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dc.contributor.authorIrwin, Amosen_US
dc.contributor.otherBoston University Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studiesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-24T21:24:48Z
dc.date.available2017-08-24T21:24:48Z
dc.date.issued2014-05
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/23661
dc.descriptionThis repository item contains a working paper from the Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative. The Global Economic Governance Initiative (GEGI) is a research program of the Center for Finance, Law & Policy, the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, and the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies. It was founded in 2008 to advance policy-relevant knowledge about governance for financial stability, human development, and the environment.en_US
dc.description.abstractAlthough China began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the 1970s, it refused to grant foreign investors the right to sue their host government in international arbitration tribunals. Few realize that China’s treaty negotiators have in fact abandoned this restriction in almost every Chinese BIT signed since 1998, including those with Latin America. Scholars have suggested that China reversed its policy in order to support Chinese overseas investors or to fit its general economic liberalization strategy. However, China’s BITs with Mexico, Peru, and Colombia as well as its arbitration case with Peru contradict these theories. I argue that China began signing open BITs to test the risks of granting open access to European countries and the United States, for whom open access is a key condition. China experimented gradually with open arbitration, just as it has experimented gradually with many economic changes since Reform and Opening began in 1978. This theory has interesting implications for China’s future BITs—as international arbitration tribunals threaten to make this experiment permanent, China has added new restrictions that bring China’s BITs closer to the US model and make a US-­‐China BIT more likely. However, the US avoids BITs with capital-­‐exporting countries, and China is now a large capital-­‐exporter. The main obstacle to US-­‐China BIT negotiations may no longer be the two nations’ differences, but rather their similarities.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBoston University Global Economic Governance Initiativeen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGEGI Working Paper; Paper 3, May 2014
dc.rightsCopyright 2014 Boston University. Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that: 1. The copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage; 2. the report title, author, document number, and release date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of BOSTON UNIVERSITY TRUSTEES. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and / or special permission.en_US
dc.subjectBilateral investment treaties (BITs)en_US
dc.subjectChinaen_US
dc.subjectLatin Americaen_US
dc.subjectInternational investmenten_US
dc.subjectUnited Statesen_US
dc.titleCrossing the ocean by feeling for the BITs: Investor‐state arbitration in China’s bilateral investment treatiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.holderBoston Universityen_US


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