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
THESIS

THE ATTITUDES OF THE NEW REPUBLIC
TOWARD AMERICAN ENTRANCE INTO THE
FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS.

by

Ernest M. Rosenthal

1949
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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

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ENTRANCE INTO THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS

Ernest M. Rosenthal
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ERNEST M. ROSENTHAL

(B.S. in J., Boston University, 1946)

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

1949

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INTRODUCTION

Starting with its first issue (November 7, 1914, shortly after the outbreak of World War One), THE NEW REPUBLIC for many years carried on its cover a self-description - "A Journal of Opinion." As a journal of opinion, the magazine has always been a leader of thought among that group of American intellectuals called "liberals," although its circulation has never been high as magazine circulations go. THE NEW REPUBLIC has printed articles by most of the progressive leaders and thinkers of the nation, and the magazine's own editors have ranked high among the liberals. There was the first editor, Herbert Croly, with his "Promise of American Life," a philosophy which still guides the magazine today. There were also George Soule and Bruce Bliven, critics Edmund Wilson, Stark Young, and Malcolm Cowley, and young pundit Walter Lippman. In the most recent period there was the brief reign of Henry Wallace, which lasted until young editor Michael Straight took the magazine back to its traditional position just to the right of the extreme Left-wing.

It is the purpose of this study to examine the attitudes of this liberal "journal of opinion" toward the two great wars in which the United States has participated in recent history, and to see how progressive minds reacted to modern history as it was happening. It is the intention of this work to trace

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To find out just what the editors of the magazine thought in the great crises of 1914-17 and 1939-41, the investigator has relied entirely upon the primary source THE NEW REPUBLIC itself. And the magazine articles chosen are those by the editors themselves writing in their editorial capacities. For the editors stress that signed articles do not necessarily carry their stamp of complete approval. The magazine printed material to which it was diametrically opposed only as letters to the editors.

The work is composed of two main parts: World War One and World War Two. There is also a short transition showing the magazine's stand upon the vital issues growing out of the first war which formed the basis for the conflicts which led to the second war. These issues were the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, the Washington Conference on naval disarmament, the Kellogg-Briand pact, the Spanish Civil War - the rehearsal for what was to come - and the United States' Neutrality legislation - the nation's effort to avoid some of the

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mistakes of 1914-1917.

The material on World War One shows the magazine's reaction to German militarism, infringements on neutral rights by both Germany and Britain, submarine warfare, hopes for the postwar world, and the decision to urge the nation to fight.

THE NEW REPUBLIC's attitude toward Fascism, German aggression, Japan, the destroyers-for-bases deal, lend-lease, and fears of a post-war world dominated by Nazi Germany, will be shown as factors leading to the magazine's interventionist stand in World War Two.

The chronological method has been used in this thesis in order to present a whole picture of the development of attitudes towards several issues at the same time.

One of the first steps in the development of the magazine's attitude was its reaction to Wilson's war message to Congress in 1917. THE NEW REPUBLIC had concluded that this was a war for neutral rights, freedom of the seas, the future of Atlantic civilization, and a post-war world whose security would be entrusted to a "League to Enforce Peace." It is the task of this first chapter to show the steps which led to the magazine's decision that the United States ought to declare war on Germany.

End of Isolation

The first issue called the end of American isolation and affirmed the nation's interest in the future peace treaty: "If the treaty in the which makes for international stability and justice, this country will have an interest in maintaining it." And conversely, the United States should work for the

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CHAPTER I

WORLD WAR ONE

THE NEW REPUBLIC's attitude toward the question of American participation in World War One changed radically between 1914 and 1917. The magazine's first reaction was that although American isolation was ended and Americans should be interested in seeing that a stable peace resulted from the battle, yet it was foolish to bill the conflict as one in which the future of civilization was at stake.¹ The editors declared in the first issue, "the future no more depends upon a single race or nation (Britain) than a nation on a single individual."² But before Wilson's war message to Congress in 1917, THE NEW REPUBLIC had concluded that this was a war for neutral rights, freedom of the seas, the future of Atlantic civilization, and a post-war world whose security would be entrusted to a "League to Enforce Peace." It is the task of this first chapter to show the steps which led to the magazine's decision that the United States ought to declare war on Germany.

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While asserting that the country should not enter the war, THE NEW REPUBLIC early criticized the government for not throwing its strongest diplomatic pressure against the German invaders of Belgium so that the peoples of the world would know that the United States was a moral force with which to reckon. As a timid neutral, the editors felt, the United States would cut a sorry figure at the postwar peace settlement. It was argued that the cause of world organization needed the backing of a morally purposeful major power.⁴

Pacifism

Judging by an editorial entitled "Pacifism vs. Passivism" the magazine did not feel that a clear case had been made out for a charge of war guilt against Germany. This editorial criticized passivism as laissez faire which made it easy for militarism. To be preferred was the newer ideal in which peace was to be actively and intentionally promoted. The editors declared,

"A modern nation which wants the world to live in peace should not be content to keep the peace itself. It must be willing and ready, whenever a clear case can be made out against a disturber of the peace, to join with other nations in taking up arms against the malefactor."⁵

League of Peace

This new pacifist ideal was carried further in a 1915 article which urged peaceful powers to organize peace as belligerents did war. It was declared essential that the approval

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or disapproval of pacific powers be made a factor in the calculations of warring nations. The editors argued that Germany dared to invade Belgium because it was decided that violating Belgian neutrality carried a larger military advantage than did respecting it. And THE NEW REPUBLIC concluded,

"If other neutral powers had been ready to fight for Belgium, German calculations would have had a different result. The only way in which neutral interests can obtain weight in the counsel of nations commensurate with their real importance is by means of a league organized expressly for their promotion and assertion in time of need."

This appeal for a league of peace was to become the war cry of THE NEW REPUBLIC. And the ideal was to be promoted in almost every issue of the war years.

In the spring of 1915 THE NEW REPUBLIC expanded on its frequent suggestions favoring the establishment of a League of Peace. It was stated that the Allies should serve as the beginning of League membership, with the United States backing up the Allies. The main difference between the League and the current alliance would be the duty of arbitration and mediation of disputes, with a public constitution. The League would provide security for France and make unnecessary the French alliance with Russia. The magazine felt that official Russia still belonged to the dark ages.

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as a weakness, but one which could be overcome. THE NEW REPUBLIC was fully aware that the basic weakness of the League would be the refusal of any state to abandon any of its sovereignty. For a true League of Peace must have the power to supervise the foreign policies of its members.⁷

Neutral Rights

That spring the magazine took up a new issue, that of law and order on the high seas. And there were sharp words for the British as well as the Germans. Great Britain was criticized for failure to live up to its international obligations in conducting its blockade of Germany. THE NEW REPUBLIC pointed out that Britain, as the preponderant sea power, held the power of life and death over nations which lived by international trade. Neutrals were urged to insist upon the sanctity of the traditional belligerent obligations to neutrals. This would at least preserve their standing in court.⁸

Meanwhile, Germany was cautioned to avoid arousing the wrath of the United States by her submarine warfare. The magazine reiterated its opposition to declaring war against Germany, but pointed out that its pro-Ally sentiment was typical of the whole American nation. And Germany was warned that if more innocent people were killed and neutral ships torpedoed, American anger might be all the more terrible because it had been so long suppressed by a desire to maintain neutrality.⁹

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emphasized the dependence of the United States on British maritime supremacy. It appeared that if German submarines should render British sea power ineffective, disaster would result not only to the Empire but to American trade.

However, the magazine confirmed Germany's right to sink ships carrying contraband, but insisted that despite the difficulties presented by the limitations on submarines, caused by their nature, no ships should be sunk until warning had been given and the safety of passengers and crew assured.

The editors declared a war with Germany would be a calamity for the United States. The United States would win, but there would be moral damage, including racial cleavage.

At the same time, the magazine took the opportunity to criticize again British encroachments on shipping. It was admitted that Germany was acting barbarously, but Britain was using the same argument that military necessity warranted the breaking of international law. The phrase "A plague on both your houses" would sum up the magazine's attitude, and the United States government was praised for the firmness and finality with which it had resisted the attempt of both belligerents to write their own national policies and interests into public law.¹⁰

The next week the editors reached the conclusion that Germany had a just grievance against international law which made it so difficult for her to break the British blockade without offending neutrals. The editors declared the German claim of military necessity was very real since the flow of American

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arms to Britain might win the war for the Allies, and civilians should not be insurance for vessels carrying war goods. At the same time it was almost impossible for the Germans to get these arms for themselves due to British sea power. However, the editors maintained that German butchery had corrupted their substantial claim against international law.

And the editors repudiated the idea that the United States should voluntarily surrender the right of its citizens to sell munitions to the Allies. International law should not be written during the heat and confusion of actual hostilities.¹¹

Later, the magazine was to declare, "The German Government planned with utmost premeditation to kill one hundred inoffensive American citizens who were behaving as they had a moral and legal right to behave."¹² Germany was cautioned that American public opinion condemned it as criminal and some day that opinion would count.

A series of articles in the summer of 1915 pointed out that the sinking of the Lusitania bared the imminent clash between American and German interests. The German note in reply to the American note of protest was not well received in the United States. Many Americans called for a break in diplomatic relations, and a strong minority who felt that the Allies were fighting our war clamored for American intervention.

In June of 1915, THE NEW REPUBLIC addressed itself to that strong pro-Allied minority. The editors agreed with much of their attitude. They agreed the cause for which the Allies

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had begun fighting ten months before was, on the whole, a good cause. The invasion of Belgium proved Germany to be an aggressor, and the United States must not shun its responsibilities.

Yet, the editors remained firm. The nation must not abandon its traditional neutrality. And if the country should be forced into war by Germany, the challenge would be accepted with extreme reluctance.

American Participation

As long as the Allies were in danger of being overwhelmed, then, it was felt, American participation in the war might be proper. But, the editors were convinced that although Germany might hold off the Allies, she could not defeat them. Instead, the editors were concerned with the fear that if the Allies crushed Germany, there could not be a just and lasting peace settlement. Europe would be carved up to suit Allied imperialism rather than the interests of democracy. And American power on the side of the Allies would mean the crushing defeat of Germany.

THE NEW REPUBLIC believed the price for a decisive American influence upon the peace negotiations would be too high. Decisive influence would go to the nation which had sacrificed greatly for the cause and still possessed military strength. The United States was not prepared to lose a million men in order to have a say about the disposition of Trieste and Constantinople. As a result, American influence would count as much as a neutral as it would as a belligerent which had contributed

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money and supplies but not human lives. Besides, there ought to be one disinterested great power at the peace table. THE NEW REPUBLIC nominated the United States for the role.¹³

That spring congressional debate began on the question of a national defense budget, and THE NEW REPUBLIC came out in favor of a moderate increase in the armed forces and immediately had to defend itself against charges of militarism made by some liberals. The magazine pointed out a lesson of history that unpreparedness never had prevented the nation from plunging into war. At the same time, Switzerland was used as the model of a nation which was known to be pacific yet was well armed. The intelligent pacifist was defined as one who set himself the task of finding answers to international problems, of developing the peaceful organization of the world, and of removing the causes of aggression. And the magazine advised the pacifist to begin at home, using Pan-Americanism as the opportunity of acquiring experience in international organization. To quote the editors, "We have little faith in pacifism which is mere laissez faire, in the doctrine that peace is the vacuum created by the absence of war."¹⁴

In the summer the debate on national defense continued. THE NEW REPUBLIC took the debate as the occasion to restate its rejection of both radical pacifism and radical militarism.

"It takes two to make peace. . . to be non-resistant must mean, then, that one regards nothing as unendurable, even the

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state but as a citizen."

loss of what one loves or admires
or have sworn to serve and protect."¹⁵

The editors declared one cannot hate lawlessness and brutality without hating those who perpetrate or instigate them. The proper projects for peace-loving men were disarmament and international court, and publicity for diplomatic negotiations.¹⁶

As for preparedness, the magazine declared, "The lack of military preparedness in a country like the United States increases the cost without diminishing the danger of war." It was again argued that if provoked, no lack of armament would prevent the nation from declaring war.

The magazine was convinced the preparedness meant the clear-sighted adoption of a new foreign policy to meet the new facts of the world. And upon the basis of that policy, military power should be created to uphold it. Assisting the armed forces would be moral and economic weapons such as boycott, discriminating neutrality, and other non-military pressure. Any new foreign policy would involve an understanding with the British Empire, the A, B, C powers of South America, and the general idea contained in a league of peace.¹⁷

Meaning of American Neutrality

Meanwhile the United States was selling arms and munitions to the belligerents. Because of the British blockade, it meant the arms were sold to Allied powers, not to the Germans. THE NEW REPUBLIC admitted it was just as neutral to ban the sale of munitions to all belligerents as it was to offer them to both when it was obvious only one party had the sea power to import

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Lesson of American Neutrality

Remember the United States neutrality laws and au-
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them safely. But, said the magazine, an embargo would be "morally and politically reprehensible." For this would be aiding the Germans whose obvious preparation for the war proved them - in the eyes of the editors - to be aggressors who had armed to conquer, not to defend. If there were two ways of being neutral, the magazine favored the stand which would help the Allies.

However, at the same time, the editors urged the government to continue to oppose both British and German encroachments on neutral rights. It was charged the British Orders-In-Council were destroying the major achievements of international law in the past one hundred years. Of course the submarine was a new weapon which was bringing terror to the seas. But the appearance of such a destructive weapon should be made the occasion for striving to help neutrals, not drive them off the sea.

THE NEW REPUBLIC felt it was up to the United States to take the lead in working for the abandonment of the blockade. And it was suggested that both Britain and Germany would prove amenable to the enormous economic power of the United States. But, the magazine believed American pressure could be asserted effectively enough so that Britain would yield before it became necessary to use that economic power against her, since she lived by world trade. And looking ahead, THE NEW REPUBLIC saw the Germany of the future participating more in world trade and thus more susceptible to pressure by neutral traders.¹⁸

German submarines continued to sink neutral vessels,

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These arguments continued to sink neutral vessels,

but were careful to give them full warning to help save the lives of the crew. But THE NEW REPUBLIC nervously awaited the next incident in which a sudden strike would result in another sea disaster. In comparing the difference between British and German infringements upon neutral rights, the editors stated,

"She (Germany) has created a reign of horror upon the high seas by destroying innocent lives. She has not only broken the law, as England has; she has broken it with cruel violence. To the American mind her sin is infinitely greater than England's, and the clear fact of the situation is that America, supposedly dollar-ridden, will never judge as equal offences the stoppage of trade and the killing of innocent people."¹⁹

The magazine was ready to go to war to defend American lives. But it was decided American entrance into the conflict would defeat American purposes. No military operation would secure freedom of the seas, and the United States would have to drop its opposition to British tactics towards neutrals.

It was acknowledged that the crushing of England and France would endanger the American future and American military intervention would be needed.

But, said the magazine,

"If we are going to stake our future, in the name of sanity, let us know that we are doing it. Let us state early with perfect clearness that we are determined to fight Germany not alone on account of her submarine policy, but because we fear her dominion of the world."²⁰

The solution must still maintain the United States'

but were careful to give them full warning to help save the lives of the crew. But the NEW YORK TIMES newspaper avoided the next two days in which a sudden storm would result in another sea disaster. In comparing the difference between British and German newspapers upon several nights, the editors added:

"The (German) has created a reign of terror upon the sea since by his own imaginary lives. He has not only broken the law, as in fact he has broken it with cruel violence. To the American also he has in his infinitely greater than England's, and the clear fact of the situation in the Atlantic, supposedly better-armed, will never judge as equal offences the slayers of crews and the killing of innocent people."

The magazine was ready to go to war to defend American lives. But it was shocked American entrance into the conflict would defeat American purposes. No military operation would secure freedom of the seas, and the United States would have to keep its operations to military tactics powers neutral. It was acknowledged that the crisis of Ireland and France would threaten the American future and American military intervention would be needed.

But, said the magazine, "If we are to have a state of future in the name of safety, let us know that we are doing it. Let us state every little perfect statement that we are determined to do. We are not alone on account of her submarine policy, but because we fear her domination of the world."

The solution must still maintain the United States!

position as the champion of neutral rights, yet furnish a way of acting against Germany which at once would condemn her while enabling America to decline the responsibility for the imperialistic policies of three of the Allies - Russia, Japan, and Italy.²¹ The possibility of sending troops to Europe was ruled out since it would identify the United States with the military policy of the Allies and prevent America from serving as mediator.

The editors came up with a new suggestion for American action on the contraband and blockade dispute. The United States should propose that prize courts and courts of control should not be British but international, representing all the neutral powers. This could be the start of a solid world organization in which neutrals acting together could force an aggressor to yield to their combined economic pressure.

For America could give what none of the combatants could give: a lead in the organization of forces which might lay the foundations of a new society of nations.²²

But, it was stressed, the American government must continue to protest every instance of British misbehavior. For only by maintaining an honest opposition to the British blockade would there be any validity against complaints by Germany. Neutrals must cling to their rights and not depend upon the good will of British sea power. For the seas to be free, they must be regulated in the interest of international security and peace. And the regulation power was too great to be entrusted

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 be prepared in the interest of international security and
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to any one nation.²³

In August of 1915, THE NEW REPUBLIC's chief editor, Herbert Croly, famous for his philosophy of "The Promise of American Life," wrote, in a signed article, of the meaning of American neutrality. He stated that the greatest benefit of the war could not be a German loss of power, but a German increase of experience. Croly declared that America owed no obligation to the cause of liberalism unless the Western Powers should seem in danger of being crushed, which did not appear likely. (Later in this work it will be seen that this fear of the crushing of Western power by Germany was the basic motive for the magazine's interventionist attitude in World War Two.) To Croly, the special problem of the allies was to make a world war contribute to permanent pacification. And the special problem of America was to make neutral abstention from war contribute to the same end. Said Croly, "If we are forced into the war we ought not to lose sight of our special work." He called for limited participation if any participation were necessary.

