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The social psychology of values

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~~THE~~ SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES

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VALUE IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

A human being is an animal organism, differing from other animal organisms mainly in the complexity and plasticity of his nerve structure, and adapted, by the nature of his inheritance and the processes of his training, for two chief functions of life:

(1) To coöperate successfully with other men for those ends which promote (or are believed to promote) the well-being of the group; that is, for common values.

(2) To compete successfully against other men (within or without the conventional rules of the game) for those "rewards" which are conceived to promote the well-being of the individual; in short, for personal values.

To get along with the group and within the group! It is a very plain and elementary truth that the welfare and happiness of every one of us, including those who are dependent upon us and those who are to succeed us, is related to a practical mastery of the arts of competition and coöperation. It is the game of life which has been played for untold ages, in which every boy and girl, every man and woman must take a hand. And we submit that to play that game well promotes affection and love for others, and self-respect in the awareness of the respect of others; in short, it promotes mental health; and our mental casualties are largely composed of

those who fail in just these ways.

Does it not seem that we should all consider it our first duty to learn the rules of that game; to know how the attitudes of others towards us are influenced and formed, to have a notion of the forces which mold public opinion? Is it not advisable for us to acquaint ourselves with those factors which lead to war, revolution, and disaster, and to intelligently search for the prerequisites of peace and good will and the public weal? Should we not look with a disapproval amounting to scorn upon an educational system which fails to instruct in those laws, upon a government which allows its members and particularly its leaders to function without a mastery of them, and upon a society which even neglects to discover the underlying principles which govern the social intercourse of human beings?

Yet social psychology, today, is the most backward branch of the science of psychology. General, individual, educational, abnormal, genetic, and comparative psychology have accumulated a vast store of exact knowledge, from which we have derived laws and principles of proved and applicable worth. But as a basis for the social sciences, psychology has had comparatively little to offer.

It is true that times are changing this backwardness, largely through the application of the experimental method to the problems of social adjustment. To the social psychology of the theorist, who strives to explain and to relate the scattered happenings of everyday life, has been

added the experimental social psychology of the laboratory worker, whose recent efforts have added a thousand researches. These two kinds of social psychology, however, have enjoyed scarcely more than a bowing acquaintance. And it is upon the former, rather than the latter, that the social sciences have based their conclusions. This is necessarily so, since these findings, compiled in a hundred laboratories, have never been boiled down into theory and law. Concerned with the problem of discovering exact knowledge, the experimenter has never given his results articulate expression.

I have ventured to attempt a union of theoretical and experimental social psychology. Instead of dealing with the theoretical or experimental aspects, I have tried to write a social psychology which is a synthesis of both. And the very rapidity with which future researches and new principles shall render obsolete this discussion will but serve to emphasize the need for the organization and the translation into theory of the flood of exact data now pouring in, however provisional the assumptions and however temporary the conclusions.

For these reasons I have omitted all polemical passages and systematic discussion. I have purposely left out all argumentative treatment of the systems of psychology, all classification of data according to schools, and all direct references to the merits or demerits of the viewpoints currently advocated, leaving to the reader the choice of interpreting and theorizing where it may seem to him advisable. In a study

of this kind the general eclectic treatment which attempts to harmonize and relate the different points of view has, I believe, gained in usefulness and clearness by its exclusion of theoretical and controversial material, and by its simple statement.

Sociologists, in the last few decades, have more or less handed over their fundamental problems to psychology.[1.] It has become increasingly evident that such questions could not be settled, absolutely, inside the limits of sociology. To the task thus appointed each psychologist naturally has brought the concepts of his own particular system, and has stressed the experimental findings which tend to bolster that system. The various works on social psychology, appearing from time to time, have ably represented the behavioristic, the Freudian, the Gestalt, and the topological or vector viewpoint, either singly or separately treated within the two covers. The subject has been approached, with few exceptions, from the methodological and provisional assumptions of one or more schools, reconsidering the elementary principles of psychology in other contexts, and translating them into new terms. This is no place to argue the relative merits; I only mention the conflict to emphasize the limitations of any special system, which, marked off for convenience only, must

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1. La Piere, R., and Farnsworth, P. R., Social Psychology, 1936, McGraw, Hill, New York, pp. 55-68.

hold its assumptions and results subject to revision and re-interpretation in the light of developments from other laboratories.

The fact is that while the various viewpoints have resulted in novel settings for discovering facts, and for new definitions of the facts, it is the method of experimentation which has yielded the facts themselves. No one school, after all, has a monopoly on investigations whether directly social in their framing, or suggestive of useful application to social problems. When, therefore, we turn to a new method and a new rationale, it must not be assumed that here at long last is a psychology at rest on solid earth. It indicates the opposite; it indicates a psychology founded on the restless sands, on vagrant theories and systematic speculation. One thing only is certain: 'theory proposes, but experiment disposes.'

Whatever one's systematic leanings, the first aim of social psychology is, without doubt, the introduction of order into the confusion of social life. This is accomplished by introducing orthodox findings and orthodox methods into the study of group adjustment. By this it is not meant to imply that the function of social psychology is limited to a mere survey of laboratory fundamentals, together with an elucidation of their relevance to social science. This discussion rejects the doctrine that human nature may be <u>fully</u> explored in laboratory experiments. It denies that the task of psychology is first to discover <u>all</u> there is to know about the

reactions of men under rigid and controlled conditions, and then, having discovered, to apply that knowledge.* This is a psychological fallacy; it involves a negation of experience. The delicate interlacings, the subtleties of group coöperation, moral suasion, and the whole artistry of social adjustment demand a like consideration. The laboratory searchers' inquiries into the mechanisms of the individual mind should be supplemented by group experiments, and by coördinated studies of men in the world at large; and to the very process of discovery there should be linked a subordinate activity of application. The careful shielding of psychology from all contact with the social world is, in fact, the surest way to stultify our aims and to defeat progress. For the very meaning of discoveries is wrapped up in their social relationships; is often disclosed in affiliations undreamed of by laboratory science.

To the modern student of social psychology, therefore, animals are not invariably confined in cages; men do not live within cubicles; religious emotion manifests itself in other terms besides systolic blood-pressure; art is more than a mere preference for the 'golden sector'; and motivation is scarcely to be regarded as the exclusive function of hormones.

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*The view that social psychology is applied individual psychology was maintained by Lazarus and Steinthal, and, by Wündt, despite the latter's criticism of this view. Some recent works in social psychology still maintain a view essentially similar.

Recent Historical Background

The task before the social psychologist, in other words, may be seen to emerge in the termination of an epoch in psychological theory and practice. For upwards of half a century the psychologist had concerned himself with the doing of a limited, definite job. It was, and is an essential job, and brilliant work has characterized its performance. Particularization has been its keynote. And the results are clear and precise. Social science should make the fullest possible use of those results; orthodox laboratory psychology is the solid ground upon which social psychology must be founded. But it is now recognized that clarity and precision, all too often, are to be had only at the price of artificiality, and by the rigid exclusion of vital considerations. The older conception is unfamiliar with the world of pride and prejudice, and of tragedy, and of hope, and of heroism. It takes little account of the will to dominate, to eat and live and cause to live, to love and be loved, to beget children. Yet of such are the dominant urges of man compounded, and will be so long as the race shall last. Of the play of motivation, the intricacies and interweaving of its manifold effects, the laboratory technique of the past could yield but a partial - and often distorted - understanding. The narrow convention as to the field of psychology, and the procedure of enquiries conceived under its auspices has been correspondingly broadened. The last decades, therefore, have seen the termination of an epoch of exclusive stress, and the rise of a new era; an era, it is believed, which holds fresh promise for all who strive after

the means to social control.

Leaving out all philosophical considerations, all treatments of what man ought to want rather than what is actually wanted, the modern psychological use of the term "value" may be said to stem from Spranger.[1] He distinguished six types of men, each type characterized by the elevation of a system of values to the dominant place in the determination of his actions, and in the evaluation of persons, accomplishments and events. These types, described in Part II, of Spranger's Types of Men, are summarized in the following paragraphs.

The theoretical man is chiefly interested in the discovery of truth. To this end he diverts his mind from considerations of utility or beauty. He seeks to observe and reason; looks for similarities and deviations; takes the "cognitive", empirical, critical, rational, in a word, the "intellectual" attitude. If he is mentally gifted, and has

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1. Spranger, E., Types of Men: The Psychology and Ethics of Personality, 1928, 5th ed., (transl. by Paul J. W. Pigors,) Max Niemeyer Verlog, Halle, (Salle), pp. 109-246.

These philosophical considerations make up a large share of the enormous work in the field of philosophy. These appear to the psychologist, in most instances, as the rationalization of the philosophers' own set of values. As psychologists we are not concerned with what man ought to want, but rather with a description of how values originate in the individual, and how they modify or determine his behavior, both individually as a member of a group, or groups. In general, it may be stated that it is not the function of psychologists to evaluate, but it is hard for the psychologist not to slip over the line, and thus to disclose his own private values. This work, for example, would be meaningless if the value of the objective, psychological method is not granted. It assumes the value of scientific study, and furthermore assumes that the reader

the educational background, he may be a scientist or a philosopher, though many fall within this group because of their interest and values, who are at best but amateurs in these fields.

The economic man corresponds to the prevalent stereotype of the American business man - as viewed by foreign visitors. He has elaborated the values originating in physical needs to apply to social standing, political faith, and international policy. The criterion of success is the accumulation of concrete evidences of wealth. He usually employs the word "practical" to describe his outlook on the affairs of the world. Beauty is subordinate to utility, or even confused with utility; painting is valued for what it costs, rather than from aesthetic considerations. He is concerned with technology rather than pure science; with applications rather than with truth. Scientific progress is evidenced by engineering feats; academic standing by a college's buildings and endowment. His science is applied science; his philosophy is pragmatism. Religion is a rationalization of capitalism. And God is the giver of wealth and tangible evidences of his favor.

The aesthetic man, on the other hand, places beauty before utility. He is not necessarily a creative artist, nor is he necessarily effete, but he merely regards beauty in general and aesthetic enjoyment in particular as that phase of

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concurs in assuming the value of the scientific approach to the study of human motives.

life to which all else is subordinate. Harmony, form, grace, symmetry, concinnity, style, and fitness, these are his criteria. Utility may be valued because it contributes to beauty, but deplored when it conflicts with that which he considers beautiful and fitting. Manufacturing and commerce he deplores to the extent that landscapes are marred and beauty destroyed. He may, like Diago Riviera, be socially minded, but is more often inclined to the individualistic attitude. In Germany he resists the evaluation of music or art on racial or nationalistic bases. Beauty knows nothing of creed, social purpose, or political expediency. He cares more for the beauty of insignia, the pomp of power, the dignity of ceremonials and ritual, than for power or religion as such.

The social man loves his fellow man, either individually or collectively, whether as a member of his family, his club, fraternity, race, nationality, or in a philanthropic way. He is humanistic rather than philosophic, sympathetic, kind, unselfish, and usually emotional in his reactions. To him, science and aesthetics are cold and intellectual, inhuman, lacking in the warmth of personal feeling. Love, not power, is his goal. In religion he is less concerned with dogma, ritual, institutional ambition and the soul's salvation, than with the charitable and social aims of Christianity.

The political man is interested in power as such, whether in politics, business or social life. Competition and struggle are his milieu, he aspires to be a leader or Führer,

craves renown for himself, and subservience from others.

The religious man is mystical, sometimes ascetic, submissive to religious authority or to what he considers Divine will. He strives for final causes, seeks to comprehend life as an expression of an all-pervading purpose, to relate himself to the embracing totality of this purpose. In Spranger's words, the religious man is one"...whose mental structure is permanently directed to the creation of the highest and absolutely satisfying value experience." His asceticism may be a tool for power, as in the case of Gandhi, but in religious organizations he is more likely to be a monk, a humble priest or minister. The political man uses the church as a means to personal power, but the religious man sees the church as a symbol of service and self-abnegation.

For Spranger these classifications are not absolute or exclusive classifications. No one belongs entirely to one group, and most persons embrace all these values, but their place in the total hierarchy of values, their relative importance in directing action and controlling belief and opinion, will vary from person to person.

Allport and Vernon have constructed a scale for measuring the "dominant interests in personality", based directly on this classification of interests by Spranger.[1] In

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1. Allport, G. W., and Vernon, P.E., "A Test for Personal Values," J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1931, 26, 231-248.

general they believe that his description of types is unified and reliable, except in the case of the social man. Scores on this test seem to have a low reliability, in contrast with the scores from the tests for the other five types, as correlated with common sense expectation and the opinions of friends and acquaintances. Since, however, there are no objective criteria by which the scale can be evaluated, the results are at best but provisional and suggestive.

Freeman was the first one to make an extensive application of Spranger's concept of value to the problems of social psychology.[1] In the present work I have drawn freely from this source, particularly, in the treatment of the values of "Special Groups". In particular I have followed his lead in employing value as a dynamic concept in the interpretation of social behavior. This treatment differs, however, in that I have attempted a detailed analysis of the genesis of value, relating its individual origin to the newer discoveries and theories in the field of learning. And it attempts, moreover, to display the relative nature of values, their dialectical arrangement into a hierarchy, and their dependence upon time and place; in short, to reveal the patterned nature of our values.

I have attempted, as a natural corollary of these recent developments, a recasting of basic assumptions and a

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1. Freeman, E., Social Psychology, 1936, Henry Holt, New York.

restatement of fundamental ideas. This will embrace the dynamics of animal and human nature, the organizing tendencies of the mind, and the cultural stereotypes which give them force and potency. This view includes within the scope of our study the conflict of values, the clashes of motivation and the unspoken revelations involved in learning, perceiving, and striving. It rejects the notion that any reaction of man is capable of being described in terms of immediate aspects alone, and without recourse to that dominant personality of which each act is a representative part. The whole man in his social, or complete, environment is the final object of our investigations, not a reacting mechanism in the precise, formal atmosphere of the laboratory.

Thus stated, however, this problem has only been half stated. Social psychology must be, at one and the same time, rigorous laboratory science, relative and purposive, and to these must be related the vague, imperfect results of less formal study. It must extend and perfect its methods for the experimental examination of the scattered happenings of daily life which hitherto have been veiled from our analysis, where our knowledge is unformulated and our skill limited. The conventional laboratory provides the controlled experiment and the exact results; but here we pass on to inquiries within the concert of individuals, to that method of partial control where the results are pertinent though neither exact nor detailed. The greater unity is attained in the coördinate balance of the

several techniques and their separate findings. These are not easily related and harmonized, but unless the balance is judiciously held, social psychology is to that extent incomplete and distorted.

If then we consider, on the one hand, the clear, direct, and sensible results of individual laboratory experiment, together with the suggestiveness of immediate social observation, we shall be disposed, perhaps, to ally orthodox psychology with those studies where complex factors are shaping the patterns of normal exp erience. To the student of human nature the actions of man in the everyday social world teem with implication. Here is summed up all that passes for practical wisdom in the art of living. In it he finds the perfect pattern of stimulation without which the vigor of normal motivation is lacking; the complete social situation for which the rigorous accuracy of the laboratory, pale and shadowy, at best vaguely reminiscent of the real thing, can never wholly

compensate. Religious faith and devotion, patriotism, racial antagonism, maternal love, and filial obligation, family unity, sexual desire and preference, moral and aesthetic values, class prejudices and class loyalties, these never can be fully explored in the formal laboratory. The laboratory can duplicate neither the punitive measures of society; the whip, the scourge, economic want, humiliation, shame, contempt, ostracism, banishment, imprisonment, the gallows and the electric chair, nor the rewards showered upon her favorites; success, wealth and power, adulation and prestige, or the adoring embrace of the loved one. Whatever artificial symbols of conditioning may be brought to bear are feeble when compared with the motivating forces of everyday life. By no conceivable means may a lynching, a religious revival, an industrial strike, a revolution, or even a political campaign be reproduced. For this reason social psychology cannot be written entirely in terms of the individual, or exclusively from data afforded by factors studied in isolation. Thus the specific role of social psychology, it must be apparent, is to act as an agent of unification; it has the peculiar function of harmonizing the scientist's search for order realized in human nature, the humanist's search for value realized in human nature, and the sociologist's search for order basic to human intercourse.

There are, however, powerful forces opposed to the realization of that unity. Misleading tradition, irrational prejudice, superstition, false interpretation, decaying tradition and vulgar misconception everywhere persist, and would

seem to remove the ideal of final harmony of effort. As these are examined they lose their hold. In the face of difficulties it is not sensible to renounce hope, to allow impatience to sour into pessimism. Objective thought and scientific results by their common lucidity are persistent and cumulative, and gather force with passing time, while superstitious tradition and prejudice spend their energies in diverse ways, and accumulate no momentum.

At present social psychology is but a phrase for what still remains a hope for principles and laws to guide the economic and political unification of man's affairs, and the common-sense control of man's destiny. Psychologists have but written the opening lines of the first chapter of proved and applicable knowledge; but a start has been made. However incomplete our factual knowledge, we may go forward with the certainty that we are on our way toward swifter and more assured rules to replace the clumsy expedients of the past.

CHAPTER I

THE GENESIS OF VALUE

Introduction - The Role of Value in Social Psychology

How effective propaganda might be was strikingly demo nstrated by Dr. Herman H. Remmers in several small high schools in the Middle West.[1] Boys and girls first recorded their opinions on public questions, were subjected to doses of propaganda, and then retested. Remmers found that a five minute paper on murder was enough to swing the group in favor of capital punishment. Reading a speech by woman cabinet member Frances Perkins swung them to the cause of social insurance. Three short lessons on conservation turned them sharply in favor of government control of farming. A paper disparaging labor unions caused a marked shift in sentiment. Superior intelligence, moreover, is no proof against propaganda, for the high I.Q.'s were swayed just as readily as the less gifted. While retests showed some deterioration after two months, much of the effect was still unimpaired six months later. High school pupils, it seems, can be pulled sharply to either side of a controversial subject by the deliberate use of propaganda, provided an emotionalized adverse opinion has not already been acquired.*

1. Remmers, H. H., "Propaganda in the Schools," Public Opinion Quarterly, Princeton Univ., Apr., 1938, pp. 197-210.

*Not all could be swayed from their union loyalty, however. The result was to split them into sharply opposed camps. Here is a practical demonstration of the primacy of early training.

But gullibility is characteristic of school children, and adults, the world over. These students were young and impressionable. Dr. Remmers exposed them to one-sided versions of important questions. But school children, and pre-school children, and adults, everywhere are exposed to one-sided versions. So one learns to love and worship the fascist state and to hate and despise liberalism and democracy, to love and revere the "Proletariat Dictatorship" and to hate capitalism and fascism, or to love liberalism and democracy and to despise a dictatorship either of the right or left. Here and now, as in every time and place, man acts on the basis of selected, distorted and emotionalized representations, rather than on the basis of truth or fact as the scientist or historian sees them; in a word, on the basis of propaganda. However subtle or obvious, whether the information is false, distorted or merely selected and removed from its context, the effect is the same; and it is safe to say that nowhere in the world is the child offered a calm, clear, objective selection of fact and opinion on all social questions, as the honest scholar knows it, and such as is likely to, or could possibly result in a fair and honest conception.

In Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan, schools (and churches, if any,) are systematically and ruthlessly used by these governments to preach their doctrines. The result of rigidly controlled propaganda, directed through school,

church, press and radio, has proved more effective than most of us would have believed. Where only one version of every question is presented, there can be no doubt of public opinion.

"Most Germans", says Stephen H. Roberts, "fall ready victims of the official broadcasts, especially on matters of foreign policy.[1.] It is very hard, even for a foreigner, to resist their messages. That is Goebbels' great inspiration - that propaganda endlessly repeated may eventually triumph over reason. Every investigator in Germany feels this - whatever his beliefs, the constant repetition of propaganda, in the press, on the air, and through personal media, wears down his resistance, until he has to exert a conscious effort not to acquiesce...Goebbels has arrived at a mathematical relationship between the stream of propaganda and any individual's power of resistance, and if his margin is sufficient to wear down doubting foreigners, how much more effective is it for his own nationals.

"The Nazis have also laid a heavy hand on education...[2.] History is not regarded as objective fact, but as a machine for inculcating German patriotism..."[3.] But intellectual detachment is treason to the Nazis.

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1. Roberts, S. H., The House That Hitler Built, 1938, Harpers, New York, p. 28.

2. Ibid. p. 254.

3. Ibid. p. 255.

For Nazis, substitute the political parties, religious sects, corporations, universities, societies, the Medical association, and other trades and professions, the New England Council, advertising agencies, the Coöperative Society, the American Legion, the Peace Organizations of America. All are twisting and interpreting facts to fit certain patterns. To each of these intellectual detachment likewise is treason. They are not so different from the Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, who says, "I am not concerned with both sides. I see only those who are for National Socialism and those who are against it..." [1.] But few protagonists are as frank as Mr. Goebbels.

