providing an appreciable measure of continuity with what had in turn gone before.

V. SUMMARY OF THE APPROACH

The aim of the approach was to facilitate the analysis of traditional African political systems in their individual and collective roles as a force shaping political change, with specific reference to a study of Uganda commencing shortly after 1900.

The first phase of the approach set forth twelve aspects of political systems which seemed significantly to relate to the question of strength of political systems in the sense of solidarity. Different possibilities were categorized under each aspect, ranging from those which might be expected ordinarily to give the most strength of this kind to a system to those which would contribute most to weakness. To permit comparative assessments of strength of different systems, an imaginary scale of strength was posited with models of a very strong system and a very weak system at either extreme end. Actual political systems, when analyzed, could then be placed at some point on the absolute scale. But the difficulties involved in reaching clearly valid judgments made it advisable to restrict the assessments of strength of systems for the present to comparisons of actual systems, and with reference to specific situations.

The second phase of the approach advanced suggestions for ranking political systems in a group selected for study according to their resources' positions.

The third phase considered the adaptability of political systems to certain inevitable Western-type demands for change. These latter numbered three.

The common sense nature of the judgments to be made under all categories, and their lack of mathematical bases (except for certain resource data), should be stressed. The approach's advantage is intended to be in its systematic coverage of aspects on a comparative basis, not in any quantitatively precise calculations of strength.

There follows a listing of the various aspects and categories used in the approach, together with a table presenting the data for certain tribes in Uganda as regards aspects significant to solidarity and as regards resources.¹

The last section of the presentation provides, as an illustration of the approach, a description and analysis of the Lango tribe's traditional political system, of the forces of change affecting it from

¹Adaptability assessments were so few they are not included in the table.

the time of the advent of British rule to 1945, and of the new political system of the Lango District which replaced the old.

VI. A LISTING OF ASPECTS AND CATEGORIES, AND THEIR APPLICATION TO UGANDA

The sixteen aspects of political systems significant to the three kinds of strength dealt with are listed, each with its categories, commencing on the next page. These are followed by the table indicating results of analyses of tribes in Uganda.¹

¹The table points up some of the weaknesses of the method, for two systems with approximately the same characteristics may be assessed as possessing different orders of strength. However, the limited checking which has been done indicates that apparent contradictions may in fact be due to differences in degree in identical characteristics.

For example, in another connection a conclusion was reached that the Acholi and Lango non-traditional political systems at the beginning of 1945 were weak in relation to the traditional system of Buganda at the same time and with reference to political strength which might be brought to bear in opposition to African representation in the Legislative Council. A judgment was also incidentally reached that the Lango system was in turn somewhat weaker than that of the Acholi. Yet, from the table and from the material which follows on the Lango at the end of the Appendix, it is evident that most characteristics of the systems of the two tribes were identical. Acholi, however, had moderate instead of Lango's minimum institutional conflict. It would be assumed that Acholi's system would be weaker than Lango's. Yet this characteristic of greater weakness is deemed to have been more than balanced by Acholi's mixed-closed-open instead of Lango's open system, and by the much more extensive minimum legitimacy of Lango's system compared to Acholi's less pervasive minimum legitimacy.

To correct the problem of significant differences in degree within a characteristic, additional categories would have to be added. It is open to question whether the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages.

ASPECTS AND CATEGORIES SIGNIFICANT TO INHERENT STRENGTH OF TRADITIONAL AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

I. Strength in the Sense of Solidarity

A. Classifications Dealing with Political Authority

1. By degree of territorial centralization
 - a) Unitary political systems
 - b) Federal political systems
 - c) Confederate political systems
2. By degree of sovereignty
 - a) Sovereign political systems
 - b) Semi-sovereign political systems
 - c) Dependent political systems
3. By degree of authority concentration
 - a) Authority-concentrated political systems
 - b) Authority-diffused political systems
4. By scope of activity
 - a) Extensive-activity political systems
 - b) Moderate-activity political systems
 - c) Limited-activity political systems
5. By believed source of legitimacy
 - a) Charisma-source political systems
 - b) Tradition-source political systems
 - c) Reason-source political systems
6. By extent of legitimacy
 - a) Marked-legitimacy political systems
 - b) Moderate-legitimacy political systems
 - c) Minimum-legitimacy political systems

B. Classifications Dealing with the Membership of the Political Unit

7. By extent and closeness of common ties of the total membership
 - a) Lineage-membership political systems
 - b) Clan-membership political systems
 - c) Tribe-membership political systems
 - d) Culture-membership political systems
 - e) Residence-membership political systems
8. By type of largest politically-dominant membership group
 - a) Dominant-lineage political systems
 - b) Dominant-clan political systems
 - c) Dominant-tribe political systems
 - d) Dominant-race political systems
 - e) Dominant-class political systems
 - f) Dominant-political-party political systems
 - g) Plural-dominant-groups political systems
9. By degree of political mobility of the members
 - a) Closed political systems
 - b) Mixed-closed-open political systems
 - c) Open political systems

C. Classifications Dealing with Conflict in the Political System

10. By degree of institutional conflict
 - a) Minimum-institutional-conflict political systems
 - b) Moderate-institutional-conflict political systems
 - c) Marked-institutional-conflict political systems
11. By degree of unresolvable membership conflict
 - a) Minimum-membership-conflict political systems
 - b) Moderate-membership-conflict political systems
 - c) Marked-membership-conflict political systems

D. Classification Dealing with Incidence of Leadership

12. By incidence of leadership
 - a) Persistent-leadership political systems
 - b) Occasional-leadership political systems
 - c) Weak-leadership political systems

II. Strength in the Sense of Resources

E. Classification Dealing with the Resources of the Political Unit

13. By extent of general natural and human resources
 - a) Extensive-resources political systems
 - b) Moderate-resources political systems
 - c) Limited-resources political systems

