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dc.contributor.authorMookherjee, Dilipen_US
dc.contributor.authorMaitra, Pushkaren_US
dc.contributor.authorMitra, Sandipen_US
dc.contributor.authorMotta, Albertoen_US
dc.contributor.authorVisaria, Sujataen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-04T14:28:14Z
dc.date.available2019-06-04T14:28:14Z
dc.date.issued2017-07
dc.identifierhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387817300251
dc.identifier.citationDilip Mookherjee, Pushkar Maitra, Sandip Mitra, Alberto Motta, Sujata Visaria. 2017. "Financing Smallholder Agriculture: An Experiment with Agent-Intermediated Microloans in India." Journal of Development Economics, Volume 127, pp. 306 - 337. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.03.001
dc.identifier.issn0304-3878
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/35765
dc.description.abstractWe explore the hypothesis that traditional joint-liability microfinance programs fail to increase borrower incomes in part because they cannot screen out unproductive borrowers. In randomly selected villages in West Bengal, India, we implemented trader-agent-intermediated lending (TRAIL), in which local trader-lender agents were incentivized through repayment-based commissions to select borrowers for individual liability loans. In other randomly selected villages, we organized a group-based lending (GBL) program in which individuals formed 5-member groups and received joint liability loans. TRAIL loans increased the production of the leading cash crop by 27% and farm incomes by 22%. GBL loans had insignificant effects. We develop and test a theoretical model of borrower selection and incentives. Farmers selected by the TRAIL agents were more able than those who self-selected into the GBL scheme; this pattern of selection explains at least 30–40% of the observed difference in income impacts.en_US
dc.format.extentp. 306 - 337en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Development Economics
dc.subjectAgricultural financeen_US
dc.subjectAgent-based lendingen_US
dc.subjectRepaymenten_US
dc.subjectSelectionen_US
dc.subjectApplied economicsen_US
dc.subjectDevelopment studiesen_US
dc.subjectGroup lendingen_US
dc.titleFinancing smallholder agriculture: an experiment with agent-intermediated microloans in Indiaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.03.001
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.mycv424970


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