Looking back, or looking aside, we see how opinion is moulded and action directed by whatever information is available. Man decides and acts only on the basis of what he knows or thinks he knows about other peoples, and as his values seem to be implicated. We can see that information is sifted, altered, distorted and falsified, and that however garbled, the given version must pass as the truth. It is harder for us to realize that about our own beliefs, but in respect to other groups and other nations, and especially other ages, we are flattered at the ease with which we detect the palpible falsehoods which stir emotion or evoke loyalty. We know, because of our superior hindsight, our superior perspective, our superior information and misinformation, that

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1. Roberts, S. H., The House That Hitler Built, 1938, Harpers, New York, pp. 246-247.

the Great War was not fought to "make the world safe for democracy", that while pacifists are communists, communists are not pacifists, that "racial purity" and "racial superiority" are a myth, that it is wrong to hang "witches", that fascism is bad and communism is worse, that pious Cosmos misread the Scriptures when he asserted that the sky was glued to the edges of a flat parallelogram. But neither for the Russian nor the German is there anything in the least absurd in the claims of these rivals; to a Christian of the sixth Century there was nothing absurd in a map based on the Scriptures; to the embattled Allies there was nothing absurd in the assertion that German soldiers made a practice of cutting off the hands of little Belgian children; and to John Lewis there is nothing absurd in the notion that all American workingmen will be benefited when every worker produces less, or to Tom Girdler in employing fascist methods and supporting fascist theory while denying that he is in any way a fascist. In retrospect and in regard to the opposition we understand the furies of war and the irrationality of persecution. They have been taken in by propaganda, and hold not to truth, as we understand it, but to what they suppose is truth, because that is what they have been told, or what they would like to believe.

To expect that men will think alike or act alike on the basis of different values and different versions of the truth is unwise. A John Watson may view his own mind as the electrical sputterings and chemical explosions involved when

nerve waves are shunted about over billions of nerve tracts. The bishop's mitre presides over a particularized kind of christian philosophy. Within the head of a Christian Scientist may be thoughts and beliefs which seem to him far more real than the shadowy world of arms and legs and buildings and oceans which his thoughts have created. In the house up on the hill resides a rich man whose social, religious and political philosophy all revolve about the sanctity of private property. Next door is a spinster whose fortune is dedicated to the promotion of spiritualism; and for all I know her gardener may be a faithful member of the House of Jehovah. All these people exist in the same geographical neighborhood, but live in very different social environments. Where such a variety of basic values is found, even the same information will be received and interpreted very differently. Our complex social structure includes innumerable associations and groupings, voluntary and coercive, local, national and international, urban and rural, political and religious, which serve to formalize more or less similar values and to instrument similar aims. The membership overlaps in an intricate fashion and for every conceivable variety of reasons. Four men, for example, belong to the "Friends of Loyalist Spain"; one because he sees that side as fighting the battle of liberalism; one to express his Protestant antipathy to an Italian Pope; one because as a pacifist he sees the Insurgents as the aggressor; and the last is a Jew who hates anything which bears the fascist label. They are united in their support of the Spanish Government, but to expect such

divergent sets of values to unite them on every issue would be unwise; this would be to base our social expectations upon coincidence.

And so before we involve ourselves in the jungle of complexities about such problems as the technique and effect of propaganda, we shall profit by fixing our attention upon the origin of those individual values which render man susceptible to organized propaganda. We do not doubt that even the earliest and most fundamental values are built in through a process of training which is itself a type of propaganda; and that the problem of propaganda analysis and of the analysis of values is inextricably related. So it would be worse than superficial to generalize about propaganda until there has been a persistent effort to understand the values which motivate men to propagandize, and which, in turn, render it effective.

- 2 -

Value and Belief

The pragmatic utility of this idea is that it places the emphasis where it belongs; that is, upon individual value, rather than upon rational process. For reason, save in those comparatively rare moments of objectivity, which is just another word for indifference, is rationalization. It is useless to pontificate about good and bad, right and wrong, delusion and truth, propaganda and education, without a clear analysis of the underlying values which prompt one to approve or condemn. For reason is a leaky vessel, into which prejudice seeps at every pore. All that we really know is that a given version is true when it has a modicum of plausibility and promotes desire.

This, then, will be the key to our analysis. We shall assume that what each man believes and does is based not on fact or truth, but on selected versions which fix and bolster his values, and which, subsequently, determine his particular type of gullibility, direct the formation of new values. If his training tells him that the slaughter of women and children is horrible he will not align his sympathies where propaganda informs him this mode of warfare is practiced. If he has the peculiar system of values which we call "Catholic" he will not believe Franco guilty of the needless slaughter of innocents; if a liberal or a Protestant, Ernest Hemmingway's version of the Spanish nightmare finds ready acceptance. Pro-Germans during the Great War just didn't believe the Belgian atrocity tales; pro-Allies did. Protestant Germans readily accepted the story that the Belgian clergy excited the populace to take pot shots at the invaders; but the German Catholic clergy took pains to discredit the story, though it tended to bolster German morale and to justify the action of the German high command.[1] Alexis Carrel, however zealous his regard for the exact observations of physical science, becomes strangely credulous about psychological questions and in metaphysical speculation.[2] The college professor of chemistry, who accepts no proposition in his field without conclusive evidence, is victimized by the blandishments of a mining stock salesman.

1. Lippman, W., Public Opinion, 1922, Harcourt Brace, N.Y., pp. 100-101.

2. Carrel , A., Man The Unknown, 1935, Harpers, New York.

Belief, unless safeguarded by the scientific method, is determined at any moment far more by preference than by objective fact. And those hard-boiled realists, socialists and radicals, the very men who are loudest in denunciation of capitalistic propaganda have for years viewed the developments in Russia through glasses of a decidedly roseate tint. What, after all, is a value but a way of looking at the world and interpreting events? What is propaganda but an effort to enlist old values to bolster old values, and through these to form new ones?

Argument or propaganda, therefore, is effective only where it aligns itself with private urgency. The same story is differently emphasized, interpreted, stressed and embroidered by every listener. The moral derived is an expression of individual set patterns and emotions. The character given to a play by husband and wife may vary widely. One woman who attended a Theatre Guild presentation of "The Silver Cord" saw her mother-in-law clearly represented in the stage version of a possessive, domineering, hypochondriacal mother; while any resemblance went entirely unnoticed by her husband. No two people, not even a married couple, confront every situation with the same set.

- 3 -

Definite Patterns of Response Evolve from Random, Uncoördinated Muscular Behavior

A positive value is anything that one wants, or any condition that is sought for any reason, or for no logical

reason at all. That which is valued may be good or bad in terms of majority standards; it may be a conscious or an unconscious desire; it may be admitted or secret. Any preference, however,

reasonable or capricious, however noble or unworthy, however beneficial or harmful, represents a positive value. A negative value, conversely, is any thing or condition which one would prefer to avoid.

The word value is used rather than ideal or purpose, because the former is usually reserved for the beautiful and the good, for what we ought to want, rather than what is actually wanted; and because the latter implies a conscious if distant goal. The term value is broader than either ideal or purpose.

The term value is broader than such words as goal, preference, attitude, good, taste, or desire. While all tastes, for example, are values, not all values are tastes.

Into the making of any man's values there enters a host of influences, some intentional and many accidental. The analysis in its fundamentals must go back to the earliest days of childhood, and perhaps, to "prenatal influences of uterine position and nutrition". And back of that are the potential drives as determined by the genes, in reaction to those "chemical and electrical fields" which make up the first phase of what we are pleased to call "individual environment". There is an essential similarity for action pattern of these drives, given normal genetic factors operating in a normal environment, just as there are inevitable variations from individual to individual. It is only when inheritance is similar and experience consistent, however, that we display those uniformities of attitude and reaction which some psychologists, and most psychiatrists are pleased to classify as "instinctive drives".

The latest theories, such as come from the work and writings of E. B. Holt[1], M. C. Jones[2], K. A. Lewin[3], S. Diamond[4], G. T. Avery[5], and G. Murphy[6], all follow the same scent, from random, general, uncoördinate, mass behavior of early infancy, to definite, particularized patterns of response. Each of us is born into a baby's world, emerging from a cushioned, sheltered, parasitical life within the amniotic sac, into a world of confusion. The meaningless medley of sights, sounds, smells, and contacts, of organic and kinaesthetic experiences, are as the jabberings and babblings of a foreign tongue. This

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1. Holt, E. B., Animal Drive and the Learning Process, 1931, Henry Holt, New York.

2. Jones, M. C., "The Development of Early Behavior Patterns in Young Children," Ped. Sem., 1926, 33, 537-585. Jones, M. C. "The Development of Basic Emotions", The Child's Emotions, 1930.

3. Lewin, K., A Dynamic Theory of Personality, 1935, Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore.

4. Diamond, S. A., "A Neglected Aspect of Motivation," Sociometry, 1939, 1, 249-256.

5. Avery, G. T., "Responses of Foetal Guinea Pigs Prematurely Delivered," Psychol. Monog., 1928, 3, 247-331.

6. Murphy, L. B., Murphy, G., "The Influence of Social Situations Upon the Behavior of Children," in Murchison, C. Handbook of Social Psychol., 1935, Clark Univ. Press, Worcester. Murphy, G., Murphy, L.B., and Newcomb, T.M., Experimental Social Psychology, 1937, Harpers, New York, pp. 27-320.

is not, however, another country or another planet which we are to explore; not a new world, but a first world. There is no repository of useful memories to serve as a source of reference, no habitual adjustment to act as a starting point. Needs are general and diffuse; our array of reflex responses chaotic. We have only vague, unstable tendencies. Only food in the mouth or stomach, only warmth and comfort and freedom of movement, or their lack, have the power to add or detract. For the rest, a shifting blur devoid of outline or form, a diffusive buzz lacking emphasis or meaning, characterizes that inner experience, by which realists tell us, the outer world is represented. No doubt there are impulses, more or less incipient in childhood and brought to the surface with maturation, such as crawling and walking and babbling, and emotional behavior, that enter obscurely into combination with experience. But even how that happens is not certain, and there is little enough that is settled which would enable us to abstract nature from nurture. For only the specific, recurring, recognizable phases of environm ent are incorporated with genetic factors to form consistent patterns of response.

How wavering vagueness dissolves into objects and things, how habits of perception introduce order and clarity, consistency and meaning, is a major problem of general psychology. The perceptions which we construct with the aid of everything and everybody that comes in contact with us, proscribe impulses which appear useful. Typical situations acquire

prepared attitudes; learning directs and emphasizes these impulses in an appropriate manner. Gradually our limited, differentiated responses evolve from diffuse mass reactions. Devastating hunger or murderous hate, for example, no longer elicit the wriggling, thrashing, screaming of early childhood. The vent for these feelings narrows in the direction of that which is immediately practical, or practical because it is socially approved.[1] Hunger sends us to the pantry; rage is controlled, sublimated, or directed against rivals, Jews, Communists, Fascists, or the New Deal. Blocks are first used to bang against the floor, and subsequently to build walls and towers; the toy telephone ceases to be a hammer or a rattle and imaginary conversations are carried on; random scribbling is replaced by drawings of houses; water is not to splash, but something on which to float boats.[2] Rather than specific impulses, incipient in childhood, entering obscurely and

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1. Minkowski, M., "Sur les Mouvements, les Reflex, les Reactions Musculaires du Foetus Houmain de 2 a' 5 Mois et Leurs Relations avec le Systeme Nerveux Foetal," Rev. Neur., 1921, 37, 1105-1235.

2. Barker, R., and Dembo, T., and Lewin, K., "Experiments on Frustration and Regression in Children," 1937, Proc. 45th Ann. Mtg. Amer. Psychol. Assn.

indirectly into combinations, the specific impulse emerges from the infant's chaos of diffuse, random behavior.[1] From the meaningless medley we focalize on what has value for us, perceiving always in the light of our own interests. Even the great dictators who decide the affairs of the world in solemn conclave, had <u>their</u> first perceptions revolve about mother or milk bottle, and saw in terms of their own hunger and comfort. Later o ther values are selected as group culture and individual stereotypes of experience direct. In the stereotype is codified that which rationalization tells us has the power to promote or harm. Our moral codes and our social philosophies are in all instances a stereotyping of our values and a codifying of our real or fancied interests, either as individuals, as members of a given religion, a class, a nation; or perhaps, as members of the human race, or the animal kingdom.[2]

- 4 -

<u>Maturation of Intelligence and Development of Values</u>

This goes to show how many variables enter into the selection and stereotyping of our interests, and that any purely instinctive theory of drives is utterly indefensible.* The perception is sharpened here, deleted there; and in

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1. Specific impulses may enter later into combinations, but before this occurs they must first be separated out of the general mass responses of the "primeval state".
2. Razran, G. H. S., "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning," <u>J. Psychol</u>., 1936, 2, 327-337.

*. Such as predicated by the various psychoanalytic schools.

clarifying the confused, undifferentiated welter of childish impression, emotional drives are normally directed upon certain specific objects.

The power to dissociate discrete patterns from the general mass of sense impressions, to channel diverse impulses and direct their impulsive steam upon that pattern, or object, is a phase of intelligence. It is a relative faculty, dependent upon maturation of the sensory apparatus, the central nervous system and motor coördination. It is a function, likewise, of environment. Yet between the ages of three and six weeks the child reacts differently to the human voice than to other sounds of equal volume. Clear visual discrimination is held up by the failure of the eye to focalize properly for distance. But around eight or nine months the child begins to distinguish faces, and has a differentiated responsiveness to familiar persons. Shyness is one aspect of this new distinction between adults.[1]

The differences in niceness of adjustments are wide as the poles apart, say as between a baby and an ornithologist observing a bird. To an infant there is remarkably little difference between a blue-jay, a pigeon, robin, and a parrot. To some of those who speak for the D. A. R. there is no great difference between a pacifist, a communist, a fascist, an anarchist, a labor leader, an "alien agitator", a criminal, or

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1. Bühler, C., Hetzer, H., and Tudor-Hart, B., "Soziologische und Psychologische Studien über das Erste Lebensjahr, 1927.

a "subversive influence".* This explains why it is unwise to expect an intelligent opinion about birds from infants, or a rational political attitude in the resolutions of the D. A. R. Different persons select their perceptive patterns and organize their driving impulses according to age, native wit, knowledge, exigencies of the environment and the cultural patterns of that environment.

- 5 -

Basic Learning Process in Formation of Values

At first the baby gets what he wants by crying, by thrashing, by wiggling, if he gets it at all. This is the phase when the child's impulsive tendencies are aroused by a wide range of stimuli. Gradually learning defines itself in a rapid narrowing of the child's genetic possibilities, through a fixation of motives in the interaction of growth and environment. Every learned response may be regarded as a "molded form of potentiality present in the gene", in the same way that a blister on the heel is a function of cutaneous friction applied to an organism geared to blister-raising. Not all stimuli are equally potent at the beginning, but there are many foods which will call forth swallowing, just as fear may be aroused by widely differing sounds, lights, and sudden changes in the environment. These organic potentialities are channeled into preferences, tastes, emotions, and eventually into social values. The tendency to swallow any one of a wide variety of

*Certain members of the D. A. R. sought to exclude Albert Einstein from entering the United States, on the ground that he was a communist. They know that he was a communist because he was an avowed pacifist.

substances is first narrowed into a preference for milk, and later expanded into a taste for olives, caviar, and filet mignon.[1] The child who has welcomed the attentions of all gentle adults, develops a preference for the mother or the nurse when about a year old.

Allowing for the purely schematic value of this description, the n eural action which we must note as critical is the tendency for two or more simultaneous brain activities to pool their assets, discharging one into the other. This tendency has been extensively studied in the laboratory setting, although the conditions are far from definite. Pressure on the palm of an infant, for example, causes brain excitations which, depending on the whole condition of the brain at the moment, may discharge into the "grasping-reflex". Other sensory impulses adventitiously present add their force. Among these are muscle sensations (kinaesthetic impulses) aroused in the very act of grasping. Adventitious stimuli thus augment and prolong any activity once it is started, and any contrary or competing action is for the time suppressed. This is the first aspect of the learning process.[2]

The second aspect is that any such facilitation-suppression combination is fixed by repetition, provided that it meets the primitive needs of the immature organism; or tends to

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1. Murphy, G., Murphy, L. B., and Newcomb, T. M., Experimental Social Psychology, 1937, Harpers, New York, p. 191.

2. Ibid. p. 101. There is considerable evidence that

be eliminated if it defeats these needs. Success, in other words, confirms that way of acting, while failure tends to substitute another.*1. The springs of feeling thus feed the river

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"suppression" is a positive, rather than a negative aspect of learning. Some of this will be mentioned later.

*. We are not attempting here a list of primitive needs, though it may be assumed that digestible food, freedom of movement, warmth and comfort, and avoidance of discomfort or pain, are sought. The argument which would establish these as needs is a "circular argument" we must admit, since "needs" are indicated by positive behavior, and positive behavior arises out of needs.

The relief of visceral tensions is the basis of many needs. These tensions likewise contribute to the dominant line of action, along with other sensory impulses. The picture is far from complete in representing the function of visceral drives and emotions in this dual role, first contributing to the dominant line of action, and second, of determining which of these modes shall be retained, and which shall be deleted. Razran, G. H. S. "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning," J. Psychol., 1936, 2, 327-337.

1. Thorek, M., "Experimental Investigations of the Role of the Leydig, Seminiferous, and Sertolicells and Effects of Testicular Transplantation", Endroconology, 1924, 8, 61-90.

of learning; and the child learns, not mechanically through repetition, but because he has an incentive.*

- 6 -

Theory of Dominance

The role of feeling, in its relation to learning, is but poorly defined. It would seem, however, that incentive does more than plug in on appropriate motor lines, and pull the plugs on contrary lines. It contributes an impulsive force of its own which acts in two directions; first, to augment the dominant line of action, and second, to inhibit competitors.** The result, as we have indicated, may be described as the narrowing of the field of action. The power generated by incentive is projected in such a way that, at the same time, some reactions are enhanced and some suppressed. That is why those lines of conduct which meet strong opposition often are executed with the greatest vigor. In viewing an automobile accident, for example, one suppresses a strong tendency toward

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*Mere repetition is not enough to insure learning. Knight Dunlap found, for example, that stutterers could sometimes be cured by a conscious imitation of their unconscious stuttering; recurring errors in typing were cured by practice in writing hte for the, for instance, the subjects reminding themselves that this was wrong. Pavlov's dogs deleted the bell-salivary response when the bell was presented successively without food.[1]

**It is generally assumed that its motive force is derived from visceral tensions, glandular secretions, the instinctive prepotency of certain reactions, and the like.

1. Pavlov, I.P., Conditioned Reflexes: an Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex, (transl. and ed. by G. V. Anrep.) Oxford Univ. Press: Humphrey Milford, 1927.

horror and avoidance, which horror, paradoxically enough, serves to augment morbid curiosity.[1]

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1. Razran, G. H. S. "Theory of Conditioning and Related Phenomena," Psychol. Rev., 1930, 27, 1-12.

This theory would explain why many of man's actions are logically and ethically opposed. We thus acquire many inconsistent forms of action. On occasion the lover vents his cruelty with a fervor accentuated by the necessity to suppress the very love which is at another moment dominant. Internecine warfare is the more bitter because of previous bonds. Passion may acquire added intensity from an initial fear or dislike. Cruelty and love, hate and sympathy, loathing and friendliness, are alternately expressed, depending upon a changing total situation, and the success or defeat of one's purpose. However paradoxical the contrasting behavior, the process is psychologically simple and consistent.*

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* A good example of the simultaneous enhancing of dominant action, as a by-product of suppression, is afforded by Morgan's[1] experiments on "distraction". Subjects were put to work pressing keys, like typewriter keys, in response to certain signals, each different signal requiring the striking of a different key. While the subject was occupied with this task auditory distractions were introduced; phonograph music, fire gongs, buzzers. Morgan found that after an initial retardation some subjects were able to work faster with than without distraction, although with a greater outlay of energy, greater strain, and more fatigue.

The impulsive force generated to resist the distracting stimuli served also to enhance the dominant activity. The stronger the distracting tendency, the more force must be exerted to suppress it, the greater the facilitation of the winning combination of reactions, and the greater the "outlay of energy", the "greater the strain", and the "more the fatigue".

1. Butler, J. R., Human Psychology, 1936, Pitman, New York, p. 171.

Interesting instances of the role of suppression, as a result of positive neural action, are common. Pavlov found that a dog whose conditioned salivary response to a bell had been eliminated by successive presentations of the bell stimulus without food, could be shocked into secreting saliva by a sudden noise presented right after the bell had sounded.[1] Learning not to secrete saliva in response to the bell involved, at least in its first phase, an active suppression of this response. And it is a matter of common knowledge that normal suppression of the sphincter muscles can be disrupted by an extremely frighten-

1. Pavlov, I.P., Conditioned Reflexes: an Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex, (transl. and ed. by G. V. Anrep.) Oxford Univ. Press: Humphrey Milford, 1927.

The loss of emotional control incident to lack of sleep, fatigue, or old age, and the amorous proclivities of older men, afford instances of weakened suppression, rather than accented emotional drive, or desire.

- 7 -

The "Fixation" of Drives

The child grows and learns. Driving energy is funneled into those well established lines of action which seem to serve the child's needs. At first contrary action is actively suppresed. Normally, however, competitors lose their force, until little or no suppressive force is required.*

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ing stimulus situation, with a loss of bowel-movement control. Strictly speaking, suppression is not a negative function, but the result of positive action. The inhibitive effect is lost when the flow of neural energy is disrupted, or diverted to other channels.

*Exceptions are not uncommon, in which competitors retaining their full vigor, wage incessant battle for the control of action. Incentive is incoherent; the house is divided against itself; and the dominant action is maintained only at great expense of suppressive effort. In extreme instances the result is mental disease, and in any instance is productive of tension, fatigue, worry and exaggerated forms of behavior. Christian aesthetes who strive after the Paulian ideal, afford common examples. Outraged nature avenges herself through tension, and a distorted emotional outlook.