And the United States, he argued, should not get too involved in the peace treaty which should be determined by a balance of forces rather than the authority of ideas. He felt that the post-war construction period would provide America with its great opportunity to contribute to world stability.²⁴

Call for Break with Germany

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Call for peace with Germany

August of 1918 was a bad month for German-American

relations. The New York World published letters apparently

written between German officials and American agents who were trying to bribe labor leaders to call strikes in munitions factories. THE NEW REPUBLIC angrily called the German offense as hypocritical and brutal as the attack on Belgium.²⁵

After the sinking of the Arabic, the magazine called for the nation to prepare for complete non-intercourse with Germany: stoppage of mails, wireless, imports and exports. It was urged that America should increase munitions production and lend money to the Allies in order to hurt Germany as much as possible. And the editors warned that the nation was being drawn into a conflict with Germany through the incapacity of the Germans to realize the submarine campaign was against their best interests. It was necessary to show that the United States meant to isolate and then boycott Germany, and finally mobilize, if submarines continued to sink without warning. In that way German moderates might prevail in their own government.²⁶

The magazine found the German reply to the United States protest on the Arabic sinking to be completely unsatisfactory. The magazine wanted President Wilson to call back our ambassador from Berlin and ask the Germans to send for their envoy to Washington. The President was advised that his only chance of securing the safety of Americans on British vessels and of rescuing international law from "the suffocating grip of an unscrupulous enemy" was to make the Germans understand the full cost of American hostility. Breaking off diplomatic relations, it was stated, would not necessarily precipitate the

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country into war. If war followed it would be because Germany chose to issue a declaration of war or had continued to kill Americans. To THE NEW REPUBLIC this would be a war of German aggression - and the American people would rally behind their government.²⁷

The magazine already had spoken out to those who would have had the nation abandon or waive the rights under international law which were bringing the country into conflict with Germany.

"These people wholly failed to realize that the rights of neutrals under the law of nations were just as plainly the beginnings of a constitutional international system as the charter of municipal rights granted by feudal lords were the beginning of domestic constitutionalism.

"The law of visit and search, which so many Americans would have consented to abandon because of the danger and cost of insisting on it, is an essential part of the whole system of neutral rights."²⁸

America's Future

In September of 1915 the magazine printed an article which later will be shown to present a basic difference between early attitudes in World War One and in World War Two. In 1915 THE NEW REPUBLIC felt that even if Germany defeated the Allies in battle the future would not be so dark. For, said the magazine, "The Germans realize better than any other people, that modern military power is based upon economic power." German victory would be followed by an energetic initiative in fields of industry and commerce, and the formation of an alliance of

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the most militant peoples of Europe - Germans, Poles, Bulgars, Hungarians, and Turks. But, according to THE NEW REPUBLIC, this "victorious and invincible combination" would do nothing about the Monroe Doctrine or the British Empire. The new alliance would be occupied for a generation in cultivating its own vast empire. It would be truculent in tone, but with Russia on hand in the east, it would not be seeking other trouble.²⁹

In October of 1915 President Wilson submitted to Congress a legislative program featuring plans for increasing the army and the navy. THE NEW REPUBLIC called this a "wise and courageous course" and said the enlargement of the American armed forces might bulk as one of the decisive facts in the world history of the following fifty years. For a nation with as formidable a navy as called for by the plans would be certain to have increased weight in international councils. The support of the United States would become indispensable to European nations. It was stressed that the United States was not arming to defend itself against Germany but to back up its national policies and international responsibilities.³⁰

United States-Britain Alliance

Meanwhile, the magazine was considering America's diplomatic course for future years. It was stated that America's policy of self-centered aloofness was partly responsible for Europe's chaos. If European democracy fell, the United States would become the last bulwark of popular government. "For this fundamental reason, there is almost literal truth to

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To THE NEW REPUBLIC the logical answer was an alliance between America and the British Empire, as the only two great powers influenced by the great moral tone of public opinion. The magazine declared that had the alliance existed before, there would not have been a World War.³¹

The next month the Allies, Britain and France, issued the statement that Germany must be crushed in the interest of world peace. The magazine sharply criticized the statement, saying the peace must be one of compromise. Otherwise, the German people would see that militarism did pay - for the victor. The harsh peace would make them loyal to their government, and convince them the unfavorable things said about Allied intentions were true.³²

Press Criticism

During the following weeks THE NEW REPUBLIC was defending itself against two charges of pro-Germanism. The accusers were The Boston Transcript, called by the magazine "the most pretentiously learned newspaper in the United States," and Professor Ralph Barton Perry, of Harvard.

To the magazine it was strange that the newspaper's remark came just three days after the magazine's appeal for an Anglo-American alliance. It concluded that by pro-German The Transcript meant anything short of complete pro-Allied fanaticism. "There are circles of Boston society where The Tran-

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script is approved, in which it is pro-German (and even anti-American) to doubt the smallest item of the most jingoistic utterance of the Allies." The magazine sarcastically suggested that perhaps it wasn't right to mention Allied atrocities and air raids. And it concluded "if everything in the world is concentrated in the cause of the Allies, then we ought to be fighting in Flanders, not making money in Boston." However, the magazine asserted, The Transcript was not willing to fight; all it did was contribute to the Red Cross and talk about the situation.³³

THE NEW REPUBLIC concluded that what bothered Professor Perry was the magazine's refusal to hate Germany. The editors pointed out they had favored closer political union with the British Empire, urged a navy larger than Germany but smaller than England's, advised a guard on German ambition in the western hemisphere, had come out against an arms embargo, spoken in favor of a loan to England and France, and had castigated Germany's invasion of Belgium. To the editors the moral issue involved was whether the awful slaughter of the war was to help towards a just and lasting peace. The question of war guilt was secondary. France, Italy, and Japan had not entered the war with clean hands. The magazine declined to be convinced that they would emerge clean. And the editors left Professor Perry with these words, "The task of reconstructing the world is so infinitely difficult that consuming hatred seems to us a luxury. It is the refuge of those too angry to think."³⁴

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Shortly before this article, the magazine had declared its opinion that the American people did not intend to take part in the war. But since America had no intention of becoming a belligerent, she ought not to talk and think like one. If inactivity was palling Americans, there was plenty of activity they could have as neutrals. Americans should take over the relief operations in Europe and should be a clearing house of act and opinion. But most of all, America should be standing against the inanity of hate, "the insanity which proposed to atone for a crime by committing more crimes." The Allied ambition to crush Germany was seen as inimical to world peace, and as making meaningless pretensions of concern for the future of civilization.³⁵

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 THE NEW REPUBLIC, which later was to have the highest praise for Woodrow Wilson, was extremely critical of the President at this time (December, 1915). The magazine declared, "Wilson avoided war not through diplomacy but through luck. His diplomacy consisted entirely in keeping the American people quiet long enough for the British to invent a defense against submarine raids."³⁶ And in January of 1916 the editors stated that in the long run the timid neutrality of Wilson would lead to war. But, they wrote, the methods advocated by Theodore Roosevelt would lead to peace. Again, they refused to give Wilson credit for any successful action against submarines. It was pointed out that both Wilson and the former president,

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Roosevelt, used words. But the editors felt it was obvious Roosevelt was not bluffing while Wilson was. They claimed Roosevelt would have warned Germany before the invasion of Belgium, setting a great precedent; he also would have warned England about freedom of the seas.

Where Wilson's method was to wait for things to happen and then to find a solution, Roosevelt would have acted before they happened. THE NEW REPUBLIC called Roosevelt "a real internationalist." The magazine said he had flung a challenge to pacifists: "You wish an organized world community; what risks are you ready to run in order to establish it?"³⁷

The editors said it was now time for the Allies to clarify their peace aims. German courage, it was said, was based upon fears of Allied aims. To state them would be a shrewd political move and would begin the education of the German people.³⁸

However critical the magazine was of the use of verbal weapons against Germany, Wilson's deference to Britain was approved as perfectly adapted to the relationship existing between the United States and the United Kingdom. The magazine repeated its support of the policy of refraining from enforcing our protests against illegal British actions on the sea. The editors said Britain was one country against which only "civilized" methods should be used. America should call every violation of neutral rights to the attention of the British government only for the sake of the record. No surrender of the

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symbol of neutral rights under international law could be made until Americans had some assurance they were to be exchanged for something better.

Returning to the theme of action along lines advocated by Theodore Roosevelt, the magazine declared that Germany's action in involving the innocent and inoffensive Belgians in the war had made neutral indifference abhorrent to right-minded men. The United States, it was said, would have been justified in declaring an embargo on all trade with Germany until Belgium was evacuated and indemnified.

But moral disapproval of Germany did not mean blanket approval of the Allied cause. It was admitted that the past domestic and foreign policies of England did not entitle her to unlimited confidence.³⁹

Militarism

In the same issue (January 22, 1916), the editors found it necessary to speak up against what it took to be the beginning in America of the very military arrogance so abhorred in the Germans. They said that if the American people had to choose between the virulence of the militarists and the ideas of the pacifists, the pacifists would win out even at the risk of destroying the foundations of American policy.

"The real desire of Americans is to make a civilization in America. They will prepare what is necessary to defend that; they may even be induced to take a share in the policing of the world. But they do not want to be told that war is a gymnasium of the virtues;

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"The real desire of Americans is

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They will spend money, it is necessary to

defend that; but they will not spend

to make a name in the politics of the

world. They do not want to be sold

that war is a transaction of the virtues;

they know it to be the stinking thing that it is. . . Their condemnation of Germany in this war is based on what they believe to be a dangerous military psychology in the rulers of Germany, and they are shrewd enough to detect and resent the same psychology when it crops up in America."⁴⁰

The next month the magazine again took up its criticism of President Wilson's policy. The occasion was comment upon a speech by former Secretary of State Elihu Root. The editors declared that during one of the great crises in the history of the world, at a moment when an opportunity existed to make the United States a positive influence on behalf of international order, President Wilson had elected to remain scrupulously neutral in word and deed, and solemnly advised neutrality in thought and in feeling. On the other hand, the editors stated, Root had expressed the discomfort of Americans who had no outlet for their moral and social convictions due to the official policy of their country during a time of intense emotional ferment. THE NEW REPUBLIC declared that Elihu Root stood for the high standard of international responsibility which could have been imposed upon public opinion by a real national leader. It agreed with Root that the government's official silence after the invasion of Belgium symbolized the failure of the administration's leadership.⁴¹

Santayana

In return, THE NEW REPUBLIC had criticism of itself to answer again. This time the critic was philosopher George Santayana, a contributor to the magazine at that time.

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Background

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The editors declared the United States should not enter the war, and American public opinion was not under any obligation to imitate French and British public opinion. It was admitted that German aggression raised an international question in which the United States was interested. But they said the war was ninety per cent national and only ten per cent international. They stated,

"Some day nations may fight for a predominantly international cause, but they are hardly prepared to do so yet. It is unreasonable to expect a country with the composition, the traditions, and collective psychology of the United States to intervene chiefly on disinterested political ground in a European war."⁴²

THE NEW REPUBLIC said that contrary to the ideas expressed by Santayana the peace settlement must not be too harsh on Germany. The United States must not countenance the destruction of the German nation. If Britain insisted upon the crushing of Germany the United States could not go through with any proposed political alliance with the British Empire since the cause of world peace would have been betrayed. A strong and contented Germany was necessary for the concert of Europe. "Thus," said the editors, "we differ from the pro-Ally Americans chiefly because we do not see Prussianism as an essentially malevolent political monster that will continue to vomit gases until it is destroyed by some equally absolute knight-errant." The Germans had made a terrible mistake, but should not pay for it with all their political ambitions for the

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future or by being classified as criminals.⁴³ The editors could not see any advantage to the substitution in Germany of a foreign oppression for a native one.

The Sussex

The sinking of the Sussex brought about a new crisis between the United States and Germany in April of 1916. To THE NEW REPUBLIC the sinking showed that even with good intentions on the part of civil authorities, submarine warfare could not be conducted with regard to the safety of the noncombatant. The magazine called upon President Wilson to demand that Germany abandon submarine warfare against merchant ships, under the penalty of a break with the United States and a threat of organized assistance to the Allies. The Germans had their chance to show whether the submarine could be used humanely. Now they would give it up or face the consequences.⁴⁴

On April 22, in an article titled "An Appeal to the President," the magazine advocated a diplomatic break with Germany and the abolishment of the doctrine of neutrality. The editors said, "We must say that from now on the United States is not neutral. It intends to use its moral power, its economic resources, and in some cases its military force against the aggressor." An aggressor was defined as "the nation that will not submit its quarrel to international inquiry, that will not suspend action until the world has had a chance to pass judgment upon it or that pursues its quarrel after the world has decided against it."⁴⁵

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has decided a case is."

Break with Germany

The magazine demanded the government announce to Germany that the United States would break off relations unless she agreed to abandon submarine warfare against commerce, to evacuate Belgium, France, and Serbia, to indemnify Belgium, and accept the principle of collective action against nations which refused to submit quarrels to arbitration. If Germany accepted this program the United States should resume intercourse and agree not to furnish special aid to the Allies.⁴⁶

THE NEW REPUBLIC realized a break in diplomatic relations could lead to war if handled improperly. And the magazine still thought the United States should keep out of the war. It felt that although the nation might go into the war for the sake of neutral rights, there was no guarantee that the war could accomplish anything for that end. The magazine stated that without the United States power on the side of the Allies a peace of compromise was more likely. And it believed that only a negotiated peace had a chance of bringing about lasting peace.⁴⁷

President Wilson's acceptance of concessions agreed to by Germany as the result of the exchange of notes over the Sussex incident was disappointing to THE NEW REPUBLIC. The editors declared,

"He (the President) intends. . . as usual, to wait and watch, trusting that in the thick of the most ruthless and destructive war of history that the offenders will cease

Peace with Germany

The magazine demanded that the government announce to the
 people that the United States would break all relations unless the
 enemy agreed to certain conditions: a just peace, no
 armaments, no reparations, no indemnities, no
 and so on. The principle of collective action against nations which
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The editors called President Wilson's type of neutrality "hypocritical".

Justice to Germans

At the same time the magazine called to the attention of the American public certain justices to the German argument. It said Americans were childish to be angry because Germany had lectured the United States on its failure to enforce international law against Britain as well as Germany. Said THE NEW REPUBLIC, "On any candid reading of the facts it is plain that the policy of the American government has been damaging to Germany and helpful to the Allies." The magazine said that the German argument was fair as well as embarrassing because the American public had been "kidding" itself about its neutrality.⁴⁹ The American people had failed to face squarely the necessary implications of their decision that German victory was undesirable and that they would not approve any policy likely to promote it. The public had tried to combine essential unneutrality with the avoidance of its necessary consequences. Had Americans really placed neutral rights above Allied victory, the United States would have placed an embargo on munitions to either side. But the government had recognized the true public feeling and because of the public delusion the government had to use hypocrisy in its dealings with Germany. The government should have been able to say to Germany, "England's methods

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threaten neutral trade, yours threaten neutral existence."⁵⁰

Acting upon the facts, the American government had allowed Great Britain to execute the most comprehensive and inexorable blockade in the history of marine war, and all in defiance of America's traditional attitude of a strict interpretation of neutral rights. As a consequence of America's rigid enforcement of similar rights against Germany, the United States had emasculated the submarine as a commerce destroyer.

The net result of American interference, according to the magazine, had been to make the defeat of Germany possible to an extent that would not have been possible merely as the result of military operations. The German government rightly had come to think of the United States as one of its enemies; and had realized that the American attitude was a reflection of fundamental American interests. For, stated THE NEW REPUBLIC, the United States must associate with the power which could threaten its national security more than any other and with whom association would be mutually most beneficial. "Thus the logic of American unneutrality is pushing the country in the direction of an arrangement with Great Britain."⁵¹ Instead of being furtively unneutral, the United States should be openly partisan; partisan not for the imperial ambitions of the Allies, but for their program for a safer Europe.⁵²

Wilson and the League

In the summer of 1916, THE NEW REPUBLIC found something to cheer about. It was a speech by President Wilson in

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 In the summer of 1918, THE NEW REPUBLIC found some-
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which he urged the future creation of a League of Peace backed by force and used to defend the community of nations. The editors declared that the President deserved the gratitude of all decent men for having pledged American aid for this civilized end. American preparedness now would become the nation's contribution to world peace. Wilson had broken with the tradition of American isolation in the "only way which offers hope to men." Not only had he broken with isolation, he had ended the "pernicious doctrine" of neutrality, and had declared that in the future the United States could not be neutral between the aggressor and the victim. The magazine said the Wilson speech meant that America was ready to act on the belief that war was no longer a matter between two sovereign nations but a common world problem of law and order.