III. Strength in the Sense of Adaptability

F. Classifications Dealing with the Adaptability of the Political System to Western-Type Demands for Change

14. By degree of adaptability to demands for individual economic opportunity
 - a) Adapted-economy-nonrestrictive political systems
 - b) Adaptable-economy-restrictive political systems
 - c) Unadaptable-economy-restrictive political systems
15. By degree of adaptability to demands for political equality of adult members of the political unit
 - a) Adapted-political-equality political systems
 - b) Adaptable-political-inequality political systems
 - c) Unadaptable-political-inequality political systems
16. By degree of adaptability to demands for an increase in the general welfare and political prestige of the political unit
 - a) Organized political systems
 - b) Organizable political systems
 - c) Unorganizable political systems

TABLE 11. - Analytical characteristics of certain tribal political systems in Uganda, 1905-1945,
relative to solidarity and resources

Aspects of the Political System	MODEL	BANTU TRIBES			MODEL
	(Polar)	Baganda			(Polar)
	Very Strong	1877 ^a	1905 ^b	1945 ^c	Very Weak
Solidarity:					
Territorial centralization	unitary	unitary	unitary	unitary	confederate
Degree of sovereignty	sovereign	sovereign	semi-sovereign	semi-sovereign	dependent
Authority concentration	concentrated	concentrated	concentrated	diffused	diffused
Scope of activity	extensive	moderate	moderate	moderate	limited
Source of legitimacy	charisma	charisma	tradition	tradition	reason
Extent of legitimacy	marked	marked	moderate	moderate	minimum
Common membership ties	tribe	tribe	culture	residence	residence
Largest dominant group	clan	class	tribe	tribe	plural
Political mobility	closed	open	mixed	mixed	open
Institutional conflict	minimum	minimum	moderate	marked	marked
Membership conflict	minimum	minimum	minimum	moderate	marked
Incidence of leadership	persistent	persistent	persistent	occasional	weak

Strength in Resources in Relation to Main Tribes:	Extensive	Extensive	Extensive	Extensive	Limited

^aTraditional, prior to British rule

^bAdapted-traditional

^cAdapted-traditional, as of beginning of 1945

TABLE 11. - Analytical characteristics of certain tribal political systems in Uganda, 1905-1945,
relative to solidarity and resources (continued)

Aspects of the Political System	MODEL	BANTU TRIBES			MODEL
	(Polar)	Banyankole	Banyoro	Batoro	(Polar)
	Very Strong	1905 ^b	1905 ^b	1905 ^b	Very Weak
Solidarity:					
Territorial centralization	unitary	federal	unitary	federal	confederate
Degree of sovereignty	sovereign	dependent	dependent	semi-sovereign	dependent
Authority concentration	concentrated	concentrated ^d	concentrated ^d	concentrated ^d	diffused
Scope of activity	extensive	limited	limited ^d	limited ^d	limited
Source of legitimacy	charisma	charisma	charisma ^d	tradition	reason
Extent of legitimacy	marked	moderated ^d	marked ^d	limited ^d	minimum
Common membership ties	tribe	culture ^d	culture ^d	culture ^d	residence
Largest dominant group	clan	caste group ^d	ethnic group ^d	ethnic group ^d	plural
Political mobility	closed	closed ^d	mixed	mixed	open
Institutional conflict	minimum	moderated ^d	moderate ^d	marked ^d	marked
Membership conflict	minimum	minimum ^d	minimum	minimum	marked
Incidence of leadership	persistent	persistent ^d	occasional ^d	occasional ^d	weak

Strength in Resources in.					
Relation to Main Tribes:	Extensive	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

^bAdapted-traditional

^dConjectural

TABLE 11. - Analytical characteristics of certain tribal political systems in Uganda, 1905-1945,
relative to solidarity and resources (continued)

Aspects of the Political System	MODEL	BANTU TRIBES.			MODEL
	(Polar)	Basoga	Bagisu	Bakiga	(Polar)
	Very Strong	1905-1910 ^e	1905 ^e	1911 ^e	Very Weak

Solidarity:

Territorial centralization	unitary	unitary	A new, non-traditional political system ^f	A new, non-traditional political system ^f	confederate
Degree of sovereignty	sovereign	dependent			dependent
Authority concentration	concentrated	concentrated ^d			diffused
Scope of activity	extensive	limited ^d			limited
Source of legitimacy	charisma	reason ^d			reason
Extent of legitimacy	marked	minimum ^d			minimum
Common membership ties	tribe	tribe			residence
Largest dominant group	clan	class ^d			plural
Political mobility	closed	mixed ^d			open
Institutional conflict	minimum	marked ^d			marked
Membership conflict	minimum	minimum ^d			marked
Incidence of leadership	persistent	occasional ^d			weak

Strength in Resources in Relation to Main Tribes:	Extensive	Moderate	Limited	Limited	Limited

^eNew (non-traditional)

^dConjectural

^fAlso, no tribal political system in prior traditional times.

TABLE 11. - Analytical characteristics of certain tribal political systems in Uganda, 1905-1945,
relative to solidarity and resources (continued)

Aspects of the Political System	MODEL	NIILOTIC TRIBES			MODEL
	(Polar)	Acholi		Lango	(Polar)
	Very Strong	1905-1911 ^a	1945 ^e	1905-1911 ^a	Very Weak
Solidarity:					
Territorial centralization	unitary	confederate	unitary	confederate	confederate
Degree of sovereignty	sovereign	sovereign	dependent	sovereign	dependent
Authority concentration	concentrated	diffused	concentrated	diffused	diffused
Scope of activity	extensive	limited	limited	limited	limited
Source of legitimacy	charisma	tradition	reason	charisma	reason
Extent of legitimacy	marked	minimum	minimum	minimum	minimum
Common membership ties	tribe	tribe	tribe	tribe	residence
Largest dominant group	clan	plural	plural	plural	plural
Political mobility	closed	closed	mixed	open	open
Institutional conflict	minimum	marked	moderate	moderate	marked
Membership conflict	minimum	minimum	minimum	minimum	marked
Incidence of leadership	persistent	weak	weak	occasional	weak

Strength in Resources in Relation to Main Tribes:	Extensive	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