Psychoanalysts describe this condition in terms of "suppression", "conflict" and "complexes", introducing wishes as mystical hormic entities, and inventing an esoteric terminology.[1] There is considerable reason for believing that "suppression", either in normal or pathological instances, is no more mysterious, and not essentially different from the suppression which operates to control the excretory functions, or as an essential factor in any instance of learning. One criterion of mental health, however, is that coherence of incentive which operates to unify one's habits and impulsions, quickly overcoming the need for strong suppressive action.

1. Freud, S., New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1933, MacMillan, New York.

The various types of learning seem to conform to this conception. Brain activities, discharging one into the other, narrow and define the patterns of response. The positive reaction to any edible food is channeled into a taste for milk.[1] The youth's amorous, affectionate and aesthetic responses are fixated on that "beautiful soul, clad in the perfect form, palpably designed from all eternity to be loved".[2] The picture of our tastes, values, preferences, "drives", passions and needs is recognizable in this description of learning. So the object naturally eliciting a drive response remains, not an adequate stimulus, but the adequate stimulus. For the object starts as one of many, but ends by appropriating all energy to itself, and for the balance of life, stokes that energy by brandishing a passport to Utopia.

The formula works when the response to that object has satisfied some inherent need. But once fixated, in heat of urgency, the original range of adequate stimuli, which affected the junction, may be wholly lost to sight. It is not girls who are divine, but this girl who is an angel; not food in general which is good, but mother's cooking; not people who are interesting, but only one's family or friends are adequate

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1. Murphy, G., Murphy, L. B., and Newcomb, T. M., Experimental Social Psychology, 1937, Harpers, New York, p. 191.

2. James, W., Psychology, Briefer Course, 1900, Henry Holt, New York, p. 394.

to full gregariousness. So our preferences and intuitions remain highly consistent and largely private. And though they may steer one with ease and grace through the troubled waters of life, they must remain largely incommunicable to others, save to our offspring in early childhood. One has the utmost difficulty in making them clear or important to others, except where common features of our cultural heritage obviate the need to explain those feelings which grew, not out of logic, but from the stresses of personal adjustment. The selection and fixation which first elicited a drive response, figures prominently in all personalities. The French term "canalization" has been adopted for this narrowing of non-specific cravings into specific desires. Cravings are fixated, or canalized, upon objects or circumstances in a manner peculiar to the individual, but characteristic of his culture. This involves the selection of a stimulus, and the merging of drives. The merging of our impulses is continuous through youth, and to a degree, throughout life. An acquired taste for balanced consonance and dissonance, rhythmical sounds and movements, gregariousness, exhibitionism, sexual passion and competition, may blend into each other so intimately that executing the "Big-Apple" to Benny Goodman's swing band outranks every other circumstance in the breadth of its appeal. The little girl is given dolls and surrounded by other influences which end in canalizing her affectionate behavior, learned desires for prestige, security, possessiveness,

domination, and sexual love*, into maternal tendencies so compelling as to outweigh all dread of illness, inconvenience, pain, and dangers of childbirth, or considerations of ease, and finance. The boy, on the other hand, is given a Meccano set, or a football, and his whole environment serves to canalize his many desires into a passion for athletics, or an ambition to become an engineer.[1.]

The canalization may be performed without our being aware of it, and sometimes in such a manner that would scandalize those phases of our personality which maintain conventionality.[2.] It may be infinitely subtle and complex. In the continence of clergy, or nuns, for example, the way is opened for all those tendencies usually associated with love and marriage,

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* Recent experiments with the isolated hormone "prolactin", indicated a direct effect on the mammary glands, and, in animals, on maternal behavior. A monkey, for example, was caused to nurse a young guinea-pig. Virgin women, and even males, could be caused to secrete milk.

It acts as a sex suppressor, contrary to psychoanalytic theory, and may explain the widespread belief that a woman could not become pregnant as long as she was nursing a child.

1. Razran, G. H. S., "Theory of Conditioning and Related Phenomena," Psychol. Rev., 1930, 27, 1-12.

2. Razran, G. H. S., "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning," J. Psychol., 1936, 2, 327-337.

to be canalized in religious zeal. The ceremony which confirms the nun as the bride of Christ, has a symbolic value which only extreme naïvete could obscure. But reason, with its moralistic prejudice, has little to do with our intuitive interpretation of vital needs.

Nevertheless, the refinement of our first propensities, the canalized version of our diverse early impulsions, transcend all other stimuli, (associative, or substitute stimuli), both as to eagerness with which they are sought, and the tenacity of their hold upon us. These are the basic motives, fixed primarily in this mould as individual members of a particular family in a given cultural area. Contrasted with the canalized value, all conditioned stimuli, all distant considerations and abstract reasons, all motives foreign to these first fixations of man, draw their impulsive power from the basic font. This is the fundamental value, deeply ingrained in childhood, widely diffused in learning, and generally suffused throughout the whole

pattern of values.

- 8 -

"Canalization" Distinguished from "Conditioning"

We have been speaking of canalization rather than conditioning, because the word "conditioning" is reserved for those instances where other present, and often adventitious stimuli, acquire by association the power to call out a version of the same response. Conditioning or association thus carries the implication that something has been copied and a new stimulus-response linkage attained. The taste for pretzels and beer we would ascribe more to canalization, whereas the child's aversion to boats, as the result of former fright or seasickness, would be described as the result of conditioning. The former is likely to be permanent, while the latter may be readily uprooted. Both canalization and conditioning are explained* through the physiological tendency to select among simultaneous impulsions, to accent one dominant line of action, suppress others, and for this pattern to be repeated.** The point of their distinction is that canalization merely fixates a natural stimulus-response tendency, such as the impulse to drink milk, while conditioning establishes an artificial pattern. In general, the former acts to limit and define our natural tendencies, while the latter often acts by association, to broaden and extend the number of

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*If they are explained at all.

**McDougall used the term "sentiment", which is very similar to the concept of"canalization". 1.

1. McDougall, W., An Introduction to Social Psychology, 12th ed., 1917, MacMillan, New York, pp. 125-178.

stimuli adequate to these well canalized responses.*1.

Nevertheless, the environment redirects our drives in many ways. While canalization centers our motives upon definite objects, conditioning attaches our motives to new objects, so that old motives are aroused by new stimuli. Constellations of feeling and action, in other words, are variously refracted, sometimes toward old, and sometimes in the direction of new stimuli.

- 9 -

Conflict and Dominance of Values

It is apparent that a true conception of our values is not a simple matter. There is no adequate technique by which we may retrace the development of associative and canalizing processes, and to determine how our mature complexes grew up.**

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*The laws of conditioning have been extended by certain behaviorists whose eyes were fixed on the physical sciences, into an inspiring guide to all human understanding. They explained manners, customs, selfishness and altruism, patriotism, religions, morals, art, philosophies - everything was the product of mechanical conditioning. "Conditioning" became a general term; it was also used to supplant rather than explain the rather mystical concept of human purpose, and to turn man into a wonderfully complicated robot. The principle, with its speculative implications, after receiving a number of intelligible but somewhat inaccurate popular expositions, became an inspiring guide to workers in various branches of the social sciences. We suggest, after Gardner Murphy, that many of the larger applications are useful and justified; some reduce to truisms recognized ever since Aristotle formulated the laws of association; while the

**Not excepting psychoanalysis.

1. Anderson, J. E., and Goodenough, F. L., Experimental Child Study, 1931, p. 26.

Ambition, economic interests, personal tastes and fears, and likes and dislikes, patriotism, class loyalties, and racial prejudices, have evolved from contacts too subtle, too complex for analysis. Stimuli are susceptible of an infinite variety and combination. Their shifting pattern may have meanings highly private, or broad in their appeal to human susceptibility. Similar circumstances, moreover, at different times may be responded to very differently. Even the individual whose susceptibilities recognize the most exquisite nuances, say in art or music, may be just as helpless to explain the origin of his values, as the clod who knows no distinction not operating on the simplest and therefore the broadest psychic level.

Thus our approach must be indirect, through artificially simplified experiments on animals and children, or from suggestive, though less exact, observations on children or adults in social situations. In experimental literature you may find a multitude of pertinent examples. Now we do not intend to

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denial of the role of purpose is absurd. Social psychologists are inclined toward the attitude that "...there is enormously less conditioning and more canalization in social life than most writers have recognized". [1]

1. Murphy, G., Murphy, L. B., and Newcomb, T. M., Experimental Social Psychology, 1937, Harpers, New York, p. 26.

review this vast literature. The very attempt would prove tiring, and a needless repetition of the principles of general and educational psychology. But there are certain experiments that may be given as typical, which are valuable in understanding the origin and development of our values.

We are forced, that is, to adopt the shortcut of the analogy. So great is the range of modifying influences that we cannot observe them all; and many processes of learning* are imperfectly understood, or as yet undiscovered. The attempt to know the full meaning of the value, therefore, is more art than science, and soon crosses imperceptibly the frontier of verification. Thus in describing why a person feels and acts as he does we rely largely on convenient abstraction; that is, on analagous inference drawn from experimental evidence.

In fearing or hating or striving after one thing violently, (in reacting in <u>any</u> way), we readily associate significant parts of the perceptive pattern. There may be an inference of cause or effect; but they may have no more connection than bean soup and a clap of lightning, or a prayer meeting and the pretty face of an organist. They are bound together, nevertheless, because the thunder or the pretty face are linked to the dominant reaction tendency, and because all

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*Such as mental age, maturity, emotional stability, stimulus intensity, etc.

other tendencies are prone to be caught up into that pattern. It is well known that if the dog, or the monkey, the child or the man is repeatedly given food immediately after a bell has rung, that the food's power to elicit salivation may be borrowed, at least temporarily, by the bell. Anything can be related to any impulsive tendency in this fashion, provided its stimulus is sensibly present. But it is not generally understood that the biologically dominant tendency may be reinforced by the suppression of unsuccessful competitors, and that weaker impulses in time tend to be sloughed off. Any act of learning involves a high degree of organization, and the exclusion of numerous possible responses.[1.]

An early experiment from Pavlov's laboratory, for example, illustrates the principle. An experimental dog was simultaneously given meat powder and an electric shock applied to his paw. Now the dog did not withdraw his paw and secrete saliva, but if the food were abundant and the shock weak, only the latter response occurred; and when the order of their intensity was reversed, only the shock avoidance reaction occurred. After consistent training the dog learned to secrete saliva to the electric shock, or to retract his paw to the meat powder, depending upon which feature of the stimulus situation had been

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1. Razran, G. H. S., "Theory of Conditioning and Related Phenomena," Psychol. Rev., 1930, 27, 1-12.

Jones, M. C., "The Case of Peter," Ped. Sem., 1924, 31, 308-318.

more potent. In other words, the biologically weaker response merges with the dominant one.[1.]

In the behavior of a dog (or a man) a strong impulse is a stream of molten lava whichcatches and incorporates whatever contrary impulses it touches. When you dig in any learned attitude you expect to find, as in excavating an ancient city, all sorts of things illogically enmeshed. Nor has the ordinary mind any way of knowing how absurd are its emotional alliances. Ancient preferences, thus reënforced by new cravings, unite into a compelling motive, where anything that is wanted appears as the embodiment of all desires.

It is not enough to say that the girl of one's heart is more beautiful than homely, more attractive than repellent, more generous than selfish, more good than bad. When strongly moved, we have an antipathy for qualifying our loves and hates. Then the suppression of perverse tendencies contributesto the impulsive stream, and the object of desire, or antipathy, is absolute, now and forever. The boy in love does not temporize. Even the untidy tendrils of hair at the nape of her neck, the girl's freckles, her petty petulance and unreasonable demands, serve but to endear her the more. It is a poor love indeed,

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1. Razran, G. H. S., "Theory of Conditioning and Related Phenomena," Psychol. Rev., 1930, 27, 1-12.

which must overlook faults. It has been truly said, that we like people in spite of their faults, and love them because of their faults. Conversely, it might be said that we hate our enemies the more for their virtues. It is a rare Jew who sees any good in Hitlerism; a poor fascist who discovers any suggestion of virtue in communism; an odd Jesuit who finds opportunity for praise on the side of Spanish Loyalists; an unusual woman who can admire the lover who jilted her. Between black and white the pendulum swings. Real perspective, real understanding and real objectivity are the handmaiden of indifference. Love and hate are equally blind; and once we recognize as faults the attributes of a sweetheart, or virtues in an enemy, the infatuation or the war is about over.

- 10 -

Configural Conditioning

Man's bewildering pattern of emotional attitudes, is without doubt the product, in large part, of simple canalization and association. But when the analysis goes one degree further in order to discover cause and effect, to retrace the haphazard steps in a social evolution of preferences and values, we find that any explanation in terms of association is tricky. The human nervous system is not a film which automatically conditions every configuration projected through its shutters. The nervous system is indefatigably selective and creative. Impressions are not received inertly, but association is a personal expression of our needs and desires. We somehow distribute the emphasis and direct the learning, in accordance with what is

called, for want of clearer understanding, one's "motives". The circumstance and the permanence of learning is far from being as accurately predictable as some writers have led us to believe.[1] The total situation, age, general experience or "readiness to adjust", are factors which seldom, if ever, may be exactly controlled or anticipated. One child acquired a fear of a stuffed cat by association with a startling noise; while under similar circumstances his sister failed to acquire the cat-fear response, for the simple reason that striking a metal bar with a 2 pound hammer did not frighten her. The boy who ordinarily welcomes the frog as a fascinating toy is badly startled when he finds one in his bed, or when the frog jumps out of the box in which he keeps his blocks. And the man who is roused to fighting anger by an insulting epithet, may "laugh it off" among good friends, or if the general situation is pleasant and amiable.[2]

Thus every social stimulus is modified or transformed by its context, and the whole pattern interpreted in the light of one's desires. Every experiment on learning requires in greater or less degree, an artificial abstraction of the stimulus, or stimuli, from a complex external situation, and then the animation of what has been abstracted. There is an abstraction,

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1. Razran, G. H. S., "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning," J. Psychol., 1936, 2, 327-337.

2. Razran, G. H. S., "Theory of Conditioning and Related Phenomena," Psychol. Rev., 1930, 27, 1-12.

in other words, from both the external stimulus field, and from the whole situation within the organism. Not being omniscient we must "set" our experiments to isolate factors of learning, recognizing that this method misses many essentials normally present. But the abstraction imposed upon our experimental inquiry into human (and animal) learning is compensated for by the definiteness of results, however limited their direct implication. Being artists of a sort, as well as psychologists, we translate these abstractions into a picture of human motives. Experiment may isolate the abnormally loaded stimulus and the crudely exaggerated response. But it should be remembered that subtle relationships, the meaning of a total social situation, are as grossly caricatured by the experimenter, as is Christ's intention by the critic who lifts one verse from its biblical context.

Nevertheless, there is much good and no harm in this abstraction, provided that the social psychologist is not led to forget man's automatic evaluation of social situations, which is probably another name for unconscious or subliminal perception based on such social subtleties as facial expression, tone of voice, or gestures. But these subtle social patterns, no less than the discrete stimuli of Pavlov's famous experiment, are given significance and value through personal experience. No pattern is significant to us until it has been teamed with factors which enhance and release, or resist and depress some desire of our own. Until that conditioning takes place it

remains one of those things which has neither meaning nor value.

In experiments on learning the handle which labels the whole food situation is often an outstanding stimulus. In social learning, however, the handle for identification is almost always a pattern in which some relational aspect, rather than a discrete stimulus, is crucial. A study of Razran's has nicely illustrated this difference.[1] In one experimental setting, salivation was in time conditioned upon a single light bulb; while in another setting this response appeared only when both a red and a green bulb were presented together. When one significant item stands for the whole food situation, it is called "colligated conditioning"; in the other instance "configural conditioning".[2]

Most social conditioning is of the latter type; is based on the Gestalt or pattern, rather than upon filling and detailed content; upon a meaningful arrangement, not an outstanding item. We are not afraid of lions in general, but only lions unconfined by cages. The boy does not love the girl's hair, but the configuration of hair and face and voice and figure. One thrills, not to the separate notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, but to their sequence, emphasis and rhythmic order, in short, to their pattern. The separate items blend into each other so

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1. Razran, G. H. S., "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning, J. Psychol., 1936, 2, 327-337.

2. Ibid.

intimately, and lose themselves in the arrangement so completely, that presented in another context they fall into patterns whose meaning may be very different. In order then that the situation shall not be a gray and meaningless confusion, it must be capable of translation into patterns whose significance is recognizable. Unless that happens it will interest only those who catch some loaded stimulus. We have to create patterns. We must breathe into the situation the breath of our life and experience.

- 11 -

Indirect Association in Formation of Values

Here we grapple with a very difficult psychological phenomenon. Motivation and meaning are neither completely explored nor easily understood. They are certainly not easily explained. For learning is, in part, a product of motivation. In some instances urgency may be so precisely marshaled that conditioning appears fatalistic; and a single significant item, standing for the whole original pattern, may elicit the same response.[1.] Such is not always the case, however. A larger sweep of items may be necessary, or enough to represent the original pattern; while motivation is at times tricky and learning unpredictable. The laboratory yields results which

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1. Razran, G. H. S., "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning," J. Psychol., 1936, 2, 327-377.

tend toward a mechanistic interpretation;these have been interpreted to indicate that motivation is readily controlled, and learning highly predictable.

To make the point specific: a given child lifts his foot in response to an electric shock, and after several repetitions responds in the same way to a buzzer which accompanied the shock; a little later a light is flashed followed by the buzzer; the child continues to give this response to the buzzer, and after the eleventh trial, lifts his foot when the light goes on. In other words, the power to cause withdrawal is transferred from the electric shock to the "buzzer", from the buzzer to the light, without the latter stimulus having any direct connection with the shock stimulus.[1.] But several presentations of the light flash, without reënforcement, eliminated this foot-lifting. Moreover, subsequent testing revealed that the child's reaction to a buzzer was thereby inhibited. Here learning is mechanical

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1. Novikova, A. A., "Conditioned Inhibition and Conditioned Reflexes of Higher Order in Children," Medikobiologic-breski Zhurnal, 1929, No. 1, 120-131.

and predictable; the natural urge to avoid the shock is readily controlled; and the critical stimulus is an outstanding item, present during practice.*

Again, an electric bell and stroking of a child's arm are associated by frequent repetition; subsequently stroking becomes a conditioned stimulus for withdrawal, because a slight prick has been administered at the same time. The bell and pricking are never directly associated, yet the children withdrew when the bell stimulus was presented. And, as in the instance described above, when the child's response to this secondary conditioned stimulus, the bell, had disappeared, it was found that the stroking-withdrawal bond had also been eliminated.** [1.]

Neither awareness, nor a conscious appreciation of a logical connection is essential. Musical selections are judged differently after they have accompanied a good meal. Plausible

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*Applying this to everyday life, we may assume that a child who fears cats because of association with the dog which frightens him, may lose the dread of dogs automatically upon acquiring a toleration of cats.

**Undoubtedly social attitudes are conditioned in this manner, are irradiated in these ways, and eliminated indirectly. Suppose that the Roman Catholic Church and General Franco of the Spanish Insurgents are linked in the minds of certain persons. Tales of the slaughter of innocent women and children by rebel bombs are received with horror and indignation. In the light of the above experiments it should be scarcely surprising if many persons thereby conceived a dislike for Catholicism. And it might be expected that reeducation which resulted in a favorable attitude toward the Church, might automatically lessen the antipathy for Franco.

1. Novikova, A. A., "Conditioned Inhibition and Conditioned Reflexes of Higher Order in Children," Medikobiologic-breski Zhurnal, 1929, No. 1, 120-131.

explanations, such as "better form", or more "rugged strength", show that the cause of preferment is not understood by the subjects.* Words which were regularly followed by an electric shock later caused an inner or visceral disturbance (as measured by the galvanic skin reflex) even though the subject could not remember that the word was accompanied by a shock. He couldn't remember, but his viscera did. In fact, if the subject failed to remember, the disturbance was greater.** 1.

- 12 -

The Need for Direct Social Study of Values

These few citations from a monumental compilation no more than suggest the laboratory searcher's contribution to the

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*When human learning is under examination, however, it is well to remember that each new habit must be integrated with a pattern of habits already present; habits are not plastered on by simple addition, but older habitual attitudes may exclude the new, act to incorporate the new by replacing some weaker tendency, or assimilate the new habit into a pattern on terms of equality. The phenomena of the stability and modifiability of human learning, as a function of the interplay of external factors with attitudinal habits, is nicely illustrated by Razran's study of "attitudinal control" in conditioning. The word "pretzel", for example, is associated with food, under conditions similar to those employed by Pavlov's dogs; some failed to condition salivation upon this signal; while others showed a negative conditioning; that is, consistently secreted less saliva than normally, whenever the word was pronounced.[2] The human being can, and often does, refuse to form a planned association. His learning seems to hinge upon a conditioned attitude toward the experimenter, upon the desire to please or frustrate. Well, one doesn't need to be a psychologist to

1. Murphy, G., Murphy, L. B., and New comb, T. M., Experimental Social Psychology, 1937, Harpers, New York, pp.162-163.

2. Razran, G. H. S. "Attitudinal Control of Human Conditioning," J. Psychol., 1936, 2, 327-337.

understanding of values. His exclusive zeal, carefully inculcated in scientific discipline, serves to emphasize our final dependence upon the fruitful methods of psychological experiment. For only by sacrifice of less formal research can he achieve exact and verifiable facts, to act as a firm basis for a social science of the future.

