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dc.contributor.authorLi, Xuelongen_US
dc.contributor.authorJusup, Markoen_US
dc.contributor.authorWang, Zhenen_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Huijiaen_US
dc.contributor.authorShi, Leien_US
dc.contributor.authorPodobnik, Borisen_US
dc.contributor.authorStanley, H. Eugeneen_US
dc.contributor.authorHavlin, Shlomoen_US
dc.contributor.authorBoccaletti, Stefanoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-26T14:43:15Z
dc.date.available2020-03-26T14:43:15Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-02
dc.identifierhttp://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000419128700022&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=6e74115fe3da270499c3d65c9b17d654
dc.identifier.citationXuelong Li, Marko Jusup, Zhen Wang, Huijia Li, Lei Shi, Boris Podobnik, H. Eugene Stanley, Shlomo Havlin, Stefano Boccaletti. 2018. "Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments." PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Volume 115, Issue 1, pp. 30 - 35. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1707505115
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/39817
dc.description.abstractNetwork reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipWe thank J. H. Lee for useful discussions. M.J. and Z.W. were, respectively, supported by the Research Grant Program of Inamori Foundation and the Chinese Young 1000 Talents Plan. B.P. received support from the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) and the Croatian Science Foundation through Projects J5-8236 and 5349, respectively. S.H. thanks the Israel-Italian collaborative project Network Cyber Security (NECST), Israel Science Foundation, Office of Naval Research (ONR), Japan Science Foundation, and the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation and the US National Science Foundation (BSF-NSF) for financial support. The Boston University Center for Polymer Studies is supported by NSF Grants PHY-1505000, CMMI-1125290, and CHE-1213217, by Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Grant HDTRA1-14-1-0017, and by Department of Energy (DOE) Contract DE-AC07-05Id14517. (Inamori Foundation; Chinese Young 1000 Talents Plan; J5-8236 - Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS); 5349 - Croatian Science Foundation; Israel-Italian collaborative project Network Cyber Security (NECST); Israel Science Foundation; Office of Naval Research (ONR); Japan Science Foundation; US-Israel Binational Science Foundation; US National Science Foundation (BSF-NSF); PHY-1505000 - NSF; CMMI-1125290 - NSF; CHE-1213217 - NSF; HDTRA1-14-1-0017 - Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); DE-AC07-05Id14517 - Department of Energy (DOE))en_US
dc.format.extentp. 30 - 35.en_US
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherNational Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
dc.rightsThis open access article is distributed under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectScience & technologyen_US
dc.subjectMultidisciplinary sciencesen_US
dc.subjectCooperationen_US
dc.subjectDefectionen_US
dc.subjectNode strategyen_US
dc.subjectPayoffen_US
dc.subjectEvolutionary selectionen_US
dc.subjectEvolutionary gamesen_US
dc.subjectAltruistic punishmenten_US
dc.subjectCostly punishmenten_US
dc.subjectPromote cooperationen_US
dc.subjectPrisoners-dilemmaen_US
dc.subjectPublic-goodsen_US
dc.subjectHumansen_US
dc.subjectOriginen_US
dc.subjectRewarden_US
dc.subjectCooperative behavioren_US
dc.subjectFemaleen_US
dc.subjectMaleen_US
dc.subjectModels, theoreticalen_US
dc.subjectPunishmenten_US
dc.subjectSocial supporten_US
dc.titlePunishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experimentsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionPublished versionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1073/pnas.1707505115
pubs.elements-sourceweb-of-scienceen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Physicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.mycv299972


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This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).