^aTraditional, prior to British rule

^eNew (non-traditional)

TABLE 11. - Analytical characteristics of certain tribal political systems in Uganda, 1905-1945,
relative to solidarity and resources (continued)

Aspects of the Political System	MODEL (Polar)	NILO-HAMITIC		SUDANIC	MODEL (Polar)
	Very Strong	Iteso 1905 ^e	Karamojong 1905-1914 ^a	Lugbara 1905-1914 ^a	Very Weak
Solidarity:					
Territorial centralization	unitary	unitary	No tribal (Cluster) political system	No tribal political system	confederate
Degree of sovereignty	sovereign	dependent			dependent
Authority concentration	concentrated	concentrated			diffused
Scope of activity	extensive	limited			limited
Source of legitimacy	charisma	reason			reason
Extent of legitimacy	marked	minimum			minimum
Common membership ties	tribe	tribe			residence
Largest dominant group	clan	ethnic groups			plural
Political mobility	closed	mixed ^d			open
Institutional conflict	minimum	minimum ^d			marked
Membership conflict	minimum	minimum ^d	marked		
Incidence of leadership	persistent	weak ^d			weak
Strength in Resources in Relation to Main Tribes:	Extensive	Moderate	Limited	Limited	Limited

^aTraditional, prior to British rule

^dConjectural

^eNew (non-traditional)

^gThe Baganda Agents

VII. THE OLD AND NEW LANGO POLITICAL SYSTEMS--AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH¹

In 1948 the Lango tribe of Uganda numbered about 265,000. Controversy exists as to whether the Lango are a Nilotic or Nilo-Hamitic people.² The people exhibit characteristics of both ethnic groups. Because of the tribe's use of the Luo language it has been classified as Nilotic.³

Cattle have played a significant part in Lango culture, but even prior to the establishment of British rule the people had become predominantly cultivators. Savannah characterizes most of Lango

¹The discussion of the Lango political systems has been based on the following sources, which have not been individually cited in the text except where particular need has manifested itself.

Audrey Butt, The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda, Part IV of East Central Africa, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. Daryll Forde (London: International African Institute, 1952), pp. 7, 15, 35, 41-42, 92-108, 179-181.

J. H. Driberg, "The Lango District, Uganda Protectorate," Geographical Journal, LVIII (August, 1921), 122-123, 126-129, 131-133.

J. E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society (Kampala, Uganda: Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 1958), pp. 82-89.

[Great Britain, Colonial Office,] Uganda, Report for 1909-10, No. 670, Cd. 5467-6, February 1911 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1911), p. 41.

Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories. Part I: East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika ([Great Britain,] Colonial Office; London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 61, 64, 67.

Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), pp. 170, 191.

Ramakrishna Mukherjee, The Problem of Uganda: A Study in Acculturation (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), pp. 76-79.

Uganda Protectorate, Annual Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western Province, for the Period 1939-1946 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1949), p. 76. Cited hereafter as UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946.

Uganda Protectorate, The Handbook of Uganda, by H. R. Wallis (second edition; London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1920), pp. 64-65, 69, 138-144.

²The correct plural for more than one Lango is believed to be "Langi" but since most writers use "Lango" in all references to the people, that practice is followed here.

³Butt, pp. 42, 92.

District, which covers some 5,000 square miles.

Warfare was the most valued tribal activity. It appears that throughout the nineteenth century groups of Lango acted as mercenaries, fighting for various factions in the Kingdom of Bunyoro. The young Lango were molded in their early years to be warriors. Discipline there was, but it evidently was of a kind restricted in nature and time to that necessary for military actions. The tribe as a whole was little accustomed to discipline or subordination from any superior central authority, either external or their own. By nature the Lango adult male was a political individualist, subject only to restraints exercised by lineage and military leaders he elected. He was emphatically independent, impatient of control, far from susceptible to compulsion. Though usually cheerful, the Lango was easily excited to violence. The political system of the tribe at the time just prior to contact with British official authority was both a reflection and an expression of the Lango "national" character.

The Traditional Political System--a Partial Description

In Lango's traditional political system political units grew rapidly more tenuous and fluid as they became more inclusive. The only quite stable unit was the lowest one in the territorial hierarchy--the village. It was the practice for several villages, each headed by a jago, to join together for predominantly military purposes under one leader, styled a rwot. These units, consisting of confederated villages, may be called chiefdoms.

In times of particular hostility vis-a-vis other tribes, two or more chiefdoms would often combine under a single war leader, called the twon lwak. More than one of these larger-scale military combinations frequently existed concurrently; and there was a measure of competition between their respective war leaders for the support of units making up the other combinations. Nevertheless it can be inferred from the data that it was not the practice for one twon lwak to engage the forces of another in military action. Temporary confederations of chiefdoms under a twon lwak apparently came about only as the result of hostilities with other tribes, and not as a result of warfare between units of the tribe. Intratribal warfare and raiding, not infrequent occurrences, took place only between the smaller chiefdom and village political units. The combinations under a twon lwak represented, then, what were essentially tribal institutions. Fluid and temporary though they were, they were "of Lango" and as such constituted one of the features distinctive of the total political system of the tribe.¹

¹The inference that a twon lwak and his supporters fought only non-Lango has been drawn from the following specific sources: Butt, pp. 92, 95-97; and Goldthorpe, Outlines . . ., p. 85. The one possible contradiction was found in Butt's work itself, but it has been given a

To provide a few additional details about the Lango political units and the political system in general, it should first be mentioned that the tribal population was divided into clans but the clans were not territorially grouped. A clan's various lineages were dispersed throughout the tribal area. Each lineage had an elected head. Where two lineages, or parts of lineages, of the same clan resided in the same village, they elected a head of what will be called here the clan section. As far as is known, clans had no single head for the entire body.¹

A village was usually composed of a dominant lineage whose members constituted the majority of the village's residents. In addition, in the village there were lineages of the same clan and of other completely different clans. Each of these lineages had its head. Collectively they will be referred to as the village elders. The head of the dominant lineage was the head of the village and was given the title of jago. He was "elected," but whether by all lineages of the village or just the dominant lineage members is not clear. It is clear, however, that he was not in any sense an absolute ruler. His was an authority which was highly dependent upon the support of the majority of the villagers. Disputes between members of the village political community were arbitrated by the village elders with the aid of the jago. The chief function of the jago was to organize and lead the men of the village in raids and warfare. Ability in this field was the most important prerequisite in the choice of a new jago from among the possible candidates in the dominant lineage. Although a jago was often the son of the previous holder of the position, he was not necessarily so, the most capable man being chosen.