As social scientists we may still be permitted to ask, though with becoming submission, not indeed what are the first facts, but what are the secondary implications to the pressing problems of life? Generally when one speaks about *social science* one is thinking about systems which will one day be perfected through the patient efforts of the pure scientist. Now there is no disputing the need of constant experiment and study on this idealized plane. But the political scientist, the statesman, the sociologist and the social psychologist, cannot stop there. For insistent problems growing out of group living demand immediate attention. And what operates in the world at large is not the simplified, artificial version seen by the laboratory worker, but a complicated pattern of circumstances and motives as yet incapable of being duplicated.

Thus the values which drive men to war are not necessarily indicated by the incontrovertible knowledge that "...the power to cause withdrawal irradiated from the electric shock to the buzzer, and from the buzzer to the light, without the latter stimulus having any direct connection with the shock stimulus". No more can one deduce the cause of war from the indirect conditioning upon a bell, of a child's urge to avoid a painful stimulus. Laboratory study of this type will not indicate the cause of war, any more than one can deduce the history of Christianity from the Gospels. It is gospel as taught and Christian virtue as conceived by the millions who profess the

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know that incentive is an important factor in learning.

**Perhaps remembrance enabled the subject to anticipate and repress the tendency.

faith, that is the key to Christianity. It is the fixation and elaboration of the canalized urges as related to the social milieu, to which the student must go.* For while there is a suggestive relation between urges conditioned in the laboratory, and the working version of social values, it is only the latter which affects social behavior.

We are compelled to make the most of experimental findings; but our great necessity demands that we press on to less certain ground in a search for useful principles. These principles, though subject to change in the face of a growing body of exact fact, are necessary assumptions. The great aim is to preserve a just medium between excessive veneration for the laboratory technique and improper impatience and contempt; it is to avoid the equal but opposite extremes of error and extravagance. Because of the acknowledged accuracy of laboratory experiment precedence is accorded whenever possible. From an acknowledged limitation and too often remote connection with adult values, we are forced to direct social study where there is no exact knowledge.

Here our observations are at best impressionistic. Pressing on, for example, to the values of everyday life, we observe that the heavens are not the same to an astronomer as to a lover, the Wacht am Rhine causes another kind of reaction in a Frenchman, and that the belle of Bali awakens a very different emotion in her native suitor than in an American tourist. We see ~~human~~ human values in their effective form after the impact of

*And to less exact, though more suggestive studies on social attitudes.

culture has done its work. The child setting out to get what he wants finds that he is not ~~ready~~ equipped for the kind of world into which he must fit. He comes up against the values of his elders. Life is full of frustrations. Fortunately! Somehow in the funding and capitalizing of his early needs personal values are fashioned. He channels and associates his drives, learns the conventional detours to his wants; encounters the canons of good manners, tradition, taste and form; observes customs, mores, taboos; develops principles of honor and decency and acquires dignity, property and respectability. His repertory of values evolves through the impact of a culture which first thwarts him, and then shows him what to want and perhaps how to get it.

- 13 -

The "Rational" vs. the "Experimental" Approach to Values

Men have hitherto ill understood themselves and these social attitudes. They have not only suffered from blank ignorance, but more from powerful prejudices which have yielded grotesque misapprehensions in regard to their origin and justification. Whether they can ever learn enough to control the problems of hate and war and poverty and crime depends upon the elimination of two types of prejudice, two opposite, but equally extravagant views about themselves and their nature: first, an over simplified, mechanical, fatalistic view of human nature, based upon such animal experiments as those listed above, which entirely overlooks or minimizes the tremendous role of human motivation in learning; and second, that view, which, entirely unconvinced by this evidence, and despairing of the scientific

approach, would cling to the fruit of religion garnered of the painful journey of man through the ages; to the idealistic upholding of the dignity of man's spirit, of the value of logic based on moralistic premises. So far the best minds have tended to separate into these opposed camps; either rushing to hasty conclusions from scanty evidence, relying upon analogous inference drawn from the laboratory and from physical science; or distrusting the application of the scientific method to the human mind, would either rule out all investigations in this field, or welcome only those findings which seem to substantiate their preconceptions. Yet it is this knowledge called "science", and its application which is the most characteristic trait of recent civilization, and which constitutes the hope of future progress in inter-human relations.

Certainly a candid but cautious inquiry into the origin and development of individual standards may be considered a very essential part of social psychology. While the subtlest and most ubiquitous of all socializing influences are those which create and fortify our stock of values, nevertheless we have inferred an orderly process of fixation and conditioning. It is supposed that the early canalized tendency, patterned to the natural appetites, passions, tissue needs, and inevitable requirements of the human animal is, by gentle insinuation modified and directed into socially approved forms; or, brutally suppressed, grows up in silence and obscurity, derives new force

from opposition, and finally, failing to sublimate its energy, the primitive desire bursts the restraining dam of social convention and triumphantly raises its banner on the ruins of character or sanity. Some such version is held by most schools of psychology. Candidness compels us to admit , however, that the picture is drawn largely from scanty and artificially simplified experiments on animals and infants, from inference as well as from experimental fact.

Now common wisdom has always distinguished carnal and spiritual values, selfishness and altruism, the sexual motif, hunger motif, vanity, sadism, masochism, self preservation and the security motif; and while we may not wholly accept this classification, these terms have a certain aptness and utility. But the character which each person gives to any common purpose will vary with age, sex, nationality, religion and profession. Within broad cultural limits these tendencies will vary with individual experience and inherited aptitude, with good fortune, indigestion and the progress of a career. Every human proclivity is restressed, retwisted and redirected by the individual personality through which it is expressed.

The statement that every human value is individually personalized is so obviously true as to be mere tautology. It is not illuminating until evidence has been accumulated to show the steps by which early tendency evolves into the compelling motives of adult life. Yet no one has traced the origin and development say, of <u>sadism</u> in the bully or the surgeon; nor has that merging of sadism and sex been disclosed which has been

alleged to explain the perverted brutality of sex crimes. Valuable as their tracing might be, the origin of values like these can only be inferred from such experiments as have been described.

- 14 -

Contrasting Values Are Acquired Through the Operation of the Same Basic Factors in Learning

As soon as we descend from generalities to detail in our study of motivation, it becomes apparent how dense is the cloud of obscurity which hangs over its first phases. How the impulse is kindled to a sentiment and the sentiment to a passion is no more than suggested by experiment. In spite of an improved technique and a monumental compendium of laboratory results, the analysis in its fundamentals gives us few settled conclusions by which we can accurately predict or direct the growth of values.*

Yet man's socialized values have fitted human nature to a set of economic and practical conditions very different from any contemplated by the undifferentiated responsiveness of the child. Through fixation and association an extraordinary amount of potential brutality, pugnacity, egoism, overbearance, and lust have been turned into the work of conquering wilderness,

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*It is only in what Jastrow has called the "slums of Psychology", among the palmists, mind-readers, fortune-tellers, and phrenologists, that fixed principles lay bare the whole story. Each psychoanalytic school, however, can disclose the motivating forces responsible for psychopathic symptoms with an ease and certainty which is the envy of orthodox, academic psychologists.

distance, barrenness, depravity, and want. Man has learned to deny the demands of the flesh and to endure dull toil in order to build a civilization which provides an opportunity to work and worship, mate andplay. The incorporation of negative values into the service of ideals has made possible the association of

that fine sense of righteous communion with the progress of mankind. The pattern becomes so nearly perfect in the sequence of work, patience, self denial and reward, that unpleasant intermediaries, instead of detracting, actually contribute their impulsive stream to achievement.* The ideal has come a long way from the infants' vague and flued matrix of organic needs; the noble passion, and the love of the good and the beautiful, have traveled by devious routes to represent very different things to different men. But the underlying principles of learning, psychology infers, were in every instance identical, however differently expressed.

And so, in spite of the critics, we believe that human learning and human behavior obey the rules. We may not know all the answers. Much has been discovered; a great deal more remains to be unearthed. Whether we can learn enough to control the fluctuations of civilization depends upon the extension and utilization of that knowledge. Prejudice and superstition die hard, and man's social affairs, in contrast to the very remarkable progress of the older sciences, has been marked more by drift than mastery. Knowledge is being slowly accumulated. But the best knowledge of man runs counter to many commonly accepted, emotionally bolstered beliefs.

*In Gestalt terminology, which is just another way of expressing the same principle, it may be stated that all activity leading to a given goal, tends to be incorporated into a discrete pattern - or Gestalt - in which negative intermediaries form the ground upon which the positive value appears as figure.

It resides in the books and heads of those who have the intellectual courage, and who have taken the pains to discover these facts. Its general acceptance is by no means certain. Only the extension of tolerance, openmindedness and objectivity can open the door to science. And only science, exact science, about human nature will enable man to free himself of these values which promote hatred and misery.

CHAPTER II

VALUES OF SPECIAL GROUPS

- 1 -

The Many Possible Combinations of Heredity and Environment

Man pursues his private interest. But how he shall conceive his interest and how he shall pursue it is not fatally predetermined.* The enormous possible combinations and permutations of heredity and environment, expressed in the incentives of man, are infinite. No one can set a limit upon his creative power. We can issue no doom of predestination or automatism. We see broad tendencies which promise to promote or defeat our interests.** But we can find no ground for pessimism, for abandoning our highest hopes for man's future, unless, disregarding the lessons of the past, we elect to predict that the science of psychology can make no further inroads into the realm of error about human nature, and choose to believe that what no one knows, no one can know.

*Whether or not man's attitudes and behavior are fatally determined through the interaction of heredity and environment, remains one of those philosophical problems upon which psychology is not yet ready to pronounce judgment . As such it need not concern us here. Most psychologists, however, assume determinism as a practical methodology.

**Pessimism merely involves our particular doctrine about final truth or ultimate good. It marks the assumption of god-like prerogatives; which is just another term for that psychic blindness which can conceive no possible interests save those which accident has contrived for us.

Only an exceedingly casual and meagre acquaintance with the varieties of man's social behavior can lead one to view the wastefulness of social conduct, the stupid cruelty of prejudice and hate and fear, as inevitable. There are no instinctive social attitudes.[1.] Babies are not born patriotic, religious, capitalistic, socialistic, anti-Semitic, cruel, kindly, chivalrous or selfish. Every child is potentially cruel. But he is just as potentially altruistic. He has a potentiality for hating his country's enemies. But he has just as strong a propensity for sympathy and kindliness. The very best and the very worse qualities, from any point of evaluation, are equally the product of his social environment.

These are pious platitudes. But social psychology should be constructive, rather than merely descriptive or apologetic. Not only does it strive to provide the instruments of analysis, to render intelligible a stupendously complex environment, but it acquires dignity and strength by turning into opportunity the constructive urge of influential men for redirecting our dominant loyalties.

- 2 -

Stereotypes and Values

Because of their remarkable pervading influence, no student of social dynamics can afford to ignore the stereotyped

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1. Allport, G. W., and Schanck, R. L., "Are Attitudes Biological or Cultural in Origin,", Char. and Pers., 1936, 4, 195-205.

attitudes which distinguish the members of any given group. Are not all of us at the mercy of our own peculiar set of stereotypes? Do we not think in terms of "Bearded Bolsheviks", "Blustering Junkers", "Goosestepping Germans", "Jew-baiting Nazis","Japanese Militarists", or "Chiseling Hopkinites"? Do we not conceive other peoples' values in terms of such apt, or trite and oft-repeated phrases: "PWA has ruined more workers than it has saved"; "Relief workers are convinced that they ought to be paid for being alive"; "Billions for relief, but not one cent for War"; "Don't scab on human misery"; "We die while you build battleships"; "Put the bankers on relief"; "Droolings from the pallid lips of a traitor"? This statement is, we think, capable of overwhelming proof, that our conceptions seldom are grounded in judicial calm, in fairness, from exact, unprejudiced knowledge, but are most often parasitically opinionated upon nursery, school, and church, compounded out of fear and hatred, or love and loyalty, and based on misrepresentation.[1]

At the core of every stereotype there is a version of human action, a picture of human values, and an interpretation of events. If the version, the picture, and the interpretation accurately represent the fundamental values of other people the stereotype serves as a useful code; insofar as it is inaccurate

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1. Litterer, O. F., "Stereotypes," J. Soc. Psychol., 1933, 4, 59-69.

and misleading, the stereotype blocks the employment of human intelligence, or perverts intelligence to dishonest rationalization. Our conceptions, therefore, must be ever suspect, and subjected to constant check, especially when they refer to other groups, and when emotionally toned. Only by purifying our minds and our hearts of catch-phrases can we avoid that uncritical thinking which equally bolsters the truth and the falsehood, the fact and the fable, the scientific report and the unfounded rumor.

- 3 -

The Cultural Stamp

Because of its persistence and contagion the stereotype has a transcendent practical importance in social living. It confirms and supports the system of values which it represents.* And what cohesion does for a drop of water, loyalty and animosity do for the social group. It promotes and conserves unity. From the love of God to the love of money, from the hatred of Jews to the hatred of alcohol, from patriotism to some diluted version of Karl Marx or Lenin, from superstition to scientific discipline, the devotion is the enormous binding agent of society.[1.]

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*There is a certain practical economy in the use of these stereotypes. If a person is described as a Princeton man, we

1. Katz, D., and Braly, K., "Racial Stereotypes of 100 College Students," J. Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1923, 28, 280-290.

The torch is passed from father to son, from teacher to pupil, from "older boy" to the new boy. Each social order is perpetuated through a constant influx of neophytes. The youth is initiated into the minute details of an ancient and mysterious system of loyalties and animosities. These stereotype his thought, his action, and above all his feeling. That core of devotions whose hallmark is that they precede and supersede the use of reason, without which he would feel puzzled and lost, is his fundamental system of values.

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may call to mind, from our stock of past impressions, the picture of a rather comely, prematurely sophisticated male, wearing the current Princeton uniform, whose chief interests are girls and football - or whatever Harvard tradition, Hollywood characterization, or a chance acquaintance with a Princeton man has created for us. When there is neither time nor inclination for personal acquaintance, these generalizations have a limited utility. For the attempt to see individually is exhausting and time-consuming. But there is no shortcut to human understanding, and no substitute for individualized study.

As automobiles are fashioned from crude ore, our values are stamped out of raw human nature and by modern production methods. Each civilization, state, school, church, society, and home has its die. But unlike an automobile plant, the various branches of the cultural factory are not synchronized. Modern life is both hurried and multifarious; the assembly belt shifts and wanders from one social milieu to another. It is as though Buick, Austin, Pierce Arrow, Lincoln, Chevrolet and Ford, all contributed separate parts for a given automobile. A public school body is lacquered in the Harvard plant; on the old fashioned theological chassis is mounted an engine designed in the modern scientific laboratory; Methodist brakes go along with a Greenwich Village accelerator. The assembly process is without rhyme or reason. And the only thing which may be said for the haphazard product is that it will run.

- 4 -

The "Prestige" Value

To the promoters of these cultural factories, and probably to most of those who come through the mill, there is nothing incongruous in the plan, or the lack of a plan. We are so used to seeing a conglomerate assemblage of ill fitted parts, so accustomed to the combination of uncoordinate values, that sputterings and stallings, the skiddings and smash-ups are taken for granted. It is said of a person that he is an American. By which it is implied that he represents certain values common to a majority of the residents of the United States. From there we go on to add that he was born in the Middle West, belongs to the Methodist Church, went to Public High School, finished his

education at Yale, and became a New York broker. How different from saying: "He is a Groton-Harvard product"! For each pattern of values there is a label. From each pattern of values issues a type of blind automatic behavior. And when these unrelated patterns produce unreasoning fear and hatred and prejudice and persecution - well, we shrug our shoulders and murmer something about "German mentality", "man's competitive nature", or having "been a Jew for 4,000 years", as though these attitudes were inbred traits of human nature.

It is human nature after it emerges from the cultural factory. This goes to show that the impressions of a large number of persons, while to an immeasurable degree personal to each, nevertheless are similar enough to bind them into co-ordinate groups. A simple and common value somehow emerges from the complexity of impressions. Such a real integration occurs because all children are similarly endowed by nature, and because the conditions of group living expose them to variable but similar forces. Thus, for example, we may be assured that each of us will harbor a judicious regard for the opinion of others. The approval-seeking-tendency is the almost inevitable outgrowth of family life. In infancy and early childhood the mother is the source of comfort or frustration. Her genial attitude is intimately associated with rewards; her frown with deprivation and punishment. Gradually the narrow compass of the child's world widens to include other members of the family, the teacher, playmates, the gang, and all those whose individual and collective approval is essential to his

needs and desires. Soon he comes to comply with the fashions of these persons; to obey the commands of authority; labors under the most gloomy apprehensions in the reproaches of his family, the censure or ridicule of his fellows. The ultimate determinant is his tendency to seek the conditions of gratification and pleasure, and to avoid the conditions of frustrations and unpleasantness. And so artfully are the conditions of well-being framed and disposed with social approval that popularity always wears the appearance of pleasure, and eventually of virtue.

- 5 -

The Confusion of "Means" and "End"

That individuals who participate in a cooperative society would develop a scrupulous regard for other opinions, if they rubbed shoulders with their fellow men, has always been evident. Complete indifference to what people think of us is scarcely conceivable. Even the respect of our enemies is an agreeable possibility. And many a war has been conducted for no other purpose than to teach somebody a lesson, or to bolster international face. Whose good opinion one most prizes, and how it is sought is highly individual, but respect itself is a well nigh universal value.

In the prestige value two natural propensities may be distinguished: First, the canalizing of our forms of gratification, and second, the association or confusion of the means with the pleasure. If the former be refined by the latter, improved by art and learning in social intercourse, corrected

by a judicious regard for the habiliments of satisfaction and frustration, and conforms with the accepted codes of behavior, it is productive of the greatest part of social well-being. To the love of prestige we may therefore ascribe most of the agreeable, most of the useful and respectable qualifications.

Thus the approval of one's family and friends, originally sought as a means to gratification, crystallizes into an immediate source of satisfaction. Popularity is then a secondary or derived value. Likewise the value placed on good reputation is preëmpted by wealth and success. These means to respect arise as tertiary values, as ends in themselves, capable of motivating one's behavior long after enough money has been accumulated to provide the primary value of comfort, and the secondary value of eminence. The most curious aspects of human motivation may be ascribed to this confusion of means and end.[1] The miser sacrifices the good will of his fellow man, and the comforts of the flesh to his lust for money. As Santayana has said: "Fanaticism is the redoubling of our efforts after we have lost sight of our aim". This fanaticism is expressed collectively as well as individually. Every age and every culture bears testimony to the progress of morals and manners, from practical devices for human

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1. Butler, J. R., Human Nature: A Guide to Its Understanding, 1933, Greenberg, New York, pp. 17-29

welfare, into ends accepted and laudable in themselves. From first to last, from means to end, gradually and almost imperceptibly, the process continues. The image becomes the idol; Alexander p asses from hero to god, until common opinion is ratified in formal deification. Accustomed long since to observe the invariable utility and necessity of industry, honesty, faith and courage, our habit, and eventually our reason, are prepared to accept them as inviolable, final principles, if not the dictates of Deity. Our admission of final truth is much less a process of active consent than of unconscious acquisition. And often we support these "virtues" or "redouble our efforts" after they have lost their utility.

The duty of a psychologist does not compel him to interpose his private opinion in the nice controversy of propriety and morals; but he ought not to dissemble the role of accident and contrivance in the determination of human values. We all of us move within a limited radius of values, as though on a leash, according to the opinion, the faith and standards of our fellow man. "What will our neighbors think," "people are saying...", "you are making yourself conspicuous", "I would like to see Mrs. Jones' face when she hears this...", "It will make us all look ridiculous". Such considerations of approval or disapproval matter more to us than law or gospel.[1]

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1. Allport, F. H., "The Influence of the Group Upon Assn. and Thought," J. Exper. Psychol., 1920, 3, 159-182.

In the course of life such secondary values as popularity are determined by association with primary urges. And out of secondary urges grow tertiary, and an endless chain of derived values. Our devotion to human welfare, for example, is prostituted to a thousand intermediate deities.[1] Idleness, dancing, the theatre, levity of discourse, and such amusements as are innocent enough in themselves, tend to be rejected with abhorrence, or accepted with the utmost caution by the severity of a Puritan world, which despised all activity not conducive

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1. Novikova, A. A., "Conditioned Inhibition and Conditioned Reflexes of Higher Order in Children," Medikobiologic-breski Zhurnal, 1929, No. 1, 120-131.

to economic security, or useful to salvation. "The devil finds work for idle hands"; "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread"; "Unto woman He said,.....in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children". The shortening of hours for labor, and alleviation of the pains of childbirth have been assailed from the pulpit and condemned by virtuous men with the conviction that labor and suffering were desirable for their own sake. It is worth noting, however, that whose who led the attack were neither mothers nor physical laborers. It is always easy as well as agreeable for the fortunate ranks of mankind to uphold the virtue of toil and pain from which their position has exempted them. Conversely, the poor and down-trodden claim a merit in the contempt of ease or pleasure from which they are excluded. For these reasons virtue often <u>seems</u> to be most actively guarded by poverty and ignorance.

- 6 -

<u>Conflicting Values</u>

If among these derived values we discover a mixture of truth, passion and error, of logic, superstition and irrationality, it cannot appear surprising that credulity and fanaticism should assume the role of inspiration, and that accident should appear in the guise of cause and effect. It was through industry, deprivation, frugality, fortitude, trial and tribulation, that man has won to success and security. These values were originally negative, for man is not predominantly masochistic. But, animated by reward, through constant association, the contagion of value is thus diffused outside the bounds of necessity.

