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dc.contributor.authorGilad, Yossien_US
dc.contributor.authorSagga, Omaren_US
dc.contributor.authorGoldberg, Sharonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-29T19:33:28Z
dc.date.available2018-05-29T19:33:28Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationYossi Gilad, Omar Sagga, and Sharon Goldberg. 2017. MaxLength Considered Harmful to the RPKI. In Proceedings of CoNEXT ’17, Incheon, Republic of Korea, December 12–15, 2017, 7 pages. DOI: 10.1145/3143361.3143363
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/29023
dc.description.abstractUser convenience and strong security are often at odds, and most security applications need to find some sort of balance between these two (often opposing) goals. The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a security infrastructure built on top of interdomain routing, is not immune to this issue. The RPKI uses the maxLength attribute to reduce the amount of information that must be explicitly recorded in its cryptographic objects. MaxLength also allows operators to easily reconfigure their networks without modifying their RPKI objects. Our network measurements, however, suggest that the maxLength attribute strikes the wrong balance between security and user convenience. We therefore believe that operators should avoid using maxLength. We give operational recommendations and develop software that allow operators to reap many of the benefits of maxLength without its security costs.en_US
dc.description.urihttps://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1015.pdf
dc.description.urihttps://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1015.pdf
dc.publisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)en_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies - CoNEXT
dc.rights© 2017 ACM. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior special permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CoNEXT ’17, Incheon, Republic of Koreaen_US
dc.subjectSecurity protocolsen_US
dc.subjectRouting protocolsen_US
dc.subjectInterdomain routing securityen_US
dc.subjectResource Public Key Infrastructureen_US
dc.subjectBorder Gateway Protocolen_US
dc.titleMaxLength considered harmful to the RPKIen_US
dc.typeConference materialsen_US
dc.description.versionPublished versionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/3143361.3143363
pubs.elements-sourcec-inst-1en_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Computer Scienceen_US


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