The editors were sure that the Wilson speech offered Germany a way out. They said:

"Mr. Wilson has introduced a new factor, . . . into the calculations of European governments. . . . To Germany it means security in return for the abandonment of aggression. It offers her the choice between arming again to meet all Europe and finding real safety in a league of the Western World. . . . For our part we have no question that a people as educated as the Germans will make the right choice once the opportunity is offered with convincing sincerity."⁵³

Although enthusiastic about prospects for preventing the next war, the magazine remained critical about the Wilson administration's handling of the war on hand, and the American

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Although enthusiastic about prospects for preventing
 the next war, the magazine remained critical about the Wilson
 administration's handling of the war on land, and the American

public's inability to face reality. The magazine caustically commented that the American public protected itself against disagreeable and dangerous possibilities by ignoring them. Americans accepted concessions contained in German diplomatic notes and pretended not to notice the reservations. As for the administration, it had done nothing and written nothing to convince Germany of its will or its ability to be neutral in the sense of enforcing the old rules against both belligerents, nor had it secured from Germany a repudiation of the sinking of the Lusitania. Declared the editors of the Wilson government, "It has no policy except of keeping out of trouble from day to day; and in this respect it is representative of prevailing American public opinion."⁵⁴

Mid-summer of 1916 brought forebodings of a troubled future to THE NEW REPUBLIC. Recent developments were regarded as providing a serious setback to propoganda for the abandonment of isolation. These developments were (1) the proposal for a postwar trade battle of tariffs and boycotts, (2) England's handling of the Irish, (3) the activity of Japan and Russia in China, and (4) the British publication of a commercial blacklist. The magazine saw this as an attempt to destroy Germany, not to conquer her. America could not guarantee the type of reactionary peace these developments promised.⁵⁵

In September the magazine again asked the Allies to offer Germany specific peace terms. The magazine was convinced that Germany was at bay and that the continuation of the war

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was up to the Allies. The journal was convinced another year of war would contribute nothing to the settlement. It was felt Wilson's pledge that the United States would join a league to enforce peace was enough of a guarantee that the Allies would be safe from future German aggression if Germany was not crushed by this war.⁵⁶

The Presidential Election of 1916

The coming of fall in 1916 meant politics. Charles Evans Hughes was running for President against Woodrow Wilson. And as a result of the Hughes policies and Wilson's espousal of a league of peace, THE NEW REPUBLIC swung its editorial voice to the support of the President. Editors Herbert Croly and Walter Lippman advocated Wilson's re-election.

The magazine printed signed articles in favor of Hughes. They were written by such men as Roland G. Usher and Henry L. Stimson. Usher was a regular contributor to the journal but not an editor. Stimson's article was printed as representative of Republican party opinion. The fact that THE NEW REPUBLIC backed the Democratic Party was admitted by publisher Willard Straight, himself a Republican.⁵⁷

Walter Lippman, a friend of the Allied cause, praised Wilson, who, he said, had never been neutral in thought or action though he talked about it. The President, Lippman said, had been "consistently and courageously" benevolent to the Allies.⁵⁸

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recommend it. Croly praised the President for taking the stump when members of his own party had opposed the needed armament program. And Wilson had prevented Congress from passing resolutions which, Croly said, would have brought the United States into collision with the Allies and given American consent to the reign of anarchy on the high seas during war. Croly stated that the majority of the opposition to the President had come from the Republicans.

The editor lauded Wilson for keeping American claims on neutral rights alive for post-war adjudication without hurting England. But to Croly the best thing about Wilson was his new "revolutionary doctrine". Wilson had promised that the United States would participate in any international system which was based upon good faith and would tend to organize general security. Croly concluded:

"In spite of his (Wilson's) early skidding, he has gradually reached an essentially sound and really national foreign policy and one which is backed by an increase in the fleet sufficiently large to make the United States a far more considerable factor in the politics of the world."⁵⁹

Several unsigned articles attacked Hughes' stand on neutral rights because the candidate's position was regarded as harmful to the Allied cause. Hughes stated that the United States should have dealt impartially with both Germany and the Allies. This was taken to mean that Hughes wanted to break the British blockade of Germany.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC declared the Republican nominee looked at neutral rights as a lawyer would, not as a statesman should - as a matter of national policy. The magazine charged that Hughes' position was a sop to the German-American hyphenate vote. And the magazine warned that if any racial group in the country could successfully exert such an influence, America would be cursed by racial cleavage.

To sum up their opposition to Hughes, the editors said that the accomplishment of his policies would have meant the triumph of Germany and the doom of France and Belgium. As it was, the waiving of American rights (in everything except name) against the Allies and the insistence on them against Germany, was felt to have been America's greatest contribution to the war against "German aggression".⁶⁰

Germany and the League

Two weeks after Wilson's re-election, German chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg proclaimed his country's willingness to consider participation in a league to enforce peace. THE NEW REPUBLIC called the announcement the "most momentous and encouraging utterance which has been made since the beginning of the war by the spokesman of a belligerent government." And the magazine agreed with the chancellor that if Germany was to participate in the league, there must be a peace without victory; all the essential controversies of the war must not be decided, willy-nilly, against Germany, or else the league would become nothing but a device to underwrite the Allied victory.

The New Republic declared the Republican nominees looked at neutral rights as a lawyer would, not as a statesman should - as a matter of national policy. The magazine charged that Wilson's position was a sop to the former-American sympathizer vote. And the magazine warned that if any racial group in the country could successfully exert such an influence, America would be cursed by racial cleavage.

To sum up their opposition to Wilson, the editors said that the accomplishment of his policies would have meant the triumph of Germany and the doom of France and Britain. As it was, the waning of American rights (in everything except race) meant the Allies and the insistence on them against Germany, was felt to have been America's greatest contribution to the war against "German aggression".

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It would be a league to prevent Germany from protesting against the consequences of her defeat and as such would keep alive all the old animosities and apprehensions.⁶¹

But events of the next weeks put the damper on the magazine's hopes. First there were the Belgian deportations. The magazine declared that the German excuses were a confession of guilt for the "horror" which had "revived the anger of the American people." The Germans clearly did not understand that Belgium had become a symbol of what made the liberal world anti-German in the war.⁶²

Then came the German invasion of Rumania. THE NEW REPUBLIC recognized the Allied blunder in strategy which had allowed Rumania to enter the war, giving Germany literally a new lease on life as her invading troops took possession of Rumanian oil and wheat fields. The magazine concluded that the new picture of the war made it impossible for the United States to urge the Allies to make peace overtures to a triumphant Germany. The German offensive must be broken first.⁶³

Doubts

Meanwhile, THE NEW REPUBLIC found itself doubting some phases of the Allied cause. The magazine angrily protested the British refusal to grant the newly appointed ambassador from Austria safe conduct to America. It was felt that this was an intolerable discourtesy to the American government.

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cially disturbing was a Russian announcement that it had received a definite promise of Constantinople. English and French blood was to be shed for Russian imperialism, and as a consequence of Russian ambition Germany might be rendered helpless, excluded from the Balkans and the Near East.⁶⁴

The magazine declared that "more and more the war has ceased to look like a clean-cut fight between right and wrong, between democracy and absolutism, between public faith and international lawlessness."⁶⁵

Peace Offensive

December, 1916, saw Germany making peace proposals to the Allies. These proposals were regarded by THE NEW REPUBLIC as liberal and consistent with the magazine's ideal of peace without victory. The problem of the British government with these proposals was realized. To accept the proposals at a time when British military power was at a low ebb meant the loss of some of the imposing prestige of the British Empire.

Restoration of the status quo of the pre-war period would show that Germany had achieved a great victory over her own allies, indeed had organized them into her own Central Europe Empire. The existence of Central Europe meant the end of the traditional British role in the balance of power. And the magazine doubted that the British would accept their new position and willingly hand to America their old post in the balance of power. However, said the magazine, the British will be doing a great wrong if they insist on continuing the war

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without being sure in their own minds that they could defeat Germany at a bearable cost.⁶⁶

After the issuance of the German peace proposals, President Wilson sent a note to the belligerent governments asking for information on their attitudes towards a league of peace. The German reply, that the prevention of future wars was a question to be dealt with after the settlement of the current war, was regarded by the magazine as one which missed the point of the Wilson note. The magazine declared that America could abandon its isolationism and enter the European system only for the sake of a league of nations. The establishment of principles for world peace was necessary before the settlement of the war so that negotiating belligerents would not have their military security uppermost in their thoughts in the bargaining.

THE NEW REPUBLIC defended the President against critics of his note. These critics were mostly pro-ally Americans. The magazine stated that Wilson had acted in the American interests as he should, and not with the wishes of either belligerent in mind. Wilson's note would serve as the opportunity for a statement by the Allies which would clear up many ambiguities of their policies. By declaring their readiness to discuss territorial details, once the principles of peace guarantees were accepted by the Central Empire, the Allies would reassure Americans that the popular objects of the war were still the real ones.⁶⁷

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Wilson and his cabinet

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The replies of both the Allies and the Central Powers were disappointing to the magazine. The editors thought the Allied reply could not possibly win them additional support from tired or wavering neutrals. And, said the editors, negotiations could not begin as long as Germany refused to consider the violation of Belgium and northern France as the object of special treatment in the treaty of peace.⁶⁸

The President had launched his program of militant pacificism, but American public opinion was not yet committed to its support. To the editors, opposition to the program appeared to come from three sources: extreme pacifists who repudiated force even in the interest of international order; militarists who refused to seek peace, and lawyers who resented any attempt to find a basis for international law except abstract right, recognized precedent, and the voluntary consent of a society of free and absolute sovereigns.⁶⁹

Attitude towards Germany

On January 13, 1917, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC answered what they said were requests for a definition of the magazine's past demands of a destruction of militarism. As an example of that spirit which they sought to have eliminated the editors gave the Prussian brand of militarism - a militarism which they said,

" . . . had conscripted the body and soul of the German nation, which had played the bully in diplomacy, which had proclaimed a national philosophy intolerable to Europe, which respected

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no treaty, overran and mutilated Belgium, sank the Lusitania to the widespread applause of the German people, organized sedition and conspiracy on neutral territory, tried to arouse a holy war in the East, stood by while Armenians were massacred, turned its face against all effort to avert war, dreamed that it would avert the war, dreamed that it would win supremacy in the world by the most deliberate and ingenious preparation mankind ever knew."⁷⁰

The editors declared, "Of all the people it is the liberal democrat who can say most sincerely that he hates this thing, hates it in Germany, hates an imitation of it at home."⁷¹

And the editors went on to say that their sympathies lay with those persons who felt that the Allies must secure the prestige of a victory in the field before they could dare to enter negotiations. A negotiated peace would see Germany supreme in Central Europe, but it did not follow that Germany would be able to use its new empire as a basis for domination of all Europe and the world.⁷²

Results of Wilson Note

A few days later a new note from the Allies accepted the principle of a league of peace. To THE NEW REPUBLIC the Allied statement was the supreme justification of President Wilson's note. For now liberals could compare the acceptance of the President's challenge by the Allies with the unsatisfactory reply of the Germans. Liberal neutrals could agree on the necessity of continuing the war until the Allies could win a decisive battle. The President was helping to create an

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effective international public opinion.

The allies had done much to clarify their objects and confirm the sympathy and support of neutrals, agreed the magazine, but more was needed. German liberals were entitled to more specific and comprehensive assurances than those contained in the Allied note. Otherwise it would not be easy to convince the German people that they could obtain a just peace.⁷³

More was also required of the United States. The American people must show their willingness to share the responsibilities of the peace, to back up their President.

The President had told the world that America would not share in a peace settlement which was dictated by the victor to the vanquished. A peace based upon faith in military power would contain no hope for the future, and America could not take part in it. A world organized in the creed of victory would be a world in which America would be forced to arm to the teeth and follow a purely national policy. THE NEW REPUBLIC said:

"Americans in the mass do not want to live in such a world. . . Happily they have found a leader who can express that feeling nobly and eloquently, a man who knows his countrymen well enough to state the tremendous alternative before them. Organized security or armed isolation - that is the choice we have to make. The better choice takes courage, means risks, and heavy responsibility. But the man would not be fit to live who failed to try it after the agony of these years. The President cannot succeed without the hearty support of the American people. . ."74

Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

On January 31, 1917, Germany announced that on the following day her navy would resume unrestricted submarine warfare. THE NEW REPUBLIC responded in a supplement to its issue of February 3. The magazine said that the long internal struggle in Germany between the moderates and the extremists was over. The extremists had taken control of the situation, and the whole history of the world would be altered as a result.

To the editors, the immediate duty of the United States was clear. They advocated the direct breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany. German ships in American harbors were to be seized at once and held as hostages. The American navy should be mobilized and an anti-submarine fleet assembled. Merchant ships should be armed. And the government should start planning economic and financial assistance to the Allies.

The editors urged that economic and military conferences between the Allies and all neutrals be initiated at once. And, said the editors, "with all clearness possible the terms and conditions of our entrance into war should be discussed and announced."⁷⁵

The Break with Germany

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different reply to Germany's action. In the past two years there had been times when it was worthwhile to pocket pride and debate, because Germany was a house divided against itself. But that time had passed, said THE NEW REPUBLIC, and President Wilson had acted as the hard facts demanded.

Moving towards War

The editors realized that the United States was in a sort of twilight zone between peace and war. And they urged that the period of suspense be devoted to increasing the pressure on Germany. "The only course of action now," they said, "is to assume that there will be war."⁷⁶ America's task was to block out the main lines of its participation, to adapt effectively strategy to politics and action to strategy.

THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that the United States was not being drawn into the war as the upholder of an obsolete system of maritime law. Instead, the United States was ranging itself on the side of western sea power in its struggle to resist continental land power. The United States was not punishing a law breaker, because both Britain and Germany had violated the laws of the sea. America was becoming the open ally of both Britain and France since at the beginning of the war most Americans decided that the Allies were fighting, in the main, for the kind of world in which they wished to live. And if America waged war it would be because its own existence and the world's order depended on the defeat of the anarchy which the Germans had misnamed the "freedom of the seas." By contributing some-

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THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that the United States was not being drawn into the war as the upholder of an obsolete system of maritime law. Instead, the United States was renouncing its claim on the side of western sea power in its struggle to remain a continental land power. The United States was not fighting for a law breaker, because both Britain and Germany had violated the laws of the sea. Justice was becoming the open ally of both Britain and France since at the beginning of the war most American ships were fighting, in the main, for the side of world in which they wished to live. And if America were to be drawn into the war it would be because its own existence and the world's order depended on the last of the energy which the Germans had misused the "freedom of the seas" by contributing some-

thing towards saving freedom of the seas, the United States would have the right to speak about its reform. For, said the magazine, "sea power internationalized is the nucleus of the league of peace."⁷⁷

United States War Effort

However, the magazine was not sure that America should send an army to fight in Europe. Participation in the land fighting might involve the United States in the territorial adjustment of Europe, a result of doubtful desirability to both Europe and America. Here, the magazine concurred with the principle laid down by President Wilson. America was not anxious to share in the settlement of Europe, but it was deeply concerned in the kind of a settlement that was to be made. America wanted no part of any peace settlement which contained the seeds of another war. Consequently, if the Allies wished America to put an army in the field, there first must be a specific definition of Allied peace terms so that the United States could be assured of a just settlement.

If the war was prolonged it probably would be feasible to send volunteers to France, train them there as American units, and embody them in the French or British Army. THE NEW REPUBLIC wanted no independent American commanders, merely American regiments as tokens of friendship without involving the United States as a nation in the detailed diplomacy of Europe.

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reserve army at home. The precautionary force would be raised by conscription. However, there would be exemptions and no draftee could go overseas without his consent. A draft was preferred over recruiting, because in the current condition of the labor market the magazine felt that successful recruiting would almost be impossible without a campaign of manufactured hatred.⁷⁸

Justification

The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC admitted that the nation was not confronted with the simple question of right or wrong in which all the right was on America's side and all the wrong on Germany's. It was admitted that the German submarine warfare against commerce, though barbarous, could not be attributed to wanton malevolence on the part of Germany. Nevertheless, said the magazine, America was justified in waging war for the purpose of protesting against it. Participation in the war must be made to result in the creation of a new maritime order. That new order must be based on cooperation.

Again it was acknowledged that America was being pulled into the war as a direct consequence of President Wilson's policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. American neutrality had penalized Germany but had allowed Great Britain to defy American traditions of neutral rights, and had permitted Great Britain to execute what the magazine called "the most comprehensive and inexorable interdict on trade in the history of marine law." Thus, said the magazine, America

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already had been playing a part in the war and behaving so as to promote the success of one group of belligerents and the failure of another.

The editors declared:

"The policy of benevolent neutrality, even though it has resulted in war, is not one for which any apology needs to be made. It was dictated by a sound and just estimate of the issues of the great war and of the proper relation of American national purposes to those issues."⁷⁹

American leanings toward the Allies were ascribed to three main factors. It was inconceivable to the magazine that a nation with the ideals of the United States could assist the violator of Belgium to reap any benefit from the action. And it was deemed equally abhorrent for a nation "so indissolubly associated with the British Commonwealth by the vital facts of geographical situation, economic intercourse and spiritual partnership" to have done an injury to Britain in an hour of peril or distress. America's choice was said to spring from "an ultimate community of situation and disposition, in such wise that a disaster to the British Commonwealth would leave the American nation in imminent physical danger and in utter physical isolation."⁸⁰

The magazine also feared the submarine, now in its infancy, which might in the future be capable of destroying sea power based upon battleships. The editors foresaw a reign of terror on the seas, with neutral nations unable to trade at all. The seas would cease to be the world's highway

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return of terror on the seas, with partial nations unable to
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but a new and worse kind of no-man's land. THE NEW REPUBLIC stated, "The answer to this dilemma is, of course, plain. It is the answer which the American nation is now making." Forced to choose between maritime absolutism and maritime anarchy the most professionally neutral of the great powers was throwing neutrality into the discard, choosing the absolutism for the moment. The reason for preferring the absolutism was that America had better reason to trust its representative.⁸¹

The editors concluded that permanent peace was possible only if the organized community of nations were to be sovereign of the seas, and America should fight only with the cause of ultimate pacification in mind. Under the leadership of President Wilson the organization of peace had become American policy, and America's possible participation in the war would give it an opportunity to try out that policy.⁸²

Readiness to Fight

The first effect of the German announcement of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare had been to keep ships in port. As a result there was a stop in the flow of goods to Europe. The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC called upon the United States government to end the state of fear which it said was making a new and greater Belgium of the high seas. The nation must act in keeping with its "sacred" obligation to protect the smaller neutrals.