The intervening hurdle comes to be endowed with the status of an independent value; and the origin is soon buried in obscurity, or disguised by fiction. The practice of these artificial virtues becomes so intrinsically congenial to the multitude, that if denied, they are moved to bitter resentment; and so urgent are these beliefs that if forcibly awakened, they immediately relapse into the strong propensity to extend their hopes and fears beyond the limits of utility or reason.[1.]

Since, however, the attainment of most values must involve negative intermediates, and since all unpleasant toil and pain cannot be obliterated, or incorporated with the reward, there is nothing except the ratio of impulsive stream behind the competitive values which can ascertain or describe the conditions of behavior. On occasion the impulsive and obstructive forces are plainly discernible. But with the best of intentions, all of us dissemble our aims and purposes, especially to ourselves. We all are unconscious hypocrites. Meekness, charity, pureness, faith, and unselfishness are Christian values enjoined by our profession. Yet human nature, howevever exalted or depressed by devout considerations, will return periodically to resume the

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1. Murphy, G., Murphy, L. B., and Newcomb, T. M., Experimental Social Psychology, 1937, Harpers, New York, p. 160.

indulgence of the canalized primitive passion. And all too often we strive to have our cake and eat it too. Selfish ambition is reconciled with Christian humility and charity, purity with carnal desire, and faith with scientific scepticism. To this end scripture, tradition, ambition, and passion are blended into an ingenious philosophical system, in which all discordant elements are reconciled. In rationalization, the most ordinary man shows

an aptness for "putting his best foot forward", not inferior to that described by John Lyly in his Eupheues.[1]

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Rationalization

And so, before we are involved in the jungle of obscurities about the effect of values, it will pay us to cast a glance upon that noble counterfeit: our own remarkable notions of ourselves. The practical utility of this personal inventory derives from the charity which comes only with self-knowledge. Until we understand our own motives more clearly, we are prey to bigotry, suspicion, fear and intolerance. For our judgment of other men is predicated upon a hybrid compound of error: a mistaken notion of our own rectitude, and, as we shall later hope to show, a mistaken notion of the values of others. So much of that fist-shaking which men carry on at each other goes with a small boy's desire to divert attention from his own shaking knees. It is hard, in short, to obey reason because we are too busily engaged in maintaining our own private fictions.

The chief hurdle to self-knowledge, to put it another way, is that self-knowledge and self-respect are incompatible. Under pious compulsion one's misdeeds are buried by an accumulation of shame too deep for recall. The deluded zealot thus externalizes his secret guilt, and diverts his condemnation to others. Pious fraud abounds in all of us, but is more easily discerned in others. Here is an example taken from the daily press, remarkable for its naïveté.

1. Hart, Bernard, Psychology of Insanity, 1916, MacMillan, New York, pp. 65-68.

"Because he locked a heavy chain to the leg of his 17 year old daughter'to keep her away from those boy friends', a 37 year old Hyde Park father, who said he had 'spared the rod and nearly spoiled the child', will be charged with assault and battery on the girl in West Roxbury district court this morning.

"'She's a good girl now and I want to keep her that way', explained Kostantz Skorohod, a mechanic, when Capt. Harry T. Grace of the Hyde Park station questioned him about the finding of Nellie Skorohod, eldest of his three children, chained in their home at 176 Dana Avenue yesterday.

"'I gave her every break in the world, captain', Skorohod asserted, 'I never hit her in my life. But she was staying out late nights with boy friends and headed for certain trouble unless I kept her in the house somehow while I was out at work'."[1.]

The statement: "I did it for her own good", or, "This is going to hurt me more than it does you!", is seldom true; and I doubt if it fools the dullest child. The very fact that we feel obliged to apologize should make one suspicious. The average parent, however, wallowing in a muddle of confused values, and unconsciously animated by a conviction of guilt, is

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1. Boston Herald, October 28, 1937.

in no condition to deal with his child in calm objectivity. He is, for example, so entangled by a secret, or acknowledged abhorrence of every enjoyment that might gratify man's sensual nature, that the 'facts of life' can only be imparted to the young with an embarrassed, allusional whimsy, calculated to force a blush or a smile. Indeed, one gathers that an otherwise

infallible Providence had erred in not providing some harmless mode of vegetation to replenish the earth.

Now wisdom and tolerance come less from a contemplation of the frailties and subterfuges of others, than from intelligent and courageous exploration among the headwaters of our own streams of action. The austere severity which imputed desire as a crime and frivolity a degrading influence, may achieve invincibility, if not insensibility, against the assaults of the flesh; but only at the expense of perpetual conflict, no less real because projected or denied. The loss of sensual fulfillment is compensated by the pleasure of spiritual pride. But I wonder what could compensate the submerged guilt, the inner tension, that quiet desperation which must flow through the troubled stream of life?

How much opportunity for self-improvement we lose because we feel obliged always to reconcile our baser acts with our better natures, because we fall back on haughty moral pride and rigid aestheticism as compensatory devices! This is not, however, a panegyric for indulgence or vice. The well tempered mixture of purity and liberality, the judicious reconciliation of values according to the maxims of human nature as well as of moral law, constitutes the only sound basis for the wholesome synthesis of a personality. After all, man was not made for the Sabbath! A milder moral sentiment, embraced in practice as well as theory, and a humble admission of ones own human frailty, are most conducive to virtue and tolerance.*

*It is a very common reproach, suggested by ignorance or malice, that psychology would enjoin mankind to unrestrained

Rationalization vs. Objectivity

But until that happy day when truth is more compelling than hatred, it will help us to cherish the ideal of justice, if we remember that here is a problem of the utmost theoretical difficulty and practical consequence. It is hard to obey reason in social adjustment, because reason, already employed in the service of emotion, can neither provide accurate data, nor control honest interpretation. Until free of preconception and emotional bias, reason only adds to the confusion by elaborating prejudice, instead of increasing knowledge.

But, since it takes a rogue to catch a rogue, we can divert the force of wit in tracing its own inconsistencies; we can direct reason to the task of detecting its own crimes. Self-analysis can thus help to bring opinion into line with fact, and divorce it from glandular dominance. At the present time this is the only way that the pernicious alliance of reason and primitive emotion can be liquidated. We can try to make a foothold for objectivity. To the extent that reasoning is unsnarled from accidental emotional associations, we enlarge the number of human problems upon which an honest reason is prepared to dictate.

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indulgence. This belief is without justification. Many persons who in this world have adhered, however imperfectly, to the dictates of propriety and morality, derived much serenity from the opinion of their own rectitude and benevolence. But when desire for perfection, enjoined by shame, grief and terror, is the ruling passion, reason becomes the handmaiden of that passion, and with rapid violence overcasts calm meditation with emotional prejudice. For reason, as is well known, embraces cold intermediation; consistency, harmony, and mental integrity, bestow their blessing where motives have resolved contradiction.

The great thing, then, in social education is to stimulate a zest for objectivity, and to instill an aversion for subjectivism. It is to teach the joy of victory over the deceitful propensities of the mind. For this the exhilaration of routing our superstitions must be substituted for the thrill of self-justification, hatred and cruelty. The more we can apply incentive to cleaning out the dusty corners of the mind, the more our critical faculties will be set free to deal with the social problems of the world in a sensible manner. As current superstition dissolves, uncensored thought turns vivid and clear. There is a radical transition from preconceived error to unfettered curiosity. With it goes an immense relief and a justified pride in mental rectitude. The great thing, in short, is to free reason from its slavery to prejudice, and to endow objectivity with passion.

Here, as in most human problems, a different kind of education is the final remedy. The hope of reëducation lies in an accurate knowledge of our own values, together with a fair estimate of the values of other persons.[1.] So long as our own values are haphazard and unrelated, and our understanding of other groups is meagre and impressionistic, the generalizations of social science cannot hope to eradicate the casual

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1. Horowitz, E. L., "The Development of Attitude Toward the Negro", Arch. Psychol., 1936, No. 194.

cruelty of error and prejudice. A radical reversal of values is a prerequisite at the very beginning. For one, there must be provided an emotional incentive to objectivity. And an insight into the mischievous bigotry of our own minds is the surest prophylactic.

- 9 -

Groups Representing Divergent Values

Anyone who has a good memory for the events of his childhood, will recall what extraordinary excuses were used as the basis for ridicule and teasing. "Buck-teeth", kinky hair together with an unusual amount of skin pigmentation, "four-eyes", bare knees, any oddity of appearance, dress, speech, religion or manner, evoked unpleasant attention. The "new boy" had to fight his way into the good graces of the gang. The studious boy was "teachers' pet" and a "sissy". Well, growing up hasn't changed us much. We still punish those who deviate from the common standard, and enforce conformity with the same childish ruthlessness. But we have learned to justify cruelty.

Among adults as well as among children, any innocent and natural circumstance of deviation may be improved into an odious imputation. Minorities are treated as a threat to social order and prosperity. Newer imigrants, sectaries of early Christianity, Jews, Mormons, Catholics or Protestants or heretics as the case may be, pacifists in time of war or in the American Legion, communists and radicals, hoboes, prostitutes and homosexuals, all are condemned in accordance with the values of the dominant groups, and out of our passion for conformity. It matters little whether the minority is recruited from the dregs of humanity, or from the ranks of idealists; whether the deviation is a harmless eccentricity or a social menace. For this reason the majority persecution alternately appears to be conceived in the darkness of superstition and ignorance, and in the light of reason and justice. It depends upon our own dominant

values and upon whether they are being upheld or defiled.

The dislike with which divergent values or peculiar characteristics are regarded by a more homogeneous majority betrays, by its emotional coloring and by distorted apologies, an origin in superstitious terror. A perusal of "reasons" for the subjection of the American negro, for example, is sufficient to remove the slightest doubt from the mind of a candid observer as to the emotional, irrational nature of such reasons. Founded on prejudice, these opinions invoke values that can be obtained only with the denial of human equality and justice. "The purity of the Aryan stock is at stake, threatened with polution by a bestial and inferior race." Such arguments "justify" brutality and lynchings, disenfranchisements, economic peonage, and every discrimination and indignity which can be enjoined against a despised minority by a securely entrenched and dominant group.*[1.]

To the tormenter and the victim, the persecutor and the persecuted, the scene appears in a very different light. We speak accurately of seeing with a jaundiced eye, or as through a rose-colored glass. When a system of values is fixed in early childhood, and supported by fear or hatred, we are impressed only by those facts which fit that system. Few people can see further into a social conflict than the justification of their

*John Calhoun of Virginia protested the proposed importation of chimpanzees for the purpose of picking cotton, on the grounds that ".....those damn Yankees will want to give them the vote".

1. Droba, D. D., "Education and Negro Attitudes", Sociol. and Soc. Res., 1932, 17, 137-141.

values demands. Christian society, for example, with its attention fixed only on the practice of monogamy, views with unseeing eyes the more obvious virtues of those who live in the faith of the "Latter Day Saints". Driven from society, the Mormons emigrated to what is now Utah. There they set up housekeeping in their own way. But the Christian community eventually caught up with them, and, in their home community, outlawed their practices.*

Yet, exceptions are numerous where minorities have been accepted with complacency, or viewed with admiration. Prostitutes, ostracized and persecuted in the United States, were honored in ancient Greece and Rome, or even endowed with a religious halo, and were respected in Japan and China. Homosexuals were in no way discredited in old China or ancient Greece.[1] Negroes are met on terms of equality in France. Pacifists are tolerated or applauded in times of peace. Instead, therefore, of explaining calamity and contempt in terms of reason, it will be more prudent to convert the occasion of persecution to the understanding of our common values.

We stand in need of such an inquiry to explain the prostitutes who adorned the Age of Pericles, yet shamed

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*The Mormons, excluded by their practice of polygamy from Christian society, converted a desert region into a productive farming district. They have maintained an exceedingly cooperative and social community life. By most standards of social worth: industry, prudence, order, and prosperity, they are distinguished above comparable religions. They have a high birth

1. La Piere, R., and Farnsworth, P. R., Social Psychology, 1936, McGraw Hill, New York, p. 325.

Christendom; those homosexuals who filled with glory their stations in the ancient world, yet disgrace contemporary life. If we seriously consider the pattern of "Christian values", we find an emphasis placed on purity and monogamy, if not celibacy. Desire is imputed as a crime, and even marriage is only tolerated for the exclusive sake of procreation, as a concession to man's defective nature. It is consistent, therefore, to consider prostitution or inversion as the nearest approach to depravity.[1.]

For every Christian sect there is a system of values. This system is a more or less organized series of beliefs and preferences for judging men as individuals, and as members of other groups. But not only for judging, for acting on that judgment. The judgment, therefore, is loaded with sympathy or hatred, associated with love or loathing, is driven home with faith, hope, pride, disapproval and fear. Whatever involves these values evokes an appropriate emotion and an appropriate action. Rarely do we keep judgment in abeyance and view fully and clearly. "There are no two ways about it; right is right, and wrong is wrong". So we see a "man of God", a "pervert", a "harlot", "a church member", "a banker", "a dangerous radical",

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rate, low death rate and great longevity. In addition, they have good average wealth, large proportion of professional standing, and many college graduates.

1. Paul, (St.)"The New Testament," Corinthians, 7, vs.1-9.

"a lazy bum", a "rotarian", a "shiftless tramp" or a "hobo". In the everyday world persons are related to the system of values at the very instant of perception, and our judgment is implicit thereto.

Now, in the kind of world we know, a culture without preferences or prejudices, a people with a purely objective

point of view is scarcely conceivable. But prejudice can become positive rather than negative; it can turn to love of the good and the beautiful, rather than to hatred of that which runs counter. And social leaders, if they be wise men, trained in the practice of objectivity, can help us to detect prejudice and to discount its effect. They can teach tolerance for the values of different individuals and other groups. And, instead of adding prestige to the unthinking surge of resentment, can apply their counsel to a rational resolution of social conflict, and to a rational solution of pressing social problems.

- 10 -

"Out-groups": The Tramp and Hobo

Law and morality are codes which determine appropriate conduct. To kill one's personal enemies is forbidden, but to kill the enemies of the state is obligatory. There are "black lies" and "white lies"! Idleness is a social distinction if one has inherited money; a source of sympathetic contempt if one can't find work; and a crime if, lacking visible assets, one refuses to work. The rules are enforced by public opinion, by law, or by both. The rules apply in conformity with social values of the dominant group. Through a process of reasoning or intuition these values are assumed to be promoted by that kind of behavior. "Out-groups" are made up of individuals who because they violate the canons of conduct, are inferred to threaten those values essential to the common good.

The Hobo, for example, having no roots in terms of occupation or residence, no recognized place in society, and thus

failing to conform to the social code, is set off by this evidence from other men. He has rejected normal values, and thereby becomes a social outcast. Loving liberty too much, rating the rewards of industry too little, or infused with a compelling distaste for labor, he dwells in the twilight zone between criminality and respectability. The habit of flinching from effort becomes chronic; the habit of running away from responsibility insures that he will wander all his life. He is forever running away: first from the restrictions of home, if he has one, from work, from "yard cops", from "breakies". He travels on "the rods" and discovering the advantages of association with others of like aims, he "hangs out in jungle camps", adopts the mores, customs, and idioms of the road. He works when he must.[1] But unlike such true migratory workers as harvesters and fruit pickers of the West, work is incidental to travel, rather than travel being incidental to work.

The tramp, a more rural, less social professional itinerant, is being supplanted, along with the hobo, by the professional "thumber". With constantly shifting objective the "thumber" wanders many thousands of miles within the year. The "thumber" is supplemented by the "bindlestiff", so called because he carries his bedding role with him when traveling "on

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1. La Piere, R., and Farnsworth, P. R., Social Psychology, 1936, McGraw Hill, New York, pp. 328-332.

the thumb". The hobo, the tramp, the thumber, and the bindle-stiff[1] are all running away from themselves, and from reality. And since reality also exists "over the hill", since a price must be paid for most of our positive values, on they move again, looking for that place and condition which does not exist.

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1. Irwin, G., American Tramp and Underworld Slang, 1931, Sears, New York.

Finally, the mere act of wandering, originally a means of avoiding unpleasantness, becomes an end in itself, the dominant value of life. Since his peculiar offense against normal values is negative rather than positive, punishment therefore takes the form of social ostracism, rather than imprisonment, although officials sometimes use the latter as a threat to "keep him on the move".

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"Out-groups": The Criminal

The sin of the bum, the tramp or the hobo is simply that he won't settle down and work "like a normal man".* Orthodox society pronounces a moral judgement, and punishes in subtle and pervasive ways best calculated to "keep him on the bum". "Get out of town and stay out of town, or we run you in!" Society acts on the theory that he has adopted the code of the road, rather than its code. And the theory is founded on true expectations partly because mem usually exhibit the kind of behavior which they are led to believe is anticipated of them.

The criminal, on the other hand, violates the social code in a positive way; he has committed acts forbidden by law. The inveterate or professional criminal, unlike the bum, is no less susceptible to social pressure than other men. But he

*They may be criminals too. But the professional itinerant is characteristically given to minor offenses rather than major crimes.

The tramp, the hobo and the desert rat are often distinguished from the bum and the beach comber. The latter are semi-pathological cases devoid of self-respect. (Self-respect is really a concern for the good opinion of others.) The "panhandlers" live in "flop-houses", and "soup-kitchens"; incompetent, often feebleminded, they are in large measure the unemployables, the residue of our industrial system.

seeks the approval of another group, and therefore subscribes to a different code. And when a man adopts the values of a given code he displays an appropriate type of behavior. What distinguishes the criminal, in other words, is not indifference to public opinion, but an acute social sense attuned to minority standards, which happen to be frowned upon by the greater society.

That is one reason why it is so dangerous to generalize about human propensities, criminal tendencies, and social enemies. A dangerous criminal may be a faithful husband, a loving father, a true friend, or even a patriot in time of war. His values may merge with as well as diverge from majority standards.* These divergencies rest upon a totally different version of what is admirable, of what are the values of other persons, and how he should act toward them. The pattern of values at the core of the code is the determinant of behavior for the criminal, no less than for the upright citizen.

More often than not the asocial individual is the product of a separate society, which, while it attacks established authority, is obliged to adopt mores and traditions, and to

*We refer here to criminals as those who have committed felonies, whether or not the fact is known. And the felony represents a violation of the well accepted mores of society, such as those referring to the inviolability of persons or property. What the French call "crimes of passion", or accidental crimes such as a starving man's theft of bread, or a drunken drivers' killing of a pedestrian are excluded. Their explanation obviously is different.

elaborate an internal code for self-government. The safety of that society, its honor and prosperity demand regulation. "Squealers", "stool-pigeons", and "welshers" are stigmatized with deserved infamy. They are punished or excluded from the bosom of an in-group whose standards they have violated, for the same reason that a gentleman is dropped from his club for failing to pay his gambling debts. In the underworld values evolve and loyalties and hatreds arise; and while its members operate in the shadow of public disapproval and under the ban of law, the activating values of their conduct are surprisingly like those of the larger group, however tinctured with bitterness and obstinacy from the contempt of "respectable people".

Criminals are at war with society. Depredations occasion no sense of guilt; any more than soldiers who ravish a foreign country are shamed by their action. And when imprisoned, criminals too enjoy the status of prisoners at war - an unfortunate but not a disgraceful circumstance.

With regard to the treatment of these social enemies, opinion is divided. One holds for stern justice, of "letting the punishment fit the crime": The other holds for mercy and reform. Practice has taken the more moderate course between the milder sentiment and rigid, inflexible severity.* This"well tempered mixture of mercy and rigor", the judicious dispensation of punishment according to the maxims of ancient practice and

*Only the most extreme, however, advocate holding all prisoners for the duration of the war - that is, for life, since the warfare between society and the underworld never ceases.

xIx.xxShaw,xC.xR.x,xDelinquentxAreas,xUnivx.xChicagox Press,x1929, xChicagox

common law, constitutes the only consistent policy of society.

In any case, the reformed professional criminal is so rare, for all our "model prisons", "trade schools" and paternalistic regimes, that there is comparatively little occasion for rejoicing in Heaven. At most the criminal population is depleted by occasional or temporary incarceration of its members. Experience has shown, in fact, that neither leniency nor sternness necessarily serves to eradicate crime. The futility of extreme severity is exemplified by the practice of hanging pickpockets in England a century ago. Pickpockets used to have a field day among the crowds that gathered to witness the execution of men for that very crime. One might as well expect to exterminate flies or mosquitoes by arming housewives with fly swatters and flit guns. No amount of diligence with these instruments would have rendered Panama safe for the workers who constructed the canal.[1.]

A perpetual stream of youth flows into the ranks of crime. They take on the patterns of behavior peculiar to their in-group, acquired from parents, associates and gangs. Because those patterns are anti-social, however necessary and useful to local social adjustment, these persons achieve the status of criminals in the greater community. The eradication of crime demands, not reform, but the eradication of breeding

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1. Shaw, C. R., "Delinquents and Delinquent Areas," Ment. Hlth. Observ., 1935, 3, 1-8.

places. It is the confluence of anti-social persons in the obscurity of city slums, criminal association, vicious and odious standards and customs that help to recruit apprentices and perfect the practice of crime.[1.]

If a boy grows up to the age of adolescence, and learns neither the accepted values of society, nor the accepted patterns of behavior, nor the standards of religious teaching, probably he will be vicious, by majority standards, to the end of his days. Although the best opportunity be afforded for learning these things later, it is a hundred to one that he will recoil from those teachings which conflict with early training, however readily he might have accepted them at an early age. All values, whether good or bad in terms of social adjustment and the common welfare, are in the last analysis, learned values. Here, as in all emotional learning, primacy is most often the deciding factor.[2.]

