Three essays on strategic political behavior in proportional representation systems
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The goal of this thesis is to understand and measure strategic behavior in proportional representation systems. Chapter one provides an empirical strategy to quantify strategic voting in such systems. Using pre-electoral survey data, it measures the degree of strategic voting in the Israeli legislative elections of 2006, which is shown to have been around 5%-10%. Chapter two uses pre-electoral data from Israel (2003 aud 2006 legislative elections) to show that that agents' perceptions on the affinities between party leaders matter over and above their own preferences and expectations on the distribution of seats in parliament, a fact that has been overlooked by the theoretical literature. A model that incorporates this behavior is also provided. Chapter three takes advantage of the fact that in New Zealand, Maori have the right to choose in which district to register (and therefore, vote), in order to understand the reasons behind Maori choices, using Census and electoral registration data from 2006. Results suggest that there is an agglomeration effect (Maori register where their Maori neighbors register) and also a small strategic effect (Maori register in the district they feel they can be more pivotal).
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at email@example.com. Thank you.