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dc.contributor.authorElipidorou, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-07T03:13:19Z
dc.date.available2015-08-07T03:13:19Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.submitted2013
dc.identifier.other(ALMA)contemp
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/12755
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe present dissertation examines the ontological status of consciousness. It argues that consciousness is physical, even though it appears not to be, and shows that consciousness' manner of appearing as something non-physical admits of a physical explanation. The dissertation responds to specific epistemic arguments against physicalism. The arguments in question are epistemic because they purport to establish an ontological gap between phenomenal facts and physical facts on the basis of an epistetnic gap between phenomenal truths and physical truths. Epistemic arguments against physicalism contend that the reason why consciousness and the physical nature of the brain appear to be different -- viz., the reason why phenomenal truths cannot be a priori deduced from physical truths -- is because consciousness and the brain are ontologically distinct. The dissertation responds to such arguments in two steps. The first step is to analyze the nature of phenomenal concepts. The second step is to demonstrate the following four theses: (1) that phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated from physical ot functional concepts; (2) that conceptual isolation is responsible for and explains the failure of a priori entailment of phenomenal truths by physical truths; (3) that phenomenal concepts ultimately pick out physical entities; and (4) that there is a physicalistically acceptable account of phenomenal concepts. Hence, far from being indicative of an ontological gap between physical facts and phenomenal facts, the exceptional epistemic status of phenomenal truths is merely the consequence of how we conceptualize phenomenal facts.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBoston Universityen_US
dc.titleOn sensible matters: a defense of conceptual dualismen_US
dc.typeThesis/Dissertationen_US
etd.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
etd.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
etd.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
etd.degree.grantorBoston Universityen_US


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