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dc.contributor.authorOrtner, Juanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-14T13:52:55Z
dc.date.available2018-08-14T13:52:55Z
dc.date.issued2017-05
dc.identifier.citationJ Ortner. 2017. "A theory of political gridlock." Theoretical Economics, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 555-586.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/30778
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties' actions. There is an election scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and parties have similar levels of popularity.en_US
dc.publisherEconometric Societyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofTheoretical Economics
dc.subjectSocial sciencesen_US
dc.subjectEconomicsen_US
dc.subjectBusiness & economicsen_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectElectionsen_US
dc.subjectPolitical gridlocken_US
dc.subjectInefficient delayen_US
dc.subjectLegislative policy makingen_US
dc.subjectBargaining modelen_US
dc.subjectStochastic modelen_US
dc.subjectAccountabilityen_US
dc.subjectDemocracyen_US
dc.subjectEconomic theoryen_US
dc.titleA theory of political gridlocken_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: No embargoen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US


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