Moral objectives in W.R. Sorley, W.D. Ross, A.C. Ewing, and A.C. Garnett
Bergmark, Robert Edward
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It is the aim of this dissertation to examine the systems of thought of four recent and contemporary objects in moral theory, W. R. Sorley, W. D. Ross, A. C. Ewing, and A. C. Garnett, with a view to evaluating the case which they make for moral objectivism. Sorley, beginning with a study of judgements of approval and disapproval, argued that such judgments claim objective validity, and, when analyzed, reveal a pattern of basic principles of moral worth. These principles are universally valid, and constitute a system of moral laws. The primary contributions of Sorley's system are to be seen in his use of coherence; in his insistence upon the significance of the person in relation to value; and in his concept of moral laws. The primary weaknesses are to be seen in his failure to distinguish adequately between value and obligation and in his appeal to intuition at crucial points in his theory. [TRUNCATED]
Thesis (Ph.D)--Boston University
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