The editors declared that the ships should be put under United States government orders, armed, and sent out on a

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prescribed order with a notice to all the world that they were sailing on such an such a date by a certain route to a specific port. And, urged the editors, it should be publicized that the armed forces of America would be behind these ships. The magazine declared, "If that is war, let it be war. . .we are dealing with a mental condition which only the strength of this nation alone can shatter."⁸³

The magazine went on to argue that America's incapable choice was to aid Germany's plan of blockading the United States or to risk war for the sake of the Allies. The editors said that any pacifist who would be impartial now was helping German militarism and taking responsibility for a German victory with all that such a victory might imply.⁸⁴ And THE NEW REPUBLIC was convinced that German victory would mean dominion of the world by reactionary military power, a world in which permanent peace would be impossible, a world in which the United States, if it insisted upon the Monroe Doctrine, would someday have to fight Germany all alone. From this viewpoint, it seemed to the magazine that the Allied cause was literally America's.⁸⁵

The Defense of the Atlantic World

THE NEW REPUBLIC admitted that the Allied blockade of Germany, a blockade which existed through the lenient attitude of the United States, was as terrible a weapon as the submarine. The German people were suffering from the blockade and the vitality of German children was being sapped by it.

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 submarine. The German people were suffering from the blockade
 and the vitality of German children was being sapped by it.

But, said the magazine, its support of the blockade was not based upon the legality or illegality of it or even upon the issue of cruelty and mercy. The magazine declared America right in accepting the blockade and defying the submarine because the war against the Allies was a war against a civilization of which America was a part. America could not stand by as long as there was the least chance of Germany winning. The true and only justification for American policy, said the magazine, was that the United States had accepted the closure of the seas to Germany and the opening of them to the Allies because it could not permit a German triumph.

The United States had clothed its most unneutral purposes in the language of neutrality, but could not go on forever without facing the consequences. So, the magazine said, "when we talk about American honor being involved we meant just this: that since we have created an unneutral policy we cannot now abandon it because it is dangerous."⁸⁶

The editors concluded that "the safety of the Atlantic world is something for which America should fight."⁸⁷ They said that a profound web of interest which was joining the western world together had grown up on the two shores of the Atlantic. If the Atlantic community were destroyed, America would know what it had lost, would then understand the meaning of the unfortified Canadian border, and the common protection given Latin-America by the British and American fleets.

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"It is the crime of Germany," said the magazine,

"that she is trying to make hideous the highways by which the Atlantic powers live."⁸⁸ Had Germany stood on the defensive against Britain and France, and limited the war to the Balkans and the eastern front, and clearly thrown in her lot with the Western nations, she would have had their neutrality and perhaps their sympathy.

Instead, Germany sought to cut the vital highways of the Atlantic world. THE NEW REPUBLIC believed that Atlantic civilization, if not all civilization, was at stake.

The magazine predicted that victory on the high seas would mean the triumph of that class which it said was seeking to make Germany the leader of the East against the West, the leader of an ultimate German-Russian-Japanese coalition against the Atlantic world.

However, Germany belonged in the Atlantic world. And the magazine was convinced that she would join the Western community if the war was effectively fought and ended wisely:

"Our aim must be not to conquer Germany as Rome conquered Carthage, but to win Germany as Lincoln strove to win the South, to win her for union with our civilization by discrediting those classes who alone are our enemies. It is no paradox and no sentimentality to say that we must fight Germany not to destroy her but to force her and lure her back to the civilization in which she belongs."⁸⁹

The magazine concluded that the issue never really had been one of neutral rights, that to fight for them alone would be to isolate America from her natural allies and leave

"that she is trying to make life on the highways by which the Atlantic powers live." The German navy stood on the defensive against Britain and France, and limited the war to the Balkans and the eastern front, and thereby threw in her lot with the western powers, and would have had their neutrality and perhaps their sympathy.

Instead, Germany sought to use the vital highways of the Atlantic world. THE NEW REPUBLIC believed that Atlantic civilization, if not all civilization, was at stake. The magazine predicted that victory on the high seas would mean the triumph of that class which is said to be seeking to make Germany the leader of the East against the West, the leader of an ultimate German-Russian-Japanese coalition against the Atlantic world.

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"The aim must be not to conquer Germany as some conquered nations, but to win Germany as a nation whose people will be free, to win her for union with our civilization by discrediting those classes who alone are our enemies. It is no paradox and no sentimentalism to say that we must fight Germany not to destroy her but to force her and thus her part in the civilization in which she belongs."

The magazine concluded that the issue never really had been one of neutral rights, that to fight for them alone would be to isolate America from her natural allies and leave

her exposed after the war. For no form of action could be devised which would vindicate all neutral rights. The defeat of Germany in itself would not necessarily mean vindication. America must fight for a common interest of the western world. And American entrance into the war would weight that world in favor of liberalism, and make the organization of a league of peace an immediately practical object. The defense of the Western world would be the cornerstone of world federation. The real danger to a decent peace, the magazine said, had always been that the western nations would become so dependent on Japan and Russia that they would have to pay any price for their loyalty. American entrance would give the liberal forces on the Allied side the preponderance of strength. Thus the liberals would decide the reorganization of the world.⁹⁰

Armed Merchantmen

The month of March 1917, saw several American vessels sunk by German submarines. President Wilson's first reaction was to ask authority to arm merchant vessels. This armed neutrality was criticized by THE NEW REPUBLIC as solely a makeshift measure, and not one which would settle anything. It could not be permanent policy. The President should, the magazine asserted, instruct the ship captains to consider the approach of any submarine as a hostile act. These instructions should be published and Germany informed that the torpedoing of any American vessel would be considered evidence that a state of war existed between Germany and the United States.

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state of war existed between Germany and the United States.

The magazine declared that Germany was fully aware that she courted war but believed the results of submarine warfare were worth the risk. The time had come for America to either back down or follow through its policy of benevolent neutrality with the proper resistance to aggression.⁹¹

Incomplete Participation

America could no longer be independent in policy in regard to the war. Its policy of benevolent neutrality had brought it to the point where it must throw in its lot with the Allies. But even though it advocated American entrance into the war, THE NEW REPUBLIC was unwilling to have America throw in its lot with the Allies completely. America's support of world peace was the justification for its pro-Ally policy. The justification for an incomplete participation in the war was that the Allies had purely national aims in mind mixed with their international purposes. The magazine said that America had the same goals as the Allies in so far as they aimed at security based upon a scientific settlement. But for the rest, the magazine wanted the United States to hold aloof and reserve freedom of action: "Just as our neutrality has attempted to discriminate, so would our warfare."⁹²

As for America's peace aims, the magazine did not regard the league of peace as the unreality it was called by its critics. As proof that it could be a real thing, the magazine offered the actions of the United States, which it said were actions based upon the principles of such a league. The

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United States had discriminated against Germany because it had judged Germany to be the disturber of the peace. And the league of peace would be at first nothing more than a formal agreement to discriminate still more sharply in the future against the aggressor.⁹³

That same month of March, 1917, saw the revelation of the Zimmermann note in which Germany tried to make an alliance with Mexico in case of a war with the United States. THE NEW REPUBLIC felt that Germany was justified in going behind the subterfuge of American neutrality and classifying America as an enemy power. The lesson for the United States was its dependence upon allies.⁹⁴

Effect of Participation

Meanwhile the magazine considered the effect of American participation in the war. The magazine said that with American aid, the Allies could break the submarine. And American entrance would convince the Germans that they were not destined to emerge from the war as victors. It would increase their impatience with the sacrifices demanded by the war. Germany would finally be ready to talk peace as one of many afflicted nations not in the role of a conqueror. This would make possible a peace in which German security, as well as that of other nations, would be established upon a basis of international organization.

The United States must not, insisted the magazine, allow its power to be used for the subjugation and humiliation

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of organization.

The United States must not, feared the machine,
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of Germany. The editors declared, "Unless America can emerge from the war as a member of a securer international order, unless a league of peace, based on a stable settlement results, we shall have made the war of 1917 as inconsequential as the war of 1812. . ."⁹⁵ It was up to America to avow openly its intention that it be the one powerful belligerent at the peace conference which would be unreservedly committed to the organization of peace. The United States would be the one great nation which could gain nothing by a new balance of power, the one nation which could win only if the whole world was made more secure. This fact, acknowledged the magazine, was not due to any specific virtue in the United States, but rather from the situation in which the nation found itself.⁹⁶

The Overt Act

On March 18, 1917, submarines sank three American ships with the loss of fifteen lives. President Wilson called a special session of Congress for April 2. It was obvious that the crisis was at hand.

THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that there was no policy short of war which would re-establish and rescue imperiled American rights. The magazine asserted that America now had an unimpeachable case against Germany, which was not committing acts of war that demanded resistance and counter-attack.⁹⁷ The German submarine campaign had forced the United States into the war by the inexorable logic of its own situation and purposes. The American people, with their deeply rooted pacifism, their

of Germany. The scientific fact is that the war was a result of a certain international situation, and that a treaty of peace, based on a stable international situation, we shall have seen the war of 1914 as inconceivable as the war of 1918. It was up to America to save openly the situation, and to be the peaceful negotiator at the peace conference which would be progressively committed to the organization of peace. The United States would be the one great nation which could remain neutral by a new balance of power, the one nation which could win only if the whole world was made more secure. This fact, acknowledged by the nation, was not due to any specific virtue in the United States, but rather from the situation in which the nation found itself.³⁶

The Great War

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THE NEW HIRSHLING stated that there was no policy about the war which would re-arrange the forces (American and British). The reason asserted that America had no political case against Germany, which was not committing any of the kind of deliberate resistance and power-attack.³⁷ The war was a political campaign, had turned the United States into the way of the American people, with their deeply rooted political

tradition and pride of neutral independence, had not been able to avoid conflict. America could not withdraw its flag from the seas at the bidding of an aggressor. It had not been able to insist on neutral rights against both belligerents without doing more harm to the Allies than to Germany. Consequently, continued the magazine, America found it must take up armed resistance to German aggression or abandon any right to be consulted about the system of law and government which was to prevail in the future on the high seas during war.⁹⁸

The Great Decision

President Wilson delivered his war message to the special session of Congress on April 2. In the next four days both houses passed resolutions declaring that Germany had already made war upon the United States.

The decision to lead the United States into war had been made by the man THE NEW REPUBLIC called "the least jingo and the most peaceful of American presidents." The magazine said that the United States had declared war after her patience had been exhausted with a nation which failed at every chance to show that her crimes were blunders, not the normal expression of her character.

The President had in December given Germany the opportunity to say that they renounced conquest and cared for the organization of a stable international system. Said the magazine, "They could not accept the offer because they had not renounced conquest. . ."⁹⁹

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The magazine went on to say that the success of such a German government with such a policy would make the twentieth century a period of profound reaction. It would mean the defeat of the new Russian revolution, the absorption of the small nations of Central Europe, the humiliation of France, the disintegration of the British Commonwealth, the terrorizing of the Americas, and the fastening upon the whole world of a system of aggressive policies backed by an illiberal collectivism. Only the military virtues could survive and a league of peace would be impossible.

On the other hand, declared the magazine, President Wilson was the most liberal statesman in high office, and before long probably the most powerful: "He represents the best hope in the whole world. He can go ahead exultingly with the blessings of men and women upon him."¹⁰⁰

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INTERIM

THE PERIOD BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS

The purpose of this portion of the work is to bridge the gap between the two great World Wars. This short transition examines the attitude of THE NEW REPUBLIC toward the main issues resulting from World War One and leading to World War Two.

Among these were the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, the Washington Conference, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the American Neutrality Laws.

Versailles

Based on the evidence offered in Chapter One of this investigation, it would not be hard to predict the attitude of the magazine towards the Treaty of Versailles. THE NEW REPUBLIC had always insisted that Germany must not be crushed but must be won over as a member of the Atlantic World. Treated fairly and shown that militarism did not pay, Germany, the magazine said, could become a valuable and loyal member of western civilization. But if the Allies used their victory to further their imperial ambitions, Germany would see that militarism did pay, as long as one was on the winning side.

Thus the magazine withdrew from its stand alongside of President Woodrow Wilson when he returned from Paris to try to convince Americans to support the Treaty of Versailles. The magazine declared, "He (Wilson) seems certain to fail in the

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end, and he deserves to fail." The journal said that Wilson had sacrificed the Treaty for the sake of the League of Nations.¹⁰¹

The magazine declared that the recovery of Europe depended upon the readmission of Germany and Russia to the society of nations. Recovery presupposed the reversal of the policy adopted at Versailles under which France plus the cordon sanitaire were to govern Europe in the name of the incomplete League of Nations.¹⁰²

THE NEW REPUBLIC insisted in the spring of 1920 that the events of the past year had justified the opponents of the Treaty of Versailles. The editors characterized the behavior of the European governments as based upon power politics and the economics of exclusive national interest and private profit. "That," the editors said, "is why they wrote as bad a treaty as the Treaty of Versailles."¹⁰³

What attitude should the American progressive take? According to THE NEW REPUBLIC, the progressive could only declare that the facts showed the Treaty of Versailles to be nothing but an unworkable interim agreement. Instead, liberals should work for a new peace conference, one in which Russia, Germany, and China would participate as equals, as they must if there was ever to be an enduring peace. And said the magazine, ". . . from such a conference America could not abstain."¹⁰⁴

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However, the magazine felt that a satisfactory or even a semi-satisfactory revision of the Treaty of Versailles

would be a task of "colossal difficulty." Revision might be impossible as long as the temper and the power of France remained what it was. The magazine believed that France probably would continue to pursue "the perilous and arrogant path of national egotism and try to block the work of creating a concert of Europe based upon certain general principles of national development and international comity." France was convinced that her security demanded a weak Germany.¹⁰⁵

League of Nations

Tied to the Treaty of Versailles was the League of Nations, which did not meet the requirements set by THE NEW REPUBLIC in its long advocacy of a league to enforce peace. The magazine criticized the tying-in of the League with the treaty. The Treaty of Versailles derived its sanction from force, not from consent. As a result, said the magazine, the League of Nations would never be able to substitute conference for war.¹⁰⁶

The editors pointed out that the League was at the mercy of the autocratic reparations commission created at Versailles. The commission was characterized as composed of the same reactionary diplomats who had broken faith with the peace-loving peoples of the world. The League would not only fail to keep peace, it would discredit for generations the very idea of a league.¹⁰⁷

Consequently, the editors felt that the United States should abstain from joining the League for a while. If the

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United States joined, the reactionaries would see no need to modify the Versailles Treaty. With the United States on the outside, the unstable peace settlement might cause the victors to make the needed changes before it was too late.

Washington Conference

The Washington Conference, which took up naval disarmament, was seen as indicative of some moral recovery from the anarchy and disorder of World War One. The treaties resulting from the conference were regarded as substantial achievements. But, warned the magazine, they were only beginnings. If they were not followed up, if they were treated as a settlement rather than as a significant advance in a promising direction, their benefits would in the long run prove illusory. THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that the treaties deserved to be ratified without any reservations or modifications.¹⁰⁸

Kellogg-Briand Pact

THE NEW REPUBLIC also favored United States' entrance into the World Court¹⁰⁹ and thought the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war was useful although weak and vague. The magazine predicted that nations which signed the pact would make more use of conferences and arbitration for the sake of public opinion. Thus the pact would raise the moral tone of international relations.¹¹⁰

The agreement was seen as possessing some of the advantages of the League of Nations minus the curse of being tied to the Versailles Treaty. And whatever its intrinsic value, it

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Self-Determination Pact

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The agreement was seen as possessing some of the advantages of the League of Nations minus the curse of being tied to the Versailles Treaty. And whatever the immediate value, it

was regarded as a milestone on the path to peace which must be passed before nations could advance to more genuine accomplishments.¹¹¹

Fascism

Europe seemed to make progress despite the ominous rise to power of the Fascists in Italy. But the appearance of Hitler in Germany began the real backward turn of the clock as Europe again took up the trail leading to world war.

One of the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC, George Soule, in a review in 1940 of the history of the magazine's foreign policy, noted that the magazine opposed appeasing Hitler from the start. Once Germany had accepted Nazism, it was too late. Soule pointed out the magazine's distrust of what it felt were reactionary governments in England and France. A distrust which the magazine said was proved correct by events in Ethiopia, Austria, Spain, and finally Czechoslovakia.¹¹²

Neutrality Laws

Between 1935 and 1937 the United States Congress passed three Neutrality Acts in an effort to prevent America from being impelled into the next war by any force except the free choice of the American people. THE NEW REPUBLIC favored the laws because the acts recognized the dilemma which had arisen in the last war and prepared to avoid it. The laws would work out in practice with British command of the sea. The nation had acquiesced in the British blockade before it was ever applied, had avoided trouble with German countermeasures,

was regarded as a milestone on the path to peace which had been
passed with the signing of the armistice in 1918.

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and had made it possible to avoid a boom in credit and industry based upon supplying the Allies. At the same time, they did not deprive the British of war essentials, especially after they were modified by the repeal of the munitions embargo.¹¹³

Spain

Meanwhile, Germany, Italy and Russia were staging their war rehearsal in Spain. THE NEW REPUBLIC condemned Franco as a fascist and the advance agent of German and Italian imperialism.¹¹⁴

The magazine sharply criticized the American embargo on arms to the Spanish loyalists, calling it a violation of international precedent and an unneutral gesture. The magazine reasoned that the embargo could not be a truly neutral act unless applied also to Germany, Italy and Portugal.¹¹⁵ The embargo was criticized as an act inspired by the influence of British Tories in the American government. And the magazine classified these Tories with the Fascists. The editors argued that they were still in favor of the neutrality acts, but could not see why they should be applied to the civil war in Spain since there was no question of involvement of the United States.¹¹⁶

On February 1, 1939, THE NEW REPUBLIC took upon itself a rare action. The editors sent a telegram to President Roosevelt urging him to end the "unneutral" embargo on Spain. The embargo, said the telegram, ". . . is helping to turn Spain over to the friend of Hitler and Mussolini." The President was urged to shake off the influence of British Tories and act in

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the interests of liberalism. The editors assured the President that he had the power to lift the embargo without action by Congress. The telegram was signed "The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC."¹¹⁷

In the summer of 1937 war clouds again gathered over Europe. As THE NEW REPUBLIC magazine was about to enter another period which would see it, as in World War One, start off by insisting the new war did not concern the United States, then decide that the nation must help Britain, then back up to the decision that the United States must declare its policy in support of supplying England's defense needs, and finally call for the United States to enter World War Two. It will be seen that THE NEW REPUBLIC, although regarded with critical conservatism, was to favor war against Germany because the journal was convinced of the will decision of the Nazi government and the threat to America even more than its own conviction of the necessity to stop isolation. And World War Two had an added factor, the Japanese threat.