- 12 -

"Out-groups": The Prostitute

If you try to explain criminality, prostitution, or any form of social maladjustment by the depravity of men and women, the crucial question of why some of us are depraved and some are noble, is left untouched. Also, why it is that a

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1. Shaw, C. R., "Delinquents and Delinquent Areas", Ment. Hlth. Observ., 1935, 3, 1-8.

2. Allport, G. W., and Schanck, R. L., "Are Attitudes Biological or Cultural in Origin?", Char. and Pers., 1936, 4, 195-205.

certain type of behavior is taken as evidence of depravity or nobility; and why it is that what is noble in one time or place is "depraved" in another era or a different part of the globe. Is it pleasure and pain which determine values? Perhaps, but the hedonist fails to explain why one man's pleasure is another man's pain. Prestige, security, domination, wealth, beauty; these are names for common values. There is an adient disposition, fixation, and conditioning back of each of these purposes. They all look pretty much alike in all of us, but they call forth very different patterns of behavior, bring men into conflict as well as harmony, produce persecution as well as admiration. The Jew's religion and the Arab's religion represent very similar values, but that similarity doesn't prevent them from trying to kill each other. If it were not for the different forms of expression taken by our values, each of us would fit as snugly into the social pattern as does Maeterlinck's bee into the life of the bee colony. The cry of "shame" would be unknown, and life as utopian as Thomas Moore could wish. Prostitutes, for example, either would be unknown, or have a recognized and honorable place in society.

But in the world we deal with, the prostitute is held in abhorrence, even, or especially, by her clients. By virtue of her peculiar values and behavior Christian communities exclude her from normal social participation. She, like the criminal with whom she is thrown by necessity, is a member of an out-group, acquires the code and mores and manner and values of this minority. Like the professional criminal, she may have

grown up within this environment, normally reflect its distinguishing values, and accept with complacency the disdain of a society whose values she neither shares nor respects. Within this group she may be well adjusted, and her conduct may involve no major conflict.[1] The members of the "profession", however, who have drifted into its ranks by virtue of economic necessity, through lack of courage and moral fibre, a preference for an easy mode of life, or through stupidity and outer imposition, must undergo a process of readjustment, involving such a clash with early standards, as to result in personality troubles. In America the majority of prostitutes are animated by a secret horror of present existence, and a concern for the contempt of society for which no amount of rationalization can ever wholly compensate.

The ancient, if not honorable, "profession", however, has not been distinguished always by that sullen, inflexible resentment and contempt with which it is held by the body of American citizens. Nor is it in every part of the globe today. The extensive prestige of the Greek and Roman prostitute is described in the most lively colors by classical authors. We learn that the Chinese and Japanese may entertain a wholesome respect for their prostitutes. Without descending into a minute scrutiny of the institution, or of the motives of those

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1. La Piere, R., and Farnsworth, P. R., Social Psychology, 1936, McGraw Hill, New York, pp. 321-323.

who so violate Christian values, it may be observed that this out-group arises out of necessity, from social exclusion. This circumstance alone accounts for the maladjustment of its members; that society rejects them with contempt; and, that

their lives involve a conflict not only with the standards of society, but with their own early standards as well.

It must not be dissembled, however, that society computes the shame of prostitution alone from consideration of Christian virtue. The eloquent condemnation is derived in part from other and more worldly standards. The woman who marries for money, and the woman who marries many times, do not share her disgrace. Neither the perversion of sex into a commercial commodity, nor polyandry is necessarily shameful. Divorcees, mercenary wives and those who are discreetly promiscious, enjoy social recognition. But the explanation of this apparent inconsistency is not difficult to find. Virtuous or "respectable women" draw the line at an excessive commercial promiscuity; but, more especially at women who sell themselves cheaply, and without the social and legal benefits of matrimony. Prostitutes and mistresses are "scabbing" against union wives.

Thus the commerce of prostitution is both an economic and a social problem. In Christian countries, it is through the practice of the so-called "double standard of morality" that the "profession" appears to have assumed a regular and institutionalized form. When men are permitted a freedom unknown to respectable women, it is found that members of the lower and criminal classes, feebleminded and maladjusted women, break the social taboos, not for the sake of sexual gratification, but for the gratification of money. But prostitution has gone into a rapid decline, along with the dual code upon which it is dependent. The spread of contraceptive knowledge and practice, which has

contributed to the liberalization of woman's moral code, and, perhaps, the restriction of man's special prerogatives, have been factors in this decline. The more extensive practice of prostitution tends to be limited to amusement centers and seaports, like Atlantic City and New York, or wherever exists a large concentration of men and a scarcity of women: such as frontier towns, near army camps, or where bridges and dams are under construction. To the extent that the "single standard" supplants the "double standard", whether by the imposition of a stricter code for man, or through a less exacting standard for women, or both, prostitution is to that extent restricted. Another important factor, without doubt, is the creation of honorable careers for women in industry and outside marriage. Through the emergence of new moral values and economic opportunities, prostitution is being deprived of its chief raison d'etre.

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"Out-groups": The Homosexual

Without some form of social discrimination, the strict maintenance of social values is impossible. In order to emphasize the code's importance, violators are ostracized and punished. For while values can be taught abstractly, they only become clear and definite when saints are created to admire and love, and fiends to despise and hate. In order for values to be driven home, somebody must be the goat.

Whether the reasons for the persecution are good or bad, the discrimination exists. Conformity is insisted upon at all costs. It is often very illuminating, therefore, to examine

the reasons for our social attitudes.

In every society there exist individuals and groups distinguished by peculiar values and aspirations. Some, like criminals, are legally punished. Others, like prostitutes and homosexuals, fall outside the inviolable bounds of propriety; yet according to the accepted maxims of toleration, society legally protects, while persecuting, persons and institutions which it despises.

Homosexuality, the practice of seeking sexual stimulation or gratification through association with members of the same sex, is a problem created by an inversion of normal sexual canalization and conditioning, and a perversion of normal values. Unlike prostitution, it seldom originates in economic considerations. The prostitute perverts sex from the function of physiological satisfaction, and procreation, to material advantage. While the homosexual also perverts sex from its normal biological role, he does so either in response to inner preference, or turns to homosexuality by reason of isolation from the opposite sex. Fortuitous inversion is unintentionally fostered in prisons and boarding schools through the unnatural separation of the sexes. Orthodox homosexuals, on the other hand, are deviated into paths of perversion, by accidental

factors in early training, or through association with homosexuals in youth.[1] Males grow to maturity animated by feminine sentiments, and governed by corresponding personality attributes and sexual values. Instead of homosexuality being superimposed on the heterosexual pattern by social necessity, the boy has so

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1. Witschi, E., Sex Deviations, Inversions, and Parabiosis; Sex and Internal Secretions; A Survey of Recent Research, Williams and Wilkins, 1932, Baltimore.

identified himself with opposite sex, that he turns automatically to members of his own sex. Only rarely is this type of unconventionality due to glandular abnormality or physiological causes.

It may appear surprising that a large society should resolve to dishonor itself in the eyes of the world; and that a great number of persons of either sex, and of every social, economic and intellectual character, should consent to violate those taboos and values which moral and social education should have impressed most deeply on their minds. They seem insensible to the charge of infamy and the fear of ostracism, and indifferent to practical biological considerations. Nothing, it would appear, could so weaken the force or destroy the restraining power of conventional morality in intelligent and otherwise socially amenable individuals. Yet such is the force of sexual values, that the unfortunate victim of misdirection betrays the cause of religion, and sacrifices reputation.

Unlike the hobo, the prostitute, and the criminal, homosexuals are not recruited principally from the dregs of the populace, from the slums, the uneducated, the stupid, the pathological and the maladjusted. These graduate into despised classes because of poor background, or drift there by virtue of inferior ability or social maladjustment; while inversion addresses itself unselectively, to those distinguished by riches and knowledge, as well as to those condemned to ignorance, obscurity and poverty. The fact that acknowledged homosexuals are

outcasts, is an outgrowth of our patterned chain of social values which stigmatizes perversion as being a "crime against nature" and "an evidence of depravity". Exclusion and maladjustment, in other words, are a product of arbitrary social standards, which socially condemn this practice with scorn and indignation.

But like members of other out-groups, the invert is forced by the rigor of persecution, and often blackmail, to stealth; there evolves a sequential chain of in-group and often anti-social values. These values are derived from public scorn, and confirmed in obsessive fear, a neuropathic conflict, and social maladjustment. Such is the fate, justly or unjustly, of those persons whose dominant values society will not tolerate.

The discrimination is dictated by loathing and fear. But where Christian values have relaxed their hold, the same factors which contribute to alleviate severity have tended to abate the guilt, and lessen the rigor of persecution. As society is actuated, not by the rigid sexual taboos of Christianity, but by the temperate policy of social expediency, contempt is relaxed into a suspicious toleration. Here it is faintly insinuated, or sometimes asserted in bold but specious argument that homosexuality has its compensatory advantages. Those who violate social canon, like those who uphold it, are adept at bending logic to the justification of their behavior and their motives.

So it is in the heart of our great cities, whoever is odious or contemptible, whoever is ostracized or guilty, gains a

certain obscurity, and, perhaps, toleration; and there congregates to form a typical group with like suspicious values, thus attempting to escape the censure of society. Here the votaries of every criminal and vicious association multiply their disciples and accomplices. Men, actuated by the sentiments of women,(and women by the sentiments of men)affecting the manners and interests, and even, at times, the clothes of the opposite sex*, practice their inversion and enlist recruits by the corruption of the young. Psychology, which undertakes to observe with calm objectivity, and to evaluate social customs for the guidance of the social sciences, would poorly serve her function if she condescended falsely to plead the cause of outcasts, or to justify the system of values which is vicious in its effects. It must, however, be acknowledged that the safety of society is but a minor consideration in the persecution of homosexuals. Condemnation grows more out of unreasoning zeal and emotional prejudice than a temperate policy of justice. The charge of "unnaturalness" and sterility, for example, might with equity be brought against voluntary celibacy. From a general view of their character and motives, and of the effect of their practices on society, we might conclude that the worse charge to be brought against homosexuals is the contagion of their perversion and their efforts to convert others to ways which preclude normal procreation.

*Those perverts who parade their abnormal values in this fashion are often referred to as "exhibitionistic homosexuals".

- 14 -

Autosexuality

Autosexuality, as distinguished from Narcissism or self-love, is prevalent among the members of either sex as a more or less temporary phase in sexual maturity.[1] This habit, though, is rare among such peoples as the Samoans and certain primitives who countenance sexual freedom for adolescents. The first sensations of pleasure are marked as the first moment of its practice. It is an outgrowth of the chaste values of our civilization, in all that pertains to the commerce of the sexes. The unanimous sentiment of moralists would class masturbation as a mild perversion, since heterosexuality is the only biologically adequate form of sex expression; but the abhorrence, the consciousness of degradation and guilt, and the conviction of physiological injury is the primary cause of any unfortunate consequences. Since this practice seldom precludes a satisfactory heterosexual adjustment, and since it is common when no other form of gratification is permitted, it is inevitable, where pre-marital chastity is enforced by social taboo, that masturbation be practiced, as least among adolescents, and it must be regarded, therefore, as an unavoidable result of our cultural values.

- 15 -

Frigidity and Celibacy

Frigidity and celibacy derive from the same principle:

1. Ellis, H., "The Concept of Narcissism", Psychoanal. Rev., 1927, 14, 129-153.

our abhorrence of every enjoyment which might gratify the sensual and degrade the moral nature of man.*

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*It was through St. Paul's teachings that Christianity took shape, and Christian values were crystallized. One quotation from his Epistle to the Ephesians will suffice to summarize his doctrine of sexual values: "It is good," St. Paul says, "for a man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband... I say, therefore, to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I. But if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn... He that is unmarried careth for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord: but he that is married careth for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife. There is a difference also between a wife and a virgin. The unmarried woman careth for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and in spirit: but she that is married careth for the things of the world, how she may please her husband."[1].

1. Paul, (St.) "The New Testament," Corinthians, 7, vs.1-9.

Where masturbation is (usually) a temporary violation of the code, growing out of necessity, celibacy is in strictest accord with the dictates of religion. The celibate voluntarily rejects sexual values in favor of spiritual values. While frigidity, though it may result from unfortunate sexual experience or physiological abnormality, most often is the consequence of repugnance, originating in horror and confirmed in obsessive fear, rather than from conscious choice. Since unbridled desire is considered vicious, and lust imputed as a crime, and inasmuch as marriage is tolerated only for the sake of procreation, as a defect, or to curb man's natural licentiousness, celibacy, by the same token, is the nearest approach to divine purity.* [1.] And

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*Celibacy, however should not be confused with bachelorhood. The latter may indicate celibacy; but it also may indicate the substitution of extra-marital relations or autosexuality. Among certain savages a celibate is considered a pervert; and virginity is considered a condition of which to be ashamed rather than proud. Native interpreters of the Gospels into Bavili, in East Africa, for example, refused to translate "Virgin Mary" literally, because "virgin" could not be anything to these people but an "opprobrious epithet".[2.]

1. Paul, (St.) "The New Testament," Corinthians, 7, vs.1-9.

2. Langdon - Davies, J. A Short History of Women, 1927, The Literary Guild of America, New York, p. 111.

frigidity, as represented by those wives who submit rather than respond to their husbands, may be explained as a half-way response, in which Christian asceticism is compromised for the sake of children, or for other advantages of matrimony. It must be admitted, however, that the insensible and abstemious disposition, so utterly incapable of promoting individual happiness or any public benefit through sensual sacrifice, would be rejected as abnormal, were it not for orthodox values growing out of otherworldly considerations.*

- 16 -

"Peculiar" Values Condoned

The frontier between what is despised because it threatens our dominant values, fades gradually into what is regarded as "queer", but "none of our business", because it is believed to be harmless. The notion of what is harmless is elastic, variable, and not always consistent. Thus a negro in the front seat of a street car is harmless in Boston, but constitutes an attack on "white" values in New Orleans. Amie Semple McPhearson is considered harmless, and a source of amusement rather than indignation. The Mormon religion is harmless, only if it desists from preaching polygamy. The House of David is harmless unless immorality is uncovered. Christian Science is harmless and Spiritualism is harmless, though many children of the former die from lack of proper medical treatment, and regardless of fraudulent practices by the latter. Today a man's

*Certain early Christians, in fact, took the advice of St. Paul so literally, that temptation was removed through the drastic practice of operative procedure. Among those who "judged it most prudent to disarm the temptor" was the scholar Origen. In later years, fortunately, the tendency to allegorize the

religion is theoretically as little a matter of public concern as the operation of his digestive tract, provided only that he do lip service to Christian sexual standards, and observe those sexual taboos, as amended and practiced by the majority of citizens. Today, in short, most religions are harmless if there is no teaching of immorality.* There was a period, however, when an eccentric theology was far from harmless. And before that there was a period when heretics were tortured into conformity...or else. But throwing slop out of the window to the street was harmless, and firth was harmless, because plagues resulted from faulty theology rather than from lack of sanitation.

But intolerance, resulting from majority values, is complicated further by a proportional ignorance and prejudice on the part of persecuted minorities. Members of out-groups, and sectaries of despised religions, depressed by fear, animated

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Gospels has been extended to the teachings of St. Paul.[1]

*The history of the notion of Christian values makes an illuminating story. Sometimes the notions violently conflict, as when Protestants permit divorced persons to remarry, and Catholics don't; or wealthy and prominent Catholics have marriages annulled, as in the case of Muriel Vanderbilt Church. And somehow certain Christian values subside into the background, or become a "dead letter", as in Christ's teaching of humility, and the doctrine of "turning the other cheek", as

1. Gibbons, E., Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1910, J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. p. 415.

by resentment, and perhaps torn by internal conflict, are scarcely in a frame of mind to view candidly their own values, or to evaluate those of their detractors. This partiality is shared by the greater society; and, in fact, often enough affects the discerning attention of those removed beyond the heat of persecution. We have attempted, nevertheless, to separate a few authentic facts from the undigested mass of prejudice and superstition; to lay bare dynamic values of the larger group and to relate these to the values of singular individuals and members of eccentric groups in a clear and rational manner. From this impartial, if brief and imperfect survey, it may be observed that society demands the image of a decent reverence; and visits its wrath upon those who would violate the sanctity, or fail to obey the precepts, of moral values. Implacable resentment and subtle or overt persecution are authorized by just or specious argument of moral justice and public safety. But whether we applaud these dire retaliations against "fanatics and the enemies of decency", or decry the "intolerance", we cannot but recognize that universal social tendency to enforce conformity, which must ever render unenviable the lot of dissenters.

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against sexual values which became elevated to first place. No one despises a child or a man for 'fighting back', for standing up for his rights, as we despise those who are "immoral", though both equally deny the teachings of Christ.

CHAPTER III

THE RELATIVITY OF OUR VALUES

"He is a barbarian, and thinks that the customs of his tribe are the laws of nature."

Bernard Shaw, Caesar and Cleopatra

CHANGING STANDARDS

- 1 -

This goes to show that our own values, together with the haphazard impression that we gain about the moral values of other groups, powerfully direct our thoughts and decide our actions. Yet these emotional attitudes are qualitatively and quantitatively variable from persons to persons. In hating Jews no one can say exactly what goes on in the minds and hearts of ten or fifteen million Germans. Motives are complex in the individual, immeasurably complex in the mass. Jew-baiting has occurred many times in various countries through a number of centuries. Yet who can tell exactly what moved each person to hatred, lust, fear, cruelty or sadism? There is little use, then, pontificating about popular values. The value is not fixed and definite, even for the individual. It grows and fades and melts into a pattern of values, so that what made a man persecute Jews or hunt witches one day, is not necessarily the same emotional impression that motivated him on the next occasion. There is no inevitable connection between a certain line of action and a particular form of values. Nor is there an invariable relation between symbols and values.

It is a common fault, nevertheless, to explain motives in terms of ones economic value, religious value, patriotic value, or prestige value, as though each exerted a separate and independent influence. These are convenient abstractions, but as such represent highly individual systems of values. And who

can say which ones enter into such an ecstacy of love or hate as that directed at communism, fascism, the CIO, or the New Deal? The cleric who despises liberalism, for example, is consciously or unconsciously

animated by a complicated pattern of values: church loyalty, patriotism, family pride, economic security, personal prestige, all of which must be rationalized into a tolerable conformity with a very genuine sympathy for the underprivileged.

PATTERNS OF VALUE
- 2 -

Any picture of a civilized man, living and working in that small circle we call his effective environment, must represent a gallant effort at reconciling his actions to a complicated order of tastes, hopes, ambitions, scruples, purposes, and ideals. For a human being is not a simple, mechanical creature. Only to a minor degree does he adjust reflexly to the many external and internal forces to which he is selectively attuned. The infinite permutations and combinations, the enormous possible implications, are perceived and interpreted as furthering or hindering his system of values; in the latter instance to be altered and reworked into that form which seems most accurately to express their relative importance.[1]

Our analysis in previous chapters regards the value as the canalized and associated form of potentiality present in the genii; and the adult value as the mimic enlargement or conditioned broadening of the childish fixation. All individuals, of course, do not organize their tendencies in the same way, nor do they interpret them similarly. Judge Lindsey and Bishop Manning didn't; nor does John L. Lewis and Tom Girdler; and they don't view the

1. Hart, Bernard, Psychology of Insanity, 1916, MacMillan, New York. pp. 65-68

problems of the world in the same way. Though they do trace their organized system of values to the same molding forces which have ever directed man's activating tendencies, moral and otherwise, and which ever will; and though these

values viewed separately may appear very much the same in the priest, the politician, the lawyer, and the financier, their effect is very differently expressed. These values are differently noted in the total hierarchy.

The point of their distinction is more dependent upon the way in which each perception is personalized and dramatized in accordance with the whole system. Each external reference has a complicated internal reference; is endowed with a subtle perspective and highly personal meaning; is judged as "good" or "bad" as its significance to his total pattern of hopes and fears is judged - though the evaluation may be vaguely realized, or concealed. A negro family has bought a house in a white neighborhood. It makes a lot of difference whether this move is regarded as a profitable real estate deal, an evidence of the brotherhood of man, a threat to social standing, or an attempt to seduce the white man's daughter. Our perceptions when we react in terms of potential rape are very differently colored than when the dominant consideration is of profit and loss, although we often confuse the profit motif with the honor of our wives and daughters.

No version of the external world, moreover, is received intact, or viewed separately and objectively as an isolated event. It is a segment of experience, meaningless in itself until related to the dominant purposes of life. We know that a man perceives, evaluates and reacts very differently depending on whether he is dealing with his mother, his daughter, his wife, or his mistress; on whether he talks with an inferior

or a superior; whether with a member of the white race or a negro; on whether he is afraid or confident, at home or abroad, with his family at Winetka or at a convention in Atlantic City.

PATTERNS OF VALUES: SIMULTANEOUS COMPARISONS

- 3 -

It is not enough, therefore, that we should know the genesis and structure of a given value. For some are so placed in the general scheme of things that they become radiant points of influence. Thus we have observed that the desire for approval is one of the most socializing factors in life.* It does not stop at its own frontier, nor act as an independent value, but even primitive appetite is subject to its supervision. This is shown in the extensive arrangement of our lives. Convention decrees that we shall dine at night rather than in the middle of the day; we prefer strawberries out of season; and prize our wives because other men think them desirable. The pattern of values, in fact, is bound together by the influence of certain key values. Where every individual has special pervasive interests, like the need for approval, or a desire for immortality, the social psychologist must combine an intimate knowledge of the special value, with a persistent sense of its role in the total Gestalt. We have attempted a schematic description of the evolution of separate values. Here we concern ourselves with their arrangement into a pattern.

