The concept of the self in the metaphysics of Charles Arthur Campbell
Frazier, Allie Mitchell
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The purpose of this dissertation is an exposition and critical analysis of the concept of 'substantival' self in the philosophy of Charles Arthur Campbell. Campbell contends that the self is known only inferentially, as a necessary precondition for the experiences of cognition, succession in time, and memory. The self is not reducible to its experiences, but is something 'over and above' its empirical manifestation. The manifested self is distinguishable from the subject self not simply in the analysis of the experience of cognition, succession in time, and memory, but also by the self's immediate apprehension of creative transcendance of 'formed character' in 'self-activity proper' [TRUNCATED]
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University
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