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CHAPTER II

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WORLD WAR TWO

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said, have invoked the Neutrality Act against the Japanese at the beginning of their war with China.

The magazine stated, "In one day he (the President) has brought the United States far along the road towards war with Japan." The President was criticized for assuming too much responsibility in taking such action without consulting Congress.¹¹⁸

German-Russian Pact

The German-Russian non-aggression pact appeared to the magazine to be proof that European affairs were still full of insincerity, devious methods, secrets, and surprises. So much so that Americans should not be taken aback at any treachery or weakness.

The magazine said Americans should learn the lesson of not being taken in by idealistic slogans. Some persons were arguing that since the British Empire was deprived of Russian military help, the United States must step in and save it. "Maybe so," said the magazine, "but in that case let us make the decision in terms of hard skepticism and not because of an ideological crusade." The magazine went on to say that Americans should concentrate solely on what really was dear to them, the promise of democracy at home.¹¹⁹ Evidently, the editors were still tender from the disillusionment of the post war period after 1918.

Cash-and-Carry

On September first, 1939, German planes attacked in

... have favored the neutrality and a strict adherence to
the principle of peace with honor.

The magazine stated, in one place, (see President's
address) that the United States had shown the world that it
was not a "great power" but a "great principle." The magazine
was criticized for assuming too much responsibility in
relation to the war without considering the
Congress.

General-Reserve Force

The General-Reserve Force appeared in
the magazine to be a force that was organized in 1911
of military, technical, and administrative. It
was an American force and not a force of any other
country or nations.

The magazine said Americans should learn the lesson
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were still under the domination of the past and
did not look forward.

General-Reserve Force

In September, 1911, General Reserve Force attacked in

Poland, and World War Two was on. The first concern of THE NEW REPUBLIC was to determine how America might stay out of the war. It was obvious that public sympathy was with the Allies. But it was important that America should not be forced into the war for emotional reasons or by the pressure of events as in the previous war. America must decide its course realistically after consideration of the issues.

It was admitted that a British defeat and the possible acquisition of the British fleet by Hitler could bring war to America. The best way to keep America out of war, it was concluded, was to find ways to help the Allies without dragging America into danger. America must again adopt benevolent neutrality.

Consequently, the magazine began a campaign for amendment of the Neutrality Laws to provide for cash-and-carry trade in munitions. As long as goods were carried in Allied ships, America would not be involved by German submarine warfare. And THE NEW REPUBLIC felt that though legally neutral, cash-and-carry would help the Allies, who controlled the seas. "More than this," the editors said, "we are not prepared to do, but less than this is too little."¹¹⁰

In the ensuing weeks the magazine continued to fight for the principle of cash-and-carry. One article said, "It is not half so important whether we export munitions or not as whether our exports, whatever they may be, shall pass out of our jurisdiction the moment they leave our shores." And the

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magazine characterized as sinister what it said were attempts by certain conservative Republicans to repeal the neutrality laws entirely in the interest of war profits. The magazine said, "That would leave us in the same situation as before 1917; nothing would more quickly and surely involve us."¹²¹

The magazine insisted that cash-and-carry was the only possible answer to the question of how to keep America from getting involved in the war. It was realized that cash-and-carry did not give the country any real guarantee of staying aloof - ". . . it may be that the American people will decide to join the war in any case" - but it gave the nation its only chance.

The editors explained their stand this way:

"Let any nation which wishes to do so come to our shores and buy goods of any kind it desires. Let it pay cash and take title on the dock. Let it then transmit these goods in its own ships, manned by its own citizens. If one of these ships were sunk, it would call for sympathy and indignation, but it would not, as in the case of one of our own vessels, demand that 'our honor be avenged.' As long as the British navy commands the sea, the beneficiaries of this plan would be the Allies, which would be in agreement with what our people want. At the same time, the terms would be open to all, which is as much as can be expected of any neutral nation in the world of realities."¹²²

War Guilt

THE NEW REPUBLIC held the Allies partly to blame for the war. Poland had accepted in 1919 territory with a preponderantly German population. England and France had greatly

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War Gullies

The NEW YORKERS held the Allies partly to blame for
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reduced the military effectiveness of the coalition against Hitler by the betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich. The Allied policy of appeasement had strengthened Hitler's belief that they would not stand up to him, and encouraged him to make demands upon Poland from which he would have found it difficult to withdraw.

Even further back, England and France had imposed an unjust peace and a destructive treaty upon Germany. French policy, under Poincare, the magazine said, was openly intended to keep Germany crushed forever.

And, declared THE NEW REPUBLIC: if the United States had not entered the war in 1917, a negotiated peace based on the stalemate of exhaustion would probably have taken place. America had made possible the Allied victory which in turn produced the unjust treaties of 1919.

However, it was the undoubted fact that it was Hitler who had chosen to resort to arms. The magazine declared that he thereby had destroyed whatever moral case he might have had for the return of territory and populations wrested from Germany in 1919.

The magazine said that all Europe, including the German people, had wanted peace. But Hitler wanted war. The magazine declared, ". . .it is indelibly written in the record that German airplanes attacked Polish towns. . .before any declaration of war, before any Polish aggression that could possibly have justified such a thing."¹²³

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As in the previous war, the magazine began to insist early that the Allies publish their war aims and possible peace terms. The magazine editors deemed it necessary to know whether the Allies were after permanent peace or were just out to crush Hitler. The editors wanted to know if the Allies intended to crush Germany so that she would again be dominated by a passion for revenge, and be ready to greet a new Hitler in another quarter of a century.

It was pointed out that in the last war Americans had been told they were fighting for justice and democracy. But it later turned out that the imperialist Allies had written a group of secret treaties which made a just settlement impossible.¹²⁴

The next week it was reported that Hitler was ready to discuss peace with the Allies. But the magazine supported the Allied announcement that the proposals would be rejected if proffered. The magazine said it was very nearly true that there never was a bad peace or a good war. But Hitler did not propose peace, but an armistice. The editors insisted that Hitler's program was not complete. In six months his ambition would again plunge Europe into conflict. Peace to him was a time when one got what one wanted by threatening to fight; in wartime you got it by fighting. The Allies could not demobilize on the strength of promises made by the author of the philosophy of falsehood advocated in Mein Kampf.

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any of which had succeeded in this regard.

However, the Allies were advised to make counter-pro-

posals so that the German people would be reassured as to the consequences if they should throw in their lot with Hitler's enemies.¹²⁵

Arms Embargo

Meanwhile, the repeal of the arms embargo was being debated in Congress. And in its editorial columns, THE NEW REPUBLIC was declaring that the issues of the war were clear enough to warrant granting the Allies that aid. The magazine pondered. The magazine was worried about American emotions. It felt that Hitler was so greatly hated and feared that if he seemed to be winning the war at any time, Americans would feel their interests threatened. These emotions were regarded as America's greatest danger. The editors declared that if the arms embargo were lifted the knowledge that the Allies were deriving as much help as they could without the abandonment of American neutrality would provide a safety-valve for these emotions. On the other hand, if the embargo were retained, a balked desire to help might swing the pendulum too far in the other direction. The magazine stated, "There is nothing in selling arms that can automatically and inevitably involve us, so long as the people do not want to fight."¹²⁶

A view of what the magazine thought of one of the leading Nazis may be gained through an editorial paragraph on the sinking of the Athenia in October of 1939. The magazine took a Goebbels speech accusing Winston Churchill of the crime as a confession that the Germans were responsible. The para-

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graph stated that if there was one man in the world who most Americans would be sure was lying in every word unless the contrary were conclusively proved, it was Goebbels.¹²⁷

Allied Fascism

In November, the magazine voiced more criticisms of what it felt were anti-democratic forces in the Allied camp. It commented sharply upon the French practice of interning anti-fascist refugees whose nationalities were German. The magazine pondered, "When the French get through fighting for democracy under leaders whose allegiance is dubious, how much democracy are they going to have left."¹²⁸

That same month the British government published a White Paper describing the mistreatment of Jewish and other prisoners in German concentration camps. THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that in view of what was already known of the Nazis the atrocity stories probably were true. But, pointed out the magazine, the White Paper consisted of reports from British diplomats in Germany accumulated over a long period of time. Therefore, the magazine declared, Chamberlain knew about "these dreadful stories" when he sat down with Hitler at Munich and then returned to Britain wreathed in smiles. And British diplomats and financiers knew about them when they hobnobbed with Goering that summer before the war in the discussions of a loan to help Germany get on her feet. It was obvious that the White Paper was published only because the two countries were now at war and it made good propaganda. THE NEW REPUBLIC declared,

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"Diplomats have strong stomachs."¹²⁹

Far East Warning

Meanwhile, the magazine gave warning to Americans that while their eyes were riveted upon Europe, important changes had been developing in the Far East. THE NEW REPUBLIC admonished Americans that they were more likely to become involved in a war in Asia than in Europe. The government was poised on the brink of a decision few citizens understood or for which they were prepared. The magazine stated, "It is a time to devote careful attention to Far Eastern policy if war is not to come in by the back door while we are engaged in barring it at the front."¹³⁰

The editors recognized that the United States was the chief obstacle to Japanese plans for domination of Asia. The United States had abrogated its trade treaty with Japan, a necessary step before establishing embargoes on materials which Japan needed both for war and for peacetime commerce. At the same time, the expansion of the American navy was alarming Japanese military quarters who now pointed to the United States as the eventual enemy.

The magazine regarded the proposed embargoes and enforcement of Japan's retirement from China as obvious steps toward war, a war which it was believed Japan was incapable of winning. However, it was important that the Western nations neither appease Japan nor war with her while the European battle was on.

"Diplomats have every opportunity."

For the British

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The Japanese rejected the proposed subsidies and en-
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toward war, a war which it was believed Japan was incapable of
winning. However, it was important that the Western nations
not let Japan get on with her war with the European nations

was on.

To solve the dilemma, the magazine proposed that Japan be assured that all the Western nations would withdraw from China along with her. And Japan would be promised a large share in the development of Chinese industry and trade.¹³¹

Revised Neutrality Act

As far as THE NEW REPUBLIC was concerned, the revised Neutrality Act, with cash-and-carry and the banning of American ships from war zones, was working out well. Neutral ships were being sunk around England every day. But for the war zone ban, some American ships might have been sunk and American citizens killed. And interventionists in the United States would have had a strong emotional argument. The magazine cautioned that it was necessary to make sure that violently pro-Ally officials in Washington did not find ways of slipping through legal loopholes and getting the nation into trouble.¹³²

The magazine asserted both Germany and Britain were violating the Pan American neutrality zone. Britain was not blamed for chasing the Graf Spee to the South American shore. But there were reports also of British raids on German commerce in that area.¹³³

Later, the magazine was to support the State Department's vigorous protests against British seizure of mails off American ships. It was advocated that the mails issue and others be turned over to the Hague Court.

Cynicism

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132

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Conclusion

The start of the new year of 1940 presents the announce-

ment from the German government of their favorable attitude towards a European Federation. This was the occasion for a NEW REPUBLIC editorial full of the cynicism it had learned as the result of World War Two. Some would be great, but said the magazine, The editors spoke of the small value of lip service given popular ideals as ideological covers for sinister forces. American were warned to be wary of making the same mistake they had made in 1917 when they had entered the war under the banner of Wilsonian idealism, which called for a just and moderate peace as the basis for a new world order. But, the editors said, both the peace terms and the League of Nations had been used as vehicles for the realistic aims of the vindictive politicians and military strategists of the victorious nations.

The editors said that this time the danger was not all from totalitarian nations. For the strongest groups in France intended to pulverize Germany to prevent any future resurgence. And the British Tories could not be trusted to put reality into any federation they did not dominate.

THE NEW REPUBLIC declared, "This is essentially a European civil war. . . . Europe must make and preserve its own peace."¹³⁴

Keep Out of War

That was the winter that Finland was fighting for its life in the snow against the Russian invasion. THE NEW REPUBLIC favored treating Finland as any other belligerent, and said it was up to the Allies, not America, to extend credit to the

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little Scandinavian land.

The magazine predicted that Norway and Sweden, Belgium and Holland were likely to be future victims of aggression. The emotional strain on Americans would be great. But said the magazine, ". . . we have decided that the part of wisdom - for the world's sake as well as ours - is to remain at peace."¹³⁵

The determination of the magazine that America should keep out of this war was shown also by its criticisms of President Roosevelt and other politicians who were asking Congress at that time to create a greatly strengthened American navy. The magazine pointed out that in its opinion the nation did not have a coherent foreign policy, thus the country could not possibly have a sensible naval and military plan. The magazine said Roosevelt was an interventionist by nature, but that the country as a whole was isolationist. And it was concluded that the country correctly wanted a military establishment only large enough for defense.¹³⁶

The magazine's fear of war was, as has been shown, two-fold: fear of war in Asia as well as Europe. The editors were afraid that America's economic war of nerves against Japan would cause the Japanese rulers to seek war as an escape from the loss of "face" which would result from a pull-out from China caused by lack of supplies. The United States must make these rulers see the advantage of withdrawing from China along with the Western nations, and then sharing equitably in future trade and investment.

Little Scandinavian land.

The magazine predicted that Norway and Sweden, Finland

and Holland were likely to be future victims of aggression.

The magazine stated on American world power. But said the

magazine, "... we have decided that the part of history - for

the world's sake as well as ours - is to remain a peace.

The determination of the magazine that America should

keep out of this war was shown also by its criticisms of President

Hoover and other politicians who were asking Congress to

take time to study a treaty strengthening American navy. The

magazine pointed out that in its opinion the nation did not have

a coherent foreign policy, thus the country could not possibly

have a realistic naval and military plan. The magazine said

Hoover was an interventionist by nature, but that the country

as a whole was isolationist. And it was concluded that the

country completely wanted a military establishment only large

enough for defense. 136

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the German navy, but then making equality in future trade

and investment.

Otherwise, the editors maintained, "There is real danger of our becoming involved in a war that nobody wants."¹³⁷

Moral Side of War

The other danger to America was said to be the moral urge toward war felt by groups of intelligent citizens. THE NEW REPUBLIC said it understood how these citizens felt - that one could not go on day after day believing that one belligerent was both dangerous and despicable without feeling a sort of moral delinquency in failing to contribute to the cause.

The magazine declared that the valid reply to these people was that they were mistaken in putting the war in moral terms of a battle between evil and righteousness.

The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC issued a strong statement of their own position:

"...we now explicitly and permanently renounce any belief that evil can be crushed by exterminating those who seem for the moment to embody it. This is not just wishy-washy liberalism: it is the sternest lesson of history. The last war generation learned it to their great cost. We can see something else, however, worth as much struggle and sacrifice as the tragic and futile but sometimes necessary effort to deal with evil by physical warfare. . .it is the effort to prepare to restore in the part of the world that is ravaged by war. . .a peace that does not contain within itself the seeds of its own destruction."¹³⁸

World War One

Taking up the same theme two weeks later, the editors pointed to the "unholy mess" caused by the profound ignorance and lofty confidence with which America had helped to redraw

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World War One

Looking up the same three weeks later, the editors

pointed to the "unhappy news" caused by the profound ignorance and lofty confidence with which America had helped to redraw

Europe's boundaries after the previous war. The magazine re-collected now how America, aghast at the implications of what it had helped to do, had withdrawn support from the unstable European peace structure, and let it fall. The journal repeated its stand that with respect to such things as immediate military and strategic considerations, national boundaries, and rival imperialisms, this was a European civil war: "We have no business fighting in it and we have no permanent contribution to make in deciding its issues." Europe must end its own quarrels or they would never be ended.

The Future

The magazine held America's future task to be cooperation in post-war efforts to create the kind of a world of freedom and social and economic justice in which the Nazi and Communist movements would never have been created had this world existed previously. The physical defeat of these movements was a negative necessity which would not lay a single cornerstone of the new western world. America's task was to remain free of the war fever which would corrupt its obligation towards the future.

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The publication in March of 1940 of the papers of Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, gave THE NEW REPUBLIC the opportunity to review the two World Wars. The magazine concluded that the chief difference in the American position was that now the nation was shielded by neutrality legislation which guarded against all the disputes with which

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Lansing had had to deal.

Perhaps the wisest safeguard was the prohibition on loans. The magazine said one of the chief lessons of the papers was the great unseen influence of the munitions industry in World War One. According to the papers, many government officials had feared the country would suffer a major collapse unless Allied war orders continued.¹⁴⁰

Invasion of Scandinavia

In April the Germans struck into Scandinavia and the so-called "phoney war" became very real on a new front.

To THE NEW REPUBLIC the new campaign was another tragic defeat in the struggle for peace and democracy against totalitarianism. Germany had showed little respect for Norwegian neutrality. And the Allies had adopted the totalitarian method of reprisal by sowing mines in Norwegian waters. Thus they had given the Germans the excuse for their long-planned invasion.

The magazine declared that the Allies had committed a grave crime if they had stimulated the German counter-measure without being prepared to stop it.¹⁴¹

New Outlook

The German successes in Norway and Denmark made necessary a new outlook on the war. THE NEW REPUBLIC magazine for the first time was forced to consider the possibility that the Allies might lose the war.

