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dc.contributor.authorFurstenberg, Rochelleen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-22T04:10:13Z
dc.date.issued1964
dc.date.submitted1964
dc.identifier.otherb14567507
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/33473
dc.descriptionThesis (M.A.)--Boston Universityen_US
dc.description.abstractThe theories ot empathy in the visual aesthetic experience as propound by Theodor Lipps, Vernon Lee and Hugo Munsterberg attempt to explain cognition ar qualities that do nat correspond to any specific sensations due to an object, but are nevertheless attributed to the object just as the specific sensations (e.g. of red or blue) are attributed to it. Pleasure felt as a result of experiencing the aesthetic object is not felt as occurring in the observer's body but as tied up with the object. The empathists discussed haw different explanations for the way that this attribution ot what seem to be "illusory qualities" is achieved. For Theodor Lipps empathy is a more complex process than it is for the other empathists. According to his view the observer, on one hand, participates in the life and activity of the object, and, on the other hand, attributes these "illusory" qualities to the object. [TRUNCATED]en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBoston Universityen_US
dc.rightsBased on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions.en_US
dc.subjectLipps, Theodoren_US
dc.subjectLee, Vernonen_US
dc.subjectMunsterberg, Hugoen_US
dc.subjectEmpathyen_US
dc.titleEmpathy theories of Theodor Lipps, Vernon Lee and Hugo Munsterbergen_US
dc.typeThesis/Dissertationen_US
etd.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
etd.degree.levelmastersen_US
etd.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
etd.degree.grantorBoston Universityen_US
dc.identifier.barcode11719022064085
dc.identifier.mmsid99181630740001161


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