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dc.contributor.authorSeeba, Erin
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-09T19:54:50Z
dc.date.available2016-03-09T19:54:50Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/15140
dc.description.abstractFrege and Husserl are both recognized for their significant contributions to the overthrowing of logical psychologism, at least in its 19th century forms. Between Frege's profound impact on modern logic that extended the influence of his anti-psychologism and Husserl's extensive attempts at the refutation of logical psychologism in the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, these arguments are generally understood as successful. This paper attempts to account for the development of these two anti-psychologistic conceptions of logical objects and for some of the basic differences between them. It identifies some problems that are common to strongly anti-psychologistic conceptions of logic and compares the extent to which Frege's and Husserl's views are open to these problems. Accordingly, this paper is divided into two parts. Part I develops a conception of the problems of logical psychologism as they are distinctively understood by each philosopher, out of the explicit arguments and criticisms made against the view in the texts. This conception is in each case informed by the overall historical trajectories of each philosopher's philosophical development. Part II examines the two views in light of common problems of anti-psychologism.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectAnti-psychologismen_US
dc.subjectFregeen_US
dc.subjectHusserlen_US
dc.subjectLogical psychologismen_US
dc.titleThe logical anti-psychologism of Frege and Husserlen_US
dc.typeThesis/Dissertation
dc.date.updated2016-01-22T18:59:11Z
etd.degree.nameM.A.en_US
etd.degree.levelmastersen_US
etd.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
etd.degree.grantorBoston Universityen_US


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