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take over the North and South American bases from which the Nazis might strike at the United States.

As a consequence of Hitler victory, the United States would become an armed camp in which progressive democracy would be lost by the wayside as militarist methods were adopted by the nation.

However, it was felt that the United States could not contribute enough in time to help the Allies win, should America decide to enter the war. The neutrality legislation aided the British blockade, the Allies had superior manpower and naval strength, and were receiving all possible equipment from America.¹⁴²

The fact was, said the editors, even if it were desirable to fight Hitler immediately, it would be fatal to enlist under the banner of the sluggish and incompetent ruling classes of Britain and France. The editors said, "...for there is no reason to believe that such leadership could win either a war or a peace."¹⁴³

Neville Chamberlain was the popular scapegoat of the British disaster in Norway. However, said THE NEW REPUBLIC, Chamberlain was but a symbol and a type. The real fault was with a decadent ruling class.¹⁴⁴

And the magazine insisted that because the Allies were in great danger of losing the war was no reason for a sudden reversal of the decision not to grant war credits. War credits were seen dangerous in that they might help get the

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nation into war by the back door, without anyone realizing it. If Americans wanted the Allies to win enough to give them ammunition, let them be courageous enough to do it openly.¹⁴⁵

Japan

The year 1940 was an election year, an election in which Franklin D. Roosevelt was to run for a history-making third term as President of the United States. With the Democratic convention looming in the near future the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC summarized and evaluated Roosevelt's second term in a special section.

The editors concluded that American policy towards the war had been less interventionist than the President would have liked and more interventionist than most of the American people realized or would have welcomed if they had realized it.

In the Far East, the magazine said, Americans were closer to a conflict with Japan than they knew. Japanese spokesmen had hinted that they might seize the Dutch East Indies if Germany invaded Holland. The United States had politely informed Japan of its opposition. If the United States was dragged into war it very likely would be through the Orient for the purpose of preventing Japanese aggression from going any farther than it had.¹⁴⁶

The same fear of a Japanese move towards the Indies was repeated in the next issue. The magazine asserted that if the Japanese fleet moved, probably the American fleet would move also. Then came the prophetic statement: "In that case

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the American public, trying to keep out of the European struggle, might wake up to find this nation fighting elsewhere."¹⁴⁷

Bases for Money

In June the magazine editors advocated a deal with the Allies. The deal was designed to solve two problems - what to do if the Allies ran out of money, and what to do if a victorious Germany took over Bermuda, Jamaica, and British Guiana.

The editors' answer was that the United States should buy all the British, French, and Dutch colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The money would be used to purchase supplies in the United States. The contract would permit repurchase by the original owners after the war.¹⁴⁸

Intervention vs. Isolation

The editors went on to consider the foibles of the two extreme views on America's position in the war. The interventionists were declared to be wrong because they refused to admit that the United States might not be able to save democracy just by going to war.

The isolationists were wrong because America could not be sure of remaining at peace merely by proclaiming it had no intention of fighting. If the Allies surrendered, Hitler would decide whether the United States must fight.

Democracy and War

The editors said the question Americans had to decide was, which is the wisest way to defend the nation, and the best way of saving democracy at home while arming against aggression.¹⁴⁹

The American public, trying to keep out of the European struggle, might want to limit this nation's foreign commitments.

Money for Money

In June the magazine editors advocated a deal with the Allies. The deal was designed to solve two problems - what to do if the Allies ran out of money, and what to do if various nations merely took over Germany, Denmark, and British Guiana. The editors' answer was that the United States should buy all the British, French, and Dutch colonies in the western Hemisphere. The money would be used to purchase supplies in the United States. The contract would permit repayment of the original payments after the war.

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The isolationists were wrong because America could not be sure of maintaining its peace neutrality by proclaiming it had no intention of fighting. If the Allies surrendered, Hitler would decide whether the United States was to fight.

Intervention and War

The editors said the question of intervention had to decide war, which is the worst way to defend the nation, and the best way of saving democracy is to have this nation's arms against aggression.

The current defeatist slogan that a democracy could not win a war against a dictatorship was bitterly assailed by the magazine. THE NEW REPUBLIC pointed to England and France as proof of the exact antithesis. For these nations, the magazine said, had failed because they were led by conservatives and anti-democrats who had exhibited their hostility to democracy at home and abroad for years. At crisis after crisis - Versailles, the Weimar Republic, the League of Nations, the appeasement of Hitler - it had been the Tories who had led Britain astray. And, said the magazine, it had even been the Tories who had failed to rearm sufficiently or to conduct the war with sufficient skill and resolution.

As for France, the enemies of democracy remained in positions of power in the army and in politics.

THE NEW REPUBLIC took the stand: "Concentration of command is, of course, necessary in a war. But not a blackout of democracy. And not a concentration of power in anti-democratic hands. (Italics in the original.) That way lies sure defeat."¹⁵⁰

Partisan Non-Belligerency

Meanwhile, the German armies closed in on Paris, and Italy declared war on England and France. The collapse of Allied resistance on the continent brought about a simultaneous change in the policies of the United States and THE NEW REPUBLIC. The magazine hailed President Roosevelt's "stab in the back" speech as the mark of the formal change of American policy

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from one of neutrality to one of partisan non-belligerency.¹⁵¹

The magazine rejected as cowardly and futile the proposals that the United States appease Japan in the emergency period. The editors could not conceive of a direct attack on America by Japan.¹⁵²

At the same time, the editors examined America's new role.

They said that America must not overlook one possible means of helping the Allies. The present expense would seem insignificant compared with what might have to be spent later if America faced Germany alone. German victory would mean, at best, an indefinite future of militarized life. At the worst, Americans would soon have to fight desperately for independence.

The editors conceded a mistake in their previous policy. They had realized the decadence of the British and French ruling classes, and their industrial unpreparedness. But wishful thinking had prevented the editors from realizing that Hitler might smash Britain and France as easily as he had Poland.

However, even with this realization, the editors maintained their position that the United States should not enter the war. American efforts should be concentrated upon the delivery of every possible type of equipment to the Allies. The United States should organize chiefly to build up Allied might, not its own. American defense must be improved, but not at the expense of the urgent needs of the Allies.¹⁵³

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In short, the editors' new policy could be summed up in their own words: "Give every possible aid to Britain short of war. In the meantime, prepare to defend as much of the Americas as possible against any attack."¹⁵⁴

A special section on national defense was published in the issue of July 1, 1940. Contributing writers included Max Lerner, Fletcher Pratt, and editors George Soule and Bruce Bliven.

The magazine's own summary of the special section claimed the writers clearly showed that the most important immediate task of defense was to devote every possible effort to preventing the defeat of Great Britain.¹⁵⁵

The imminence of the nation to war caused a review of the magazine's attitude toward American participation. The editors thought that a real case could be made for American entry into the first World War, along with a better case for staying out of it. For the real case was not the one that the politicians presented to the people. The politicians had succeeded in making words like "democracy" and "our brave Allies" distasteful to honest mouths for a long time. The editors acknowledged that they had never been doctrinaire pacifists, rather their efforts to keep this country out of danger had been directed towards keeping it from being tricked into war for other than compelling reasons of justice and survival.¹⁵⁶

Answer to Schuman

The month of July brought a letter from Professor

Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College urging that the United States declare war on Germany at once. To this THE NEW REPUBLIC replied, "If it were reasonably certain that our belligerency would save Britain from conquest by Hitler, it would be almost impossible to make a good case for remaining at peace." But, insisted the magazine, the critical period for Britain was a matter of days. American armed forces could not help that speedily. American efforts must concentrate on the immediate task of supplying Britain. And should Britain emerge victorious, the United States would be committed to war without any knowledge of the peace aims.¹⁵⁷

In the meantime, the magazine did not lose sight of the threat in the Orient. The editors wrote that it was no secret that Japan had long desired to expel all the white men out of the Orient, and would try to do so as soon as she felt strong enough.¹⁵⁸

The summer of 1940 saw the Presidential campaign swinging into high gear as Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie squared off against each other. The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC put themselves on record in favor of a third term for Roosevelt. They said the President had many faults and that they could not call themselves devoted personal followers of his. Yet, they saw in him a symbol of a tendency in the national life which they believed must be returned to power if the nation was to be made ready to face its enemies. The editors stated that in no country had a representative of business been able to organize

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the nation efficiently for war.¹⁵⁹

THE NEW REPUBLIC jumped eagerly onto the proposal that America trade fifty over-age destroyers in return for leases on British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. America did not need the destroyers; Britain did. And sending Britain the destroyers might save the United States billions of dollars in the future. At any rate, the leases on the bases were worth far more than were the destroyers.¹⁶⁰

Editor George Soule appraised the magazine's foreign policy in an article in August of 1940. To Soule, the policy he had helped to make had had two major errors in relation to World Wars One and Two.

The first mistake had been to trust in the 1918 peace aims of the victorious Allies. The other had been the failure to realize that Hitler could win the second war, even though the magazine had known of the decadence of Britain and France.

Soule wrote that the present policy of the magazine was: (1) the utmost possible help to Britain short of war, (2) prompt organization of American defense, (3) refusal to commit the nation to help Britain win the war without a full understanding about peace aims, (4) recognition that the only world order in which the United States should become a partner was one in which the economic, social, and political phases of the democratic revolution were fulfilled.¹⁶¹

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editorial support of conscription. The magazine quoted General

George Marshall's statement that the army needed a minimum of 1,200,000 men for defense. Obviously, concluded the magazine, that number of men could not be recruited. Conscription was the only answer. The nation could not afford to gamble.¹⁶²

The magazine took the occasion of a communication from its London correspondent, H.N. Brailsford, to stress its insistence that the United States refrain from entering the war yet. The editors said that not for a year would the country be well enough prepared to give Britain enough soldiers to count. And Britain already was receiving everything else. Also, said the magazine, the question of military aid could only arise after Britain had fended off the invasion and America was ready.

"...we shall have to consider with the utmost care the possible peace aims and whether this nation ought to commit itself to war in their behalf. Fortunately, we may be able to make a choice instead of being led by the pressure of events as we were in 1917."¹⁶³

The formation of the Rome-Berlin-Tokio Axis in the fall of 1940 was taken by the magazine as an attempt to intimidate the United States. The magazine said the American answer should be to cut off all shipments of oil to Japan and give far more assistance to China.¹⁶⁴ And the magazine lauded President Roosevelt's radio statement that the United States refused to be intimidated. THE NEW REPUBLIC insisted: "Japan is in reality more afraid of us than we are of her."¹⁶⁵

More Aid
President Franklin D. Roosevelt won his third term

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fight in November and a short time later established his "rule of thumb" for aid to England. But the rule of thumb was not satisfactory to the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC. They wanted to know why the government did not hand over more than fifty per cent of America's military aircraft, and they urged the government to send Britain more over-age destroyers. The editors argued that aid to Britain should be gauged by need, not by guess. If America's first line of defense was not broken, the second line might never have to be defended.¹⁶⁶

The editors foresaw a financial problem if Britain continued to pay cash on the line. They decided it was better to make an outright gift of money to Britain rather than let her borrow it. Surely, they said, American defense was worth the expenditure of a billion dollars for Britain. America could not permit Hitler to win.¹⁶⁷

In the Christmas issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC, the editors took a stand strikingly similar to the one adopted in February of 1917. The editors declared, "It is a waste of time to argue whether the United States should enter the war. We are already in the war and have been for several years." And they went on to say, "In recent months our status has been openly recognized as that of a non-belligerent ally of Great Britain. The one important question before us is how to make our cooperation most effective."

The editors advocated all possible aid even at the risk of war, although they still felt it was to Great Britain's

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 could not permit Hitler to win. 187

In the Christmas issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC, the edi-
 tors took a stand strikingly similar to the one adopted in
 February of 1917. The editors declared, "It is a waste of time
 to argue whether the United States should enter the war. We
 are already in the war and have been for several years." And
 they went on to say, "In recent months our status has been
 greatly complicated as that of a non-belligerent ally of Great
 Britain. The one important question before us is how to make
 our cooperation most effective."

The editors advocated all possible aid even at the
 risk of war, although they still felt it was to Great Britain's

advantage for the United States to remain at peace. In that way supplies would not be diverted to a necessarily expanded American military force.

British-American Alliance

And the editors returned to the idea of the first editors of the magazine - the alliance of Britain and America. They urged the two nations to assume responsibility and leadership for all of the non-totalitarian world. The new nations should participate together in economic, industrial, and cultural activities. British-American cooperation was seen as the alternative to Fascism.

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Next, the editors took a cue from President Roosevelt, falling in line with his fireside chat asking war industries to expand without reference to fear of excess capacity after the crisis. Said THE NEW REPUBLIC; "We must produce exactly as if we were at war."

The magazine agreed with the President that if Britain was aided to the utmost, Americans might not ever have to fight in World War Two.

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The Battle of 1776

With the thought in mind that aid to Britain would eliminate the possibility of American participation in the war, THE NEW REPUBLIC endorsed the Lend-Lease Bill, H.R. 1776, saying that it might be the decisive action of the war.

170

Japan and Britain

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That was in January of 1941. In February, the maga-

zine turned its attention to the Pacific area. Japanese actions were interpreted as an effort to keep the American fleet in the Pacific, and to prevent the government from transferring any more destroyers to the British.

The magazine refused to bite. It insisted that if Britain won the war, the United States certainly would have little to fear from Japan. The editors were confident that Japan would bow down before a firm front; Japan would be ended as a major power if Britain and the United States applied economic pressure.¹⁷¹

Naval Aid

Instead of asking for the weakening of American naval power in the Atlantic, the editors called upon the government to use its ships to patrol this side of the ocean. This would release some British ships.

And if American naval vessels should spot a submarine, the editors saw no harm in flashing the news to the wide air over the ship's radio.¹⁷²

Close to War

The magazine continued on its path to the ultimate war. The editors next urged the government to take steps to protect war cargoes headed for Britain. Whatever steps were necessary would be supported by the magazine.

The editors acknowledged that this might cause Hitler to declare war. They answered that they did not believe he would. If he did, he would only be doing sooner what he un-

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doubtedly would do later. The editors declared, ". . .the risk is insignificant compared with the risk - to us of a British defeat. . ."

They hoped that war would not be necessary. But they were sure that a war fought alongside of Britain was preferable to a lone fight in the future. ". . .our choice is not between imperfect Britain and perfection; it is between imperfect Britain and a Germany more imperfect to an indescribable degree."¹⁷³

Public Opinion

THE NEW REPUBLIC had almost reached the point where it was to ask for war against Germany. The editors knew it. But, to their alarm, they suddenly realized that the American public had progressed as far toward war as they had.

The editors called this a great danger. They pointed out to Americans that their navy patrolled the Atlantic giving active aid to the British.

They told the public they should realize that Hitler was as determined to destroy the United States as he was Britain. And they called the unwitting allies of Hitler those business men who were holding back defense production by resisting any plant expansion they did not think they could use profitably after the emergency.

The editors closed by saying that whatever needed to be done to ensure the safety of America and to defeat fascism throughout the world should be done regardless of any other consequence.¹⁷⁴

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The Die Is Cast

On May 26, 1941, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC asked the United States to take the offensive against Germany, and bitterly regretted that the nation was not already taking up arms.

On this date the editors assured their readers, "If we do not fight now, it is absolutely certain that we shall have to fight later, at a time of Hitler's choosing, with a far smaller probability that we shall be successful."

And they offered a program which they believed the minimum necessary to save America. It called for American participation with England in a joint expedition to seize Dakar; seizure of all the French islands in the Western Hemisphere; protective occupation of the Azores, and the Cape Verde Islands; seizure of all the funds of Axis powers in the United States; the suspension of all diplomatic relations with the Axis nations; and the use of the entire American fleet, if necessary, to convoy military and other supplies to Great Britain.

Along with this the editors urged the government to stop the appeasement of neutrals like Spain, to fire all fascists and anti-semites in the State Department, and to start an active campaign for the spread of democratic propaganda throughout the world.¹⁷⁵

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President's action was a defiance of Hitler, and would almost certainly lead to fighting within a few weeks or months. The magazine was positive the President now shared its belief that it would be a wiser course to fight Germany at that point than later. It was crucial that Britain remain standing. The prospect of war was a horrible one, but not as terrible as the prospect of a world dominated by the Nazis.

The magazine asked, "Why play further cat and mouse with the problem instead of employing the sound strategy of the offensive? This is our hour of decision."¹⁷⁶

Two weeks later the magazine declared that only the productive power and moral energy of the United States stood between Hitler and world domination. And the editors now became irked at President Roosevelt's failure to act as swiftly as they desired. They stated the President was too much influenced by the fact that the public still was unaware of the danger inherent in a German conquest of Britain.

The editors called it an hour of desperate crisis. They said, "We implore the President to act and act at once." And they presented another program which was essentially a call for war.

This program included the fullest possible use of the navy in delivering more goods to England. The editors stated, "If this means shooting, then shoot." Then they asked that every particle of army equipment which could be spared be sent to British forces. They advocated

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also the reorganization of the nation's defense on an industrial basis, complete price control, recognition of air power, and the democratization of the State Department and elimination of appeasers.¹⁷⁷

Way Out for Japan

Meanwhile, the magazine's attention was also focused on the Far East. Secretary of State Hull's letter to Doctor Quo of China reminded the editors of their own proposals for Asia. Hull had expressed the same idea previously supported by the magazine - that the United States should lead the Western nations in giving up extraterritorial rights in China after the war. The editors claimed it would show Japanese moderates there was a way out which would save face. All nations should be equal partners in the development of the great Asiatic mainland.

At the same time, the editors wondered if such letters were not meaningless. They referred to rumors that America was contemplating a Far Eastern Munich. More appeasement, they said, would be intolerable. The arguments used to support appeasement of Japan were characterized as the same ones which had been proven false in Europe.