*Just as the less discriminating may be led to crude exhibitionism, vulgarity, or even crime, by a passion for public notice.

Now the patterned, relative nature of our values is readily apparent in the lightest tendency, no less than in the expression of dominant urges. Who has not witnessed a hungry child lose interest in his potatoes and other vegetables because the dessert was brought to the table? A "ten cent cigar" may be a luxury to the man who ordinarily cannot afford them, but is an affront to the nostrils of a person accustomed to thirty-five cent cigars. The "beautiful spring day" of the month of March would be thought to be unseasonably cold in May. A fifty dollar "Sunday suit", prized as a model of style and quality by one man, is only a "hand-me-down" in the eyes of one used to custom tailoring. Again, a ten thousand dollar income might impress the modest clerk as extreme munificence, but would only signify comparative poverty to a millionaire. An impressive home in poor surroundings would be an "eye sore" if transferred to an exclusive neighborhood; the prize winning portrait in a modern exhibition might suffer in the company of "old Masters". The new house, or car, or fur coat, or electric refrigerator, is a thing of joy and beauty - until some neighbor buys a better one; and so we are tempted to "keep up with the Jones'".

It is readily apparent that in determining our standards, simultaneous and successive comparisons are admitted at every instance. Leaving the dentist's chair is a pleasant relief, for no other reason than that the discomfort is ended. A trip to Bermuda is the answer to our heart's desire, until we learn that we might have gone to Europe. Any step up in the scale of living tends to be desirable and agreeable, and any regression

disagreeable, whatever the point of departure. "This is worse that I expected", we say, or "Better than I feared", "not nearly as good as the pie mother makes", "a lot harder than the bed I have at home", ".....roomier and more convenient than the house we last lived in," "nowhere near as expensive as Mary's dress", or "Mrs. Smith's little boy is no older than Jane, and he has already learned to read". Such alternate possibilities and expectations and comparisons, of what has gone before, of what is presently observed, and of that which we anticipate, color every situation for better or worse, and affect our evaluation. Even those values which we consider most stable: morals and manners, standards of achievement, seasonal and climatic preferences, niceties and luxuries, have plainly evolved out of past judgments whose comparative value has now become habitual. But for all this standardization, the growth and modification of our values is susceptible of infinite continuance, at least until old age has robbed us of our plasticity.

The process of choosing our values and of ordering their relative merit, contains, therefore, endless comparisons. Every instance is an extremely complex act, namely, a consideration of the whole set of possibilities and a judgment of relative worth. If, for example, we move to a finer neighborhood and into a better house, our pleasure is insensibly fortified and intensified, the value of our new mode of life stands out sharply defined in the foreground by recollections of the old, which recollection, however dimly felt, is always there as a fringe, as a background; and if the background fades and is

gradually replaced by more exalted standards as it tends to do in time, our satisfaction fades with it. Any change in the condition of our lives, therefore, any alternation in the background of remembrance or possibilities, alters the figural pattern of our values. Today no less than yesterday, the status of a value is no nearer final resolution. Love, the urgency of desire, waxes and wanes and rises again; changes in form, and finally dies to rise no more. Equilibrium is never reached until longevity is the sole remaining value, or even that is gone. But nothing tells us that all this is provisional and ephemeral. This is fortunate. For, each set of values is represented at every step as the climax of their evolution. Today, at long last, the light of experience has displayed them in true perspective. Tomorrow nevertheless they will be altered and expanded or suppressed. And it is only in senescence that we may disguise a smile of contempt for hopes and fears which no longer have the power to add or detract.

THE HIERARCHY OF VALUES: THE KEY VALUE

- 4 -

Systematized value patterns, cemented gradually in the stable and recurring features of our environment, are best illustrated in the gentle but powerful influence of manners and morals, of ethics and custom, as related to economic, social and political theory and practice, or to the violent precepts of religion. The keynote of one person's whole set of values is his practice of judging each possibility by the effect upon man's well being in this world; another judges in terms of

prosperity in the world to come; while the key to the values of

a third person may be the promotion of Catholicism, the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Church of the Latter Day Saints, Communism, Atheism, or the spread of Nazism, the Japanese Empire, the British Commonwealth of Nations.* So we understand the persistent motives of man not only in terms of the hierarchy of values; and more specifically, by relating them to the dominant or "key value" of the moment, or of life.

The priest, the layman, the captains and the kings, the laborer, the statesman, the merchant, they and their fellows or organized followers, are all bound by values, which, viewed separately, are more or less common; but no matter how similar the values, each person or group is distinguished by a different emphasis or arrangement of those self-same values. Thus Rabbi Stephen Samuel Wise, and Dr. Cyrus Adler are both Jews, both Americans, and hold to a common patriotism, value the common religion and the common culture. Yet between the groups which they head is deep rooted animosity, and between Rabbi Wise and Dr. Adler an intense personal dislike.** Said Rabbi Wise in a

*Most men rationalize the several ends they deem desirable. The votary, for example, stoutly maintains that whatever promotes salvation, likewise promotes man's well-being here below - a happy circumstance for the repose of mankind. But one or the other, either religion or humanism, is the standard by which the propositions of life are accepted or rejected. He who opposes the child labor amendment, for example, because he is led to understand that it is inimical to the interests of his church, may justify his position on constitutional grounds, or by arguments of human prosperity. If his first love is a given church, then child welfare is a rejected value, forced into conformity, and the man is guilty of rational chicanery. It matters not, for our purpose, whether the rationalization is logically correct or erroneous. The important thing is: Which value has precedence?

**Rabbi Wise is president of the ardently Zionist and anti-German, American Jewish Congress. Dr. Adler is president of the conservative, non-Zionist, anti-boycott American Jewish Committee.

Cleveland speech: "In 1933 we offered German Jewish groups an opportunity to unite but they told us to mind our own business. They said that they were Germans first, Germans who happened to be Jews. I am a Jew who is an American. I was a Jew before I was an American. I have been an American all my life, 64 years, but I'be been a Jew for 4,000 years."* [1.]

These values, so similar when considered apart, yet so pregnant with underlying conflict when the order of precedence is reversed, are almost uniformly accepted by professed Jews. What divides them and keeps them apart is the question: Are we Jews first, or are we first Americans and then Jews? They stand for the same values, but they are moved to opposing action.

For each person and each group is distinguished by a hierarchy of values. In the Provence of Quebec, for example, the Roman Catholic Church controlling 85% of the population, disapproves of mixed marriages, requires certain promises from the non-Catholic before granting a dispensation, and does not recognize the validity of civil marriages or those performed by Protestant clergymen. These facts, growing out of the precedence of Catholic values to all other considerations, has, in recent years, caused the civil annulment of many mixed-marriages

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*The pro-Adler Journal, American Hebrew, claims that organizations totaling more than a million membership have declared themselves 9 to 1 against placing Judaism above Americanism.[2.]

1. Time, June 20, 1939.
2. Ibid

which have been disapproved by the Church. Recently Judge Alfred Forest, a Catholic, annulled a mixed marriage performed by an Anglican minister, (and disapproved by his Church) on the

ground that the minister was incompetent to perform the ceremony, and because of some technicality about witnesses. But in June, 1938, Chief Justice Greenshields, a Protestant, canceled the annulment. Said the Chief Justice: "Such authority as the Church has in civil matters is given to it by the law of the land, and the Church and every church is subservient to and in no sense dominates the law...Any church may bless or curse a marriage to its ecclesiastical heart's content but it does not in any way affect the validity of the marriage." Now it would be a mistake to suppose that Judge Forest, or the Church to which he gives his highest allegiance, did not value civil law; to suppose that Chief Justice Greenshields did not honor religious values. But unlike the Catholic Judge, the Justice gives civil law precedence over the law of any ecclesiastical body.[1.]

THE HIERARCHY OF VALUES: CONSISTENCY

- 5 -

There are some of us who place humanism above all other considerations. These will say with Ruskin, "There is no wealth but life"; will rate sobriety, industry, thrift, honesty, courage, and morality among the positive values, not as ends in themselves or because they promise salvation, but because they promote that human welfare which is deemed most vital. Yet when these so-called virtues are turned to a use which he considers bad, when the Japanese abstain from alcohol, work long hours to produce the sinews of war, save their money to buy war bonds,

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1. Time, June 20, 1939.

all to the end that the slaughter of Chinese may be carried on more effectively, or to subjugate them and to make them generally miserable - then these virtues scarcely are to be evaluated

in the same way as similar virtues in American automobile workers, who make cheap cars so that farmers can ride to town for church services, or to attend the movies. He might go so far as to believe that money diverted to purchase sake is "well spent", since it is taken away from the making of bombs. Neither would this socially-minded person class the industry and courage of criminals with the industry and courage of policemen. Being a pacifist may force one, in time of war, and in all consistency, into hostility to moral values, which antinomian attitude can be explained only by the major value to which these others are subordinate.

Few values (perhaps none) stand on their own feet alone. They are grouped into a pattern of values in almost every instance, because they promote, or are thought to promote, still other values. One man is concerned primarily with his own, or his family's, prosperity. Each consideration is then weighed in the balance of its relation to him and to his. When the issue is international, we are interested primarily, or only, in our own nation. Some devote themselves to the progress of certain institutions, subordinating everything, either openly, or by the subterfuge of rationalization - (which is merely a way of trying to reconcile irreconcilable values, for the reason that it is not convenient to acknowledge that a conflicting value has been rejected). Still others devote their ultimate loyalty to the constructive arts of civilization, to science,* to the elimination of poverty and destitution, the curbing of disease, the opening

*A student of mine once wrote to Albert Einstein, asking his approval on a projected book to be entitled: Jewish Men

of possibilities for joyous living. To the attainment of a major value or values (call them ideals if you like), a whole pattern of values is related. And no one of them is to be understood without reference to the whole system of which it is an integral part.

Happily for the peace and prospects of man, the various systems are capable of being woven into a consistent pattern of values, in which the discordant elements are truly reconciled. This true unity can be had only by a calm, courageous, intelligent, and honest examination and comparison; by facing the implications of various objectives and by rejecting less vital ones when indicated. It is not to be attained, however, by that cringing and resentful terror with which too many persons react when any effort is made to probe and interpret and relate their dominant values.

Intellectual integrity is quite impossible unless one preserve a cool, unbiased judgement, especially in the face of solicitation by those values which are generated in passion and hatred. Indeed, if for the joy of thinking with one's glands rather than with one's intellect, for the pleasure of stampeding with the herd, (or from mere lack of courage), the cherished values of love, kindness, and tolerance are overruled by prejudice and sadism, then it is that Christian virtues and idealism have no function except in dull moments. When cruelty

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of Science. To which Einstein replied with the question: "Why not a book entitled, Red-Headed Men of Science?..." By which Einstein protested the effort to subordinate science to religious and social values.

for it's own sake, hatred and pride, (individual or national), run roughshod over human affection, then ordinary Christian virtues, like generosity and public spirit, are pressed into the service of fear, emnity, malice and rancor. The activity of Christian ministers in fostering hatred for Germans during the war is a sad example.

In closing in, after all the preliminary discussion, upon the essential nature of individual values, we find ourselves driven more definitely by each succeeding step to consider the manner in which values are affiliated. We are forced to consider the manner in which they harmonize, conflict, dominate or are subordinated in the whole scheme of values; in short, to the relative nature of values. It must be kept in mind that resultant action is always due to this pattern, and to the ratio of driving force under a given circumstance. We cannot always tell by mere outward symptom or verbal account, to what values present behavior is due. But our attitudes are mostly logical results, within the limitations of intellect and mental integrity, growing out of determinate values.

EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL VALUES

- 6 -

Values are related, likewise, to time and place. Through changing social standards, (ethics) we implicitly recognize their tentative, relative character. Certain of our virtues, for example, evolve out of a background of economic and political conditions and theories, and out of related religious

principles. Out of an economy of scarcity grew the Puritan virtues of industry, economy and saving. Preachers joined hands

with employers in an unqualified support of ceaseless work. The pulpit advocated a fifteen hour day, rationalized from ethical considerations. Long hours and low pay save men's souls by fostering patience and obedience; and because "the devil finds work for idle hands". This was a very agreeable doctrine to employers and the upper classes generally. And why not? It pandered to man's immemorial desire to "have his cake and eat it too"; allowed the exploitation of laborers under religious sanction. In this instance, tireless industry, ceaseless economy and unending saving were plainly virtues growing out of the pioneer need in an expanding country for surplus capital.*

Gradually, through a long period of preaching, these economic virtues were hammered home as the righteous observances which would guarantee God's blessing, here and hereafter. These have been exalted as a social and a religious duty. When science and labor-saving machinery came along, these too were desirable because they fostered the same value: the increase of surplus goods.

And then came the inevitable smash-up of our business

*It was sometime after the first successful use of ether as an anesthesia was reported to the French Academy of Science in 1850, before many prominent doctors would have anything to do with anaesthesia. Man's sense of pain had been given him for a purpose, it was held. One doctor made the statement from the floor, at the time of the first report to the French Adademy, that he saw no real advantage in rendering a patient insensible to pain during an operation; pain, after all, is a trivial matter, this physician believed. And in the Crimean War, the chief ofthe British Army Medical Service cautioned army surgeons against using chloroform during amputations or operations, because the pain inflicted by the knife acted as a wholesome stimulant. Certainly we have come a long way in less than a century.

economy! Another "beautiful theory murdered by a gang of brutal facts!" Millions of men unemployed, frozen accumulations, the "opportunities for safe investment which would bring adequate returns" becoming increasingly rare, governmental manipulation of currencies all have cast doubt upon those virtues to which morals and religion gave their highest approval. Dr. Townsend, Huey Long, and others of the "lunatic fringe" quoted scripture to prove how mischievous were the old virtues. Henry Ford preached a doctrine of shorter hours and higher pay. Labor demands a thirty hour week. To work only four or five hours a day is advocated as a moral duty. "Ending is better than mending", as Huxley satirically says; spending is better than saving. Business insisted that economic revival demands a vast increase in spending. Calvin Coolidge, who lived to preach the gospel of saving made articulate by Benjamin Franklin, died bemoaning a new era to which he did not belong. A persistence of the 'old virtues' is stigmatized as "ethical lag"; the good man of yesteryear loses his claim to the veneration of posterity. Ethical values applauded yesterday are decried today.* All of which goes to show that our values change with the times. The circumstances vary, the living impressions of people vary in an immeasurable degree personal to each, and finally, the accepted stereotypes of ethical behavior vary in the mass of the people.

It is not the function of this book to intrude any

*Strangely enough, it is only in Godless Russia, and quasi-pagan Germany that the so-called Christian virtues of industry and thrift still hold without qualification.

opinion of economic theory or derived economic values. It is enough to disclose the emergence of virtues out of deeply felt personal opinion conditioned upon local and ephemeral conditions, and to point out their relative nature. These opinions, no matter how deeply felt, are neither final in form nor unalterable in concept. But the provisional, relational element of every virtue, in the heydey of that virtue goes unnoticed. Behind every moral dictum is the authority of a "mandate to a chosen people", divine revelation, the Word of God, a Spiritual Father, a Holder of the Keys, the best people, a patron saint, or immutable economic law. Virtues are ever of an infallible origin, and only "social enemies", or "subversive influence" touch them with questioning and profane hands. Even when our gods are rational our hearts are nevertheless warm. And only extreme irreverence or social catastrophe tears aside the veil.

THE SYSTEMATIZED PATTERN OF OUR VALUES

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We do not remove the veil because we cannot question one virtue without jeopardizing many other values endeared to us by ancient habit. Virtues and values, like the beliefs which bolster them, are systematized into a logical, interrelated pattern. So unconsciously it is felt that to cast doubt upon one might bring down the whole moral and social structure.

Some virtues, therefore, are sacrosanct. They represent a system of values which we conceive to be at the core of all order and safety, and which safeguard our position in society. They form an ordered, logical system to our minds,

however inconsistent they may appear to the philosopher or the psychologist. To these values are related our habits, from these values evolve our tastes and purposes, and upon the maintenance of these values depend our hopes, our security, and our peace of mind. This system of values dictates a picture of the world, a version of human nature, a conception of cause and effect which reciprocally bolster one another. To question any one of them is thus an attack upon the whole system. If one is a "rugged individualist", a "capitalist", a believer in a fierce and ruthless competitive system where strong men match their strength, then Roosevelt's New Deal turns one white with a revulsion of feeling almost convulsive. For all its vagueness, the system calls forth a definite emotion, and often enough, definite action. The New Deal represents an attack or a fancied attack upon the whole American and Christian scheme of things to which we are adjusted, upon the familiar, the comfortable, the natural; in fact, upon the "foundations of society".

Even the critic who sets himself the task of re-examining our values is about as welcome as a frost in Florida. For the possibility of placing any aspect of the system of values upon the scale of judgment tends to break the spell that unthinking prejudice has cast over them all. And unconsciously it is felt that all too likely enquiry will demonstrate these values as a reflection of our prejudiced and very limited, self-centered knowledge of human nature.

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"Drags" on Changing Values

To circumvent the decline of old values which were

prized, and the rise of new ones which were deplored, strange sentiments have been expressed by our spiritual and temporal leaders. In 1670, Governor Berkeley of Virginia said: "I thank God there are no free schools, nor printing, for learning has brought disobedience and heresy into the world, and printing has divulged them". In 1794, Fourquier-Tinville, at the trial which resulted in the condemnation of Lavoisier to the guillotine, is reported to have pronounced these words: "The Republic has no need of scientists". Cardinal O'Connell said: "When I first came to Boston I thought it would be a good thing to improve the condition of our poorer Catholics. But I found that as they became more prosperous they tended to drift away from the Church". By these extraordinarily honest statements key values which dominate the whole system are disclosed. To the Governor, ignorant obedience is the highest virtue, and social stability the highest value, to which social welfare is subordinate. Governor Berkeley's statement, by its date, and the Cardinal's, by its anachronous tone, for it states an opinion once commonly and openly avowed, serve but to emphasize a ceaseless evolution in the reordering of our values.

Whether or not the Governor and the Cardinal are correct, or whether their values are above or below the normal standard, it is not necessary to decide. At the moment we are thinking only about the shift in the relative pattern of our values with passing generations, as a natural consequence of the changing concepts and conditions of our lives; and especially

how one key value is supplanted by another. The smug pronouncements of our dogmatic leaders have never stopped the tide. As

Charles Kettering says, in commenting on the inflexibility of our self-styled industrial leaders, "To the unimaginative the world is always finished...." The world will always make allowance for pious fraud, for man's proclivity to pay lip service to humanism while in the very act of denying, or subordinating it. For it is, of course, natural for us to defend against change in that system under which we, personally and through cherished institutions, have prospered, and to protect that hierarchy of values to which we are adjusted.

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The Handicaps of Social Science

Unfettered curiosity, nevertheless, has widened our knowledge. Through empirical achievement and inductive conclusions which deductive logic could not suppress or ignore, the physical scientist achieved his freedom from religious and moral domination. The social scientist, however, of necessity has relied upon haphazard observation rather than controlled experiment. He cannot prove his thesis, and then offer it to the public as an incontrovertible fact. He cannot offer the complete assurance of laboratory results. For certain of his problems the social world is his only possible laboratory. If he were allowed to test his hypothesis - the physical scientist tests and revises his hypotheses hundreds of times - and the hypothesis were wrong, the damage might be irreparable, however illuminating the experiment. He is dealing with human lives and human emotions and these subjects do not lend themselves naturally to the objective approach. Furthermore the emotions and values with which he would tamper have been built in deliberately

by church, school and home to bolster our social institutions. The social scientist in the very nature of his work must analyse these values and place these institutions upon the scale of objective judgment. The traditionalist, the religious leader, the conservative press - and to a lesser degree, the liberal press - have, therefore, deliberately fostered the notion that he is a crank, an academic simpleton, a dangerous radical, or a "subversive influence."

As things go now, social change grows out of physical science and its application, with little foresight of its implication, and no preparation for the consequence. Instead of social science directing and ordering and preparing the way for industrial and economic innovations, it can only stand aside as an impartial observer to comment upon the change, and analyse or evaluate its consequence. There is no form of expertness interposed between the common citizen and those puzzling developments for which his values and institutions have neither adapted nor prepared him. It is not surprising that he is at times bewildered and helpless. The more remarkable fact is that he adjusts himself as well as he does.

One has only to read the introductory article in the report of the national resources committee, forbiddingly entitled,

"Technological Trends and National Policy, Including the Social Implications of New Inventions",[1] by Professor William Ogburn, to review the startling, exciting, if not disturbing social changes that have been wrought since the turn of the century, by reason of new inventions. In 1900 Theodore Roosevelt was

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1. Burdeau, L.R., Human Psychology, 1936, Pitman, New York, pp. 15-38.

praised by a newspaper for his "characteristic courage" in taking a ride in an automobile. The effect of the automobile on our lives and standards has been too widely discussed from the pulpit and by the press to merit mention here. Other inventions traced by Prof. Ogburn are moving pictures, the telephone, airplanes, radio and rayon.*

Prof. Ogburn and his committee also prophesy those future inventions which are most likely to bring widespread social changes within the next twenty years: the mechanical cotton picker, which may alter the working and living conditions of millions of southern negroes; air conditioning equipment; plastics; artificial cotton; woolen-like fibres; photo-electric cell; facsimile transmission; gasoline produced from coal; the automobile trailer; steep-flight airplanes; and tray agriculture. With exaggerated momentum applied science is altering our economic and social order. The comparatively rigid, static society of the past has been supplanted by a fluid, changing society. And despite "ethical lag", our values change, sooner or later, for better or worse, to meet the changed conditions.

