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    Data-driven regulation: theory and application to missing bids

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    Date Issued
    2019-03
    Publisher Version
    10.3386/w25654
    Author(s)
    Ortner, Juan
    Chassang, Sylvain
    Kawai, Kei
    Nakabayashi, Jun
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    Permanent Link
    https://hdl.handle.net/2144/38160
    Version
    First author draft
    Citation (published version)
    Juan Ortner, Sylvain Chassang, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi. "Data-Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids." NBER Working Paper No. 25654. March 2019. https://doi.org/10.3386/w25654
    Abstract
    We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. There is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: it is inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop a theory of data-driven regulation based on “safe tests,” i.e. tests that are passed with probability one by competitive bidders, but need not be passed by non-competitive ones. We provide a general class of safe tests exploiting weak equilibrium conditions, and show that such tests reduce the set of equilibrium strategies that cartels can use to sustain collusion. We provide an empirical exploration of various safe tests in our data, as well as discuss collusive rationales for missing bids.
    Rights
    © 2019 by Sylvain Chassang, Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, and Juan M. Ortner. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
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    • CAS: Economics: Scholarly Papers [187]
    • BU Open Access Articles [3664]


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