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dc.contributor.authorPodobnik, Borisen_US
dc.contributor.authorVukovic, Vuken_US
dc.contributor.authorStanley, Harry Eugeneen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-02T18:08:25Z
dc.date.available2020-04-02T18:08:25Z
dc.date.issued2015-10-23
dc.identifierhttp://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000363309200076&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=6e74115fe3da270499c3d65c9b17d654
dc.identifier.citationBoris Podobnik, Vuk Vukovic, H Eugene Stanley. 2015. "Does the Wage Gap between Private and Public Sectors Encourage Political Corruption?." PLOS ONE, Volume 10, Issue 10, 15 pp. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0141211
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2144/39941
dc.description.abstractWe present a dynamic network model of corrupt and noncorrupt employees representing two states in the public and private sector. Corrupt employees are more connected to one another and are less willing to change their attitudes regarding corruption than noncorrupt employees. This behavior enables them to prevail and become the majority in the workforce through a first-order phase transition even though they initially represented a minority. In the model, democracy—understood as the principle of majority rule—does not create corruption, but it serves as a mechanism that preserves corruption in the long run. The motivation for our network model is a paradox that exists on the labor market. Although economic theory indicates that higher risk investments should lead to larger rewards, in many developed and developing countries workers in lower-risk public sector jobs are paid more than workers in higher-risk private sector jobs. To determine the long-run sustainability of this economic paradox, we study data from 28 EU countries and find that the public sector wage premium increases with the level of corruption.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis paper was supported by the University of Rijeka, the Zagreb School of Economics and Management, and the Adriatic Economic Association. (University of Rijeka; Zagreb School of Economics and Management; Adriatic Economic Association)en_US
dc.format.extent15 pagesen_US
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherPUBLIC LIBRARY SCIENCEen_US
dc.relation.ispartofPLOS ONE
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 Internationalen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectScience & technologyen_US
dc.subjectMultidisciplinary sciencesen_US
dc.subjectGrowthen_US
dc.subjectCrimeen_US
dc.subjectEmploymenten_US
dc.subjectEuropean Unionen_US
dc.subjectHumansen_US
dc.subjectPoliticsen_US
dc.subjectPrivate sectoren_US
dc.subjectPublic sectoren_US
dc.subjectRegression analysisen_US
dc.subjectSalaries and fringe benefitsen_US
dc.subjectHumansen_US
dc.subjectCorruptionen_US
dc.subjectWage gapen_US
dc.subjectLabor ratioen_US
dc.subjectNetwork model of democracyen_US
dc.titleDoes the wage gap between private and public sectors encourage political corruption?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionPublished versionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1371/journal.pone.0141211
pubs.elements-sourceweb-of-scienceen_US
pubs.notesEmbargo: Not knownen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston Universityen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciencesen_US
pubs.organisational-groupBoston University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Physicsen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.mycv42086


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Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International