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dc.contributor.authorYu Lin-Huien_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-27T14:36:50Z
dc.date.available2015-04-27T14:36:50Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.submitted2013
dc.identifier.other
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/11091
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.)--Boston Universityen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines whether the adoption of clawback provisions decreases earnings management. Clawback provisions are intended to discourage managers' opportunistic behavior by enabling companies to recoup erroneously awarded compensation in the event of an accounting restatement. Using firms that voluntarily implement clawback provisions, I find that clawback-adopters experience a reduction in both accrual-based and real earnings management in the post-adoption period, relative to non-adopters. These results are robust to multiple approaches controlling for endogeneity of the clawback decision. In addition, these results are also consistent within subsamples of firms facing high level of incentives to manage earnings, suggesting that clawback provisions remain effective in curbing accrual-based earnings management even when managers are under more pressure to manipulate earnings. Overall, the findings are consistent with clawback adoption signaling a move towards overall higher reporting quality.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBoston Universityen_US
dc.titleThe effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings managementen_US
dc.typeThesis/Dissertationen_US
etd.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
etd.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
etd.degree.disciplineManagementen_US
etd.degree.grantorBoston Universityen_US


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