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dc.contributor.authorIrwin, Amosen_US
dc.contributor.authorGallagher, Kevin P.en_US
dc.contributor.otherBoston University Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studiesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-24T21:25:06Z
dc.date.available2017-08-24T21:25:06Z
dc.date.issued2014-06
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/23664
dc.descriptionThis repository item contains a working paper from the Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative. The Global Economic Governance Initiative (GEGI) is a research program of the Center for Finance, Law & Policy, the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, and the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies. It was founded in 2008 to advance policy-relevant knowledge about governance for financial stability, human development, and the environment.en_US
dc.description.abstractScholars have compared China’s liberalization, inward FDI attraction, and export promotion policies to those of its "Asian Miracle" predecessors to assess China as a 'developmental state.' We build on that literature by drawing a new but similar comparison: the extent to which Chinese development banks have financed the globalization of China’s ‘national champion’ firms. We focus on the role of state finance in promoting China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in comparative perspective. In order to answer this research question, we created a database of Chinese finance for OFDI and compared our results to the existing literature on previous developmental states. We estimate the total value of China’s OFDI finance from 2002‐2012 at $140 billion. As a percentage of total OFDI, China’s lending is roughly three times 55% higher than Japan, the previous global leader in OFDI finance. Like Japan and South Korea at earlier developmental stages, China’s lending also goes overwhelmingly toward natural resource acquisition, though to a much greater degree. Unlike Japan or Korea, we find that China’s market entry has more to do with developing project expertise and supporting exports than it does with tariff‐hopping or outsourcing industries that are fading on the mainland. We identify two major reasons for China’s high (31%) ratio of OFDI lending to total OFDI. First, China has a greater incentive to give OFDI loans than Japan or Korea ever did because its borrowers are state‐owned so it can more easily dictate how they use the money. Second, China has a greater capacity to give OFDI loans because it has significantly higher savings and foreign exchange reserves than Japan and Korea, both today and especially during equivalent developmental stages.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBoston University Global Economic Governance Initiativeen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGEGI Working Paper; Paper 6, June 2014
dc.rightsCopyright 2014 Boston University. Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that: 1. The copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage; 2. the report title, author, document number, and release date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of BOSTON UNIVERSITY TRUSTEES. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and / or special permission.en_US
dc.subjectChinaen_US
dc.subjectOutward foreign direct investment (OFDI)en_US
dc.subjectCapital flowsen_US
dc.subjectInvestment loansen_US
dc.titleExporting national champions: China’s OFDI finance in comparative perspectiveen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.holderBoston Universityen_US


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