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dc.contributor.authorFrazier, Allie Mitchellen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-31T13:45:22Z
dc.date.available2018-07-31T13:45:22Z
dc.date.issued1963
dc.date.submitted1963
dc.identifier.otherb14687021
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/30108
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.)--Boston Universityen_US
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this dissertation is an exposition and critical analysis of the concept of 'substantival' self in the philosophy of Charles Arthur Campbell. Campbell contends that the self is known only inferentially, as a necessary precondition for the experiences of cognition, succession in time, and memory. The self is not reducible to its experiences, but is something 'over and above' its empirical manifestation. The manifested self is distinguishable from the subject self not simply in the analysis of the experience of cognition, succession in time, and memory, but also by the self's immediate apprehension of creative transcendance of 'formed character' in 'self-activity proper' [TRUNCATED]en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBoston Universityen_US
dc.rightsBased on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions.en_US
dc.subjectCampbell, Charles Arthuren_US
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectSubstantival selfen_US
dc.titleThe concept of the self in the metaphysics of Charles Arthur Campbellen_US
dc.typeThesis/Dissertationen_US
etd.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
etd.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
etd.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
etd.degree.grantorBoston Universityen_US
dc.identifier.barcode11719025663438
dc.identifier.mmsid99175767640001161


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