The Lango village was more highly organized for economic activities than was usual among the Nilotic tribes. Yet the organization was egalitarian, as it was in the political sphere. The initiative for communal activities came from the individual; rights over land remained with the individual or family cultivating the land; cattle were communally grazed as a matter of convenience, but ownership of cattle rested with individuals, subject to restraints exercised only by their family and lineage kinsmen.

A jago who was particularly successful as a war leader often

low evaluation as evidence because of the use of the word "perhaps." Butt, referring to the fact that each twon lwak "endeavoured to obtain the allegiance" of the villages of the neighboring twon lwak, has added that this was "perhaps one of the main causes of the period of internal strife among the Lango just before the coming of the British." Butt, p. 95.

¹Butt, pp. 98-99.

extended his influence to the point that villages other than his own came to accord to him their "allegiance," calling him a rwot. In this way there was formed a kind of chiefdom, the process being repeated throughout the tribal area. The position of a rwot was much more precarious than that of a jago. It was dependent on the support the rwot enjoyed as the head of a powerful lineage. But much more was it related to his success as a war leader. The functions of the rwot were predominantly military. He also assisted village elders and the jagi in arbitrating disputes between members of different villages and could often act as the decisive "third force" in issues involving political authority. But by virtue of his elective standing he had always to have the majority of the people behind him in such instances.

Lango chiefdoms were, thus, somewhat temporary associations of villages primarily directed to defense and offense, with authoritative spheres of activity in either the "legal" or the more strictly nonmilitary political field being quite limited.

Having dealt with the first two levels of political units--the village and the chiefdom respectively--the more inclusive tribal political system at the total Lango societal level can be considered. It was distinguished by several features. The whole tribe might unite for defense or offense. Exactly how this was done is not known, but the Lango used distinctly different methods and weapons in warfare with other tribes than they did in cases of fighting within the tribe.

During the age-set ceremonies, which took place every fifth year four times during a twenty-five year period, and which related primarily to rain-making, there was by custom a complete suspension of all hostilities in Lango territory. What is significant is that there were harsh sanctions against infractors, sanctions which were universally recognized and enforced as regularized tribal mechanisms for preservation of peace during these times.¹

Cultural forces contributed to a sense of cohesiveness of the tribe as a political entity in relation to other tribes. Among these were a common language and a common culture, as well as the practices of marriage only within the tribe, of several villages cooperating in hunting, and of disbursing a family's cattle in various villages to reduce concentrated losses from disease.

Other forces of a social nature, in the form of certain groupings, cut across the territorial political divisions of village and chiefdom. Two of these groupings--the military combinations under war

¹It is clearly inferred that infractions were punishable by any political membership or unit of the tribe, that this was a tribal authority question and not limited to the jurisdiction of a village, chiefdom, or temporary military combination. Butt, p. 97.

leaders with the title of twon lwak, and the Lango clans--have already been mentioned. As for the former, it should be emphasized that they were characterized by a high degree of mutation. The tenure of a twon lwak was in the first instance restricted to times of war. In the second instance it was completely dependent upon his success in war, the office bearing no relation to leadership of a lineage or of a clan section. In time of need of greater cooperation than offered by that available from the institution of chiefdom, several rwodi accepted the leadership of a superior war leader. He acted as the military commander under whom all rwodi and their respective jagi served until the action was terminated, or until they withdrew if not satisfied with his leadership. Under such conditions it can be presumed that the composition of the different military combinations, as well as their leadership, was subject to considerable variation from time to time. This characteristic eliminated the military combinations as sources of permanent tribal divisions, which on that territorial level would have been highly significant if sustained in relation to specific areas over a number of years.

There were two other social institutions which, although not political, operated to affect the political system by reducing the exclusiveness of the ties binding members of the villages and chiefdoms. The first was the etogo. It was a village organization, apparently including all adult males of the village and thus cutting across lineage and clan distinctions, which performed certain ritual ceremonies. These included the maintenance of relations with the dead and the distribution of meat according to certain rules and procedures. Each etogo had a name. A man could participate fully in any etogo anywhere as long as it was his etogo, that is, of the same name; but if he moved to a village where the etogo was different, he had to sit apart from the others in the ceremonies. The etogo as an institution acted to transcend kin ties within the village setting. To the extent men utilized etogo of the same name elsewhere, the institution acted to transcend both kin and locality ties.

The other social institution referred to was related to the age-set system. The latter was nonpolitical and was limited in sphere of activity primarily to rain-making. Lango territory was divided into four regions for purposes of age-set ceremonies. In one of the four regions there was relatively little concern with the age-set culture feature. The others, where it was more prominent, exhibited variations in age-set ceremonies and customs. Since these regions also cut across kin and territorial divisions, they acted to lessen the intratribal conflict. On the other hand, they did not constitute such a strong or integral part of the social organization as to result in politically significant divisions of their own.

The Traditional Tribal Political System--Aspects of Strength and Adaptability

From the above description, and from other details which it was not possible to include, assessments will now be made of the traditional Lango political system with regard to aspects of strength and adaptability. The total tribal system at the societal level will first be considered, and following that some mention will be made of the system of the chiefdoms. The assessments will use the sets of categories set forth in the experimental approach designed for the analysis of traditional African political systems.

Aspects relating to solidarity. As regards political authority, the Lango political system was a confederate one, and a very weak confederate system at that. It was sovereign; its authority was diffused; it was limited-activity. The source of legitimacy of political authority was predominantly charisma-source, but the extent of legitimacy was minimum.¹ Political authority thus gained strength at the tribal level only from its sovereign and charismatic qualities.

