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dc.contributor.authorBokulich, Alisaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-15T18:36:09Z
dc.date.available2019-03-15T18:36:09Z
dc.date.issued2016-07
dc.identifier.citationAlisa Bokulich. 2016. "Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth: Moving Beyond the Ontic Conception." The Monist, Volume 99, Issue 3, pp. 260 - 279. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onw004
dc.identifier.issn0026-9662
dc.identifier.issn2153-3601
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/34296
dc.description.abstractDespite widespread evidence that fictional models play an explanatory role in science, resistance remains to the idea that fictions can explain. A central source of this resistance is a particular view about what explanations are, namely, the ontic conception of explanation. According to the ontic conception, explanations just are the concrete entities in the world. I argue this conception is ultimately incoherent and that even a weaker version of the ontic conception fails. Fictional models can succeed in offering genuine explanations by correctly capturing relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence and licensing correct inferences. Using the example of Newtonian force explanations of the tides, I show how, even in science, fiction can be a vehicle for truth.en_US
dc.format.extentp. 260 - 279en_US
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_US
dc.relation.ispartofThe Monist
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.titleFiction as a vehicle for truth: moving beyond the ontic conceptionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionPublished versionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/monist/onw004
pubs.elements-sourcecrossrefen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Philosophyen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.date.online2016-10-10
dc.date.online2016-10-10


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