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    Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

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    This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
    Date Issued
    2018-01-02
    Publisher Version
    10.1073/pnas.1707505115
    Author(s)
    Li, Xuelong
    Jusup, Marko
    Wang, Zhen
    Li, Huijia
    Shi, Lei
    Podobnik, Boris
    Stanley, H. Eugene
    Havlin, Shlomo
    Boccaletti, Stefano
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    Permanent Link
    https://hdl.handle.net/2144/39817
    Version
    Published version
    Citation (published version)
    Xuelong Li, Marko Jusup, Zhen Wang, Huijia Li, Lei Shi, Boris Podobnik, H. Eugene Stanley, Shlomo Havlin, Stefano Boccaletti. 2018. "Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments." PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Volume 115, Issue 1, pp. 30 - 35. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1707505115
    Abstract
    Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.
    Rights
    This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
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    • CAS: Physics: Scholarly Papers [414]
    • BU Open Access Articles [4751]


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