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The Authoritarian vs. "Trial and Error" Method

If what the social scientist had to say about our changing world were interesting and pleasant, instead of disturbing and dull, and above all, if he spoke with dignity and

*Prof. Ogburn quotes an interesting statement made in 1903 by the famous astronomer, Simon Newcomb, then dean of American science: "May not mechanicians be ultimately forced to admit that aerial flight is one of the great class of problems with which man can never hope to cope and to give up all attempts to grapple with it?"

self-assurance from objective knowledge, his role might be constructive, rather than critical or apologetic. But that is not the only fundamental difficulty; there is an inherent problem in our effort to view sanely and rationally the detailed values of an ancient culture. Many pious and good men feel that in striving to adapt our morals and loyalties to psychological priciples and modern social conditions, even in questioning their infallibility and utility, we risk all mankind has gained in the age-old struggle for social stability and security.

If we are to understand the opposition which social science is encountering, we must know the system of ideas and canalized emotion, which makes such conservatism seem reasonable. Suppose a mayor of Boston were to ask his father or his priest why he should not accept a bribe. The answer that he might be put in jail would not be adequate because any politician knows that few political "grafters" ever serve jail sentences. The answer, however, that in the long run "honesty is the best policy"; that the Ten Commandments of Moses (whether or not it is asserted that these were revealed by God on Mt. Sinai) and the teachings of Jesus Christ, together with the dictates of the church are most conducive to the good life here or (and) hereafter; that "decent" men don't graft - is an answer that is satisfactory to most men, if not to many of those immersed in municipal politics. But this argument rests upon a faith in the persistent and infallible truth and utility of moral values, which faith can be maintained only if the authority of the whole code is accepted intact and free from doubt or question. When the

Commandments admonish against coveting anything that is one's neighbors, and Christ instructs us to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesars" and warns that "the poor are always with us", we must avoid any social legislation tending to end poverty or redistribute national wealth, because this would break the spell with which reverence and uncritical acceptance have crowned the whole code, and thus indirectly give encouragement to thieves and grafters, to the envious, the revolutionary, if not to communists. Viewed in this manner few objective thinkers would accept the reasoning, but the argument cannot be contemptuously rejected as absurd. For that is just the way men's associated attitudes often operate.

This medieval outlook is not so much a matter of logical unity as of indirect association. In Chapter I, we mentioned the child who learned to retract his hand when the bell sounded, because the bell had been associated with the stroking of his arm, which in turn had been associated with the pin prick. If we are to regard any one of the Ten Commandments as a temporary expedient in a social flux, having utility only for a brief period over a limited area, what is to prevent our adopting the same critical and doubtful attitude toward the other nine Commandments with which it is so intimately linked? Once it is recognized that any given moral value is but a relative standard invented by fallible men the whole code is suspect. Any given rule, then, is judged by the criteria of prosperity and material comfort, health, decent housing, adequate education, beauty, and opportunity for joyous living,*

*Whether or not these criteria of the "good" are valid

rather than by whether it is in tune with the opinions of duly appointed or self-constituted authorities on what happened to be going on in the mind of Moses, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Confucius, Karl Marx, George Washington, or the members of the Constitutional Congress. The preoccupation is with results - in this world - rather than with origin; the value is judged by its "fruits rather than its roots". And once any religious or political value is brought before the bar of humanism, it may be that other values which one would prefer to have let alone will next be questioned.

Group and Individual Values[11]: Their Conflict and Integration

Behind the whole argument of ethical or political conservatism is this fear: that if we view any one accepted standard calmly and objectively we cast doubt upon them all. It therefore has seemed better to cling to the mixture of blessing and well-being, justice and injustice, and misery which is the bitter-sweet fruit of old ways. Neither is this attitude ridiculous, nor should those who act upon it be regarded with moral indignation as defenders of ancient injustice; they defend injustice for the sake of justice, and sacrifice one ideal for the sake of them all.

An authoritarian set of moral values, based on religious creed or reverence for time-tested rules, differs from the outlook of social science, however, in claiming to embody

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lies, of course, outside the realm of social science; perhaps, as B. Russell suggests, ... outside the domain of knowledge..

absolute and eternal truth, and in believing that if stoutly defended, these values can be, and should be maintained without modification; whereas the social scientist regards their practical utility as tentative, subject to modification and correction, is aware that his method is inherently incapable of arriving at a final conclusion, and that for better or worse old patterns losing their cogency and force, are replaced by the growth of a new order in our values - and that nothing can circumvent this ceaseless evolution. Social science thus encourages the reexamination of old criteria, and the search for new and more practical criteria, which may be substituted in a more objective and successful search for useful standards.

It is obvious, to begin with, that what is desired, our values, represent "good", and that what is dreaded, our negative values, represent "bad". We have individual values and collective values. There is a ceaseless attempt to bring the individual into line with collective values, and an equally persistent effort to bring collective values into line with those of the individual. Penitentiaries are designed to dissuade burglars from "anti-social values"; the manufacturer assures the laborer that a protective tariff means higher wages and maintenance of the "American Standard".

It is obvious, however, that our values conflict, both individually and collectively, however we may strive to enlist allies by a specious harmonizing of values. Donald Budge can win tennis tournaments only by frustrating the desire of his opponents to win. The farmer gets more for his product by

charging higher prices to the consumer. The capitalist profits, perhaps, by low wages and long hours of labor; nations value territorial possessions and natural resources which can be had only at the expense of other nations. The citizens of nations which have fared well in past wars value the status quo, and depreciate any effort to change it. The victims of past defeats are branded as "aggressors", and it is clearly implied that any government which strives to get more of the earth's riches for its people by the only possible means, that is, by war, is immoral. This is an attempt to gain universal, not merely local, sympathy for the desire to retain the benefits of war. The superior morality of "have" nations,* which condemns any but "defensive warfare", reminds one of the poker player, who, having won most of the money, tries to persuade the losers that it is better to quit playing and get some sleep.

-12- The Rival Patterns of Culture

Almost everyone deplores group conflict, such as industrial strikes, revolution and war. The balance, called "realists" if they are on our side, "opportunists" or "knaves" when on the other side of the fence, take conflict for granted or like Nietsche, glorify conflict, and try to insure that their side will not come out second best. Few place the blame upon the values which bring these things to pass, unless indeed it is to blame the values of opponents. Each selfish or socially-minded individual is wont to produce, through an appeal to emotion, an artificial harmony by arousing in others the same

*As the late Frank Symonds called them.

desires. Each self-centered group shapes its code as an instrument of selfish interest, and attempts to educate others by propaganda so that they will feel wicked if they promote other values.

And behind each system of values, however egotistically conceived, is the vision of an harmonious pattern of human relations in which each person enjoys certain rights and fulfills certain obligations. To the extent that each person dutifully fills his role the system works without conflict. Plato outlined such a system in his "Republic". The Brahman caste system, the feudal conception, capitalism, guild socialism, communism, fascism, Catholicism, all envision an ordered society, inspired, imposed, or evolved. The exponents of these "isms" generally imagine a bureaucracy, a dictator, or a Pope to direct education and decide values, to prescribe rights and assign duties, and to enforce conformity.

Though these concepts would rule out all social or group conflict, at least within national boundaries, democratic theory and capitalism retain class conflict within certain well-defined limits as a part of the system. A democracy is made up of self-centered groups, representing class, geographical, municipal, occupational, political, and, above all, religious groups, of every shade and variety. Each citizen as an individual and as a member of various groups is engaged in a perpetual strife to promote his values in competition with the system of values of other individuals and other groups. A democracy, and to a lesser degree a republic, might be defined as that state of

affairs where one may battle for his system of values against all other systems, and where the warfare of propaganda is only temporarily settled at the polls.

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Democratic Theory of Values

Democratic theory thus assumes that values will change to meet changed conditions, new perspectives, wider experience. It provides machinery for instrumenting changing sentiments. Therefore, when any feature incident to democracy is stated in absolute terms someone has lost perspective, has forgotten that the particular value was evolved out of a peculiar state of mind to meet special conditions. To identify any value with the theory that it might enjoy an eternal sanctity is to defeat the fundamental aim of democracy.

Those who believe in an "objective right and wrong" contend that the view which we have been advocating (i.e., that values are relative one to another, and to time and place), has immoral consequences. This fear, it seems to us, is based on three faulty assumptions: First, that some values shouldn't and, as a matter of fact, do not change; Second, that the democratic machinery was meant to improve or adapt our laws for the attainment of old values, not for the expression of new values; And third, that to the extent that values are ephemeral standards conditioned upon time and place, the less this fact is called to popular attention, the better.

When we contemplate this point of view, it appears that a democracy is the last place where any permanent benefit is likely to result from obscuring facts, by fooling ourselves

or each other. As for the contention that values are absolute and final, it should be enough to point out the shifting emphasis in the teachings of those very institutions which most emphatically deny relativity. Such institutions as monarchy and monasticism, for example, rise and fall, and along with them the system of values which they bolstered and which bolstered them. Elizabethan frankness is succeeded by that peculiar hierarchy of values which is often referred to as "the Victorian state of mind". We live, we say, in a different world today than that in which the "best people" set up housekeeping in caves and formed anchorite communities; or than that in which a maiden lady brought a baby doll to show the doctor exactly where her knee was injured.[1] More accurately, they lived in a world in which different ideals, or values, were elevated to the highest place. They lived in the same world, but they thought and felt as though it were a different one, because, in part, the importance of a future and hypothetical world was emphasized in their education. Nothing, it seems, is more certain than change. And from this ceaseless evolution in the sphere of human relations, the relative pattern of our values most certainly is not exempt.

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The Coöperation of the "Practical Man" and the "Theorist"

Since the truth or error, the utility or harmfulness of any doctrine cannot be immediately known, but only through trial and error, the democratic tradition of freedom to exploit "good" values involves equal freedom for those who advocate a "bad" system. This doctrine is a commonplace more often forgotten than

1. Finney, J.T.M., The Physician, 1930, Scribners, New York.

remembered.* This intolerance is based upon an ancient and persistent belief that while the truth or falsehood of any physical hypothesis has to be learned by observation and hard work, truth about human nature, on the other hand, and about the best of all possible order in human values, is not learned, but "revealed", "inspired", supplied gratis to a few men in oecumenical councils, through reading ancient authorities and arm-chair philosophizing, or in the party councils of the fascist leaders; and that these men pass this infallible and invaluable information on to us for nothing, or for a small monetary consideration.

This insistent dichotomy of human wisdom into that which is deduced out of one's own or someone's else conscience from absolute principles, as distinguished from that which has to be learned from experience, has been responsible both for the exciting achievements in "natural philosophy", and for the amazing lag in the rational solution of our pressing social problems. A static theorism in values, a steadfast reliance on fixed moral principles, has blocked the employment of human intelligence. The guiding values of life had to be deduced by a curiously set and sacred formula. Greek philosophy, the Bible or the Talmud, the pronouncements of prophets and Church Fathers provided an inspired system of values out of which new rules could be fabricated without the trouble of learning new truths from experience.**

*And it is anathema to fascism, communism and Catholicism.

**Nazi values, likewise, are infallible, exempt from criticism, imposed from above, and militantly aggressive against competing systems of values.

It has meant that any new arrangement in this pattern had to be spun from the same time-honored premises, and without destroying the illusion of infallibility; that is, by pretending that changes are not changes at all, but only logical developments from the same old rules.

The dynamic practical and scientific attack which has annihilated space and revolutionized an industrial civilization, contrasts sharply with the futility of our efforts in the field of human relations, where immutable boundaries mark the limits set by superstition for the investigation of fact. The whole Christian era has seen precious little progress; the ancient Greeks were just about as wise. Trial and error has not evolved a tested hierarchy of values to rescue man from his ancient shame. Values arranged in a pattern deduced from hoary moral and legal premises are passed on by family, church, and school, in utter disregard of the laws and principles of psychology, and despite the contradictions of everyday experience. There is, in fact, an edict against any effort to verify the practical utility of the premise; the ability to draw conclusions from the premise, rather than to test the premise, is the end of ethical training.

Having clung to the premise too long, because it was necessary to the "logical unity" of Christian theology, or fascism, or communism, there has resulted a one-sided development. The objective method has given us riches but has not taught us how to use our wealth for the promotion of human welfare. So we find that the applications of science are turned over to a world animated by cupidity, envy, fear, hatred and suspicion; to a democratic majority still

motivated by the stagnant theoristic principles of the Middle Ages. Man most commonly places loyalty to religious institutions above courage and honesty and ability,* nationalism above justice, the impregnable integrity of institutions above human lives, the future of the human soul above humanitarianism. Chemical science is perverted to the making of poison gas, and high explosives. Wars are bigger and bloodier. Airplanes, warships, and the machines of modern warfare are turned over to medieval, feudalistic Japan to aid in the slaughter of helpless Chinese civilians and to facilitate the extinction of a kindly culture. Radio and moving pictures disseminate an anemic vulgarity, educate the populace to the imaginary virtues of certain brands of cigarettes and breakfast cereals; or worse yet, become instruments of economic and political propaganda.

Thus moral theory starting from its beautiful vision of good and inspired men as the peculiar repository for "true values", and rejecting the test of experience and the findings of psychology, has acted as an effective deterrent to any concerted sensible effort at finding a way out of the besetting sins of social injustice and strife. It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that practical men cannot administer, without expert aid, to a world complicated by the applications of science; that the morals, the loyalties and animosities, in a word, the "values" of our fathers are <u>not</u> "good enough for us". There are signs that the social scientist is

*No Catholic can become president of the predominantly Protestant country, and no Protestant can become mayor of predominantly Irish Catholic Boston.

acquiring dignity and prestige. He is no longer a voice crying in the academic wilderness. Harvard has instituted a school of political science. Here theory is in mesh with the driving wheels of government, and both science and practice stand to benefit radically. Thurman Arnold has been called to the Department of Justice; Adolf Berle is,(or was) Assistant Secretary of State; the voice of Felix Frankfurter is heard in Washington, to mention but a few. The wedge is being driven. One can envision here, in the union of action and theory, the beginning of an era in which social science will not be confined to universities. There is, I believe, an opportunity for trial and error in the social laboratory; for testing any probable theory, without necessarily "shaking the foundations of society."

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES

The Abstract of a Dissertation

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Spranger's "Types of Men" divided men into six general types on the basis of dominant values: *the theoretical, the economic, the aesthetic, the social, the political* (or *Machtmensch*), and *the religious*. In 1931 Allport and Vernon published a "study of Values", which is based on Spranger's work, and which is offered to the public as a test of individual interests, or values. This test tends to indicate that Spranger's types are well selected. Religious and aesthetic types were the most satisfactory, and social values the least satisfactory. Correlation with occupation and profession showed the test to have a fair reliability for those six types. In 1936 Freeman published "Social Psychology" which applied the concept of *value* as a dynamic factor in social cooperation and competition. The present paper is an extension of the work of these men. Specifically, it attempts an analysis of *value* in the light of recent experiments, and a consideration, on the basis of that analysis, of certain social problems.

In the first chapter, "The Anatomy of Value", I have attempted to trace the growth of typical values, and by reference to some of the more recent theories and experiments relating to learning, to explain how the child's values are directed in social living. Especial emphasis is placed on Holt's theory of "adience", Novikova's and Munroe's indirect conditioning, or "conditioning of the higher order", Razran's study of "configural" and "colligated" conditioning, Pavlov's, Razran's and Jones' principle of "dominance", Murphy's "canalization" or "fixation", as distinguished from conditioning, and as developed from McDougall's concept of "sentiments". As J. E. Anderson has pointed out, the principle of dominance, involving the "narrowing of organic potentialities", results in the selection of specific responses to determine stimuli out of diffusive, mass reactions. The infant's preference for milk, for example, is an individuation of his tendency to swallow any one of a large number of foods. His later preference for "mother's cooking" would be explained in the same way. The desire for attention and approval may be taken as an example of conditioning based upon this early canalization.

All these studies point to the same course of individual development. Uncoordinate, mass behavior is replaced by particularized patterns of response. Devastating hunger, or murderous hate, cease to elicit the wriggling, thrashing and screaming of early childhood. Hunger sends one to the pantry; rage is controlled or sublimated against rivals, Jews, communists, fascists, or the New Deal.

But incentive does more than plug in on appropriate lines, pull the plugs on contrary lines. It acts, rather, to *suppress* competitors *and* to *augment* the dominant line of action. A strong competing (but subordinate) reaction tendency requires an intense suppressive force, which accentuates the dominant reaction. In viewing an automobile wreck, for example, one suppresses a strong horror and aversion, which, paradoxically enough, acts to augment morbid curiosity. This would explain, in part, the tremendous driving force of alternate positive and negative values; why love is aligned with hate, and one often supplants the other; why love or hate is intensified by the opposite value; and perhaps it explains why love is blind, why we love people because of, rather than despite, their faults.

The selection and fixation upon objects which first elicited a drive response figures prominently in shaping the values of every personality. The French term "canalization" is preferred by Murphy for this narrowing of non-specific cravings into specific desires. Little girls are given imitation infants, dolls, are surrounded by a complex of influences which end by canalizing affection, prestige, security, possessiveness, and other values into a compelling *maternity*

value. *Canalization*, rather than *conditioning*, is here used, because the latter implies a new stimulus-response linkage, an association of other present, often adventitious stimuli, to an old value. Thus the child's response to the mother at feeding time would be described as conditioning, but the taste for milk or pretzels or beer would be ascribed to fixation or canalization.

Since social conflict or harmony result from the clash or synchronization of individual values, a clearer understanding of the genesis of value is vital to social psychology. This need is apparent when one considers the attitude of society toward the members of "out-groups", and, conversely, in the consideration of the reaction of those persons to that society which condemns and persecutes them.

All of us, it seems, are more or less at the mercy of stereotypes which serve to codify certain values. Men think in terms of "Jew-baiting Nazis", "Chiseling Hopkinites", "Long-haired Radicals", "Harlots", "Pimps", "Fairies", "Bums", and "Jail-birds". The stereotype represents both a value and an interpretation of events which relate to that value. It confirms and supports the system of values which it represents.

This is noticeable in one's attitude toward one's own group and other groups, especially toward the members of minorities and out-groups. Like children who taunt with such expressions as "buck-teeth", "four-eyes", or "nigger", the adult persecutes those who deviate from the common standard. But adults have learned to rationalize cruelty.

Sometimes resentment is expressed against innocent deviations from standard appearance or action, as in the case of Negroes in the south, or Japanese on the west coast. In general, however, dislike is directed against those who violate, or seem to violate our own values. Mormons who practice polygamy, hobos who won't work, homosexuals, or criminals who violate our moral values, or values which relate to the sanctity of property or persons, are examples.

We must distinguish between those whose offense is negative, as with hobos or tramps who refuse to act according to the majority value placed upon industry, and those whose offense is positive, as in the case of criminals. And we must distinguish between the violators of those values which are codified in law, and those whose offense is against morals and manners.

To the student of social psychology, moreover, there is an enormous practical difference between those criminals and prostitutes who belong to an out-group, who are well adjusted within that group, but whose group standards bring them into conflict with the larger society, as contrasted with those who class themselves with a despised minority by their inability to conform or adjust to the values of the society in which they have been brought up.

Insofar as the criminal is the product of an area where anti-social values are dominant, the cure is the elimination of these breeding places. Punishment is not a cure. New recruits are constantly filling the ranks depleted by prosecution and imprisonment. Asocial values are still being passed on to growing boys and girls. The Panama Canal Zone would never have been made safe by arming people with fly-swatters.

It should not be inferred that members of "respectable society" compute the shame of prostitution or homosexuality entirely on the basis of Christian moral values. The prostitute not only is immoral, but she also sells herself cheaply, without the legal and economic benefits of marriage. She is thus

a threat to the security of respectable, or "union" wives. Homosexuals are a disturbing influence, uncomfortable to have around in a society whose organization and customs presuppose heterosexuality.

Frigidity and celibacy, while just as "unnatural" as homosexuality or prostitution and as inimical to normal procreation, derive from those Christian values which abhor every enjoyment which might gratify the sensual, and thus subordinate the moral nature of man. Celibates are not condemned, but often admired and respected, since their lives conform to the writings of St. Paul as taught by the various Christian sects. So it would appear that the attitude of society is determined only in part from considerations of social consequence.

In the experiments on learning mentioned above, the handle which identifies the whole situation is usually an outstanding stimulus or object. In social learning, however, the handle for identification is most often a pattern in which some relational aspect, rather than a discrete stimulus is crucial. Razran's experiments on "colligated" and "configural" conditioning suggest a valuable method for studying the conditions of social values. The boy, for example, does not love the girl's nose, or hair, or eyes, but the whole configuration. The separate items blend into each other so intimately, that presented in a different context they fall into a pattern whose significance is very different.

And the values themselves are relative standards. They are relative to time and place for the individual, and temporary expedients for the group, undergoing a constant evolution. As the individual matures he tends to arrange his system of values into a hierarchy, in which each value has a more or less fixed position, with certain values outranking others. While tending to hold their relative importance, they shift temporarily, sometimes permanently, with the circumstance, with the surge and waning of desire, with frustration and success, with his profession, and the whole condition of his adjustment. Social psychologists have often erred in considering a value as an independent entity which exerts an influence without regard to the whole pattern of values of which it is only an integral part. No single value, or its effect upon behavior, therefore, is to be understood without reference to the person's whole system of values. And any analysis of values which fails to take account of their relative nature, is just as artificial and misleading as the pre-*Gestalt* treatment of perception by our leading psychologists.

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