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dc.contributor.authorLaine, Liisa T.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMa, Ching-to Alberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-14T11:27:37Z
dc.date.available2018-03-14T11:27:37Z
dc.date.issued2017-08
dc.identifier.citationLiisa T. Laine, Ching-to Albert Ma. 2017. "Quality and competition between public and private firms." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 140, pp. 336 - 353.
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/27467
dc.description.abstractWe study a multistage, quality-then-price game between a public firm and a private firm. The market consists of a set of consumers who have different quality valuations. The public firm aims to maximize social surplus, whereas the private firm maximizes profit. In the first stage, both firms simultaneously choose qualities. In the second stage, both firms simultaneously choose prices. Consumers’ quality valuations are drawn from a general distribution. Each firm's unit production cost is an increasing and convex function of quality. There are multiple equilibria. In some, the public firm chooses a low quality, and the private firm chooses a high quality. In others, the opposite is true. We characterize subgame-perfect equilibria. Equilibrium qualities are often inefficient, but under some conditions on consumer valuation distribution, equilibrium qualities are first best. Various policy implications are drawn.en_US
dc.format.extent336 - 353en_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
dc.subjectPrice-quality competitionen_US
dc.subjectQualityen_US
dc.subjectPublic firmen_US
dc.subjectPrivate firmen_US
dc.subjectApplied economicsen_US
dc.subjectEconomicsen_US
dc.titleQuality and competition between public and private firmsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.012
pubs.elements-sourcecrossrefen_US
pubs.notespublisher: Elsevier articletitle: Quality and competition between public and private firms journaltitle: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization articlelink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.012 content_type: article copyright: © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US


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