The editors called for a strong and democratic China, free of foreign domination and intervention, as the core of American policy in the Far East. American sympathy for China should be backed up with clear deed - an embargo on oil and copper to Japan and an increase in economic aid to China.

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There were two important reasons, to THE NEW REPUBLIC, why America had to help China more than ever. First a strong China would be the most effective insurance against Japanese domination of Asia, which consequently would mean the destruction of American post-war markets together with the strengthening of Hitler's world order. The second reason was ideological. To abandon China was to betray democracy - to betray a nation in its great resistance to fascist aggression.¹⁷⁸

As for the threat of a two-ocean war if America was involved with Japan, THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that the United States could fight in two oceans as long as the British navy were available to help. The real danger would come if the United States let the British go down and thus had to face the totalitarian world alone.¹⁷⁹

Germany Invades Russia

The complexion of the war changed suddenly on June 22, 1941, when German troops launched an invasion of Russia. The course the American government should take appeared clear to THE NEW REPUBLIC. Russia was now Hitler's enemy. If Hitler defeated Russia, he then could turn on England with security at the rear. Therefore the United States must help Russia, not for Russia's sake, but for the best interests of America.

And the editors stated flatly, "The time has now come, in our judgment, when the United States should immediately go to war with the Axis."¹⁸⁰

There were two important reasons, to the United States, why America had to help China. First, a strong China would be the most effective bulwark against Japanese domination of Asia, which consequently would mean the restriction of American east-west routes together with the establishment of a new world order. The second reason was that if Japan should China was to be left technology - to betray a nation in its own interests to assist a great power.

As for the United States, it was in the interest of the United States to help China. The United States could not afford to lose the Pacific. The United States had to face the possibility of a world war.

Germany Invades Russia

The completion of the war started suddenly on June 22, 1941, when German troops invaded the Soviet Union. At the time the American government should have appeared clear to the United States. Russia was now Hitler's enemy. If Hitler attacked Russia, it was clear that the United States would be forced to help. However, the United States must help Russia, not for Russia's sake, but for the best interests of America. For the United States could not afford to see Russia fall. The United States must help Russia, not for Russia's sake, but for the best interests of America. In our interest, when the United States must help Russia, not for Russia's sake, but for the best interests of America. To win the war.

Second Front. Immediately, the magazine editors sought for the method of making American power speak most effectively. First, the fleet should convoy ships carrying war supplies all the way to British ports.

And, said the editors, there should be a second front in North Africa.¹⁸¹

The editors chafed at the bit as President Roosevelt failed to move as swiftly as they desired. They applauded the government for the occupation of Iceland and the sending of troops to Trinidad and British Guiana: "The giant of the Western world is at last rousing himself from his long, almost fatal lethargy and is preparing to fight for his way of life."

Their criticism: these actions did not go far enough.¹⁸²

They pointed out that the nation already was committed to shooting when necessary. Therefore, even stronger actions against Germany would not necessarily in themselves bring a shooting war, since Hitler had not chosen to attempt reprisals.

The editors were convinced that the public was showing itself ready for deeds of war if not for words of war.¹⁸³

Crush Japan

At the same time, the editors called for strong action against Japan, in order to eliminate the threat in the Pacific. Then full attention could be brought on the European battle scene.

The editors claimed superior naval forces for the

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Allied side. Japan would be crushed by these naval forces if she decided to fight. But the Allies need not fight Japan to crush her. The editors were convinced that a strict embargo would bring Japan to her knees in a matter of months.¹⁸⁴

As history has shown since, the under-estimation of Japan was the second strategical error of the editors. They had already acknowledged their mistake in not realizing that Germany could defeat the Allies.

Public Reluctance
The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC had presumed that although the American people were somewhat tardy in realizing their danger and their obligations, all that was needed to bring them around was time to adjust to the situation. But in August, the editors thought they noticed a backward trend away from accepting responsibility.

The blunt truth, they said, was that Americans were trying to avoid what they realized was their duty. They were seeking to benefit from the fruits of a victory over Hitler without doing their share to make the victory possible. They were willing to sell their products to the Allies, but not spend any manpower.

The editors declared Americans childishly dreamed of a miracle whereby they would wake up one morning and find the Nazis had been defeated without them having had to make any real sacrifices. Americans also hoped that the Russians would

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The editors believed Americans collectively dreamed of a miracle whereby they would wake up one morning and find the battle had been finished without their having had to make any real sacrifices. Americans also hoped that the Russians would

be able to do their job for them. To all this the editors said, "Either this is our war or it isn't." And they reaffirmed their conviction that this was America's war.

The editors blamed President Roosevelt for the indecision of the American people. They said the President concealed important information from the public and shrank from telling them of the dangers facing historic American principles. Since the President did not want to be called a warmonger, THE NEW REPUBLIC suggested a better term: truthmonger, a monger of specific facts.¹⁸⁵

Why Fight? The editors explained why they had decided America should enter the war, instead of concentrating on being the Allies' arsenal. They claimed a declaration of war would be effective now, since the problem was no longer the desperate attempt to save the British Isles. There was now a chance to defeat Hitler through the combined strengths of Britain, Russia and the United States. The editors argued that the declaration of war would immobilize Japan. Japan would not dare to take one step further as long as there was a chance that Germany would be defeated. According to THE NEW REPUBLIC, the United States could not achieve moral integrity by waiting to be pushed into war by a trick or an accident. The magazine prophetically asked whether the American decision on so great an issue,

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whether to fight now with Allies or have to fight him alone later, was to depend on a Japanese bomb falling too close to an American ship, or a reckless U-boat commander torpedoing an American vessel instead of a British one.

No, answered the magazine. War was a job the people should undertake deliberately by a free act of will in a case where the national safety and future was endangered.

The best citizen, said the magazine, worked for a world in which war would be unnecessary. But, it was insisted, such a world could not exist with Hitler in it. And America could not wait until the Allied peace aims were more definite, despite the betrayal of the first World War. The Atlantic Charter pointed the way. Americans must see to it that specific peace aims were developed in the future.

But the first act must be a declaration of war on the Axis. And the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC, on August 25, 1941, asked the President for such a declaration.¹⁸⁶

THE NEW REPUBLIC sadly watched the reluctance of the country to go to war at what the magazine thought was a golden opportunity. The magazine foresaw a future in which the United States would be surrounded by anti-democrats. As a result, the nation would have to be either permanently militarized or else succumb to fascism. And the editors declared that each American who failed to use his personal pressure for war would share the responsibility for future calamities.

Said the editors, "One might excuse Chamberlain at

whether to fight now with allies or to wait for the
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can who failed to use his personal pressure for war would share
the responsibility for future calamities.

But the editors, they did not excuse themselves at

Munich on the ground that it was impossible to foresee the enormous successes of Hitler; but we have had plenty of warnings."¹⁸⁷

Ultimatum to Japan

THE NEW REPUBLIC also urged the State Department to take decisive action in the Pacific. The magazine said in articles in the issues of September 1 and October 20, 1941, that America must send Japan an ultimatum.

The ultimatum must threaten Japan with a shooting war unless she withdrew from China and Indo-China. The reward for withdrawal from the Asiatic mainland would be the promise of an equal share in its development along with European nations.

If Japan refused, said the magazine, she would be crushed by a severe economic blockade.

And if Japan resisted, the magazine relied on the so-called "competent military authorities" who said Japan could not possibly hold out against the Allies for more than a few months.¹⁸⁸

In October a Japanese spokesman hinted that Japan might invade Siberia when she thought it safe to do so. THE NEW REPUBLIC called for a joint declaration by Britain and the United States that a Japanese move towards Siberia would bring immediate war with the Allies.¹⁸⁹

And a week later, the magazine was sure that the new cabinet appointed in Japan was one which intended to strike if things went badly enough. A strong ultimatum by the United

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States was needed. The editors were positive Japan would change her policy if shown the error of her assumption that the United States was timorous, vacillating and decadent.¹⁹⁰

At the same time, the American destroyer Kearny was attacked by a German submarine. THE NEW REPUBLIC refused to beat its breast in horror. The plain truth, said the magazine, was that Germany and the United States were at war. And such incidents were to be expected. The magazine hoped the attack on the Kearny would awaken some Americans to the national situation.¹⁹¹

War with the Axis

Once again, the magazine repeated its demand for war with the Axis. THE NEW REPUBLIC of November 10, 1941, said that America had two choices. She could wait meekly until her two implacable enemies got ready to attack jointly. Or she could follow the common-sense procedure of disposing of the weaker of the two first, so she would be better prepared to meet the threat of the other. The magazine pointed out that America had a two-ocean navy, half of it under the British flag.¹⁹²

The attempt to sink the Kearny was followed by the torpedoing of the destroyer Reuben James with the loss of 76 lives. Congress responded by passing President Roosevelt's request for permission for American merchant ships to arm and enter belligerent ports.

The reply of THE NEW REPUBLIC was the renewed insistence that the time had come for war between America and Germany.

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The magazine asserted that a declaration of war would aid the American effort to help the Allies in several ways. Japan would not be able to attack Russia in the rear. If Japan fought she would be knocked out quickly, said the magazine. In the meantime, Hitler could not strike at the United States.

The editors said a declaration of war would provide the needed spark for increased production of war supplies. It would destroy the business-as-usual philosophy.

Morale, both civilian and army, would be boosted. And German spies and saboteurs could be dealt with effectively.

It was obvious common sense, reiterated the editors, to realize that even if Hitler did not intend to destroy the United States, the nation could not live as a democratic island in a fascist world.¹⁹³

Hull-Kurusu

In the closing days of November the Japanese envoy Kurusu and Secretary of State Cordell Hull conferred on the growing crisis between the two countries.

The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that these negotiations were useless. Tojo and Togo, the Japanese Premier and his Foreign Minister, had blocked the way to a successful understanding by speeches delivered as Kurusu arrived in Washington. The editors said these speeches were an ultimatum to the United States to recognize the Japanese conquest of China. The ultimatum must be refused.

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 in a fascist world.

WILLI-KURBAN

In the editorial days of November the Japanese navy
 Kurban and Secretary of State Cordell Hull contacted on the
 ground, crisis between the two countries.
 The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that these na-
 tionalists were useless. To be and to be, the Japanese frontier
 and his foreign minister, had looked the way to a successful
 understanding by speeches delivered as Kurban arrived in Washin-
 ton. The editors said these speeches were an ultimatum to the
 United States to race into the Japanese conquest of China. The
 ultimatum must be refused.
 Instead, the editors criticized what they called the

meechness of the State Department. They said that the government should have already sent final and drastic American terms to Japan and should have demanded an immediate decision. American terms would be simple: Japan must leave the Axis, withdraw from China and every country she had invaded, and try to behave like a civilized nation in the future. Any American agreement to anything less, the editors said, would constitute an inexcusable and disastrous Far Eastern repetition of Munich.¹⁹⁴

On December first, the editors declared that America would betray China by any compromise with Japan. For China believed herself part of the world democratic front.

The editors advised the government to take advantage of Kurusu's presence in Washington. He should be informed that any attempt by the Japanese army to sever China's lifeline, either at Kunming or in Burma itself, would be viewed by Britain and the United States as an act of war.¹⁹⁵

Pearl Harbor
December 7, 1941 was as big a shock to THE NEW REPUBLIC as to the most complacent American, in spite of the fact the magazine realized all along, as few Americans did, that Japan and the United States were close to war. Evidently the men who bombed Pearl Harbor were not as convinced as THE NEW REPUBLIC of the inevitability of a swift American victory.

In the already published issue of December 8, the magazine crowed over what it called good news from every front of the world war. The Germans were being driven from Rostov

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ment should have already sent Linn and Gracie American terms
to Japan and should have demanded an immediate decision. As a
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the magazine resisted all along, as the Americans did, that
Japan and the United States were close to war. Evidently the
men who headed the NEW PUBLIC were not as convinced as the NEW
PUBLIC of the inevitability of a swift American victory.
In the already published issue of December 6, the
magazine crossed over what it called good news from every front
of the world war. The forecasts were being given from Moscow

by the Russians and the British had penetrated well into Libya. THE NEW REPUBLIC declared, "No doubt these events affected the Japanese decision not to start a war with the United States. . . at least not yet."¹⁹⁶

That issue was full of statements calculated to make the blushing editors wish they could call it back before it hit the news stands. The magazine had declared that it agreed with a Roosevelt statement made before he became President in which he said there could hardly be a war between Japan and the United States because neither could get at the other to fight it.

If there was a war, the magazine predicted it would consist of limited naval fighting, perhaps some jungle warfare in Malaya or Burma, but mainly it would consist of a process of economic strangulation which Japan would have little chance of arresting.

Would Japan fight? The magazine thought it possible that the stories of the mystic belligerence of Japan's military caste might be true. In which case, Japan might fight to save face.

However, the editors said, "Unless there is some unlikely error in our information about the naval situation, sane strategists would never permit Japan to start such a hopeless war."

As for the United States, the editors were convinced that it would never act unless Japan struck first.

But the editors did feel that Japan would never yield

by the British and the United States...
The Japanese...
Japan decided not to start a war with the United States...
of Japan not yet.

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the Japanese...
the news stands...
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and the subject did not mean Japan would never yield.

to the United States without armed resistance. They said both nations were gambling by waiting for the outcome of the European war.

"Therefore," said THE NEW REPUBLIC, "we should have no great cause for regret if Japan decided to resist now. For the more she resists, the more quickly will she exhaust her reserves of material, and her menace might be eliminated in time to allow us to concentrate all our power in the final struggle with Hitler."¹⁹⁷

War

All was changed when the next issue came out, on December 15, 1941. The confidence in a quick victory for the United States had been destroyed along with part of the American fleet lying on its side at Pearl Harbor. The magazine recognized the success of the Japanese naval blow in equalizing Pacific naval strength.

But the magazine was still sure that America had to win in the long run. Japan's strategy obviously was based upon a short campaign.

And the editors ruefully admitted the Japanese attack should not have come as a surprise to supposedly intelligent men.

The editors saw the Pacific war as part of a strategic whole with Europe. It was being said throughout the country by large groups that Americans must not forget her real enemy was Hitler. THE NEW REPUBLIC flatly stated this to be untrue. The real enemy was the coalition arrayed against the United States.

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The editors say the Pacific war as part of a strategy
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large groups and Americans were not to be deceived. The
editorial said that the Japanese attack was to be expected. The
real danger was the collision strategy against the United States.

Whether America concentrated first on defeating Japan or on defeating Hitler was purely a matter of strategy.¹⁹⁸

There are striking similarities between the attitudes of THE NEW REPUBLIC to World Wars One and Two. The magazine editors favored peace, but not a peace at any price. Some things, they said, are worth fighting for.

Basically, their final interventionist positions were caused by a determination that Germany should not defeat Britain. The editors called it "protecting America's national interests." In fact, the advancement of the nation's interests was the only valid reason for going to war.

And it was their contention in World War One that America's future lay in an alliance with Britain as the only other nation with common interests and values. The editors said the British navy was America's first line of defense.

This same feeling carried over into World War Two. But the editors could not conceive at first of a German victory for that reason they were perfectly willing that Britain fight without United States aid, even though they felt that England fought America's war.

THE NEW REPUBLIC never was neutral in either war. Neither was the United States, and the magazine recognized that fact. In the first war, the editors declared neutrality irrelevant when one of the warring powers was the nation which had invaded Belgium and was turning the seas into a highway of horror. The magazine called for benevolent neutrality - favorable

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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

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THE NEW REPUBLIC AND CONSPIRACIES

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to the Allies. In 1939, the editors insisted immediately on all possible aid to Britain that would not involve the United States in the war. The editors called for amendment of the Neutrality Acts to permit cash-and-carry trade, a trade which would benefit Britain as the mistress of the seas.

Then step by step they progressed towards advocacy of a shooting war. The magazine became more and more desperate as Germany rolled through Europe. With Britain facing invasion and complete defeat, THE NEW REPUBLIC could hold back no longer. The editors asked that the United States declare war on Germany.

In the second war, the editors were much more positive and aggressive in their interventionist attitude. A review of differences in ideas between 1914 and 1939 will show why the magazine adopted a war psychology more quickly in World War Two.

The editors feared the Nazis as they never were afraid of the Kaiser. It was only in the height of the war fever in 1917 that the magazine was able to convince itself that the Kaiser's Germany was after world conquest.

However, Hitler was another story. The editors insisted from the first that world domination was Hitler's goal. The United States would have to fight the Nazis some day, and if Britain were defeated, the United States would face alone what would be the greatest military power on the earth. The editors declared that America could not afford to lose the protection of the British navy in the Atlantic.

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The editors feared the Axis as they never were afraid of the Kaiser. It was only in the matter of the war fever in 1917 that the magazine was able to convince itself that the Kaiser's Germany was a real world opponent. However, Hitler was another story. The editors distanced from the first that world opponent was Hitler's goal. The United States would have to fight the Axis some day, and if Britain were defeated, the United States would face alone what would be the greatest military power on the earth. The editors decided that war was not afford to lose the protection of the British navy in the Atlantic.

Neutral rights were a tremendous issue to the editors in the first war. They demanded that the United States vigorously protest violations of freedom of the seas by both sides. However, the editors said the United States could not make more than strong verbal protests to Britain. For the British blockade must not be hampered. It was his strict insistence upon enforcing neutral rights, and therefore hindering the British war effort, that led the magazine to declare itself against the presidential candidacy of Charles Evans Hughes.

On the other hand, the magazine criticized the United States for what it called, at first, weak handling of the submarine situation.

The editors realized that because of their vulnerability and limitations, submarines could not observe the international requirements of warnings before the use of torpedoes, and coming to the aid of passengers on sinking vessels. But, said the editors, anarchy on the seas cannot be permitted.