The membership of the political system was tribe-membership. There was no one largest politically dominant group, but rather there was a plurality of dominant groups. As for political mobility, at the tribal level the system was an open one.² Institutional conflict was moderate. Unresolvable membership conflict was minimum.

With respect to specific leadership resources, the tribe's

¹These judgments take into account the very temporary nature of political authority at the tribal level. For example, if not qualified by its sporadic incidence, political authority would have been classified as moderate-legitimacy. The reasoning behind the minimum-legitimacy conclusion is as follows. In the restricted sphere of action recognized as subject to political authority at the tribal level--the military sphere--authority was concentrated in one leader. However, the "goodness" or "rightness" of his claim to authority was most dependent upon his successful performance. Also, the rwodi, jagi, and their peoples could withdraw their support as freely as they gave it. For these reasons legitimacy was only moderate and not marked. Reducing the extent of legitimacy from moderate to minimum was the occasional nature of the authority's exercise and the variations in those exercising it and those acknowledging it.

²Goldthorpe has specifically pointed out that an individual could rise by natural leadership to the position of head of a dominant lineage --jago. By military prowess and ability as arbitrator, one could become a rwot. By military skill alone one could rise to the post of twon lwak. Just as these were primarily achieved and not ascribed qualities, so also was the magical prowess of a rain-maker. Goldthorpe, Outlines. . ., p. 88.

history appears studded with examples of leaders. Some of these were of tribal importance; therefore, the incidence of leadership was occasional.

Resources. What was Lango's position with respect to human and natural resources? Lango was on the whole quite unfavored compared to the very favored Buganda resources, yet somewhat better off than the very unfavored Karamojong.

On a scale of extent of resources varying from extensive (the Baganda), to moderate, to limited (the Karamojong), Lango would be a limited-resources system.

Adaptability. The traditional system was, however, notable for its adaptability to two of three Western-type demands for change which might be expected to materialize. Although restrictive in some respects, the political system was adaptable to a demand for individual economic opportunity. In the matter of political equality, Lango already practiced this and therefore would be faced with no demand for it by members. The third anticipated demand--for increase in general welfare and political prestige of the unit--would have been hard but not impossible for the Lango traditional political system to meet. It is categorized, therefore, as organizable.¹

The Traditional Political Systems of the Lango Chiefdoms

What about the chiefdoms? Were they somewhat stronger in aspects of solidarity? As for political authority, they were weak confederate types, though not to the extent of the tribal system. They were also sovereign, though less so at times of warfare with other tribes. Authority was diffused, but not so much as in the tribal system; and the same obtains concerning the chiefdoms' limited activities.

¹That the system could have been organized to fill the political prestige function is entirely possible. But it is questionable that it could have been organized to bring about an increase in general welfare without there resulting a fundamental change in the system. The villages were organized to carry out such tasks--albeit in an egalitarian and therefore undoubtedly slower manner--and in the sense that they could therefore be delegated the authority from higher levels, the tribal system may be said to have been organizable. Strictly speaking, delegation of any authority from above would have changed the basis for the whole traditional system. The assumption of the villages of the new function would in this case have had to be brought about in a different constitutional sense--letter or spirit. Presumably this could have been done, although the possibilities were not extensive. But because they existed, and especially since the system appeared organizable to meet a demand for increased political prestige, the system has been judged as organizable, admittedly with some hesitancy.

Legitimacy was charisma-source but with a noticeable tradition-source component. Its extent was greater in comparison with the minimum legitimacy of the total system but was still classifiable as minimum. Membership was tribe-membership; plural-dominant-groups;¹ and mixed-open-closed as pertains to mobility. There appears to have been both minimum institutional conflict and unresolvable membership conflict in the chiefdoms, which were also occasional-leadership.

In conclusion, the political systems of the chiefdoms were not as weak as the tribal system in certain of the aspects of political solidarity, but the differences were also not so very marked.² (The systems of the chiefdoms were not, of course, really comparable in terms of resources to the Lango tribal political system.)

As regards adaptability, the chiefdoms were classifiable in the same categories as the tribal system, but were more organizable for general welfare in view of their greater proximity in political level to the villages.

The Forces of Change

British administration is variously reported to have commenced in Lango in 1907, 1909, and 1911, discrepancies which are indicative of some of the early difficulties. In the years before this time, the area had been disturbed by the activities of the insurgent Bunyoro and Buganda rulers, Kabarega and Mwanga, who had taken refuge among the Lango. With the gradual establishment of law and order, peace came to a people who were most unaccustomed to it and whose way of life as a virile warrior tribe was fundamentally affected.

The British authorities experienced grave problems in the first years trying to locate individual Lango to act as chiefs. In traditional times a chief's authority and central function were wrapped up in warfare activities. Without these, no one could command respect--still less obedience--from the highly egalitarian Lango. In what must have been a sense of pronounced desperation, British officials brought in

¹The villages were dominant-lineage, and a case might be argued that the chiefdoms were also. But it is considered that the dominant lineage of the rwot could have been and no doubt was easily balanced by combinations of dominant lineages of the other constituent villages.

²Butt has described Lango political authority as rudimentary. She has placed it on a scale of centralization of authority in the Nilotic tribes at a position midway between those tribes with personal political authority and centralized offices and those with acephalous kinship societies where lineage segments are coordinated with territorial segments. Lango had some of both features. Butt, pp. 180-181.

