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dc.contributor.authorGrassi, Simonaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMa, Ching-to Alberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-06T15:10:54Z
dc.date.issued2016-11
dc.identifier.citationSimona Grassi, Ching-to Albert Ma. 2016. "Information acquisition, referral, and organization." The RAND Journal of Economics, v. 47, issue 4, pp. 935 - 960.
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/29254
dc.description.abstractEach of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work effort because of the lack of cost responsibility.en_US
dc.format.extentp. 935-960en_US
dc.publisherRand Corp.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofThe RAND Journal of Economics
dc.subjectEconomicsen_US
dc.subjectInformation acquisitionen_US
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen_US
dc.subjectCost-reduction incentiveen_US
dc.titleInformation acquisition, referral, and organizationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1756-2171.12160
dc.description.embargo2018-11-11
pubs.elements-sourcecrossrefen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.date.online2016-11-11
dc.date.online2016-11-11
dc.date.online2016-11-11


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