Because of submarine warfare and the clumsy diplomacy of the German government, THE NEW REPUBLIC declared neutral rights were more safely entrusted to Britain. The editors felt sure that Britain would live up to her responsibilities as soon as the pressure was off.

The second war did not see such a concern for neutral rights. The Neutrality Laws, favored by the magazine, were intended to keep America out of war by keeping American ships out of the danger spots, and banning the munitions trade. Thus

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actually the United States had abandoned some of the rights for which she claimed she fought in 1917.

All through the war years of 1914-17, THE NEW REPUBLIC clamored for both belligerents to declare their war aims. The editors were supporters of a league of peace. It was because of the league of peace idea that the magazine swung to the side of President Woodrow Wilson after early criticisms of him. In fact, it was because it seemed that an Allied victory would insure the establishment of a league to enforce peace that the magazine finally was able to tell itself that the Allied cause was the just fight. For this would be a war in keeping with American national interest if it could be turned into a war to secure a stable and peaceful world.

But, the editors could not conceive of a stable world without Germany and Russia as equal partners in it along with other nations. Thus the Treaty of Versailles was taken as a betrayal of the liberal cause since it seemed to promise a weak and subjected Germany at the mercy of France. And the imperialist attitudes of the Allies after the war resulted in the disillusionment of the editors. They said the League of Nations was a sham, designed to preserve the status quo.

Consequently, THE NEW REPUBLIC did not stress war aims as much in its discussions of World War Two. Promises made under pressure by unwilling Allies could not be depended upon. It was more important to defeat the Nazis.

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in 1941, THE NEW REPUBLIC never fooled itself into the idea that the peace settlement would solve basic problems.

In the first war, one of the magazine's reasons for its first attitude of abstention from fighting was to preserve a sane level of thought in America. The United States must sit at the peace table without any feelings of hate which would be the natural outcome of participation in battle. In the postwar years, the editors often rued the naivete which had led them to expect the imperialist leopards to change their spots.

The second World War was complicated by the Japanese factor. The editors had Japan pegged correctly, but did not follow through to the logical conclusion. They knew Japan was controlled by a militarist clique which was out to rule Asia and would strike at Thailand or the Netherlands East Indies when it was seemed safe to do so.

The editors insisted that the United States must not yield one inch to Japan. The editors said the United States must order Japan out of the Asiatic mainland, then a benevolent America should invite Japan to share as an equal partner in the development of China.

The editors could not conceive that Japan could buck the United States even though they realized the preoccupation of the Nipponese warlords with saving face. The editors made a basic error in military strategy. Just as they misjudged the strength of Hitler's armies, they miscalculated the striking power of Japan against a dormant United States navy.

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Because of America's supposed naval and economic superiority, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC said Japan would be foolish to engage in a war which would see it crushed by America in a few months. In fact so sure were the editors of this, they wrote that they almost wished Japan would fight so that one Axis partner could be eliminated.

The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC realized in 1939 that America might enter the war through Asia quicker than through Europe. Yet the actual outbreak of war caught them flatfooted. Their issue distributed the day after Pearl Harbor spoke smugly of Japan's reluctance to force the issue with the mighty United States.

Conclusion

To sum up, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC were not neutral in either World War One or World War Two. In the first war, despite their early insistence that the United States should not participate in the fighting, the editors supported a policy of benevolent neutrality. It was their belief that the United States should do nothing to harm the British war effort. The editors of 1939 did not have any of the early attempts at non-partisanship of 1914: they immediately called for amendment of the Neutrality Laws to aid Britain. From there they went on to the destroyers-deal, lend-lease, and a shooting naval convoy.

In both wars, the editors were convinced that a British victory was for the best interests of the United States. They were positive that a Hitler victory over Britain meant

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that the United States would later have to fight Germany without allies. So, as in 1917, the editors called for war with Germany.

The excesses of German submarine warfare paved the way emotionally for the editors' 1917 decision. Rationally, they said, the league of peace was a goal worth fighting for.

However, the period from 1918 to 1939 saw the editors disillusioned in their hopes for a stable world peace.

As a result, their pro-Allied attitude in the second war was based upon what the editors thought was strict calculation of what was best for America. There was a notable absence of any goal except self-preservation.

With German armies threatening to leap across the English Channel, the editors admitted their early insistence that the United States need not fight was based upon their underestimation of German strength, and Allied weakness. Had these things been realized, the editors would have called for war as soon as Germany invaded Poland.

Between 1939 and 1941, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC just about invited a Japanese attack. They urged the American government to adopt a firm unyielding attitude towards Japan. So sure were the editors of American superiority, they would not let themselves see that Japan might make a desperate lunge to free herself of the threat of what she considered a domineering United States. The editors were just as complacent about America's supposed military strength as was the public. Both

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were shocked by Pearl Harbor.

THE NEW REPUBLIC's role as a leader of liberal thought differed in both wars. In the first conflict, the magazine came around to intervention much later than did most so-called liberals. Indeed, the editors several times had to defend themselves against charges of pro-Germanism.

However in the second war, the magazine was ahead of many liberals. Despite its early statements that American armies were not needed, the magazine was always prepared for a shooting war the minute it could be shown that Britain could not defeat Germany in any other way. And the magazine was certainly well ahead of the general public which remained oblivious to the danger of war right up to Pearl Harbor.

10. Ibid., May 10, 1915, pp. 25-27.
11. Ibid., May 24, 1915, pp. 34-35, 73.
12. Ibid., July 3, 1915, p. 212.
13. Ibid., June 5, 1915, p. 109.
14. Vol. 3, March 20, 1915, p. 146.
15. Vol. 3, June 19, 1915, p. 166.
16. loc. cit.
17. Ibid., July 3, 1915, p. 215.
18. Ibid., July 26, 1915, p. 296-297.
19. Ibid., July 31, 1915, p. 328.
20. Ibid., p. 323.
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FOOTNOTES

All references are to THE NEW REPUBLIC magazine.

1. Vol. 1, November 7, 1914, p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 23.
3. Ibid., p. 10.
4. Ibid., November 14, 1914, p. 7.
5. Ibid., December 12, 1914, p. 7.
6. Vol. 2, February 27, 1915, p. 87.
7. Ibid., pp. 167-169.
8. Ibid., March 27, 1915, p. 193.
9. Vol. 3, May 8, 1915, p. 1.
10. Ibid., May 15, 1915, pp. 25-29.
11. Ibid., May 29, 1915, pp. 54-55, 78.
12. Ibid., July 3, 1915, p. 212.
13. Ibid., June 5, 1915, p. 109.
14. Vol. 2, March 20, 1915, p. 166.
15. Vol. 3, June 19, 1915, p. 166.
16. Loc. cit.
17. Ibid., July 3, 1915, p. 218.
18. Ibid., July 24, 1915, p. 296-297.
19. Ibid., July 31, 1915, p. 322.
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5. Ibid., December 12, 1914, p. 7.
6. Vol. 2, February 27, 1915, p. 27.
7. Ibid., pp. 127-128.
8. Ibid., March 27, 1915, p. 123.
9. Vol. 2, May 2, 1915, p. 1.
10. Ibid., May 12, 1915, pp. 22-23.
11. Ibid., May 23, 1915, pp. 24-25, 78.
12. Ibid., July 3, 1915, p. 212.
13. Ibid., June 3, 1915, p. 109.
14. Vol. 2, March 20, 1915, p. 122.
15. Vol. 2, June 12, 1915, p. 122.
16. Ibid. cit.
17. Ibid., July 3, 1915, p. 212.
18. Ibid., July 24, 1915, p. 222-227.
19. Ibid., July 31, 1915, p. 222.
20. Ibid., p. 223.
21. Ibid. cit.
22. Ibid., pp. 222-227.

23. Vol. 4, August 7, 1915, pp. 4-5.
24. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
25. Ibid., August 21, 1915, p. 55.
26. Ibid., August 28, 1915, pp. 82-86.
27. Ibid., September 18, 1915, pp. 166-167.
28. Ibid., September 4, 1915, p. 111.
29. Ibid., September 11, 1915, p. 142.
30. Ibid., October 23, 1915, pp. 293-294.
31. Vol. 5, November 20, 1915, pp. 62-63.
32. Ibid., November 27, 1915, p. 85.
33. Ibid., December 4, 1915, p. 107.
34. Ibid., December 18, 1915, pp. 161-162.
35. Ibid., December 4, 1915, pp. 108-109.
36. Ibid., p. 132.
37. Ibid., January 1, 1916, pp. 210-211.
38. Loc. cit.
39. Ibid., January 22, 1915, pp. 289-292.
40. Ibid., p. 293.
41. Vol. 6, February 19, 1916, p. 53.
42. Ibid., February 26, 1916, p. 100.
43. Ibid., p. 102-104.
44. Ibid., April 1, 1916, p. 224.
45. Ibid., April 22, 1916, p. 304.
46. Ibid., p. 306.
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ENTRANCE INTO THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS

by

ERNEST M. ROSENTHAL

(B.S. in J., Boston University, 1946)

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

THE NEW REPUBLIC was born as a "journal of opinion," and that opinion is ranged with the progressive forces in American political and intellectual life. It was the purpose of this thesis to examine the attitudes of this liberal journal toward the two great wars in which the United States has participated in recent history. The study traced the steady change in attitudes which finally led the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC to advocate United States entrance into the two world wars.

Method

This work made use of primary sources, the issues of the magazine itself. And the chronological method was adopted in order to present a whole picture of the development of attitudes toward several issues at the same time.

In World War One THE NEW REPUBLIC early rejected isolation. Like most Americans, the editors favored peace. They called non-résistance a negative attitude. To them, true pacifism was not mere moral refusal to have anything to do with war, but the effort to build a world in which war would not be necessary. Thus they were among the first advocates of a league of nations; the term they used was "a league to enforce peace."

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impossible, both from a moral and practical point of view. Morally, they considered it reprehensible for a nation to claim neutrality in a case of aggression, such as the German invasion of Belgium. Practically, there was the problem of neutral rights. German submarines were creating anarchy on the high seas. The British also infringed upon American rights. The United States pressed its protests against submarine warfare which was taking lives. But it was obvious that the United States would never get beyond polite words in its protests to Britain. If the United States were to break the British blockade it would help Germany, and that was undesirable. It would also mean a fight against British sea power, and the editors were advocates of a future alliance between Britain and America as two great nations with a community of interests. The editors would not favor any conflict with British naval power which they regarded as the first line of American defense.

The magazine came out for "benevolent neutrality," a neutrality which favored the Allies as non-aggressors and defenders of the "Atlantic world," the civilization of which the United States was a part.

However, Germany was not to be excluded in the future from her rightful place as a member of that Atlantic world. The magazine never accepted the thesis of exclusive German war guilt, nor did it overlook the sins of Czarist Russia, or imperialist Britain or France. The magazine insisted upon "peace without victory." The peace must be negotiated, not dictated

impossible, with a moral and practical point of view. Morally, they considered it reprehensible for a nation to claim neutrality in a case of aggression, such as the German invasion of Belgium. Practically, there was the problem of neutral rights. German submarines were creating havoc on the high seas. The British also infringed upon American rights. The United States pressed its protests against submarine warfare which was taking lives. But it was obvious that the United States would never get beyond polite words in its protests to Britain. If the United States were to break the British blockade it would help Germany, and that was undesirable. It would also mean a little more British sea power, and the British were advocates of a future alliance between Britain and America as two great nations with a community of interests. The alliance would not favor any conflict with British naval power, which they regarded as the first line of American defense. The magazine came out for "benevolent neutrality," a neutrality which favored the Allies as non-expressers and defenders of the "Atlantic world," the civilization of which the United States was a part. However, Germany was not to be excluded in the future from her rightful place as a member of that Atlantic world. The magazine never accepted the thesis of exclusive German war guilt, nor did it overlook the side of Caesar's Russia, or Imperialist Britain or France. The magazine insisted upon "peace without victory." The peace must be negotiated, not dictated.

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The editors had begun by criticizing President Wilson for his timid neutrality. However, they swung to his side as he made it obvious he intended to do nothing to harm the British cause. As a result, the magazine worked for Wilson's reelection in 1916, opposing Hughes because his insistence on strict impartiality would lead to the breaking of the British blockade of Germany and aid the German war effort.

THE NEW REPUBLIC took every possible occasion to record itself in favor of the Allied cause. But for a long time it could not find a good reason for military participation. Nevertheless, the German submarine warfare was pushing it and the United States toward a choice. THE NEW REPUBLIC felt that the only possible excuse for America to fight would be for the cause of world peace. But the United States could not be sure that a good peace would result from the war unless the belligerents accepted the principle of a league of peace.

The Allies seemed to accept the league, whereas the Germans were unwilling to make the league a pre-requisite to negotiations.

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When Germany announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on January 31, 1917, the magazine replied the next day that the United States must break off diplomatic relationships and prepare for war. Articles in the following weeks attempted to prepare America by insisting that the United States already was at war through its policy of benevolent neutrality.

THE NEW REPUBLIC had jumped on the Wilson bandwagon when he made his own the fight for a league of peace. And when Wilson took the United States into war after continued German submarine action, THE NEW REPUBLIC was prepared to follow the man they now called a great leader, in his efforts for world peace.

The post-war settlement brought bitter disillusionment to the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC. They criticized the Treaty of Versailles as a product which revealed the basic imperialist intentions of its makers. They said there could not be any stable peace unless Germany, Russia, and China were full members of the family of nations. They attacked the League of Nations because of its link with the Treaty.

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war. Out of this came the Neutrality Acts, designed to keep America from making the same mistakes which had helped push it into the first World War. THE NEW REPUBLIC approved the Neutrality Laws, but the editors did not believe that the laws should be enforced against the Spanish Loyalists.

With the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the resulting outbreak of world war, the magazine immediately placed its support on the Allied side. The editors instantly called upon Congress to permit cash-and-carry trade with belligerents. This would be legally neutral, although in practice it would favor Britain, the great sea power.

The editors refused to make this war an ideological conflict. They pointed out that the previous war had shown that evil could not be eradicated by fighting. The only justification for war was self-defense. The editors did say that there was enough right on the Allied side to warrant American action towards repealing the arms embargo.

The magazine editors did not have any confidence in the democratic intentions of the leaders of France and Britain. The conservative leadership of those countries were characterized as decadent, anti-democratic, and incompetent.

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any intentions of ever harming the United States was proof that the opposite was true. The editors wrote that appeasement of Hitler had failed because his ambitions were limitless. And they declared that if Hitler defeated England, it would only be a matter of time before the United States had to defend itself. The editors knew Germany could not invade the United States. But, they said, Germany could obtain the necessary springboard bases on the American continent.

Meanwhile, the editors warned that war might come quicker to America from Asia than from Europe. They insisted the United States order Japan out of China and threaten her with economic boycott. They were sure that Japan would have to bow to economic sanctions. Japan's only alternative would be a desperate war which, the editors thought, she could not possibly win.

On the other hand, the editors urged the United States to offer Japan a way out. The United States should lead the white nations in withdrawing from China. Then Japan should be invited to share equally in the development of the Asiatic mainland.

The success of the German invasions of Scandinavia, and then France and the low countries, shocked THE NEW REPUBLIC. For the first time, the editors realized that the Allies could lose the war.

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defense of America. Without England the United States would be a democratic island in a hostile German world. The defense of England was the defense of America.

The editors then called upon America to give Britain all possible help - arms, ships, all equipment which could be spared. The editors supported the gift of the over-age destroyers and wanted even more destroyers to be sent.

However, the magazine did not want the United States to go to war. The equipment and training of an American army would take up too much time before the army could be of any use. And supplying this army would deprive England of needed weapons. The major task of the nation was to be the "arsenal of democracy." And at the same time, the government should embark on a defense program planned so that it would not interfere with the supply line to England.

Another reason for not entering the war was to keep clear of European entanglements. It was not yet certain what the war was about except to defeat Hitler. And it was not clear yet that even the participation of America would insure Hitler's defeat.

In the next months, the editors advocated American navy convoys for ships in the zone close to America, the arming of merchant vessels, lend-lease, and the destroyers-for-bases deal. Whatever it cost to save Britain then would save the expenditure of much more money in a future war.

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can navy to patrol the American coastal waters in order to release more British shipping. Then the magazine decided that American ships should go all the way to British ports, and if that meant shooting, it was all right by the editors.

The German invasion of Russia seemed to be a great opportunity to the magazine. Germany now was fighting on another front; Russia must be aided.

The German-Russian war brought about the great decision of the magazine. The United States should fight Germany. For the time had come, the editors said, when American entrance could win the war for the Allies. Russia kept Germany busy on one front, and if Germany won out there, England would suffer. For Hitler could turn his back on Eastern Europe.

The magazine now called for a second front: American armed forces should join the British in an invasion of North Africa.

THE NEW REPUBLIC had made up its mind early in the summer of 1941, but the American public was not ready. So the editors fretted as President Roosevelt delayed making what seemed to the editors the obvious decision.

The magazine turned its attention to Japan. The editors decided the United States must call Japan's bluff and eliminate her from the Axis. The editors did not believe Japan would fight. If she did, the fight would be welcomed; then the United States would crush her quickly and turn on Germany without any worries about the Pacific.

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However, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC were as much surprised as anyone by the Pearl Harbor attack. The issue of December 8, 1941, was full of optimism based upon the Russian victory at Rostov and British successes in Libya. Surely the Japanese would not dare resist now. The next week the editors adjusted quickly to the outbreak of war and were ready for the crusade against the Axis.

CONCLUSION

A review of the magazine's attitudes towards World Wars One and Two shows the editors were not neutral in either conflict. Their basic policy was the advancement of American interests. And they thought it was in the American interest in each case that England should not be defeated by Germany. In the first war the establishment of a league of peace seemed more likely with an Allied triumph. In the second war, a German victory seemed to threaten the future security of the United States which would become, the editors thought, a democratic island in a fascist world.

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