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dc.contributor.authorChassang, Sylvainen_US
dc.contributor.authorOrtner, Juanen_US
dc.date2018-04-04
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-01T19:13:20Z
dc.date.available2019-10-01T19:13:20Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationS. Chassang, J. Ortner. 2019. "Collusion in auctions with constrained bids: Theory and evidence from public procurement." Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/701812
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/38165
dc.description.abstractWe study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope of punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counterintuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the winning-bid distribution. The model’s predictions are borne out in Japanese procurement data, where we find evidence that minimum prices weakened collusion. A robust design insight is that setting a minimum price at the bottom of the observed winning-bid distribution necessarily improves over a minimum price of zero.en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Political Economy
dc.subjectCollusionen_US
dc.subjectCartel enforcementen_US
dc.subjectMinimum pricesen_US
dc.subjectEntry deterrenceen_US
dc.subjectProcurementen_US
dc.subjectEconomicsen_US
dc.subjectCommerce, management, tourism and servicesen_US
dc.titleCollusion in auctions with constrained bids: Theory and evidence from public procurementen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted manuscripten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/701812
pubs.elements-sourcemanual-entryen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: No embargoen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublished onlineen_US
dc.identifier.mycv92212


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