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dc.contributor.authorOrtner, Juanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-14T14:10:17Z
dc.date.available2018-08-14T14:10:17Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationJ Ortner. 2017. "A Continuous Time Model of Bilateral Bargaining."
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/30780
dc.description.abstractThis paper constructs a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining to study how fluctuations in bargaining power affect the outcomes of negotiations. The paper deals with the technical complexities that arise when modeling games in continuous time by building strategy restrictions into the equilibrium definition. These restrictions select a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations. This unique equilibrium corresponds to the limiting subgame perfect equilibrium of discrete-time bargaining games with frequent offers.en_US
dc.publisherunpublished manuscripten_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectContinuous-time gamesen_US
dc.subjectTime-varying bargaining poweren_US
dc.subjectEconometricsen_US
dc.subjectMathematicsen_US
dc.subjectEconomicsen_US
dc.titleA continuous time model of bilateral bargainingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: No embargoen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusSubmitteden_US


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