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dc.contributor.authorZhang, Jingen_US
dc.contributor.authorPourazarm, Sepidehen_US
dc.contributor.authorCassandras, Christos G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPaschalidis, Ioannis Ch.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-26T01:07:52Z
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-29T15:20:03Z
dc.date.available2016-08-26T01:07:52Z
dc.date.available2016-09-29T15:20:03Z
dc.identifier.citationJing Zhang, Sepideh Pourazarm, Christos G Cassandras, Ioannis Ch Paschalidis. "The Price of Anarchy in Transportation Networks by Estimating User Cost Functions from Actual Traffic Data." 2016 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.
dc.identifier.otherhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1606.02194v1
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/18012
dc.description.abstractWe have considered a large-scale road network in Eastern Massachusetts. Using real traffic data in the form of spatial average speeds and the flow capacity for each road segment of the network, we converted the speed data to flow data and estimated the origin-destination flow demand matrices for the network. Assuming that the observed traffic data correspond to user (Wardrop) equilibria for different times-of-the-day and days-of-the-week, we formulated appropriate inverse problems to recover the per-road cost (congestion) functions determining user route selection for each month and time-of-day period. In addition, we analyzed the sensitivity of the total user latency cost to important parameters such as road capacities and minimum travel times. Finally, we formulated a system-optimum problem in order to find socially optimal flows for the network. We investigated the network performance, in terms of the total latency, under a user-optimal policy versus a system-optimal policy. The ratio of these two quantities is defined as the Price of Anarchy (POA) and quantifies the efficiency loss of selfish actions compared to socially optimal ones. Our findings contribute to efforts for a smarter and more efficient city.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.replaceshttp://hdl.handle.net/2144/17756
dc.relation.replaces2144/17756
dc.subjectOptimization and Control (math.OC)en_US
dc.subjectComputer scienceen_US
dc.subjectGame Theory (cs.GT)en_US
dc.titleThe Price of Anarchy in Transportation Networks by Estimating User Cost Functions from Actual Traffic Dataen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
pubs.notes14 pages, 5 figures, submitted to the 2016 IEEE Conference on Decision and Controlen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: No embargoen_US
pubs.organisational-group/Boston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-group/Boston University/College of Engineeringen_US
pubs.organisational-group/Boston University/College of Engineering/Department of Electrical & Computer Engineeringen_US


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