Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDaum, Paul S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-19T11:46:05Z
dc.date.issued1966
dc.date.submitted1966
dc.identifier.otherb14628806
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/37129
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.)--Boston Universityen_US
dc.descriptionPLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe United States played a major role in the Polish settlement both in 1919 and again in 1945. However, American policy toward Poland showed a marked change in the two instances. The motives guiding Wilson's actions were far removed from those which determined the course Roosevelt was to follow. Scholars have investigated individual aspects of the Polish problem: American foreign policy in the twentieth century; the Paris Peace Conference, Teheran and Yalta; Wilson and Roosevelt; the establishment of the Polish State; Russian-Polish, French-Polish, German-Polish relations. Much has also been written on the "Curzon Line", the Oder-Neisse Line, and to a lesser extent the Teschen problem. No one, however, after an examination of these three boundary problems, has attempted to determine the evolution of American policy toward Poland in the twentieth century Further, no student has surveyed the American Congressional reaction to the Polish problem. This study demonstrates that Congress played a small part, if any, in guiding American foreign policy toward the boundary problems. The executive, who determined policy, both in 1919 and in 1945 gave support to Polish aspirations for an independent State. In spite of this similarity, there were significant differences between Wilson's and Roosevelt's actions. The former did not waver from his principles, especially that of self-determination of peoples. The latter, because of his misconceptions of the character and aims of Stalin, made concessions to Russian desires, among them the Polish boundaries. Roosevelt sacrificed the ideal of self determination for an unworkable dream of post-war co-operation with Russia.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherBoston Universityen_US
dc.subjectPolanden_US
dc.subjectUnited Statesen_US
dc.subjectForeign policyen_US
dc.subjectHistoryen_US
dc.subjectInternational relationsen_US
dc.titleSome Polish boundary problems and the United States reaction, 1919-1945en_US
dc.typeThesis/Dissertationen_US
dc.description.embargo2031-01-01
etd.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
etd.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
etd.degree.disciplineHistoryen_US
etd.degree.grantorBoston Universityen_US
dc.identifier.barcode11719025609290
dc.identifier.mmsid99190937760001161


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record