Baganda Agents. They acted first as agents for the colonial officials in Lango and then increasingly as tutors to the Lango lineage heads and elders who had been appointed as chiefs at various levels. Appointments evidently were not and could not be rigorously selective. The aim in essence was to find a man--anyone, but usually with some lineage standing--who could command a measure of support and obedience. It was slow work.¹

By 1921 the Lango District was constituted into seven embryonic counties, each with a chief, and with units at a lower level which represented considerable amalgamations of the initial territorial divisions. Almost all of the Baganda Agents had been withdrawn, not without, incidentally, instances of Baganda loss of life in the performance of their assuredly disagreeable duties. The Lango chiefs apparently were still closely associated with and dependent upon their people, having been described as inevitably democratic since their people would not have tolerated any other form of chieftanship.²

The above happy situation, if it was indeed as bright as the one main contemporary source would lead us to believe, obviously did not continue in the years to follow. By 1945 the Lango "heirarchy of chiefs had become so firmly entrenched that they themselves constituted somewhat of a bar to progress" And up to 1946 "the Lango Council was composed almost entirely of Chiefs who consequently imposed their opinions on the tribe as a whole, their rule tending to verge at times on the autocratic."³ Such a situation was a far cry from the egalitarianism of the traditional political system. It was further pointed up by the efforts of the chiefs, successful until 1946, to block a move to introduce a larger number of councils and to broaden their representation.

In contrast to Acholi and Teso, Lango did not develop a major sectional bifurcation in the district as a result of British rule. Also, although the specific reasons are not clear, Lango did not divide along religious (Catholic--Protestant) lines in a way which was politically significant in any marked degree. But the mission influence plus other forces which operated struck hard at certain aspects of culture and by the end of World War II little was left or remembered of the age-set system, and many of the other ritual ceremonies had faded into the limbo of the past.⁴

¹See especially Driberg, Geographical Journal, LVIII, 127.

²Driberg, Geographical Journal, LVIII, 129.

³UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946, p. 76.

⁴One expression of this may have been the formation of the Young Lango Association, which evidently had, however, gone to sleep by the end of 1945.

The New Lango District Political System in 1945

The effect of the forces of change was to obliterate the essence of most of the features of the traditional political systems, both those at the tribal and at the chiefdom level.¹

Was the new system which replaced the old a stronger one in its different characteristics? And was it adaptable to demands for further change?

By reason of the authority of the District Commissioner and the manner in which it was exercised, the new system was both a unitary and an authority-concentrated system. Both characteristics represented sources of strength and therefore complete changes from these aspects of the traditional system. However, there were features of weakness in the new system as follows: it was a dependent system; it was still limited-activity; it was presumably reason-source, if there was any source of legitimacy; and most enfeebling was that the Lango accorded to it a minimum extent of legitimacy, as far as can be surmised.

The system remained tribe-membership; plural-dominant-groups; and open, as regards political mobility. There was apparently a minimum of institutional conflict and of unresolvable membership conflict.² The system became a weak-leadership system in contrast to the traditional occasional-leadership system.

Its resource position continued as limited, in comparison to those of the rest of the twelve main tribes.³

The new system was characterized by adaptability to all of the three Western-type demands for change. With the changes which had already occurred by 1945, the system was practically an economy-nonrestrictive one. It was already one of political equality, in that there continued to be no one appreciable group which enjoyed superior political rights or status by reason of birth or other

¹This was not so much because the forces of change were strong, for in fact they were less so than in Acholi. Rather it was because the political systems of the traditional Lango were even less endurable in the face of the forces of change than those of the Acholi, particularly at the chiefdom level.

²The inherent Lango dislike of authority, and in this case that of the chiefs and of the British, is not considered here to represent in and of itself "institutional conflict." In any case, the situation has been reflected in the crucial aspect of extent of legitimacy.

³Lango was of course much better off in 1945, but in roughly the same relative position in the Protectorate.

ascription. And it was organized to deal with demands for increased general welfare and political prestige.

The one crucial problem for the future appears to have been, in 1945, that which arose from the system's almost complete lack of legitimacy. This was much more extensive a lack than was the case even with the new 1945 Acholi political system. There was a tradition of aristocratic authority in Acholi which was absent from Lango, and therefore the authority of the British-appointed Lango chiefs was even less recognized as a possibly good claim than in Acholi. Some progress had been made in Acholi in increasing the number of councils and widening their base of representation. None had been effected in Lango by the end of 1945. The job of strengthening the new, non-traditional Lango political system, if such were considered a desirable aim, would indeed be a formidable task.

APPENDIX V

A NOTE ON CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES

There have been numerous changes in Uganda's external and internal administrative boundaries. As regards the former, when Uganda's old Eastern Province was transferred to Kenya in 1902, the Protectorate's Central Province became the new Eastern Province. Settlement of the boundary with Belgium brought most of Kigezi to Uganda in 1911 in return for some of the Semliki Valley. Adjustment of the Sudan boundary in 1914 brought the loss of some territory north of Acholi, but what is now the West Nile came under the British administration. The old Rudolf Province on Uganda's northeast was given to Kenya in 1926, and the Protectorate's external borders have remained firm up to the present time--1960.¹

With respect to Uganda's internal administrative boundaries, those of Buganda were set forth in the 1900 Agreement and since then have delineated that Province. But the boundaries of the other provinces and even some of the districts have been changed throughout the years. With regard to the provincial borders, it would seem that as of the end of 1931 and during the preceding years since the 1902 transfer, the Western Province had consisted of Ankole, Toro, and Kigezi, with Bunyoro possibly forming a part of it in the earlier years. The Northern Province included Bunyoro, West Nile, and two Acholi Districts administered separately--the Gulu District which included yet another separately administered area, Madi; and the Chua District to the east with headquarters in Kitgum. The Eastern Province included Lango, Karamoja, Teso, and the smaller Districts of Bugwere, Budama, and Bugisu. As of January 1, 1932, Lango was transferred from the Eastern to the Northern Province.²

Sometime after 1935 but before 1939 the two Acholi Districts

¹For changes in territorial frontiers, see H. B. Thomas and Robert Scott, Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 41, 461, 473, 476, 479. See also the map in Roland Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), p. 294.

²Thomas and Scott, pp. 225 (map dated 1935), 468-469, 471, 473, 475.

were amalgamated into one.¹ Probably at the same time supervision over the affairs of the Madi Sub-District was transferred from the District Commissioner at Gulu to the officer in charge of the West Nile District.²

As of the beginning of 1939 the Northern Province was merged with the Western Province and the new entity was given the latter name. This meant that the new Western Province included Kigezi, Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro, West Nile, Madi, Acholi, and Lango.³

At a point between 1935 and 1941 the Bugwere and Bugisu Districts in the Eastern Province were joined to form the Central District, leaving the southern Budama District intact.

