Split-ticket voting: causes and consequences
Jaimes Arellano, Lilian Denisse
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This thesis uses a public policy perspective to examine the individual and institutional factors that lead to, and the consequences of, split-ticket voting. Chapter 1 uses a new methodology to identify the individual-level variables that influence the levels of split-ticket voting, using Mexico as an example. I find that 25% of Mexican citizens split their ticket, an intermediate level in comparison with other countries such as the United States or Brazil. I also find evidence that the hypotheses of party identification and candidate appeal are viable explanations for split-ticket voting in Mexico. In addition to testing existing hypotheses, I also study and find differences in vertical and horizontal split-ticket voting. Chapter 2 focuses on the institutional factors that influence voters to split their ballots. I review previously-reported institutional variables and test them in 13 countries using the CSES Module 3 dataset. I use a probit model to test the effect of institutional variables—political alliances, type of electoral formula, number and magnitude of electoral districts, institutionalization of democracy, and type of executive. To complement the econometric analysis, I conduct an experiment to test how the number of parties on a ballot affects split-ticket voting. I find evidence that institutions play a relevant role in this phenomenon and that increasing the number of parties in a ballot increases the probability of a split-ticket vote. Chapter 3 describes the policy effects of split-ticket voting by examining the allocation of federal transfers between subnational levels governed by different political parties. I use Mexico as a case study and the difference-in-differences methodology to test whether state governors favor municipalities governed by their same political party by granting more funding and projects of public works. Interviews with political actors suggest that governors’ influence to allocate resources at will have diminished as new actors have appeared. The results of the analysis of 2025 municipalities, during the period of 2014 and 2015, indicate that there is no partisan bias in the allocation of funds of the Ramo 23.