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dc.contributor.authorAkinwumi, Josephen_US
dc.contributor.authorByers, Johnen_US
dc.contributor.authorTerzi, Evimariaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-21T14:54:12Z
dc.date.available2011-07-21T14:54:12Z
dc.date.issued2011-07-21
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/1428
dc.description.abstractThe Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher. Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. Following previous modelling efforts, we model the program as a two-sided market with advertisers on one side and publishers on the other. We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction. GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known. We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction. The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectTwo-sided internet advertisement marketen_US
dc.subjectTwo-sided marketsen_US
dc.subjectInternet advertisingen_US
dc.titlePricing Algorithms For a Two-sided Internet Advertisement Marketen_US
dc.typeImageen_US


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