In 1939 Kumam was transferred from Lango to Teso and in the following year Teso was further enlarged with the addition of Bukedea, a county to its southeast which had previously been part of the District of Bugwere and later of the Central District.

In 1941 the Budama District was joined with the Central District to become the new Central District and later the Mbale District. However, two separate administrations were retained and evidently these represented a reshuffling. One of them was for the Bagisu and the Sebei and covered the same general area as the old Bugisu District. The other included what was left of the Central District (the former area of Bugwere minus Bukedea) together with the late Budama District. This second half of Mbale's administrative area came to be known as Bukedi, with its extremely heterogeneous population consisting of Bagwere, Banyuli, Samia, Bagwe, and Badama, not to speak of the presence of numerous Iteso.⁴

As of January 1, 1947, the large Western Province was split into two, but not exactly duplicating the pre-1939 lines. Bunyoro this time

¹Probably about 1937. Thomas and Scott's work doesn't mention the amalgamation; a personal informant stated it was during Sir Philip Mitchell's term as Governor (1935-1940); and a Uganda report covering the war period of 1939-1946 refers to just the one Acholi District and reports nothing of an amalgamation, which therefore presumably preceded 1939. Uganda Protectorate, Annual Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western Province, for the Period 1939-1946 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1949), p. 71. Cited hereafter as UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946.

²UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946, p. 48.

³UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946, p. 65.

⁴UP, Annual [Provincial] Reports . . . 1939-1946, pp. 35-36; Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part I: East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika ([Great Britain,] Colonial Office; London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 26.

went with the new Western Province, which henceforth has consisted of Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and Kigezi. Karamoja was taken from the Eastern Province and added to the new Northern Province, which has since comprised Karamoja, Lango, Acholi, Madi, and the West Nile. The Eastern Province as of 1947 had as constituent parts the Districts of Busoga, Teso, and Mbale.¹

The major change since the 1948 Census has been the official decision to abolish Mbale District as such and create, of the two previously separate administrations, two legally constituted districts--the Bugisu and Bukedi Districts. The decision became formally effective on November 1, 1954.²

¹[Great Britain,] Colonial Office, Annual Report on Uganda for the Year 1946 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), p. 103; Uganda Protectorate, Annual Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western Province, Northern Province for the Year Ended 31st December, 1947 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1949), pp. 65, 99-100.

²Uganda Protectorate, Annual Reports on the Eastern Province, Western Province and Northern Province for the Year Ended 31st December, 1954 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1955), p. 5.

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All works to which reference was made in the dissertation have been classified in the Bibliography (including those mentioned as not used). As regards sources consulted but not specifically cited in the footnotes, only a small number have been added to the listing.

An abbreviation, not employed previously in the study, has been used below. In the case of material published by His (or Her) Majesty's Stationery Office, that Office has been designated as follows: HMSO.

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II. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

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Note on Report Series Designations in Footnotes

The bibliographical entries below indicate that the pre-1920 annual and other reports on Uganda issued by the Government of Great Britain were often identified by several particulars. However, to simplify the footnote citations in the body of the preceding study, a less complex system has been followed for the first "full" references in chapters.

The reports published prior to the 1905 transfer of jurisdiction over the Protectorate from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office have been identified by their Africa series number and the year of publication (in addition to their titles), even though some of these reports also carried command paper (C.; or Cd.) numbers.

Annual and other British Government reports on Uganda from 1905 up to and including the 1918-19 report have been identified by their command paper (Cd.; or Cmd.) numbers, even though certain of them also bore other series' numbers (Colonial Reports--Annual; or, Colonial Reports--Miscellaneous). Like the Africa series, some of the post-1905 reports were issued as Parliamentary Papers, but this additional division is not made in the Bibliography.

For the annual reports on the Protectorate from the 1919-20 report through that for 1938, only one number series (Colonial Reports--Annual) was assigned by the British authorities; it has been used for these years' reports in the study's initial footnote citations in chapters.

There were no annual reports dealing with Uganda issued by the

British Government for the period 1939-1945. The annual report for 1946 (which covered the war years in only a very limited sense) and the later annual reports were not given official numbers, in either the old or a new series. Therefore, footnotes for these reports provided no special identifying numbers.

Published Government of Great Britain documents which are listed below have been grouped as follows: Parliamentary Papers, 1893-1905; Annual Reports on Uganda, 1905-1958; and Miscellaneous. The first two groupings have been chronologically ordered. The last has been alphabetically arranged.

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Uganda Protectorate

Notes on Legislative Council Debates and on Blue Books

Through October 1939 the official record of Legislative Council debates was designated as Summary of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Uganda. The subsequent verbatim publications were entitled Proceedings of the Legislative Council.

In the latter series, Sessions were also divided into numbered Meetings. Until the 1954-55 Thirty-Fourth Session, the practice was to designate each separate day of debate as a new Meeting, and two or more Meetings were frequently bound together in one volume with a single pagination. For example, the Third and Fourth Meetings of the Thirty-Third Session covered respectively the debates for March 23 and March 24, 1954, and they were issued in one volume with the pages numbered continuously from 1 to 91. (Since the provision of both a Meeting number and the date for a particular Session's debate during the period prior to the Thirty-Fourth Session would represent identical references to the same issue of the Proceedings, only the date has been provided in the study's initial footnote citations in a chapter, and the Meeting designation has been omitted.)

Commencing with the Thirty-Fourth Session, the practice changed--one Meeting often included several days' debates, and each Meeting was always bound separately. Furthermore, with the Thirty-Sixth Session in 1956 the Proceedings of some Meetings became so extended that they were bound in two or three separate volumes (designated as Parts), each beginning a new pagination and usually including more than one day of debates. (To facilitate location of particular debates commencing with the Thirty-Fourth Session, it is considered desirable in initial footnote citations to these Proceedings to provide not only the date but also the Meeting number, as well as the Part number where the record of the referenced Meeting was bound in more than one volume. This was done for the one post-1954 debate which was cited.)

With regard to the inclusive bibliographical entry below which relates to the Proceedings during the period 1939-1945, the published records of certain of the debates were missing from the Library of Congress holdings and were, therefore, not available as source material.

For the Nineteenth Session, only the Proceedings of the Second Meeting (December 6-7, 1939) could be consulted. Also missing from the collection were the First Meeting of the Twentieth Session and the Fourth Meeting (March 14, 1941) of the same Session.

The listing which follows of published documents emanating from the Government of the Uganda Protectorate has been divided into recurrent reports of three kinds, each chronologically ordered, and an alphabetically ordered Miscellaneous category.

The first grouping, the Protectorate's annual Blue Books, may be regarded as supplements to the annual reports on Uganda issued by the Colonial Office and included previously under official publications of Great Britain. The Blue Books, containing almost exclusively statistical data relating to a wide range of subjects, were not issued for the years 1939-1944. With the edition for 1945, which provided some figures for the earlier war years, publication of the series was discontinued. As indicated by its omission from the list below, the report for 1920 was not consulted; it was missing from the holdings of the New York Public Library.

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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Abstract of a Dissertation

COLONIAL POLICY AS A MAJOR VARIABLE FORCE SHAPING POLITICAL CHANGE IN AFRICA:

A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA, 1905-1945

by

Charles Henry Walter Howe

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation is a case study of the effect of colonial policy on political change in a dependent African territory--the Uganda Protectorate--from 1905 up to 1945.

It is developed within an analytical framework purposely designed for broader, comparative use. Five human, societal forces are singled out as major variables affecting political change in a large part of Africa during most of the colonial era. They are: the traditional African political systems; the policies of the colonial powers; alien contact and influence; events and issues; and the social situation and social change. All of the variables, as they interacted in the Protectorate, are considered at one or more stages in the dissertation. But, carried out as a library research project in the United States, this work places the main emphasis on the second of the forces--colonial policy.

The study is directed specifically to the problem of the assessment of British policy's role in the extent of political change in Uganda. The focus is on change in political institutions for governing the African population at both the local level and the territorial level. As for the former, a distinction is made in turn between the tribal areas of direct and indirect rule.

From the inquiry's findings, conclusions are drawn which substantiate a thesis about the importance of policy--in relation to the other variables--in shaping the differing extent of change which occurred in the three categories of political institutions distinguished above.

The examination of native administration policy reveals that although for much of the period Protectorate officials viewed their policy for the entire territory as the application of the classic British concept of Indirect Rule, of the twelve main tribes surveyed none but the people of the Kingdom of Buganda were in fact ruled indirectly. Approached analytically, British rule of the eleven smaller, non-Baganda tribes was in reality direct; and for the majority of them it was decidedly direct. It is shown that in the latter cases--the Acholi tribe receives particular study--the change in the traditional political institutions was extensive; and that the direct rule policy was the primary causal factor. As for the Baganda, change in their traditional political system was relatively limited; and the two most important forces shaping the extent of the change were the adaptive Buganda system itself and the indirect rule policy.

Change in the territory's central political institutions--Governor, Administrative Organization, Executive Council, Legislative Council--is found to have been limited; and it is concluded that this was primarily attributable to British policy in its several aspects. With special reference to the Legislative Council, the policies toward the central institutions were themselves inhibitive to change. Other policies which operated with similar effects, though in most cases

probably not by design, included the tribally variant native administration policies; the regionally disparate economic and social policies, relating to agricultural production, labor, and education; and the official predispositions toward federation of East Africa. The consequences of these diverse policies were, for example, such as to limit pressures for central institutional change from Africans in the areas of pronounced direct rule; and to facilitate as well as engender specific Baganda opposition to mooted African representation in the Legislative Council.

In addition to the conclusions presented regarding the thesis, several hypotheses are formulated concerning the generalized relationships of some of the forces as they varied and interacted in different combinations in Uganda, assessments are made of the validity of theoretical postulates advanced by certain other writers, and a critique of British policy in the Protectorate is provided at the end.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Charles Henry Walter Howe

The writer was born on March 8, 1923, at Hot Springs, Arkansas, son of J. William and the late Olga C. Howe. (An aunt and uncle, Mabel M. and Edward Grebenstein, have acted as foster parents.) Married in 1947 to Margaret Anne Chadwell, a graduate of Swarthmore College, he has four children.

His primary schooling was obtained in Hot Springs, after which-- in 1935--a move was made north to New Jersey. In 1939 he graduated from the Woodrow Wilson High School of Weehawken, New Jersey, entering Dartmouth College that fall and majoring in International Relations. In the senior year he commenced studies at the College's Amos Tuck School of Business Administration. The degree of A.B. was awarded by Dartmouth on January 1, 1943; and the degree of M.C.S. was granted by the College on September 25, 1946, after completion of the Tuck School's graduate course. In the intervening period there was U.S. Army service of two and one half years, most of which was spent in Europe, but which also included a five months' course in the Dutch language and the Far Eastern area at the Army Specialized Training School, Stanford University, California.

During the eight years from 1946 to 1954 the writer was posted as a career Foreign Service Officer to Indonesia, Iran, and Luxembourg,

resigning at the end of 1954 to pursue a course of studies in African political affairs. Boston University, with its special African Studies Program, was chosen for this purpose. The major fields of study selected as a Department of Government doctoral candidate were Government and Politics of Africa, Comparative Government, State and Municipal Government, and Public Administration and Public Policy.

The Ph.D. requirements were completed at the end of 1956 except for the dissertation. By late 1957 the source data for that had been collected, but progress was then interrupted to carry out a field research project under an additional grant from the Ford Foundation. Material was gathered in Uganda for a study of political value-beliefs as a significant factor in political behavior in the Protectorate, after which work was resumed on the dissertation with the return to the United States in July 1959.



C. H. Walter Howe